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SUMMARY
The work is an a ttem pt to  survey and analyse, in a h is to rica l context, the
*
evolution o f the Communist Party's policy, strategies and tac tics  w ith  regard to 
agricu ltu re  in Hungary. I t  covers a period from  1919 -  as Hungary emerged from  
the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the collapse o f the short-lived 
Soviet Republic under Bela Kun - through the considerable p o lit ica l changes 
a fte r the Second World War -  especially when, in 1948, the communists took 
power and Hungary became a People's Democracy and its  agricu ltu ra l 
development began to  fo llow  the Soviet model closely -  to  the popular Uprising 
in 1956. Despite the great changes tha t had taken place a fte r both the F irs t and 
Second World Wars the element o f con tinu ity  was an im portan t fac to r. One of 
the main purposes of the study is to  trace the in te rp lay of p o lit ica l and economic 
forces w ith  particu la r reference to  the fortunes o f agricu ltu re  in Hungary over 
th is period.
The study is divided in to  four more or less d is tinc t parts. In the f ir s t  part 
the background to  the main story is given: the agrarian conditions, the p o lit ica l 
and socio-economic position of the peasantry, the a ttitudes and policies of the 
governing and opposition parties, w ith  special reference to  the Communist Party 
in the shadows of ille g a lity , during the in te r-w a r period. The economic e ffec ts  
o f the War are also discussed. The second part is devoted m ainly to  discussion of 
the po lit ica l and economic process which had begun before 1945 and the new 
policies which were in itia ted , s t i l l  w ith  ind iv idua lly  owned peasant farm ing, 
during the period. I t  f irs t  describes and analyses the struggle fo r p o litica l 
supremacy between the communists and, on the one hand, the other coa lition  
partners and, on the other, the peasants, through the period o f Land Reform  and 
the Three-Year Reconstruction Plan, and then examines the po tentia l fo r the 
development o f priva te , individual, farm ing. This section concludes w ith  the 
defeat of po lit ica l opposition and o f the peasants in 1948. This is fo llowed, in
X.
part three, by discussion and analysis o f the various aspects, theore tica l and 
practica l, o f the policy o f co llec tiv isa tion  launched by the
communists in 1948/1949, including its  e ffec ts  on the peasants and agricu ltu ra l 
production. The fin a l part examines the changes and developments in 
agricu ltu ra l policy fo llow ing Stalin's death in 1953: i t  describes and analyses 
Nagy's a ttem pt to  im plem ent the libersalising p o lit ica l and economic, and in 
particu la r, ag ricu ltu ra l, poljpijes of the 'New Course' -  under which peasant 
exp lo ita tion  was reduced and forced co llec tiv isa tion  came to  a ha lt -  through his 
struggle w ith  Rakosi, whose continued obstruction o f Nagy's policies fin a lly  
resulted in the la tte r 's  removal from  power, bringing the progress of the 'New 
Course' to  an end and leading to  a re turn  to  the earlie r policy of co llec tiv isa tion . 
Popular discontent and Khrushchev's d e n unc ia tion  of Stalin at the Tw entie th  
Party Congress in the spring of 1956, however, helped to p rec ip ita te  a renewed 
protest movement which, in October 1956 spilled over in to  a revolu tion which 
restored Nagy to  power. Part four concludes w ith  a discussion, in te r alia, of the 
ferm ent in agricu ltu re  im m ediate ly preceding the revolu tion, the rev iva l of post- 
1945 po lit ica l forces and the role played by the peasants during and im m ediate ly 
a fte r the crushing of the revolu tion, resulting in the tem porary defeat by the 
peasants of the regime's e ffo rts  to  co llectiv ise  them.
PART 1: HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
An a ttem pt is made here to  provide a general but im portant background 
to  p o lit ic a l and economic developments re la ted to  agricu ltu re  in post-war 
Hungary. Many o f the po licy decisions made up to  1948, in the fie ld  o f 
agricu lture , were influenced by, indeed o ften  d ire c tly  re flec ted  the h is to rica l 
position o f the country's peasantry and p o lit ic a l parties during the period 
preceeding the Second World War. Agrarian policies pursued a fte r  1948 
seemingly do not bear much relevance to pre-war agrarian problems. The 
policies, on the whole, were the result o f po litica l-ideo log ica l considerations and 
decisions were, o ften, made w ithout any economic raison d 'e tre; the w ill and 
wishes o f the entire  class o f peasantry, more than before the war, were 
com plete ly ignored. Soviet agrarian practices were slavishly im ita te d  and, 
p a rticu la rly  up to  1956 -  save fo r the b r ie f Im re Nagy interregnum in 1953 - not 
even an a ttem pt was made to  adapt them to  Hungarian conditions. While the 
basis of po licy decisions had changed rad ica lly  the human m ateria l in ag ricu ltu re  
- the peasantry - remained, largely, the same as before the war: th e ir behaviour, 
th e ir a ttitude , th e ir  aspirations and reactions to  policies, between 1945 and 1948 
and a fte r 1948, during co llec tiv isa tion , were conditioned by and had th e ir  roots 
in the agrarian p o lit ica l and economic problems of the pre-war period.
Agrarian conditions in Hungary, before 1945, were characterised, both 
in respect o f social level and organisational strucure, by serious contrad ictions 
and backwardness. Unlike the more developed European countries, Hungary did 
not undergo many im portant social and technological changes. Not only England, 
France and the Benelux countries, where these changes opened the road fo r 
im portant agrarian developments, but also Czechoslovakia, Germany and the 
Northern countries enjoyed much more favourable conditions fo r  agrarian 
development. Even her otherwise econom ically and socially more backward 
neighbours le f t  Hungary behind in agrarian development during the in te r-w a r
- 2 -
period. What were the reasons fo r this? What specific conditions influenced 
Hungarian agricu lture? To understand the developments in post-1945 Hungary a 
survey o f the in te r-w ar period is im portant.
- 3 -
Chapter Is The Economics of Agriculture in the Inter-war Period
1.1 Impact o f T e rr ito r ia l Changes a fte r World War I
A lthough the collapse o f the Austro-Hungarian monarchy brought
Hungary’s independence from  Austrian domination, the new te r r ito r ia l conditions
prevailing a fte r the Trianon Peace T reaty had fa r reaching social and economic
consequences. The te rr ito ry  o f the new Hungary was reduced to  32.7 per cent o f
its  previous size and according to  the 1935 Census, 41.6 per cent o f the
population projected o f the old te rr ito ry  lived w ith in  the new boundary. These
two pieces o f data demonstrate the major problems created by the te r r ito r ia l
changes. The centra l areas le f t  to  Hungary were the more densely populated.
2
The density o f population p rio r to the changes was 64.2 persons/km , a fte r  them
2 (1)i t  was 82.4 persons/km . This density o f population, which reached the figure  
2
of 97.8 persons/km by the end o f the 1930s, was much higher than most
contemporary industrialised European countries, e.g., France, Denmark and 
(2 )Austria  , whose densities were approxim ately ha lf tha t figure . This was the
fundamental problem: a population density corresponding to  a developed
industria l country had to  be supported by an underdeveloped agrarian-industria l
country. Agrarian reform s, i.e., land re-d istribu ton , or accelerated, s ta te -
subsidised industra lisation to  absorb surplus labour were the most im portan t
preconditions to  resolve these problems. On the one hand, as w ill be shown, the
obstinate h o s tility  o f the large landowners to  any rad ica l reduction in th e ir
holdings precluded a meaningful land re -d is tribu tion . On the o ther hand,
industria lisation faced almost unsurmountable d iff ic u ltie s . W hilst i t  was true
tha t w ith  the te rr ito r ia l change, s ta tis tica lly , Hungary became more
industrialised, the share o f the ac tive ly  engaged labour fo rce  in agricu ltu re
declined from  64.5 per cent to  55.7 per cent a fte r World War I ( it  declined
(3)fu rth e r to  51.8 per cent by 1930 and 49.0 per cent by 1941) , industry lost most
- 4 -
o f its  raw m ateria l resource base, which remained outside the new boundary. 
Industry, therefore, became dependent on fore ign trade fo r raw m ateria ls and fo r 
modern machinery. The fore ign trade sector, thus, became one o f the most 
im portant sectors fo r the function ing o f the economy. A g ricu ltu re , besides 
having to  supply the population w ith  food, which became more d if f ic u lt  since the 
agrarian population was sm aller - although the proportion o f landless peasants 
was higher -  had to  finance the country’s raw m ate ria l im ports in addition to  any 
industria l development. This at a tim e when high industria l raw m ateria l prices 
and low ag ricu ltu ra l export prices fu rth e r aggravated the problem. But 
industria l development, w ith  industria l p ro tection  under a customs system which 
led to  high industria l prices, also had to  be financed by agricu ltu re . W ithout th is 
pro tection free ly  com peting cheap fore ign products would have ruined the 
chances o f developing domestic industries. The resultant high dom estic 
industria l prices put increasing demands on agricu ltu re . In a sense, the roles o f 
industry and agricu lture  were reversed. In pre 1918 Hungary, agricu ltu re  enjoyed 
the benefits o f high customs barriers and it  was industry which had to  su ffe r a ll 
the disadvantages; now industry w ith  its  high costs, enjoyed the benefits o f 
p ro tection and agricu lture  was to bear the burden o f in te rna tiona l com petition .
Although the number ac tive ly  engaged in agricu ltu re  declined, Hungary,
during the in te r-w ar period, remained p rim a rily  an ag ricu ltu ra l country.
Undoubtedly, some progress was made during these tw o decades in
industria lisation. Hungary very slow ly began to  change her ag ricu ltu ra l
character. The decline in the ag ricu ltu ra l sector played a s ign ifican t ro le  in this,
but the lag compared w ith  other European countries remained considerable. The
small change achieved was, nevertheless, positive: the share o f ag ricu ltu re ,
during the in te r-w a r years, in the National Income declined from  42 to  37 per
cent and tha t o f industry increased from  30 to  36 per cent; the share o f
(4)industria l employment, by 1941, increased from  21 to  just over 25 per cent but
-  5 -
even i f  employment in commerce and transport are included w ith  industry the
increase in its  share from  30 per cent, in 1920 to  35 per cent in 1941 was a
moderate one. M anufacturing industria l output at 1929 constant prices increased
by 28 per cent from  1913 to  1938, about 1 per cent growth pa which compares
very unfavourably w ith  growth rates o f 5.4 per cent in the early years o f the
(5)tw en tie th  century. This moderate industria l progress, which to  a degree
occurred under the fram ew ork o f war economy conditions was, however,
in su ffic ien t to  reduce the social tensions created by the depressing
unemployment level among the ag ricu ltu ra l workers.
The other im portant consequence o f the boundary rearrangem ent was the
e ffe c t i t  had on the d is tribu tion  o f land ownership. The change did not a ffe c t
large and small holdings in the same proportion. The number and area
(61d is tribu tion  o f holdings, by size classes, in 1895 is shown in Table 1.1 below.
The outdated, sem i-feudal, conditions tha t dominated in Hungary at the tu rn  o f
the century are c learly  visib le from  the table. Nominal changes in the
d is tribu tion  o f land holdings did occur during the period between 1895 and the
(7)F irs t World War, but th is does not, s ign ifican tly , a lte r the p ic tu re . Indeed, 
great d ifferences between large, medium, dw arf and landless peasantry remained 
even a fte r the 1918/1919 revolu tion. A lthough the exclusion o f forests and 
pasture holdings in Table 1.1 d is to rts  the p icture , since th e ir  inclusion would 
increase the re la tive  weight o f large estates, the lopsided land d is tr ibu tion  which 
existed before the F irs t World War is c learly  demonstrated. A lm ost 24 per cent 
o f the to ta l number o f holdings w ith  an average size o f 0.4 cadastra l yokes 
possessed only 0.6 per cent o f the to ta l land area, another 30 per cent, averaging
2.7 cadastral yokes, had 5.2 per cent o f the to ta l area. More than ha lf o f the 
to ta l number o f holdings was below the size o f 5 cadastral yokes. Against th is 
the over 1000 cadastral yokes holdings possessed 11.9 m illion  cadastra l yokes 
i.e., 32.3 per cent o f the to ta l area. Another s trik ing  aspect o f the tab le  is tha t
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holdings exceeding 100 cadastral yokes, exactly  1 per cent o f the to ta l number, 
owned 47.7 per cent o f the to ta l land area. The dispersion shown by the average 
size o f holdings, ranging from  0.4 to  3160 cadastral yokes, demonstrates an even 
more pronounced unequal d is tribu tion . The m a jo rity , i f  not a ll, o f the owners of 
the holdings in the f irs t  two categories could not maintain themselves from  the ir 
ag ricu ltu ra l production and had to  find  employment on la rger estates to  
supplement th e ir incomes.
This already highly d is torted pa tte rn  o f land d is tribu tion  was fu rth e r 
augmented by the new boundary conditions. The structure  o f agricu ltu re  in the 
new te rr ito ry  d iffe r  from  tha t before 1918. The e ffe c t o f te r r ito r ia l changes is 
shown in Table 1.2 below:
One, perhaps the most im portan t, change in the ag ricu ltu ra l scene was 
the greater number o f large estates, above the .100 cadastral yokes category, 
than o f sm aller peasant holdings located w ith in  the country ’s revised te rr ito ry . 
Approxim ate ly 70 per cent o f the la tte r  category, and p a rticu la rly  o f the holdngs 
in the 0 -10 cad. yokes range, were situated on the ceded te rr ito ry . A lthough the 
average arable land area o f these holdings, except fo r those in the 1-5 cad. yokes 
category, was re la tive ly  higher than in the whole o f pre-1918 Hungary - though 
only s ligh tly  -  i t  did not compensate fo r the greatly  increased proportion o f 
estates, above the loo cad. yokes size, brought about by the te r r ito r ia l changes.
Therefore, in post-1918 Hungary, the social structure  o f agricu ltu re  
became more polarized. T e rrito ries  had been added by the Trianon Peace T reaty  
on which the re la tive  share o f peasant holdings was greater, but w ith in  the new 
boundaries large estates became more dominant, as shown in Table 1.2. On 
average, 45.62 to  58.10 per cent o f pre-1918 holdings in the 100-1000 cad. yokes 
category were located w ith in  the country ’s new boundaries. W ith respect to  the 
above 1000 cad. yokes size th is  figu re  was 68.33 per cent. The e ffe c t o f 
te r r ito r ia l changes is even more pronounced i f  these proportions are considered
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in re la tion  to  arable land area. In th is case, 70.12 per cent o f the above 1000 
cad. yokes size were now located w ith in  the new boundaries. The reason fo r th is 
was tha t the large estates near the country ’s fo rm er border contained a 
p roportiona lly  higher share o f forest land. The result o f these changes was tha t 
in re la tion  to  the whole pre-1918 situa tion  the social structure  o f agricu ltu re  in 
the new te rr ito ry  d iffe red  considerably and the proportion o f arable land area 
w ith in  the 0-10 cad. yokes size holdings declined. The number o f holdings w ith in  
the 0-10 cad. yokes size, the smallest and econom ically the least viable, declined 
from  81.35 to 76.63 per cent, but w ith in  th is  category, especially those in the 1-3 
cad. yokes size, the share o f arable land area fe ll from  27.83 to 19.30 per cent. 
Consequently, the average size o f th is econom ically unviable category o f 
holdings was fu rth e r reduced. The result o f th is  was tha t these owners now 
became more dependent fo r th e ir live lihood on undertaking paid or aux ilia ry  
employment than was the case before. P a rticu la rly  those in the 3-10 cad. yokes 
size had th e ir arable land area reduced, adversely a ffe c tin g  th e ir  operating 
conditions. But operating conditions had worsened even fo r  those 10-50 cad. 
yokes category since th e ir number had increased re la tive ly  by some 3.93 per 
cent. The d iffe rence between the lower and upper categories, i.e., holdings 
above 100 cad. yokes size, became more prom inent. W ithin th is category, but 
p a rticu la rly  in the above 1000 cad. yokes size o f holding, s ign ifican t changes 
occurred in respect o f both number and share o f arable land area. The number of 
estates above the 100 cad. yokes size category in pre-1918 Hungary was 0.71 per 
cent o f a ll holdings, and th e ir share o f arable land area was 30.66 per cent. The 
corresponding figures in post-1918 Hungary were 1.1 and 41.15 per cent. The 
number o f estates in the above 1000 cad. yokes size increased even more 
d ram atica lly  from  0.06 to  0.12 per cent w ith  th e ir  share o f arable land area 
increasing from  11.05 to  17.67 per cent. I t  can be seen tha t the overa ll 
im portance o f large estates w ith in  the revised te rr ito ry  was considerably g reater
- 10 -
and tensions w ith in  th is new agrarian social s tructure  became more in tensified.
As a result, the role o f large arable land fa rm ing increased considerably. These
are im portant facts, which would go a long way to  explain the increasing
pressures fo r land re form  from  ’below1 and the increasingly hostile  a ttitu de  to
land re fo rm  proposals from  ’above’, by the landowners - even though social
tensions were v is ib ly  increasing and they were fu lly  aware o f the consequences i f
re fo rm  were not a ffected . In pre-1918 Hungary land re -d is tribu tion  a ffec ted
areas, largely, o f fo re s try  or less useful land and these were located in the lost
border areas. Any fu tu re  re form  would a ffe c t valuable arable land which, as
shown earlie r, became more im portant to  landowners. Hence, th e ir  growing
reluctance. Thus, the increasingly rig id  and hostile a ttitu de  o f th is  class to
reform s can be explained by these s truc tu ra l changes brought about by the Peace 
(9)Treaty. This is, o f course, not the fu lly  story as regards the im pact o f 
te r r ito r ia l changes. The landless and propertyless peasants o f the ag ricu ltu ra l 
population have not ye t been considered. Even before 1918 they represented a 
sizeable proportion o f the ag ricu ltu ra l population. This stra tum , being 
predom inantly employed by large estates, lived la rge ly w ith in  the new 
boundaries: 47.4 per cent o f ag ricu ltu ra l servants and 42 per cent o f ag ricu ltu ra l 
workers lived in the new te rr ito r ie s . Looking at the d is tribu tion  o f agrarian 
population according to  occupation, in the tw o periods, the d iffe rences in the 
social sructure can be seen in Table 1 .3 :^ ^  The proportion o f wage earners 
(categories 5 & 6) w ith in  the to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l population, in fa c t, increased 
s ign ifican tly . While previously farm -servants and ag ricu ltu ra l labourers 
constitu ted 33 per cent o f the to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l population, th is p roportion was 
now increased to  45.7 per cent. When the category o f peasants w ith  in su ffic ie n t 
land to  support themeslves and the ir fam ilies is added to  the above group the 
working s tra ta  in agricu ltu re , i.e., the wage earners, come to  more than h a lf the 
agrarian population.
-  11 -
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The dissolution o f the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the subsequent 
te r r ito r ia l changes also had an adverse e ffe c t on ag ricu ltu ra l production and 
m arketing. Hungarian agricu ltu re  during the pre-1918 period supplied the whole 
empire w ith  its  produce. In th is established economic s truc tu re  industrialised 
A ustria  and Czechoslovakia supplied Hungary w ith  industria l products in 
exchange fo r ag ricu ltu ra l produce and industria l raw m ateria ls. During the 
monarchy 70 to  80 per cent o f Hungary's exports was taken by these two 
countries and a s im ila r proportion o f Hungary's im ports came from  them. The 
area form ed a Customs Union w ith  common monetary and in tegra ted banking and 
c red it systems. In essence, it  operated like  an in terna l market and the system 
protected Austrian and Czechoslovakian industries and Hungarian agricu ltu re  
from  outside com petition. Hungarian ag ricu ltu ra l produce found a secure market 
and was not under com petitive  pressures from  other European or overseas 
countries. This ra ther id y llic  scene was disrupted considerably by the 
dissolution. Austria  and Czechoslovakia, the two most im portan t markets, 
became independent countries and in e ffe c t closed th e ir markets to the 
ag ricu ltu ra l produce o f Hungary. I t  was not so much the d iscrim ination , by high 
p ro tec tive  ta r iffs , which had the most damaging a ffe c t on Hungary. I t  was the 
fa c t tha t under the new arrangement Hungary's agricu ltu ra l produce was exposed 
to  world wide market pressures and s ign ifican tly  increased com petition. This put 
Hungary, w ith  its  low p roduc tiv ity  in agricu lture  and high costs o f production, in 
a very d if f ic u lt  s ituation. A ustria  and Czechoslovakia were now in a position to 
choose between Hungarian or any other country's ag ricu ltu ra l produce. The 
result was tha t the previously protected Hungarian agricu ltu re , isolated fo r so 
long from  world market pressures, now had to  face a drop in its  a r t if ic ia l ly  high 
ag ricu ltu ra l export prices to, or even below, the world m arket level. This was 
not a ll. The policy o f se lf-su ffic iency  in agricu ltu re  pursued by A ustria  and 
Czechoslovakia, the unfavourable world-w ide market trend fo r  ag ricu ltu ra l
- 13 -
produce and the qua lita tive  change in Hungary’s domestic m arket conditions, and 
the fa c t tha t regions previously dependent on im ports o f ag ricu ltu ra l produce 
were annexed to  ag ricu ltu ra l countries and were lost as markets fo r Hungary 
aggravated the problem even fu rthe r. A g ricu ltu ra l m arket conditions, fo rm er 
export possibilities and in te rna l d is tribu tiona l problems gradually became more 
and more strained. The 1918 te r r ito r ia l changes disrupted and confused the long- 
established d is tribu tiona l network. In the years im m ediate ly a fte r the war th is 
did not pose pa rticu la rly  great problems: no food surplus existed. But by the tim e 
the reconstruction period came to  an end i t  became more and more d if f ic u lt  to  
find  external markets fo r the accum ulating ag ricu ltu ra l surpluses. Hungary’s 
domestic m arket, small now and never rea lly  developed, w ith  low e ffe c tive  
demand, could, o f course, have been extended by a substantia l increase in liv ing  
standards. This, however, did not come about. Therefore the lion's share o f 
ag ricu ltu ra l production had to  be sold on fore ign markets. Furtherm ore, the 
considerably increased volume of badly needed industria l im ports, aggravated by 
the loss o f the country's resource base, necessitated a fu rth e r increase in 
exports. Under these conditions the balance o f payments became, increasingly, a 
constra in t on the development o f the economy. A g ricu ltu ra l produce was, o f 
course, predominant in Hungary's to ta l exports -  its  share, at curren t prices, 
varied between 65 and 82 per cent o f to ta l exports (ignoring price d istortions); to 
achieve a balance in fore ign trade depended, even more than in the past, on 
agricu ltu re . Operating against many and varied d iff ic u ltie s , success was not 
achieved. The techn ica lly  re la tive ly  backward Hungarian agricu ltu re , w ith  high 
production costs inspite o f the ava ila b ility  o f cheap labour,could not stand up to 
the challenge from  overseas countries. Scarcity o f cap ita l, a slow ra te  o f 
industria lisa tion and urbanisation and the lim ite d  domestic m arket were some of 
the reasons. But probably the most im portant single fa c to r was the low 
e ffic ien cy  re flec ted  by the organisational structure , spoilt by the benefits o f
-  14 -
pro tection . During the monarchy th is was not so noticeable, but during the 1930s
it  was becoming increasingly visible.
Theore tica lly , at least, i t  was possible to  find  a way out o f these
problems. F irs tly , by increasing the earnings, purchasing power, o f the working 
population, especially tha t of ag ricu ltu ra l workers, the domestic m arket could 
have been extended. This, however, would have opened the road fo r increased 
com petition between large and fa m ily  peasant landowners resu lting in lowering 
the incomes o f large estates. This solution was not adopted. Instead, ru ra l real 
incomes were fu rth e r depressed in an a ttem pt to  reduce production costs and to 
increase com petitiveness on external markets. But during the years o f the 
depression even th is  proved insu ffic ien t. So the regime, by tax  and other 
revenues, resorted to  a system o f agricu ltu ra l exports and subsidies, la rge ly fo r  
those engaged in grain production. Since fo r small farm ers i t  was more ra tiona l 
to  sw itch to  animal husbandry and m arket gardening the government po licy 
im plied a free g if t  to  big estates, to the least enterprising, and at the expense of 
the rest o f the ru ra l and non-rural com m unity. Thus, the whole working 
population was made to  carry the burden o f in e ffic ie n t large estates. Farmers 
paid d ire c tly  fo r th is in the form  o f steeply graded land tax and agrarian workers 
and cottagers by low real incomes. They supported the low production o f large 
e s ta te s /* ^
Secondly, a considerable modernisation programme o f the techn ica lly  
backward ag ricu ltu ra l sector was needed to  improve its  e ffic ien cy . This, 
however, would have required a s ign ifican t stepping up in the invetm ent 
programme. In the new situation, as discussed previously, cap ita l requirements 
increased considerably fo r the national economy. Demand fo r resources came 
not only from  agricu ltu re  but also from  the industria l sectors, especially to  
create industria l export capacity and to  develop im port-substitu ting  industries. 
Modernisation, however, was not achieved even during the best years o f the
- 15 -
1920s due to  low investment levels and the unproductive use o f fore ign 
(13)credits. During and a fte r  the depression years i t  was econom ically out o f the
question. Foreign cap ita l was not rea lly  a ttrac ted  because o f fear o f in fla tion
due to  drastic increases in the money supply, and it  played a declin ing role in
m anufacturing industries. While in 1913 36 per cent o f industry was fore ign
(14)contro lled, by 1929 it  had declined to  28 per cent. A  s im ila r decline occurred
in the sphere o f banking. So, the role o f fore ign cap ita l in productive investment
was minor: about 75 per cent o f to ta l investment came from  in te rna l
(15)accum ulation and only 25 per cent from  fore ign sources.
The small progress achieved was, o f course, g rea tly  disrupted by the
Depression. Fa lling  ag ricu ltu ra l prices adversely a ffec ted  export earnings.
Between 1929 and 1933 the value o f exports, at current prices, decreased by 60
per cent; at constant prices th is figure was 27 per cent. For the same exports
(16)Hungary was able to  obtain about 15 to  20 per cent less im ports. More also 
had to be sold by the peasants, to  buy, to  pay taxes, to  service debts; the result 
was a fu rth e r erosion in peasant incomes and consumption. The deepest point o f 
the depression came a fte r the summer o f 1931, when much fore ign c red it was 
w ithdrawn and Hungary lost much o f its gold and fore ign currency reserves. The 
country was econom ically almost to ta lly  exhausted. In summary, then, i t  can be 
said tha t the te r r ito r ia l changes brought a highly unfavourable s itua tion  fo r  the 
ag ricu ltu ra l sector o f the Hungarian economy: i t  increased the im portance of
large holdings, i t  increased the role and value o f arable land - making the big 
landowners even more unreceptive to  the idea o f a rad ica l land re fo rm ; it  
im m ediate ly increased the proportion o f landless, propertyless agrarian wage 
earners, increasing the pressures from  below fo r  reform s; and combined w ith  the 
depression i t  adversely a ffec ted  both in te rna l and external m arket conditions fo r 
the country.
-  16 -
These facto rs should have determ ined the d irec tion  and to  a degree even 
the method o f fu rth e r agrarian developments. But existing socio-economic 
forces in the country did not perm it the emergence o f an appropriate agrarian 
policy, e ithe r in production or marketing, nor even at the social level, to  resolve 
these problems.
The question o f optimum size in agricu ltu re  was and remains fa ir ly
uncertain. Generally, optimum size varies w ith  crop and production methods,
i.e., the a va ila b ility  o f capita l, land and labour determines the size o f production
o f s im ila r crops. I t  is, nevertheless, true  tha t large holdings tend to  be more
(17)e ffic ie n t at crop production, but less so in mixed farm ing. But in Hungary,
where the leve l o f technology used was la rge ly the same on both large and
peasant holdings, no s ign ifican t d iffe rence in p roduc tiv ity  had existed. Indeed,
Matyas M atolcsy’s study, w ritte n  in 1933, has shown tha t peasant holdings below
the 100 cad. yokes category, taking the average o f 1926-1930, produced higher
(18)yields than the large estates in wheat, maize, potatoes and fodder beet. 
S c ien tific  evidence, however, was ine ffec tive  because it  was sim ply not accepted 
by the government. Indeed, the government exerted its e lf to  close an exh ib ition  
in the K aro ly i Palace on 21st September 1938 because it  exposed, not by slogan 
and p o lit ic a l posters, but by well documented sc ie n tific  research, the preva iling  
unhealthy and lopsided land d is tribu tion  in Hungary.
-  17 -
1.2 Land Reform in the In te r-w ar Period
The fundamental land holding s tructure  in Hungary was fa ir ly  well 
established by the tim e o f the em ancipation o f serfs in 1848. The peasants then 
obtained freehold ownership o f the land which they cu ltiva ted , but s t i l l  a 
s ig n ifica t portion o f the country ’s ag ricu ltu ra l area remained in large estates. 
The sm all size o f land given to  the peasants was in su ffic ien t to  allow  them a 
reasonable existence. Only through a land re form , which would rad ica lly  a ffe c t 
the large la tifund iae, could a strong peasant s tra ta  have been created; but in 
fa c t the lim ite d  d is tribu tion  a ffected  only sm aller holdings. As tim e  passed the 
position o f the small peasants fu rth e r deteriorated, causing a considerable 
amount o f unrest cu lm inating occasionally in strikes and demonstrations and 
rad ica l peasant movements. Those who could no longer cope w ith  the conditions 
em igrated. Em igration helped to  some degree to disarm, tem porarily , 
dem ocratic peasant movements. Inheritance practices leading to the s p littin g  up 
o f farm s and strong overseas grain price com petition forced many peasants in to 
heavy debts. A large number o f peasants who were unable to  pay th e ir  debts lost 
th e ir holdings and joined the ranks o f those whom the 1848 reform s had le f t  
w ithout land. The potentia l land hunger o f th is constantly increasing ag ricu ltu ra l 
p ro le ta ria t provided the strong pressure fo r post-F irs t World War land reform s.
A fte r  the conclusion o f the war, during which burning agrarian problems 
were pushed in to the background, demands fo r radica l land re fo rm  came to the 
fo re fro n t w ith  a ll th e ir com plexity. The defeat in war brought about not only a 
m ilita ry  and economic but also a serious p o lit ic a l crisis -  who was to  lead the 
country and in what manner. Three o f the previous opposition parties, the 
Independence Party - led by Count M ihaly K aro ly i -, the Nationa l Bourgeois 
Party and the Social Dem ocratic Party form ed the National Council in October 
1918, and a coa lition  government under it .  The fo rm ation  o f the government was 
im m ediate ly fo llowed by the resumption o f popular unrest, revo lu tionary
discontent and workers demonstrations in an a ttem pt to  pressurise the 
government to  procla im  a Republic. U ltim a te ly , in November 1918, a fte r the 
Habsburg King Charles relinguished power, Count K aro ly i was able to  announce 
the Hungarian Republic, headed by h im self. The Karo ly i adm in istra tion leaned 
heavily towards republican dem ocratic ideas on both the p o lit ic a l and economic 
levels. I t  adopted many rad ica l measures during its  f ive  months o f existence, in 
an a ttem pt to modernise and democratise the country. For some these measures 
went too fa r, fo r others they were not rad ica l enough. The power structure  of 
the government did not, however, perm it the transform ation  o f the agrarian 
structure . The government, i t  is true, im m ediate ly included land reform  in its  
programme. But d issatisfaction among the peasants quickly spread due to  the 
delay in im plem enting th is re fo rm  and in January 1919 in many places illega l 
seizure and parce lling  out o f land from  the large estates had already begun. The 
fig h t o f the agrarian p ro le ta ria t grew stronger, land appropriating com m ittees 
mushroomed and the land reform  became the foca l point. The government 
coa lition  parties hoped tha t the announcement o f the re form  would calm the 
ru ra l areas and separate the agrarian p ro le ta ria t from  the revo lu tionary 
movement. N atura lly, the peasants, having lent th e ir  support to  the revolu tion,
expected a rad ica l red is tribu tion  o f the land but th e ir hopes were disappointed.
(19)The new land re form , promulgated in February 1919, came too la te , because 
o f the lengthy debates about who should get how much, and fe ll generally too 
short o f the peasants’ expectations. The reform  set a l im it  o f 500 cadastral 
yokes, above which land could be expropriated - except in the case o f land owned 
by the church, where the l im it  was 200 cadastral yokes. The peasants considered 
th is lim it  too high and objection was also raised to  compensation o f the 
dispossessed. Also, the numerous loopholes fo r exemptions, e.g., each adult 
fa m ily  could be given 500 cadastral yokes o f land, were regarded as unjust and 
u n s a t is fa c to ry /^  The peasants’ mood was even fu rth e r frus tra ted  by the
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exclusion o f those who had partic ipa ted  in the revo lu tionary spontaneous seizing
and d istribu ton  o f land a fte r  1st November 1918, which had occurred in a number
o f places, a s tipu la tion which excluded a large number o f poor and landless
peasants. D issatisfaction was also expressed over the measure tha t land was to
be given on a perpetual tenancy basis w ith  the s tipu la tion tha t land could be
(21)redeemed, and inherited, by insta llm ents at a 5 per cent ra te  o f in te rest.
These measures did not satis fy  the mood o f the peasantry which restlessly
continued to  d r if t  towards a more rad ica l position. The most im portant fa c to r in
whipping up the mood o f the peasantry was, however, the sluggish a ttitu d e
expressed by the ’Com m ittees o f Land D is tribu tion ' towards the execution o f the
re fo rm . These Comm ittees, due largely to  the lack o f tra ined personnel at the
disposal o f the new government, were sta ffed  by members o f the old
adm in istra tion. S w ift execution of an agrarian re fo rm  is a d if f ic u lt  task even
under the most favourable circumstances but under these conditions i t  was
p ra c tica lly  impossible. Nothing happened u n til 23rd February when Count
K aro ly i, the President o f the Republic and h im self a large landowner, began
amidst great pub lic ity  to  d is tribu te  his own estates at Kapolna. He inspired,
however, l i t t le  enthusiasm among his fe llow  landowners. But, encouraged by
this, on 25th February the landless peasants in the county o f B ihar s ta rted  to
occupy the large estates and events then began to  move towards a revo lu tionary
(22 )solution The Republic, however, did not collapse because o f dom estic 
problems but fo r reasons connected w ith  the in te rna tiona l balance o f power. 
W ith the country slow ly d r if t in g  towards anarchy, the Karo ly i interregnum  came 
to  an end in March. Negotiations between the Social Dem ocratic Party and the 
Communist Party were s w ift ly  concluded and the two parties merged to  fo rm  the 
Hungarian Socialist Party. The chaotic momentary vacuum created by the 
resignation o f the government brought forw ard the more rad ica l and m ilita n t 
elements. The agreement between the two parties provided Bela Kun w ith  the
-  2 0  -
opportun ity to assume power and to  procla im  the Hungarian Soviet Republic and
fo r the purpose o f governing form ed the Revolutionary Soviet o f Government.
Kun wanted to  establish the d icta torsh ip  o f the p ro le ta ria t im m ediate ly. In it ia lly
the peasants were hopeful. They believed tha t the Kun regime would, in the end,
break up and red is tribu te  the large estates to  peasants fo r  ind iv idual farm ing. In
the beginning even the press in the Soviet Union thought red is tribu tion  was Kun’s
aim. Indeed, w ith  a suitable land re form  the d icta torsh ip  o f the p ro le ta ria t
m ight, perhaps, have been able to  win the support o f the poor peasants and
landless agrarian workers. But instead, ignoring the signals tha t land
red is tribu tion  was the deepest desire o f the lower peasant s tra ta , and misled by
the rash o f land seizures, Bela Kun called on 27th March fo r an agrarian
revolu tion. He forbade and stopped the red is tribu tion  o f land and equipment and
on 3rd A p ril, a fte r long debate, passed Degree 38 'Expropria ting and Socialising
(23)the Medium and Large Estates'. So, while the K aro ly i adm in istra tion
attem pted to  introduce a land reform  w ithout radicalism , the new regim e went 
fo r  a radica l socialisation o f the land -  in e ffe c t a cen tra lly  adm inistered system 
o f State Farms, subordinated to  'Production Commissars' and 'Workers' Councils'. 
Kun fu rthe r im plied tha t small holdings were due fo r socia lisation next. This 
'great leap forw ard ' could not fa il to  disenchant many members o f the agrarian 
p ro le ta ria t and to  give rise to great uncerta in ty and aggravation. There were 
not enough experts to  oversee these farms, so o ften b a ilif fs  and even ex- 
landlords were employed as Production Commissars, who were o ften  worse than 
landlords. The improvement in wages o f agrarian labourers was also nominal. 
Small holders were equally disappointed, together, o f course, w ith  the more w e ll- 
to-do peasant stra ta .
This com m unist-socia list agrarian blunder by the new regim e was 
instrum ental in the undoing o f the Hungarian Soviet Republic, in a few  months 
tim e. I t  w ill be shown tha t th is ideological misjudgement had an enduring
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im pact: on the one hand, the Communist Party learn t its  lesson from  th is single 
experience o f fa ilin g  to d is tribu te  the land, a blunder i t  did not repeat in 1945, 
even under more favourable conditions; on the other hand, even a fte r  the 1945 
land re fo rm  the peasants remained deeply suspicious o f Communist Party 
intentions, r ig h tly  so, considering the cruel co llec tiv isa tion  in the Rakosi era.
The reason why the Hungarian Socialist Party, in 1919, repudiated the 
idea o f parce lling  out the large estates is stated by Borkenau, in a very concise 
manner:
i f  over there (Russia) they had no choice but to  give the 
peasants the land -which surely would jeopardise a ll Lenin's 
fu rth e r steps towards socialism - then they (Hungarians) 
would show the world tha t in the West a pro le ta rian 
d ic ta torsh ip  could and would go forward w ithout and inspite
o f the peasant.(24)
Indeed, Kun h im self said tha t we should be able to  do i t  be tte r than the Russians 
(25)themselves. Lenin, however, must have foreseen tha t they could not go 
forw ard and stab ilize  the regime in th is manner. Tokes refers to  the Russian 
reaction, w ith  Izvestiya rep rin ting  Lenin's telegram  to  Kun urging him to  isSue a 
decree or land d is t r ib u t io n / ^
The idea o f socialisation ,m et a hostile reception from  the peasantry. 
Socialisation to  them meant only a change of landlord and what they wanted was 
land to  sa tis fy  th e ir  land hunger and to  become, at last, th e ir  own masters. An 
almost instant reduction in marketed ag ricu ltu ra l production, and p rodu c tiv ity , 
was the response to  socialisation, fo rc ing  the regime to  resort to  a ruthless 
requis ition ing campaign, under the slogan "food to  the c itie s", which was 
resented by the peasants and almost sp lit town and countryside apart. The 
aversion o f the Hungarian peasantry to  land socialisation or co lle c tiv isa tion  
pa rtly  orig inates from  th is short period. The regime lost the support o f the 
people. Kun remained unrepentant and a year a fte r the fa ll o f the Commune 
even trie d  to  convince Lenin tha t its  greatest single achievement had been la rge-
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scale socia list agricu lture . I t  was another 5 years before he adm itted that,
fo llow ing  Russian practice , eventually "we would have been compelled to
(27)red is tribu te  the land as i t  happened in Russia". The many in te rna l attem pts
to  overthrow  the regim e tha t fo llow ed - revo lts  o f peasants, and o f ra ilw ay
workers, among others -  added to  the serious external d iff ic u lt ie s  o f the
government. P o lit ica l a le ination o f a large section o f the peasantry helped the
organisation o f counter-revo lu tion in ru ra l areas. Landless agrarian labourers
organised themselves in to  an ’Association o f Agrarian Labourers’ which at its
(28)Congress, in June 1919, turned in to  an open confronta tion w ith  the regime.
A t the same tim e, anti-bo lshevik resistance became organised in Szeged, a c ity
in southern Hungary, and Adm ira l H orthy -  Regent o f Hungary u n til 1944 -
assumed command o f the national army and began to  March on the cap ita l. When
the successful ’coun ter-revo lu tion ’ came to  power on 1st August 1919, i t  was
supported by a large section o f the peasantry. The big landed estates were soon
handed back to th e ir previous owners. This was a re la tiv e ly  simple
adm in istra tive  operation since under Kun, although socialised, they were kept in
large units. The communists, therefo re , by obstructing Count K a ro ly i’s
’bourgeois dem ocratic ’ land re fo rm  enabled the new regime to  give a new lease
o f l i fe  to  the large estates system.
The incip ient demands fo r land re fo rm , however, could not be en tire ly
ignored by the new government. But once the regime was consolidated and the
revo lu tionary ferm ent receded so did the mood fo r  any substantia l and rad ica l
land red is tribu tion . Indeed, the lopsided agrarian structure  was one o f the most
im portan t reasons fo r the rem aining social tension in ru ra l areas before the
(29)Second World War. The Land Reform  Law , commonly known as the 
N agyatadi-reform , was passed towards the end o f 1920 and its  execution was 
entrusted to  an independent ’National Tribunal fo r  the Regulation o f Land 
Ownership’. The stated aim o f th is law was not the te rm ina tion  o f the large
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estate system, but m erely to  improve upon the existing agrarian structure . The 
law stipulated tha t land fo r re -d is tribu tion , and the amount o f compensation to 
be paid, was to  be determ ined on a vo luntary basis by individual agreements, 
w ithou t ind ica ting  any specific  size o f holdings above which land was to  be re ­
d istribu ted. The Tribunal, however, retained the power o f compulsory requisition 
and acted as the highest Court o f Appeal in disputed cases. Land could be 
requisitioned from  large estates only i f  i t  did not endanger th e ir economic 
v ia b ility ; land from  dw arf or small holdings could not be appropriated. The 
maximum land to be given was three cadastral yokes to the category o f landless 
peasants and the supplementary land given to small and dw arf holdings could be 
no more than to  bring the size o f th e ir holding up the loca l average, but in no 
case was i t  to  exceed 15 cadastral yokes. A ll applications were to  be made
before 7th December 1 9 2 5 .^ ^  In to ta l 927,000 cadastral yokes o f ag ricu ltu ra l
(31)land were appropriated by the state, o f which some 632,000 cadastral yokes
(32)orig inated from  the large estates and the rest from  medium-sized holdings.
Some o f th is area was reta ined by the state in payment o f land taxes. The
re fo rm  transferred 189,000 cadastral yokes to  185,000 landless peasants which
represented approxim ately o n e -fifth  o f the to ta l landless ag ricu ltu ra l population.
Thus, instead o f the 3 cad. yokes which the re fo rm  law proposed should be given
to  the landless peasant category, the average area o f land d istribu ted  was just
over 1 cad. yoke. Another 116,000 cad. yokes were given to  114,000 dw arf and
small holders to  supplement th e ir meagre holdings and a fu rth e r 110,000
claim ants, in various categories, e.g., 59,000 war-disabled and widows, 41,000
artisans, 6000 re-enlisted soldiers, etc. received in to ta l 389,000 cadastral 
(33)yokes. The overall average area o f land d istribu ted was thus approxim ate ly
1.7 cadastral yokes per c la im ant.
On the whole the accomplishments o f the re fo rm  cannot be considered
(34)impressive. Its  underlying p o lit ica l motives, as stated by a Western h istorian,
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are c learly  visib le and it  ce rta in ly  did not solve e ither the social or the economic
problems o f the tim e. The extrem ely modest scope o f the re fo rm  can best be
seen i f  i t  is compared w ith  the reform s carried out in neighbouring countries, as
shown in table 1.4 below: But in some o f these countries the re fo rm  had a
na tiona lis tic  content and was aimed at the fo rm er Russian, Polish and Hungarian
landlords. I t  can, however, be seen from  the above table tha t Hungary compares
very unfavourably w ith  other East European countries. That Bulgaria had such a
low re form  figure is explained by the fa c t tha t its large estates occupied a
re la tive ly  ins ign ifican t area. In the context o f Hungary’s need the re fo rm  was
only an apology. I t  was too lenient towards the large estates and fa iled  to
change the character and the excessive inequalities in property ownership. I t
favoured the giant holdings since in re la tive  term s a larger area was taken from
an estate o f say 200 or 1000 cad. yokes than from  10.000 or 100,000 cad. yokes -
and such size la tifun d ia  did, indeed, exist in Hungary. The compensation o f the
estate owners subjected to  expropriation took place betwewen 1925 and 1929,
a fte r the settlem ent o f the re form . The actual compensation paid was very low.
The state did not intervene in the negotiations, old and new owners were in
d irec t legal re lations. The peasants paid about 30 to  40 per cent higher
(35)redem ption price fo r the land than its  actual market price. The re fo rm , 
although bringing some lim ited  benefits to 185,000 landless farm  labourers and
114,000 dw arf and small owners, fa iled  to  introduce a general and lasting 
im provem ent in the conditions o f the peasantry.
Since, fo r  a ll p rac tica l purposes, the re fo rm  was completed by 1930 the 
results o f the 1935 A g ricu ltu ra l Census can be used to demonstrate the im pact it  
had on the structure  o f land ownership at tha t tim e. This is shown in Table 1.5 
below.
The most s trik ing  feature  o f the table below is tha t despite the re fo rm  
302 giant holdings s t i l l  owned 22.1 per cent o f the to ta l area, while almost
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1.185.000 holdings embraced only 10.1 per cent. On the one hand, 0.2 per cent 
o f landowners, among them the Church w ith  825,000 and Prince Eszterhazy w ith
223.000 cad. yokes possessed 29.9 per cent o f the land in the fo rm  o f holdings
over 1000 cad. yokes. On the other hand, the 85 per cent o f holdings between 0
and 10 cad. yokes counted fo r only 19.3 per cent o f the arable land. To this
extent, the post-F irs t World War land re fo rm  did not m ate ria lly  im prove agrarian
conditions in the country. What i t  did achieve was the creation o f a very large
number o f rea lly  uneconomic dw arf holdings, while leaving the economic and
(361social conditions o f the landless agrarian labourers unchanged. Indeed, 
perhaps, i t  could be argued tha t the re fo rm , by shielding the large estates from  
being broken-up, achieved almost the opposite o f what i t  set out to  do. It 
created a large number o f econom ically unviable, in e ffic ie n t and 
undercapitalised small holdings whose owners were not only unable to  compete 
against the large estates but were unable to  make a liv in g  from  th e ir  land and 
were forced to  look fo r  additional work on the large estates. The resultant 
increase in the supply o f geographically im m obile workers consequently reduced 
th e ir wages and incomes even fu rthe r. The landless ag ricu ltu ra l labourers had 
provided the most fo rce fu l impetus fo r  the red is tribu tion  o f land, but on 
com pletion o f the re form  those who actua lly  benefited from  it  were re la tive ly  
few in number.
A lthough a fte r the Nagyatadi land re fo rm  the whole question o f re fo rm
became closed, towards the end o f the 1930s the land question came in to
prominence again. Further proposals fo r ag ricu ltu ra l re fo rm  were put forw ard
by the government. Yet, very l i t t le  was done. The actual land readjustm ent
tha t took place up to  the end o f the Second World War was very lim ite d . I t  did
not, in any way, a lte r the Hungarian ag ricu ltu ra l scene. A 'Law o f Settlers ',
(37)adopted in 1936 by the Daranyi adm in istra tion , envisaged the red is tribu tion
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o f some 265,000 cadastral yokes over 20 years and the creation o f 150,000
(38)cadastral yokes land reserve to  provide small tenancies. But due to  land price
increases and lack o f governmental funds to  purchase the land, the whole
proposal ran in to p rac tica l d iff ic u ltie s . S till, some 5000 fam ilies received small
holdings and another 3000 fam ilies received tenancies under the provisions o f
th is  law. Then, in 1939, a land re fo rm  proposal was subm itted to  parliam ent by
(39)the Imredy adm in istra tion. Imredy, in a speech delivered at Kaposvar on 5th
September 1938, unreservedly promised a radica l land r e f o r m . H i s  speech
was prom ptly  attacked strongly the landed gentry, whose most prom ient
representative was Count Gyula Karo ly i. In a la tte r  to  Horthy, he strongly
critic ised  the views expressed by Imredy on land po licy and subm ittd his own
counter-princip les regarding land policy. His views weighted heavily when the
government f in a lly  worked out its  land po licy proposals. I t  was proposed tha t
during he next 15 years some 100,000 cad. yokes should be released annually to
peasants, not in to  th e ir ownership but as small tenancies. This m odified
proposal, o m itting  com plete ly the words ’land re fo rm ', was introduced to
(41)parliam ent on 17th January 1939. In no sense was this, o f course, a land
re fo rm . I t  was designed to  u tilise  m ostly fa llow  land, obviously the worst qua lity
land, some Jewish land, land owned by im portant companies and some entailed
land. Large estates could only be considered fo r  d is tribu tion  when a ll o ther
sources were exhausted. Even then, although the expropriation was to  begin
above the 500 cad. yokes lim it ,  the proposal provided so many loopholes, in the
form  o f ’allowances' and 'exemptions' tha t its  real a ffe c t on large estates was to
be m inim al. For example, Prince Eszterhazy, who owned some 220,000 cad.
yokes would, under the proposal, have been obliged to release only 5400 cad. 
(42)yokes. Parliam entary debate on the proposal was successfully dragged on
(43)u n til the fa ll o f the Imredy government. The elections in May 1939 resulted 
in the fo rm ation  o f the Teleki government, which had embraced Imredy's sm all
- 29 -
tenancy proposals from  16th February 1939 as th e ir own, and re-in troduced them
(44)to  parliam ent on 19th September 1939. The proposals were u ltim a te ly
(45)accepted and became law in 1940, under the 1940 IV .t.c . Due to  increased
war preparations and then to  the war its e lf the Law was not im plem ented. It
was considered in-opportune, pa rtly  due to  the possible unrest i t  could have
created among the la rge ly peasant soliders at the fro n t and p a rtly  to  its  possible
adverse e ffe c t on agricu ltu ra l production - at a tim e  when German pressure on
Hungary to  raise her contribu tion to the war e ffo r t  was increasing.
The only actual land readjustment was ushered in under the Laws o f 1939
IV t.c . and 1942 X V I.t.c ., promulgamated in September 1942. As a resu lt o f
these laws, revived under strong German pressure, a ltogether 820,000 cad. yokes
(47)of Jewis land was expropriated w ithout compensation, although Nicholas
Ka llay -the  then prim e m in ister - states in his memoirs tha t the law, in fac t,
included provisions fo r c o m p e n s a tio n /^  This, however, could hardly be
regarded w ith in  the concept of Land Reform . Furtherm ore, almost a ll the land
so released was d istribu ted as small tenancies. Beyond these nothing more was
actua lly  done in this period.
The idea o f land reform , however, was revived once more. W ith the
changing fortunes o f the war. In January 1943 ha lf o f the Second Hungarian
A rm y was wiped out on the Don, and the Prime M inister, N icholas Kallay,
an tic ipa ting  the eventual outcome o f the war, became increasingly convinced
tha t an agrarian re form  could not rea lly  be put o f f  much longer. His d ra ft
proposals, prepared by the M in istry  o f A g ricu ltu re , were to be put to  parliam ent
before the end o f th  war. His views on a ’new agrarian policy’ were f ir s t  outlined
(49)in a speech at Szeged, on 27th January 1943. Kallay explains tha t the tw o 
basic reasons fo r his earlie r deferment o f a land re form  no longer existed: there 
were few er soldiers at the fro n t and w ith  Hungary’s increasing re luctance to  
pa rtic ipa te  in the war the maintenance o f the figh tin g  sp irit o f the arm y no
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longer m attered. Furtherm ore, i f  executed gradually, the adverse e ffe c t o f re ­
d is tribu tion  on production could be alleviated. In any case, a ll surplus 
ag ricu ltu ra l production achieved only had to be surrendered to  the Germans.
The re form  envisaged the division o f about 90 per cent o f Hungary's 
arable land in to  small holdings o f about 85 cad. yokes. Dispossessed owners were 
to  receive compensation in the form  o f bonds, to  the fu ll value o f th e ir  land -  a 
sort o f purchase by installm ents. Ka llay wished to create a system o f genuinely 
econom ically viable small holdings. Powerfu l landowners who saw th is  proposal 
as foreshadowing to ta l expropriation o f th e ir land -  very much on the same lines 
as happened to the Jewish land - were able to  block the proposal.
In re la tion  to the post-war years it  is, nevertheless, im portan t to  note 
tha t towards the end o f the in te r-w a r period the land question was fu lly  
recognised by the pre-war regime and its  proposals, judging by the reaction  to 
them, were quite radical.
In sum, the in te r-w ar period ended w ithout any s ign ifican t changes to  the 
fortunes o f Hungarian agricu lture . Successive governments, by focusing th e ir 
a tten tion  almost en tire ly  on the ra ther lim ite d  quan tita tive  changes in the 
structure  of land ownership, fa iled  to  come to  grips w ith  many o f the problems 
tha t faced agricu lture . I t  would, perhaps, be too strong to  accuse the 
governments o f deliberate subservience to  the pressures and in terests o f the 
landed gentry to  the de trim ent o f the peasantry. I t  was more a case o f sheer 
incompetence, o ften lack o f vision, and a ra ther disorganised, casual approach 
towards the real needs o f Hungarian agricu lture . This was re in fo rced the 
shortsighted resistance o f the landed gentry to any rad ica l reorganisation. It  
would also be fa ir  to the regime to  say tha t there were signs o f recognition, 
increasingly, tha t a radica l solution to  the country's agrarian problems were 
needed - a fte r the war ended. For the regime, however, the d ilem m a at tha t 
juncture  was real. The lim ita tions  on ag ricu ltu ra l mechanisation posed by the
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wear and industria l underdevelopment were im portant obstacles. But in a more 
fundam ental sense the regime's fa ilu re  was tha t i t  perceived agrarian reform s 
solely in quan tita tive  term s. That alone could not have s ig n ifica n tly  improved 
the ag ricu ltu ra l system. That much had, o f course, transpired from  the agrarian 
problems o f backwardness which continued to  trouble most o f the neighbouring 
countries, a ll o f which, as shown, carried out fa r  more extensive land reform s 
tha t were implemented in Hungary.
What Hungarian agricu lture  needed most was two im portan t and in te r­
re lated changes. F irs tly , i t  needed modern ag ricu ltu ra l production units and, 
secondly, a change from  the outdated methods o f tra d itio n a l c u ltiva tio n  to  
become com petitive  in world markets. N e ither o f these, however, could have 
been achieved w ithout a rad ica l a lte ra tion  in the organisational s truc tu re  and 
ownership. This too was becoming increasingly recognised by the regim e. Only 
such changes could have in itia ted  the necessary improvements in production 
techniques. Improvements in tha t sphere were o f v ita l im portance, irrespective , 
in fa c t, o f whether agricu lture  was to  be based on a system o f sm all or large 
fa rm ing units. As i t  was there was very l i t t le  d iffe rence between them, both the 
small holdings and the heavily subsidised large estates were operating under 
fa ir ly  s im ila r conditions -  w ith  19th century practice  and generally outdated, 
wasteful production methods.
Hungarian agricu ltu re  needed e ffic ie n t fa rm ing units. E ff ic ie n t fa rm ing  
could have been established by the creation o f smallholdings, provided tha t 
su ffic ie n tly  large sums o f money had been spent on mechanisation, use o f 
fe rtilise rs , improvement o f techniques, in fras truc tu re , education and tra in in g  
etc. A large share o f the National Income would have had to  be devoted to  
achieving th is. Even i f  the w ill to  do so had been there the country could not 
a ffo rd  it .  And w ithout developing industries no im m ediate im provem ent in world 
competitiveness could be expected. Any ra tiona l fu rth e r development o f the
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large estates system also needed a radica l change in ownership s truc tu re  to  make 
them more com petitive . But th is was a problem the po litic ians fa iled  to  resolve. 
The red is tribu tion  in the in te rw ar period, as shown previously, created a number 
o f sm all in e ffie n t units, unable to  compete against the large estates and force 
them to  modernise. For th is  the reform  as carried out by the regim e can be 
considered to  have been a mistake. The solution o f Hungary's agrarian problems 
lay in the creation o f e ffic ie n t, cap ita lis t fa rm ing units. What s t i l l  remained to 
be done, at some opportune moment in the fu tu re , was to# break up the large 
estates in to viable units and to  consolidate a ll the in e ffic ie n t fa rm ing  units 
which had been created. This had to  be accompanied by greater development o f 
industries, to absorb the surplus ag ricu ltu ra l workers. This was recognised by the 
regime, as shown by its  rev iva l o f in terest in the r process o f m odernisation o f 
agricu lture  in the la te  1930's and early 1940's. I t  came, however, too la te  and 
was too l i t t le  to  produce any im portant changes in the countryside. I t  is fa ir  to  
say tha t some lim ite d  cap ita lis t transform ation was taking place gradually but 
th is process was in terrupted by the war. I t  would, however, seem th a t the 
problem o f modernisation, as posed by Hungarian agricu lture its e lf and combined 
w ith  the lack o f a genuine industria l base -  almost throughout the in te rw a r 
period - could not have been solved, as h is to ry  would suggest, w ithou t a drastic  
and fundam ental change in the country.
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1.3 The Economic status o f A g ricu ltu re  and the Peasantry
The strength o f the land-owning class natura lly  im plies a com plementary
stra ta  of the ag ricu ltu ra l population - the agricu ltu ra l labourers. A b r ie f survey
of th e ir num erical d is tribu tion  and th e ir  economic conditions w ill fu rth e r
illum inate  the problems le ft  untouched by the reform s. O f the to ta l 4.5 m illion
agrarian population, 2,031,000 were active ly  engaged in agricu ltu re . In 1930, the
landless ag ricu ltu ra l labourers numbered 787,000, representing 38.5 per cent o f
to ta l ac tive ly  engaged in agricu lture , and there were 552,000 land-poor peasants,
representing 27.1 per cent o f the population ac tive ly  engaged in agricu ltu re , who
owned less than about 1.75 cadastral yokes e a c h / ^  Together w ith  dependants
th is group numbered approxim ately 3 m illion  or 68 per cent o f the to ta l
ag ricu ltu ra l population. The number o f landless agrarian labourers decreased
somewhat to  746,000 by 1941, as a result o f some fu rth e r land settlem ent and
(51)movement to  the c ities. This ru ra l p ro le ta ria t, numbering 1,339,000, i.e., 65.9
per cent o f the to ta l active  agricu ltaura l labour force - a la rger proportion than
(52)in any other contry in C entra l Europe , lived under very adverse social and
economic conditions -lack  o f employment opportunities, low liv in g  standards and
slim  prospects fo r  im proving th e ir lo t. The only way to  improve th e ir  prospects
was land re -d is tribu tion . The possibilities o f em igration, which had served as a
safety valve in the past, were greatly  reduced, due p a rtly  to  na tiona lis tic  po licy
o f the government and also to  the Am erican 'national quota' system. The
category o f dw arf owners, up to  about 4-5 cad. yokes, were a ffec ted  in the same
(53)way. They numbered approxim ately 207,000 and th e ir  land, p a rticu la rly  i f  o f
below average qua lity , was insu ffic ien t to  provide a live lihood, so they too had to
jo in  the exodus o f ru ra l p ro le ta ria t in search o f periodic employment. But even
the small holders, w ith  land o f up to 8-10 cad. yokes, numbering approxim ate ly
(54)250,000 , perceived th e ir fu tu re  in land re -d is tribu tion . W ithout many
reserves, th e ir live lihood was very sensitive to  natural disasters, or unfavourable
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m arket fluctuations. They had two choices: e ithe r to  acquire more alnd and
upgrade themselves to  the category o f middle peasants, or face im poverishm ent,
i f  not themselves, than o f th e ir descendants. So, in to ta l over 85 per cent o f the
agricu ltu ra l working population saw the ir fu tu re  prospects in reform s. The
ossified land ownership re lations and the scarc ity  o f purchasable land, and its
consequent high price, e ffe c tive ly  excluded almost any possib ility  fo r  m ob ility
between small, medium and large holdings. The desire to obtain land, however
small, was so great tha t peasants were w illin g  to  put a ll the ir life  saving in to  the
purchase o f land. This subsequently drove up land prices, p a rticu la rly  in the
sm aller land category. The price indices, in 1938, calculated per cadastral yoke
in the various categories are shown, fo r  com parative purposes in Table 1.6 below,
taking the 1-5 category = 100. Not only were land prices higher in the sm aller
categories but so was the in terest ra te  fo r credits. In any case, the tu rnover in
buying and selling o f land did not m a te ria lly  a ffe c t the existing property
d is tribu tion  since estates were mostly sold in in tegra l units, which au tom a tica lly
e lim inated the chances o f poorer peasants. I t  was more usual fo r  large or
medium holdings (or Banks through indebtedness o f holders) to  purchase land
from  bankrupt, o ften  new, small holders. Between 1926 and 1938 some 67,000
(55)holdings were auctioned . A large number o f these were from  the new sm all 
holders who gained possession under the most adverse circumstances; about tw o - 
th irds o f them had no aminals and a correspondingly low leve l o f ag ricu ltu ra l 
equipment. This, combined w ith  the e ffe c t o f the Depression years, imposed a 
great burden on them and fo r some i t  proved to  be beyond th e ir  resources.
Due party to  the extrem ely high proportion o f ag ricu ltu ra l labourers 
w ith in  the agrarian population and pa rtly  to  the extensive type o f fa rm ing  m ostly 
pursued in Hungary, employment opportunities in agricu ltu re  were seriously 
lim ite d . Intensive farm ing w ith  high employment prospects was not very
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widespread in Hungary. Generally, almost 75 per cent o f the to ta l arable land 
was devoted to  the production o f cereals, which im plied both a low demand fo r 
labour in re la tion  to  the area o f land cu ltiva ted  and high seasonal labour 
requirements during harvesting and planting. W ith such a system o f fa rm ing  
labour u tilisa tio n  was extrem ely in e ffic ie n t. An ag ricu ltu ra l labourer could 
norm ally find  employment on medium and large estates fo r only 150 to  180 days 
on average in a year and fo r  the rest o f the year was unemployed, resu lting in a
/CM
50 per cent labour u tilisa tion . This cyc lica l pa tte rn  o f em ployment was
fu rth e r re in forced by the re la tive ly  low level o f mechanisation, making large
estates dependent on seasonal employment fo r  th e ir operation. Since most o f
the land was owned by giant and large estates cap ita l equipment, d ra ft animals,
etc., were concentrated on these holdings. This only meant, however, tha t they
were re la tive ly  be tte r equipped than small and medium holdings. Large estates
did not base th e ir production on well-developed mechanised farm ing, having had
no incentive to  mechanise because o f the existence o f cheap labour. A lthough
some progress was made over the years, mechanisation o f agricu ltu re  was s t i l l  at
a fa ir ly  low level. Before the F irs t World War, only the threshing operation in
Hungarian agricu lture  was mechanised and trac to rs  were, as yet, hardly used. By
1925, 1189 and by 1929, 6800 trac to rs  were registered. This increase in the
number o f trac to rs  stopped a fte r the Great Depression, indeed, th e ir  number
tem pora rily  declined and by 1938 it  had just surpassed the pre-Depression peak
(57)of 6957. Theore tica lly , on 9.7 m illion  cad. yokes o f ag ricu ltu ra l land th is  
meant approxim ately 1400 cad. yokes per tra c to r, but more in p rac tice  since 
during the 1930s only about tw o-th irds o f the trac to rs  were in operation since to  
employ the rest was simply uneconomical under the unfavourable ag ricu ltu ra l 
conditions. The impeding influence o f large farm s on agrarian development is 
confirm ed by the fa c t tha t about ha lf o f the trac to rs  were concentrated on 
peasant farm s sm aller than 100 cad. yokes, which rented them out fo r  ploughing
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or fo r o ther work to  sm all farm ers who could not a ffo rd  to  buy th e ir  own. Such
pleasant farm s’ share o f trac to rs  was considerably greater than th e ir  share o f
ag ricu ltu ra l land. Apart from  tra c to r  u tilisa tio n  the techn ica l development o f
agricu ltu re  can also be observed in the modernisation o f threshing machines.
Here too development occurred la rge ly up to  1939. Mechanisation in o ther
branches o f agricu ltu ra l operations hardly progressed. In 1935 only about 3.3 per
(58)cent o f agricu ltu ra l operations were carried out by machines. The
development o f mechanisation was prevented by the extrem ely cheap, large and
underutilised labour force.
Besides mechanisation, the in it ia lly  fast increasing use o f a r t i f ic ia l
fe rt il iz e rs  improved the productive capacity o f the soil. The use o f a r t i f ic ia l
fe r t i l iz e r  just made its  appearance before the F irs t World War. By 1913 on
average 12 kg of d iffe re n t kinds o f a r t if ic ia l fe rt il iz e rs  were used per cadastra l
yoke o f ag ricu ltu ra l land. A fte r  a tem porary decline in the im m ediate post-
World War I years, by the end o f the 1920s it  reached the figu re  o f 15 kg/cad.
yoke. During the Depression years i t  declined d rastica lly  again to  2 kg/cad.
yoke, never to recover to  its  previous height during the in te r-w a r years. In 1938
only about 6 kg/cad. yoke were used on average and none at a ll was used on
(59)sm aller peasant fam ily  farms. The extrem ely moderate progress o f f ie ld  crop 
production, which essentially stagnated, could have been balanced by changing 
the composition o f crops grown, supplementing the tra d itio n a l ones w ith  the 
development o f vegetable and f ru it  growing. In a sense, a ll the m ajor economic 
indicators pointed towards the development o f labour intensive c u ltiva tio n . 
During the 1930s i t  became a w idely held view, a view which came in to  
prominence again in the post-1945 period, tha t one o f the most im portna t 
preconditions, to  increase National Income and L iv ing  Standards was the 
prom otion o f labour intensive crops. That Hungary should concentra te  on 
vegetables, f ru it ,  industria l crops, da iry products and livestock fa rm ing . The
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in ten tion was to  transform  Hungarian agricu ltu re  on the Danish p a t t e r n / ^
An im al husbandry, however, presented an even more unfavourable s itua tion  than
land cu ltiva tion . L ivestock numbers declined a fte r the F irs t World War and did
not succeed in recovering to  th e ir previous level during the in te r-w a r years. Even
at the beginning o f the Second World War the number o f lives tock was lower
than p rio r to  World War
The re la tive ly  low leve l o f industria lisation also lim ite d  the employment
opportunities fo r labour outside agricu lture . An increase in the ra te  of
industria lisation could have provided the solution to  the problems. F irs t o f a ll, it
would have drained o ff  surplus agricu ltu ra l labour and increased its  purchasing
power. Also, it  would have created an increased in te rna l m arket fo r  ag ricu ltu ra l
/go)
products, w ith  higher prices resulting in higher ag ricu ltu ra l incomes. The
necessary capita l requirements fo r industria lisation, however, were not
forthcom ing due mainly to  the low level o f savings and investments, which in
tu rn  was the result o f the low purchasing power, p roduc tiv ity  and real income of
a large section o f the population. Hungary was no exception to  the theory o f the
'vicious c irc le  o f poverty ' as discussed in development economics by many 
(63)scholars. Increased rura l purchasing power would have given a stim ulus to 
industria l development. Nurkse has given a concise statem ent o f the problem, 
fu lly  applicable at tha t tim e:
The trouble is th is: there is not su ffic ien t m arket fo r
manufacturing goods in a country where peasants, farm  
labourers and th e ir fam ilies, comprising typ ica lly  tw o -th irds  
to fo u r-f if th s  o f the population, are too poor to  buy any 
fac to ry  products, or anything in addition to  the l i t t le  they 
already buy. There is a lack o f real purchasing power 
re fle c tin g  the low p roduc tiv ity  o f a g r ic u ltu re .^ )
The loss o f te rr ito rie s , discussed above, also fu rth e r aggravated the s itua tion  by
reducing the size o f the in te rna l market fo r m anufacturing goods even more,
pu tting  yet another brake on industria l development. A g ricu ltu re , previously in a
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favourable position, due to  the Monarchy A g ricu ltu ra l T a r iffs  Agreements, was 
now exposed to  strong in terna tiona l com petition and to  low  ag ricu ltu ra l world 
prices. Reduced demand, both in domestic and fore ign markets, resulted in a 
drastic slump o f the ag ricu ltu ra l price level, which fu rth e r reduced the
/ C C \
agricu ltu ra l population’s purchasing power. On the o ther hand, industria l 
prices, because of the new high ta r i f f  pro tection, did not decline -  thus the term s 
of trade became very unfavourable fo r  agricu lture  -  ’widening o f the agrarian 
scissors’.
Beginning in 1929, the world economic crisis ushered in a period o f
general deppresion a ffe c ting  a ll s tra ta  o f the peasantry. The riche r peasants
were unable to sell th e ir products - m ostly grain, which was extensively produced
in Hungary and worst a ffected  on world markets - and the large surplus tha t
developed pushed prices down; the agrarian ’scissors’, compared w ith  1913, were
only 6 per cent in 1928, but by 1930 had become 47 per cent and in 1933 70 per
cent. The peasants were forced to pay high rates fo r  servicing th e ir  cred its
and increased taxation. The use o f credits by the less wealthy peasants meant,
in the m a jo rity  o f cases, complete bankruptcy. The increase in debts fe ll mostly
on the peasant holders. In 1932 ha lf o f to ta l debts fe ll on farm ers w ith  less than
(67120 cad. yokes but th e ir share in land was 31 per cent. For the landless and
land-poor ag ricu ltu ra l labourers, who owned no property and lived from  day-to -
day, the crises brought fu rth e r in tens ifica tion  o f th e ir  m isery, increased
unemployment. While previously on average they worked fo r 150 days per year,
(681now in many pleased th is dropped to  no more than 80 to  100 days per year.
The ru ra l d iff ic u ltie s  in employment were fu rth e r increased by those who le f t  
the towns and went back to  the villages where they could find  no employment. 
A ll th is caused a fu rth e r increase o f tension w ith in  the c o u n t r y . P a r t i c u l a r l y  
badly h it were those who received land under the land re fo rm . Many o f them had 
begun w ith  debts and were forced out o f business. In many instances the middle
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peasants bought up th e ir land. The series o f droughts and heavy frosts between 
1928 and 1935 caused severe losses and added fu rth e r to  the burdens. Agrarian 
conditions worsened everywhere, but some regions were more adversely a ffec ted  
than others.
The general economic life  began to  show some flu c tu a tin g  improvements
in the second ha lf o f the 1930s. The in flu x  o f German cap ita l s tim ula ted lim ite d
industria lisation, m ostly in food and ligh t industries, but also to  a lesser extent in
heavy industry. In 1937-1938 the government's 'Gyor Programme ' (which w ill be
discussed more fu lly  in the next chapter) allocated 1000 m illion  Pengo fo r
investment over the next 5 y e a rs .^ ^  Hungary began the transfo rm ation  o f the
country's economy to  meet m ilita ry  requirements by expanding industria l 
(71)production. A g ricu ltu re  had recovered from  the various shocks by 1940,
reaching outputs higher than during the la te  1920's. S till, the exceptiona lly  high
ra te  o f ru ra l unemployment was not reduced. Even in the la te  1930s
(72)unemployment remained at about 15 per cent o f ru ra l workers. Wages, too,
increased but remained almost 30 p.er cent lower than before the Depression.
The record harvest in 1938 gave a special boost to  the purchasing power o f the
(73)peasantry. But real improvements fo r the ru ra l areas came only a fte r  the 
outbreak o f the Second World War, when Hungarian agricu ltu re  was pressed to 
produce the food requirements of Germany and Ita ly , and to  sa tis fy  the increased 
food needs o f the enlarged country, creating a process o f slow expansion. The 
maintenance of high ag ricu ltu ra l production was in the in te rest o f Germany 
throughout the period, up to  the end o f the war. Im ports from  Germany, m ostly 
manufactured goods, doubled between 1934 and 1937 and exports to  Germany, 
la rge ly ag ricu ltu ra l produce, trebled. When Hungary entered the war in June 
1941 the whole ecnomic life  o f the country became geared to  the war e ffo rt, 
thus obviating most o f the problems. Growing economic dependence on Germany 
gave a boost to  agricu lture  and helped m anufacturing industries, at the price  o f
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imposing a war economy on them. Unforeseen in te rna tiona l events enabled the 
government to  shelve the agrarian problems o f the country once again u n til the 
end o f the war.
The in te rna l m arket fo r industria l goods was also increased because of
(74)the te rr ito r ie s  annexed by Hungary under the tw o ’Vienna Awards’. These
te rr ito r ie s  were industria lly  less developed than Hungary and the needs o f the ir
population fo r  industria l goods had to  be satisfied by Hungarian industry. In the
economic sphere, in the short-run, especially regarding agricu ltu re , the gains
proved something o f a mixed blessing. These awards nearly doubled Hungarian
te rr ito ry  and added over 5 m illion  people - 2 m illion  not Hungarians - to  her 
(7 5 )
population. I t  is true tha t Hungary's economy was re inforced by the newly
acquired reserves o f raw m aterials, new supply o f labour and, undoubtedly, the
acquisition o f im portant food-grow ing areas. But, fo r the short te rm  these
changes were not necessarily advantageous fo r Hungary, especially in respect o f
agricu lture . F irs tly , they increased Axis demands fo r deliveries. Secondly, in a ll
the returned areas smallholders predominated, th e ir farm s la rge ly  under-
mechanised, re ly ing  on fam ily  labour and generaly in some financ ia l d iff ic u lt ie s .
Th ird ly , the ra tio  o f arable land area to  to ta l cu ltiva te d  area declined by nearly
(76)11 per cent and the share o f forests increased by an equal amount. The state 
o f agricu lture  in the returned areas was generally worse than in Hungary. The 
Czech, Romanian and Yugoslav regimes were not p a rticu la rly  keen to  invest in 
the areas which were inhabited by Hungarians who were generally regarded as 
second-class citizens and potentia l p o lit ica l troublemakers. Roads and transport 
too were in a worse condition than in Hungary, which in tu rn  increased the 
d is tribu tion  problems on the poor rura l roads in the countryside.
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In Hungarian usage the surname precedes the given name, but the more
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Chapter 2: The Politics of Agriculture up to the end of World War n
The stagnating ag ricu ltu ra l scene o f the in te rw ar period was, in many
ways, a re fle c tion  o f the p o lit ic a l impotence o f agrarian movements, especially
u n til 1930. The peasantry, pa rticu la rly  the lower strata, during much of the
period, as w ill be shown, had no genuine representation, e ither inside or outside
Parliam ent. The fa c t tha t the ’National Peasant P arty ’ representing the in terest
o f fa rm  workers was founded - even then large ly on paper -  as la te  as 1939,
perhaps demonstrates this. Parliam entary opposition did exist throughout the
period, confined mainly to  three parties, but th e ir ac tiv ities  among the agrarian
population were severely res tric ted  by the g o ve rn m e n t.^  A number o f other
small groups or parties, some o f them quite rad ica l, existed throughout the
country, but they were m utually antagonistic and also care fu lly  watched by the
police. Any incip ient organisation on the part o f the peasantry was soon
declared illega l and o ff ic ia l opposition parties were not allowed to  canvas in the
villages. Socialists and industria l workers were e ffe c tive ly  ’discouraged’ from
establishing contacts w ith  them. I t  is always a hard task to organise a pragm atic
and conservative peasantry, dispersed geographically in small units over the
country, but these measures e ffe c tive ly  isolated the peasantry from  any p o lit ic a l
involvement. The General E lection in 1922 set an enduring pattern  which was to
last u n til the end o f the Second World War. Throughout tha t period the
’Government Party ’ under various names and compositions maintained a f irm  grip
over the p o lit ica l life  o f the country. The res tric ted  new e lecto ra l law, linked
everywhere to  fa ir ly  harsh property and educational qua lifica tions, passed on
24th January 1922, reduced the electora te by about one th ird , to  about 22.5 per
cent o f the population. In addition the law also stipulated tha t elections were to
(2)be held by secret ba llo t in the towns but openly in the countryside. By this 
measure the agrarian masses of the country were, in e ffe c t, com ple te ly
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disfranchised. Not u n til 1939 was this law relaxed and secret ba llo ting  
introduced, by which tim e, paradoxically, Hungary was strongly in the economic 
o rb it o f the German war machine, semifascism was prevalent and conditions 
were fa r from  normal. Candidates in the countryside were o ften  the local 
landowners and it  was ill-advised fo r the local peasant to  vote openly against 
him. In urban areas instead o f the 5000 signatories norm ally required fo r 
nom ination, about 25,000 were o ften needed fo r a worker nominee because the 
police frequently  declared signatories invalid. The regimes between 1920 and 
early 1944 were non-d ic ta to ria l, but s tr ic t ly  conservative w ith  au thorita rian  
leanings. The government, in e ffe c t the Regent, Nicholas H orthy, had almost 
to ta l power but he used it  on rare occasions and therefore he appeared a 
constitu tiona l ru ler. I t  was even possible fo r  some m ild ly le f t is t  opinion, at 
times, to  emerge and exert some m odifying influence. The government 
perm itted , o ften apportioned, a modicum of liberalism  and social democracy to  
take on the role of opposition. As in the pre-1918 period there was a m u ltipa rty  
system which included the Social Democrats and only the Communist pa rty  was 
s tr ic t ly  outlawed. The experience of Kun's Soviet Republic in 1919 resulted in an 
almost to ta l ideological re jection  o f u ltra - le ft-w in g  values. Indeed, generally 
most Hungarians remained insensitive to  the baits o f p o lit ic a l extrem ism , 
whether from  the le f t  or the righ t.
2.1 The Smallholders Party
One, perhaps the most in teresting characte ris tic  o f the period regarding 
the ru ra l area, was the fa c t that although the peasantry had a huge supe rio rity  in 
numbers i t  was unable to  exercise power or even any im portant in fluence on the 
adm instration. The peasantry in Hungary had a ra ther special sort o f existence, 
and d iffe red  from  any other category o f people. They were praised, 
enthusiastically fo r th e ir service to the country and, at the same tim e , they were
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oppressed and exploited. A number o f booted, tieless, wealthy -  and healthy -
looking farm ers, ca lling  themselves 'smallholders’ were pushed in to parliam ent
fo r  ru ra l representation under the aegis o f the Government Party and
Independent Smallholders party, the la tte r  o f a moderately progressive party,
w ith  rura l support and the most im portant party among the opposition. This
party, in it ia lly  called ’National Independence & Smallholders' Party ' was founded
by I. Nagyatadi-Szabo in 1910 before the F irs t World war, but had very l i t t le
(3)im pact on the p o lit ica l scene. For its  tim e the party had a fa ir ly  rad ica l land 
reform  programme, adopted at Szentgal, in which i t  demanded the 
nationalisation o f the ’la tifun d ia ’ and the land owned by the Church. The party  
also advocated p o litica l democracy, universal suffrage, secret ba llo ting  -  
endorsing the Social Dem ocratic Party ’s struggle fo r democracy - and im proving 
the social conditions o f the agrarian p ro le ta ria t. Its land reform  proposal, 
however, made no provision fo r the d is tribu tion  o f land to the peasantry. The 
party was not widely accepted by the land-owning peasantry, most o f who 
remained loyal to tra d itio n a l parties.
A f te r  the F irs t World War the party had three d is tinc t and more or less 
independent periods of p o lit ic a l existence. A fte r  the old regime was swept away 
it  partic ipated in the 1918 'Bourgeois Dem ocratic Revolution' o f M ihaly Karo ly i. 
The party wanted a quick and e ffe c tive  solution to  the land question -by the 
development o f a healthy fa rm er class instead o f the old-fashioned large estate 
system - which Karolyi's revolu tionary m inistries promised to  do. During th is 
tim e Nagyatadi-Szabo was M in ister o f A g ricu ltu re  which was hoping to  gain the 
support o f the b e tte r-o ff peasants.
When K aro ly i was replaced by Kun, Nagyatadi-Szabo and his party, 
frightened by the d is in tegration o f the trad ition a l individual agrarian order and 
disappointed in its  hopes, turned against the Hungarian Soviet Republic.
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The b rie f, in te rim  adm in istra tion form ed by I. F riedrich on 15th August
1919 offe red the agricu lture  p o rtfo lio  to  I. Nagyatadi-Szabo again and he and
tw o o f his colleagues from  the Smallholders' Party were included in the
government. For the f irs t  tim e  in h istory i t  looked as i f  the peasantry, at last,
had succeeded in ge tting  a share in p o lit ica l power. Indeed, on 17th November
1919 the government passed the famous Degree No. 5987/M.E. 1919 which
(4)established universal franchise and secret ballo ting. P o litica l democracy had
been achieved. But under the Karo ly i Huszar government form ed on 23rd
November 1919 Nagyatadi-Szabo was dropped from  the M in istry  o f A g ricu ltu re
in response to demands from  the entente powers to counterbalance u ltra - le ft
pressure fo r to ta l d icta torsh ip  and the post was given to the more moderate
Gyula Rubinek to  confirm , in a sense, tha t in terest in radical land re fo rm  had
receded. A t the same tim e, a new post o f M in ister o f Smallholders was created.
The f irs t  post-war National Assembly, under the new e lecto ra l laws, was
completed, together w ith  the supplementary elections in the Trans-Tisza region
when the Romanians w ithdrew, by June 1920. The Assembly re-established the
old constitu tiona l Kingdom of Hungary and appointed Nicholas H orthy as Regent
(5)and head o f state. The by then merged 'Smallholders and Farmworkers Party ' 
won 91 seats at th is e lection and became the largest party in Parliam ent. 
However, since i t  included some dissidents from  the Christian Party, a number o f 
independents and some who had joined not out o f conviction but m erely because 
i t  was fashionably 'progressive', the Party was in te rna lly  fa ir ly  divided. One of 
its  great handicaps, perhaps, was tha t there were only about 12 members who
/g\
could cla im  authentic peasant origin. The second largest party, the C hristian 
Party, won 59 seats. When the sovereignty o f Parliam ent was under th rea t o f a 
w h ite -te rro ris t m ilita ry  coup d 'e tat, Count I. Bethlen, prom ising Nagyatadi- 
Szabo land re fo rm , took the in it ia tiv e  on 12th June 1920 fo r the tw o parties to  
amalgamate. They published a common 'Programme Declaration ' in which they
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demanded, in te r a lia , a land re form , drawing on the proposals o f both Nagyatadi
and Rubinek. Disagreements, however, about the composition o f a Bethlen
government made H orthy fin a lly  decide to appoint Count Paul Teleki as prim e
m inister. Nagyatadi-Szabo was given the M in istry  o f A g ricu ltu re  in Teleki's
coa lition  government on 19th July and retained it  in the reshuffle  on 16th 
(7)December 1920. The land re form  proposal submitted to  the Assembly in
August 1920 was in fa c t worked out by the moderate Gyula Rubinek but i t  was
le f t  to  Nagyatadi-Szabo, when he replaced him, to put i t  in to  e ffe c t a fte r  i t  was
passed, in a much d iluted form , by the Assembly in November 1920. Nagyatadi's
only achievement was the passing o f the 'Land Reform Decree 1920, X X X V I.t.c .
Amendment on 7th December 1920, im proving the land d is tribu tion ; th is
(8)eventually became known as the 'Nagyatadi Land Reform Law'. Because o f 
in te rna l disagreements the Christian and the Smallholders Parties agreed to 
separate on 10th February 1921, leaving the la tte r  s t i l l  the largest party in 
parliam ent, w ith  90 seats.
A fte r  the f irs t  a ttem pt at Hapsburg restoration, the compromised Teleki 
government was forced to resign and, on 14th A p ril 1921, H orthy nominated 
Count I. Bethlen, a large landowner conservative from  Transylvania, to  fo rm  the 
next government. The new government was dominated by the large estates and 
big cap ita l. Since Nagyatadi-Szabo and his party were against both, and the 
landed aristocracy dominated the 'Upper House' a fte r its  reshuffle , on 3rd 
December 1921, Bethlen dropped him from  his second cabinet. In consolidating 
his government Bethlen's policy p r io r ity  was, f irs t, to  normalise re la tions w ith  
labour and the Social Dem ocratic Party. This was achieved, as shown elsewhere, 
when he concluded, on 21st December 1921, the famous Bethlen-Peyer Pact in 
which the government made im portant concessions to  the SDP in re tu rn  fo r an 
undertaking, in te r a lia , not to ag ita te  among the ru ra l population. Bethlen's 
second objective was to settle  relations w ith  Nagyatadi-Szabo which he achieved
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when the two parties, the Christian and Smallholders Parties, concluded an
agreement on 20th February 1922 to merge, yet again, to  fo rm  a new party under
(9)the name 'U n ita ry  Party '. The submergence of the Smallholders Party meant 
tha t the peasantry lost its  independent p o lit ica l representation fo r  the next ten 
years. Indeed, the absence o f an independent peasant party in Hungary during 
the 1920s was a unique phenomenon compared w ith  neighbouring C entra l 
European countries, where these parties played an im portant ro le in the po lit ica l 
process. But Nagyatadi-Szabo remained desperately, almost obsessively, 
interested in a through-going land reform  and was promised th is by Bethlen; he 
was to give away a lo t fo r this: he agreeed to  the abo lition o f the new universal 
franchise and secret ba llo t in rura l areas and to  submerge the id en tity  o f his own 
party when the two parties were united. The cunningly devised process of 
p o litica l consolidation in which no major role was allowed to  e ithe r labour or the 
peasants - which was, in fac t, begun under Teleki -  was now com plleted by 
Bethlen. It was not long now before the landed peasants, too, were excluded 
from  the p o lit ic a l life  o f the country, and w ith  i t  the scene fo r a lasting, 
consolidated Bethlen era was set. The new elections, in May 1922 were 
conducted under the new franchise law. The 'U n ita ry  Party ' won an absolute 
m ajority . A large number o f Nagyatadi-Szabo's peasant sm allholder candidates 
were replaced by aristocrats and large estate o w n e r s . W i t h  labour pacified 
and restrained, the peasantry absorbed and neutralised the character o f the 
'U n ita ry  Party ' and the Bethlen government, a fte r the e lection, d iffe red  very 
l i t t le  from  the pre war ancien regime i t  replaced, and parliam ent was now ready 
to  carry through Bethlen's consolidation policies. For years to  come, the 
absorbed Smallholders Party cooperated closely w ith  the government and its  
a c tiv ity  ra re ly  went beyong registering occasional dissent. In order to  
strengthen his position fu rthe r, on 16th June 1922 Bethlen had reshuffled his 
government, f i l l in g  a number o f the posts w ith  his own supporters.. Nagyatadi-
Szabo too was, again, given the M in is try  o f A g r ic u ltu re /* ^  Some extrem e-righ t
factions, dissatisfied w ith  th e ir p o lit ica l influence, launched an a tta ck  on the
conservative, Bethlen wing o f the government, using land-reform  demagogy and
nationa list incitem ent. To prevent the fo rm ation  o f unfied anti-governm ent bloc
Bethlen concluded an agreement w ith  a frac tion  o f the Smallholders Party and
decided to  m odify the 1920 Land Reform Law by increasing the au tho rity  o f the
M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re  at the expense o f the National Land Commission. This
(12)
was gradually put in to e ffe c t between May 1923 and 31st March 1924. 
U ltim a te ly , the land reform  tha t the government perm itted fe ll desperately 
short o f what had been envisaged by Nagyatadi-Szabo. Indeed, i t  m ight be 
argued tha t in the early 1920’s democracy was, fo r the f irs t tim e, w ith in  the 
grasp o f the peasantry. Their leaders, however, having traded a ll dem ocratic 
rights fo r no more than the promise o f a thoroughgoing land re fo rm , lost the 
opportun ity and the means to carry out a radica l re form . This f in a lly  became 
clear to  Nagytadi-Szabo too and, dissatisfied w ith  the progress and vigour o f the 
land reform  towards the end o f 1922, he threatened to  w ithdraw  his pa rty  from  
the coa lition  and re-establish the Smallholders Party in opposition. Bethlen’s 
response was to make some nominal improvements as a ta c tica l move to pac ify  
him. But nothing o f substance happened, the government continued to  hinder the 
land re fo rm  to  which i t  was supposedly com m itted, and Nagyatadi-Szabo had to  
f ig h t hard fo r any concessions. In August 1924,he f in a lly  gave an u ltim a tum  to  
Bethlen demanding in te r a lia , a more dynamic im plem entation o f the land 
re fo rm , improvements in the conditions o f the poor peasantry and a move
(13)
towards a more dem ocratic form  of government. He warned Bethlen tha t
unless his demands were met in fu ll he would resign. Bethlen agreed to make
concessions only on points o f m inor importance and Nagyatadi-Szabo, at long last
realis ing tha t Bethlen had never intended to  fu l f i l  his promise and undertakings,
(14)resigned in October 1924.
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Since the party  was large ly based on the support o f the b e tte r-o ff 
peasant farmers, the poor peasants had not rea lly  figured in his policies and he 
was la te r often accused o f betraying the interests o f the dwarfholders and the 
ru ra l poor. The la tte r , as w ill be shown, became a special concern o f the 
populists la te r. Having accepted a cabinet post in successive conservative 
adm inistrations and le t his name to  the meagre land reform  perm itted  by these 
adm inistrations, Nagyatadi-Szabo e ffe c tive ly  denied him self and his party the 
righ t to  lead and influence the ru ra l masses fo r almost ten years a fte r the 
turbulent early 1920s. When the government reached a settlem ent w ith  labour 
and allied its e lf w ith  cap ita l and the large estate system Nagyatadi-Szabo found 
him self out-of-step w ith  it .  Having been manipulated in to some dubious exports 
corruption scandal, abandoned by the government, frus tra ted  in his hopes, he 
died soon a fte r his resignation, a broken p o lit ica l figure. From tha t tim e  on u n til 
the end o f the decade the party's leadership floundered and its  in fluence was 
slight.
The second period o f the Smallholders' party was from  1929, when the
p o lit ica l and economic consolidation o f Bethlen's government reached its peak,
(15)to  1933. The discontent and misery generated by the World Depression,
combined w ith  the increased desire fo r change by those who were ge tting  tired
of Bethlen's p o lit ica l manoeuverings, led to growing po lit ica l opposition among
the landowning peasantry. In January 1930 an im portant meeting was organised 
(16)at Felsonyek, in the county of Tolna, which led to  the emergence o f a new 
peasant party a few months la te r. The meeting was also im portan t because the 
three basic creeds o f the new party's programme -  nationalism , anti-socia lism  
and in terest in moderate land reform  - were determ ined there. The ideological 
and agricu ltu ra l orientations o f the party, established there, remained u n til a fte r 
the Second World War. On 12th October 1930, representatives o f the new
(17)
'Independent Smallholders Party ' met, at Bekes, fo r the ir founding congress.
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Bekes, a tra d itio n a lly  radica l region o f Hungary - commonly known as the
'storm y corner' (Viharsarok) was selected to  witness the b irth  o f the new party to
give greater credence to  i t  and to  its  policies. The congress approved the
election o f its  leaders - Ba lin t Szijj, a life  member o f the 'Upper House' became
the Chairman, Zoltan T ildy the executive chairman, and Ferenc Nagy the general
secretary. I t  also established its  weekly paper, Magyar Fold (Hungarian Soil).
The congress approved its  o ff ic ia l p la tfo rm  which became known as the party's
'Bekes Programme'. It was largely based on Nagyatadi-Szabo's "Szentgal
(18)Programme'. The new programme, although a fa ir ly  impressive and lengthy 
document, both in term s of po litics  and as regards agricu lture , was more 
moderate than its  predecessor. It was on the conservative side. Its p o lit ic a l 
demands stopped short o f universal suffrage, contenting its e lf instead w ith  a 
broader but s t i l l  re s tr ic tive  e lectorate. I t  asked, however, fo r the in troduction  
o f secret ba llo ting  in ru ra l areas. Its demands in respect o f agricu ltu re  were so 
moderate tha t, in its  programme, i t  used the term  'national land po licy ' instead 
o f 'land re fo rm '. Its content, correspondingly, was ra ther moderate: i t
demanded the expropriation o f a ll entailed land, the abo lition  o f o ther 
restric tions on land, the authorisation o f the state to buy land fo r d is tribu tion , a 
cheap cred it policy, the e lim ination o f ru ra l unemloyment by 'appropriate land 
policies' and improved rura l education. The programme was loaded in favour o f 
the b e tte r-o ff peasants; the poor peasants did not figure much in it .  S till,  fo r 
Hungary o f the 1930s i t  was a moderately progressive programme. Its  a ttem p t 
to  neutralise the poor, ra ther than mobilise them, was also s im ila r to  Nagyatadi- 
Szabo's programme. Soon a fte r its  founding congress a p o lit ic a lly  more 
in fluen tia l figure, Gaszton Gaal, a landowner o f some 1000 cad. yokes standing, 
was inv ited in December 1930 to  become party  leader on th  suggestion o f Zoltan 
T ildy. Gaal, from  1926 the leader o f the 'Agrarian Party', which was supported 
by a few large estate owners, merged his party w ith  the Independent
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Smallholders Party. He led the party, ra ther uneventfu lly, u n til his un tim e ly 
death in 1932.(19)
This upsurge in p o lit ica l ac tiv ities , in which the middle and the be tte r- 
o ff  peasants played a dominant ro le - although support was fo rthcom ing  from  
poor peasants in some regions too -  could not rea lly  develop strongly. The 
reasons fo r th is were, partly , the government’s increasingly hostile  a ttitu d e  and, 
partly , because the new party soon came under the influence o f landed estates. 
S till, even w ith  its  proposed m inim al re form  programme the party exerted quite 
a strong influence among farm ers and also on some members o f the agrarian 
section o f the ’U n itary Party ’. ^ 9  ^ The major obstacle facing any agrarian party 
a ttem pting  to establish an e ffe c tive  representation was the great d ifferences 
tha t existed between the various layers o f peasantry. In p rac tica l term s, no such 
th ing as a 'po licy of the peasantry' could be established. When the economic 
s ituation was stabilised a fte r the Depression and improved a fte r the mid 1930s, 
the influence o f the party began to  decline. The party, however, managed to 
carry on and it  did provide a p la tfo rm  fo r p o lit ica l ac tiv ities , m ostly at the local 
leve l.(21)
A fte r  the death o f Gaal on 7th December 1932, T ibor Eckhardt was
(22)inv ited to  lead the Independent Smallholders Party. As was to  be expected it  
turned out to be an unwise choice, to  say the least, which had im portan t in te rna l 
and extenal im plications fo r  the p o litica l fortunes of the party during the 1930s. 
In the end, he proved to be the least distinguished leader o f the party. The 
choice was, presumably, influenced by two major factors. One was the ris ing 
an ti-sem itic , r igh t-w ing  p o lit ica l tendency in some parliam entary quarters. The 
other was tha t a fte r the resignation o f the Bethlen government a number of 
r ig h tis t members o f parliam ent, together w ith  the agrarian bloc o f the ’U n ita ry  
Party ' began to  draw closer to  the Independent Smalholders Party, especially to  
Eckhardt, w ith  a view to  form ing the next coa lition  government by means o f a
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Gombos-Eckhardt alliance. Eckhardt's credentials to  fu l f i l  such expectations
were unquestionable. He had been in righ t-w ing  po litics  since the war and was
widely known fo r his an ti-sem itic , ardently anti-soc ia lis t views. Indeed, w ith
Gyula Gombbs he had founded a number o f ra c ia lis t oriented parties in the past
and was a leading o ffic ia l o f various rac ia lis t societies. Parliam ent, however,
was unw illing  to  to le ra te  a strong, independent peasant party . His p o lit ica l
jockeying, in the end, proved in vain despite the fa c t tha t he was not shy of
changing his p o lit ic a l principles, and sides, in pursuit o f power. A fte r  he took
over, the pa rty ’s parliam entary representation and its  popularity declined. This,
(23)in part, was due to  the character o f his p o litica l leadership. The agrarian part
o f his social programme was very conservative. He was fa r from  radica l on land
reform  and was certa in ly  not fo r agrarian democracy. Even the re la tive ly
moderate 'Bekes Programme’ was put in cold storage. His main objective was to
secure pa rtia l peasant representation w ith in  the given p o lit ic a l fram ew ork.
Under increasing pressure to recover some o f the party's dw indling influence, and
not to  be outdone by the Imredy government’s own land re form  proposals, in
(24)December 1938 he too subm itted a land re fo rm  proposal to  Horthy. The fu ll
te x t o f th is was published in the party ’s weekly, called now the 'Independent
Smallholder’ but not much in terest was shown in i t  e ithe r by parliam ent or the
government and it  was soon com pletely fo rgo tten . Under both leaders, Gaal and
Eckhardt, the party had a fa ir ly  large number o f fo llow ers among the peasantry
(25)but th is was not re flec ted  in parliam entary strength. One other im portan t 
reason fo r the party ’s continued p o lit ica l weakness was the fa c t tha t the 
’government party ' too, as we have seen, was a sort o f agrarian party. Apart 
from  the representation o f large landowners, i t  had almost more sm all-holder 
members than the Independent Smallholders Party itse lf. Furtherm ore, there 
were a number o f other small opposition parties which included some nominal 
agrarian element and, together w ith  the challenge of the agrarian wing o f the
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Social Dem ocratic Party, as w ill be shown below, they sp lit the peasant 
movement.
The party's fa ilu re  at the May 1939 general elections and the
organisational challenge posed by the fo rm ation  o f the National Peasant Party in
June 1939, to  represent genuine peasant interests, exerted an im portant stimulus
to  the Independent Smallholders Party to  change both course and leadership. A
more representative peasant wing, led by Zoltan T ildy and Ferenc Nagy,
successfully attem pted to regain a say in party a ffa irs . A fte r  the resignation o f
T ibor Eckhardt the party's executive com m ittee elected T ildy  and Nagy as
President and national general secretary respectively. Contro l over the party
was fu lly  established a fte r the Anglo-Saxon oriented Eckhardt was sent to  the
(26)USA by H orthy in the summer o f 1940 to  represent Hungarian in terests there.
A lthough the change in leadership in itia ted  a sh ift towards a more 
genuine peasant representation at the top, i t  did not arrest the declin ing fortunes 
o f the party. I t  was s t i l l  loosing influence and prestige due to  the 
disappointment w ith  Eckhardt's leadership and policies, u n til at least the tu rn  o f 
1942/1943, when w ith  the ris ing fortunes o f the Red A rm y were making the 
outcome of the war more and more predictable. A fte r  the outbreak o f war in 
June 1941 the party suspended its  operation, stopped a ll organisational work and 
w ithdrew in to the security o f Parliam ent. I t  relinquished open opposition to  the 
government but at the same tim e did not lend its  support to  the government's 
war e ffo rt. Instead, the party began to  focus a ll its  energy on preserving its e lf 
unblemished fo r  its  perceived 'h is to ric  mission' when in te rna tiona l and dom estic 
p o lit ica l facto rs perm itted a more e ffe c tive  opposition. The party's leadership, 
perhaps, never believed in the possib ility o f an u ltim a te  German v ic to ry . A fte r  
the German setback in the autumn of 1942 and the spring of 1943, the in fluence 
o f the party's le ft-w ing , under Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, led it  to decide to  give up its
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( 27 )passive a ttitu de  and it  began to  emerge gradually from  sem i-obscurity. From
tha t tim e on i t  partic ipated more and more in the p o lit ica l li fe  o f the country.
One o f its  main preoccupations was the search fo r  a way out o f the war; to  try  to
find  a way to  avoid a to ta l catastrophe, to  stop the unncessary bloodshed and,
perhaps more im portan tly , to stop the sufferings o f the peasantry who, during
the war, bore a larger burden on the ir shoulders than any o ther section of
society. The party was beginning to  see that in the post-war period a h is to ric
mission was awaiting a ll dem ocratic praties and tha t i t  could play an im portant
p o lit ica l role in solving, at least, the agrarian problems o f the country. I t  began
to prepare seriously fo r tha t role by establishing the moral basis, in order to  be
ready when the tim e came.
The f irs t signs o f attem pts to  rejuvenate the party came in the spring of
1943. F irs t, on 11th February i t  was decided to convene a m eeting o f the
Permanent National Com m ittee, composed of delegates from  the counties, to
discuss how p o litica l a c tiv itie s  by the party could be revived. The meeting
resulted in a c ircu la r requesting local party activ is ts  to  close ranks and assist the
party in its  e ffo rts . The response was, according to  T ildy, overwhelm ing. O f the
(28)2400 local organisations some 1280 replied most encouragingly. Secondly, on
27th May fo r the f irs t  tim e during the war, the General Assembly, the highest
organ o f the party, was convened and a fte r a keynote speech by T ildy , the party
adopted a new programme - in e ffe c t reviv ing the orig ina l 'Bekes Programme' -
(29)and also redefined the p o lit ica l d irection  the party should take. The
programme remained the party's p la tfo rm , in princip le  i f  not in p ractice , during
(29)the remaining years o f the war. A fte r  this, the party  increased its
organisational and p o lit ica l work, not only in the countryside but also in urban 
areas where i t  had h ithe rto  had few followers. From the middle o f 1943 the 
strength o f the party increased rapid ly and it  made im portant gains in ru ra l 
areas. Its e ffo rts  in urban areas, however, proved less successful.
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The aim of the party's new programme, a fte r an in te rva l o f several 
years, was tw ofo ld : (i) to  t ry  to  ex trad ite  Hungary from  the war, and from
German tute lage, in such a way as not to  loose the te rr ito r ie s  received from  the 
Germans under the two Vienna Awards, and (ii) to  begin the process of 
dem ocratisation of the p o lit ic a l adm in istra tion and to  prepare fo r  the most 
urgent social reform s w ith in  the legal fram ew ork ra ther than in the fo rm  of a 
revo lt or by a sh ift to  the extrem e-righ t. The fu ll te x t o f the programme, fo r 
understandable reasons, was not published. I t  om m itted, e.g., the section 
re fe rring  to the pa rty ’s view on w ithdrawal from  the war; also its  domestic 
p o lit ica l demands were modest. I t  did, however, re jec t the idea o f a republic in 
favour o f a 'constitu tiona l monarchy'. But the party  pledged its e lf to  make both 
upper and lower houses o f parliam ent more dem ocratic and generally i t  wished to 
establish a p lu ra lis t, equalitarian, society. Towards this end it  began to 
cooperate w ith  the Social Dem ocratic Party. As regards agricu ltu re , the 
programme rated land reform  as the most urgent social problem and the party 
made this its  f irs t  p r io r ity . The leadership, however, com m itted its e lf in general 
term s only to land reform , w ith  fu ll compensation, but i t  did not elaborate on the 
details beyond saying tha t they would liqu idate the large estate system and base 
agricu lture on healthy medium-sized peasant holdings as well as on church land. 
I t  was an a ttem pt to  take the wind out o f the revolu tionary sails o f the landless 
agrarian workers e ither on the le ft  or the r igh t. A part from  land re -d is tribu tion , 
the programme contained a number o f other points regarding the financ ia l 
improvement o f the condition o f agrarian workers and poor farm ers; i t  put 
continued emphasis on the development o f ag ricu ltu ra l production; proposed the 
continued development o f industries, on a decentralised basis; aimed to  close the 
'agrarian scissors', which was considered im portan t from  a social po in t o f view; 
and, fo r the f irs t  tim e, i t  made a notional reference to  the large scale 
development o f cooperatives, p rim arily  in the fie lds o f production, consumption 
and m a rk e tin g .^ ^
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2.2 The Populist Movement, the 'March Front' and the National Peasant 
Party
(32)The 1930s witnessed the rise o f the Hungarian Populist movement. I t
represented a reaction to the conservatism tha t generally permeated the
po lit ica l culture. The peasantry found good allies on the one hand, disillusioned
young in te llectua ls, concerned w ith  ru ra l problems and, on the other, populist
w rite rs, ranging from  poets to  agronomists. Their a tten tion  was focused
particu la rly  on the life  o f the poorest ru ra l p ro le ta ria t and dwarfholders, the
most il lite ra te  stra ta  o f Hungarian society. Some called themselves ’V illage
Explorers’ and it  was a ’back-to-the land’ movement which produced numerous
(33)sociographical works exposing the sufferings o f the peasantry, th e ir social
s tra tif ic a tio n  and the problems and differences tha t existed among them. By
th e ir w ritings they tried  to  l i f t  the peasantry out o f th e ir economic and cu ltu ra l
depression. The movement opposed the large estate system and demanded a land
reform  to restructure agricu lture on the basis o f medium-sized peasant farms.
And w ith  convincing power they argued, and proved, the need fo r radica l land
reform . The movement also exercised some influence on the ’progressive’
in te lligents ia  and opened the eyes o f many townsmen to the m isery o f ru ra l
areas. On the whole, the movement had a le ft is t  p o lit ica l conviction but i t  also
included members w ith  r ig h tis t sympathies. P o litica lly , i t  was a ra ther
perplexing movement. Three main groups w ith in  i t  can be id en tified  c learly . One
strand was peasant rom anticism  and nationalism  verging on fascism. The second
group leaned towards a m arxist ideology and arrived u ltim a te ly  at the Commuist
(34)Party, w ith  which i t  in it ia lly  cooperated. The th ird , a ra the r loose
in te lle c tua l coalition, remained true to  deeply rooted populist trad itions and
ideas, never accepting e ither the m arxist or the r ig h tis t a lte rna tive . The
populist-communist dichotomy, never rea lly  resolved, becomes o f great in terest 
(35)la te r. The ac tiv itie s  o f the movement were ca re fu lly  watched by the
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authorities, pa rtly  because there were signs, between 1935 and 1937, tha t the
le ft  populists were moving closer to  the Communist Party, which wished to
po litic ise  the movement. In 1937, in an atmosphere o f growing fascist p o lit ica l
ferm ent, the le f t  populists, influenced by the communists, decided tha t the tim e
was ripe to  strengthen the forces o f the le f t  and to  become p o lit ic a lly  more
active than they had been before. A fte r  long debate, agreement was reached on
the fo rm ula tion  o f appropriate reform s, which were proclaimed by the movement
on 15th March 1937, a national holiday commemorating the 1848 revo lu tion -
a fte r which the movement became known as the 'March F ront’. The March
Front proclam ation delivered by the populist w r ite r Imre Kovacs in fron t o f the
statue o f Hungary's 1848 revolu tionary poet - Sandor Pe to fi - at a mass meeting
in the gardens o f the National Museum, contained 12 points and was,
unquestionably, the most c learly stated progressive appeal fo r democracy and
equality, not only fo r the peasantry, but fo r the entire  nation. The programme
demanded: the dem ocratic transform ation o f the country; freedom o f speech,
press and association; universal, equal franchise and secret ba llo t; the proh ib ition
of con flic ts  o f in terest fo r members o f parliam ent; the expropriation o f a ll large
estates above 500 cadastral yokes; the abo lition o f the power o f banks, carte ls
and monopolies; the in troduction o f progressive taxation; job opportunitiess fo r
a ll and a 40 hour working week fo r industria l, ag ricu ltu ra l and o ffice  workers; an
acceptable minimum wage; freedom fo r economic organisation o f labour; be tte r
access to  secondary and higher education fo r the working classes and on the basis
o f ab ility ; a Hungarian revision -  a free  choice fo r  the people o f Danubian
countries to  establish a Danubian Confederation to  enable them to  resist pan-
(37)German and pan-Slav im peria lis t expansion. The communists were quick to 
associate themselves, public ly, w ith  the demands o f the March Front once they 
were published. P a rticu la rly  active support came from  the communist group in 
the provincia l town of Debrecen, under the leadership o f Ferenc Donath, and its
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'U n ivers ity  C irc le ', la rgely under communist influence. The communists
ta c tic a lly  endorsed the demands, except fo r tha t re fe rrin g  to  'pan-Slav
(38)im perialism ', but they insisted tha t an 'in te lle c tu a l movement' could only 
transform  its e lf in to an e ffe c tive  'popular movement' and become the spokesman 
fo r the masses i f  i t  involved its e lf in current po litics. But they warned at the 
same tim e tha t th is did not mean the transform ation o f the March Front in to  a 
po lit ica l p a r t y / ^
As the populists became more involved in rura l po litics  - because o f th e ir 
sociographical w ritings and the numerous meetings organised in ru ra l centres 
throughout the country - and also to counteract communist ag ita tion  ca lling  fo r 
the radica lisation o f the movement towards a 'popular fron t', i t  was decided to 
convoke a grand meeting to  elucidate the ideological position o f the movement, 
to  demonstrate its  determ ination and to expound its  programme fu rthe r. A good 
opportunity presented its e lf on 6th October 1937, a national holiday, when a 
mass meeting was organised in the radica l p rovinc ia l c ity  o f Mako. The meeting 
passed a resolution, the 'Mako Manifesto' which re ite ra ted  the basic 12 Point 
Programme. I t  re jected Marxism, w ith  its  theory tha t a ll soc io -po litica l 
problems and the libera tion  o f a ll oppressed people can only be accomplished by 
the Soviet Union and communists. It re ffirm ed  its  fa ith -in  the Hungarian people 
who, i t  declared, were quite capable o f achieving the dem ocratic transform ation  
o f th e ir  country on th e ir own. The manifesto also re jected the Len in ist thesis 
regarding the prim acy o f industria l workers as the only revo lu tionary class, to 
which a ll other classes were subordinated, and called fo r cooperation between 
them as equal partners.
In addition, the meeting discussed two other im portant points which had 
ra ther serious im plications la te r. F irs tly , the question o f 'm ovem ent' versus 
'party ' was raised fo r the f irs t  tim e. The m a jo rity  o f partic ipants, includ ing most 
populist w riters, opposed the idea o f a party, promoted and favoured by both
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. (41)Imre Kovacs and Ferenc Erdei. Opposition to  transform ing the movement
in to a party was voiced by Geza Feja, Gyula Illyes and Peter Veres, on the
grounds tha t i t  would result in certa in  p o lit ic a l fa ilu re . Others, like  Ferenc
Donath, opposed a party because they believed tha t a 'popular fro n t' organisation
was needed, which a ll could jo in  w ithout the fram ew ork o f a party. Since no
consensus was reached, the whole idea was, fo r a while, pushed in to the
background, only to re-emerge, w ith  force, a few months la te r. Secondly, at the
Mako meeting Ferenc Erdei advocated the need to  organise, or at least prepare
fo r, a revolution. His call, however, was prom ptly  re jected by a substantia l
m a jority  on the grounds o f ir ra tio n a lity , that the approaching war s ituation
excluded the possib ility o f such a fo rce fu l solution. Moreover, the extrem e-
(4 9 )
righ t, too, was a ttrac ted  to the idea o f a revolu tionary solution.
The rapid advancement o f the 'F ront' by the turn  o f 1937/1938, however,
could not continue and it  should be regarded as the peak o f the movement. The
year 1938 brought a series o f d iff ic u ltie s  fo r the movement. By the end o f 1937
the authorities looked upon the 'F ron t' as a movement 'in  the service o f 
(43)communism' inspite o f the Mako meeting, because communist in fluence was
becoming increasingly evident in certa in  groups w ith in  the 'F ron t'. The regime
began to show signs o f nervousness abut the successes o f the 'F ron t' and worried
about the possib ility tha t populist ideas m ight sweep through the country. So,
from  early 1938 the authorities began to  obstruct and prevent planned meetings
o f the Front and some w riters, too, were brought to  t r ia l fo r alleged p o lit ic a l
(44)incitem ent in th e ir sociographical w ritings. The last proclam ation o f the
'Front' was delivered in March 1938, a year a fte r the declaration o f its
programme, at a mass meeting organised, under the shadow o f the Anschluss, by
(45)the Budapest 'U n ivers ity  C irc le ' in the sanctuary o f its  own gardens. A fte r  a 
lengthy debate about the des irab ility  o f communist influence, the orig ina l 12 
point programme was revised, by Ferenc Erdei, and published in the movement's
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journal. The revised programme remained, in substance, unaltered. Most of 
the points, however, were explained in greater de ta il. In term s o f agricu lture, 
the only a lte ra tion  was tha t i t  now envisaged tha t ag ricu ltu ra l production would 
be organised and developed fu rth e r on a cooperative basis. The influence o f the 
le ft ,  perhaps, could be seen in the adaptation o f the whole programme, ca lling  
fo r p o lit ica lly  more active propaganda and a change in to  a p o lit ic a l movement, 
and also in the re jection  o f the idea o f a pan-Slav im peria lis t th rea t, which 
created so much controversy.
The revised programme, however, again a ttrac ted  the a tten tion  o f the
authorities. Repressive measures were soon to  fo llow : some com munist-
in filtra te d  student and youth organisations were suspended; five  prom inent
populist w rite rs  were taken to  court and given short-term  prison sentences; and,
perhaps most im portan tly , th e ir theore tica l journal Valasz was banned in the
middle o f 1938, thereby depriving the movement o f an in fo rm ation  and
canvassing medium. Under the prevailing conditions the eventual dissolution o f
the Front, in July 1938, could not be prevented. Indeed, from  the early spring
the Front existed only in theory. Its rise to prominence in Hungarian in te lle c tua l
and p o lit ica l life  in the spring o f 1937 was as quick and spectacular as its  end
was quiet, almost to the day a year la te r. Its members, however, did not
disappear com plete ly from  public life . Some, already a ttrac ted  by the great
surge in anti-Sem itism  and semi-fascism, moved to  the righ t; others, including
some communists, joined the communist-run Social Dem ocratic ’National Youth
(47)Com m ittee ’ (OIB) or went to work on its  daily Nepszava. Yet another group, 
the most in teresting fo r the present study, remained com m itted to  the principles 
o f the ?March Front' and succeeded in acquiring the much respected weekly 
Szabad Szo, prom oting the interests o f the agrarian p ro le ta ria t. Soon a new 
p o litica l force was organised^*^ around this weekly, and the organisational 
e ffo rts  o f th is le ft is t  group led in a short tim e the foundation o f the 'N ationa l 
Peasant Party'.
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The dissolution o f the 'March Front' natura lly  revived in te rest in the
question o f 'movement' versus 'party ', f ir s t  raised in 1937 at the 'Mako meeting.
The populist w rite rs  who gathered around Szabad Szo had created a d irec t
p o lit ica l forum  to  expand the sphere o f operation o f the movement by
transform ing a basically in te lle c tua l and lite ra ry  movement in to a social and
p o lit ic a l one. This debate resumed around the tu rn  o f 1938/1939, and was an
almost complete re-run o f the earlie r debate, w ith  previous divisions s t i l l  very
much alive w ith in  the populist movement. Some expressed the desire to remain
an economic and cu ltu ra l oriented movement, some, led by Erdei and Kovacs,
advocated the establishment o f a p o lit ic a l organisation at the earliest posssible
moment, re ly ing on the support o f the agrarian p ro le ta ria t. However, almost a ll
the populist w riters, on various grounds, opposed the foundation o f a new 
(49)party. They could not decide between the need o f a new party or whether to 
revive the Independent Smallholder's Party. Many argued tha t, on the one hand, 
a new party would create a c lim ate  o f c rit ic ism  of the Smallholders and, on the 
other hand, would have to  gain support from  both Smallholders and Social 
Democrats, from  small and middle peasants, otherwise it  could not be organised. 
This was untim ely, they argued, owing to  increasing righ t-w ing  pressure in the 
country, and would seriously weaken the dem ocratic opposition forces. This view 
was, o f course, supported by the communists, who did not want the establishment 
o f a r iva l party. Those in favour believed tha t w ithout a new party  th e ir 
p o lit ica l programme could not be carried out. Since no consensus was reached in 
th is pro tracted debate, the group around the Szabad Szo did not put up 
independent candidates fo r the fo rthcom ing general elections, in May 1939, but 
used th e ir paper as vehicle to  popularise and support the candidates o f the 
Smallholders' P a r t y / ^
The general election, held in May 1939, brought the ra ther unexpected 
advance o f the extrem e-righ t, A rrow  Cross, p o lit ica l forces as the main rad ica l
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challenge to the regime. It  was an e lectora l defeat fo r the dem ocratic forces, 
both the Smallholders' Party and tne Social Dem ocratic Party showing a sharp 
decline in both seats and popularity. I t  was th is defeat which tipped the balance 
o f the debate w ith in  the populist movement, leading to recognition of the need 
to  change the re la tions between Szabad Szo and its members and the
Smallholders' Party, and also o f the need fo r a new party, since the Smallholders' 
Party had lost its appeal. I t  was now fu lly  recognised and acknowledged that a 
new party had to  be formed to  replace, or to supplement, the unpopular 
Independent Smallholders' Party.
The founding meeting o f the National Peasant Party was held on 29th
(51)
June 1939, in the provinc ia l c ity  o f Mako. No permission was granted fo r the
meeting by the authorities, hence the party was formed under ' 'illega l'
circumstances. The new party adopted Szabad Szo as its  o f f ic ia l newspaper,
through which i t  was able to reach a re la tive ly  large number o f peasnats. I t
made its p la tform  public in July in the columns of Szabad Szo, closely fo llow ing
the March Front's 12 point programme and the Mako Manifesto. In its  10 point -
(52)programme , insofar as agricu lture was concerned, i t  demanded: the
complete liquidation o f feudalism, the expropriation o f a ll estates o f more than 
500 cadastral yokes, the commassation o f land or the establishment o f producer's 
cooperatives, the modernisation of ag ricu ltu ra l production and a system atic 
increase in the standard o f liv in g  o f ag ricu ltu ra l labourers. The other points 
demanded an independent Hungary, Hungarian leadership, popular dem ocratic 
rule, equitable taxation, recognition o f the value o f work, re s tr ic tio n  on the
power o f monopoly cap ita l, industria lisation, and universal education. On the
whole, a ll points stipulated by the previous programmes. The innovative demand 
was social security fo r  disabled workers, the old and the unemployed, and the 
establishment o f minimum working hours. Its  p o lit ic a l aim was the w e lfare  
state, w ith in  the fram ework o f a free enterprise, but not la issez-fa ire  system.
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Follow ing th is policy declaration the party called its  f ir s t  leadership
conference on 20th August 1939, where organisational m atters were debated and
(53)the conference elected its  leadership, w ith  Pal Szabo as its  f ir s t  President.
Its  leadership included, in te r a lia , Im re Kovacs, the heavily le ft- le a n in g  Jozsef
Darvas and Ferenc Erdei, both w ith  strong links w ith  the underground
communists, and Ferenc Ilias, an active  member o f the illega l Communist Party.
From its  inception, however, the organisational work o f the party  was
hampered by the authorities and, fo r a ll p rac tica l purposes, i t  ceased to  function
by the end o f 1939. There was ce rta in ly  no tim e fo r  the development o f a local
organisational network. Organisational contact, however, between Szabad Szo,
the radica l populist w rite rs  and the agrarian p ro le ta ria t was not com plete ly
severed. Under d if f ic u lt  circumstances, on average tw ice  a year, under the
pre text o f ed ito ria l discussions, conferences were called, o ften  lasting a few
days, to which w riters, po litic ians, and provincia l peasant correspondents were
invited to  discuss current problems and things to  be done. Many o f the most
prom inent representatives of the peasantry, from  all provinces o f the country,
trave lled to  Budapest to attend these conferences. Also, many members o f the
illega l Communist Party partic ipated in the discussions. Furtherm ore, th e ir
o ff ic ia l organ, Szabad Szo, continued to  be published. It  basically reta ined its
le ft-w in g  p o lit ica l bias gave an opportunity to  other le ft is t  w rite rs , very o ften
communists, to  publish in its  columns. Illegal communists, e.g., Ferenc Ilias,
Lajos Feher and Ferenc Donath, o ften ac tive ly  partic ipated in its  e d ito ria l work
and used these conferences at Szabad Szo fo r p o lit ica l indoctrina tion  o f peasants 
(54)attending them. In the Spring o f 1941 Szabad Szo and its  ed ito r, Imre
Kovacs, joined in the debate conducted in the columns o f Nepszava regarding the
(55)Worker-Peasant A lliance. Together w ith  the party, the need fo r  the A lliance  
was accepted but, in it ia lly , the leading ro le o f the working class movement was 
denied. From the Spring o f 1941, the journal also became the s e m i-o ffic ia l organ
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fo r the Hungarian Independence Movement around which a ll the le ft ,  including 
the communists, gathered. Since much o f the party ’s work was conducted under 
the aegis o f its  paper, Szabad Szo, the Communist Party increased its  pressure in 
an a ttem pt to  make it  conform  more closely to communist views and interests. 
For th is reason the paper and its  ed ito ria l board were o ften  reconstitu ted  and 
’radicalised’. On the whole it  remained supportive o f the communist cause and 
played an im portant role in establishing the ’Peasant A lliance ' - w ith  government 
approval - under the chairmanship o f Ferenc Nagy, in September 1941.
2.3 The Arrow  Cross Party
Another principa l feature  o f the second-half o f the 1930s was the rise o f 
righ t-w ing  extrem ism. The main expression o f the extrem e-righ t could be found 
in the ’Hungarist’ movement, in itia ted  by Ferenc Szalasi. The basic ideology of 
this movement, which was form ed in 1936 and, by un iting the various extrem e- 
righ t-w ing  parties, eventually became the ’Arrow  Cross Party ' comprised o f a 
huge dose o f nationalism, re in forced by the idea o f taking on the ro le o f guardian 
o f the agrarian strata and trad itions, plus a small dose o f national socialism. In 
any event ’Hungarism’ received marginal support from  the general public, and 
very l i t t le  indeed from  the p o lit ica l establishment. The social and economic 
programme o f the movement was rea lly  unim portant in comparison w ith  its 
ideology. From the various party publications and statements i t  would seem tha t 
the party did not actua lly  have a detailed programme fo r the d irec tio n  o f the
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economy. Some reference was made to the nationalisation of, or cen tra l
contro l over, the industria l sector. They were, perhaps more influenced by the 
Ita lian  corporate princip le which they wished to  transplant in to  Hungary. For 
e lecto ra l purposes the party campaigned, la rge ly in vain, w ith  three main 
demands: (i) to  expell Jews and Jesuits from  the country, (ii) to ta l
collaboration w ith  Germany and Ita ly , ( iii)  land d is tribu tion  to  the landless
peasants. N a tura lly , its  land-d istribution e lectioneering propaganda had great
appeal among the peasants. But contrary to th is propaganda the party  was not
rea lly  fo r land re fo rm  and i t  o ften declared its  support fo r  the ’b e tte r-o ff ’
(57)peasants and boycotted parliam entary discussions on the land question. The
party ’s a ttitude  to the economy, especially to  agricu lture , was o ften  confused.
On the one hand it  needed peasant support, hence it  promised them land; on the
other hand, the sheer necessity to fu l f i l  and increase export obligations to
Germany caused it  not to  in te rfe re  too much w ith  the large estate system since
it  did not wish to  jeopardise agricu ltu ra l yields and production. In e ffe c t, this
was the same reason given by Horthy to  the Germans fo r not extending the
1940.IV. Land Reorganisation Law any fu rthe r. I t  is, o f course, impossible to  say
whether, i f  they had achieved power, they would have taken land from  the large
estates and d istribu ted it  among the landless peasants. R e flec ting  on history,
the same th ing had been promised in Germany by the National Socialists but was
not carried out a fte r the a tta inm ent o f power. I f  the Hungarian peasants knew
that, they did not seem bothered about it .  They were desparate and ready to
grasp at any straw o f hope. The party had a re la tive ly  small fo llow ing. A t its
peak, its  membership was about 300,000. A fte r  Hungary joined the war it
(58)declined to below 100,000 by December 1943. The pa rty ’s re la tive  in it ia l 
popularity among the peasants was re lated to  the ra ther moderate p o lit ic a l 
success achieved by other opposition parties in the second ha lf o f the 1930s, 
especially tha t o f the Smallholders' Party, when it  lost much o f its  ru ra l support.
The 'A rrow  Cross Party' remained in p o lit ica l limbo u n til October 1944 
when, a fte r the German occupation o f Hungary, fo r a few months i t  became the 
Government.
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2.4 The ’Peasant A lliance '
To p ro tec t the small and medium peasant farm ers from  the growing
extreme righ t-w ing , fascist in fluence among the peasants, and to  regain its  rura l
support, the Independent Smallholders’ Party, under the new leadership, w ith  the
fu ll approval and support o f the government, founded the 'Peasant A lliance ' in
(5 9 )
September 1941. Its membership was res tric ted  to  peasants and the declared
aim was to  serve the economic, cu ltu ra l and social interests o f the peasantry. A t
its  founding convention i t  was stated tha t the 'A lliance ' was not a p o lit ic a l
organisation. The authorities envisaged tha t the A lliance could provide a bridge
between the Independent Smallholders' Party, which in fa c t dominated it, and the
National Peasant Party which wanted an organisation tha t served the interests
not just o f the b e tte r-o ff peasants. The authorities also intended it  to  be a mass
organisation which could provide the instrum ent to  contro l the peasants'
dem ocratic and land reform  demands.
Contrary to  the authorities ' in tentions, the 'Peasant A lliance ' provided a
good opportun ity fo r the radica l le ft ,  and the illega l Communist Party, to  use the
A lliance as a cover fo r the ir po lit ica l a c t i v i t i e s . T o g e t h e r  w ith  the populist
w rite rs , the illega l Communist party, w ith  the support o f the agrarian poor and
Szabad Szo, decided at the ir ed ito ria l conference in March 1942 to  prom ote the
development o f the new organisation, but emphasised tha t a ll peasant stra ta
should jo in  the 'A lliance '. I t  was also proposed tha t an independent
representation fo r the poor, ru ra l p ro le ta ria t, should be established, w ith in  the
A lliance, a proposal tha t was strongly supported by the illega l Communist party.
Such a special section, i t  thought, could provide the opportun ity to  gain contro l
(61)o f the mass peasant movement from  w ith in . The f irs t  a ttem pt by the le ft ,  
however, was frustra ted  by the Smallholders' Party. But when, early  in 1943, 
Szabad Szo, supported by the le ft ,  waged an intensive campaign demanding the 
im m ediate establishment o f the section, threatening otherwise to  pu ll out the
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entire  poor peasant masses, v ic to ry  was fin a lly  won by the le f t  and an 
’A g ricu ltu ra l Labourers' Section’ was established in May 1943. Its  president was 
Istvan Dobi, on the le f t  o f the Smallholders' Party and a crypto-com m unist, and 
the secretary was Ferenc Ilias a member o f the Communist Party. Its o ff ic ia l 
paper was Szabad Szo.
Because of its  predom inantly le ft is t  conviction, and w ith  the changing 
fortunes o f the war, the Smallholders’ Party reviewed its  re lations w ith  the 
A lliance and decided tha t i t  was more im portant fo r i t  to  a ttem pt to  rejuvenate 
the party and extend its  organisational structure  ra ther than to  keep the 
peasants in a passive state during this transitiona l period, ready fo r a clean s ta rt 
a fte r the war. Accordingly, i t  slowly w ithdrew from  the A lliance, leaving i t  to 
the le f t  and the communists, who remained in close contact w ith  i t  u n til the end 
o f the war.
The 'A g ricu ltu ra l Labourers' Section' subsequently achieved im portant 
influence. Many le ft-o rien ted  peasants joined and there was a rapid expansion of 
its  ac tiv itie s  to  create a local organisational network. It held its  f ir s t  National 
Congress, attended by some 1500 delegates, in Veszto in February 1944. at 
which i t  debated its  fu tu re  tasks, demanded improvements in the li fe  o f the 
peasants and voiced its support fo r w ithdrawal from  the war. Its fu rth e r 
development, however, was cut short by the German occupation o f Hungary in 
March 1944 when, together w ith  other ce n tre -le ft parties, e.g., the Smallholders' 
Party and the Social D em ocratic Party, the 'Peasant A lliance ' too was dissolved 
and banned, its  assets confiscated and its  paper s i le n c e d /^  Since its  
organisational work was incomplete its  dissolution was easy and, having no 
experience o f clandestine ac tiv ities , as the Communist Party had, i t  lost its 
e ffe c tive  power.
W ith a view to  organising a united opposition against the war and 
German occupation, contact between the now illega l Peasant A lliance , the
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Smallholders' Party, the Social Dem ocratic Party and the Communist Party, by
now renamed 'Peace Party ' was re-established in A p ril-M ay 1944, not only in the
cap ita l but in ru ra l areas as well. Underground p o lit ica l a c tiv itie s  f in a lly
resulted in the establishment o f the 'Hungarian Front' in the middle o f May 1944
in the name o f the a n ti-H itle r  national un ity . This was joined u ltim a te ly  by a ll
centre and u ltra - le f t  w ing parties. The Communist Party, to  counteract the
growing cooperation between the Smallholders’ and Social D em ocratic Parties,
argued in favour o f accepting the National Peasant Party in to  the 'Hungarian
( fiFront' as the representative o f the poorer section o f the peasantry. This, 
a fte r in it ia l resistance by both the Smallholders' and Social Dem ocratic Parties, 
was accepted. Both o f these parties had been suspicious of the intensions o f the 
N ational Peasant Party from  the early days o f the establishment and both o ften  
displayed hostile a ttitudes towards it .  The Social Dem ocratic Party was c r it ic a l 
o f its  na tiona lis tic  a ttitude , while the Smallholders' Party, believing tha t the 
entire  peasantry should be united under one umbrella, feared its  d isun ify ing 
e ffe c t. The Communist Party, righ t from  the beginning, openly indicated tha t i t  
wished to  absorb the Party in order to  establish strong radica l support in the 
ru ra l areas where it  had few fo llowers. O bjection was also raised by the 
Smallholders' Party regarding the 'leading ro le ' the Communist Party 
au tom atica lly  expected in the resistance movement o f the 'Hungarian Front'. 
Presumably, too, the Smallholders' Party foresaw the possib ility  o f im portan t 
Soviet influence on the post-war p o lit ic a l scene when it  f in a lly  jo ined the 
underground 'Hungarian Front'. Soon a fte r this, the 'Hungarian Front' began its  
ac tiv itie s  by d is tribu ting  pamphlets and urging people to  sabotage production and 
compulsory deliveries and generally obstruct, any way they could, the German 
war e ffo rt. This w ar-tim e cooperation w ith  the communists in the Hungarian 
Front was continua lly  overshadowed by m istrust. A ll the dem ocratic  parties 
hoped to establish a p lu ra lis tic  p o lit ica l system a fte r the war. They were only
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too aware o f the possib ility  tha t the eventual presence o f the Red A rm y might 
assist the communists to  introduce 'pro le ta rian d ictatorsh ip '.
2.5 The Hungarian Communist Party
The d is in tegration o f the Hungarian Communist Party fo llow ing  the 
collapse o f Kun's Soviet Republic in 1919 was noted earlie r. O f the dispersed 
leadership and members, some went to  Vienna, some to  Masaryk's Prague and 
some remained in Hungary, where many perished between 1919 and 1920 during 
the 'w h ite  te rro r'.
It was largely from  Vienna tha t the party attem pted to  organise and 
establish its e lf secretly in Hungary. But, being illega l and under close 
surveillance and persecution by the police, it  faced great d iff ic u lt ie s  and was not 
rea lly  able to establish a t ig h tly -k n it organisation. During the early 1920s a few 
isolated groups o f communists inside Hungary were undertaking lo w -p ro file  
p o lit ic a l ac tiv ities , e.g., d is tribu tion  o f leafle ts, but the ir more serious ac tiv itie s  
were marred by in terna l disputes and communication d ificu ltie s  w ith  communist 
emigres in Vienna. The main feature  o f the exiled group’s ac tiv itie s , apart from  
personal squabbles and discontent w ith  th e ir leadership, was fac tiona l in figh ting  
and sectarianism leading to  com plicated manoeuvrings, w ith  the locus of power 
t i l t in g  o ften im perceptib ly from  one group to another, to se ttle  eventually in 
Moscow. This fac tiona l in figh ting  tha t went on intensively u n til the party's f irs t  
Congress in 1925 in Vienna, and in some im portant aspects even beyond, was not 
over basic policies but over theo re tica l debates regarding stra tegy and tac tics  
and organisational problems. A ll agreed,on the fundamental pogramme -  to  fig h t 
against the regime in Hungary fo r the success o f a new pro le ta rian  revolu tion 
and a second d icta torsh ip  o f the p ro le ta ria t. They d iffe red , however, on how to 
achieve this. Much disagreement was also ferm ented by the Com intern, which 
neither trusted nor approved of the a c tiv itie s  o f these Hungarian emigres.
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The party  was sp lit, fundam entally, in to  two groups, led by Bela Kun and Jeno 
Landler respective ly. The f irs t  wished to establish a clandestine mass party  in 
Hungary, sending back emigres to  run it ;  the second opposed this, asserting tha t 
so soon a fte r the abortive revo lu tion in 1919 i t  was prem ature and to ta lly  
unfeasible, and favoured in f i lt ra t in g  the Trade Union movement and the Social 
Dem ocratic Party to  ca rry-ou t communist propaganda and subversive a c tiv itie s  
from  w ith in . In the end, since these two views could not be reconciled, both 
tac tics  prevailed and o p e r a te d /^
The f irs t im portan t gathering o f the exiled Party, a fte r its  foundation on
/go\
24th November 1918, and its  subsequent dispersion in 1919 , was its  F irs t,
Reorganising, Congress, which took place on 18th-21st August 1925, in Vienna. 
The declared main purpose o f th is gathering was to  resolve, at last, the rampant 
fac tiona l disputes. The Congress was attended by 22 delegates o f whom 14 
came from  the underground organisation in Hungary. The long agenda included 
several reports: on the in te rna tiona l situation and the Com intern, on the illega l 
a c tiv itie s  in Hungary, on the recently established 'Socialist Workers Party o f 
Hungary', on trade unions, on party organisation -  by Matyas Rakosi -  and on the 
Communist Youth Movement. The two most im portan t items on the agenda, 
however, were re lated to  the general p o lit ica l s itua tion  in Hungary and the main 
tasks to  be perform ed by the party, and secondly, the peasant question. The main 
speaker on both these item s was Bela Kun. I t  was stressed tha t the party 's 
general s tra teg ic objective should remain the 'revo lu tionary d ic ta to rsh ip  o f the 
p ro le ta ria t, in close alliance w ith  the poor peasants'. But, fo r  ta c tic a l
reasons it  was emphasisesd tha t th is did not mean the complete abandonment o f 
th e ir campaign fo r  p a rtia l p o lit ica l and economic reform s, though not fo r 
bourgeois democracy. The la tte r  was to  be advocated by the newly established 
Socialist Workers Part o f Hungary, which was under to ta l Communist influence.
The second urgent business on the agenda was to  review  the pa rty ’s 
agrarian th ink ing  in the ligh t o f the 1919 experience and to  establish an 
ag ricu ltu ra l p ro g ra m m e /^  The major points o f what was re fe rred  to  as the 
’m in im al’ programme adopted included:
a) the liqu ida tion  o f the large estate system: state expropriation, 
w ithou t compensation, o f holdings above the size o f 100 cadastral 
yokes, complete w ith  implements and th e ir d is tribu tion  to  landless 
and poor peasants free o f charge. The party was not to ta lly  averse 
to  state compensation o f the land owners, but i t  was to  come from  
the revenue collected from  highly progressive taxa tion  o f the 
wealthy classes.
b) to  reorganise the ag ricu ltu ra l tax  system by g iving to ta l exemption 
to peasants w ith  land below the size o f 5 cad. yokes; a s ign ifican t 
reduction in tax fo r peasants w ith  land between the size o f 5 to  10 
cad. yokes; and to increase s ign ifica n tly  -  approx. ten tim es tha t of 
the previous group - the tax fo r the large esta tes.^
c) to improve conditions and pay fo r the agrarian labourers; the 
regulation o f working hours and a general increase in the welfare 
o f ag ricu ltu ra l workers.
The Congress acknowledged that no revolu tionary s ituation existed and tha t the
Commune's policies were ta c tic a lly  inappropriate. The main task now was
(72)defined as to a ttem pt to  win the support o f the masses. And th is  could only
be achieved i f  the party joined in the struggle fo r th e ir in terests. To secure a
foothold in the countryside greater a tten tion  had to  be devoted to  w inning the
support o f smallholders and the low er-s tra ta  o f the middle peasantry. The
w ealthy peasants were viewed as strong supporters o f the regime. And although
many smallholders were won over by the lim ite d  land reform  o f the regim e, th e ir
leaders were considered not radica l enough by many to  challenge the regim e.
These, and the dwarf-holders were viewed as po tentia l allies o f the pro le ta rian
revolu tion, while the landless and the dispossessed agrarian labourers were
believed to fee l a close a ff in ity  w ith  th e ir urban p ro le ta ria t brothers and to  be
(73)susceptible to  p o lit ica l radica lisation. Closer cooperation w ith  the Social 
Dem ocratic Party was also attem pted, la rge ly in vain; a number o f a ttem pts to
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establish a common p la tfo rm  fa iled. Notw ithstanding its  decision, in the
’m inim al' programme - o f expropriation w ithout compensation, the pa rty  decided
tha t fo r ta c tic a l reasons in the short-run i t  would be wrong to  re jec t the concept
o f land reform  to ta lly . There was indeed a need fo r the party, at th is  stage, to
jo in  other opposition forces in demanding the revision o f the ongoing land-reform
- tha t a ll land above 200 cad. yokes should be disributed and tha t the redemption
price to be paid fo r land should be o ff ic ia lly  set at a low minimum, w ith  payment
(74)over a period o f at least 50 years and at low in terest rates.
The party's pa rtic ipa tion  in the struggle fo r dem ocratic libe rtie s  and 
social and economic reform s - alongside the bourgeois dem ocratic forces -meant 
a m odifica tion in tac tics  designed to  gain the support o f the masses. I t  did not 
mean, nor did it  result in, a permanent change in the party's s tra teg ic  d irection. 
There is no doubt that the small party un it, so soon a fte r a defeated revolu tion 
and in fac tiona l disarray, to ta lly  overestim ated its po ten tia l a b ility  to  win the 
support o f the masses. Even its, more restric ted , objective o f fig h tin g  not fo r 
im mediate power but to win the support o f the m a jo rity  of the working class and 
to  build the foundations o f a worker-peasant alliance were unrea lis tic  since i t  
overestim ated the degree o f discontent among the workers and the peasants in 
the country.
Since the party was outlawed in Hungary and could not openly operate
and voice its  demands, p rio r to  the Congress, in A p ril 1925, communists, w ith  the
help o f le ft-w in g  socialists -  joined by expelled members o f the Social
Dem ocratic Party and the trade union movement - established the 'Socialist
(75)Workers Party o f Hungary'. This was pa rtly  made possible by the Hungarian
government's re laxation o f cn tro l over the le ft  at the end o f 1924, pa rticu la rly ,
o f course, over the Social Dem ocratic Party, and its to le ra tion  o f the fo rm ation
(76)o f new parties. The government may have wished and hoped to  weaken the 
Social Dem ocratic Party. This newly form ed party, ostensibly an o ff-shoo t o f
-  78 -
the Social Dem ocratic Party advocating 'bourgeois democracy', in re a lity  was 
under the complete contro l o f the communists. I t  was created to  provide a legal 
fro n t fo r  the illega l Communist Party. To avoid autom atic dissolution i t  did not 
jo in  the III. In ternational.
The agrarian programme o f the 'Hungarian Socialist Workers Party '
published in 1926 was a replica o f the 'm in ina l' programme of the Communist
(77)Party. This was the f irs t open agrarian programme of the le ft .  Indeed, the 
in d iffe re n t a ttitude  o f the Social Dem ocratic Party to the ru ra l areas, no doubt 
due la rge ly to  the Bethlen-Peyer Pact, played an im portant role in the 
foundation o f the party. During 1926, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party 
frequently  c ritic iesd  the SDP on th is account. The party, a fte r some in it ia l gains 
among the ru ra l landless and poor peasants had, on the whole, a b r ie f and 
unsuccessful existence. Its h is tory was crammed w ith  arrests, tr ia ls  and 
persecution by the government. Indeed, any upsurge in p o lit ic a l a c tiv itie s  
against the communists resulted in an increased level o f harassment o f a ll 
parties o f the L e ft.
C om itern 'offensive ' tac tics  had many fo llow ers among the extrem ist 
Hungarian emigres. Like the Com intern leadership, the Hungarians too nourished 
great hopes, in 1926, o f an upsurge in the revo lu tionary mood o f the working 
class movement, not only in Hungary but in the whole o f C entra l Europe. 
Preparations fo r th is expected development began earnestly. The decision was 
taken at the Plenary Session o f the C entra l C om m ittee o f the Communist Party, 
in December 1926, a fte r re-exam ination o f the Hungarian s ituation, to  w ithdraw  
some o f the slogans employed by the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) 
because they were deemed unsuitable fo r the changing situation. I t  was argued 
tha t the expected fu tu re  revolu tionary upturn required a more rad ica l approach 
to  slogans, instead o f the types tha t were lega lly  permissible w ith in  the 
fram ew ork o f the HSWP, some o f which -  as a cover party -  made p o lit ic a l
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overtures to  the Social D em ocratic Party (SDP). The 1926 general election,
which the HSWP entered w ith  slogans ca lling  fo r a new land re fo rm  and a
(78)Republic led by a worker-peasant government, resulted in an overwhelm ing
v ic to ry  fo r  the government party  and was a great disappointment fo r the
socialists. The SDP lost some 40 per cent o f its  previous members o f parliam ent
and the HSWP - w ith  which the SDP refused to  run jo in t candidates - fared even
(79)worse, losing a ll the seats i t  contested. This was large ly because its
independent e lection campaign was paralysed by o ffic ia l harassment. This 
e lection debacle, among other factors, in itia ted  a thorough investigation in to  the 
re la tionship between the HSWP and the Communist Party and the a c tiv itie s  and 
the usefulness o f the HSWP in the form  in which it  then existed. R e flec ting  also 
on the antic ipated increase in the in tens ity  o f attacks and harrassment against 
the le ft  as a result of the government's e lection v ic to ry  and subsequent economic 
consolidation, on the one hand, and on the new Comintern view th a t cover 
parties were a righ t-w ing  deviation, on the other hand, the Communist Party 
decided tha t there was no fu rth e r advantage to be gained from  the le ga lity  o f 
the HSWP. The sentiment was expressed at the conference tha t, con tra ry  to 
expectations, the illega l operation o f the Communist Party was adversely 
a ffec ted  by the existence o f the HSWP; tha t the Communist Party re lied  fa r too 
much on operating w ith in  the legal fram ew ork o f HSWP; tha t i t  overestim ated 
its  e lection chances; tha t i t  was generally a mistake not to  have operated openly; 
tha t the pa rty ’s slogans were ambiguous and had been diluted by the existence o f 
the HSWP. In sum, radica l, undiluted communist slogans would have produced 
be tte r results and the ambiguous 'dua lity ' o f the Communist P a rty  had to  be 
term inated. There could be no independent and d iffe re n t slogans and demands in 
the party's legal and illega l operations. The legal operations o f the HSWP has to 
be connected to the Communist Party's overa ll strategy and plan fo r  the struggle 
o f the 'd icta torsh ip o f the p ro le ta ria t' -  to  prevent the possible development o f
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'dem ocratic illusions'. W ithin a short while, however, the Comintern
changed its  view on the emerging revolu tionary s ituation in Centra l Europe again
and the over-zealous Hungarian communiss were discredited fo r th e ir reading of
the Hungarian p o lit ica l s ituation; Com intern now called upon them to  keep the
(81)HSWP alive as a cover party, w ith  d iffe re n t slogans and tac tics  o f its  own.
This advice went la rge ly unheeded in re a lity  and the Hungarian communists
managed only to  cover up th e ir extremism fo r the next two years.
In accordance w ith  th is new concept, the Communist Party reviewed the
agrarian programme o f the HSWP. Its programme, i t  declared, was a 'social
dem ocratic deviation ' and it  insisted on re turn ing to its  own orig inal, undiluted,
communist concept o f land expropriation w ithout compensation and free
red is tribu tion  to  peasants instead of a land reform , and the 'd ic ta torsh ip  o f the
p ro le ta ria t' instead o f a 'dem ocratic republic'. The main drawback o f th is
resolution was, o f course, tha t i t  made the function ing o f the HSWP considerably
more d if f ic u lt .  In the period a fte r February 1927, when some 72 communists 
(82)were arrested , the HSWP found its e lf more and more harrassed, its  meetings
broken-up, or prevented, by the police. Indeed, fo r a ll p ractica l purposes the
party ceased to exist and was eventually dissolved by the Communist Party in 
(83)1928. Having lost its legal base, in the period to fo llow  the Communist Party 
turned increasingly towards the Trade Unions, organising many e ffe c tive  strikes 
and ferm enting discontent among the workers. A fte r  the d is in tegration o f the 
HSWP the Communist Party soon found tha t its  connection and influence in the 
villages had declined considerably. Members o f the fo rm er HSWP e ithe r moved 
back to  the SDP or, in the case o f the most m ilita n t, fo rm a lly  rejoined the 
Communist Party.
In July 1928 an im portant debate, which rad ica lly  changed the party's 
policy, took place at the Plenary Session o f the Centra l C om m ittee o f the 
Communist Party, which met in Prague. I t  was convoked to  discuss the
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message from  the VLCom intern Congress which had devoted a considerable part
o f its  tim e  to  discussing the d is tinc tive  types o f revolutions tha t were applicable
in d iffe re n t countries at d iffe re n t stages o f social and economic development.
For example, in Hungary feudal remnants s t i l l  remained in agricu lture, bourgeois
development was incomplete, but the m inim al basis necessary fo r the build ing o f
socialism was already there. The Congress duly endorsed a resolution tha t some
countries could, possibly fa ir ly  quickly, progress from  bourgeois dem ocratic to
socia list revolution, while in others pro le tarian revolution was possible where the
revo lu tion could play an im portant ro le in providing solutions to  bourgeois
dem ocratic problems. Thus, under the f irs t  instance, i t  was possible tha t the
'd ic ta torsh ip  o f the p ro le ta ria t' could occur at a la te r stage, a fte r  the
(85)'dem ocratic d icta torsh ip  o f workers and peasants’
The resolution at the Congress had in itia ted  a heated debate in the
Hungarian Communist Party. What should happen in Hungary? Should
pro le ta rian revolu tion as a d irec t s tra teg ica l objective o f the Communist Party
be retained? The divergent in terpre ta tions o f the new Com intern line managed
to  sp lit even fu rth e r a Hungarian Communist Party (HCP) already dominated by
fac tiona l dissent. A the end o f 1928 Gyorgy Lukacs prepared a d ra ft discussion
(86)paper, commonly re ferred to as the 'Blum Thesis’. In this, on the basis o f
the Com intern resolution, he advocated tha t the Centra l Com m ittee o f the HCP 
should adopt a new policy d irection  fo r the party's progam me. The essence o f his 
thesis was tha t, instead o f pro le tarian revolu tion and the 'd ic ta to rsh ip  o f the 
p ro le ta ria t' as an im mediate objective the party should adopt the 'dem ocratic 
d ic ta torsh ip  o f workers and peasants'; tha t in Hungary the bourgeoise had grown 
together w ith  the landowners and the la tte r  could only be destroyed by the 
destruction o f the bourgeoise. In the event the Blum Thesis was not adopted by 
the HCP. I t  was re jected on the grounds o f 'r igh t-w ing  opportunism ' and 
'appeasement'. The party stated that the 'd icta torsh ip  o f the p ro le ta ria t' could
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be replaced only by a 'socia lis t' and not a 'dem ocratic ' revolu tion. Had the Blum-
Thesis been adopted, i t  m ight have changed the course o f Communist Party
po litics  in the post-second world war years, when ideology, s tra tegy and tac tics
(87)were a ll thrown in to  the m elting pot.
In 1929 an 'open le t te r1, prepared by Bela Kun et al., was sent to  the
(88 )Centra l Com m ittee o f the HCP. I t  accused the party o f pe rm itting
opportunist elements to  a ttem pt to  d ive rt i t  from  its correct ’p ro le tarian
revolu tionary ' stance and persuade i t  to  adopt the incorrect 'dem ocratic
revolu tionary ' concept. I t  rea ffirm ed tha t no trans itiona l stage existed in the
party's struggle fo r p ro le tarian revolution. This restatem ent o f the s tra teg ica l
objective against the 'sectarian' standpoint seemed to  be ju s tifie d  and was
undoubtedly supported by the unfolding World Economic Crisis in 1929, which,
the le tte r  said, showed tha t s ta b ility  was tem porary and contradictions in
capita lism  were leading to  sharpening class struggle.
A fte r  such antecedents the 2nd Congress o f the HCP was held, in
(89)A prilovka in the Soviet Union, between 25th Feburary and 15th March 1930. 
There were 22 delegates o f whom some came from  Hungary. The numerous 
reports delivered included Bela Kun on the p o lit ica l s ituation in Hungary and 
Jozsef Revai on agricu ltua l questions. A fte r  pro tracted deliberations, re fle c tin g  
in the main, on the crisis o f capita lism , the Congress added very l i t t le  tha t was 
new. On the whole, the party adhered to  its  rig id  sectarian and utopian line, 
ignoring the social, p o lit ica l and economic rea lities  in Hungary. Regarding 
agricu lture  and its  main p o lit ica l slogans i t  returned, in e ffe c t, to  the position 
tha t prevailed at its  f irs t  Congress, in 1925, and confirm ed the 'open le tte r ' o f
1 9 2 9 .^ ^  The Congress endorsed the view tha t the World Economic Depression 
would soon lead to  revolu tion; but the rich  and b e tte r-o ff peasants were beyond 
redemption; the main slogans adopted were: 'overthrow  o f fascism ', reduced 
taxation fo r the peasantry, expropriation, w ithou t compensation and
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red is tribu tion  o f large estates among the poor peasants and landless ag ricu ltu ra l 
workers.
The years o f the Great Depression, as everywhere, h it the Hungarian
economy generally and the agricu ltu ra l sector especially badly. I t  increased
social tensions in the country and presented the HCP w ith  a golden opportun ity
to  in tensify  its  p o lit ic a l ag ita tion among the growing pool o f unemployed
industria l and ag ricu ltu ra l workers, who were organised, w ith  the help o f the
communists, in the ’National U n ity  Com m ittee o f Unemployed' which had some
(91)2000 members in 1930 and increased to  4000 by 1932. The party  had ac tive ly
partic ipa ted  in organising demonstrations and strikes in various parts o f the
country. Its slogans, too, were gradually becoming more m ilita n t, try in g  always
to  outdo the Social Dem ocratic Party in ag ita tion  etc. Inspite o f the favourable
circumstances o ffe red by the Depression, as the Plenary Session o f the C entra l
Com m ittee in March 1932, which has also issued what is called the 'M ilita n t 
(92)Programme', re g re tfu lly  acknowledged because of the inadequate party
structure  and, i t  can be added, because of ill-conce ived, ill- t im e d  operations on
the instructions o f the Comintern, ignoring local conditions, the pa rty  fa iled  to
create un ity  amongst organised, unorganised and unemployed workers. I t  also
fa iled  to  establish a united fro n t w ith  the SDP inspite o f many o ffe rs , including
one w ith in  the 'M ilita n t Programme' fram ew ork in 1932 and the a tte m p t in 1933
on Com intern instructions. These fa ilu res were due pa rtly  to  opposition by the
divided trade union movement and pa rtly  to  the fa c t tha t the SDP did not wish to
conclude any deal w ith  the HCP, pa rtly , perhaps, fo r fear o f jeopardising its
legal status. But even the alliance o ffe r  in 1934, w ith  a convenient 'legal
(93)pro tection ' clause, fa iled  to  a ttra c t the SDP. Com petition and o ften  d irec t
h o s tility  between the two parties grew over the years and it  was only in 1935
tha t the HCP changed tac tics  to  a ttem pting  to  establish a le ft-w in g  group
(94)sym pathetic towards i t  w ith in  the SDP.
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The 'M ilita n t Programme', on the whole, rea ffirm ed the revolutionary
demands o f the 2nd Congress. A special section was devoted to  agricu lture . The
expropriation o f large estates, w ithout compensation, and free  red istribu tion,
remained the principa l goal, in line w ith  the resolution o f the 2nd Congress.
A part from  this, a number o f piecemeal demands were added: funds put aside fo r
compensation o f 'optional' landowners (those whose lands had been confiscated by
neighbouring countries a fte r the Trianon dismemberment) were to be used to
a llev ia te  the economic hardship o f the poor and the unemployed; wages were to
be improved and be tte r employment opportunities created by public works; land
rented by smallholders, to  supplement th e ir livelihood, was also to  be
expropriated, w ithout compensation, and redistributed to  the tenants; to ta l tax
exemption was demanded fo r poor peasants and a 75 per cent reduction fo r
middle peasants - who were now also included along w ith  poor peasants.
Furtherm ore, m artia l law, proclaimed in 1931, which had substantia lly res tric ted
(95)the clandestine operation o f the party, was to  be suspended. Against th is 
background, care must, however, be exercised not to  give the impression tha t the 
HCP, by managing to instigate demonstrations and strikes, was a p o lit ic a l force 
to  reckon w ith . In re a lity  the party  had a low membership, its  organisation was 
inadequate and its  a c tiv ity  was o ften reduced to  propaganda in the trade unions 
and the SDP. Its membership in 1931-1932 amounted to  no more than a few 
hundreds and its  d irect in fluence extended to  a few th o u s a n d s /^  The party 
faced great d iff ic u ltie s  in rec ru iting  new members. This was pa rtly  due to its  
basic lack o f appeal, pa rticu la rly  in the villages where re lig ion  was especially 
strong, and naturally, Kun's Soviet Republic o f 1919 was s t i l l  v iv id ly  remembered 
-  people disliked communists and Russians. Also i t  was d if f ic u lt  fo r anyone to  
jo in  the party. In a sense, the party had to  jo in  any aspirant. These aspirants 
could only hope tha t by playing an active role in the trade union movement they 
would come to the notice o f the clandestine party organisation.
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Throughout the 1930s and up to  the end o f the Second World War, the 
party was in a state o f permanent crisis. Its b rie f h istory was characterised, on 
the one hand, by persecution, arrests, tr ia ls  and executions, on the other hand, 
fra n tic  attem pts at constructing a ’popular fron t'. Both o f these trends became 
more and more in tensified as the in terna l p o lit ica l c lim ate  moved increasingly 
towards the 'r igh t'. The in troduction o f m artia l law in 1931 created many 
d iff ic u lt ie s  fo r the party. A lthough the party became more cautious and carefu l 
not to  engage in actions de trim enta l to  its  weak organisation, the zeal w ith  
which the police pursued i t  nevertheless claimed many v ic tim s. The pa rty  could 
hardly recover from  the system atic attacks by the police authorities, e.g., in 
1932, 1935, 1940 and 1942, which in flic te d  heavy losses on it .
The VII. Congress o f the Comintern was convoked in the summer o f 1935,
in Moscow, in the face o f ris ing fascism. Indeed, the Congress iden tified  fascism
as the most im m ediate danger to communism and a threat to  bourgeois
democracy. To combat th is development the task facing in te rna tiona l
communism was to create a 'popular fro n t' in defence o f communism and,
ta c tic a lly , o f bourgeois dem ocratic libe rties. To put th is in to practice , the
'sectarianism ' and 'instant pro le tarian d ictatorsh ip ' adopted at the end o f 1928,
when the Blum-Thesis was rejected, and which were characte ris tic  o f Com intern
policies, were now rejected in favour o f creation o f a broad dem ocratic fro n t
against fascism and re-adoption o f the trans itiona l stage theory to  provide tim e
fo r the working classes to  prepare fo r a socialist revolu tion. The Congress used
local communist parties to  establish a united fro n t w ith  workers' parties,
(97)especially w ith  the SDP. The new line transform ed the Social Democrats 
almost overnight from  'social fascists' in to acceptable, even coveted, allies. 
Although aimed large ly at the socialists, the sp in -o ff e ffe c t o f the new line was 
to  appease the peasants.
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The result o f the Comintern resolution in Hungary was to  condemn at the 
same tim e  the rig id , sectarianism, revo lu tionary dogmatism and constant 
in figh ting  tha t raged among the Kun leadership -  hindering the pa rty ’s 
development. Although, a fte r the resolution, Kun acknowledged his e rro r in 
c ling ing to the old theory o f establishing a 'second Soviet Republic’ he showed 
l i t t le  lik in g  fo r, and attem pted to  delay the application of, the Com intern 
ins truc tion  requiring a popular united fro n t policy. The Com intern therefo re  
dismissed the entire  Centra l Com m ittee o f the HCP in May 1 9 3 6 .^ ^  
Concurrently, Com intern’s cadre department ordered the home party to  suspend 
its  operation pending a reorganisation and to  present a clean slate fo r  the 'united 
fro n t', to  be established fo r the 'common interests o f a ll working people' fo r  an 
an ti-fasc is t, an ti-cap ita lis t alliance. The dissolution in 1936 had a lasting e ffe c t 
on the fortunes o f the party, marking the beginning o f a period o f almost to ta l 
d islocation which was to last u n til 1944.
The complete reorganisation o f the party and the preparation o f a new
programme, in the summer o f 1936, were entrusted to a newly appointed
(99)Provisional Secretaria t w ith  its headquarters in Prague. And to  advance the 
'united fro n t' po licy the new programme now accepted the 'trans itiona l stage' 
theory and called fo r a common fig h t fo r a dem ocratic Hungary. Since, however, 
a united, popular fro n t policy could not possibly be successful w ithou t the 
support o f the m a jo rity  o f the peasants, the party  also had to  m odify its  ta c tic a l 
standpoint on the worker-peasant alliance. As shown earlier, the party  trea ted  
the agrarian question as an in tegra l part o f the struggle fo r the d ic ta to rsh ip  o f 
the p ro le ta ria t. But, while i t  openly and decisive ly championed the liqu ida tion  o f 
the large estates, w ithout compensation, it  showed less enthusiasm fo r  the free  
d is tribu tion  o f land to  the peasants. Now the new programme c la rifie d  and 
rea ffirm ed  some points when it  declared tha t i t  was in favour o f a universal 
dem ocratic land reform  and o f making the land the peasants' inalienable
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property. In order to  lay the foundation fo r a successful popular fro n t po licy the 
party  decided to  steer clear o f the concept o f an agrarian revolu tion, which 
would have achieved the m obilisation only o f the lower s tra ta  o f the peasantry 
and the landless agrarian w o rke rs /*® ^  The new programme also included 
strengthening the trade unions and cooperating w ith  the SDP, w ith in  which i t  was 
to  fig h t fo r the adoption o f the 'correct* p ro le ta ria t policy, so as to  tu rn  tha t 
party in to a ’true party o f the pro le tarian class s t r u g g le '/ * ^  This in e ffe c t 
represented, on the ideological plane, the last major deliberation o f the party  on 
agricu lture  p rio r to Hungary's entry in to the war on 26th June 1941. W ith a 
Provisional Secretariat in Prague and disbandment and confusion in the ranks o f 
the home based communists, the party had l i t t le  tim e to spare fo r  pragm atic 
policy statements. It was d istracted by its  own in terna l organisational problems.
During subsequent years the party continued its  precarious 'clandestine' 
a c tiv itie s  amid confusion and distrust created by the 1936 Com intern dissolution 
and the Moscow tria ls  and purges. Several attem pts were made to revive the 
movement in Hungary. F irs t, in March 1937, the Comintern instructed the HCP 
to  reconstitu te  an illega l party centre, in Hungary, and also to  re-launch a new 
underground paper, Dolgozok Lapja, printed in Prague. Its d is tribu tion  network, 
however was destroyed w ith in  a year by the police authorities and the party 
centre fa iled  to  m ateria lise .(102) Communists in Hungary fo r some years to  
come in tensified the ir ac tiv ities , mainly outside the fo rm a l party  network, 
w ith in  workers' organisation, especially in the SDP and the trade union 
movement. The ir in fluence there, pa rticu la rly  among the le f t  factions, 
increased but the establishment o f a 'united front* eluded them. A t the same 
tim e the party d irected its  a tten tion  more and more towards ce rta in  groups o f 
the illigen ts ia  and its  relations, especially, when the populist movement and the 
'March Front' were growing stronger. Second, a fte r a lapse o f three years, in
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January 1940, a small d irec ting  organ, the 'Organ o f P o litica l D irec tion ' was 
established on the in it ia t iv e  o f Hungarian communists operating in Paris. A 
number o f other units also operated in fo rm a lly  and separtely among various 
groups o f wokers. To consolidate these groups the Comintern had called on the 
HCP in September 1940 again to  set up a centra l leadership in Budapest, though 
w ithout the old activ is ts , so as to avoid detection. But because o f the outbreak 
o f the war the order only reached Hungary, via the Czech Communist Party, in 
1942, and in any case was ignored as u n re a lis t ic .^ * ^  Third, in January 1941, 
a fte r the fo rm ation  o f a new Comintern Secrtaria t, a reorganisation and the 
reconstruction o f a new Centra l Com m ittee were atempted - f irs t  from  Paris, 
then from  Moscow - but i t  only lasted fo r a short tim e. I t  was argued tha t w ith  
the two Vienna Awards, the te rr ito r ie s  annexed from  Carpathian Ukraine, 
Romania and, most im portan tly , Czechoslovakia, contained thousands o f m ilita n t 
communists, whose re tu rn  to  Hungary now offe red a new p o lit ica l dimension and 
possibilities fo r  action fo r the H C P . ^ ^  The party, however, fa iled  to  come up 
w ith  a coherent programme tha t was capable o f gaining support in the country.
W ith the outbreak o f the Second World War, and Hungary's en try on the 
side o f Germany against the Soviet Union, the HCP's com m unication w ith  
in terna tiona l com mittees, and w ith  Moscow especially, came to  an end. The ir 
relations were only resumed a fte r the a rriva l o f the Soviet Arm ed Forces in 
1944.
A t the tu rn  o f 1942-43 alerted and re inforced by the decisive and 
successful offensive o f the Red Army, the party began to  recognise its  ranks and 
revived the question o f partic ipa tion  in an independence fro n t among the 
socialist le f t  to  consolidate the an ti-fasc is t forces. In A p ril 1943 the 
reconstitu ted home Centra l Com m ittee issued its  own, second, 'M ilita n t 
Programme' -  on s im ila r lines to the one developed, and broadcasted, by the 
Hungarian emigres in M o s c o w . C o n t a i n i n g  12 points, the programme
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expounded the urgent need fo r  a national collaboration e ffo r t  and a common 
programme in the struggle fo r national independence and called fo r preparations 
to  extrad ite  Hungary from  the war e ffo rt by means o f a separate peace. The 
focus o f the programme was not on how to organise this struggle but ra ther on 
the question o f dem ocratic transform ation o f post-war Hungary. A ll parties of 
the le f t  agreed on the necessity, indeed the in ev itab ility , o f in troducing social 
reform s a fte r the war ended. They were to  be accomplished w ithout the active 
pa rtic ipa tion  o f revolu tionary masses, a lesson learned from  the mistakes of 
1919, in order to  avoid disruption and revolu tion and w ith in  the fram ew ork of 
bougeois democracy, in which the HCP was to  partic ipate . Because o f th is the 
party renounced mass m obilisation and disapproved o f any national collaboration 
plan from  which it  was exluded. The programme also included an independent 
industria l policy, and, on agricu lture , a land reform  -expropria tion  and 
red is tribu tion  o f estates above the size o f 300 cadastral yokes, free o f charge fo 
those who actually worked the land and to  fam ilies whose breadwinners had 
perished during the war or became prioners o f war. In May 1943, just before the 
dissolution o f Comintern, a fin a l a ttem pt was made to reach understanding w ith  
the socialist le ft .  Discussions, however, ended w ithout a rriv ing  at an acceptable 
agreement, largely because the HCP was unw illing  to abandon the use o f illega l 
methods. Rejected by other p o lit ica l groupings, the Centra l C om m ittee o f the 
HCP engaged in a heated debate in June about changing the illega l pa rty  in to  a 
legal p o lit ica l un it. As a result, in July 1943, the Budapest branch o f home 
communists public ly announced the fo rm a l dissolution o f th  HCP -  the fou rth  
tim e in its  h istory, but th is tim e  by its  own vo lition  -  and it  reconstitu ted  its e lf 
under the name 'Peace P a r t y ' . ^ ^  The liqu idation o f the HCP was, o f course, a 
mere fo rm a lity  w ithout any change in substance and previous polic ies were 
readopted w ithout m odifica tion. There were several resons fo r th is  ta c tic a l 
step. F irs tly , i t  was argued by the party tha t a fte r the dissolution o f the
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Comintern the HCP lost the raison d'etre to  continue under its  existing name and 
organisational form , which prevented the party from  pursuing the an ti-fasc is t 
stuggle. Secondly, i t  was to  perm it cooperation w ith  other opposition parties in 
the underground 'Hungarian Front' established shortly a fte r  the German 
occupation in May 1944 - in order to  enable them to  create a common fro n t 
against the war and fascism, and to  help the organisation o f a national resistance 
movement. The 'Hungarian Front' was eventually created by the underground 
leaders o f the Smallholders' Party, the SDP and the HCP. La te r the inc ip ient 
NPP was, on communist instigation, also invited to  jo in . Fourth ly, i t  was hoped 
tha t this ta c tic a l step would d ive rt police a tten tion  and make persecution less 
e ffic ie n t. Two waves o f arrests, in 1940 and 1942, had decimated the party's 
membership and its  existence was hardly more than symbolic, and the C.C. 
leadership saw this ta c tic  as the only way fo r the hard-h it pa rty  to  survive. 
However, the move fa iled since the police authorities soon knew tha t the 'Peace 
Party ' was a communist fro n t and did not relax th e ir persecution. Nor did the 
opposition parties, inc identa lly , change th e ir a ttitude  towards the communists. 
The ta c tica l dissolution succeeded, however, in creating confusion and 
uncerta in ty among the party's own followers. When the war ended, and the 
'Muscovite' branch o f communists returned from  the Soviet Union they expressed 
th e ir displeasure to  the 'Budapest' leaders about th is dissolution and accused 
them of misjudging the logic o f why the Soviet communists had sacrificed  the 
Comintern to  the interests o f the an ti-fasc is t s t r u g g le / * ^  Some, e.g., Janos 
Kadar, paid a heavy penalty fo r th is act during the post-1949 period. The 
Centra l Com m ittee o f the 'Peace Party ' issued calls fo r  armed resistance and 
sabotage, through thousands o f propaganda leafle ts, also ca lling  on peasants to 
hold back th e ir produce from  Germany. The party's a c tiv itie s  proved somewhat 
in e ffec tive , its  ca ll fo r action was large ly ignored and re ta lia tio n  by the 
authorities, w ith  arrests and the destruction o f its  illega l press, were soon to 
fo llow .*108)
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The last o ff ic ia l act o f the party a fte r the German occupation, when the 
'Peace Party ' had run its  course, was to  reconstitu te  its e lf under its  old name 
'Communist Party ' -  but dropping the words 'o f Hungary'. During the German 
occupation, when a ll opposition parties were dissolved, the pa rty  made some 
progress in coordinating a modicum o f resistance movement and in consolidating 
the an ti-fasc is t forces in preparation fo r a dem ocratic post-war period. The 
communists, o f course, -  much more than any other party - were accustomed to 
operate under clandestine conditions. The 'Hungarian Front' increased its 
a c tiv itie s , procla im ing a new struggle fo r freedom, a new 'popular war' against 
the Germans, fo r the foundation o f a free dem ocratic Hungary. I t  m odified its 
previous staandpoint, tha t i t  was possible to  ex trica te  Hungary from  the war by 
re ly ing  on the Western powers and stated tha t 'the Soviet Union does not 
endanger, ra ther it  defends our national in d e p e n d e n c e .'^ ^
The new leadership o f the reorganised Centra l Com m ittee a ttem pted 
once again to  forge the elusive Hungarian Front in to  an e ffe c tive  p o lit ic a l 
alliance. To achieve this the in it ia l plan prepared by Gyula Ka llay and Laszlo 
Rajk in September 1944, an tic ipa ting  a 'un ified workers' party combining the SDP 
and CP -postponed eventually to  peacetime - and ca lling  fo r the establishment o f 
a 'rad ica l people's democracy' was ta tic a lly  d ilu ted to  win the support o f the 
entire  SDP and Trade Union Council. Soon a fte r  th is the Smallholders' and 
National Peasant Parties joined the Hungarian Front. The dem ocratic parties - 
which believed in a p lu ra lis tic  dem ocratic system a fte r the war -  remained 
suspicious o f the communists, fearing the ominous possib ility  tha t the CP would 
deploy the support o f the Soviet Union and, o f course, the presence of the Red 
A rm y to  establish a 'd icta torsh ip  o f the p ro le ta ria t'. To a llev ia te  these 
suspicions, Gyula Kallay and Laszlo Rajk prepared a 'D ra ft Programme o f the 
C entra l Com m ittee o f the Communist Party ' in October 1 9 4 4 ^ *^  in order to 
explain the communist version o f democracy. A f te r  discussions i t  was to  be
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subm itted to  the parties grouped around the Hungarian Front. However, because 
o f the coup d 'e tat by the A rrow  Cross Party on 15th October 1944, imposing a 
nazi-sty le  to ta lita r ia n  government, and the subsequent arrest o f Laszlo Rajk, 
these discussions did not take place. This s tillbo rn  document consisting o f 17 
points was conc ilia to ry  in tone and could not be called over-rad ica l. The broad 
premises i t  suggested were as follows: declaration o f a people's republic; a ll 
working s tra ta  to  pa rtic ipa te  in the ru ling  o f a dem ocratic state, founded on a 
worker-peasant dem ocratic government; re jection  o f to ta l expropriation, but 
support fo r rad ica l re fo rm  o f cap ita l and priva te  property re la tions to  prevent 
exp lo ita tion, speculation and the creation o f unemployment by cap ita lis t classes. 
Point 6 o f the programme dealt w ith  agricu lture. Here the programme 
re ite ra ted  - and to  some extent expanded -  the party's previous po licy demanding 
a radica l solution to the problems o f the peasantry by: cancellation o f a ll except 
a narrow concept o f priva te  and personal debts; expropriation o f a ll estates over 
200 cadastral yokes, complete w ith  implements, w ithout compensation and th e ir 
d is tribu tion  to the peasants -  w ith  the exceptions o f state studs, model estates 
and fo res try  -  to  be carried out by dem ocratica lly  elected com m ittees; in terest 
free cred it to those receiv ing land, to  enable them to  contribu te  to  ag ricu ltu ra l 
production as soon as possible.
In Moscow, meanwhile, under the d irection  o f the Soviet Union, those 
Hungarian commmunists who survived the S talin ist purges also began to  prepare 
fo r  the post-war period. A t roughly the same tim e, in September and early 
October 1944, the External Com m ittee o f the HCP was meeting in Moscow to 
discuss the proposals subm itted by Jozsef Revai and Erno Gero regarding the 
policies to be adopted in Hungary a fte r the w a r . ^ * ^  Conscious o f Hungarian 
m istrust o f communism, the prolonged debates resulted in the adoption o f a 
gradual transform ation strategy. I t  was w idely believed tha t conditions in 
Hungary were not ripe fo r  an immediate declaration o f the 'd ic ta to rsh ip  o f the
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p ro le ta ria t’. A l l other parties, to  d iffe r in g  degrees, were in favour o f re form s on 
a w ider fro n t but none were in favour o f pro le ta rian d ictatorsh ip, nor o f a 
socialised economy.
A fte r  pro tracted  debates a document -  prepared in Moscow but revised 
fin a lly  by Revai and Gero a fte r they arrived in occupied Hungarian te r r ito ry  - 
was published in the Debrecen 'Neplap' on 30th November 1944 under the t i t le  
'Programme fo r  the Dem ocratic Recovery and Reconstruction o f Hungary: the 
HCP's Proposal' Since it  was accepted at the general m eeting o f the
Szeged 'N ationa l Com m ittee ' - composed o f the HCP, SDP, SHP, NPP, Bourgeois 
Dem ocratic party and the trade unions -  i t  was commonly refered to  as the 
'Szeged Programme'. With the publication o f this programme the ea rlie r 'D ra ft 
Programme ....', prepared by Kallay and Rajk - which was designed to  serve a 
s im ila r purpose - was superseded. The d iffe rence between them, as w e ll as the 
programme itse lf, w ill be discussed la te r in greater deta il. For the moment i t  
suffices to  say tha t the new programme was more radica l in tone and already 
c learly  showed the ta c tica l divergence between the 'M uscovite' and the 
indigenous Home communists, re fle c tin g  rad ica lly  d iffe re n t p o lit ic a l rea lities , 
th inking and environments.
By th is tim e, o f course, the Red A rm y had already penetrated fa r  in to  
Hungarian te rr ito ry . The population began to  worry deeply about a Soviet 
version o f 'libe ra tion '. The 'Muscovite' communists, a fte r years o f S ta lin is t 
fears, hum ilita tion , imprisonment and exile, in toxicated by the prospect o f 
power, began steadily to f i l te r  home. The domestic communists were eagerly 
aw aiting them. Fervent p o lit ica l ac tiv itie s  im m ediate ly began in the 'libe ra ted ' 
te rr ito r ie s  when the two communist centres merged. But it  did not take long to  
see the 'w ritin g  on the wall', that the 'M uscovite' communists would dom inate the 
post-war p o lit ic a l scenario.
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2.6 The Hungarian Social Dem ocratic Party (HSDP)
Some reference had already been made to  this old, and complex, party  in 
re la tion  to  the HCP, its  main riva l, and w ith in  the context o f other parties. I t  is 
now a ttem pt to trace, in some deta il, the p o lit ica l p ro file  o f the SDP, its  
ideological stance, its  aspirations and achievements, la rgely in the sphere of 
agricu lture  but also to  provide a fram ew ork fo r  the p o lit ica l l i fe  and main tends 
during the p e r io d /* * ^
The Hungarian Social Dem ocratic party ' began its  life  in May 1880, under 
the name of Hungarian General Workers' P a r ty /*  * ^  The programme o f the 
party was, in many ways more socialist at this earlie r tim e than la te r. It 
advocated universal franchise, nationalisation o f finance and the key sectors o f 
the economy. In agricu lture , it  favoured the establishment o f producer's 
c o o p e ra tiv e s /**^  Although much troubled by in terna l s tr ife  and m ilita n t 
tendencies from  its  more revo lu tionary members, the party  survived to 
partic ipa te  in the founding Congress o f the Second In te rnationa l. S a tis facto ry  
resolution o f in ternal s tr ife  and growing labour m ilitancy contribu ted towards 
increased socialist confidence and led to  the form ation , in 1888, o f the SDP in 
the Austrian ha lf o f the empire. Over the years to come th is party  exerted a 
great influence on its  Hungarian sister party and working clas movement, 
resulting in the la tte r's  adoption o f the name Hungarian Scial D em ocratic P arty  
(HSDP) in December 1 8 9 o /* * ^  The new party  came in to  existence w ith  a 
bourgeois dem ocratic progamme which was in e ffe c t more o f a sta tem ent o f 
principles than a programme. It  foresaw the eventual liqu ida tion  o f cap ita lism  
by the p ro le ta ria t. But in view o f the problems facing the party  in re a lity  under 
the prevailing p o litica l and socioeconomic c lim ate in Hungary i t  perceived its  
imm ediate task as not the liqu idation o f capitalism  but to  organise and develop 
the working-class movement, seeking improvement in the working conditions o f 
labour and o ften re ite ra ted  goal o f widening the franchise. L ike its  A ustrian
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bretheren it  did not a ttem pt to  devote its  energies to  agrarian problems or to 
deal w ith  peasant demands. I t  considered tha t the Socialist Workers’ Movement 
was too under-developed and weak to  include ag ricu ltu ra l demands in its 
programme of dem ocratic t ra n s fo rm a t io n .^ ^  The growing d iff ic u lt ie s  created 
fo r  the ra ther in e ffic ie n t agricu lture  by overseas com petition together w ith  ru ra l 
unrest and the increasing problems of underemployment and unemployment, 
however, forced the party to  raise the problem o f agricu lture  at its  Congress in 
1894. The main aim was then seen as the development o f a b ro therly  alliance 
between workers and peasants. I t  also advocated the socialisation and the 
development of large-scale operation o f industria l and ag ricu ltu ra l production 
units. This was not, however, linked to  a demand fo r the break-up o f large 
estates, nor did the party support the demands o f poor and landless peasants fo r 
land red istribu tion . On the whole, the party expressed its  desire to socialise 
church and entailed land, in order to  establish modern fa rm ing  units to  be 
managed - as industria lisation progressed -  by the ag ricu ltu ra l workers 
th e m s e lv e s .^ ^  Thus, by this tim e the party seems to have m odified its  ea rlie r 
concept -  set out in 1880 - o f establishing ag ricu ltu ra l producers’s cooperatives. 
I t  remained, however, com m itted to modern large-scale farm s but w ithou t the 
necessity o f dem ocratic, radica l land red istribu tion .
The increasingly e ffe c tive  socialist ag ita tion  among the workers and 
poor peasants in the mid 1890s resulted in growing government repression and 
police persecution. This presented the party w ith  a dilemma, causing a sp lit at 
the party ’s 4th Congress in 1896, regarding the respective m erits o f compromise 
and m ilitancy. D ifferences deepened fu rth e r by its  5th Congress in 1897 on 
ideological and policy questions in respect o f agricu lture . A fte r  p ro tracted , and 
often heated, debate the Congress rejected the demands o f its  more rad ica l le f t -  
wing members who were subsequently expelled from  the party. A new la rge ly 
agrarian-oriented party was formed in September 1897 by these expelled
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members under the name of 'Independent Socialist Party', led by Istvan Varkonyi, 
a fo rm er ag ricu ltu ra l worker expelled from  the HSDP because o f his insistence 
on the land red is tribu tion  question. For a while th is new party  commanded a 
modicum o f support, mostly among the more rad ica l elements o f the agrarian 
w o rk e rs /* * ^  For the f irs t  tim e  in Hungary's h istory i t  drew a programme fo r  
land re form , which was pa rticu la rly  strongly supported by agrarian labourers in 
the Trans-Tisza regions. A predictable response from  the authorities was 
attem pts to  re s tr ic t the ac tiv ities  o f th is party, by police persecution leading to  
arrests and the imprisonment o f its  leader, the banning o f its  newspaper and its  
eventual outlaw ing by the a u th o r i t ie s / * ^  So, at the tu rn  o f the century 
socialism in Hungary was ideologically ra ther weak, splintered, w ith  a narrow 
basis o f s t i l l  ra ther cautious industria l workers and growing pockets o f m ilita n t 
agrarian workers.
In the face o f increasing in terna l d iff ic u ltie s  the HSDP reorganised its e lf 
in 1900 and the adoption o f an agrarian programme at its  10th Congress in 1903 
led to  a considerable d im inution in the influence o f the 'Independent Socialist 
Party ', especially a fte r 1906 when increasing peasants' discontent and growing 
unemployment brought about the fo rm ation  o f the 'Hungarian Peasant P arty ' -  
essentially a regional party - under the leadership o f Andras L Ach im , a peasant 
p o l i t ic ia n / * ^  This new agrarian party gained many - but by no means a ll - o f 
its  supporters from  disillusioned members o f the 'Independent Socialist P arty '. 
The recru itm en t o f members o f the Hungarian Peasant party  was p a rticu la rly  
strong and successful in the South-East o f the Trans-Tisza region, commonly 
known as the 'storm y corner' (Viharsarok) o f Hungary, a province o f great 
agrarian discontent. A t its Congress in Bekescsaba in 1908 th is  newly form ed 
party adopted an agrarian programme opposing the landed property system, 
which went beyond the proposals o f the HSDP. I t  demanded, in te r a lia  
red istribu tion  o f a ll estates above the size o f 1000 cadastral yokes, the
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nationalisation o f a ll church and entailed land, the provision o f cheap cred its  to
(122)farm ers and increased and more progressive taxation o f the riche r farm ers.
Its leader, Andras L. Achim , was re-e lected to  Parliam ent in 1910 where he
constantly, and heatedly, argued the case fo r land re form  and against the large
estate system. Because o f this, he was continually harassed by the authorities,
his party was under constant police surveillance, leading to  his eventual
(123)assassination, in 1911. A fte r  his death the Hungarian Peasant Party
disintegrated and its  place was pa rtly  f ille d  by the o thr new party , the
’Independent Smallholders’ and Husbandrymen Party ' led by Istvan Nagyatadi-
Szabo. S till on the agrarian fron t, a ’National Association o f Hungarian
A g ricu ltu ra l Workers', under the leadership o f Gy. Nyisztor, was established in 
(124)January 1906. Its existence, however, was extrem ely short; because o f its
radicalism  and its a ttem pt to organise the agrarian p ro le ta ria t o f f ic ia l 
persecution soon destroyed it .  About this tim e many peasants, the more rad ica l 
elements, were sent to prison under the law promulgated in 1906 which placed all 
farmhands below the age o f 18 at the complete disposal o f the land owner. This 
law exended in 1907 to  l im it  the personal freedom and geographical m ob ility  o f 
a ll farmhands.(125)
The economic recession which spread across Europe between 1900 and 
1903 had a much less serious e ffe c t on Hungarian industry than in some of the 
more advanced European countries. Its  adverse social and economic im pact was, 
however, quite im portant in the sphere o f agrarian employment, in a country 
where about tw o-th irds o f the labour force was s t i l l  ac tive ly  engaged in 
agricu lture  and where only a small number o f workers could be absorbed by 
industria l development. The bottom  o f the recession was reached in 1903 and 
was followed by stagnation u n til about 1906, a fte r which a slow recovery set in 
lasting u n til 1913, only to  be fo llowed by a new downturn. The e ffe c t o f th is 
uncertain cyc lica l pa tte r on agricu ltu ra l employment was devastating. Between
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1900 and 1914 some 1.5 m illion  workers em igrated overseas in search of 
employment. About 70 per cent o f these em igrants came from  ru ra l national
/ i o c \
m inorities o f Slovaks, Romanians, Ukrainans and south-east Slavs.
It  was against th is  background tha t the 10th Congress o f the HSDP was
convoked in A p ril 1903. The Congress elaborated a long overdue programme fo r
agricu lture  in which, in te r a lia , i t  proposed the nationalisation o f church land,
the prohib ition o f the sale o f state and communally held land and its  ren ting  to
workers' cooperatives, the abolition o f the entire  system o f entailed land to
make way fo r the 'revolution is ing force o f capita lism ' to  take the place of 
(127)feudalism . While ideologically the programme was, perhaps, more socia list
than previous resolutions, on the whole i t  was very narrow and the party, very 
cautiously, declined to  support peasant demands and rejected the concept o f land 
red is tribu tion  on ideological grounds in preference fo r a functiona l re fo rm  in 
agricu lture .
To th is extent, from  the point o f view o f the peasantry, the party 's
proposals were modest and cautious. I t  was fo llow ing, ra ther than leading the
other bourgeois libe ra l parties on the question o f agricu lture , which was not the
foca l point o f in terest fo r the party. In the period up to  and including World War
I, the princip le goals o f the party remained the organisation o f industria l labour,
recru itm en t in to  and consolidating the trade union movement and, most
im portan tly , the continued and p a rtia lly  successful p o lit ica l struggle fo r
(128)universal suffrage and secret ballo t. This was perceived as a ra the r ind irec t 
way to  obtain, in the end, some of the land owned by gentry.
The party ta ilo red  its  tac tics  in such a way as to  avoid upsetting the
ru ling  e lite , who feared the consequence o f democracy tha t would pe rm it the
partic ipa tion  o f the urban and rura l p ro le ta ria t. For th is reason measures to  
inh ib it the growth o f industria l and ag ricu ltu ra l labour organisations m u ltip lied . 
As a result, even the more acceptable HSDP became more and more inward
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looking, preoccupied p rim arily  w ith  trade unionism. A lim ite d  success was 
scored by the party in 1912 when the new franchise reform  law extended voting 
rights, subject to  qua lifica tion  and wealth, from  6 to  10 per cent o f the po tentia l 
e lecto ra te .*129*
The radica lisation process in the country, in itia ted  by the war, was 
enhanced by the Russian Revolution and gained added impetus a fte r  the 
d is in tegration o f the Dual-Monarchy. A n tic ipa ting  major p o lit ic a l changes, the 
HSDP convoked an extraord inary Congress on 13th October 1918, to  discuss the 
princip le  goals the party should adopt, and the way to  achieve them, under the 
changed conditions. The main theme of the Congress was ’Peace and the Future 
o f Hungary.'*199* I t  concerned its e lf only m arginally w ith  the question o f 
agricu lture . I t  le f t  the question o f land reform  de liberate ly open and vague, 
made no recommendation regarding, e.g., the lim its  of estates above which land 
was to  be redistributed, the question o f compensation or,-indeed, i f  i t  was to  be 
paid by the recipients of the land. The main speaker at the Congress, 
representing the cen tris t leadership o f the Kautsky tra d itio n  was Zsigmond 
Kunfi. In his address he dismissed the strategy o f 'a ll power to  soldiers', workers' 
and peasants' councils' as inapplicable to  Hungarian conditions. He argued tha t 
the party  was not strong enough to  impose a programme un ila te ra lly  and 
proposed a renewed alliance w ith  bourgeois libe ra l parties. He believed tha t in 
tha t new alliance, under the new p o lit ica l c lim ate , the HSDP would lead ra the r 
than fo llow .*191* This view was challenged by a vocal le ft-w in g  fa c tio n  which 
presented a more radica l p o lit ica l programme, demanding the 'liqu ida tion  o f the 
vestiges o f feudalism in Hungary' and tha t 'in  the fu tu re  workers and peasants 
should have a decisive voice in running th e ir  a ffa irs ', red is tribu tion  o f a ll land 
which could not be worked by the owner and his imm ediate fa m ily  on th e ir  own 
and the setting up o f agricu ltu ra l producers' cooperatives on the expropriated 
land. This view, however, was not endorsed by the Congress. Nor
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was the view of another le ft-w in g  speaker, Jozsef Landler - la te r  to  jo in  the
Communist Party -  who challenged Kunfi's assessment tha t the party  was too
weak to  go it  alone w ithout any alliance. But he ra ther cautiously did not re jec t
ou trigh t possible collaboration w ith  other bourgeois libe ra l parties but introduced
an amendment, which was in the event endorsed by the Congress, tha t the HSDP
(132)should fig h t a ll parties which did not accept its  programme.
The beginning o f 1919 saw a decisive increse in the spontaneous
occupation o f land by the agrarian landless in several provinces. Increasingly,
the question o f land re fo rm  became the foca l point in the countryside. The
HSDP's leadership accepted the concept o f compensation fo r dispossessed
landlords but was not enthusiastic about land red is tribu tion , favouring instead
using the land to  develop a cooperative movement. This was in line w ith  the
Kautsky tra d itio n  o f favouring large-scale farm ing. In the f in a l analysis,
however, the party accepted the wishes o f the other bourgeois libe ra l parties,
which proposed to  transfe r the land to p riva te  farm ing. The Budapest Workers'
Council discussed the question o f land reform  as early as 13th December 1918.
This Council was dominated by the HSDP, but was also w e ll in filt ra te d  by the
communists. The HSDP's leadership, at that meeting, agreed to  a compromise of
lim ite d  land red is tribu tion  w ith  compensation, in the form  o f bond issue. The
upper l im it  o f land proposed was 200 cadastral yokes, above which i t  was to  be
d istribu ted , but a maximum o f 500 cad. yokes could be owned, as unsufructuary,
(133)e ithe r in p riva te  hands or by companies. This was also the po licy  o f the
other bourgeois libe ra l parties regarding agricu lture , and was accepted by the 
HSDP. The communist view expresed at th is m eeting was d iffe re n t. While 
making ta c tic a l concessions fo r  the re ten tion  o f p riva te  farm ing, which they 
believed under the circumstances p o lit ic a lly  could not be refused, they 
advocated the expropriation o f large and medium-sized estates. A Nationa l 
Congress, composed o f the representatives o f the organisations o f the ru ra l
pro le ta ria t, should then decide i f  fa rm ing was to  be based on large-scale 
communal or small-scale priva te  f a r m s / * ^  A f te r  long debate, the proposal o f 
the HSDP was accepted, w ith  the proviso tha t under the preva iling  power 
re lations tha t was the maximum atta inable. In response to increasing communist 
attem pts to  manipulate the p o lit ica l scenario and sow the seeds o f discontent 
among the returning, demobbed soldiers and the unemployed, re in forced by 
m anifestations o f labour unrest in other European countries, the communists 
came under increasing a ttack  from  the authorities and were subject to  police 
raids from  the f irs t  months o f 1919. Once again, the HSDP convoked an 
extraord inary Congress, on 9th February 1919, which discussed and endorsed a 
resolution ca lling  fo r a purge o f communists from  the party and trade union 
m o v e m e n t . T h e  ensuing campaign against them was a pa in fu l blow to  the 
recently  established HCP, since in many provincia l places i t  s t i l l  lacked 
organisational units o f its  own. The Congress re jected the proposal to  establish a 
'socialist society' led by a Social Dem ocratic Government as inapplicable under 
Hungarian conditions. The Congress, again, fa iled  to  deal spec ifica lly  w ith  land 
reform , surprisingly perhaps, since by then i t  had become the cen tra l issue in the 
in terna l p o lit ic a l life  o f the country. This was once again le ft  to be resolved by 
other bourgeois libe ra l p a r t ie s / * ^
The struggle fo r  Soviet power by the le f t  inside the HSDP, and by the 
communists, continued unabated. As economic conditions worsened, the 
aggravation and dissatisfaction created by the land reform  decree widened and 
the HCP fu rth e r itensified  its  ag ita tiona l work, spreading radica lism  and 
discontent. I t  undoubtedly contributed to  the rapid le ftw a rd  s h ift in the 
p o lit ica l c lim ate. The progressive occupation o f Hungary by the French and 
allied armies, Karolyi's a ttem pt to  obtain a to lerab le  peace se ttlem ent to 
contain the growing in te rna l dissent and pressure by conservative po litic ians  
appalled at the spread o f anarchy also contribu ted to  the destabilisaton o f the 
p o litica l power o f the government.
W ith gathering momentum through the months o f February and March
1919 the p o lit ica l influence o f Councils increased. The Budapest Workers'
Council and the Soldiers' Council acquired pa rticu la r influence but in many other
c ities the Workers' Councils seized power and challenged the government. The
survival o f the coaliton government increasingly depended on how successfully
the HSDP could contain the growing communist influence. But the le f t  inside
the party, dominated by fu tu re  communists, gradually prevailed over the cen tris t
leadership. A t its  meeting on 7th March, 1919 the Budapest Workers' Council
overwhelm ingly endorsed Jeno Varga's proposal, ho tly  opposed by the HSDP, to
establish a select com m ittee to  investigate the possib ilities o f socialising 
(137)industry. In the ensuing weeks the in te rna tiona l s itua tion  deterio rated
fu rthe r, the march o f the le ft  inside the HSDP continued so successfully tha t the
HSDP's leadership, which u n til then had re jected the communists' overture fo r
jo in t action, was moving towards the conclusion tha t anarchy could not be
stopped w ithout some understanding w ith  the communists. Several ten ta tive
contacts were made between the two parties during these weeks. On 11th March
1919 Bela Kun, at the request o f the le f t  w ith in  the HSDP, d ra fted  a le tte r , in
prison, containing 10 points in which he set out the ideological position o f the
communists. W ith regard to the land question i t  proposed state expropriation,
w ithout red is tribu tion  o f a ll land which could not be cu ltiva ted  by the owner and
his fa m iliy . On the expropriated land i t  proposed the establishm ent o f
(138)agricu ltu ra l producers' cooperatives as a short-te rm , trans itiona l, measure.
Kun's proposal upset the increasingly isolated moderate leaders w ith in  the HSDP
and in reply they denounced the communists in th e ir  e lecto ra l proclam ation on
13th March. The socialist plan called fo r a government exclusive ly by the SDP
to  carry on and complete the land re form  and to  in troduce extensive 
(139)nationalisation. I t  was to  be supported, from  the outside, by the libe ra l
parties o f the coa lition . This, i t  was believed, was the only way to  contain the
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spread o f pro le tarian revolu tion and to  strengthen the bourgois-liberal p o lit ica l 
system. On 17th March, the Council o f M inisters met to  discuss the grave 
p o lit ica l s ituation. A t th is meeting, Vilmos Bohm, a moderate social democrat, 
announced tha t the SDP could not, on its  own, accept the p o lit ic a l responsib ility  
o f defending law and order and the au thority  o f the government when, in re a lity , 
the influence o f the le ft ,  demanding a change to  a socia list governmental system 
was dominant in the party.
The harsh and unacceptable u ltim atum  by the allied powers on 20th 
March, to  w ithdraw  more Hungarian troops from  specified te rr ito r ie s , created 
the conditions under which a unified socialist movement could conceivably take 
over power. Faced w ith  the hopeless in te rna tiona l s itua tion  the government 
collapsed, leaving a p o lit ica l vacuum which was, at once, f ille d  by the 
revolu tionary, communist, Kun regime. The abdication o f the government le f t  
the HSDP in a predicament. A t its  meeting on the afternoon of 20th March, 
Vilmos Bohm suddenly proposed tha t i t  should assume power. But, due to 
stra teg ic necessity, and to  secure wide support in the country, he also proposed 
tha t the HSDP should at once begin to  negotiate an alliance w ith  the communists 
in which the HCP would undertake to  support the HSDP p a ss ive ly /1^  
Representatives from  both parties met to  discuss the conditions required fo r  the 
communists to  collaborate. A day o f busy negotiations ensued on 21st 
M a r c h . ^ ^  During the negotiations the HSDP indicated its  w illingness to  fo rm  
a government w ith  communist backing. The proposal, however, was fo r a 
collaboration agreement between the tw o parties, ra ther than a merger, so tha t 
each party  would re ta in  its  organisational id en tity . This proposal, however, was 
defeated by the jo in t forces o f the le ft-w in g  o f the HSDP and the HCP. 
U ltim a te ly , a fte r  long negotiations, the d ifferences were reduced to  what the 
name o f the new party should be. The HSDP's proposal to  drop the word 
'communist* from  the new party was eventually accepted, and 'The Socialist
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P arty o f Hungary’ was born. A d ra ft agreement, drawn up afterw ards, declared
tha t the new party would, 'w ithou t delay1, assume a ll powers in the name o f the 
(142)p ro le ta ria t. W ith th is agreement the h is to ric  moment had arrived and ’The
Soviet Republic o f Hungary' was d e c la r e d / * ^
This merger, however, could not give even an outward impression o f
ideological unanim ity. The moderate and revo lu tionary orienta tions o f the two
parties continued to  be expressed, la te r to  be exploited by the entente powers.
The F irs t Congress o f the unified party was convened on June 12th-13th, 1919.
The Congress, a fte r discarding the 1903 party  programme o f the HSDP,
presented a new programme, modelled on the Russian Communist Party's 8th
Congress. I t  also hailed the agrarian reform s already in progress w ith
tremendous pride. A t its  closing session the Congress f in a lly  compromised and
(144)adopted the new name of 'Hungarian Party o f Socialist-Com munist Workers'.
A fte r  the demise o f the Hungarian Soviet Republic on 1st August, 1919
the leaders o f the HSDP hurried ly began to  disengage th e ir  pa rty  from  th is
ruinous alliance w ith  the communists. The ir propaganda machine was entrusted
w ith  the task o f try in g  to minimise the party's role in the Soviet Republic. The
old HSDP was also speedily reconstitu ted at the extraord inary Congress
convoked on 24th August, 1919. A t th is  Congress the party resurrected its  1903
programme and the partic ipants unanimously refused to  id en tify  themselves w ith
the communists and 'the acts com m itted  by the d ic ta to rsh ip  o f the 
(145)p ro le ta ria t'. Indeed, at th is Congress the social democrats adopted a
staunch anti-com m unist stance from  which they did not deviate fo r the next 20 
years. The declaration was genuinely supported and c learly  represented the 
fee ling  o f the membership. I t  was, o f course, also a prerequisite fo r  th e ir  
p o lit ic a l survival in a c lim ate o f emerging conservatism, in which socialism  was 
merely to le ra ted  w ith in  very s tr ic t lim its .
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During the Nagyatadi-Szabo land re form  debate, in itia te d  by the new 
regime in the early 1920s, the HSDP hardly o ffe red  a word on agrarian 
questions. Although the pa rty ’s pa rtic ipa tion  in Parliam ent and the seats i t  
gained tended to put pressure on i t  to  expand its  a c tiv itie s  in to  ru ra l po litics , i t  
was prevented from  doing so by the Bethlen-Peyer Pact, signed in December 
1 9 2 1 .^ ^  This Pact, concluded between the regime and the HSDP, accorded the 
party the rights to  assembly and freedom o f press, restored its  confiscated 
properties and released a ll internees, except communists. In re tu rn , however, 
the party promised not to a ttack  the government but to  cooperate w ith  it .  This 
Pact proved to  be a serious handicap fo r the HSDP throughout the 1920s. During 
th is period the party  was searching fo r a way out o f the impasse and its  p o lit ic a l 
voice remained ra ther uncertain and o ften contrad icto ry. Indeed, as mentioned 
earlie r, this ind iffe rence o f the social democrats to  agrarian questions played an 
im portant role in the establishment o f the Hungarian Socialist workers Party in
(147)
1925. The fo rm ation  o f tha t party in itia ted  a change in the a ttitu d e  o f the 
HSDP to  the land question. In tha t year the party established a com m ittee  w ith  
the task o f d ra ftin g  an agrarian programme. The com m ittee , however, 
progressed very slowly. Stimulus to  prepare an agrarian programme came also 
from  the SDPs o f Europe, a ll o f which between 1922 and 1929 began to  draw up 
agrarian programmes. But apart from  the constra in t placed upon the party  by 
the Bethlen-Peyer pact, its  h is to rica l experience o f being attacked by the 
landlords and police persecution every tim e i t  engaged in agrarian p o lit ics  acted 
as a brake on its  readiness to  get involved in agrarian questions. Thus, re fe rr in g  
to  the inappropriateness o f the tim e and the prevailing p o lit ic a l c lim a te  -which 
prevented a wide ranging debate -  the party decided to  take the agrarian 
question o f f  its  agenda a ltogether,(148) ^ u rjng the 1 9 2 0 s no d e fin ite  agrarian 
programme emerged from  the HSDP. What i t  had amounted to  no more than a 
declaration o f p rinc ip le  on land reform , w ithout any clear com m itm ent. Because
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of th is  i t  was unable to  extend its  influence among the poorer s tra ta  o f the 
peasantry.
A t the end o f 1929 the M in is try  o f the In te rio r allowed the HSDP to 
expand its  organisational a c tiv itie s  in ru ra l a re a s /*4*^ This change in 
governmental a ttitu de  had im portant consequences fo r  the pa rty ’s po licy towards 
agricu lture . I t  occurred, also, at a tim e  when the Great Depression was 
adversely a ffe c tin g  the peasants and s ign ifican tly  increasing the social tensions 
in ru ra l areas. Accumulated debts, on average equal to  nearly three years’ 
income, and d rastica lly  reduced prices combined w ith  high taxa tion  levels shook 
the very existence of the working peasantry, especially the sm allholder. Many 
who had recently  received th e ir land under the land re form  could not survive and 
had to  sell th e ir land to  the b e tte r-o ff landowners v ir tu a lly  fo r pennies. The 
landless could find  no em ployment.(150) u ncj er these conditions, from  about the 
spring o f 1930, p o lit ica l ac tiv itie s  and demonstrations by ag ricu ltu ra l workers 
increased, soon to  be followed by smallholders. Countryw ide meetings were held, 
opposition groups of smallholders were form ed and the re lationship between 
them and the regime deteriorated considerably. This ru ra l unrest compelled the 
HSDP to  review its  agrarian policies and to  begin work on an ag ricu ltu ra l 
programme.
The occasion fo r announcing a new approach to  agricu ltu re  was provided 
by the 27th Congress o f the party, which met on 7th September 1930. I t  resulted 
in the adoption o f the new agrarian programme, the f ir s t  concrete one since 
1903: regarding land reform , i t  demanded the expropriation o f a ll land above 200 
cad. yokes in single ownership, w ith  compensation; the expropria tion o f a ll 
church and entailed land, w ithout compensation, and th e ir 'red is tribu tion  to  those 
who t i l l  i t ' . ^ ^  The Congress, however, remained silent on the question o f the 
price basis o f compensation, and on whether the recip ient peasants would have to 
pay fo r the land. Thus, a fte r decades o f delay, in it ia t iv e  f in a lly  came from  the
- 107 -
HSDP and i t  represented a rad ica l change in its  ag ricu ltu ra l po licy. The party
now abandoned the idea o f socialisation o f the land. I t  scarcely needs to  be
stressed tha t the new programme was an ti-M arx is t and pro-bourgeois, and was
pa rticu la rly  damaging to  the Smallholders’ Party, which became concerned tha t
the HSDP would take the wind out o f its  sails w ith  a programme very s im ila r to
its  own -  a result the regime had undoubtedly, wished to  see. I t  hoped tha t the
more rad ica l elements emerging w ith in  the Smallholders' Party would sp lit the
peasant movement and make confronta tion between the two parties inevitab le.
Indeed, the Smallholders' Party's denounciation o f the HSDP was soon to
f o l l o w / * ^  The increasing strength o f the HSDP prompted the Smallholders'
Party to  renew its  in terest and publish th e ir own revised agrarian programme in
1 9 3 0 . Af t er  the pub lication o f the HSDP's new agrarian programme the
party increased confidence among the agrarian poor and by tapping existing, and
la ten t, discontent, especially during 1930 - 1932, social dem ocratic pa rty  cells in
rura l areas sprung up like  mushrooms. Even middle peasants moved closer
towards the party, ind ica ting that the ac tiv itie s  o f the Smallholders' P arty  in
(154)opposition did not en tire ly  satisfy the land-owning stra ta  of the peasantry.
In the early 1930s the HSDP became the strongest dem ocratic opposition,
published its  own peasant newspaper, Fold es Szabadsag, and was engaged in a
struggle fo r ru ra l in fluence w ith  the Smallholders' Party u n til early 1943, when
during the war they sunk th e ir d ifferences and jo ined forces in the 'Hungarian
Front'. Regarding the question o f land re form , th is  1930 programme remained
the HSDP's last and most comprehensive programme u n til a fte r the war.
Meanwhile, the regime was becoming more and more concerned, and
embarrassed by the success o f the HSDP, both in elections and in ru ra l
recru itm ent. In the Spring o f 1932 the M in is try  o f the In te rio r f in a lly  issued a
s tr ic t ly  confidentia l d irec tive  to  ru ra l authorities to  suppress th is  rap id ly
(155)growing social dem ocratic ru ra l movement. The energetic re s tr ic t iv e
measures th a t fo llowed put the SDP in a dilem m a: i t  had to  decide, e ither, to 
continue its  ru ra l organisational work and accept the ensuing attacks, or, to 
submit to  government pressures. In the end the 're fo rm is ts ’ in the party  carried 
the day and 'peace' was chosen but not before, under increasing government 
pressure, the le f t  o f the party  had combined forces w ith  discontented workers 
and peasants sharply c r it ic a l o f the passivity o f th e ir party to  cajole the 
leadership in to  counteraction. A fte r  mass demonstrations and strikes scheduled 
fo r 7th A p ril 1932, the Government responded by fu rth e r police in itim id a tio n  o f 
the party  and by b rie fly  suspending its  newspaper, Nepszava, thus crushing the 
protest. The HSDP fin a lly  capitu lated, accepted the o ffe r  to  negotiate and 
retreated. Soon a fte r th is i t  began to  w ithdraw  from  ru ra l ac tiv itie s . It
was at th is tim e tha t some disillusioned poor peasant SDP members began to  turn  
to  the HCP, while others continued the struggle fo r  a more acceptable 
dem ocratic solution. The 29th Congress o f the party  in January 1933 heard many 
peasant com plaints and cries fo r help. The urgently needed help, however, was 
not forthcom ing; although there was some protest in parliam ent, and in 
Nepszava, against the authorities fo r try in g  to paralyse organisational a c tiv itie s  
in the villages and dragging some SDP members away from  village m eetings.(157) 
By the middle o f 1934 it  had become clear to  the HSDP tha t i f  th e ir 
influence were not to  be lost fo r ever in the ru ra l areas th e ir stance must change 
and help must rap id ly  be provided. The party, therefore , set up an o ff ic ia l 
Commission o f inquiry to  investigate the ru ra l conditions and the state and mood 
o f party organisations, and to  assess and define the tasks fac ing  the party . The 
ensuing report was very discouraging fo r the SDP. The pessim istic testim ony o f 
the report revealed extrem ely bad ru ra l conditions, continuing m isery and 
unemployment, and ris ing debts. Impatience and growing radica lism , according 
to  the report, were widespread among the working peasantry. This, in the 
opinion o f the Commission, could not easily be changed by peaceful dem ocratic
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means. Many ru ra l party cells were d is trus tfu l o f its  leadership and the view
prevailed among them tha t they were neglected and inadequately represented in
parliam entary fractions. Local leaders accused the national leadership o f being
anti-province and anti-peasant.(158)
Signs o f a growing sp lit w ith in  the SDP became increasingly evident. This
was f irs t  c learly  re flected  during the preparatory discussions regarding the
inclusion o f the motion in favour o f a 'working programme' at the next party
congress, in a s im ila r vein to other West European SDPs, which were also
preparing such programmes, at the same tim e. This programme, however, was to
d iffe r  from  tha t o f other West European parties since, in Hungary, the foca l
point o f such a programme was to  be agrarian reform s. Those in favour believed
that to  achieve a dem ocratic transform ation  o f the country, the extension o f the
sphere o f influence o f social democracy and the broadening o f the a lliance camp
against ris ing fascism must, increasingly, be the basis o f SDP po licy. The
discussions tha t were taking place repeatedly emphasised the need to  win over
(159)the peasants, to  'cap tiva te ' them fo r social democracy. In Hungary, i t  was
stated, the land and the peasants were not merely social and economic questions 
but, fundam entally, they were questions o f po litics  and power - agrarian reform s 
and the liqu idation o f large estates were an indispensable cond ition fo r 
dem ocratic development.(160) were most urgent, not only because o f the
accumulated unresolved peasant problems, but also because o f the regime's 
proposals regarding entailed land, the resettlem ent policy o f the Gombbs 
government, the exceptionally severe drought and, most im portant, the steady 
decline in the number and influence o f ru ra l party organisations. A l l these facts 
tend to  confirm  why the peasant and the land question became the foca l point of 
discussion at the party's 30th Congress in September 1935. A t th is  Congress the 
HSDP openly expressed its  opposition to  the regime's corporatis t overtures and in 
response to  the earlie r appeal o f the HCP to  the HSDP leadership, i t  continued
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to  re jec t any idea o f co llaboration w ith  the communists, to  jo in  them in a 'united 
fro n t1/*®  ^  Generally, in th is respect, the h istory o f the HSDP during much o f 
th is  period could be characterised as a constant struggle against losing its  own 
id e n tity  and being absorbed, and to  prevent communist in f i lt ra t io n  in to  the party 
and the trade union movement.
One o f the main speakers at the Congress was the fresh ly elected
member o f Parliam ent, Ferenc Takacs. He was the f irs t  MP fo r  the HSDP w ith  a
genuinely ru ra l orig in , someone who rea lly  knew about the problems o f ru ra l 
fl621l ife . W ith a h ighly c r it ic a l speech, in ru ra l d ia lect, he attacked the
leadership fo r  th e ir neglect o f ru ra l areas, fo r fa ilin g  to  provide a lead in the 
fig h t fo r the im provement in ru ra l conditions and fo r doing very l i t t le  about 
increasing the ru ra l representation in the party's leadership. W ith his v iv id  
description o f the desperate social and economic p ligh t o f the agrarian workers 
and his strong a ttack  on the regime fo r its  continued police harrassment o f ru ra l 
party organisations, he inspired the sympathy o f the delegates and almost turned 
the mood o f the whole party gathering in to  a peasant C ongress/*® ^ The 
Congress, on the whole, rea ffirm ed  the party's existing ag ricu ltu ra l proagramme. 
As fa r  as the national leadership was concerned, a fte r  the sharp c r it ic is m  it  
showed greater in terest in ag ricu ltu ra l problems, became more sensitive towards 
the needs and the complaints o f the working peasants, and raised its  voice in 
th e ir defence more o ften  in Parliam ent. V isits to  local party organisations too, 
fo r a while, became more frequent and system atic. Apart from  raising the 
peasant question at the Congress, Ferenc Takacs also delivered a speech at the 
meeting o f the 'Orszagos Mezogazdasagi Kamara' where his demands regarding 
peasants' working hours, wage rates and insurance were accepted.(164)
The renewed general in terest in agricu lture  was also re flec ted  at the 
MFOSZ (Magyar Foldmunkasok Orszagos Szovetsege) meeting in the Spring o f 
1936, where the land question was again debated and the meeting re ite ra te d  tha t
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the u ltim a te  solution to  the problems o f Hungarian agricu ltu re  could only come 
w ith  la n d -re d is tr ib u tio n /1^  And as the land question and the peasants were 
becoming the centre o f discussion th is  revived an ideological debate w ith in  the 
working-class movement regarding the rationa le fo r  the liqu ida tion  o f large 
estates: was i t  because small holdings were more productive or was i t  because 
big holdings were an obstacle to  fu rth e r social development? The HSDP openly 
declared tha t i t  considered it  necessary, p rim arily , on p o lit ic a l grounds, but 
qua lified th is by s ta ting  tha t small holdings were also more productive; th is
second argument was disputed by the communists, while they agreed on the f irs t
+ (166) count.
The growing concern w ith  the problems of agricu lture  and the need to  
combat the ris ing  fascism made the HSDP membership more receptive to  the 
need fo r a worker-peasant alliance. The leadership, however, wished to lim it  
th is to  the fram ew ork o f the social dem ocratic movement. The party, therefo re , 
re jected a ll a ttem pts in which local party organisations proposed to  take a 
common stand on top ica l questions w ith  other local party organisations. This was 
greatly  influenced by the Spanish and French p o lit ica l developments where jo in t 
action in the form  o f a ’un ited -fron t' or 'People's Front' po licy was fo llow ed. The 
communists and radicals in Hungary continua lly pressed fo r  th is and it  was also 
supported by the communist and ex tre m e-le ft members o f the HSDP. The party 
leadership, however, opposed any such proposals. I t  maintained an 'a n ti­
communist' and 'an ti-S ovie t' conviction and fought against views which tended to  
lump together the HSDP and HCP. I t  pub lic ly stated tha t 'the HSDP is
/■% G7\
simultaneously an ti-fasc is t and anti-com m unist'. In the debate regarding
the People's Front policy between Monus o f the social democrats and Revai o f 
the communists in the columns o f the SDP's theo re tica l journal Szocializm us, the 
fo rm er c learly  expressed the view tha t in Hungary the conditions fo r a people's 
fro n t did not exist: there were no bourgeois parties w ith  strong trad itions ; the
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urban bourgeoise, the most im portan t element o f a People’s Front was small; no 
le ft-a g ra rian  parties w ith  appropriate trad itions existed. To th is extent, the SDP 
declared tha t:
our stage is s t i l l  the stage o f bourgeois revo lu tion in which,
according to  the laws o f social development, the ro le o f the
working class is only s e c o n d a r y . ( 1 6 8 )
While neither the in te lle c tua l offensive, nor the working programme, nor the 
party's a ttitude  to  the land question furthered the cause o f anti-fascism , some 
figh tin g  sp irit was in jected in to  the working-class movement as a whole. It did 
not, however, help to demolish the 'd iv id ing wall' between the two workers's 
parties.
The pressure by the ru ra lis ts  w ith in  the HSDP a fte r the 1935 Congress 
was sustained fo r the next few years. The influence o f Ferenc Takacs, la te r  in 
his capacity as regional secretary fo r the Trans-Tisza Region, was growing 
w ith in  the SDP, p a rticu la rly  amongst the rura l party secretaries and activ is ts  
who supported him fo r his extrem e views. A t th is stage, however, i t  was not 
clear whether he represented a 'le f t ' or 'r igh t' wing brand o f extrem ism . That his 
sympathy lay w ith  'r igh t-w ing ' extrem ism  was to  become clear only l a t e r . ^ ^  
Together w ith  Istvan Erdei, they organised new ru ra l party organisations, party  
centres, and revived old ones. By 1937-38 th is group had gained some popu la rity  
not only in ru ra l Trans-Tisza but also in other ru ra l and urban areas in the 
country.
A fte r  the 1935 general e lection the HSDP and SHP agreed to  cooperate 
more closely w ith  one another. The SHP's influence in the Trans-Tisza region, 
however, increased so much tha t the HSDP's leadership period ica lly  had to  warn 
the regional membership not to  establish too close and strong ties w ith  local 
organisations o f the Smallholders Party and to  stop th e ir mutual support at local
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elections. The 'populists' and the 'March Front' were s im ila rly  an im portan t
influence on the HSDP's and SHP's regional ru ra l membership and were observed
w ith  apprehension by the national leadership. This was why, a fte r a b r ie f period
o f cautious support, the HSDP's leadership viewed the b irth  o f the 'M arch Front'
in 1937 and its  expanding ru ra l oaganisational a c tiv ity , together w ith  the
'Populist Movement' w ith  disapproval. The party  was apprehensive regarding its
p o lit ic a l ambitions, especially its  strong le ft-w in g  representation, and sought to
lim it  i t  to  a purely in te lle c tua l movement.(170) membership, however, at
every possible opportun ity  expressed so lida rity  w ith  the 'March Front', o ften
'cheered' them at meetings. This too had shown c learly  the co n flic t o f views
between the national leadership and the ru ra l grass-roots m e m b e rs h ip .^ S o m e
evidence suggests tha t at the beginning o f 1938 the Populist movement and the
'March Front' approached the ru ra l 'socia lis t' leaders, amongst them Ferenc
(172)Takacs, to  jo in  the movement to  establish an independent Peasant Party. No 
data exist to  confirm  th is  but i t  appears tha t the 'March F ront’ organised much 
more successfully in the areas contro lled by Takacs and Erdei.
The second ha lf o f the 1930s saw a dram atic  increase in anti-Sem itism  in 
the country, pa rticu la rly  strong in the Trans-Tisza region. The general 
d issatisfaction w ith  the national leadership because, o f its  neglect o f ru ra l 
questions, was gradually augmented by the development o f an ti-S em itic  
sentiments w ith in  the HSDP directed against its  leaders. The leadership fa iled  
to  have the courage to  oppose such developments because i t  was worried about 
the possib ility  tha t some eminent people m ight leave the ranks o f the party, 
taking others w ith  them, and also tha t i t  could leave the party open to  attacks 
from  both inside and outside. Moreover, the argument, already in progress, 
around the question o f 'populism' and 'nationalism ' in the ru ra l section o f the 
party could widen dangerously. The 'A rrow  Cross Party ' was also represented in 
the extrem e righ t-w ing  section o f tha t movement and w ith  open rig h t-w in g
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(173)propaganda slogans i t  could fu rth e r d isturb the membership. Any
development o f tha t sort was regarded as h ighly undesirable by the HSDP since it  
could have in itia ted  a d is in tegrating process, not only amongst the ru ra lis ts  but 
also w ith in  the party  itse lf.
When the 31st Congress met in A p ril 1937 anti-fascism , an ti-w a r 
sentiments and the question o f voting rights were the main problems tha t
(174)
concerned the party. Against expectations, the party hardly considered the 
question o f an alliance o f dem ocratic, an ti-fasc is t forces. The party  did not 
propose to  negotiate collaboration w ith  other bougeois opposition parties and 
even the question of cooperation w ith  o ther parties in the struggle fo r voting 
rights was passed over in silence, in the main, by the Congress, fo r  tw o  reasons. 
F irs tly , the leadership subordinated the solution o f a ll the basic questions 
brought up during the discussions to  the settlem ent o f the franchise. This single 
issue was regarded by the party as the most im portant task and it  fought against 
a ll who attem pted to  repudiate the re form  o f the franchise. The pa rty  based the 
fu lf ilm e n t o f the numerous dem ocratic social demands, e.g., land re fo rm , wages, 
working hours, progressive taxation, fu ll employmet, righ t o f association, righ t 
o f assembly - on a sa tis factory  solution to  the question o f the franchise. 
Secondly, the party wished to  avoid the embarassing situation in which i t  would 
be faced w ith  the problem of having to  take a decision regarding the sensitive 
issue o f the 'March Front'. The leadership, in its  o ff ic ia l statements and reports 
to  the delegates, ca re fu lly  avoided any reference to  welcoming the a c tiv itie s  o f 
the 'March Front', nor did i t  express support fo r them. This calculated 
ommission, however, was quickly remedied by several speakers who demanded a 
positive po licy towards the Front. Especially strong demands were registered by 
the com munist-oriented youth movement o f the HSDP - the 'Orszagos Ifjusagi 
B izottsag' (OIB), the National Youth Com m ittee, which was reconstitu ted  in the 
Spring o f 1936. Faced w ith  this s ituation the leadership could no longer ignore
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the question en tire ly  and had to  acknowledge o ff ic ia lly  'w ith  de ligh t' the 
successful campaign o f the 'March Front' in ru ra l areas and the fa c t tha t many 
OIB members were jo in ing  the movement. I t  also commended the 'March Front' 
fo r its  courageous an ti-fasc is t a ttitude , but stopped short o f sa tis fy ing  the 
demands from  the rank-and-file  to  endorse or encourage any co llaboration w ith  
the F ron t.(175) goon af t er the Congress the communists reconciled themselves 
to  the fa c t tha t they had l i t t le  hope o f successfully bringing together an 'a lliance 
o f dem ocratic forces' w ith in  the HSDP. A fte r  th is fa ilu re  the communists 
stepped up th e ir clandestine in f ilt ra t io n  o f the HSDP in order to  work from  
w ith in  to  achieve th e ir aims.
The Spring o f 1938 saw the rapid strengthening o f German influence in
East and South-East Europe, cu lm inating in the Anschluss w ith  Austria . The
appearance o f Nazi Germany on the Hungarian fron tie rs  created great anguish
and apprehension among a wide section o f the population. To calm people's
nerves, Regent Horthy, in a radio speech, reassured the public tha t he would not
allow the transforam tion  o f the form  o f government in to  a nazi-sty le  o n e . ^ ^
While his speech, assisted by heated protests from  the ru ling  p o lit ic a l c irc les,
achieved, tem pora rily , the intended result - o f lim itin g  the d irec t e ffe c ts  o f the
Anschluss on Hungary - the leg is la tive  work, especially in the areas o f e lecto ra l
re fo rm , anti-Jew ish law and restric tions on socialist organisations -  e ithe r
proposed or already in process -  were accelerated by the events. The growing
id en tifica tio n  o f the government o f Daranyi w ith  the ex trem e-righ t, its  pressure
on the HSDP and attacks on the Trade Union movement, e lic ited  protests from
many quarters in the form  of strikes and demonstrations. May the 1st was,
perhaps, the most m ilita n t in the in te rw ar h istory o f Hungary and chantings o f
'long live  democracy', 'down w ith  fascism' and 'down w ith  war' echoed in the
(177)streets o f Budapest. More im portan tly , pressure and objections to  the
government's righ t-w ing  policies came from  sources near to  the Regent and also
(178)from  an im portant group o f industria lists. In mid-May the government was
forced to  resign and a new adm in istra tion, headed by the fo rm er finance m inister
(179)Bela Imredy, was form ed. In his programme speech, on 14th May 1938 he 
stated his government's in ten tion  to  slacken Hungary's com m itm ents to  the 
Germans and regarding in te rna l policies -  showing l i t t le  sympathy fo r e ithe r the 
A rrow  Cross or the Socialists - he promised to  make determ ined e ffo rts  to  deal 
w ith  provocations from  the extreme righ t and to  take a firm  stand against a ll 
underground organisations. The HSDP's leadership greeted this po licy w ith  some 
re lie f and began to  prepare term s o f negotiations on cooperation w ith  the new 
government, a move which was opposed not only by its  own le f t  but also by the 
en tire  socia list movement. The leadership expected tha t the party's responsible 
and disciplined behaviour in domestic po litics  would be rewarded by some 
concessions from  the new government. This, however, was not to  be. I t  soon 
became quite clear tha t the government's promised measures to  restra in  the 
extrem e righ t were also to be used against the le ft .  The government's Decree 
No. 3400 soon came in to force, p roh ib iting  c iv il servants w ith  extrem e p o lit ic a l 
views, whether on the 'r igh t' or the 'le ft ' from  holding o ffice . For the f irs t  tim e 
since the Bethlen-Peyer Pact, the government placed the extreme r igh t-w ing  
A rrow  Cross and Social Dem ocratic Parties under the same po lit ica l um brella, to 
the great surprise and annoyance to  the HSDP, seriously a ffe c tin g  its  
leadership/****^ While the government's a llegation o f being 'an tina tiona l' was 
prom ptly  denied and re jected by the party i t  nevertheless provided the p re tex t 
fo r  an extreme righ t-w ing  campaign and propaganda against the HSDP, 
especially against the Jewish members o f its  leadership/****^ The aim o f the 
regime was, partly , to  p rec ip ita te  in te rna l dissent between the Jewish and non- 
Jewish factions creating, in turn , a w ider discontent amongst the general 
membership, so as to  render the movement p o lit ic a lly  as in e ffec tive  as possible. 
I t  was hoped tha t th is would lead to a more stable p o lit ica l and a be tte r
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industria l c lim ate , greater harmony between cap ita l and labour, to  aid the 
uninterrupted rearmament programme o f the government.
By the end o f 1938 the HSDP found its e lf in a d if f ic u lt  position and under
a tta ck  from  two d irections: the A rrow  Cross Party d ram atica lly  increased its
propaganda campaign, labe lling  the HSDP as anti-na tiona l and pro-Jewish, and on
12th November carried out raids on socialist premises, prom pting the party ’s
(182)leadership to  the government to  m aintain law and order. A ttacks also came
from  the government itse lf, demanding -  as a basic condition fo r  the continuned
operaton o f the party -  a change in its  ideology from  a fundam entally
in te rna tiona l outlook to a national one. A fte r  the F irs t Vienna Award, powerfu l
passions o f ’nationalism ’ swept Hungary, a ffe c ting  a ll p o lit ica l persuasions. The
influence o f the nationalists w ith in  the party increased, un iting  the various
extrem e groups around a common programme, giving rise to  the b r ie f appearance
o f a group commonly re fe rred  to as the Takacs-Bresztovszky-Erdei group, which
presented a serious challenge, a ttem pting  to  take over the leadership or, at
least, to  secure some im portant posts w ith in  the pa rty ’s hierarchy. A pe titio n  on
16th November 1938, drawn-up by the opposition group w ith in  the HSDP and
subm itted by Takacs, called fo r the resignation o f the leadership and the handing
over o f power to  a ’Provisional Governing Commitee' made up o f five  
(183)members. The struggle fo r power now went beyond the orig ina l demands fo r 
greater representation o f ru ra l interests, as shown earlier, to  a ca ll fo r  a ’change 
o f guards’, a change in the nature o f the party. An appeal published a fte r the 
p e titio n  called fo r a break w ith  the past; a new fram ework, w ith  g reater and 
fresher ideological content, fo r  a ll s tra ta  o f workers; severance o f the party's 
links w ith  in ternationalism  and a change in its  cosmopolitan a ttitu de , demands 
which were founded on the an ti-Sem itic , righ t-w ing , tendency o f the group 
a ttem pting  to  reduce the Jewish prominence in the press and in the party's 
leadership/***4  ^ The pe titio n  called upon the 'Provisional Governing C om m ittee '
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to  convoke, a fte r  its  own election, a Congress to  discuss, in te r a lia , the proposal 
included in the pe tition , to  change the name o f the party to  ’Hungarian Socialist 
W orker’s and Peasant’s Party ' or, be tte r s t ill ,  to'Hungarian Workers and Peasants 
Paty', to  give expression to  the party's increased com m itm ent to  and in te rest in 
agricu ltu re  and ru ra l workers. A t the same tim e, to  put the party  on a more 
national orien ta tion , i t  requested w ithdraw al from  the Second In te rnationa l. The 
offensive mounted against the party leadership by Takacs et al., was not, 
however, long lived. The leadership took up the challenge and decided tha t fo r 
the sake o f pa rty  un ity  i t  had re treated fa r too often, made too many 
concessions in the recent past and to le ra ted  too much unacceptable and a n ti­
socia list rhetorics. The tim e had come, i t  decided, to  stand up and figh t, i f  need 
be by involving the entire  membership, fo r the principles o f social democracy, 
and to  bring in to  the open the serious sp lit tha t existed w ith in  the party's 
leadership and to  reveal the real objectives and aspirations o f the opposing 
group. The f ir s t  counter a ttack  was delivered by the party's National Steering 
C om m ittee, which met on 25th November to  discuss, in te r a lia , fo r the f irs t  
tim e, the various proposals listed in the pe tition /****^  The opposition attem pted 
to  persuade the closed session, f irs tly ,  to  change its  a ttitude  on the fundam ental 
ideological question and, secondly, to 'weed out' the leadership. These attem pts 
remained unsuccessful. The pe titio n  was re jected bya m ajority  o f the session and 
the opposition, tem porarily , was forced to re trea t. But, since the view o f the 
leadership was divided, instead o f liqu ida ting  the opposition, a compromise 
solution was reached, whereby the dispute was not to  be made known to  party 
organisations and no o ff ic ia l documents were to  re fe r to  it  - in spite o f the fa c t 
tha t party  organisations up and down the country were becoming more and more 
aware o f and preoccupied w ith  the continuing quarrel in the upper echelons o f
/ 1 Q C \
the party. Charges against the group, prom pting them to deny accusations
o f being 'fascist in filt ra to rs ’ and 'an ti-pa rty ', and demands from  local party
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organisations to  involve the whole membership in attem pts to  resolve the in tra ­
party  leadership disputes were growing throughout the country. In addition to 
these protests, a more de fin ite  proposal came from  the communist influenced 
'N ationa l Youth C om m ittee ' (OIB), in an 'A ction  Programme' designed to  solve 
the in tra -p a rty  problem. In te resting ly, in many ways th is proposal raised s im ila r 
issues to  tha t o f the opposition group, but cha rac te ris tica lly  i t  saw th e ir  solution
in the need fo r  a sh ift to  the 'le ft ' ra ther than to  the 'r igh t', w ithout surrendering
(187)any socia list principles. Thus, on the eve o f the party's 32nd Congress
pressure both from  the righ t and also, increasingly, from  the le f t  could be 
observed w ith in  the party. The leadership, however, continued to  focus its  
a tten tion  on the opposition group o f righ tis ts  and redoubled its  e ffo rts ,
determ ined to  resolve the leadership issue and some o f the other issues raised
prio r to  the Congress. During the weeks before the Congress leading members of 
the Takacs-Bresztovszky-Erdei group were invited to  attend, separately, a 
meeting arranged between the party executive and its  Parliam entary fac tion . A t 
th is  meeting Bresztovszky, perhaps the most extreme in the group, was the f ir s t
to  be called in. He was f irs t  suspended from  the editorship o f Nepszava and then
(188)expelled from  the party. The meeting, not com plete ly free o f opposition,
was ta c tic a lly  more lenient towards Takacs and Erdei, hoping thereby to  create
disunity w ith in  the ranks o f the group. These tac tics  did in fa c t pay o ff. The
group became unsure o f itse lf, fee ling tha t its  endeavours m ight not on the whole
command the approval and support even o f its  members' own loca l pa rty
organisations. As a consequence the group began to  moderate its  demands.
Takacs et al., abandoned th e ir demands to put the party  on a 'national' p rinc ip le
and to  change the entire  leadership. Instead, the group modified its  proposal to
increase the size o f the leadership from  13 to  21 members in such a way as to
(189)increase the proportion o f ru ra l representation w ith in  it .  The f in a l
confron ta tion  came, shortly a fte r this meeting, at the P re lim inary Conference o f
the C o n g re s s /* ^ ,  which decided to  hold a debate on the issue o f changing the 
pa rty ’s name. There were two proposals before the Conference: (i) a proposal by 
the party  leader, Karo ly Peyer, advocating a compromise solution suggested by 
the pa rty ’s ch ie f secretary, Arpad Szakasits, to  adopt the name 'Social 
Dem ocratic P arty ’ and (ii) the opposition group's motion to  adopt the name 
'Hungarian Socialist Workers’ and Peasants’ P a rty ’ or ’Hungarian Workers’ and 
Peasants' Party '. The meeting was marked by prolonged and heated debate w ith  
some d iff ic u ltie s  in reaching an agreement. But in the end the m eeting passed a 
resolution accepting the leadership's proposal. To pre-em pt the possib ility  o f 
fu rth e r debate on the issue at the Congress, which m ight have reproduced the 
same d iff ic u ltie s  and embarassments, the meeting also proclaim ed tha t the 
conference decision was fin a l and binding. The opposition m otion its e lf was 
received w ith  great indignation and outraged the conference delegates. They 
accused the opposition o f 'treachery ' and demanded th e ir removal from  the 
party. W ith this, the leadership had achieved what i t  had set out to  do, namely, 
to  paralyse and isolate the opposing group. And in the fin a l analysis its  defeat 
was achieved by dem ocratic pressure from  the conference delegates. For a ll 
p rac tica l purposes this defeat was the end o f the group as a p o lit ic a l force to 
reckon w ith . Although, a fte r the Congress its  members attem pted to  close ranks 
and remain together as a group, th e ir e ffo rts  were unsuccessful. Gradually, 
during the war, the group dispersed and eventually, both as a group and as 
individuals, they disappeared from  the p o lit ic a l scene. The significance o f th is 
opposition group, w ith in  the context o f HSDP h istory was tw o fo ld . F irs t, as an 
indigenous agrarian re fo rm is t group, composed in the main, o f ru ra l party 
secretaries, i t  attem pted to  change the basic urban, in te rna tiona lis t o rien ta tion  
o f the party to  embrace and meet the challenge o f growing radica lism  among the 
peasantry, who disliked both liberalism  and in te rna tiona l socialism. The group 
believed tha t the HSDP's influence could only be increased through ru ra l
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extension, reaching out to the more rad ica l peasantry so as to  pre-em pt a move 
towads an independent peasant party, or a tendency fo r the peasants to  tu rn  to  a 
r igh t-w ing  party. In th is the HSDP fa iled  and shortly a fte r, in June 1939, the 
'Nationa l Peasant Party ' was established; the peasants also now turned more to 
the extrem e righ t-w ing  'A rrow  Cross Party '. The second way which the 
opposition group was im portant was tha t by a ttem pting  to  influence the HSDP to  
understand and accept the 'changing tim es', to  adopt a dose o f nationalism , in its  
p la tfo rm , especially a fte r the 'F irs t Vienna Award', which gave a great boost to 
nationalism  in Hungary -  i t  put the HSDP and the Trade Union movement in a 
weaker position vis-a-vis the increasing fascist pressures.
The 32nd Party Congress was convened, a fte r two postponements, on
29th January 1939 and was attended by 334 delegates, w ith  a stronger
le ft is t  representation than at any previous Congress. In his keynote speech,
ca lling  fo r the preservation o f Hungarian independence and sovereignty, in a
subtly designed nationalist undertone, Peyer protested, on the one hand, against
the growing German economic and p o lit ica l influence and, on the o ther hand,
against the A rrow  Cross Party. This was warm ly welcomed by the delegates. In
accordance w ith  the decision taken at the P re lim inary Conference, in order to
reduce the d ifferences in the party in the fa c t o f the upsurge o f nationalism , he
proposed to  delete the adjective 'Hungarian' from  the party's name, which was
thought to  emphasise tha t the party was a branch o f the in te rna tiona l labour
(192)movement, in order to  stress tha t i t  was purely a national party . This 
proposal was carried by a m a jo rity  o f the delegates. The most s ign ifican t 
contribu tion  tha t emerged from  the Congress regarding agricu ltu re  was the 
in troduction  o f a proposal by the communist secretary o f the HSDP's National 
Youth C om m ittee (OIB), Gyula Kulich, fo r a more positive 'A c tion  Programme', 
re la tin g  to  the questions o f national independence and land re fo rm . The foca l 
point o f th is land reform  was the demand fo r im mediate expropria tion and
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red is tribu tion  o f a ll entailed and tied  land, and a ll other land above the size o f
(193)200 cad. yokes w ith in  the next 5 years. This proposal remained w ith in  the
fram ew ork o f the party ’s agrarian programme but the se tting  o f a tim e  l im it
made i t  more concrete. Fearing tha t th is would lead to  fu rth e r con fron ta tion
w ith  the authorities and provoke more repressive measures against the party, the
Congress declined to discuss and take a vote on this proposal and re fe rred  i t  to
the Council o f the Party fo r fu rth e r consideration w ith in  the context o f the
(194)pa rty ’s own A ction  C om m ittee ’s proposal fo r an action programme. F ina lly ,
to  reduce the chance o f fu rth e r attacks the Congress agreed to reca ll some of
the Jewish members o f the leadership com m ittee, to  confirm  Arpad Szakasits in
his new post and to  replace the Jewish Illes Monus as general secretary and ch ie f
(195)ed ito r o f the party's da ily  Nepszava. His appointment, however, did not
re fle c t the in tra -pa rty  power balance but, ra ther, the results o f p o lit ic a l
developments in the country.
In tra -pa rty  debate and dissent came to  an end a fte r the Congress p a rtly
because it  was e ffe c tive ly  discouraged by the leadership and pa rtly  because the
Jewish repression w ith in  the party and its  bad e lecto ra l showing had a s t if lin g
e ffe c t on the a c tiv itie s  o f the party. The General E lection in May 1939 was
conducted under a new e lecto ra l law which gave the vote, by secret ba llo t, to  2
m illion  c i t i z e n s . I t  was perhaps the most dem ocratic o f pre-w ar elections.
The campaign posed great d iff ic u ltie s  fo r the SDP. Many o f its  sources o f
finance were e ither s ign ifican tly  depleted or disappeared altogether because the
(197)regime's Second Jewish Law bankrupted them. The election results were
disastrous fo r the SDP; its  parliam entary representation was d ras tica lly  reduced
from  11 to 5, representing 2 per cent o f the to ta l votes cast, while the sudden
(198)advance o f the extreme righ t brought i t  49 deputies. Much to  the dismay o f 
the SDP, a large section o f organised labour switched its  support to  the A rrow  
Cross Party in this great upsurge o f nationalism ; A rrow  Cross membership, in
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fa c t, increased u n til 1940, but rap id ly  lost ground a fte r that. In the a fte rm a th  of 
the disastrous e lection two opposing trends could be observed w ith  the SDP. 
F irs tly , great unce rta in ty  and dis-spiritedness -  some members even le f t  the 
party. Secondly, the increasing strength o f the le f t  brought demands fo r  a sh ift 
in po licy and stronger cooperation between the communists and the social 
dem ocratic le ft .  The communists or communist sympathisers began to  gain more 
leading posts and dual membership, o f SDP and CP, too was increasing.
As regards agricu lture , the party made no im portant pronoucements in 
the next few years. In its  search to  resolve the post-e lection problems, the le ft  
resurrected the 'A c tion  Programme' promised but shelved by the Congress some 
months before. Communist influence, both in its  resurrection and in its  content, 
was im portant. Due p a rtly  to  renewed obstruction by the moderate leadership, 
and p a rtly  perhaps, to  the outbreak o f World War II, no discussion on the 
programme was ever in itia ted . Its importance, nevertheless, was tha t the sp irit, 
the ideological declaration in th is document -  e.g., the aim o f not g iving up the 
concepts o f a 'genuine and fu ll socialism ' and 'class struggle' -  and the concrete 
demands embodied in i t  -  e.g., the concepts o f a planned economy, a just land 
re fo rm , w ithout compensation, the development o f producer's m arketing and 
consumer's cooperatives -  made it  ideologica lly suitable fo r the communists and 
the le f t  o f the SDP as a ra lly ing  document fo r collaboration u n til the end o f the 
war, perhaps even a fte r .(199)
The document, however, fa iled  to  re fle c t one im portant question tha t 
developed during the summer o f 1943 in the fo rm  o f a debate in the dem ocratic 
press and at various conferences on, f irs t ly ,  the need fo r national u n ity  against 
the in te rna l and external enemy and, secondly, the respective roles o f working 
class, middle class and p e a s a n t ry .^ ^  The debate in it ia lly  focused on the 
d e fin ition  o f national un ity  by cautiously emphasising the leading ro le  o f the 
working class in the event o f cooperation. A contribu tion  to  the debate by
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Jozsef Darvas, in an a rtic le  en titled  ’Further by one step’, brought the peasantry
in to  the argument as a previously neglected but interested party  which should
not be le f t  out o f such c o o p e ra t io n .^ ^  In th is regard, meetings were also
organised by the National Youth Com m ittee (OIB) to  discuss cooperation fo r
jo in t action between workers, peasants and in te llectua ls. Before, however, any
o f th is  ’theo re tica l debate’ could be translated in to  real achievements an
unexpected event, the German-Soviet non-aggression pact signed on 23rd August
1939, created ideological confusion amongst the socialist rank-and-file , leading
to  anti-Soviet sentiments w ith in  the SDP. No fu rth e r progress in the area o f
cooperation occurred u n til the second ha lf o f 1941, a fte r Hungary's en try  in to
the war, when the whole idea o f national independence and un ity  was rekindled,
in s im ila r vein, by the dem ocratic parties in the press.
When Hungary entered the war on 27th June, 1941 the en tire  in te rna l
p o lit ic a l scene changed drastica lly . F irs tly , i t  ushered in a period o f accusations
against the SDP, demonstrations w ith  slogans saying 'out w ith  the social 
(202)democrats’ and questioning o f its  lega lity . The threat o f dissolution by the
regime as a sword o f Damocles hanging over the party ’s head resulted in
extrem ely cautious relations w ith  the regime throughout much o f the period. It
was, however, allowed to  operate, w ith in  s tr ic t  lim its , u n til the occupation, but
many o f its  members, mostly on the le ft ,  were period ica lly  arrested. The party
often had to  show its w ill to  purge its e lf o f communists and to  dem onstrate tha t
i t  would not allow communist ag ita tion  in the trade union movement. The
party ’s leadership remained unreceptive to  communist proposals fo r an ti-w a r
(203)ag ita tion, fearing  risking its  existence. The regime, in the end, w isely
decided tha t since there were no production problems due to  disruption, labour 
unrest, strikes or sabotage, a ban on the party  could create more problems w ith  
disorganised workers, who could also become an easy ta rge t fo r the communists. 
The SDP suffered also because o f a s ign ifican t decline in its  membership by
-  125 -
1942, from  its  1939 peak, due to  the development o f war industries, where
unionisation was o ff ic ia lly  discouraged and also because workers change
a ff i l ia t io n  from  the 'le f t ' to  the ’r ig h t' and joined the A rrow  Cross or were called
up fo r  m ilita ry  service, which especially a ffected the peasants. Secondly, in the
p o lit ic a l arena, the party  in itia te d  the main theme in w artim e Hungary o f
'na tiona l independence', 'popular fro n t ’ and ’cooperation’. A press debate through
the summer rekindled the theme o f 'national un ity ' and developments in the
w in te r o f 1941 s ign ifican tly  increased the anti-w ar, anti-Germ an fee ling  in the
country, generating widespread, purely nationalist reaction, which u nw itting ly
helped the communist organisers o f the ’Independence F ront'. Covert communist
m anipulations resulted in a series o f ta c tica l non-ideological a rtic les  by a team
o f w rite rs  in the Christmas issue o f Nepszava in which the emphasis was on
p a tr io t ic  so lida rity  and national independence. This represented a b rie f f irs t
move, made jo in tly  by workers, peasants and progressive in te llec tua ls , towards
the fo rm ation  o f a 'Popular Front'. Apart from  creating a storm y press debate
amongst conscious in te llectua ls, however, i t  achieved very l i t t le  im pact on the
mass o f people, who were delighted at the te rr ito r ia l gains and the war against
(204)the generally disliked Soviet Union. Another m anifestation was the creation 
o f the 'Magyar Tortene lm i Emlek B izottsag' (MTEB) -  Hungarian H is to ric  
M emoraial Com m ittee -  in January 1942 by communists and communist 
sympathisers, supported by the dem ocratic press and fo r a while by some 
misguided, but im portant personalities from  a ll walks o f life , w ith  the ostensible 
aim o f propogating the ideals o f the 1848 revolution. This com m ittee organised 
p a tr io tic  demonstrations against the war and against Hungary's dependence on 
Germany, ca lling  on the people to  resist Germany's th rea t to  national 
independence. A lthough secret negotiations between the HCP and SDP fo r a 
'Jo in t Com m ittee ' to  d irec t these independence a c tiv itie s  and industria l sabotage 
fa iled , fo r the same reasons as before, the 'Popular F ront' idea had taken another
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(203)step forw ard. O ff ic ia l harrassment and the SDP denounciation o f the
demonstrations perhaps induced by government pressure, and the arrest o f its
(20fi)President, Imre Kovacs, led to  the early demise o f the Com m ittee. A police 
sweep in A p ril 1942, arrests o f communists in Nepszava, the SDP purges o f 
communists and sympathisers w ith in  the party and a decree, p roh ib iting  young 
people from  jo in ing  p o lit ica l associations led to  the disbandment o f the ’National 
Youth C om m ittee ’ (OIB), and to  the disintegration, fo r a tim e, o f the 
’Independence F ront’ po licy fo r  national cooperation. The SDP leadership f irm ly  
opposed continuing the policy o f national cooperation on the grounds tha t 
communists were involved in the 'Independence Front'. Thus, from  the summer 
o f 1942 the SDP reverted to i t  its previous passivity, its  da ily Nepszava devoted 
its e lf almost exclusively to  the problems o f industria l workers and did not even 
mention the issue o f cooperation between workers, peasants and o ther social 
classes. But by October 1942 the idea o f an 'Independence F ron t’ was 
resurrected, w ith  the old slogans o f cooperation between the classes. The 
rev iva l was led in it ia lly  by the press, especially the daily Magyar N em zet, and 
the bourgeois members o f the fa te fu l 'H is to ric  Memorial C om m ittee ', but soon 
the communists regained th e ir contro l over the movement. Also, in November 
1942 the HCP in a general policy statem ent to  party members and to  the 
socia list le ft ,  re ite ra ted  the party's advocacy o f a 'national fig h tin g  fro n t', led by 
the working class, but including also the peasantry, the progressive in te llec tua ls  
and indeed anyone w illin g  to  cooperate in bringing about the dow nfa ll o f the 
government. To achieve this, i t  would need the m obilisation o f the le f t is t  
elements w ith in  the SDP, TU, SHP and its  a ff ilia te d  Peasant U n io n . ^ ^
The SDP was in a d if f ic u lt  position regarding national cooperation. The 
non-socialist, bourgeois dem ocratic parties insisted tha t cooperation must be 
genuine, sincere and based on democracy, and the socialists must, the re fo re , 
abandon the principles o f 'class struggle' and 'd ic ta torsh ip  o f the p ro le ta ria t'.
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A fte r  long in terna l debate the SDP accepted these term s and, in early November
1942, concluded an agreement which provided fo r cooperation between the 
parties on tha t basis. The communists, at th is stage, had l i t t le  influence. A fte r  
th is  agreement the SDP and the SHP remained in regular contact.
Meanwhile, preparations fo r convening the 33rd Party Congress, the f ir s t
and last during wartim e, fo r  13th December 1942, were completed. The M in is try
(208)o f the In te rio r gave permission fo r the Congress but fo r one day only.
Because o f the decision not to  antagonise the regime, the SDP la te r re fe rred  to
th is as the 'S ilent Congress'. I t  proceeded w ith  great circum spection in order not
(209)to  jeopardise the party's re lations w ith  the new Kallay adm in istra tion. The 
SDP believed tha t i t  was much more prudent to try  to  save the party  in ta c t and 
ready fo r action when i t  was called upon to  fu l f i l  its  h is to ric  role when the war 
ended. The Congress, therefore , simply re ite ra ted  tha t the policies endorsed by 
the previous Congress in 1939 were s t i l l  va lid but under the preva iling  conditions 
could not be realised. The party Chairman, Karoly Peyer, in his keynote speech 
introduced the theme 'to  prepare and be ready fo r government’. He said tha t the 
war indicated tha t a fte r i t  ended the SDP would have a say in deciding Hungary's 
fu tu re . The Congress also emphasised tha t the party could not be considered a 
'h id ing place fo r  Bolshevik ag ita tion ' and stated c learly: 'we are not bolsheviks 
and we do not use, nor do we approve, th e ir methods.' I t  was stressed tha t 
ne ither the party nor the trade unions' independent policy could give cover to  
bolshevik ag ita tion, and declared: 'we are to  the core social democrats and we 
shall not deviate e ithe r to  the " le f t "  nor to  the "r ig h t"  from  th is r o a d . '^ * ^  Peyer 
also called the a tten tion  o f the Congress to  the possib ility  o f national 
cooperation w ith  the government, and stressed tha t d iffe re n t ideology should not 
prevent the party from  jo in ing such action.
The m ilita ry  setbacks fo r the Axis at the tu rn  o f 1942-43 and early in
1943, augmented by the in terna l strains o f the w artim e economy, more and more
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convinced the Kallay adm in istra tion tha t H itle r's  Germany could not win the
war. Very cautiously, a slight sh ift in emphasis in Kallay's speeches can be
observed: Hungarian independence, defensive war, etc., and omission o f the
g lo rifica tio n  o f H itle r. According to  the A llied  Powers, Hungary desparately
needed social reform s. In try in g  to  satisfy public opinion and to  re fu te  Western
charges, Ka llay devoted parliam entary tim e, in the Spring o f 1943, to  discussing
various social reform s proposals and generally wished to in it ia te  a process o f
dem ocratisation o f the country, mainly to avoid a repe tition  o f 1 9 1 8 . ^ ^  He
declared his willingness to  cooperate w ith  any parties prepared to  accept some
basic conditions to  avoid in te rna l d isin tegration and to  partic ipa te  in moulding
Hungary's fu tu re . He o ffe red the possib ility  o f cooperation w ith  the SHP, the
dominant opposition party, and invited the SDP to  jo in  in the cooperation i f  i f
was w illin g  to  abandon its  'dogmatism' and accept i t  w ithout c rit ic ism , i.e., i t
(212)re jected Marxism, which was a bar to national un ity . The choice fo r  the
SDP was now e ither to re tu rn  to  cooperation w ith  the government and other 
bourgeois circles - in a sense already accepted by the Trade Union Council, in 
January 1940 - or to  cooperate w ith  the communists in rev iv ing  the 
'Independence Front' policy. In e ither case, the party had to  throw  o f f  the 
passivity which permeated i t . ^ ^
Since the summer o f 1942, many o f the bourgeois groups had 
endeavoured to  loosen Hungary's re lations w ith  Germany and to  look fo r  
possibilities o f e x trica ting  Hungary from  the Axis coalition. They reckoned on 
the support o f the SDP. Regular and close d irec t, and ind irect, contacts existed 
between them and the representatives o f the SDP since the autumn o f 1942 and 
these groups pressed the regime to  provide greater freedom o f movement fo r  the 
Social D e m o c r a t s . ^ I n  Parliam ent, Zoltan T ildy, o f the SHP, sided w ith  the 
SDP, i f  not overtly , at least by o ffe ring  the possib ility  o f c o o p e ra t io n .^ ^  Also, 
the Christmas issue o f Nepszava, by now almost an annual event, carried  a
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fea tu re  a rtic le  en titled  'Towards Tomorrow's Hungary'. I t  called fo r an expanded
campaign fo r the recru itm en t o f general and branch secretaries. The a rtic le
emphasised the le ga lity  o f the SDP, by which i t  aimed to  give the party  a
p o lit ic a l foundation such tha t i t  would be to lerated, perhaps even supported, by
the government, so as to  be ready fo r  action at the end of the war. A f te r  the
Congress, party and trade union organisational work revived and permission fo r
meetings and conferences was given by the police a ll over the country. This
re c ru itin g  drive went on throughout January and February 1943, m ainly at lower
and middle levels, but the new recru its  tended to  be o f le ft is t  m en ta lity , keen
and ready to work. The leadership, o f course, knew about th is and a ttem pted to
(216)'f i l te r  out' bolshevik elements by s tr ic t conditions o f recru iting . And a fte r 
the HCP was dissolved, in May 1943, confidence among SDP members o f 'w inning 
on a ll fron ts ' was widespread.
By la te  summer o f 1943 p o lit ica l and m ilita ry  developments persuaded
the SDP that the tim e had come to  make urgent decisions about the party's
fu tu re . Some o f its  top leaders, independently, began to  prepare in earnest a
working programme en titled  'Tomorrow's Hungary'. I t  was grea tly  influenced
again by West European thought and especially the B ritish  Labour Party's
(217)Beveridge Plan. It was a substantia l work which, a fte r an in troduction  o f
socia list principles, focused its  a tten tion  on a number o f issues, in fou r main 
areas, composed of 10 separate chapters: form  o f state; economic s truc tu re ; 
social and cu ltu ra l policies. The economic section o f the programme was la rge ly 
based on the party's 1903 programme, but 'modernised' in main ideologica l 
questions, envisaging a mixed economy w ith  nationalisation o f key industries and 
state contro l over capita l and banks. In agricu lture  i t  advocated the d is tr ibu tion  
o f a ll estates above the size o f 200 cad. yokes. A fte r  an inconclusive and at 
tim es heated c r it ic a l debate, lasting u n til the Autumn o f 1943 - during which 
tim e  i t  was d istributed selective ly in te rna lly  fo r comment -  a compromise
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solution was adopted whereby the 'working programme' was re fe rred  to  a set of
'Specialised Comm ittees', established in July, by the leader Karo ly Peyer. One
(218)o f these com mittees, the 'Inte lligence Organising Com m ittee ' , was 
entrusted w ith  the task o f d ra fting , in a re a lis tic  and p ractica l manner, not firm  
po lit ica l and economic plans, but a moderate reform  programme fo r a 
trans itiona l economy, designed to  avoid a repe tition  o f the disastrous trans ition  
from  war to  revo lu tion during 1918-1919. The specialised areas considered by 
some of the groups in th is Com m ittee, 8 a ltogether, were such tha t they did not 
have to  consider the s ituation a fte r  the war nor take a position on the fo rm  of 
'fu tu re  society'. Groups (i) public laws and public adm in istra tion and (ii) 
economics, however, could not avoid considering these questions. Thus, in tha t 
respect four possible a lternatives were considered by the f irs t  group:
1. a Socialist State
2. a Socialist State, but not governing on purely socia list princip les
3. the SDP governs, in coa lition  w ith  other parties
4. the SDP remains in opposition
A fte r  consultations i t  was agreed tha t the th ird  varian t was to be worked out in 
detailed d ra ft fo rm . The second group, on economics, considered two 
alternatives -  a moderate and a radica l varian t, i.e., a revo lu tionary one, where 
the po lit ica l and economic strucure had altered rad ica lly  -  and made fo rm a l 
proposals on the second varian t, arousing great anger amongst the Peyer 
leadership. So much so tha t i t  u ltim a te ly  ruled tha t i t  was impossible to  deal in 
such de ta il w ith  a s ituation when it  was not known what in fa c t would happen 
a fte r the war; i t  therefore , conveniently, re jected the proposals.
Thus i t  would seem tha t the policy o f the SDP was decis ive ly influenced 
by its  concepton tha t i t  would govern a fte r the war, in coa lition , and the party,
- 131 -
therefore , did not want to  lay its e lf open to  attacks by endorsing a revo lu tionary
a lte rna tive  which would obviously be unacceptable to  prospective coa lition
partners. The le ft-w in g  o f the SDP, however, antic ipated a drastic  increase in
the p o lit ic a l influence o f the working masses and accordingly expected a
coa lition  led by a 'worker-peasant alliance'. I t  also linked dem ocratic
transform ation  w ith  a gradual trans ition  to socialism. To th is extent, two
opposing groups, both established f irm ly , could be observed w ith in  the SDP.
F irs tly  a le ft is t  group around Arpad Szakasits, who wished to revive and fu rth e r
develop the 'independence fro n t' policy, in itia ted  and large ly influenced by the
communists, and, secondly, a r ig h tis t group, around Karoly Peyer, who found the
Ka llay government's aim to  'rescue the system' a ttra c tive  and trie d  to  find  a way
out o f the war. So, almost custom arily, there was a sp lit w ith in  the social
dem ocratic movement.
A t the tu rn  o f 1942-43 the communists and the le ft  o f the SDP began to
revive the crushed 'Independence Front'. The f irs t  signs o f th is appeared, as
mentioned earlie r, in the Christmas 1942 issue o f Nepszava, where Arpad
Szakasits, in a leading a rtic le  en titled  'Class struggle and National U n ity ', urged
opposition to  those who wished to  postpone the 'F ront' policy. Having declared
(219)1943 the 'Year o f P e to fi' , i t  organised a P e to fi Conference, on 3rd January
1943, and under his patronage formed a kind o f 'popular fro n t' com m ittee, s im ila r
to  the 'H is to ric  M emorial Com m ittee ' (MTEB), to  urge the alliance o f a ll forces
wishing to  save the nation. The working class, however, assumed the prim acy in
(220)th is policy. This whole programme, however, was frus tra ted  by the
determ ination o f the regime, combined w ith  other p o lit ica l forces, not to  a llow  
the le f t  to  gain the in it ia tiv e  and, by the Spring o f 1943, a barrage o f a rtic les  
appeared in the bourgeois dem ocratic press on the question o f 'na tiona l un ity '. 
There were, however, d ifferences o f opinion w ith in  the bourgeois dem ocratic  
camp, too, and fo r th is reason it  could not act in complete unison. Some
- 132 -
re jected the basic requirem ent fo r a bourgeois dem ocratic transform ation,
(221)namely a radica l land re form . Under these circumstances a group around
Rudolf Andorka decided to  take the pre lim inary steps to  establish a p o lit ic a l plan
o f alliance, w ith  the pa rtic ipa tion  o f the SHP and SDP, and proposed to  set up a
'Hungarian Cooperation Com m ittee ' w ith  the aim o f prom oting cooperation and
alliance among workers, peasants and in te llectua ls. Its most im portan t task was
to  work out a plan to  overcome the problems o f establishing a 'dem ocratic
Hungary of the fu tu re '. The proposal declared tha t the Com m ittee was based on
the princip le  o f 'constitu tiona l monarchy* and refused to cooperate w ith  any
party  or p o lit ica l group which used revolutionary methods to  achieve its 
(222)aim. This, o f course, meant the exclusion o f the communists.
Meanwhile, in A p ril 1943, the communists has published th e ir programme
(223)fo r national un ity  and alliance. In th is way they opposed the K a llay regime
and a ll other groups ra lly ing  behind its  policies. The communists decided tha t an
attem pt should be made to  repair contacts, through the le f t  o f he SDP, to
achieve a modus vivendi between the two parties. The m a jo rity  in the SDP
leadership, however, again re jected the possib ility, not only fo r an agreement
between the two parties, but even o f resuming discussions. The Peyer leadership
was convinced tha t any decision regarding the plans fo r  the fu tu re  need not
seriously concern its e lf w ith  the communists. A t th is stage the party  s t i l l  seems
to have believed tha t a Western occupation o f Hungary would come a fte r  the 
(224)war. Indeed, during th is period the righ t o f the SDP s t il l  aired its  a n ti­
communist convictions frequently  and happily and re jected any cooperation w ith  
the communists. In A p ril 1943 a meeting between Arpad Szakasits and Janos 
Kadar to  reach a ten ta tive  agreement -  the fo rm er feared tha t i t  would lead to 
renewed arrests and loss o f contacts w ith  other dem ocratic parties, and there 
was disagreement over the illega l communist methods, which they were unw illing
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to  renounce. The le f t  in the SDP was, o f course, not a fra id  o f revo lu tion . It
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believed in a revo lu tionary transform ation o f Hungary a fte r the war and it  was
w illing  to  establish a dialogue w ith  the communists. Most o f the contacts,
however, tha t developed were at a lower level, because higher levels were
worried about le ga lity  and the very existence o f the party.
By the Spring o f 1943 the SHP also abandoned its  passive 'w a it and see'
a ttitude  and published its  own programme. As the largest opposition party, i t
decided to pursue an active  opposition policy. I t  joined other opposition parties
in recognising the Hungarian geopolitica l dilemma and refra ined from  a ttack ing
the government. I t  began a serious rejuvenation and w ith in  weeks had
reorganised its  agrarian section. Failing to  get a clear response from  other
bourgeois dem ocratic parties or from  the SDP it  began a recru iting  drive among
anti-German in te llectua ls  w ith  a view o f enro lling them in its  own 'C itizens
Section (or bourgeois, middle-class section) established in May 1943, under the
leadership of Bajcsy-Zsilinszky. A t the tim e th is section had no great
impact on the fortunes o f the party, but its significance became apparent a fte r
1945, when centre and righ t-w ing  parties were not perm itted  to  function  and
many in te llectua ls, in fac t, joined the SHP. The road towards cooperation
between the SDP and SHP was greatly enhanced by an open in v ita tion  from  the
General meeting o f the SHP, in June 1943, o ffe ring  cooperation to  the SDP. Soon
a fte r this, concrete negotiations reached complete agreement on 7th August -
(227)1943, a fte r which the tw o parties formed a 'parliam entary alliance'. This
agreement was greeted by Istvan Dobi in the name o f the 'A g ricu ltu ra l Section'
(228)of the SHP as the most im portant domestic event in the preceding 20 years.
Its reception was not so uncritica l, however, in other quarters. Some, especially
the populists around Szabad Szo - the main organ fo r the National Peasant Party,
voiced th e ir concern tha t it  would adversely a ffe c t the in terests o f the poor
(229)peasants and a 'Popular Front. Even w ith in  the SDP the reception was not 
unequivocal e ither. A small, but im portant, section opposed th is cooperation on
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ideological grounds and Arpad Szakasits in particu la r, while acknowledging its
importance, emphasised the ideological d ifferences between the tw o parties and
maintained the prim ary importance o f the point tha t in ’tom orrow ’s Hungary'
(230)workers should be given greater importance. Organised labour, however,
supported the cooperation agreement, w ith  some reservations, but asked i f  i t  was
a ’pact’, what role was played in i t  by the government. Some saw in i t  the
sabotaging o f workers’ interests. The communist 'Peace Party ' greeted the
agreement warm ly and stated tha t i t  was an im portant step towards national
un ity , but believed it  could only fu l f i l  its  real role o f an ti-fasc is t, anti-G erm an
forces, m ainly from  the le ft ,  were brought together to  in it ia te  a mass
movement. The extreme righ t attacked and blamed the government fo r  g iving
such a destructive role to  the le ft .
A fte r  the events in Ita ly  Ka llay was ready to  s it down w ith  the leaders o f
the SDP and SHP to  discuss the questions o f 'ne u tra lity ' and ’w ithdraw al from  the
war'. Knowing tha t th is could prec ip ita te  occupation by the Germans a ll
accepted a 'secret, d ip lom atic ' procedure. In te rnationa l events, o f course, not
only influenced 'world po litics ' but made themselves fe lt  on the dom estic scene.
Workers' a c tiv ity  increased and there was pressure from  below to  resort to
(231)concrete action, which the le ft  o f the SDP trie d  to  explo it, urging action.
The Ita lian  arm istice and in terna l pressure, galvanised the leaders o f both parties
- the SDP and the SHP - in to action. A common memorandum was subm itted to
Kallay on 12th September 1943, in which they demanded tha t the government
(232)take the necessary risk and w ithdraw from  the war. The SHP, in its
declaration, promised to support the government not only in fore ign po licy  but
(233)also in securing a satis factory trans ition  from  war to  peace. Ka llay,
however, on the one hand, wanted to  w a it fo r the appearance o f B ritish - 
Am erican troops at Hungary's border and, on the other hand, believed tha t the 
danger o f occupation would ra lly  the other parties around the government. The
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policy o f 'w a it and see' appeared the only real a lte rna tive  available to  the
government, which believed tha t the regime could be rescued i f  in te rna l p o lit ica l
discip line was such tha t no gounds were provided fo r a German occupation. The
main condition fo r  th is was in te rna l discipline and p o lit ica l s ta b ility . Hence, the
government's attacks on the communists and th e ir supporters. But i t  did not
extend them to  the SDP and SHP opposition parties, whom, in fa c t, i f  o ften
defended against the attacks o f the extreme righ t, which p rom ptly  accused
(234)Ka llay o f try in g  to  make social democracy 'presentable' and 'acceptable '. 
Undoubtedly, in terest in and membership o f the SDP and the trade unions 
inceased during these months, reaching almost its  1939 peak leve l. During 
December 1943, both the SDP and the trade unions began to  revive, a ttra c tin g  a 
growing number o f lower middle class and white co lla r workers. The centre and 
the moderate le ft  o f the party were w idely regarded as the winning side. There 
was, therefore , a great in flux  o f recru its  to  the various sections o f the SDP, as 
w e ll as the SHP, which were now able to  pick and choose amongst the applicants.
Kallay's policy became more and more concerned w ith  try in g  to  'rescue 
the regim e' in tac t w ithout too much upheaval and disenchantment and w ith  
avoiding occupation. He asked Parliam ent and the Upper House to  support him 
in these endeavours. He announced tha t, as ever, his whole action was 
influenced greatly  by the urgent need to  fig h t against bolshevism and revo lu tion. 
Both the SDP and the SHP assured him o f th e ir continued support in his a ttem pts
(9OZ\
to  achieve 'national un ity '. The question o f what would happen a fte r  the
war ended occupied the thoughts o f p o lit ica l leaders o f a ll persuasions more and 
more. To achieve p o lit ica l s ta b ility  and to  'rescue the nation', K a llay suddenly 
changed p o lit ica l d irection  at the turn o f 1943-44. Instead o f continu ing w ith  his 
po licy o f favouring the le ft ,  he leaned to  the righ t and trie d  to  pac ify  and apease 
it .  He hoped in th is way to  be able to avoid a German occupation and to  gain the 
support o f the 'r igh t' against the dangers looming from  the East. The bourgeois
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dem ocratic parties , the ir confidence shaken by Kallay's opportunistic diplomacy,
attem pted to  build a second line o f defence behind Kallay. Negotiations fo r  a
'Bourgeois Dem ocratic A lliance ' came to  a head at the beginning o f 1944: a
(0 3 6 )
programme was dra fted fo r debate. The proposed programme, b u ilt upon
the dem ocratic demands o f the 'Hungarian Cooperation C om m ittee ' (MEB),
described its  basic aim to avoid the disaster o f 1918 and to  achieve the
resto ra tion  o f 'leg itim a te  Hungarian Monarchy'. I t  proposed to  leave priva te
property in tac t and instead o f a general land re fo rm  advocated a p a rtia l land
re fo rm  w ith  fu ll compensation. A ll these measures implied, o f course, the
exclusion o f communists from  any fu tu re  p o lit ic a l developments and denied the
poss ib ility  o f leg itim is ing  them. The SDP, too, was excluded from  the
negotiations, as was the radica l wing o f the SHP, which pointed to  the fa c t tha t
one section o f the SHP was quite happy to  leave the 'cooperation agreement'
concluded w ith  the SDP and was w illin g  to  exchange bourgeois dem ocratic
transform ation  fo r a programme which aimed to reform  the system very
(237)moderately. W ith regard to  agricu lture, i t  was satisfied w ith  a p a rtia l land
re fo rm , leaving the medium sized and church estates in tac t. The SDP protested
(238)in the strongest terms against th is new endeavour. I t  warned tha t the
working class would not s it by id ly  w a iting fo r external in terna l p o lit ic a l forces
to  solve the tasks o f the nation.
A t the beginning o f 1944, when the Russian Armed Forces were no more
than about 95 miles from  the Hungarian fro n tie r, i t  became more and more clear
th a t any e ffo rts  to  negotiate a separate peace must be illusory. The communists
warned the SDP leaders, in a memorandum, about the dangers involved in th e ir
continued support o f the regime and stressed the v ita l necessity to  widen the
(239)existing cooperation fram ew ork in to 'genuine national un ity '. S im ila r
sentiments had also been expressed by certa in  leaders w ith in  the SDP and TU 
movement. Others, notably Peyer, however, cautioned those who wanted to
(240)move too fa r and too quickly towards a radica l solution. The solid 'r ig h tis t'
core o f the party, accepting th is advice, ra llied  behind Peyer. The le ft ,  however,
led by Arpad Szakasits, attem pted to  sh ift the party's po licy towards tak ing
im m ediate action and did not wish to  w a it 'id ly  as h istory passed us by', as 
(241)Szakasits declared. • The le ft ,  however, at tha t tim e was not such a un ified
force  at top and middle leadership levels in the party  as in 1940-1942.
Furthermore, the w e ll organised communist network was not there e ithe r to  help
it ,  hence, its  im pact on party po litics  was weak. But, contrary to  the 'r ig h t' o f
the party, the le ft  was not alarmed by the prospects o f revolu tion. Indeed, i t
o ften  expressed the be lie f tha t a te r the war the transform ation o f the country,
the trans ition  to  a socialist Hungary, ws most like ly  to  be revo lu tionary in
character. I t  was in favour o f working together w ith  the communists, although
contacts were, largely, res tric ted  to  lower and middle levels; contacts and
sentiments to  cooperate were very much lacking at the top level. The isolated
p o lit ica l actions taken were s t i l l  considered too lim ite d  to  ju s tify  independent
p o lit ica l in itia tives  by the le ft .  In th is way they were greatly  influenced also by
th e ir  own weakness and th e ir fear o f losing the operational le ga lity  o f both the
party  and the trade unions. But when the Red A rm y Forces were approaching
the Hungarian border in early 1944 th is s ituation was to  change. On 16th
January 1944 at a Party general meeting held at Nagyvarad and attended by 200
(242)delegates, the f irs t  sign o f change came. In a keynote speech, Karo ly Peyer 
spoke out unusually strongly against the extreme righ t and called upon organised 
labour to  fig h t hard against it .  The centra l theme o f his address was s t i l l  the 
task facing the party in preparing fo r the fu tu re . A ll th is  was, however, 
unacceptable to Arpad Szakasits who, when his tu rn  came, called upon the 
delegates to  give up the prevailing party passivity since the hour had arrived 
when members c learly  and openly had to decide which 'camp' they jo ined. The 
fu tu re  o f the country, he declared, could not be entrusted to  chance. His
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message to  bourgeois forces, who he said protected the past against the social 
dem ocratic le ft ,  was tha t the party was ’a bridge between the past, present and 
future* w ith  its  aim o f *a free, independent Hungary, founded on social 
democracy'. This was a speech which in sentiment returned to  the policies o f
1941-1942 and la id  the foundations fo r  the 'Hungarian Front', discussed
(243)earlie r, which was established in a few  months tim e, in May 1944, and 
included the communists.
Thus, from  the beginning o f 1944, two main p o lit ica l trends can be
observed: (i) a sh ift to  the le ft  in the SDP, w ith  increased cooperation between
the le f t  socialists and the communists and (ii) closer personal and organisational
relations generally between the oposition parties. This strengthening in re la tions
between the dem ocratic parties, especially the common stand by th e ir le ft ,  made
it  possible, on the eve o f the occupation, to  exert pressure on the government
and, in the name of these parties, to demand the breaking o f f  o f re la tions w ith
Germany and the seeking o f support from  the A llie d  Powers fo r measures to
prevent a German occupation. These pleas, however, were re jected by the
Kallay Government fo r  the ostensible reason tha t a ll such measures could s t i l l  be
(244)postponed. So, in th is c r it ic a l s ituation, the re jec tion  o f independent
actions in itia ted  by the dem ocratic parties and th e ir  continued trus t in Kallay's 
diplomacy mumbed these parties and prevented them from  m obilising th e ir  
forces, preparing to  move underground and taking steps to  p ro tect th e ir  members 
from  arrest. The cris is could not, in fa c t, be put o f f  any longer and German 
troops occupied Hungary on 19th March 1944.
The consequence o f the occupation was a ban on a ll dem ocratic parties 
and a propaganda war against them. The occupation, na tu ra lly , had a 
pa rticu la rly  adverse a ffe c t on the SDP, in a sense the consequence o f its  own 
policies. The 'above ground' movement, owing to  its  be lie f in the p rinc ip le  o f 
'peaceful transition  o f Hungary to democracy', was very exposed and received a
-  139 -
serious blow; having lost th is ta c tic a l aim i t  was not in a position to  establish an
(245)'underground' movement. Unpreparedness, Gestapo arrests and murders o f
SDP leaders and lower and middle functionaries, the ban on the da ily  Nepszava, 
the occupation o f party  and trade union premises and confiscation o f its  assets 
to ta lly  paralysed the party and trade union movement. Also, Gestapo arrests and 
raids on meetings discouraged illega l organisational a c tiv ity . The trade union 
movement was not banned. It  was w a iting  fo r  discussions w ith  the Government, 
which i t  believed could turn  out favourably fo r it  since the government had 
already satisfied the minimum demands o f trade unions and they believed tha t 
they could trade the promise o f labour discipline fo r freedom o f operation. The 
leadership o f the workers went, autom atica lly , in to the hands o f the communists 
who, already underground, were hardly a ffected . P a rticu la rly  serious was the 
blow to  the rura l party organisation o f the SDP when, a fte r the occupation, many 
o f its  leaders were arrested and the army began in earnest to  ca ll up members 
fo r  m ilita ry  service. Those leaders who managed to avoid arrest re tire d  from  
po litics  and refused to undetake any illega l organisational a c tiv itie s . They were 
preoccupied w ith  th e ir e ffo rts  to try  to  save the fo rm al func tin ing  o f th e ir 
institu tions and to reach some sort o f accommodation w ith  the new government. 
The 'le f t ' o f the party, i f  not arrested, went im m ediate ly underground and trie d  
to  organise the nucleus o f a resistance movement. This group, which developed 
around Arpad Szakasits, was p o lit ic a lly  and ideologica lly inclined to  establish 
close working re lations w ith  the communists and to  operate w ith in  th e ir 
resistance movement and work towards the establisment o f an ille g a l SDP 
network. Throughout th is period, the le f t  wing o f the SDP and the communists 
worked closely together. They both agreed to  work inside and develop the 
'Hungarian Front' and the le ft  SDP paved the way fo r the communists to  jo in , 
since while the other parties were very apprehensive o f the communist's 
presence, they hoped tha t the SDP would establish the upper hand in the F ront 
fo r the socialists.
-1 4 0  -
In September 1944 the Communist Party was reconstitu ted under its old
name; but dropping the adjective ’Hungarian1 to  re fle c t the dissolution o f the
Comintern. The newly appointed CP leadership concentrated a ll its  e ffo rts  on
changing the elusive ’Hungarian F ront’ in to  an e ffe c tive  p o lit ic a l a lliance. The
plan fo r th is, in te r a lia , envisaged a unified workers’ party. A f te r  long
discussions between the CP and the le f t  o f the SDP and the trade unions i t  was
agreed to  sign a fo rm a l agreement fo r jo in t action, but to postpone the merger
of the tw o p a r t ie s ^ * ^ ,  u n til tim es were more normal. Discussions w ith  the
cen tris t trade union leaders, A n ta l Ban and Lajos Kabok, unexpectedly broke
down at the last m inute and they refused to  sign the d o c u m e n t . A r p a d
Szakasits had reached th is agreement on his own and some in flu e n tia l pa rty
members protested against i t  and promised to  expel a ll those who signed it .
Nonetheless, on 10th October 1944, the jo in t action document was fo rm a lly
signed by Gyula Kallay and Arpad Szakasits on behalf o f the communists and
(248)social democrats respectively. The two parties agreed tha t the fin a l
objective o f each was the establishment o f socialism in Hungary. This, however,
hardly represented o ff ic ia l SDP policy.
By September 1944 increased le ft is t  in fluence in the 'Hungarian Front'
can be observed. On 20th September 1944 a com m unist-dra fted memorandum,
(249)composed of 4 main points, was sent to  H orthy. I t  was signed by the le f t -
leaning Zoltan T ildy  (SHP), Arpad Szakasits (SDP) and Gyula Ka llay (CP). The 
memorandum called fo r:
i) w ithdrawal o f the Hungarian army from  the war and the disarm am ent o f 
German forces on Hungarian te rr ito ry .
ii) declaration o f war against Germany
iii)  the sending o f delegations to the Governments o f the A llie d  Powers to 
discuss an arm istice.
iv) establishment o f a ’Hungarian F ron t’ coa lition  government.
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Another memorandum was sent at the beginning o f O ctober,(250)
'Hungarian Front' again o ffe red its  good o ffices  to  Horthy, who was already 
considering, ten ta tive ly , leaving the Axis. The memorandum emphasised tha t 
any move to  leave the war and Germany could only be successfully accomplished 
w ith  the help of armed workers. By th is tim e, however, the Red A rm y had 
penetrated in to  Hungary and secret negotiations were already under way w ith  
Horthy's representatives in Moscow, when suddenly and w ithout any warning to 
the leaders o f the 'Hungarian Front' came to  the broadcast o f Horthy's a rm istice  
proclam ation, which because o f lack o f preparation and German fore-knowledge, 
was doomed to  fa ilu re .(251)
A fte r  the Nazi coup on 15th October 1944 Ferenc Szalasi, leader o f the 
A rrow  Cross Party, was installed by the Germans to  replace H orthy. A f te r  its  
assumption o f power the Arrow  Cross Party conducted a campaign o f vengeance 
and persecution against a ll bourgeois dem ocratic and le ft is t  parties which had 
partic ipated in the 'a rm istice  a ttem pt'. A lthough the trade unions were not 
banned, th e ir legal and illega l work was com plete ly paralysed. Many social 
dem ocratic leaders were arrested and murdered by the fascists; and the illega l 
nucleus o f the SDP, together w ith  some other be tte r established organisations, 
soon disintegrated. Some members belonging to  the 'Hungarian Front' and having 
close re lations w ith  the CP were able to  secure forged personal documents to  
avoid arrest. Some joined the resistance movement. By the end o f O ctober, 
however, the 'Hungarian Front' was reactiva ted, but contro l over i t  was lost by 
the group around Arpad Szakasits. And when, in November 1944, the p o lit ic a l 
centre o f g rav ity  shifted away from  the 'Hungarian Front' to  the newly
/ o c o \
established 'L ibera ting  Com m ittee o f the Hungarian National Uprising'. 
(Magyar Nem zeti Felkeles Felszabadito B izottsaga -  MNFFB) which, as w e ll as 
the 'Hungarian Front' parties, incorporated o ther anti-Germ an, a n ti-A rro w  Cross,
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bourgeois organisations and interests. The Com m ittee dra fted  a programme in 
which i t  called fo r resistance against the Germans, a free  independent 
dem ocratic Hungary, the in troduction o f social reform s in ce rta in  areas, and
/ o r o \
cooperation w ith  Hungary's neighbours including the Soviet Union. I t
declared the Szalasi Government unconstitu tional and claim ed legal con tinu ity  
fo r the Com m ittee. I t  planned to  organise a national uprising and to  establish
contacts w ith  the Red A rm y and i t  sent a delegation, headed by Professor A lbe rt
r
Szent-Gyorgyi, carying a le tte r  to  Molotov in which i t  recommended, in te r a lia ,
the preservation o f the existing c iv il adm in istra tion and police in the Soviet- 
(254)occupied areas. A ll these plans, however, collapsed a fte r a wave o f arrests 
and executions by the fascist A rrow  Cross Government, leading to  the dow nfa ll 
o f the Com m ittee. Some o f its  members managed to  escape to  the Soviet Union 
where the ir role became almost to ta lly  ins ign ificant compared w ith  the influence 
on fu tu re  events exercised by the exiled 'Muscovite' Hungarian communists. 
Others joined the m ilita r ily  in e ffec tive  resistance movement.
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Chapter 3: War and Breakdown
3.1 A g ricu ltu ra l Policy and Developments
The f ir s t  sign o f the new trend o f increased German economic links w ith
Hungary began as early as 1934 when, on 15th March the 'Rome Protocols' were
signed g iving p re fe ren tia l trea tm ent to  Hungarian wheat, thereby g iving Hungary
a more secure m arket. This increased in terest was p a rtly  due to  the theory tha t
in tim e  o f war Hungary, and her neighbours, could be easily reached by land, and
p a rtly  because her under-developed industry but strong ag ricu ltu ra l sector
appeared to  complement the German economy. Hungary was viewed by the
Germans as a source o f raw m ateria ls and ag ricu ltu ra l produce and at the same
tim e  a m arket fo r  German industria l goods. From 1934 on, w ith  favourable
com m ercia l agreements, large quantities o f surplus ag ricu ltu ra l deliveries o f
meat, cereals, ca ttle , lard, pou ltry  etc, were made by Hungary to  Germany
w ithou t any apparent fr ic tio n . Meanwhile, Germany supplied Hungary w ith
machinery. In 1936 Hungary obtained some 70 per cent o f her to ta l machinery
im ports from  Germany while Hungarian exports to  Germany rose from  20 per
cent to  25.9 per cent o f her trade between 1929 and 1 9 3 7 .^  In 1938 the share
o f Hungarian im ports from  and exports to  Germany were 30.1 per cent and 27.4
(2)per cent o f her to ta l trade respectively. The economy o f the country began to
be drawn more closely towards Germany a fte r  the declaration o f the 'Gyor
Programme' by the Daranyi adm in istra tion in March 1938. By 1939 trade w ith
(3)Germany exceeded 52 per cent o f Hungary's to ta l fore ign trade turnover. The 
'Gyor Programme' created an a r t if ic ia l boom in the economy from  the second 
ha lf o f 1938, a ffe c tin g  p rim arily  the armaments and heavy industria l sectors. 
The programme was a five  year schedule o f investments to  im prove the 
defensive capabilities o f the country and to  promote industria l and a g ricu ltu ra l 
production. T o ta l investment expenditure was estim ated at 1000 m illion  pengo,
(4)i.e ., 200 m illion  pengo per year. This meant, roughly, the doubling o f 
investments, which actua lly  absorbed somewhat less than 6 per cent o f National 
Income. The investment programme was financed by a once -fo r-a ll wealth tax  
ra ising 600 m illion  pengo and the rem aining 400 m illion  pengo came from  
in te rna l loans. The burden was la rge ly  on the wealthy, although they could raise 
the tax by special c red it which in tu rn  was financed by increased money supply 
which caused a slow in fla tiona ry  process. Its  e ffe c t began to  show only in 1940. 
The investment was to  be d istribu ted in the fo llow ing proportions: th re e -fifth s  
was to  be allocated to  m ilita ry  equipment and industry, o n e -fifth  to  transport 
and communications and o n e -fifth  to  agricu lture. So the main th rust o f the 
programme was in favour o f m anufacturing industry, ra ther than agricu ltu re , but 
the main areas o f investment in the ag ricu ltu ra l sector were the fo llow ing:
i) speeding up o f the com pletion o f an ambitious irr ig a tio n  scheme, started 
in 1937, over some 172,000 hectares o f land; certa in  regu la tory  works on 
rivers and inland waters;
ii)  prom otion o f ag ricu ltu ra l production and improvement o f m arketing 
organisations;
ii i)  improvement o f technica l education in agricu lture;
iv) resettlem ent o f some o f the landless population;
v) improvement o f housing, health and social services in ru ra l areas.
There was no detailed, comprehensive plan, however, and no special machinery
was set up to  coordinate and contro l plans drawn up by the various government
departments. I t  was not u n til 1940 tha t the M in ister o f Finance became
o ff ic ia lly  the coordinator o f policies and an advisory body, the 'Supreme
Economic Council1 was also created.
In the autumn o f 1938 the Defence Council, to  increase the pace o f war
preparation, decided to  raise the ra te  o f investment to  com plete the programme
(5)by August 1940, i.e., in two years ra ther than five . Thus the 'Gyor
- 158 -
Programme’ accelerated industria l development. The volume of industria l
production increased rap id ly  compared w ith  1938; in the single year o f 1939 it
(6)rose by 21 per cent, almost as much as in 20 years o f peacetime. So, when
war broke out in September 1939 the Hungarian economy was already in the
course o f rearmam ent and although Hungary did not yet enter the war the
process was given a fu rth e r push.
The in it ia l stage, however, came to  a ra ther abrupt ha lt in the summer
o f 1940. The rearmament plan was o v e rfu lfille d  and m ilita ry  orders decreased,
leading to  a decline in the a r t if ic ia l boom created earlie r. Industria l growth in
1940 was about 11 per cent, most o f which was achieved during the f irs t  ha lf o f
the year. I t  was a tem porary decline which was soon fo llowed by a renewed
expansion when the Soviet Union entered the war in the summer o f 1941.
Hungarian industria l expansion did not in it ia lly  coincide w ith  the German vision
o f the fu tu re  planned European division o f labour. German opposition to
Hungarian industria l expansion was p a rticu la rly  strong since, unlike her
neighbours, she was m arginally more industrialised. From the end o f 1939 to
1940 th is led to  serious disagreements between the tw o governments. In 1939 a
v is itin g  Hungarian delegate was given a memorandum regarding Hungary's
economy. The f ir s t  part o f th is memorandum re fe rred  to  the fu tu re  tasks
allocated to  Hungary's agricu lture : her agricu ltu re  i t  stated 'w ill have to
conform  to  the demands o f the German m arket more closely than ever'. The
second part re fe rred  to  industry, which had to  be transform ed in accordance w ith
German export in terests. This meant tha t Hungary had to  (i) in tens ify
ag ricu ltu ra l production, (ii) develop ag ricu ltu ra l processing industries and ( iii)
reduce industria l ta r if fs  and give German industry tax and c red it concessions and
abolish im port quotas. The clear intension was to  degrade Hungary to  the level
(7)o f prim ary producer. Hungary had to  conform  to  her natura l conditions, since 
u n til then she had developed 'unnaturally ', i.e., had industria lised. A f te r  the
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declara tion  o f war against the Soviet Union this a ttitu de  underwent some 
m od ifica tion . The reason fo r th is  was, pa rtly , increased demands on the German 
economy, more than any experienced before and, partly , a llied  bomb damage to 
her industry. Germany tr ie d  to  increase industria l production in unaffected 
Hungary.
The entry o f Hungary in to  the war, in June 1941, opened up a new era in
the h is to ry  o f her economy. Hungary remained p o lit ic a lly  more or less
independent u n til the German occupation in the spring o f 1944, but inevitab ly
now she was greatly  pressurised by German demands fo r  her to  become
econom ically an organic part o f the German ’G rossraum wirtschaft'. Her
economy was rap id ly  adapted to  complement the German economy. So, from
1941 on, the Hungarian economy was speedily transform ed in to  a war economy.
The sta te  gave large orders to industry, p rim a rily  to  heavy industria l enterprises.
I t  also rap id ly  increased the ra te  o f expansion o f basic raw m ate ria l production,
e.g. o il, bauxite, coal, iron, steel and manganese, which were indispensable fo r
the war. The w artim e peak o f industria l production was reached in 1943, when
the manufacuring production, in real terms, was 38 per cent higher than in 1938;
the share o f heavy industry increased from  44 per cent to  51 per cent during this 
(8)tim e . To ta l industria l production declined a fte r the end o f 1943 because, w ith
the deepening o f the war, the output o f consumer goods decreased by 25 per cent
compared w ith  1938-39. Also, disorganisation began to  appear in industry; p lant
was worn out and not replaced and there was lack o f maintenance and general
(9)economic deterio ra tion. The increased role o f industry as a sector resulted in 
an increase in the industria l labour force by 100,000, compared w ith  1938, which 
was more than during the two decades between the war. On the o ther hand, the 
proportion  working in agricu ltu re  declined to  below 50 per cent o f the to ta l 
labour fo rce  and, fo r  the f ir s t  tim e, the share o f industry in the Nationa l Income 
was g reater than tha t o f agricu ltu re . A lthough most o f the annexed te rr ito r ie s
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were industria lly  underdeveloped, they too contribu ted to  industria l production, 
which was 62 per cent higher, at constant prices, in the 1943 te rr ito ry , than in 
1938. Together, the annexed te rr ito r ie s  contribu ted some 15 per cent to  to ta l 
industria l production. The im portance o f ce rta in  annexed regions was much 
more than tha t figu re  would suggest, especially in term s o f raw m ateria l 
supplies. In term s o f to ta ls , they were im portant in the tim be r industry, 
contribu ing 46 per cent o f a ll output, 23 per cent in the food industry, ra ther less
in steel and m eta lworking -  15 per cent, and very l i t t le  in engineering -  1 per
♦ ( 10) cent.
These w artim e demands on the Hungarian economy by the German war 
machine required great e ffo rts  which could only be achieved by strong 
governmental in te rven tion  in the economic li fe  o f the country. This had already 
begun in 1938, but especially from  1941 a wide w artim e system o f in te rven tion  
was set up. The m arket gradually lost its  freedom. The most im portan t form  of 
in terven tion re la ted to  m ilita ry  orders from  the state, thereby regu la ting 
production. The state became the most im portant single buyer, frequen tly , even 
in the ligh t industria l sector. Moreover, the state also regulated the 
establishment o f new enterprises, or the expansion o f existing ones. Many 
facto ries were declared 'war facto ries ' and workers could not leave them . Some 
industries were com plete ly changed over from  c iv ilian  to  war production. The 
state also regulated the financ ia l and employment markets. Bank cred its  were 
under state con tro l and the financing o f the economy, operating la rge ly  on the 
basis o f state orders, passed in to  the hands o f the state. A la rge r and la rger 
share o f the N ational Income was used by the Budget, ris ing from  33 per cent in 
1938/39 to 71 per cent by 1944.(11)
In agricu ltu re , special in terest attaches to  the manner in which policies 
had to  be adapted by the Government to  meet Germany's demand fo r  exports. On 
the whole, th is meant the development o f production o f cereals, meat, oil-seeds,
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industria l crops and associated processing industries. Policies a im ing to  fu l f i l  
these aims were pursued, w ith  increasing fervour, u n til the end o f the war, yet 
success was p a rtia l, and in lim ite d  areas only. I t  w ill become clear tha t even 
w ith  increased governmental support and economic centra lisa tion Hungary could 
not fu l f i l  a ll her fo re ign  obligations and feed her own people at the same tim e.
From 1934 on, w ith  com m ercia l agreements favourable to  Hungary, huge 
ag ricu ltu ra l surplus deliveries were made to  Germany, w ith  apparent ease. On 
th a t basis Germany believed tha t, i f  needed, even more surplus deliveries could 
be squeezed out o f Hungarian agricu lture . In th is context, perhaps, it  is 
in te resting  to  re fe r to  H itle r's  b r ie f to  his Economic Com m ittee in 1941, when he 
expressed the view tha t maintenance o f the large-estate system was in the 
in terests o f Germany and was the sole guarantee tha t German war demands fo r 
ag ricu ltu ra l products would be met, even though, he said, most o f the large
estate owners were 'leg itim is ts ' and did not support the national socia list
f (12) movement.
But during the war, as w ill be shown below, exports o f only a few  crops 
were successfully increased. A g ricu ltu ra l deliveries to  Germany always 
remained below the level o f her demands and expectations. There were several 
reasons fo r  th is. F irs tly , the inherent in te rna l problems o f Hungarian 
agricu ltu re , as discussed earlie r, soon manifested themselves in the face o f the 
demands o f war. I t  became clear tha t the huge surplus deliveries in the period 
during the depression were more apparant than real and were la rge ly  made 
possible because o f the extrem ely low in te rna l consumption owing to  low  liv in g  
and n u tr it io n a l standards, and the large surplus o f labour. Low yie lds and low 
ag ricu ltu ra l p roduc tiv ity , due la rge ly to  under-mechanisation, were soon to  
become obstacles to  increased ag ricu ltu ra l production. W ithout a substantia l 
im provem ent in p roduc tiv ity  no fu rth e r increase in production was possible. This 
in tu rn  required large cap ita l investments in agricu ltu re . For the same reason, in
- 162 -
the short-te rm , no s ign ifican t reduction in the ag ricu ltu ra l labour force was
possible. Secondly, German estim ates o f Hungarian ag ricu ltu ra l capabilities
must have been tin ted  by the record harvest in 1938.
During the f ir s t  years o f the war ag ricu ltu ra l exports to  Germany
increased s ign ifican tly . For a tim e  i t  looked as i f  labour moving out of
agricu ltu re  to  industry, and to  the army, could be replaced by im ports o f
ag ricu ltu ra l machinery from  Germany. To some extent th is was the case, but it
fa iled  to  raise yields which, aggravated by the adverse e ffe c t o f low yields in the
annexed te rr ito r ie s , declined fo r  most ag ricu ltu ra l produce from  the early 1940s.
The use o f chem ical fe rt il iz e rs , low as i t  was in the 1930s, almost to ta lly
disappeared during the war, and due to  the reduction in livestock the supply o f
natura l fe rtiliz e rs , too, decreased. Apart from  a single exce llent year,
production results remained below those o f pre-war years. Compared w ith  the
average fo r  the second-half o f the 1930s overall ag ricu ltu ra l production declined
(13)by about 20 to  25 per cent. The decline was p a rtly  due to  the unusually bad
harvests o f 1941 and 1942. An index based on harvests fo r cereals, tak ing  the
period 1929-1938 = 100, gives only 83.1 fo r  1940, 84.1 fo r  1941 and 76.2 fo r 
(14)1942. But 1943 was a reasonable harvest and the index fo r  tha t year was 101;
the figu re  fo r rough fodder, tak ing  1935-1939 = 100, was 85 in 1942, 78 in 1943.
The p ic tu re  in animal husbandry was no more favourable e ither, c a ttle  numbers
increased u n til 1942, but declined s ign ifican tly  the rea fte r and were about 10 and
(15)12 per cent lower in 1943 and 1944 respective ly than in 1942. Pig numbers, 
too, declined by 32 per cent between 1939 and 1943 .*^
In discussing the development o f ag ricu ltu ra l production during the war, 
the changes in sown area must also be considered. An im portan t s h ift in the 
struc tu re  o f the sown area occurred in favour o f industria l crops. The ir area 
incresed 3.2 tim es by 1944, compared w ith  the average fo r  1931-38, th e ir  share 
in to ta l sown area ris ing from  1.2 to  3.9 per cent. The area o f legumes increased
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th ree fo ld  by 1943, the share clim bing from  0.76 to  2.33 per cent, while the area
sown to  root-crops and cereals declined from  30 to  28 and from  52.6 to  50.3 per 
(17)
cent respective ly. The above ra ther negative production results were
balanced by the increase o f 300-400 percent in the sphere o f industria l crops,
(18)w ith  a n inefold rise in the case o f sunflower. The decline in production was 
re la tiv e ly  even steeper, when the te rr ito r ia l gain made by Hungary is taken in to 
account. The size o f Hungary, as noted earlie r, almost doubled during this 
period. The annexed te rr ito r ie s , apart from  the province o f Bacska, annexed 
from  Jugoslavia, had l i t t le  ag ricu ltu ra l significance. But the te rr ito r ie s  acquired 
added almost 3 m illion  to  Hungary’s population, who had to  be fed.
The decline in ag ricu ltu ra l production combined w ith  the greatly  
increased in te rna l food requirements meant tha t the increased German demands 
fo r  ag ricu ltu ra l deliveries a fte r 1939 could not be met. During the f ir s t  years of 
the war Germany constantly pressed Hungary to  step up her a g ricu ltu ra l exports. 
By 1941 a stage was reached when the Hungarian negotia ting team was cajoled 
in to  signing a com m ercia l tre a ty  w ith  Germany which stipulated, fo r  the fisca l 
year o f 1941/1942, the delivery o f 50 per cent o f surplus wheat and rye, 80 per 
cent o f maize, 100  per cent o f a ll oil-seeds and the to ta l food surplus o f the
(19)
province o f Bacska fo r the duration o f the war. Hungary was allowed to 
annex Bacska, but in re tu rn  the entire  excess food output o f tha t province was to 
be shipped to  Germany, where i t  was to  be shared w ith  Ita ly  in the proportions of 
60 and 40 per cent respective ly. A pro toco l was signed in Budapest in May 1941 
which allowed German ag ricu ltu ra l experts in Bacska to  conduct the necessary 
s ta tis tic a l estimates, an exercise which was repeated in 1942. This surplus, in 
1941-1942, amounted to  some 340,000 tons o f g ra in .^ ^  La te r production here 
too declined to  a point when, i t  would seem, there was nothing to  spare fo r 
export. A f te r  1941 Hungarian exports o f cereals, due p a rtly  to  the bad harvest, 
mentioned earlie r, became almost ins ign ifican t. Exports o f wheat and flo u r fo r
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the fisca l year 1939/40, from  'Trianon* Hungary, to  Germany to ta lled  277,300
tons. By 1940/41 th is  declined to  20,900 tons and by 1941/42 to  nothing at a ll. I t
was only a fte r  intensive German pressure tha t Hungary promised to  de live r a
certa in  amount o f bread and fodder, from  the next year's harvest, regardless o f
(21)mounting d iff ic u ltie s . Any defic iency in cereals supplied by Hungary was to
be made up by increasing the value o f deliveries o f f ru it ,  wine and vegetables,
from  46 m illion  to  66  m illion  reichmarks, and also increasing the export o f c a ttle  
(2 2 )to 56,000 head. This, however, remained underfu lfilled . A t the end o f the
1942/43 fisca l year Germany complained b itte r ly  tha t 32,000 o f the promised
56,000 c a ttle  had not been delivered, while ca ttle  were shipped to  neutra l 
(23)Switzerland. W ith predictable regu la rity , German d issatis faction w ith
Hungarian ag ricu ltu ra l deliveries was recorded at the six m onthly Economic 
Com m ittee meetings. Between 1940 and 1944 Hungarian ag ricu ltu ra l deliveries 
remained constantly below the quota figures regulated by the com m ercia l 
agreements. Only 50.7 per cent o f the agreed quotas fo r horses was delivered in 
the period between 1940 and 1943. By 1943/44 th is declined steeply to  7.3 per 
cent. The corresponding figure fo r  ca ttle  was 69 per cent, fo r  pigs 30 per cent. 
D e liveries o f sheep showed a decreasing tendency u n til 1942, a fte r  which they 
disappeared altogether. Between 1940 and 1943 only about one quarte r o f the 
agreed quota obligation in food was delivered to  Germany by Hungary. In value 
term s Hungary's food deliveries to  Germany steadily declined from  400 m illion  
dollars in 1939 to  21 m illion  dollars in 1943. The share o f ag ricu ltu ra l exports in 
her to ta l exports decreased gradually from  81 per cent in 1940 to  76 per cent in 
1941, 68  per cent in 1942, 69 per cent in 1943 and 57 per cent in 1944.
The basic aim o f government ag ricu ltu ra l po licy was to  reduce 
ag ricu ltu ra l exports, to  f u l f i l  German demands as m in im a lly  as possible. One 
im portan t consideration fo r  th is po licy was, o f course, the s ign ifican t reduction 
in overa ll ag ricu ltu ra l output, discussed earlie r. The other was the g rea tly
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enlarged in te rna l demand due to  the increase in Hungary’s to ta l population, the 
steadily growing size o f her industria l work force and, o f course, the size o f the 
conscripted army, a ll o f which needed to  be fed. In 1941 Hungary sent a 
contingent o f some 350,000 soldiers to  f ig h t on the Russian fro n t. Most o f the 
draftees were young peasants and there was no machinery to  replace them on the 
fie lds, resu lting  in a serious food shortage as the war advanced. A f te r  1942/43 
the fortunes o f the war changed, resulting in the debacle at Stalingrad. W ith the 
demoralised army and the growing possib ility  o f u ltim a te  defeat the 
government’s reluctance to  ship goods to  Germany increased, in an a ttem pt to 
save as much o f the economy as possible fo r  a fte r the war. Resistance to  
supplying food by the peasants must be an additional consideration. Moreover, 
Hungary must have been more than disenchanted since most o f the deliveries to  
Germany were made on c red it. German-Hungarian trade during the war period 
showed a pa tte rn  o f rap id ly increasing Hungarian trade surplus. C red it increased 
as i t  was requested. German debts, which stood at 140 m illion  Reichmarks (RM) 
in 1941, increased d ram atica lly  to  500 m illion  RM by 1942, 1000 m illion  RM by 
1943 and 1500 m illion  RM by 1944. N a tura lly , th is  contribu ted to  rapid 
in fla tion , re la tive ly  low u n til 1941, since these debts had to  be financed in the 
budget by a substantia l increase in the money supply. About 50 per cent o f the
/og\
increase in money supply was due to  accumulated German debts, a measure 
o f the degree o f exp lo ita tion  o f Hungary by Germany, or the Hungarian 
’con tribu tion ' to  the 'common cause', to  be discussed a fte r  the conclusion o f the 
v ic to rious war.
As the war progressed, and needs m ultip lied , increased pressure was put 
on Hungary by Germany. She was warned not to  make constant excuses 
regarding the non-ava ilab ility  o f surplus stocks, but to  make greater sacrifices 
and to  reduce domestic consumption. State in te rven tion  was g rea tly  extended to  
cover most industria l production. S im ila rly , during the war increasing German
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demands fo r ag ricu ltu ra l produce played an im portant role in the extension o f
sta te  in te rven tion  in agricu lture . This was c learly  re flec ted  not only in the
measures taken to  boost ag ricu ltu ra l production and the leve l o f compulsory
de live ry  quotas, but also in the s tuc tu ra l transform ation o f ag ricu ltu ra l
production. A ll th is was fo r  the purpose o f increasing exports to  Germany. Since
Hungary was an independent a llied country, Germany refra ined from  d irec t
pa rtic ip a tion  in the various production schemes. Rather, German influence was
res tric ted  to  technica l collaboration in the fram ew ork o f trade trea ties.
State in te rven tion  in Hungarian agricu ltu re  increased f ir s t  in marketing,
but w ith  a ra the r d iffe re n t purpose. P rio r to  the war, in te rven tion  was lim ited ,
p rim a rily , to  organising the market, in an a ttem pt to  monopolise it ,  in the
interests o f m aintaining high prices. Under war conditions m arketing con tro l no
longer presented the main problem. Now, the problem was how the backward
agricu ltu re  could be made more responsive to  both the increasing German
requirements, on the one hand, and the growing in terna l needs, on the other. In
these circumstances, the state, especially from  1940 on, g rea tly  extended its
po licy o f in tervention. A fte r  the beginning o f the war in te rven tion  became more
and more concerned w ith  securing the d is tribu tion  o f the lim ite d  ag ricu ltu ra l
supplies which best served the in terests o f the state. A decree in 1940
prohib ited the free  m arketing o f a number o f im portant ag ricu ltu ra l products,
(27)e.g. bread grain, maize, leguminous crops and potatoes. A f te r  1941 this
proh ib ition  was extended to  cover sugar beet, tobacco, fodder, a va rie ty  o f
industria l crops and a ll cereals. M arketing res tric tions were placed on pe tro l in
(28)March 1942, on beef c a ttle  in July 1942, and on pou ltry  in November 1942.
Another im portant change in po licy  was the in troducto in  o f a compulsory
(29)de live ry quota fo r  fa ts  in 1941. During 1942 the pressure on the u tilisa tio n  o f 
ag ricu ltu ra l produce was fu rth e r in tensified. M arketing was in the hands o f 
enterprises which were a ll in a monopoly position.
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This system o f contro l and deliveries, however, fa iled  to  sa tis fy  the ever 
increasing pressure fo r more ag ricu ltu ra l produce. In 1942, there fo re , a new 
system o f compulsory deliveries was introduced, dubbed a fte r  the name o f the 
M in is te r fo r  Food Supplies, the Jurcsek-System. ^ ^  The main ob jective  o f th is 
new system was to  put a t the disposal o f the state a fixed  amount o f ag ricu ltu ra l 
produce every year, based on ag ricu ltu ra l production capacity, ra ther than on 
actua l ag ricu ltu ra l output in a specific  year. The quotas fo r the de live ry 
obligations were to  be determ ined in wheat units and the capacity was to  be 
measured by the land-tax assessment value o f land - the net cadastral yoke 
income, assessed in gold crowns per cadastral yoke. This law fixed th is de live ry 
un it a t 50 kg o f bread grain per gold crown o f net income fo r  every cadastral 
yoke. The law also specified tha t one f i f th  o f de livery obligations was to  be 
fu lf i l le d  in bread grain and one f i f th  in fa ts. The remaining three f if th s  could be 
at the farm ers’ d iscretion or replaced free ly  by bread grain or fa t.  The 
f le x ib il ity  o f th is system, by its  nature, had an im portan t in fluence on 
production, since quota fu lf ilm e n t necessitated both an increase and a change in 
the production structure . A long w ith  the new delivery system, a netw ork o f 
M arketing Centres was established, which took over the ro le  o f m arketing 
management from  the fo rm er monopoly agencies. Apart from  the cooperatives, 
only some of the most in flu e n tia l com m ercial businesses were pe rm itted  to  take 
part in the work o f these centres.
I t  soon became clear, however, tha t even the new system could not
arrest the steadily growing food supply d iff ic u ltie s . D e livery quotas very o ften
remained un fu lfilled , especially fo r  pou ltry  and eggs, fo r  which only 27 per cent
and 32 per cent o f the pre-w ar marketed levels were co llected. Accord ing to
o f f ic ia l reports, holdings below the size o f 100  cadastral yokes und e rfu lfille d  the
(31)prescribed quotas by 8 per cent. The burden o f de live ry assignments w ith in  
th is group was even greater on the sm aller working peasant farm ers, since th e ir
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land was assessed on a re la tive ly  higher gold crown per cad. yoke value basis
than the large holdings. Also, the production structu re  o f th e ir land tended to  be
oriented towards intensive crops and the share o f arable land in th e ir  holdings
was higher than in the case o f large holdings resulting, again, in ye t higher
ob liga to ry  quota targets. For th is group o f farm ers, often, the only way to  f u l f i l
the de livery quotas was by reducing th e ir  own consumption. The large estates
and the b e tte r-o ff farm ers, on the other hand, were le f t  w ith  surpluses which
they could dispose o f on the black m arket, where prices were much higher. Under
the im pact o f th is po licy about fo u r-f if th s  o f the to ta l de livery assignments fe ll
on holdings o f less than 100  cadastral yokes o f arable land, while th e ir  share o f
(32)ag ricu ltu ra l land in 1935 was only one th ird . Faced w ith  this s itua tion , the
working farm ers, not tem pted by prices, put up resistance to the au thorities ’ new
requirements and very o ften  fa iled to  f u l f i l  th e ir quota obligations. The
resistance to  the new system o f ca ttle  requ is ition ing was so widespread tha t
regulations had to  be m odified. I t  is also true  tha t produce was o ften  w ithheld
fo r sale on the luc ra tive  black m arket. Moreover, unde r-fu lfilm en t o ften
expressed pure p o lit ic a l opposition to  the unpopular war. In such cases the
authorities imposed serious penalties, o ften  requisition ing, to  make examples o f
the farm ers concerned. I t  was o ff ic ia lly  reported th a t in 1943 legal proceedings
were begun against 4000 small farm ers in the county o f Csongrad, and 1200 in
(33)Szentes, because o f u n fu lfilm en t o f de livery quotas fo r  maize.
A lthough labour was not m ilita rised  in industry, where some production
units were declared war factories, the state abolished the free labour m arket
which, under the preva iling  s ituation, had favoured the workers. A ccord ing ly, a
decree was passed which, w ith  some qua lifica tion , perm itted  the use o f any able-
bodied man or woman between the ages o f 14 and 70 fo r  ag ricu ltu ra l work i f
(34)urgency required. To secure the labour requirements o f large holdings, fa rm  
workers were prohib ited by law from  changing th e ir  place o f work. A ccord ing to
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the decree those who did not bind themselves by contract by a specified closing
tim e  and did not f u l f i l  m ilita ry  duties were to  be moved to  work camps, run by
(3 5 )
m ilita ry  command. According to  the 1941 Census, re la tin g  to  the pre-
Trianon boundaries, th is resulted in f ix in g  the location o f some 207,000
agricu ltu ra l workers.
The Jurcsek-System was continued u n til 1944/45. By tha t tim e, 
however, some other land, pastures and grass lands, which had previously been 
om itted  from  de live ry  assignments, were included in the ca lcu la tion. Also, in 
order to improve the meat supply, meat too became subject to  compulsory 
de livery. To compensate fo r  the extension o f the compulsory de live ry  system, 
the quota ca lcu la tion was reduced from  50 to  40 kg. bread grain units per gold
crown per cad. yoke net income. But the new system was not adm inistered
/qg)
because the theatre  o f war had moved on to  the te rr ito ry  o f Hungary by then.
Because o f the increasing labour shortage, due to  m ilita ry  call-up, in 1944/45 the
compulsory de livery was modified to perm it farm ers to  fu lfu l th e ir  prescribed
(3 7 )
quotas by working on the large estates. This, to  the large estates, meant 
re la tiv e ly  cheap labour, since wages, ris ing in the f irs t  stages o f the war, were 
now fixed by the law.
On the whole, however, the Government s t i l l  fa iled  to  achieve a balance 
o f supply and demand in food, inspite o f making d irec t a ttem pts to  re s tr ic t 
consumption by price regulation and in troduction  o f a system o f food ration ing. 
In te rvention was also extended to  p ro fits  to  some degree in the in te res t o f 
p o lit ic a l equ ilibrium . The main method o f in fla tio n  contro l was, as noted earlie r, 
by lim it in g  wage increases to  much less than the ra te  o f price increases. By the 
end o f 1943, compared w ith  pre-war levels, prices had increased by almost 
three fo ld , while incomes o f workers, regulated by the state, had risen only 60 per
(38)
cent, resulting in a s ign ifican t decrease in purchasing power.
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There was also a d irec t a ttem pt to  l im it  consumption by the in troduction
of ra tion ing. During the war ra tion  cards were introduced fo r almost a ll basic
foods: bread, flou r, fa t, m ilk, bu tte r, potatoes and there were ra tion  books fo r
clothing, at fa ir ly  low levels per head. The black m arket which developed,
however, provided some re lie f fo r  the scare items, p rim a rily  fo r the be tte r o ff,
thereby p e rm ittin g  higher consumption levels than those im plied by the ra tion ing
system. On the whole, i t  would appear tha t the population did not rea lly
experience extrem e hardship. O ften, people fa iled  to  appreciate the fu ll
pressure o f the war, at least from  1939 to  1942. While the supply worries o f the
population gradually increased, the fu ll economic e ffec ts  o f German de live ry
demands remained re la tive ly  unknown to  the public. One o f the main concerns,
(39(namely unemployment, to ta lly  disappeared under the boom.
It  is not easy to  provide a sa tis facto ry  and complete explanation fo r 
Hungary’s good supply provision during the war, as the evidence is both 
insu ffic ien t and con trad ic to ry . Shortages o f food did appear, due p a rtly  to  bad 
harvests and, perhaps more im portan tly , because the country -  both at the
national and ind iv idual levels -  engaged in stock accumulation, o ften  w ith  the
fu ll connivance o f the government. The extent o f th is remained unknown; no 
o ff ic ia l figures were published, a ll rem aining in h ighly confidentia l reports, many 
o f which were destroyed during the war, in which the Germans were o ften  not 
to ld  the real s ituation. In his otherwise admirable and pioneering study, K a rl 
Brandt makes the fo llow ing  observation, which is w orth  quoting in fu ll:
Hungary had no sca rc ity  o f food during the war, even in the 
la rger c ities, u n til combat action rea lly  struck. Even when 
the fro n t lines were but a few kilom etres from  Budapest, 
food suplies in its  restaurants and other public eating places 
were almost on a peacetime level. The in troduction  o f food- 
ra tion ing  cards, which occurred a fte r Hungary entered the
war (sic), only s ligh tly  lowered the consumption ra te  the
urban population had enjoyed during peacetime. The farm  
population even indulged in an increased consumption o f 
food.(40)
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R ea lity , from  evidence available, would look somewhat d iffe re n t. F irs tly , the
system o f ra tion ing  was, in fa c t, introduced in A p ril 1940 fo r sugar and fa t, at 80
(41)dkg. and 1 kg. per head per month respective ly. Secondly, from  tha t tim e  on,
but especially a fte r the establishment o f the ’National Food Supply O ffice ' in
January 1941, the ra tion ing  system was extended to  cover most basic item s and
the overa ll trend o f rations per head, a lbe it w ith  some fluc tua tion , declined
continua lly . The fo llow ing  tim etab le  affords a rapid survey o f the extension o f
(42)ra tion ing  quotas per head, in the period 1940 to  1943: '
1. Bread: Sept. 1941/35 dkg.; Feb. 1942/20 dkg.; June 1942/15 dkg.;
Aug. 1942/20 dkg.; O ct. 1942/16 dkg.; June 1943/20 dkg.
2. F a t: A p ril 1940/1 kg.; Feb. 1942/72 dkg. per month.
3. Sugar: A p ril 1940/80 dkg.; Feb. 1942/60 dkg. per month.
4. F lour: March 1941/2 kg per month; Feb. 1942/1.6 kg. per month;
June 1943/ 2 kg per month.
5. Potatoes: ra tion ing  introduced in October 1942, no data.
6 . M ilk : ra tion ing  introduced in Budapest in May 1942.
7. Soap: ra tion ing  introduced May 1942, no data.
8 . Eggs: ra tion ing introduced November 1942, no data.
9. M eat: ra tion ing  in some prov inc ia l c ities, June 1942, Budapest and
d is tr ic ts  January 1943.
10. C loth ing and Industria l goods: ra tion  books introduced May 1941.
In the spring o f 1941 a sudden, ra ther unexpected shortage o f wheat and certa in  
o ther food products developed. Behind these d iff ic u ltie s , the au thorities  ra ther 
unconvincingly explained, lay the need fo r s tockpiling o f food as Hungary’s 
soldiers were marching to  ’H is to ric  Frontiers '. But, as yet, only a few  soldiers 
had marched. The real reason could have been the extrem ely bad harvest, due 
p a rtly  to  the very serious floods in 1940. The Government had to  extend its  
emergency powers and resort to serious large-scale requisition ing, to  reduce the
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fa t  ra tion  and introduce fu rth e r res tric tions on the slaughtering and sale o f 
fa ttened livestock. During the summer, a ll im portant cereals and fodder crops 
came under con tro l and producers, under heavy penalty fo r  evasion, hoarding 
e tc., were obliged to o ffe r  a ll th e ir surplus to the Government at fixed  prices. 
For a while, in June, bread vanished com plete ly from  the streets o f Budapest. 
The s itua tion  was serious enough fo r the country to  look forw ard w ith  great 
concern to the coming harvest, which turned out to  be below average again and 
the supply scare o f the spring did not subside. General consumer goods too were 
in short supply and purchasing books were issued fo r c lo th  and linen, in which 
purchases had to  be registered.
The s itua tion  deterio ra ted fu rth e r and in February 1942, ra tion ing  was 
extended to  cover the entire  country fo r bread, fa t, flou r and sugar and there 
were three 'meatless days' per week. The 'Nationa l Food Supply O ffice ' charged 
w ith  the duty o f preventing hoarding, in a year from  its  modest o rig in  had grown 
in to  a pow erfu l M in istry , whose f irs t  duty was to  secure food supplies fo r  
Hungary's allies. Only a fte r a ll th e ir needs were satisfied could the Hungarian 
A rm y come, and what was le ft  a fte r tha t was fo r c iv ilia n  consumption.
In January 1942 Ciano visited Hungary and noted, ra ther in te res ting ly ,
tha t:
one did not fee l the war there .... The c ity  was fu lly  lighted, 
t ra f f ic  appeared almost normal, there were few res tric tions 
on goods, and those were more fo rm a l than e ffe c tive . Bread 
was white , exactly  as before the war, and as abundant as i t  
was then.(43)
In fa c t, i t  would appear tha t only a month afterw ards the Hungarian population
was amongst the worst supplied w ith  basic item s in Europe and ra tion ing  was
(44)reduced to  lower levels than in Germany its e lf:
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Bread Fat Sugar
Germany 286 gr./day 927gr./month 1021 gr./m onth
Hungary: 200 gr./day 720 gr./m onth 600 gr./m onth
The economic position in 1942 was s t i l l  serious. The supply position continued to 
be bad. Stocks ran low again. Indeed, by mid-1942, just before the harvest, the 
bread ra tion  was reduced to  15 dkg. per day fo r  six weeks. A number o f o ther 
res tric tions  were also introduced e.g., m ilk  became rationed in Budapest and 
meat in some provincia l towns. Farmers were ordered to  de live r th e ir  en tire  
main cereal crops, at fixed prices, a fte r allowance fo r seed and th e ir  own 
consumption. The harvest in fa c t came just in tim e to  re lieve the pressure fo r  a 
while. There was a great shortage o f labour, due to  m ilita ry  ca ll-up and under- 
mechanisation and a shortage o f spare parts now began to  appear. A f te r  the 
harvest the bread ra tion  was restored to  its  previous level but since the bread 
grain harvest proved unsatisfactory owng to  renewed serious floods, not as 
extensive as in 1941 but covering about 1.5 m illion  cad. yokes, the bread ra tion  
was down again to  16 dkg./day by October 1942 and the portion o f crops farm ers 
were allowed to  re ta in  fo r th e ir own consumpton and seed was also reduced.
The food shortages o f 1941 and 1942 did not recur during the f irs t  h a lf o f 
1943. The more e ffe c tive  compulsory system devised by Jurcsek, helped by the 
prospects o f a reasonable harvest, made i t  possible to  increase the ra tion  fo r 
bread and flo u r to  th e ir previous levels again on 23rd June fo r a tim e at any ra te . 
The jurecsek-system o f deliveries imposed greater compulsion on farm ers than 
h ithe rto  to  de live r p rac tica lly  a ll th e ir  produce above the leve l o f the personal
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allowance at o f f ic ia lly  fixed  prices. The harvest, as predicted, was reasonable 
(1929=100; 1943=101) but by Ju ly an in fla tio n  scare swept through the country, 
which brought about a run on shops and the population began to  hoard food in 
earnest. People trave lled  to  villages fo r  food which u ltim a te ly  provided a very 
useful reserve fo r  the c r it ic a l months in 1944 when A llied  raids, combined w ith  
loss o f te rr ito ry  made food provision and movement very d if f ic u lt .  The hoarding 
o f the previous three years meant tha t every v illage was able to  look a fte r its e lf; 
possibly Budapest presented the most serious problem. Industria l consumer goods 
disappeared from  the shops, black market prices increased rapid ly, but normal 
rations remained, fo r  a while, unchanged on paper. A  reasonable d is tribu tion  o f 
necessities was achieved up to  November. In tha t month o ff ic ia l rations were 
cut d ras tica lly  but even these nominal quotas were o ften just not available. 
Some farm ers s t i l l  brought supplies to  the market but refused to  sell fo r money, 
becase o f the rapid increase in in fla tion  in 1944, and accepted only clothes and 
c igare ttes in exchange. The bread ra tion  was down again to  15 dkg. but, 
together w ith  m ilk  and fa t, was p rac tica lly  non-existent, even at the 
phenomenally high black m arket prices.
So, on the whole, i t  is d if f ic u lt  to  establish the level o f food provision, or 
s tarvation, o f the Hungarian population during the war. Looking only at the leve l 
o f o f f ic ia l ra tion ing  some real hardship was indeed experienced, varying in 
in tens ity  at d iffe re n t tim es. Obviously, towards the end o f 1944 food provision 
was quite  bad. While harvest and stocks were reasonable, food d is tribu tion  
became a great problem due to  transport bottlenecks. Transport was p a rtly  in 
ruins due to  a llied bombing, p a rtly  used fo r  m ilita ry  purposes and movement o f 
naz i-co llaborator refugees from  the Ukraine and, a fte r  Romania’s defection , o f 
German m inorities there. Industria l goods almost to ta lly  disappeared, black 
m arket prices reached astronom ical heights. Food o ften  could not be found, 
even o ff ic ia l rations could not be obtained. While horse meat and sausages were
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(45)s t i l l  d istribu ted, no eggs, no salt, and very o ften  no bread was available. 
D iffe re n t sections o f society and geographic areas were a ffec ted  d iffe re n tly . 
Rationing had a pa rticu la rly  adverse e ffe c t on the level o f consumption o f the 
average urban wage and salary earner, especially those on fixed  incomes. The 
w idely developed black m arket, fo r  most o f the war period, provided an 
a lte rna tive  to  the more determ ined and the b e tte r-o ff, who were able to 
supplement th e ir consumption, a lbe it at much higher prices. There is no 
evidence tha t urban ra tion ing  was d iffe ren tia ted  between ’norm al consumer’, 
heavy and extra-heavy workers. Some workers, however, re luc tan t to dismantle 
plants fo r shipment to  Germany towards the end o f the war, were o fffe red  
double-rations as an incentive.
As fa r as the ru ra l population is concerned, especially the sm all farm ers, 
th e ir consumption level, i f  perhaps not p le n tifu l, was considerably above th a t o f 
the urban population. Anti-G erm an in sentim ent on the whole, farm ers whenever 
i t  was possible res tric ted  deliveries; i t  was one way fo r them to  express th e ir 
p o lit ica l resistance, to  sabotage German economic demands. Generally, the 
Government le ft  the farm ers, both small and large, alone provided they did not 
engage in open and obvious resistance. Moreover, in tim es o f in fla tio n  they 
na tura lly  were prone to  hoarding, which could be done w ith  re la tive  ease by 
small farm ers, whose stocks were especially d if f ic u lt  to  contro l, and who hid 
stocks inspite o f a ll orders. A question which is d if f ic u lt  to  answer w ith  any 
degree o f accuracy is what was the size o f these stocks in Hungary, just before 
the war was over. This w ill be taken up la te r.
For the moment, mention must be made regarding avenues o f fu rth e r
government in te rven tion  d irected to increase ag ricu ltu ra l output. Amongst such
measures was the law, promulgated in 1942, which made the growing of
(47)industria l crops compulsory. Farmers w ithou t exception were compelled by 
th is  law to  devote tw ice  the area o f the previous tw o years to  the growing of
-  176 -
sugar beet, tobacco, f la x  and hemp. The law fu rth e r stipu lated tha t holdings 
above 50 cad. yokes should allocate 5 per cent o f th e ir arable land to  the 
production o f sunflower, while those below i t  were obliged to  sow maize as a 
border around th e ir land. Holdings above 200 cad. yokes were compelled to  
allocate 2 per cent o f th e ir  arable land to  the growing o f castor o il plants. This 
law was fu rth e r extended in the summer o f 1943 to  include a ll holdings above 15 
cad. yokes, and the ta rge t o f 5 per cent was increased to  7 per cent. These 
e ffo rts  to  boost the production o f industria l crops, especially oil-seed were to 
comply w ith  German requirements and resulted in a marked increase in th e ir 
share o f exports to  Germany during the fin a l phase of the war.
In 1943 the Government also passed a b ill which in itia te d  a 
comprehensive budgetary investment programme, covered by ordinary revenue, 
fo r  the ’Development o f A g ricu ltu re ’/ ^  In a sense, th is programme attem pted 
to  redress the imbalance between industry and agricu lture  created by the ’Gyor 
Programme’. I t  provided 1000 m illion  pengo, over a period o f 10 years. The 
p rim ary object o f th is programme was the im mediate and rapid increse o f 
ag ricu ltu ra l output w ith  the main emphasis on developing animal husbandry. 
These plans came very much to  the fo re fro n t a fte r  the German occupation o f the 
Ukraine, when Hungary was designated to  supply the Ukraine w ith  high-grade 
breeding stock and qua lity  seeds. I t  would seem tha t a fte r the occupation o f the 
Ukraine Germany agreed to  accept sm aller quantities o f ag ricu ltu ra l produce 
from  Hungary than before the war, and to  give her the option o f supplying a 
sm aller proportion o f th is in wheat and livestock, provided i t  was made up in 
o ther ways, especially raw m aterials, but also f ru it  and wines. The ’granary’ o f 
Germany was, to  some degree, the Ukraine.
The 1943 budget allocated some 14.6 m illion  pengo fo r  the development 
o f anim al husbandry, which represented about 21 per cent o f the to ta l 
ag ricu ltu ra l investment. Some e ffo rts  were also made in the sphere o f
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irr iga tion , soil am elioration, seed improvement, free  d is tribu tion  o f fodder crops 
in the village, improvement o f fe rtiliz e rs , and setting-up o f experim ental
stations. The decree, while creating no special machinery to  put the programme 
in to  e ffe c t in a system atic way, made some proposals regarding the 
reorganisation o f ag ricu ltu ra l adm in istration. The existing post o f 'Regional 
A g ricu ltu ra l O ffic e r ' was considered ine ffec tive , due to  the large area they had 
to  cover. Now the b ill established the post o f 'A g ricu ltu ra l O ffic e r ' fo r a ll large 
villages, w ith  sm aller ones grouped together; he was charged w ith  the duty o f 
con tro lling  the execution o f the programme and provid ing advisory services on 
ag ricu ltu ra l m atters to  loca l councils and farm ers. An advisory body, the 
'N ationa l Council fo r  A g ricu ltu re ', was also created, appointed by the M in iste r o f 
A g ricu ltu re . The powers o f the M in ister to  contro l the d irec t production were 
extended greatly. He was also given the power to  compel farm ers to  adopt more 
e ffic ie n t production methods, to  dispossess in e ffic ie n t farm ers (gu ilty  o f gross 
negligence) and to  give authorisation, w ithout p rio r consultation, fo r  the 
consolidation o f fragm ented holdings. Farmers making investments to  e ffe c t 
permanent improvements in agricu lture were given tax rebates. S im ila r 
exemptions were available to  industria lists. Had it  not been fo r  the war, its 
im pact on Hungarian agricu ltu re  could have been considerable, not only in
increasing output and im proving the e ffic ien cy  o f production but also in
rem odelling economic organisation through the extension o f state contro ls. In
the tw o years the programme was in force, however, l i t t le  use was made o f some 
o f these powers, apart from  compelling farm ers to  grow ce rta in  crops and 
granting monopolistic rights to  cooperative societies and state agencies fo r  the 
purchase, d is tribu tion  and export o f certa in  ag ricu ltu ra l products. Most o f the 
measures were only introduced on a minor scale and th e ir  e ffec ts  on ag ricu ltu re  
were small in comparison w ith  the e ffects  o f the 'Gyor Programme' on industry.
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O verall, during the war, hea lth ie r s truc tu ra l proportions developed; as a
result o f these policies agricu lture  became more intensive but, as discussed
earlie r, there was no increase in the output o f the most im portan t crops and
therefore  the volume o f ag ricu ltu ra l production as a whole did not increase.
A fte r  the autumn 1943 production peak, disorganisation and decline were already
appearing: there were disruptions due to  lack of maintenance and generally
production fa iled  to  respond to the measures to  increase output.
Economic re lations between Hungary and Germany seem to  have
remained fa ir ly  steady and c iv il throughout much o f the war. A t tim es, o ffic ia ls
cooperated grudgingly, more so a fte r 1943, when Hungary became a re luc tan t
pa rtic ipan t in the war, though many avenues to  leave the war and make a
separate peace w ith  the A llied  powers were pursued. The resu ltan t German
occupation on 19th March 1944, brought about a rapid decline in the economy.
The story o f the actual occupation is not very d iffe re n t from  tha t in
other countries, apart from  the fa c t tha t now i t  happened to  an a llied  country.
As in other countries i t  went very smoothly, w ithou t any resistance. As could be
expected, the occupation signified the to ta l exp lo ita tion  o f Hungary’s economic
resources. Economic relations between Hungary and Germany a fte r  the
occupation could be quite adequately characterised by the resolution adopted, on
(49)19th A p ril 1944, by the conference which took place in the German Foreign
O ffice  regarding the role of the national economy o f Hungary. I t  was noted tha t:
The M in ister o f Foreign A ffa irs  pointed out tha t i t  was a 
question o f a quick and relentless exp lo ita tion o f the 
economic resources o f the country ... we agree on the fa c t 
tha t no Hungarian contributon o f any significance must be 
neglected sim ply because o f lack o f means o f payment and 
the danger o f fu rth e r in fla tion  in Hungary ... Hungarian 
agricu ltu re  must be set to  work to  supply German 
requirements to  the utmost ... A representative o f the 
M in is try  o f Supply should examine in what areas the 
shipments o f Hungarian raw m ateria ls can be increased even 
fu rth e r. Here too the objective is to  ex trac t everyth ing 
possible fo r  the German war economy to  the maximum ...
Germany w ill not pay fo r these supplies, hence the leve l o f
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c learing-cred it w ill have to  be raised to  120  m illion  pengo ...
The needs o f the occupying forces w ill be provided fo r, both 
in money and in kind by Hungary ... we w ill also do our best 
to  comb through Hungary fo r  any available labour fo rce  and 
make i t  work fo r the German war economy. We w ill begin 
w ith  the deportation o f Jews to  forced labour camp.(50)
This, then, was the ’Magna C arta ' fo r  the systematic and com plete exp lo ita tion
o f the Hungarian economy. To tha t end, Germany arranged the fo rm ation  o f a
'righ t-w ing , 'rubber-stamp' cabinet, tha t was prepared to  put th is programme in to
e ffe c t. A p len ipotentiary was appointed, in the person o f Veesenmayer, to
ensure tha t the Hungarian government operated in accordance w ith  the Reich
Government. Barely a week a fte r  the fo rm ula tion  o f German policy, the
Hungarian Prem ier, Dome Sztojay, hurried ly reported at a conference th a t a
sizable consignment o f maize had been delivered to  Germany. I t  was indicated
tha t fu rth e r substantia l shipments o f cereals were planned fo r  A p r il and May.
This was the beginning o f German shipments o f Hungarian reserves out o f the
country. U n fortunate ly, no re liab le  s ta tis tica l data seem to  exist fo r 1944. Hence
it  is d if f ic u lt  to  provide an accurate figure  o f what shipments were made in the
end. According to  some sources, the Hungarian government promised the
delivery o f some 700,000 tons o f cereals, but delivered only, and here figures
d iffe r  s ign ifican tly , 100,000 tons. O ther sources maintain tha t some 400-
(51)500,000 tons were actua lly  sent. Further sources indicate th a t i t  was
believed Hungary had 1,200,000 tons o f cereals available, and tha t a fte r  much 
negotiation Hungary agreed to  send 700,000 tons but only 90,000 tons were ever 
s e n t/52>
Also, from  the end o f March, German experts began to  a rrive  in numbers 
in Hungary. The ir role was to  d irec t and oversee personally the ways in which 
production, both in industry and agricu lture , could be boosted. On 1st A p ril 
German representatives fo r the 'D irec tion  o f Arm am ent and War Production in 
Hungary' were appointed. Veesenmayer, however, reta ined u ltim a te  a u tho rity  in
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a ll m atters. A decision was made by th is group o f representatives tha t some
50,000 workers would be dispatched to  German fac to ries  and tha t the lion's share
(53)o f ag ricu ltu ra l reserves was to  be shipped to  Germany.
The means o f economic exp lo ita tion  o f the country were given a legal
fram ew ork on 2nd June, 1944 when the new German economic representative,
Boden, and the top Hungarian economic m inister, Imredy, signed a com m ercia l
(54)tre a ty . According to  th is ra ther ambitious agreement, Hungary accepted a ll 
the conditions set out by Germany regarding the closer in teg ra tion  o f war 
production o f the two countries. Hungary also agreed to  establish a 'War Fund', 
to  which she was to  contribu te  200  m illion  pengo per month, towards the 
provisions o f the occupying troops. Contributions to  the German war-food 
economy, in the form  o f deliveries to  the Wehrmacht, assumed a la rger scope 
only a fte r the summer o f 1944, when war operations sh ifted to  Hungarian 
te rr ito ry  and substantial numbers o f German soldiers had to be provisioned. U n til 
tha t tim e, no Wehrmacht units were stationed in Hungary except at the ra ilw ay 
transport o ffices, a irports and s im ila r places.
In industry, several plants and facto ries producing goods o f s tra teg ic  
im portance were sim ply taken over by the loca l German authorities. Much 
machinery, even plants, were simply confiscated. From the several hundred- 
thousands o f Jews being deported, some leading Jewish industria l magnates were 
selected, and in exchange fo r  the ir personal freedom they handed over th e ir  
assets in Hungary, which allowed the Germans to  gain s ign ifican t and d ire c t 
in fluence in the economic li fe  o f the country. In the same vein, mention must be 
made regarding the a c tiv itie s  o f the Swede, Roul Wallenberg, who was saving 
many Hungarian Jews in exchange fo r supplies o f lo rries, food and o ther war 
m ateria ls to  the Germans. Ensuing measures, however, made the economic 
s itua tion  much worse, inspite o f the fa c t tha t the Germans could not achieve 
th e ir fu l l  expectations. The measures taken were m anifestly unsuccessful.
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Indeed, from  A p ril 1944 production in almost a ll areas o f industry and agricu ltu re
began to  decline. Much of th is  was due to  the rapid decline in p rodu c tiv ity ,
brought about by the atmosphere in the country, where even draconian penalties
(55)could not eradicate absenteeism and bad work. Production was also seriously 
disrupted by A llied  raids, which began on 2nd A p ril 1 9 4 4 . ^ ^  These raids 
continued throughout the fo llow ing  months and by September almost a ll o il 
re fineries were in some way incapacita ted. No precise data are available, but i t  
was claimed tha t production declined by about 30 to  40 per cent due to  bombing,
absenteeism, shortage o f m ateria ls and supply d iffic u ltie s , p a rtly  due to  the
(57)paralysed transport system. The German authorities continued to  exp lo it the 
resources o f the Hungarian economy to  the end, w ithout encountering any
o ffic ia l, or uno ffic ia l resistance. The Hungarian leadership, to ta lly  pro-N azi
(58)a fte r 15th October, 1944, put no obstacles in th e ir path; many would cla im  
tha t in fluen tia l p o lit ica l groups even encouraged them.
In conclusion, i t  can be said tha t Hungary made a not un im portan t 
contribu tion  to  the German war-food economy. But i t  was probably not 
commensurate w ith  the economy's productive capacity. P rim a rily  an 
ag ricu ltu ra l country, Hungary was over most o f the war years, paradoxica lly  
perhaps, not o f the greatest economic significance to  Germany, since a lte rna tive  
supplies could be procured from  Poland, France and the Ukraine. In many ways 
German economic policy was more im portant, and successful, w ith  regard to  raw 
m ate ria l supplies, especially tha t o f bauxite and o il. I t  would seem th a t in th is  
respect Hungary's role could be compared to  tha t o f Romania, whose economic 
im portance lay in her o il resources. During the war, Hungarian o il production 
rose from  p rac tica lly  zero to 840,000 tons per year. While, o f course, fa r  below 
tha t o f Romania, i t  was nevertheless the second most im portan t source o f o il 
w ith in  the German sphere o f influence. Indeed, i t  was the only source a fte r  the 
defection o f Romania from  the Axis camp in August 1944. A pprox im ate ly  50 to
(59)60 per cent o f Hungarian o il output went to  Germany. From the German 
occupation in March to  about December 1944, the Hungarian economy assumed 
paramount im portance to  Germany. The German sphere o f in fluence was 
reduced to  a point where Hungary, or parts o f it ,  was almost the only fore ign 
te rr ito ry  o f significance under German contro l. Observers did note tha t H it le r  
seemed more determ ined to  hold out in Western Hungary than anywhere else, 
perhaps in order to  re ta in  his last source o f o il.^ * ^  As la te  as February 1945, 
when Budapest capitu la ted and surrendered to  the Soviet A rm y, A lb e rt Speer 
flew  to  the Hungarian o il region in a desperate a ttem pt to  ex tra c t pledges from
(C  1 \
loca l representatives o f his M in istry  to  pursue the struggle to  the b itte r  end.
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3.2 War Damage in A g ricu ltu re
Hungary was probably the most unfortunate amongst the European 
countries because the ravages o f the war reduced her economic position to  
depths never before known in the course o f her h istory. On the one hand, much 
o f the country's m ate ria l resources and assets were raided by both the re tre a tin g  
German and advancing Russian armies, eager to  seize anything useful. This, in 
the case o f Germany was done w ith  the encouragement o f the pro-N azi 
Hungarian Government on the basis o f an agreement reached between the tw o 
countries on 14th November 1944, which stated tha t:
in the interests o f continued war e ffo r t  certa in  production 
sectors had to  be, tem porarily , re located from  Hungary onto 
the te rr ito ry  o f the Third Reich.(62)
On the other hand, although the country was a ba ttle fie ld  fo r more than six 
months, compared w ith  the whole Russian theatre  o f war, Hungary was a sm all 
area on which huge armies clashed, causing immense and disproportionate 
devastation. On purely economic grounds, however, losses in ag ricu ltu re  were 
not solely due to  these d irec t factors. Some im portant long-term  damage was 
caused ind irec tly , over the entire  war period, when figh tin g  was s t i l l  conducted 
outside Hungarian te rr ito ry . Furtherm ore, i t  could indeed be le g it im a te ly  argued 
th a t beyond the actual war damage, the 300 m illion  dollars reparation payment, 
made over 6 years by Hungary, should also be added to  the account o f war 
losses.(63)
I t  would, perhaps, be appropriate to  deal f ir s t  w ith  some o f th is  in d irec t 
damage which, apart from  trade exp lo ita tion, as noted earlie r, had im portan t 
long-te rm  e ffec ts  on agricu lture . These ind irec t factors showed themselves, 
la rge ly, in the continued deterio ra tion  in the supplies o f the various inputs in to  
agricu ltu re . F irs tly , the most im portant among them was the rapid reduction in
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the supply o f a r t if ic ia l fe rtiliz e rs . The reason fo r th is  was, pa rtly , the
discontinuation o f phosphate im ports and, partly , the increasing use o f nitrogen
fo r  the production o f explosives. An im portant con tribu to ry  fa c to r la te r  was, as
noted earlie r, the destruction o f many chem ical plants by A llie d  bombing. The
1928 (a max. o f the in te r-w a r period) peak year fo r fe r t il iz e r  production was not
reached again u n til 1951. Its  adverse cum ulative e ffec ts  began to  show its e lf
a fte r the th ird  year o f the war, when soil exhaustion was becoming an acute
problem. In Hungary about 96 per cent o f the soil conservation was done by the
use o f natura l manure. The shortage o f i t  was, in many ways, the Ach illes ' heel
o f agricu lture , even during the in te rw ar period. L ivestock losses f irs t  o f a ll
a ffe c t manuring s ign ifican tly . W ith the leve l o f livestock tha t existed in
Hungary, and assuming a normal level o f application o f 280 qu in ta l/hecta re , i t
would have required 5 to  6 years to  supply the to ta l arable land area; w ith
livestock losses, to  be discussed below, th is period was extended to  17 y e a r s / ^
The disastrous e ffe c t on soil conditions was to  be fe lt  over a long period.
According to  estimates, lack o f manure was to  cause a loss o f 15 per cent in the
production o f cereals and 25 per cent root crops which was to  continue fo r  at 
(65)least 5 years. Secondly, during the war an increasing proportion o f horses
and trac to rs  were diverted to  m ilita ry  use. This reduction in tra c tiv e  power in
agricu lture  resulted in an adverse a ffe c t on the qua lity  o f land cu ltiva tion . In
Hungary about 95 per cent o f tra c tive  power in agricu lture  was provided by d ra ft
animals. The decrease in livestock caused a loss o f more than 58 per cent in
d ra ft animals from  about 485,000 horse-drawn units to  about 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 .^^
(67)According to  other sources, the loss was nearer to  65 per cent. This was one 
o f the princ ipa l reasons why, in the f ir s t  year a fte r the war, a considerable part 
o f arable land was not sown. Machinery tha t had survived was also in very bad 
condition. Third ly, the great shortage in manpower reduced both the quan tity  
and qua lity  o f agricu ltu ra l work. The peasantry, mostly the younger and stronger
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section o f i t ,  was drafted in to  the army in hundreds o f thousands. Large numbers 
o f them had been k illed , became invalids or were taken prisoners o f war. The 
cost o f war in m ilita ry  casualties was 1.5 m illion , o f whom 400,000 were k illed  in
( C O )
action, died during bombing or as prisoners o f war. During the last stages o f
the war, the policy o f compulsory resettlem ent fo r  people in ce rta in  areas and in
a number o f categories fu rth e r aggravated the labour p r o b l e m . O w i n g  to  the
shortage o f tra c tiv e  and manpower, as the war progressed more and more land
remained fa llow . While in 1939 175,000 cad. yokes came in to  th is category, the
figu re  by 1940 and 1941 had increased to  460,000 and 860,000 cad. yokes,
respective ly. In 1944/45, some 1,300,000 cad. yokes o f land was le f t
u n c u lt iv a te d /* ^  Fourth ly, reference should also be made to  the po licy which,
over the war years, diverted much needed resources from  pro tec tion  against
flood and r iv e r contro l to  the war e ffo r t .  The resultant problem o f flood ing only
emerged in the la te 1940s.
By fa r the greatest damage, however, in flic te d  on the economy and
spec ifica lly  on agricu lture was by German destruction and the e ffe c t o f m ilita ry
operations. To ta l war damage was near 22,000 m illion  pengo, about 430 m illion
dollars based on 1938 prices, which represented approxim ate ly 45 per cent o f the 
(71)national wealth. The d is tribu tion  o f war losses according to  m ajor sectors is 
(72)shown in Table 3.1. The to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l losses represent about o n e -f if th  o f
(73)to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l wealth and para lle l the losses in the transport system, i.e.,
roads, bridges, ra ilw ay tracks and ro llin g  stock together, where more than ha lf o f
the to ta l system was destroyed. I t  was double the loss o f p riva te  res identia l
buildings. A g ricu ltu ra l losses represented almost 53 percent o f the to ta l losses
in the production sectors o f the economy; th is is about tw ice  as much as
(74)ag ricu ltu ra l production contributed to  the National Income in 1938.
W ith in  agricu lture, livestock and animal husbandry suffered the most 
losses. The d is tribu tion  o f to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l losses, excluding fo res try , in the 
various categories, is shown in Table 3.2:
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Table 3.1: D is tribu tion  o f War Losses
Sector value o f losses in m illions o f 1938 
pengo
as % o f 
to ta l 
losses
A g ricu ltu re 3682.3(a) 16.8
M ining & M etallurgy 65.4 0.3
M anufacturing 2042.4 9.3
Small Scale Industry 727.0 3.3
Commerce 1365.4 6 .2
Transport 3689.3 16.8
C red it Institu tions 830.0 3.8
Insurance Institu tions 157.0 0.7
P riva te  Households 5247.9 23.9
P riva te  Resid. Build ing 1854.0 8.4
Small Works, Buildings 212.9 1 .0
H ealth  & Welfare Inst. 156.2 0.7
C u ltu ra l Losses 407.3 1.9
O ther Losses 1513.8 6.9
TOTAL 21.950.9 1 0 0 .0
(a) A g ricu ltu re , including fo res try
£ o u v o e .  ■- -) Ap<
Table 3.2: D is tribu tion  o f A g ricu ltu ra l Losses
Categories Losses in m illion  1938 pengo
As % o f 
to ta l agr. 
losses
L ivestock 1507.1 43.3
Crops 1320.0 37.9
Buildings 217.6 6 .2
Carts, wagons 185.1 5.3
Machinery, equipment 162.4 4.7
O ther losses 89.7 2 .6
Tota l  ^ 3481.7 1 0 0 .0
S e> U a J C£ £ f e e v. 1  ^
The reduction in livestock numbers threw  Hungary back 100 years; not since 1857
had the level o f livestock, in any category, been as low as in the autumn o f 
(76)1945. Not a ll the animals were, o f course, destroyed or driven away, but
many, especially pigs and sheep, were slaughtered by the farm ers themselves
fearing confiscation; some perished due to  undernourishment and s tarva tion  and
some were consumed by the figh tin g  armies. Table 3.3 presents a tabu la tion  o f
(77)the d is tribu tion  o f losses in livestock fo r the main categories o f animals. In
1945 livestock numbers in term s o f ca ttle  units were 55.6 per cent lower than in
1938. The s itua tion  was, in fa c t, much more serious than these figures would
suggest. There are two main reasons fo r th is. F irs tly , the best qua lity , prim e
animals were driven away on the hoof. Most o f the lost horses were less than
three years old, since a fte r  the war began the army gradually replaced its  old
draft-horse stock w ith  stronger and be tte r qua lity  younger animals. O f the to ta l
(78)losses in horses, 78 per cent were younger than three year olds. Secondly, the
severity o f damage varied regionally, the degree o f va ria tion  was from  7 to  97
(79)per cent loss in d iffe re n t counties. High losses were recorded in those
counties where the ba ttle  fro n t remained sta tionary fo r  long periods or where
resistance was p a rticu la rly  determ ined and the lo c a lity  changed several tim es.
Moreover, livestock loss was not only regional but p a rticu la rly  heavy on the big
estates. Most o f the animals were taken away from  the big estates, where o ften
no more than 1 to  2 per cent o f the previous stock leve l r e m a in e d /^  O ften
there was no tim e  to  co llec t animals from  the sm all peasant farm ers and move
them behind a new line o f defence. The various crops and produce made up
nearly 38 per cent o f the to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l losses. In grain crops alone (i.e.,
wheat, barley, rye, oats and m ille t) some 30 m illion  quintals were destroyed by
(81)the war. The conversion o f the country in to  a theatre  o f war led to  
destruction o f wealth on a grand scale. Much o f the harvest in 1944 could not be
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TABLE 3.3: D is tribu tion  o f L ivestock losses
Livestock
Type on 31 Oct. on 15 March on 31 May
1857(a) 1938 1945
in 1 0 0 0 s head in percentage
C a ttle 1587 1875 1070 32.6 42.9
Pigs 1616 5224 1114 31.1 78.7
Horses 744 814 329 55.8 59.6
Sheep 4973 1629 328 93.4 79.9
Tota l
number:(b)
2404 2863 1270 47.2 55.6
(a) recalcu lated to new boundaries
(b) computed on the basis o f standard livestock units
Sonvce % ^  }  ^ ^  ^
Losses compared 
w ith  
1857 1938
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collected. M ilita ry  operations greatly  hampered and o ften  com plete ly prevented
autumn planting and sowing on the Great Plain in the Trans-Tisza regions in
1944, while i t  prevented spring sowing in the Trans-Danube region in 1945, where
(82)only one th ird  o f the norm al wheat area was sown. Farm work was generally
neglected. Labour morale and discipline, under the preva iling  confused
conditions, were also at a very low point. While in 1943 the country produced
some 22.7 m illion  quintals o f wheat, in 1945 only 6.5 m illion  quintals were
(83)produced; even in 1946 production was only 11.3 m illion  quintals.
Much o f the ag ricu ltu ra l resources, in te r a lia , was removed by the
German and Russian m ilita ry  command. East o f the Tisza, the Russian
breakthrough o f the fro n t- lin e  came so qu ick ly and unexpectedly th a t the
German and Hungarian commands had very l i t t le  tim e  to  organise and coordinate
an e ffe c tive  salvage operation. Under the ea rlie r agreement to  destroy
s tra teg ica lly  im portant objects and stocks, much in th is region was destroyed,
but s ign ifican t amounts o f stocks, especially wheat, stored away in the eastern
region was le ft  unavoidably behind, most o f it  to  be taken away by the advancing
Russian a r m y / ^  Indeed, operations even in the region between the Danube and
the Tisza were s im ila rly  a ffected . The authorities, however, managed to  remove
much more from  Transdanubia. From here much ag ricu ltu ra l produce, includ ing
livestock, was sent to  A ustria  and Germany. Vast convoys, m ostly ag ricu ltu ra l
produce and animals, but also machines, raw m ateria ls and even the contents o f
shops, were loaded up and moved west. O ften  as many as 4 to  8 tra in  loads, w ith
100 axles or more, le f t  Hungary daily. Much went also by road and w ater. No
re liab le s ta tis tica l data appear to  exist concerning the extent o f these
shipments. I t  was stated at the tim e by the Szalasi Government Departm ents
tha t some 55,000 wagons o f m aterials went, m ostly to  Germany, by the end o f
March 1945. Some got no fu rth e r than Austria . There, they were scattered, used
(85)by German and Hungarian troops and c iv ilians; some was auctioned. Many o f
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the consignments in A ustria  were looted by the loca l population. L ivestock too 
went the same way. Some of the animals were u ltim a te ly  d is tribu ted  to  local 
peasants by B ritish  and Am erican forces when they arrived. N a tu ra lly , the 
Russians expropriated fo r themselves what they found in th e ir zone. The non­
a v a ila b ility  o f data makes it  impossible to  apportion the size o f loo ting  between 
the Germans and the Russians. I t  was suggested tha t at the tim e o f the Russian 
invasion some 18 m illion  quintals o f cereals was in public stores. The Red A rm y 
seized much o f th is and took i t  out o f the country. Also, about ha lf o f the loss o f
/Qg\
livestock could be a ttribu ted  to  the Russians.
The growing shortage o f ag ricu ltu ra l produce, together w ith  livestock, 
had seriously a ffected  the food supply to  the population, especially in the last 
stages o f the war. The shortage, re la tive  to  demand, which developed was so 
great tha t i t  could not be re lieved by the harvest o f 1945. Transport and 
d is tribu tion  d iff ic u ltie s  and the growing in fla tio n  prevented the flow  o f produce 
to  the urban population. In 1945 the supply and demand imbalance was 46 per 
cent fo r  bread grain, including barley, fo r  meat 74 per cent, fo r  fa ts  56 per cent 
and fo r  sugar 78 per cent. Consequently, during the w in te r o f 1945 the section 
o f the population tha t re lied on cen tra lly  d is tribu ted  supplies received only one
th ird  o f its  calorie intake. This was less than tha t o f the German population or
• I? i ^ (87) prisoners in England.
In A p ril 1945 when the Red A rm y drove the German and pro-Nazi 
Hungarian armies in to  Austria, the towns and villages as w e ll as the people and 
land had been to ta lly  devastated. The war ended, not only w ith  Hungary’s 
defeat, once again, but also w ith  the v ir tu a l destruction o f her economic system, 
including her agricu lture . The ’new’ Hungary which was to  be born from  th is  
devastation s t i l l  contained many o f the problems o f the ’old’. Hungary’s 
agricu ltu re , therefore , had to  s ta rt out, a fte r  the war, from  a very low  point and 
she was burdened w ith  almost the same unsolved problems as a fte r  the F irs t 
World War.
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in fla ted  prices o f 1938 and also in real term s, due to  d ifferences in price 
levels, 1 reparation do lla r = 10.21 pengo, instead o f the o ff ic ia l 5.14 
pengo resu lting in an actual payment, in rea l term s some 3000 m illion  
pengo instead o f the actual 1500 m illion  pengo. In 1945/46 this 
represented 17 per cent o f the reduced N ational Income. The proportion
gradually reduced by 1946/47 it  was 10 per cent and in subsequent years
7.7 per cent u n til 1952, when it  was completed
Ivan T. Berend, A szocia lista gazdasag fejlodese magyarorszagon, 1945- 
1968, Bp. Kossuth, 1974, p . l l
64. Ferenc Donath, Reform  es Forradalom, A Magyar Mezogazdasag
S truktu ra lis  A talakulasa 1945-1975, Bp. Akadem iai Kiado, 1977, p.27
65. Magyarorszag Problemaja es Mezogazdasaga (no author), Bp. 1946, p.46
6 6 . Bela Fazekas, Mezogazdasagunk a felszabadulas utan, Bp. Mezogazdasagi 
Kiado, 1967, p.40
67. Magyarorszag Problemaja ... op.c it., p.46
6 8 . Matyas T im ar, Gazdasagi fejlodes ... op .c it., p.27
69. The Szalasi Government, in it ia lly  toyed w ith  the idea o f to ta l population 
resettlem ent, or evacuation, from  occupied te rr ito r ie s . But due to  the 
resistance o f the population u ltim a te ly  only about 500,000 people were 
resettled, under the slogans ’To save our People over to  the Reich1 and 
'the fru its  o f such noble deed w ill be blessed not only by the present day 
Hungarians, but a ll fu tu re  generations to  come'
Ivan T. Berend, Magyarorszag Gyaripara ... op .c it., p.537
70. Ivan T. Berend, A Szocialista Gazdasag, op .c it., p.12
71. Matyas T im ar, Gazdasagi fejlbdes ... op .c it., p.21
72. Ivan T. Berend, A Szocialista Gazdasag ... op .c it., p.12
73. P.ZS. Pach (ed.), Magyarorszag Tortenete ... Vol. 8, op .c it., p.26
74. Bela Fazekas, Mezogazdasagunk a ... op .c it., p.39
75. ib id., p.39
76. The s itua tion  compared to  one year ea rlie r had improved m arginally, 
since in the eastern part o f the country where the war already moved on, 
some increase in livestock occurred
77. Bela Fazekas, Mezogazdasagunk a ... op .c it., p.40
78. Ferenc Donath, Reform  es Forradalom ... op .c it., p.27
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79. Bela Fazekas, Mezogazdasagunk a ... op .c it., p.40
80. Ferenc Donath, Reform  es Forradalom ... op .c it., p.27
81. Bela Fazekas, Mezogazdasagunk a ... op .c it., p.41
82. Ivan T. Berend, -  Gy. Ranki, A Magyar Gazdasag Szaz ... op .c it., p.221
83. Matyas T im ar, Gazdasagi fejlodes ... op .c it., p.21
84. C .A. Macartney, October F ifteen th  ... op .c it., p.189
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Accord ing to  in te rna tiona l standards ca lorie  intake was set at 3125 
calorie/person/day; in 1945/46 the population received 1648 calories. 
Reduced calorie  intake, p a rticu la rly  shortage in m ilk  and da iry products, 
adversely a ffected  the health o f the population, especially children. In 
year 1945, more than 32 per cent o f children under the age o f one died
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PARTH: PRELUDE TO COLLECTIVISATION, 1945-1948: THE PHASE OF TRANSITION
The period between 1945 and 1948 represents an independent phase in 
the h is to ry  o f Hungary: on the one hand, i t  completes the p o lit ic a l and economic 
processes which began before 1945, on the other hand, new processes were 
in itia te d  during th is  period.
The process o f land reform , set in to  motion during the in te rw a r period, 
came to  a ha lt w ith  the outbreak o f the War. With the end o f the War, in the 
spring o f 1945, the tim e  arrived to  solve fin a lly  the land d is tribu tion  question. 
The concept, the endeavours towards land re fo rm  and the aim were, o f course, 
not new. As shown previously, they featured fo r  years in the programmes o f the 
now emerging dem ocratic parties. Land re fo rm  im m ediate ly became the focus 
of a tten tion  o f a ll these parties. Scarcely ha lf o f the country had been 
'libera ted ' when the daily Delmagyarorszag carried an a rtic le , on 19th November 
1944, po inting out tha t 'the success or fa ilu re  o f the new dem ocratic Hungary lay 
in the sa tis fac to ry  solution to the question o f land reform  .... The land re fo rm  is 
one o f the most urgent and pressing national tasks.' Moreover, while the 
conquest o f Hungary was s t i l l  going on, orders fo r agrarian reform s were given 
by the Red A rm y. The reason fo r th is urgency, however, was to  induce the 
peasants, who were s t i l l  figh ting  on the side o f Germany, to  d e s e r t .^
Several facto rs, both exogenous and endogenous, contributed to  the fin a l 
dissolution o f large estates. Thus, the emergence o f the Communist Party, w ith  
its  a lly  the advancing Russian Arm y, undoubtedly provided a most im portan t 
impetus fo r  reform s. Further, i t  was helped by the fa c t tha t a ll the non­
communist parties emerging a fte r the war, most o f them from  underground, 
were almost as rad ica l as the Communist Party, especially on social and 
economic questions. There was a consensus among them, in p rinc ip le , regarding,
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e.g., the necessity o f land re form , although, as w ill be shown, there were
im portan t d ifferences o f opinion regarding the extent, method and tim e  o f its
execution. The Communist Party, in accordance w ith  its la tes t po licy  on land
re fo rm , as adopted in the 1930s, did not forge ahead, as it  did in 1919, w ith  the
nationalisation o f agricu lture , inspite o f some hardline party members who tried
to  ’sho rt-cu t' the 'inevitab le  development' and proceed stra igh t away w ith
(2)co llec tiv isa tion  o f the expropriated estates. More, of course, w ill be said
about th is la te r. Therefore, the 1945 Land Reform , although on a much more
extensive scale than ever attem pted before, was conceived on the same basic
princip les as the reform  in the in te rw ar period. Its aim was to broaden the
property base o f the agarian society, by a large scale red is tribu tion  o f land, but
i t  had no apparent in ten tion  o f changing the organisation o f ag ricu ltu ra l
production. The p o lit ica l realism , great caution and restra in t displayed by the
Communist Party at th is tim e  were undoubtedly in sharp contrast to  its
(3)em otional p o lit ica l adventure in 1919. The party's overrid ing concern was to
avoid the mistakes com m itted in 1919, by adjusting its e lf to the general mood o f
the country, while creating, speedily, a firm  p o lit ica l base fo r  its  fu tu re
operations. This cautious circum spection was, o f course, fu lly  ju s tif ie d  since the
party 's power base in the country, discounting possible support by Russian
m ilita ry  m ight in case o f an emergency, was extrem ely modest. In 1944 the
Communist Party membership, including the 'fe llow  trave lle rs ', numbered few er
(4) . . .than 12,000 people. I t  is not surprising then tha t the Hungarian Communist 
P arty (HCP) turned its  a ttem tion , p rim arily , to  ind iscrim inate re c ru iting , to  the 
questions o f land re fo rm  and economic reconstruction and to  the most 
susceptible and discontented section o f society, the 'ru ra l p ro le ta ria t', where its  
e ffo rts  to  a ttra c t the necessary support were expected to  pay the highest 
dividends in the shortest tim e.
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For the f ir s t  tim e in h istory, tha t old dream, the development o f 
agricu ltu re  on the lines o f individual peasant farm ing, based on intensive 
cu ltiva tion , seemed to  the dem ocratic parties more real than ever before. 
Conscious o f Hungarian m istrust o f communism, Stalin proceeded somewhat 
more w a rily  in the case o f Hungary than o f some other East European countries, 
notably Romania and Bulgaria, where the USSR fu lly  exploited its  position o f 
strength. He adopted an increm ental, gradualist, s tra tegy which, at the 
beginning, emphasised the establishment o f a progressive, m u ltipa rty , 
government (w ith  a Soviet veto, however, on the composition o f its  cabinet), land 
red is tribu tion  and economic reconstruction -  to  the great disappointment o f the 
HCP. Thus, apart from  communists, and th e ir crypto-com m unist allies, the 
Provisional Government formed in December 1944 at Debrecen, included the 
leading in te r-w ar dem ocratic opposition parties, i.e., the Small Holders Party 
(SHP), Social D em ocratic Party (SDP) and National Peasant Party (NPP). W ith a 
conc ilia to ry  mask, the HCP called fo r national un ity  and it  also determ ined the 
speed of execution o f the land reform . By insisting on in it ia lly  ind irec t contro l 
over the M in istry  o f the In te rio r, the HCP was greatly  aided in e lim ina ting  any 
po ten tia l p o lit ica l oppositon. Under the pre text o f economic reconstruction the 
party  successfully fought fo r  reform s which extended the sphere o f cen tra l 
government in the national economy at the expense o f the priva te  sector. W ith 
the well-known ’salami ta c tics ’ the SHP was gradually f irs t  rendered p o lit ic a lly  
im potent -  its  leadership s t i l l  hoped to  survive the ’temporary* Soviet occupation 
by avoiding d irec t confronta tion w ith  the communists -  and then com ple te ly 
destroyed. Through the techniques o f in f ilt ra t io n  and subversion both the SDP 
and NPP were e lim inated from  the p o lit ica l arena. By the August 1947 General 
E lection, using devious and unlaw ful means, the HCP fin a lly  achieved its  ta rge t 
o f a m ajority . Soon a fte r, the Cominform  was established and the HCP was, at 
last, allowed to  remove its  ’po lit ica l mask' by dropping a ll pretence o f the
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acceptance o f parliam entary rule. And when the h is to rica l year 1948/49 arrived 
- the 100th anniversary o f the lost ’Hungarian War fo r Freedom’ o f Kossuth and 
P e to fi against Habsburg oppression in 1848/9 -  Hungary, again, lost its  p o lit ica l 
freedom.
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Chapter 4: The Post-1945 Land Reform
4.1 Preparation o f the Reform
While the tu rm o il o f the war was s t i l l  going on strongly in Western
Hungary, the HCP, w ith  the generous help o f the advancing Russian Arm y, was
already beginning to form  its  network o f organisations in the liberated areas. The
almost to ta l vacuum o f p o lit ica l power it  found in the country was ideally
suitable fo r this operation. In the midst o f in it ia l confusion, in place o f the
d istin tegrated local adm in istra tion, the organs o f the People's Movement,
composed largely o f the more radica l elements o f the peasantry and the fa ith fu l
old revolutionaries o f 1919, spontaneously assumed power. The ir au thority ,
however, was short-lived because the HCP was quick to  realise the inherent
(5)danger in 'dual power' and rap id ly  brought the movement under party  contro l. 
The HCP was determ ined not to  fo llow  the clumsy and v io len t po licy o f 1919, 
which le f t  such animosity among the people. This tim e it  ta c tic a lly  concealed 
its  main objective, the drive fo r u ltim a te  po lit ica l power in the country, and 
declared its e lf w illin g  to  cooperate in a coa lition  w ith  the other dem ocratic 
opposition parties and advocated the maintenance o f dem ocratic principles. The 
prim e concern o f the party was to  gain the sympathy and popular support o f the 
people. The peasantry, being the largest and most discontented element o f the 
population, presented its e lf to  the communist leaders as an obvious ta rge t which 
could be induced by the adoption o f appropriate agrarian policies to  provide the 
necessary support fo r  th e ir fu tu re  operation. Thus, from  the very beginning the 
accomplishment o f a s w ift land reform , to  satis fy  the need o f the peasantry, was 
regarded as the party ’s most im portant task. The HCP, therefore , went to  great 
lengths to  present its e lf as a strong believer in priva te  farm ing, in order to  dispel 
the peasantry's d istrust o f its  policies. I t  loudly denounced a ll those who trie d  to 
keep alive the notion tha t the u ltim ate  aim o f the party was the co lle c tiv isa tion
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o f agricu ltu re . On numerous occasions the party stressed tha t the 
co llec tiv isa tion  o f agricu lture  was not the pa rty ’s u ltim a te  aim. Thus, the F irs t 
Secretary, re ite ra tin g  the changed a ttitude , said ’we do not want kolkhozes, but
/g\
strong and prospering small farm s’.
N a tu ra lly , the communist leaders im m ediate ly realised the im portant 
advantages tha t could be derived from  a land reform , which was designed to 
serve three specific  purposes. F irs tly , i t  was to  be s u ffic ie n tly  rad ica l to  allow 
them to  liqu ida te  the aristocracy and the large land-owning class, whom they 
considered th e ir  greatest enemies. This measure contained an additonal benefit 
in tha t large areas o f land would be released which could be d is tribu ted  among 
the many landless and land-poor peasants, in turn  securing th e ir  support. 
Secondly, however, the reform  was not to  be excessively rad ica l lest it  should 
offend and alienate the middle peasantry and turn  them against the re fo rm . The 
communist leaders did not fa il to appreciate the key position o f the middle 
peasant and they foresaw, as early as this, the im portant role he was to  play 
during the fin a l co llec tiv isa tion  of agricu lture . They were fu lly  aware o f the 
tra d itio n a l d is trust and em nity the middle peasant fe lt  towards them, and the 
best they could hope fo r was tha t the by the pursuance o f a middle-course policy 
they would be able to  neutralise him. In th e ir  view, the middle peasant was not 
going to  be unduly disturbed by the liqu ida tion  o f the large land-owning class, 
because the middle peasant would w illing ly  see the disappearance o f one of his 
ch ie f riva ls in ag ricu ltu ra l production. A rad ica l land reform , in pa rticu la r, one 
o f a revo lu tionary character, would unequivocally drive him in to  opposition. 
Th ird ly , the re fo rm  in th e ir view had to  be implemented w ith  the utm ost speed. 
There were several obvious reasons fo r th is: (i) the vo la tile  p o lit ica l c lim a te  was 
very much in th e ir  favour; most p o lit ic a l parties already supported a land 
re fo rm , at least in princip le . The communist leaders acquired an im portant 
in it ia l advantage over th e ir main r iva l fo r power, the SHP, pa rtly  because of the
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help they received from  the Russian M ilita ry  High Command, and p a rtly  because
o f th e ir  unquestionably superior organisational ta len t. These advantages had to
be exploited. The SHP, on the other hand, at th is crucia l tim e  was re la tive ly
(7)disorganised and lacked a working programme. The explanation tha t i t  was
caught unprepared because i t  expected the country to be occupied by the
Western Powers is somewhat dubious. I t  seems more plausible tha t i t  expected
Russian contro l o f Hungary, accompanied by the in troduction o f the ’d ic ta to rsh ip
o f the p ro le ta ria t’. What may have caught it  unprepared was, perhaps, the
unexpected re la tive  freedom o f the p o lit ica l arena, pe rm itting  dem ocratic
parties to organise themselves and play th e ir part in the state machinery. The
second im portant reason why the communists wanted a sw ift re form  was to  give
the peasants a sense o f permanency o f ownership and by this to  secure th e ir
support, to persuade them to see the HCP as the p ro tecto r o f th e ir  in terest.
F ina lly, the rapid ly de terio ra ting  economic conditions and urgent food supply
problems, in a ll major c ities  but especially in Budapest, demanded an early
resumption o f agricu ltu ra l production, i f  extreme hardships were to  be avoided.
In March 1945, a large supply o f food-stu ffs  was delivered by the Russians to  the
(8 )already starving c ities. As shown earlie r, these loaned supplies were, in fa c t, 
a t in y  proportion o f the large quantities o f grain and livestock seized by the 
advancing Russian A rm y in Eastern Hungary.
In view of these requirements, the HCP set the wheels o f its  p o lit ic a l 
machinery in to  motion. As early as 30th November 1944, i t  was the f ir s t  party 
to  issue a programme, in Szeged, en titled  the 'Programme fo r the D em ocratic
(9)
Recovery and Reconstruction o f Hungary: the HCP's proposal.' In th is  the 
party, on the insistence o f Soviet advisers who, o f course, saw the im portance of 
including a comprehensive land reform  in the inaugural p r o g r a m m e , d e v o t e d  
considerable space to  the question o f land re form  and set the tone fo r  fu tu re  
development. I t  demanded, in te r a lia , tha t the reform  was to be im plem ented
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im m edia te ly and w ith  the active partic ipa tion  o f fu tu re  beneficiaries. But th is
tim e  i t  avoided elaborating on the extent o f expropriation, sim ply declaring tha t
the necessary land was to  be acquired by confiscating the land and equipment o f
tra ito rs , war crim inals, 'Volksbund' m em b e rs^^  and a ll those who served in the
German army. The pa rty ’s programme was, in princip le , endorsed by the other
parties o f the ’Hungarian National Independent Front', formed on the in it ia t iv e  o f
the HCP on 3rd December 1944. Shortly a fte r th is, the National
Com m ittees -  the local branches o f the 'Independent Front' -  were formed
throughout the country, also on the in it ia tiv e  o f the communists. A lthough the
princip le  o f representation by a ll member parties o f the Front was o ff ic ia lly
adopted, these National Com m ittees were dominated, in re a lity , by the HCP.
They were form ed throughout the 'liberated ' provinces, largely w ith  the help o f
communist emissiaries, who did everything in th e ir power to include members
(13)who would be com pliant about carry ing out the ir policies.
On 21st December 1944 the 'Provisional National Assembly', proposed
(14)and organised by the HCP, was convoked at Debrecen. The Assembly, a fte r
selecting and 'e lecting ' the Provisional Government - i t  was closely supervised by
the A llied  Contro l Commission, whose chairman was Voroshilov -  issued a
proclam ation which also defined the imm ediate fu tu re  o f the peasantry. It
stated, in te r a lia , tha t 'we want a land re form . We shall provide land to  the
many hundreds o f thousands o f landless and land-poor peasants in order to
strengthen Hungarian national power and to  consolidate the dem ocratic
(15)Hungarian State order fo r centuries. A lthough both the Nationa l Assembly
and, o f course, the Provisional Government endorsed the programme generally,
and the land reform  pa rticu la rly , i t  fa iled  to  give a tim e schedule fo r  its
(16)execution. The main obstacle to  a speedy and constitu tiona l re fo rm  was the 
seemingly paradoxical fa c t tha t a fte r th e ir le g itim iz ing  role was fu lf i l le d  the 
members o f the A sse m b ly  were sent home and th e ir next convocation was
T  J
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scheduled fo r 1st A p ril 1945. The SHP maintained tha t i f  the re form  was to  be
legal i t  had to  be made law by the leg is la tive  body. Therefore, i t  proposed tha t
the re form  be postponed u n til the Assembly next met. This, however, was,
unacceptable to  the HCP, which demanded tha t the reform  be e ffec ted  by an
appropriate Government Decree. The extra tim e to  be gained, i f  the re form
were postponed, would have been very im portant to  the SHP since i t  would have
provided an opportun ity fo r it  to organise and consolidate its p o lit ica l power. The
large m a jo rity  o f the land holding peasantry in the country considered the SHP as
th e ir own, but Western Hungary, an im portant stronghold o f the party, was s t i l l
under German occupation. Thus, it  was im portant to the party to  play fo r tim e,
to  try  to  postpone the fin a l decision on the reform  u n til such tim e as the whole
(17)country was free to partic ipa te . The HCP, o f course, was aware o f th is  and 
had begun to prepare in earnest fo r the re form .
The pressure on the SHP, and the campaign fo r the re form , began w ith
the publication o f an ed ito ria l in Neplap en titled  'When shall we have the land 
(18)re form ?' In i t  the HCP launched a fu ll scale a ttack on the 'delaying' ta c tics  
o f the SHP. I t  unequivocally stated tha t ' i t  is absolutely out o f the question to 
postpone the re form  t i l l  a fte r the signing o f the 'Peace Treaty', the f ir s t  steps 
have to  be taken im m ediate ly'. Moreover, in early January 1945, the Debrecen 
C entra l Com m ittee o f the HCP was hurried ly convoked and passed a resolution 
regarding the d irection  o f a ttack the party  should adopt. I t  contained three 
major pints: (i) the campaign at the local leve l was to  be organised at once in 
order to  exert pressure, from  below, fo r an early re fo rm . Peasant deputations, 
organised by the HCP, demanding the land reform  were indeed a rriv in g  
continuously from  various parts o f the country, urging the M in ister President to 
in it ia te  the re fo rm , (ii) On 14th January 1945 a detailed land reform  proposal by 
the NPP, the HCP's in term ediary, whose leadership, as shown, included the 
crvpto-com m unist Ferenc Erdei, was to be published in both newspapers, Neplap
(19)and Delmagyarorszag. I t  was agreed tha t on 21st January both papers would
also carry the o ff ic ia l view of the HCP on what was ostensibly the NPP's
proposal, embraced and promoted by the communists, ( iii)  Im re Nagy, the
communist M in ister o f A g ricu ltu re  was, at the same tim e, to  prepare a d ra ft
re fo rm  decree, by 30th January 1 9 4 5 .^ ^  P rio r to the launching o f the re fo rm
campaign the other member parties o f the ’Independent Front* were requested to
subm it th e ir own proposals fo r the land re form . This request was en tire ly
ignored by the parties who remained silent. As mentioned earlie r, there was no
opposition w ith in  the government to  the princip le  o f land reform  but there was
serious disagreement over its  tim eliness before the whole country was 'liberated '.
Because of this, debates regarding the re form  tended to  drag on. The campaign
in itia ted  by the HCP was, undoubtedly, pa rtly  due to  th is 'negative' and 'passive'
(21)behaviour by the other parties, in pa rticu la r the SHP, w ith  which the
communists were, of course, mainly concerned. The communists saw tha t th e ir 
ta c tic a l speedy reform  policy was in jeopardy. Due to  the pressure exerted from  
below and the published reform  proposal o f the NPP - and its  acceptance by the 
HCP, in accordance w ith  the prepared plan - the other parties were, in a way, 
forced to  a ttem pt to  make th e ir o f f ic ia l positions clear on the question o f 
re fo rm . It  is in teresting to note, en passant, the extent to which the NPP was 
used as a fro n t by the communists on the question o f land reform  so much so tha t 
the HCP never rea lly  dra fted a reform  proposal o f its  own. But i t  did, o f course, 
see great p o lit ica l advantages in d is tribu ting  land, no m atte r how small, to  a ll 
cla im ants. I t  also envisaged converting some o f the large estates in to  State 
farm s, to  form  the nucleus o f a socialised agricu ltu ra l sector.
The SDP was the f irs t  to make a statem ent on the re fo rm . Instead o f 
drawing up a new reform  proposal it  re fe rred to  its  previous declaration, made to 
the National Assembly, which i t  was ready to  re ite ra te  now. I t  stated tha t the 
party's concept o f the reform  was formed, and published, in 1930 and i t  had no
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(22)reason to  a lte r it .  A fte r  a b rie f period o f vac illa tion  during which some
pressures was exerted by the communists, the SDP fe ll in to  line and accepted the
NPP's proposals on 20th February 1945.
The SHP, on the other hand, decided to  continue its  struggle fo r  the
potponement o f the re fo rm  and did not publish a detailed counter-proposal. I t
made a statem ent, however, in which the party expressed, once more, its
agreement in princip le  w ith  the land re form : 'We th ink i t  is necessary to  dissolve
the mammoth and large estates and by leaving the middle-sized holdings
(23)undisturbed to transform  agricu lture in to a viable holding system'. The SHP
promised, at the same tim e, to  submit a detailed fo rm al proposal at the next
meeting o f the Assembly where, i t  hoped, i t  would be debated in a 'fre e ' and
'dispassionate' atmosphere.
Events, however, overtook these expectations and the promised d ra ft
land reform  proposal was completed but never debated in the Assembly. The
content o f th is proposal was, in fac t, not known u n til 1962, when it  was found in 
(24)the archives. In retrospect, i t  is possible to establish tha t there were no
differences, in substance, between the SHP and NPP proposals regarding the
breaking up o f large estates. Both d ra ft proposals envisaged ou trigh t
expropriation o f land over 1000  cad. yokes and seizure o f a ll but 100  cad. yokes
of the sm aller estates. An exception was made fo r the wealthy peasants -  soon
to be identified  w ith  the 'kulak' name - whose p o lit ica l neu tra lity  was wooed by
an allowance of 200 cad. yokes. The main differences were mostly regarding the
size o f compensation to  be paid and, also, the SHP proposed to  give add itional
land under the t i t le  o f 'fa m ily  pro tection '; a scheme by which each ch ild  o f the
owner, i f  w illin g  to  carry on farm ing, would be allowed to  re ta in  an add itional 50 
(25)cad. yokes. Perhaps the most im portant d iffe rence between the two
proposals was the method of execution. While the NPP, and, o f course, the HCP, 
proposed to re ly  on active peasant partic ipa tion , in order to give 'revo lu tiona ry
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character' to  the land d is tribu tion , the SHP proposed to  entrust the d is tribu tion  
to  'dispassionate' bodies o f experts, ra ther than ad-hoc com mittees, the lowest of 
which was to  be the ru ra l d is tr ic t. I t  is, however, c lear from  the proposal 
tha t the SHP wished to  see the creation o f somewhat la rger farm s and 
econom ically more viable ceilings, ra ther than chopping up the land into 
numerous small units. I t  was, at the same tim e, concerned and fu lly  aware of 
the size o f the landless and land-poor peasant population, w a iting  fo r th e ir  share 
o f the land. But i t  considered it  in the in terest o f e ffic ie n t ag ricu ltu ra l 
production to  give more land per applicant and to  solve the problem o f surplus 
agrarian population, 'disguised' unemployment, in some other, as yet unspecified, 
way.
The in it ia l pro jection fo r  the com pletion o f the reform  was set fo r 1st
October 1945. On 12th March 1945 the P o lit ica l Com m ittee of the National
(27)Assembly met to discuss the question o f land reform . It was agreed tha t the
Assembly was s t il l to  be given the opportunity to  debate the re fo rm  and
subsequently to promulgate the Reform Law, on 1st A p ril 1945. Instead o f a
lengthy parliam entary debate, in m id-March a curious event to place. The Soviet
High Command, in e ffe c t Marshall Voroshilov, issued a statem ent regarding
German preparations fo r an offensive, re in forced by Hungarian units, in western
Hungary. In view of th is operation, the m ilita ry  experts claimed, the best policy
was to  begin w ith  the land d is tribu tion  im m ediate ly in order to  iso late these
Hungarian units. I t  was hoped tha t red is tribu tion  would provide a d isincentive
fo r  these units to  fig h t and would induce them to  re tu rn  home fo r  th e ir  share o f
(28)the land, and tha t th is would generate popular support fo r  a m ilita ry  push 
against Germany. Indeed, im patient w ith  the lack o f progress regarding the 
re fo rm , Marshall Voroshilov public ly inv ited the peasants, on 15th March to  seize 
land and then had the representatives o f the HCP convoked in Debrecen. It  is 
d if f ic u lt  to visualize exactly the impact land d is tribu tion  would have had on the
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f igh tin g  forces, composed, by then, la rge ly o f hard-core believers, determ ined to
fig h t the Russians to  the b itte r  end, even at tha t la te hour. Moreover, i t  is also
highly dubious whether there were any soldiers among the figh tin g  force who s t i l l
maintained any hope o f receiving land when, and if ,  they returned - fo r  one th ing
due to  th e ir fascist m ilita ry  records. I t  is reasonably clear tha t th is issue was
used only as a pre text, in collaboration w ith  the HCP, to  exert the f in a l pressure
to  begin the land re form  and, most im portan tly , thereby to  preempt the
deliberation o f the Assembly.
Once the Soviet decision to  in te rfe re  on behalf o f the HCP was made,
imposing a tig h te r schedule, events moved s w ift ly  and smoothly. On 15th March
1945 an In te r-P a rty  Conference was held, at which Voroshilov's d ra ft on reform
(29)was imposed. A t th is conference the SHP, recognising tha t the balance o f
power was heavily against them, 'agreed' to the reform  proposal, fo rm a lly
introduced by the M in ister o f A g ricu ltu re , Imre Nagy, w ithout any fu rth e r
debate. A fte r  a b rie f token discussion, the Council o f M inisters gave its  consent
to  the reform  on 17th March 1945,^^^ and the Provisional Government published
its  Decree No. 600/1945. Me.sz. on the next day, under the heading 'Term ination
(31)o f the System o f Large Estates and Redistribution o f Land to  the Peasantry'.
The last comment on the reform  decree came from  Count Geza Teleki, a
(32)member o f the Provisional Government , when he observed:
I also believe in the necessity and benefits o f land re fo rm , but 
not in the unconstitu tional manner in which i t  was pushed 
through. O rig ina lly , i t  was agreed tha t i t  would be a law and i t  
should have been promulgated as a law. I t  ought to  have been 
subm itted to  the National Assembly, since a decree is not a 
source o f law. I gave no authorisation whatsoever to  Secretary 
o f State Balogh to accept the decree. I regard the decree as 
bad and the procedure as un law fu l.(33)
The ideas embodied in the fin a l Land Reform Decree, o f course, re flec ted  
en tire ly  the d ra ft proposal subm itted by the NPP on behalf o f the communists. In
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the preamble, the decree emphasised tha t the term ination  o f the syustem of 
large estates 'safeguards the dem ocratic transform ation and fu tu re  development 
o f the country '. I t  also stressed tha t the execution o f the re fo rm  was 'o f v ita l 
national in te rest and economic necessity'. And i t  confirm ed tha t 'a fte r  the 
te rm ina tion  o f large holdings, agricu lture  in Hungary w ill rest on viable, healthy 
and e ffic ie n t sm all holdings which w ill be the legal property o f peasant 
la n d o w n e rs /^
The re form  decree provided fo r two forms o f expropriation: (i) a ll land, 
irrespective o f size, and a ll property o f tra ito rs , war crim ina ls, fascist 
collaborators and enemies o f the Hungarian people were to  be confiscated 
ou trigh t; ( ii) owners o f estates larger than 1000  cad. yokes were to  lose a ll 
rights to  re ta in  any land or other fa rm ing assets, e.g., buildings, animals, 
equipment, but were to be compensated fo r the ir losses. Owners o f holdings 
between 100  and 1000  cad. yokes were allowed to re ta in  a maximum o f 100  cad. 
yokes -except in case of land located w ith in  30 km. radius o f Budapest, where 50 
cad. yokes was to  be the top lim it.  The decree made a ta c tic a l d is tinc tion  
between gentry and peasant farm s and in the la tte r  case farm ers were allowed to  
re ta in  200 cad. yokes, re fle c tin g  the po lit ica l consideration o f the HCP towards 
the middle peasants. Those who distintinguished themselves in f ig h tin g  against 
the Germans were allowed to  keep up to  300 cad. yokes. The maximum 
reta inable size in the case o f vineyards and orchards ws 20 cad. yokes, and a ll 
forests, above the size o f 10 cad. yokes were to  be nationalised and put under 
state management. One cad. yoke o f vineyard or orchard was deemed to  be 
equal to  5 cad. yokes o f arable land, in respect o f both expropria tion and 
a llo ttm en t. The decree, on the other hand, specified closly who was e n title d  to  
land: these included landless servants o f large estates and ag ricu ltu ra l labourers, 
dwarf-holders and smallholders wishing to  enlarge th e ir land, in tha t order o f 
p r io r ity . An upper age lim it  o f 60 was set fo r  e lig ib ility  to c la im  land. The
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maximum amount o f arable land a cla im ant could be a llo tted  was set at 15 cad. 
yokes (8 .6  ha.), plus 3 cad. yokes o f vineyards and orchards. In the case o f 
priv ileged persons th is could be raised to 25 and 5 cad. yokes respective ly. The 
minimum size was fixed at 3 cad. yokes (1.7 ha). Land, o f course, was not given 
free  o f charge to  the new landowners. The decree stipulated tha t they were 
obliged to  pay a 10 per cent down-payment o f the purchase price - fixed 
substantia lly below the m arket value, at 20  tim es the value o f net revenue per 
cadastral yoke. The remainder could be paid in 10 annual instalments. Form er 
landless servants and labourers were given even greater concessions: they 
received three years grace before the f irs t  down-payment and had to  pay the 
remainder in 20 annual instalments. The newly acquired land was also subject to 
im portant lim ita tions  since it  could not be mortgaged or sold fo r 10 years. Since 
the land f irs t  went in to  state ownership, the new owners were to  redeem from  
and make payment to the state. In teresting ly, the state, in the f irs t  few  years, 
put no pressure on the new owners fo r  payment. Later, however, when 
agricu ltu re  became collectiv ised, the co llection o f these outstanding debts was 
used to  exert economic pressure on priva te  farm ers to  jo in  collectives.
The decree contained promises o f compensation to  fo rm er landowners.
An in teresting aspect o f the HCP's p o lit ica l maneouvring is c learly  expressed by
its, seemingly, flex ib le  a ttitude  to the question o f compensation. T rad itiona lly ,
in princip le , the party was opposed to  any compensation. P o lit ica l expediency,
however, demanded tha t i t  accept th is burden tem porarily . I t  was adm itted la te r
tha t th is was im perative, because the p o lit ic a l conditions prevailing at the tim e
did not perm it the party to  advocate a heated and prolonged debate on the issue.
I t  antic ipated, tha t by the tim e compensation payment was due the 'leading ro le '
o f the working class would be strong enough to  arrange the question o f
(35)compensation 'in a revolu tionary manner'. In any case, the decree was very 
vague on the question o f compensation. I t  stated tha t a compensation fund was
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to  be set up from  payments made by the new owners and used by the state to 
recompense 'according to  its  means' those whose land was expropriated. W ith 
the high ra te  o f in fla tion , war losses and reparation payments, even i f  the 
in ten tion was rea lly  there, the 'means o f the state ' must have been extrem ely 
lim ited . The whole question o f compensation remained a promise. W ith the 
rad ica l change in the c lim a te  of po litics  in 1948 the question o f compensation 
was removed, fo r  ever, from  the agenda.
The most revo lu tionary feature o f the whole question o f land re form  
was, undoubtedly, the proposed method and speed o f its  execution. According to 
the decree, executive organs were to  be set up at various adm in istra tive  levels 
on a regional basis. A supreme executive body, the 'National Council fo r Land 
D istribution ', was created, entrusted to deal w ith  any m od ifica tion  o f 
regulations, issue o f decrees, and se ttling  o f disputes. Apart from  legal aspects, 
the National Council also dealt w ith  the technical, engineering and land 
reg is tra tion  problems in connection w ith  the re form . I t  was assisted by a 
network o f 25 County Councils fo r  Land D is tribu tion , which were the courts o f 
f ir s t  instance in a ll questions o f expropriation and a llo ttm en t. The main duties 
o f adm in istration, la rge ly  reg is tra tion  and the se ttling  o f legal complaints, were 
given to  the National Land O ffice , w ith  branches whenever an in term ediate Land 
D is tribu tion  Council existed. These o ffices were subordinated to  the Councils at 
th e ir respective levels. The task o f im plem enting the re fo rm , a fte r  
expropriation and a llo ttm en t, was put in to the hands o f approxim ate ly 3200 
Land-C laim ants-Com m ittees. These were made up from  landless cla im ants, 
many o f who were recru ited  in to these Comm ittees, and to  the party, by 
communist ag ita tors sent out into the countryside by the HCP. The nature o f 
th is 'd irec t partic ipa tion ', the communist o rien ta tion  and unrestrained behaviour 
o f these Comm ittees -  mobilised by the HCP fo r  s w ift red is tribu tion  and to  exert 
pressure on the Government gave a revolu tionary character to the re fo rm . The
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entire  h ierarch ica l set-up was responsible to  the M in istry  o f A g ricu ltu re , headed
(36)by the communist Imre Nagy. The execution, due la rge ly  to  the
adm in istra tive  set-up and the speed o f im plem entation, created serious 
d iff ic u ltie s  and was the source o f numerous distortions and much fr ic tio n , which 
u ltim a te ly  led to  the v io la tion  o f the le tte r  of the decree.
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4.2 Im plem entation o f the Reform
In the fa c t o f vigorous organisational and p o lit ica l a c tiv itie s  in the rura l
areas by the HCP, i t  soom became apparent tha t the real value o f the land
reform  decree and the whole character o f fu tu re  agrarian development was
decisively dependent on the manner in which the decree was implemented. From
the very in it ia l stages there were signs tha t the le tte r  o f the decree was going to
be vio lated. In many places, pa rticu la rly  in Eastern Hungary, the more rad ica l
peasants did not even w a it fo r the decree to come in to fu ll operation but sim ply
expropriated the land on which they worked before and d istribu ted i t  amongst
themselves. Also, as a result o f the constant convassing an ag ita tion  by the
HCP, 'Land-C la im ant-C om m ittees' began to be form ed as early as February,
(37)before the enactment o f the decree. In other parts o f the country,
p a rticu la rly  in the Trans-Danubia region, the landless and land-poor peasants, on 
the other hand, did not exhib it such revolu tionary zeal and waited u n til th e ir land 
hunger was satisfied w ith in  the fram ework o f lega lity .
When the decree became operational, the organisational work by a ll
parties, but especially by the HCP, began in real earnest. The communist
M in ister fo r  A g ricu ltu re  and the communist dominated executive s tructure ,
especially at the grass-roots level, ensured the speedy and comprehensive
im plem entation o f the decree. The Soviet High Command, having already
intervened at the preparatory stages o f the reform , as noted, continued to  keep a
close eye on the im plem entation stages and active ly  partic ipated, intervened and
provided 'help' whenever i t  became necessary. Some loca l Russian
C o m m and an ts  went as fa r  as to  request the local adm in istra tion to  submit
(38)daily reports to  them on the progress o f the land re form . N e ither did the
HCP spare any e ffo rts , sending out its  'best’ cadres to  the countryside, to  
influence, 'advise' and contro l the composition o f membership o f the d iffe re n t 
adm in istra tive agencies. Its prime concern, o f course, was to establish the Land-
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C la im ant-C om m ittee and to  f i l l  them w ith  recently  recru ited HCP or NPP 
members, a ll w ith  a favourable disposition towards the party 's d is tribu tion  
policies. By this, the party was able to  achieve a strong organisational 
advantage throughout the country, at a level most d ire c tly  involved in the 
execution o f the land re form . Consequently, these Com m ittees acquired a 
vested in terest and d irec t representation in the land reform .
The County Councils fo r Land D istribu tion , the in term edia te
adm in istra tive organs o f the reform , began to  evolve sometime a fte r  the Land-
C laim ant-Com m ittees were already organised throughout the country and land
distribu tion, in fa c t, was already w ell under way, in some places even
(3 9 )
completed. Their unhurried establishment, during and im m ediate ly a fte r  the 
f irs t wave o f land d istribu tion, was an im portant ta c tica l gain fo r the HCP. 
A fte r  they were set up, they were expected to  endorse, as fa its  accom plis, the 
d is tribu tion  decisions o f the Land-C la im ant-Com m ittees, which led to  serious 
disagreements and tensions between the two adm in istra tive  levels; qu ite  
na tura lly  and lega lly  they were re luctan t to  accept a secondary, purely 
adm in istra tive, role w ithout decision-making power. A fte r  p ro tracted  
negotiations, the compromises reached 'above', in the higher regions o f po litics , 
were not respected by the Land-C laim ant-Com m ittees, which frequently  refused 
to  execute 'adverse' decisions made and passed down by the County Councils. A t 
times, the relationship between these two executive organs deterio rated, in fa c t, 
so much as to  force the National Council to  take up the issues and to  in s truc t the 
Land-C laim ant Comm ittees to  respect the resolution and the au tho rity  o f the 
County C o u n c i l / ^  Inspite o f this, th e ir re lationship remained extrem ely tense.
Soon a fte r th e ir fo rm ation , these Land-C la im ant-C om m ittees began 
th e ir work seriously. The ir f irs t duty was to  draw up a lis t o f holdings, in th e ir 
respective d is tric ts , which were, in the term s o f the decree, to  be expropriated . 
A t the same tim e, peasants began to reg is te r th e ir claims fo r land. The
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submission o f applications fo r land, in the d iffe re n t provinces, did not show a
uniform  p icture . In many palces th is process was hampered fo r  various reasons.
In it ia lly , the peasants often, pa rticu la rly  in the region o f Trans-Danubia,
(41)displayed a hesitant a ttitude  and did not reg ister the ir claims fo r some tim e.
The result o f trad ition a l peasant m istrust o f communists was often, as noted by a
leading communist, that ’weeks, even months, passed and in many places the land
(42)
was neither d itribu ted  nor t il le d ’ The prime m otivation behind th is cautious
a ttitu de  was, undoubtedly, the fear o f possible reprisals by the dispossessed
landowners should, a fte r all, the outcome o f the war change in th e ir favour: if ,
as they murmured, ’the English were to occupy the country', they would be able
to  re turn . The war, i t  should be noted, at th is tim e, was s t i l l  raging fie rce ly  in
certa in  parts o f western Hungary. Also, the peasants often re fe rred  to the fac t
tha t many o f them were hanged in 1919, when the p o lit ica l s itua tion  changed and
the landlords returned. Many also complained 'what was the use o f having land i f
(43)there were no equipment and implements'. Thus, although the peasants had 
a burning desire fo r land, they also had doubts as to  the permanence o f the 
re fo rm .
A fte r  this in it ia l hesitation, however, the reform  was set in to  m otion
w ithout any fu rth e r delays. The few who had the courage to  reg is te r th e ir
claims, and subsequently received a llo ttm ents, spurred on the more hesitant and
the d is tribu tion  o f land began expeditiously, i f  not w ithout fu rth e r d iff ic u lt ie s .
One o f the main problems was caused by the in te rm itte n t in flow  o f applications
fo r land, which caused an immense amount o f extra  work fo r  the Com m ittees
and, inevitab ly, delays in d is tribu tion . In many places, as a resu lt o f la te
applications, the land already distributed had to  be re-pooled and re-a lloca ted ,
(44)often two or three times, before the land d is tribu tion  could be fina lised. In 
addition to  la te  applications, there was also the problem o f the slow ly re tu rn ing  
soldiers, ex-prisoners o f war, who as they returned challenged the results o f the
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land d istribu tion, 'finalised* during the spring and summer. A ccord ingf to  the
decree, 5 to  10 per cent o f d istributable land was to  be reserved fo r  th is
categeory, but th is condition, in most places, could not be satisfied because of
(45)land shortage, pa rticu la rly  in the eastern provinces. Indeed, applicants in 
many places did not succeed in securing an a llo ttm en t. A lready, during the f ir s t  
few  weeks o f the re fo rm , disputes developed between the fo rm er fa rm  servants 
and landless agricu ltu ra l labourers as to  who was to  have p r io r ity  to land. 
Although the decree ca tegorica lly  stated p r io r ity  fo r the f irs t  group, th is was
( A  £  \
ignored in many places. Moreover, disputes developed between neighbouring 
villages because the differences in d is tribu tab le  land resulted in sm aller 
a llo ttm ents.
In areas where land was in short supply the Government proposed to
solve the problem by re -se ttling  the applicants to  areas where land was
available, e.g., mostly in fo rm er Volksdeutscher villages whose population was
repatria ted to  Germany, in accordance w ith  the Potsdam Agreement. This,
however, posed an immense dilemma fo r the adm in istra tion since most o f the
peasants, quite natura lly , refused to  move and maintained tha t they should be
given land in th e ir own villages. Rather than move, they demanded the
d is tribu tion  o f the available 200  cad. yokes holdings, protected by the decree,
and the subsequent settlem ent, w ith  equivalent land compensation, o f th e ir  
(47)owners. This proposal, however, was unacceptable to  even the HCP which, at 
th is stage, was anxious not to offend this class o f peasants. By August 1945, 
when it  became evident tha t land would not be forthcom ing, some fin a lly  agreed 
to  re-se ttlem ent. The whole procedure o f re -se ttlem ent was extrem ely slow and 
many settle rs faced fu rth e r d iff ic u ltie s  due to  lack o f liv in g  quarters, o ther 
buildings etc., destroyed by the war, and u ltim a te ly  many o f them w ithdrew  th e ir  
application. For a tim e  the whole operation o f re -se ttlem ent came to  a 
standstill. In September 1945, the Provisional National Assembly was compelled
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to  discuss the problem and the question o f re -se ttlem ent was fin a lly  regulated in 
May, by Law No. IX  o f 1 9 4 6 ^ \  a fte r which the movement o f farm  population 
began once again, but the fin a l re-se ttlem ent was not completed u n til much 
la te r. A lthough the qua lity  o f operation improved, pa rtly  because the law 
reassigned the adm in istra tive  duties to  the National Council -  from  the People’s 
W elfare O ffice , which the HCP claimed was in filtra te d  by reactionaries -  on the 
whole the policy o f re-se ttlem ent did not succeed in solving the acute land 
shortage problem; i t  was, nevertheless, able to  a llev ia te  it.
Owing to  the great presure fo r  land and, often, to  the veiled
encouragement and blessing o f the HCP, the im plem entatin o f the re fo rm  went
fa r  beyond the provisions o f the Land Decree. In many places, the dissatisfied
mass o f peasants, w ith  the connivance o f the Land-C la im ant-C om m ittees,
in terpre ted the confiscation clause o f the Decree in an a rb itra ry  manner. In
many instances, landowners, who by the size o f th e ir land would not otherwise
come under the category, were declared war crim inals, tra ito rs  and/or enemies
o f the people, w ithout any evidence or ju s tifica tio n , and th e ir land was seized 
(4 9 )
and distributed. A number o f holdings in the 100 to 200 cad. yokes category, 
sometimes even sm aller ones, were a ffected  in th is way. The higher executive 
organs were p rac tica lly  powerless, at th is stage, to  prevent and reverse these 
happenings. Many in tentional, and unintentional, ille ga litie s  were also 
com m itted at the surveying state, when the size o f the holdings was established. 
This pa rticu la rly  a ffected  the 1000 cad. yokes estates, since i f  the size was 
declared to  be over 1000  cad. yokes nothing was required to  be le f t  to  the owner. 
Since, in many instances, the Land Registration C e rtifica tes  had e ithe r been 
destroyed by the war or removed by the flee ing  adm in istration, the Com m ittees 
were faced w ith  genuine problems and situations where th is could be explo ited. It 
is because o f the se a rb itra ry  and o ften  over-zealous actions at the grass-roots 
level tha t many present day writings question whether i t  was Land Reform  or 
Agrarian Revolution:
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a) its  characteristics carry the stamp o f re form , since i t  was brought about 
by Decree, compensation fo r  owners below 1000 cad. yokes size of 
holdings was promised and the recipients had to  pay fo r the land
b) but, these were observed only to  a small extent or not at a ll, and the 
Parliam ent o ften legalised actions and passed statutes which were 
in itia ted , in the f irs t  instance, from  below.
A fte r  the middle o f 1945, by which tim e the lion ’s share o f the land was 
d istributed, peasants - w ith  the support o f the Land-C la im ants-C om m ittees - 
began a vigorous campaign fo r the extension o f the scope o f the land re form . 
Mostly, they were a ttem pting  to  revise the upper l im it  o f peasant holdings, 
downwards, to  50 cad. yokes, thereby free ing  more land fo r d is t r ib u t io n / ^  The 
campaign was also extended to  try in g  to  legalise the status o f the lands already 
confiscated.
Owing to  the many excesses, the Land-C la im ant-C om m ittees came 
under constant, i f  ine ffec tive , f ire  from  the landowners and also the higher 
executive organs, in which the SHP had some, i f  nominal, influence. Numerous 
complaints and petitions were filed  a ll over the country by land owners against 
the rough justice  they received from  these Committees, which seized more than
specified from  kulaks, gentry etc. In a le tte r, e.g., to  the M in is te r of
(
A gricu ltu re , the County Csanad branch o ffice  o f the SHP complained tha t:
the work o f the Land-C la im ant-C om m ittee in our county, in 
our opinion, deviated from  the le tte r  o f the law because a fte r  
the d is tribu tion  o f legally d is tribu tab le  estates i t  now 
subm itted, several -  one a fte r the other -  confiscation 
proposals fo r the farms o f hard working, honest smallholders, 
especially i f  they are members o f our party. This was 
already established by the National Council fo r Land 
D is tr ib u tio n .^
and the le tte r  from  County Bacs, complaining about the illega l com position of 
the local Land-C la im ant-Com m ittee 's membership:
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The Land-C la im ant-Com m ittees, in most places, are form ed 
ille g a lly  and th e ir membership is not made up o f those who 
are e lig ib le  fo r land, they operate contrary to  the le tte r  o f 
the law: a fte r, f irs t,  satisfy ing themselves these, otherwise 
ine lig ib le , Com m ittee members provide others, equally 
ine lig ib le , w ith  land.(52)
Because o f these ’spontaneous' allocations o f land and the favouritism  they 
displayed towards th e ir  members, re la tives and friends, the Land-C la im ant 
Comm ittees also became the ta rge t o f a ttack  by the peasantry. They accused
the Com m ittees o f giving more and be tte r qua lity  land to  th e ir pre ferred
. (53) people.
A part from  various excesses and favouritism  the frequent dissolution and
re-constitu tion  o f the Committees resulted, invariably, in the m od ifica tion  o f
previusly agreed land d is tribu tion  plans, causing immense confusion and
(54)discontent and delaying the completion o f the re fo rm . Towards the end o f
the re fo rm  instead o f prom oting they hindered its  com pletion. I t  is not
surprising then, tha t by then even the HCP, in a memorandum prepared by the
(55)P o litica l Com m ittee, called fo r the ir abolition. The ir f in a l d issolution
together w ith  the County Councils did not come, however, u n til Feburary 1947.
The p o lit ica l scene changed s ign ifican tly , i f  only fo r a short period, w ith  
the decisive e lecto ra l v ic to ry  of the SHP in November 1945. The po litics  o f the 
period w ill be discussed soon. For the moment i t  is su ffic ien t to  say tha t the 
party obtained almost 60 per cent o f the seats in the Parliam ent. I t  came as a 
great surprise to  the HCP, who expected to  do much be tte r. This defeat showed 
c learly tha t the communists had not succeeded in obtaining the overwhelm ing 
support from  the agrarian pro le ta ria t which, o f course, had been th e ir  greatest 
hope. The new landowners had become class-conscious and strong supporters o f
private ownership and voted fo r the parties which championed the sanc tity  o f
(56 )private property as they did also in 1947. As a result o f the SHP v ic to ry , the
(5 7 )
M inistry o f A g ricu ltu re  was prom ptly taken over by Bela Kovacs. Inspired by
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its  v ic to ry  and, perhaps, by the veiled ta c tic a l encouragement o f the Russian
(58)High Command , the party believed tha t the tim e was ripe to  show a more
vigorous opposition towards the HCP and its  policies. I t  should be noted tha t,
inspite o f its  defeat at the elections, the HCP continued to hold the key positions
in the Government, including the Supreme Economic Council, which contro lled
the overa ll economic policy.
The mistakes and discontent regarding the reform , already voiced in
many quarters, presented the party w ith  an excellent opportun ity to  launch its
a ttack . Being in fundamental agreement w ith  the reform , i t  did not a tta ck  its
princip le , but launched a fo rce fu l campaign against the method and the manner
o f its  execution. I t  publicised the excesses tha t were com m itted. The main
thrust o f the accusations was tha t the peasants fa iled  to  observe the 100  and 200
cad. yokes lim its , prescribed by the decree, but d is tribu ted many such 
(59)holdings. The party also accused the Land-C la im ant-C om m ittees o f not 
adhering to  the princip le o f im p a rtia lity . Moreover, i t  accused the HCP of 
try in g  to  monopolise the land reform  as its  own achievement. I t  stated tha t:
we a ll wanted a land re form . The SHP fought fo t i t  fo r  15 
years. But the 'd irec t democracy' prevailing at present, 
in s titu tiona lly , almost com plete ly excluded the Smallholders'
P arty  from  partic ipating  in its execution.(60)
Subsequently, the SHP embraced the cases o f many who had been u n fa irly  
dispossessed during the d is tribu tion  and urged a tighten ing up o f the confisca tion 
procedure and a jud ic ia l review, i f  necessary, o f a ll land a lloca tions made 
thereto , w ith  p rio rity , o f course, fo r the contested cases. I t  proposed tha t while 
the investigation was in progress, a ll land d istribu ted was to  be regarded as 
leased p ro p e r ty .^ ^
The overall questioning o f the manner in which the re fo rm  was executed 
and the prospect o f re-exam ination could not but fa il to  raise the hopes o f even
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le g itim a te ly  dispossessed landowners tha t perhaps the re form  could be reversed
and th e ir land returned to  them. These high hopes were, however, quickly
dashed. The SHP refused to  id en tify  its e lf w ith  th is sectional in terest. The
number o f lawsuits file d  by landowners against illega l confiscations, however,
increased drastica lly , and in some instances the courts issued re-possession 
(62)orders. This tu rn  o f events, o f course, disturbed the HCP; i t  was something it
could not accept since i t  weakened the whole work and progress o f the re fo rm .
The party was determ ined to  prevent the evic tion  o f peasants from  th e ir new
farms. A lthough the SHP c learly  stated tha t those recip ients 'who acquired land
(61)in accordance w ith  the decree have nothing to  fea r’ , th is  did not seem to  
have alleviated the widespread alarm and b itte r  reaction tha t arose among the 
ranks o f the peasantry. They saw the 'permanence o f the re fo rm ' in jeopardy. 
This fee ling was re inforced by the fac t tha t only very few new se ttle rs  received 
the fin a l t i t le  to  th e ir farm s. The ensuing confron ta tion  between the HCP and 
the SHP was b rie f and intense. In response, the HCP C entra l C om m ittee 
launched a coun ter-a ttack by ca lling  the communist members o f the Land- 
C laimant Comm ittees to  a National Conference, which proclaim ed a campaign
i d  A \
w ith  the slogan 'land we w ill not re turn '. The HCP instructed a ll d is tr ic t and 
provincia l party organs to  organise and prepare the workers and peasants fo r  the 
struggle, and fo r some 8 weeks communists, using propaganda, manipulated mass 
demonstrations to  show, in th e ir words, to
convince the SHP leadership tha t even the m ultitude o f votes 
cast fo r them cannot provide pro tection  against force , but 
only the use o f counterforce, which they do not have at th e ir
d is p o s a l.^ )
Thus, in March 1946, on the in it ia tiv e  o f the HCP the 'L e ft-w in g  Bloc' was
(66)form ed by the party w ith  the SDP, NPP and Trade Union Council. More 
about th is la te r. For the moment, i t  is enough to  say tha t, led by the
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communists, the Le ft-w ing  Bloc took the offensive and began to  give u ltim atum s 
to  the SHP, in the name o f the Hungarian people, to  restra in  its e lf and behave as 
a progressive dem ocratic party. I t  was, in fa c t, the beginning o f an a ll-ou t 
a ttack  on the SHP. Those who opposed or disagreed w ith  the demands o f the 
L e ft-w in g  Bloc were quickly denounced as ’fascists’ and ’enemies o f the people’. 
This type o f manipulation and the pressure exerted by the dem onstrating masses, 
re in forced by the Russian presence, le f t  no a lte rna tive  to  the isolated SHP, but 
to  re trea t. Already, at this stage, power began to  sh ift to the le ft .  The 
fo rm ation  o f the Le ft-w ing  Bloc was, undoubtedly, the most s k illfu l ta c tic a l step 
by the HCP, undermining the SHP, and by using th is alliance over the next two 
years it  gradually, through ceaseless in te rna l manipulations, manouvered the SHP 
in to a se lf-liqu ida ting  process. A t th is stage, however, the HCP, as w ill be 
shown, considered it  p o lit ica lly  prem ature to  e ffe c t a fu ll liqu idation . I t  m erely 
wished to  keep the influence o f the SHP w ith in  contro llab le bounds, in order to  
avoid more serious d iff ic u ltie s  la te r.
Soon a fte r th is, the SHP was ’persuaded’ to  w ithdraw  its  demands fo r  the 
revision and re-exam ination o f the re fo rm  and the party  reached a 'comprom ise' 
w ith  the L e ft-w ing  Bloc. So, fo r a ll the a rb itra ry  in justices the SHP fe lt  tha t 
these were best le f t  as fa its  accomplis and leg is la tion confirm ing th is  was duly 
passed by Parliam ent in Law No IX. 1946, in May o f tha t year. The law 
stipulated tha t land could not be taken back from  anybody and i t  forbade the 
restoration o f any land, expropriated before 1st January 1946, to  the previous 
owners. There was only one exception: i f  the expropriated land was sm aller than 
50 cad. yokes, i t  had to  be returned to  the owner. The new sta tu tes then 
legalised most o f the excesses com m itted up to  then, and the ille g a lly  
dispossessed landowners had no fu rth e r recourse whatsoever. A fu rth e r 
concession to  the communists was made by the Prime M inister, Ferenc Nagy, on 
23rd February 1946, when he replaced the moderate Bela Kovaes w ith  th  c ryp to - 
communist Istvan Dobi, as M inister o f A g ricu ltu re .
Although the new law did not a ltogether stop fu rth e r argument about the
execution o f the re form , i t  reduced it  d rastica lly . By ra tify in g  the status o f a ll
d is tribu ted land it  succeeded in calm ing down the peasants. A f te r  th is, illega l
land confiscations by the Land-C la im ant-C om m ittees large ly, though by no
means com pletely, ceased to  be a problem and land tha t was confiscated
illega lly , a fte r 1st January 1946, was soon, on instruction , returned to  the 
(68)owners. The ch ie f problems tha t remained during 1946 were two: (i)
reorganisation o f the Comm ittees and the fa c t tha t new plans fo r  d is tribu tion  
were s t i l l  being drawn up in many places prevented the fin a l com pletion o f the 
re fo rm  and (ii) the extrem ely slow progress by the o ff ic ia l surveying teams 
delayed the entry o f a llo ttm en ts in the reg is try  b o o k s /^  Resulting from  this, 
i t  became clear by the end o f 1946 tha t the re form  could not be concluded unless 
some o f the executive organs were removed. On 14th January 1947, Law No. V. 
1947 was passed by Parliam ent ’For the prom otion o f an early com pletion o f the 
R e fo r m '/ ^  The law f in a lly  abolished both the Land-C la im ant-C om m ittees and 
County Councils. It also transferred some of the adm in istra tive  duties o f the 
National Council fo r Land D is tribu tion  to  the National Land O ffice , and its 
network o f country branches. This was the fin a l act regarding the land re fo rm , 
a fte r which the re form  was successfully concluded during 1947.
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4.3 Balance Sheet o f the Reform
As a result o f the re form , the agrarian character o f the country changed
rad ica lly . The large la tifundias, predominant in the past, com plete ly
disappeared; although some land was retained by the state and converted in to
State Farms. The ir place was taken by small and medium ind iv idua lly  owned
peasant holdings, which came to  rule the agrarian scenario, i f  only fo r a
re la tive ly  b rie f in terlude. The HCP regarded the re form  as one o f its  own
greatest achievements. A t no tim e did i t  accept tha t the re fo rm  was the ta il
end o f a reform  movement which orig inated in the years between the wars and
which prepared the ground so much so tha t, even w ithout the emergence o f the
HCP as a force in post-war po litics, land re fo rm , oriented to  be sure towards
more economic considerations, would have been implemented. Be tha t as i t  may,
i t  is true, o f course, tha t the HCP achieved an im portant ta c tic a l success by
using the reform  as a basis to  make p o lit ica l inroads. I t  flows from  th is  tha t the
princip le  feature o f the reform  was en tire ly  p o lit ic a l in character, transcending
(71)
a ll purely economic considerations. The HCP was w e ll aware o f the fa c t tha t 
the economic benefit to  be gained from  a re form  of th is kind was, in the short 
and, especially, in the long run, m inimal. What was to ta lly  clear to  them was the 
p o lit ica l lesson o f 1919 and Stalin's po licy o f 1929: the land had to  be given to 
the agrarian poor, the landless, and not to  the more e ffic ie n t sm all and medium 
peasants. The party  was unconcerned whether the re fo rm  would lead to  the 
fu rth e r development o f agricu lture towards more e ffic ie n t fa rm ing. For the 
HCP the re form  was intended to  secure the basis o f support amongst the 
agrarian poor, the landless labourers and dw arf holders to  increase, as in Russia, 
the 'class c o n flic t in the countryside'. Alas, Hungary was s ig n ifica n tly  d iffe re n t 
to  Russia. The peasants showed remarkably l i t t le  gra titude to  the HCP fo r  the 
re form , no neat divisions existed among the layers o f the peasantry, while the 
excesses com m itted by the Land-C laim ant Com m ittees le f t  much d is trust, and
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lit ig a tio n  amongst the actual beneficiaries o f the re form  and alienated the
wealth ier peasants from  the le ft is t  parties.
The land reform  was accomplished, as shown, w ith  considerable speed
and was, in its  major proportions, impressive. The to ta l amount o f land made
available by the re form  fo r d is tribu tion  was 5.6 m illion  cad. yokes, which
(72)represented 34.8 per cent o f to ta l arable land area. O f th is to ta l, 3.26
m illion  cad. yokes, i.e., 58.2 per cent was actua lly  d is tribu ted  to  ind iv idual
peasants and th e ir fam ilies and 2.34 m illion  cad. yokes was reta ined as communal
pastures, state property, household plots or put aside fo r various o ther form s of 
(73)public use. A lthough it  was o f no p rac tica l significance, 57 per cent o f the
to ta l number o f holdings was obtained by confiscation and 43 per cent by
(74)expropriation w ith  the ’promise' o f compensation. The fa c t, however, tha t
the area o f confiscated land, heavily concentrated in Trans-Danubian regions,
represented only 10 per cent o f the to ta l indicates tha t predom inantly sm all
holdings were so a ffected, which highlights the p o lit ic a l s ign ificance o f
confiscations a ffe c ting  'Volksbund' members and senior c iv il servants o f the
previous regime etc. In the course o f the reform  some 75,000 holdings were 
(75)redistributed. The proportion o f land redistribu ted fo r d iffe re n t kinds o f land
(76)use is shown in Table 4.1. A ltogether, some 750,000 persons subm itted
applications fo r land, but in accordance w ith  the decree there were 663.000
elig ib le applicants among them. O f these, some 642,000 individuals and th e ir
(77)fam ilies obtained allocations o f land under the reform  , leaving some 2 1 ,0 0 0
r ig h tfu l applicants w ithout a llocation in order not to  carve up the ag ricu ltu ra l
land o f the country in to even sm aller farm s. Their real number, however, was
much higher than this figure would tend to  suggest since i t  excludes many of
thoe who, although e lig ib le , fa iled  to  subm it applications at the r ig h t tim e , e.g.,
re tu rn ing soldiers etc. The d is tribu tion  o f a llo ttm ents by number and occupation
(78)o f beneficiaries is shown in Table 4.2:
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TABLE 4.1 - Proportion of land re-distributed for different
kinds of land use
Uses
to ta l area o f 
holdings in 
'0 0 0 s o f cad. 
yokes
land area 
re-a llocated by 
the reform  in 
'0 0 0 s o f cad. 
yokes
re-a lloca ted  land 
area as 96 o f 
to ta l
% d is tribu tion  
o f land area by 
use
Ploughland 9.763 2.879 29.5 51.4
Garden 219 42 19.2 0 .8
Meadows 1.104 345 31.3 6 .2
Vineyards 355 46 13.0 0 .8
Pastures 1.701 550 32.3 9.8
Forests 1.922 1406 73.1 25.1
Reeds 50 29 58.1 0.5
unsuitable fo r
agricu ltu ra l
purposes
967 302 31.2 5.4
Tota l: 16.081 5.599 34.8 1 0 0 .0
S. *
TABLE 4.2 -  Distribution of allottments according to the 
number and occupation of beneficiaries
Beneficiaries T o ta l d is tribu ted  Average area 
Occupation o f area in cad. o f a llo ttm en t
beneficiaries Number, % d is tribu tion  yokes per person in
cad. yokes
A g ricu ltu ra l labourers 261.088 40.6 1.288.463 4.9
Farm servants 109.875 17.1 922.255 8.4
D w arf farm ers 213.930 33.3 829.477 3.9
Small holders 32.865 5.1 143.131 4.4
Rural craftsm en <5c artisans 22.164 3.5 53.866 2.4
Q ualified agricu ltu ra lis ts 1.256 0 .2 14.548 1 1 .6
Forestry employees 1.164 0.2 6.998 6 .0
Total: 642.342 1 0 0 .0 3.258.738 5.1
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The largest segment o f ru ra l society, 91 per cent, to  benefit from  the reform
were the poorest peasant ag ricu ltu ra l labourers and farm  servants - both en tire ly
landless -  and the dw arf holders. O f these, the farm  servants benefited by fa r
the most w ith  an average o f 8.4 cad. yokes per person. According to  recognised
agronomists th is  figure  constitutes, under Hungarian conditidns, an absolute
minimum upon which a fa rm er can derive an acceptable liv in g  fo r h im se lf and his
fam ily . The change wrought in the l i fe  o f some 109 thousand fam ilies  was
immense. These people, fo rm erly  employed on yearly contracts, as farm
servants on large estates, had previously the lowest social status in the ru ra l
hierarchy. Now they became masters o f th e ir own. There is a s ign ifican t
d iffe rence between the two landless groups, ag ricu ltu ra l labourers and farm
servants, regarding the size o f a llo ttm en t. The reason fo r  th is  is tha t the
agricu ltu ra l labourers lived in concentration in regions o f the country where the
number o f large estates was small and, consequently, the land available fo r
d is tribu tion  was also smaller. Farm servants, on the other hand, lived on large
estates where land was more abundant. The basic a llo ttm en t was, o f course, the
same as fo r others, but farm  servants tended to  have larger fam ilies  which also
tended to  increase the size o f th e ir a llo ttm en t. The average a llo ttm e n t given to
agricu ltu ra l labourers enabled them to  upgrade th e ir economic status to  tha t o f a
dw arf holder, but they s t i l l  had to find  some seasonal employment to  supplement
th e ir fa rm  income. W ith the dissolution o f large estates, however, employment
opportunities fo r them, and fo r those who remained landless even a fte r  the
reform , became extrem ely lim ited , crea ting  great employment problems. The
sign ifican t feature  o f the re form  is tha t out o f the 746,000 wage-earning landless
agricu ltu ra l p ro le ta ria t, tha t existed before the war (see Table 1.3, Chapter 1,
( 79)p . l l  ), the re form , by a lloca ting land to  some 370,000 o f them, s t i l l  le f t  over 
375,000 en tire ly  landless. This insuperable problem was recognised by the 
Government, tha t there was simply not enough land available fo r  d is tribu tion .
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This was, pa rtly , the reason fo r the tremendous pressure exerted by the 
peasantry during the re form  to  reduce the maximum reta inable size o f holdings. 
Assuming tha t 27.8 per cent o f a ll expropriated and confiscated land reta ined by 
the s ta te ^ ^  had been d istribu ted, i t  would have provided approxim ate ly a 
fu rth e r 4.3 cad. yokes on average fo r  those who remained landless. This, 
however, would have been en tire ly  im prac tica l and contrary to  the national 
economic in terest since the lion ’s share o f th is was forest land. A part from  
differences in average a llo ttm en ts between the ag ricu ltu ra l labourers and the 
fa rm  servants, considerable regional differences also existed. The disproportions 
in regional red istribu tion  could not be reduced by the re -se ttlem en t policy. 
A lthough some 25,000 fam ilies moved in to  fo rm er German villages, p rim arly  re ­
settled from  Czechoslovakia, only some 10,000 poor peasants volunteered fo r
land on large estates by settlem ent; making a to ta l o f 35,000 poor peasants re- 
(81)settled. The high cost o f re -se ttlem ent and the dire shortage o f financ ia l
resources in war-ravaged Hungary prevented greater incentives being o ffe red .
In evaluating the results o f land re form , i t  is im portant to  examine the
new farm  size d is tribu tion  and the im pact the reform  had on the s truc tu re  o f
(82)agricu lture . This is given in Table 4.3
The pre- and post-war com parative land d is tribu tion  pattern , 
dem onstrating the changes tha t occurred in respective categories can be 
conveniently shown from  the computations o f Table 1.5 on page 27 and Table 4.3. 
This is shown in Table 4.4. Since the above tables are more or less se lf- 
explanatory only a few observations, re la ting  to  the major changes, are rea lly  
called fo r. On analysing these tables i t  becomes apparent tha t as a resu lt o f the 
re fo rm  the in te rre la tion  between the various categories o f holdings, in term s o f 
numbers and area, changed considerably. The re fo rm , although i t  did not 
e lim ina te the inequalities in land ownership com plete ly, did reduce them
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TABLE 4.3 -  Distribution of Farms in Hungary in 1947
Size Class 
in
cad. yokes
Number % of 
to ta l
Farms in each 
class
Area in 96 o f 
cad. yokes to ta l
Farms in each 
class
A v . area in 
in each size 
class in 
cad. yokes
0 - 5 1,406,325 68 .1 2,871,958 17.9 2.04
5 - 1 0 388,179 18.8 3,388,857 2 1 . 1 8.73
10 -  20 175,428 8.5 2,789,353 17.3 15.90
20 -  50 71,164 3.4 2,359,004 14.7 33.15
50 -  100 14,864 0.7 1,295,506 8 .1 87.16
100  -  200 5,525 0.3 714,512 4.4 129.32
200  -  1 0 0 0 (a) 4,034 0.2 1,352,728 8.4 335.33
1000  - 3000(a) 504 0.0 796,007 4.9 1579.38
over 3000(a) 91 0.0 513,919 3.2 5647.46
Total: 2,066,114 1 0 0 .0 16,081,844 1 0 0 .0 7.78
(a) These are state holdings: data include land taken in to public,
communal ownership, mostly pastures and forests. The share o f arable 
land in holdings above the size o f 100  cad. yokes a fte r the re fo rm  was 
approx. 4 per cent. None of these categories were p riva te ly  owned.
S ource?: <vv . £  £
TABLE 4.4 - Changes in the number and area of holding as a 
result of the 1945 Land Reform
increase (+) 
decrease(') 
number
or Percentage 
in change in 
number
increased) or 
decrease^) in 
area
Percentage 
change in 
area
of holdings of holdings
0 - 5 + 221,542 + 18.7 + 1,240,712 + 76.0
5 - 1 0 + 183,708 + 84.9 + 1,911,481 + 122.6
1 0 -2 0 + 31,242 + 21.6 + 763,407 + 37.6
20 - 50 - 2,499 -  3.3 + 186,704 +8.6
50 -  100 - 376 - 2.4 + 259,344 + 25.0
100 - 200 - 267 - 4.6 -  90,652 - 11.2
200 - 1000 - 1,168 - 22.4 - 722.073 - 36.3
1000 - 3000 - 264 - 34.3 -  454,592 - 36.3
over 3000 - 211 - 69.8 - 3,044,311 - 88. 3
Tota l: + 431,707 + 26.4
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drastica lly . The to ta l number o f holdings increased by more than 431,000 as 
compared w ith  1935. More than half, i.e., 51.3 per cent, o f the newly created 
holdings occurred in the 0 to 5 cad. yokes category. Compared w ith  the pre- 
re fo rm  s ituation the number o f dwarf-holdings had increased in absolute but 
decreased in re la tive  term s. The area o f these holdings, however, increased both 
in absolute and re la tive  term s. The biggest single increase in the area o f 
holdings took place in the 5 to  10 cad. yokes category. The number o f holdings in 
a ll categories above 20  cad. yokes decreased, although the reduction in the 
categories o f 20 to 50 and 50 to  100 cad. yokes was not accompanied by a 
corresponding decrease in th e ir to ta l areas. As a result o f these changes, in 
numbers and areas, the average size o f holdings, up to  100  cad. yokes, shows an 
econom ically healthy improvement, although it  was s t i l l  fa r from  ideal.
The d is tribu tion  o f the to ta l land area, i.e., 16,081,000 cad. yokes
according to  ownerhip was: 12,758,000 cad. yokes p riva te ly  owned,
approxim ately 296,000 cad. yokes state owned and 3,027,000 cad. yokes some
(83)form  o f public or communal ownership. The most s ign ificant change brought 
about by the reform  was in the structure  o f p riva te  ownership. The percentage 
change in the d is tribu tion  o f p riva te  holdings in the various categories, compared 
w ith  1935, is shown in Table 4 .5 . ^ ^  The dram atic shrinking in the area o f 
holdings above the size o f 100 cad. yokes can be seen from  the tab le . The 
number o f holdings was reduced in the below 100  cad. yokes size categories, w ith  
the exception o f  5 to 10 cad. yokes category, but the to ta l area increased. So, 
a fte r the re form  the ownerhsip structure  had changed dram atica lly  -  the gentry 
type o f holdings, above the size o f 100  cad. yokes, ceased to exist, together w ith  
the type o f wealthy peasant holdings, soon to  be called 'kulaks', above the 200  
cad. yokes. A l l holdings above this size went exclusively in to  some fo rm  o f 
public ownership.
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TABLE 4.5 - Percentage change in number and area of farms in 
1945 compared with 1935
Categories
1935
D is tribu tion  o f private 
numbers
1945
holdings in 
area 
1935 1945
0 - 5  cad. yokes 73.0 68.5 12.9 22.5
5 - 1 0  cad. yokes 12 .6 18.9 11.7 26.5
below 10 cad. yokes 85.6 87.4 24.6 49.0
10 -  50 cad. yokes 13.2 11 .8 32.4 39.5
below 50 cad. yokes 98.8 99.2 57.0 88.5
50 - 100 cad. yokes 0.8 0.6 6.7 8 .6
below 100 cad. yokes 99.6 99.8 63.7 97.1
above 100  cad. yokes 0.4 0.2 36.3 2.9
s k ,
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A part from  land, reference should also be made to  the fa c t tha t during 
the land re fo rm  other live  and cap ita l asets, i.e., livestock, buildings, seed 
stocks, machinery, implements, etc., were also expropriated and some were 
d istributed. More than 1500 castles and manor houses, w ith  almost 8000 cad. 
yokes in to ta l, la rge ly in the Trans-Danubian regions, went in to  state ownership. 
In addition some 65 to  70 m illion  m^ o f buildings were expropriated, some o f 
which were given to  beneficiaries o f the re form  and some to  communal, 
cooperative organisations. Some 160 sp irit d is tille ries , 228 flo u r-m ills , 210 ru ra l 
industria l plants and 175 other small scale plants were transferred to  cooperative 
ownership. Cooperatives were also given some 6950 trac to rs  and steam-ploughs 
and some 600 threshing-machines. The new landowners received some 160,000 
smaller soil cu ltiva tin g  and some 250,000 other small items of machinery. The 
to ta l value o f cap ita l assets was equivalent to  the value o f 18 to  20  m illion  
quintals o f wheat, which meant tha t an average recip ien t in addition to  the land
was given, d ire c tly  or ind irec tly , the equivalent value o f 35 quintals o f
u + (85) wheat.
I t  is clear from  the above data tha t the post-1945 re fo rm  achieved 
substantia lly more, in a much shorter tim e, than the reform s o f the in te r-w a r 
period. The major achievement o f the re form  was, undoubtedly, tha t i t  
com plete ly abolished the la tifund ia  in the country, and' changed rad ica lly  the 
land ownership structure . The clear winners were the 642,000 poor peasants and 
dwarf-holders, the losers the large estate owners. But many problems remained 
unsolved. Looking at the ag ricu ltu ra l scenario, i t  is true  to  say th a t a large 
segment o f the peasantry could not cla im  a qu a n tita tive  im provement in th e ir 
lives. The problem o f poverty s t i l l  remained since the poor and landless peasants 
s t il l constitu ted approxim ately 50 per cent o f the agrarian population. Many o f 
those who were given land could not cu ltiva te  i t  e ff ic ie n tly  due to  lack o f e ithe r 
tra in ing  or eequipment or both. I t  is not surprising tha t much d issatis faction s t i l l
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remained in the years a fte r  the re fo rm  amongst those who were not given land 
and also amongst some o f the new landowners. By d is tribu ting  land to  so many, a 
myriad o f small units was established and these could not ensure the e ffic ie n t 
p roduc tiv ity  o f the new farm ers. The re la tive  e ffic iency  o f the new land 
s tructure , however,,was not to  be fu lly  tested, fo r  the peasant's permanent fear 
o f co llec tiv isa tion  was realised w ith in  a few years. For the moment, however, 
by neglecting economics in favour o f p o lit ic a l gains, the land re fo rm  created 
problems in agricu lture  which haunted the policy-m akers fo r  many years to 
come. As a result, to  various degrees, a ll p o lit ica l parties were caught in a 
dilemma regarding the policies fo r the fu rth e r development o f agricu ltu re .
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Chapter 5: Individual Peasant Agriculture: the Economics
5.1 The ’d ilem m a1 o f fu rth e r ag ricu ltu ra l development
A fte r  the war the HCP, together w ith  other urban based parties, 
epecia lly the socialists, inherited an a ttitu d e  on the part o f the peasants which 
they did not rea lly  know how to  overcome. F irs t, because o f the 'Kun 
experim ent’, discussed earlie r, in the memories o f the peasants the communists 
remained those 'enemies who wanted to  co llectiv ise '. Second, a tra d itio n a l 
antagonism had prevailed between the ru ra l and urban population. Both o f these 
a ttitudes had been re inforced by the general c lim a te  o f uncerta in ty in the post­
war period.
The wide d iffe rence o f in terests and h o s tility  in Hungary was not 
between the 'classes', but between the 'c ity - fo lk s ' on the one hand, and the 
'peasants' on the other. The c ity  w ith  its  modern Western way o f l i fe  and 
'unaccented' c ity  language had very l i t t le  in common w ith  the language o f the 
peasantry. The c ity  people looked down on the peasants as e ithe r 'stupid ' or 
'cunning', regarded them as 'p r im itive ' in th e ir  a ttitude , 'funny' in th e ir  peasant 
costumes and backward and tra d itio n a l ra the r than modern. To the c ity  the 
peasantry was a stratum  o f society which always had, at least, enough food fo r  
surviva l and o ften  managed to  get rich  at the expense o f the urban population. 
The peasants, o f course, reciprocated these feelings, regarded the 'c ity - fo lk s ' as 
hostile towards them and equally 'funny' in th e ir  manner. The peasants generally 
feared the c ity , because it  possessed coercive powers over the l i fe  o f the 
p e a s a n try .^  In la te r years, inc identa lly , these hostile  feelings decreased, but 
the rura l-urban d ifferences remains strong even today. The 'magyar' peasant 
rated amongst the most confirm ed 'rugged indiv idualists ' on earth. In many ways 
he s t i l l  reta ined an acute d istrust o f 'big people', 'c ity  fo lks ' and government 
representatives. This mutual d is trust was p a rtia lly  responsible fo r  the
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fragm ented society tha t existed at the end o f the Second World War. I t  
represented a form idable obstacle to  the establishment o f a permanent and 
m utually acceptable agrarian policy, in varying degrees by any o f the coa lition  
parties, but pa rticu la rly  the communists and socialists.
In view o f th is d i f f ic u lt  background, fu rth e r augmented by the problems 
o f war losses and post-war p o lit ic a l developments, i t  was d if f ic u lt ,  in the 
im m ediate post-war years, to  introduce and develop a long-te rm  viable agrarian 
po licy  tha t was acceptable to  the partic ipants. The question, as shown earlie r, 
was not about the need fo r land re form . That was undisputed and supported by 
a ll the coa lition  parties. Since most o f them had 'preached' the need fo r a land 
re fo rm  throughout the in te rw a r years, p o lit ic a lly  a ll parties com m itted 
themselves to  a land re form , even though most o f them knew tha t a rad ica l land 
re form  was not the panacea fo r Hungary's ag ricu ltu ra l problem and could not 
solve the poor and landless peasant problem. The HCP accepted tha t the 
nationalisation o f land and the co llec tiv isa tion  policies o f the 'Hungarian Soviet 
Republic' were disastrous. And while the HCP leadership secre tly  wanted to 
fo llow  Soviet ag ricu ltu ra l practices, w ith  the lessons o f tha t experim ent in mind 
and also perhaps because i t  could not re liab ly  see how long the coa litio n  regime 
would run, the party  opted fo r  ta c tic a l reasons fo r the po licy  o f 'land to  the 
peasants'. But, quite apart from  p o lit ic a l considerations, the need fo r  a land 
re fo rm  was also clear on economic grounds. I t  was considered by many to  be the 
cheapest way fo r the ag ricu ltu ra l recovery. W ithout the re fo rm , perhaps, as 
many as one-th ird  o f arable area would have remained uncu ltiva ted . Also, the 
regeneration o f the highly concentrated large holding system would have 
required large amounts o f cap ita l, d iverted from  industry, a p r io r ity  sector of 
the HCP. Instead, by re ly ing  purely on spontaneous peasant accum ulation the 
road was opened fo r  im m ediate and quick recovery from  the war damage. I t  was 
estimated tha t a fu ll agrarian recovery to  pre-war level would haveneeded
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approxim ate ly 21 three-year plans, i.e., l i  years. But, by re ly ing  on in te rna l
resources o f peasant v ita l ity  and enthusiasm, recovery was achieved w ith in  one
(2)th ree-year plan period This reasoning, however, disregarded the fa c t tha t the
new ownership and land s tructure , created by the re fo rm , was also po ten tia lly
high cap ita l intensive if ,  at some la te r stage, the fragm ented sm allholding
system was to  be properly consolidated. For obvious reasons, to  be detailed
la te r, tha t longer-term  view was no serious concern to  the HCP.
The main question, however, which also had im portant im p lica tions fo r
fu rth e r agrarian development was not the 'need* fo r land re form  but what type o f
land re fo rm  was to  be introduced. The HCP and the radica l NPP, draw ing upon
Soviet and previous Hungarian experience, decided tha t land had to  be given to
the agrarian poor and landless ra ther than, as favoured by the SHP, to  the middle
or productive sm allholding peasant fa rm er who could work i t  more e ffic ie n tly
and w ith  greater p rodu c tiv ity , fo r both him self and the country. A lthough in the
end the SHP accepted the type o f re form  proposed by the other coa lition  parties,
recent documentary evidence, in Section 5 o f the ’D ra ft Agrarian Proposal o f the
(3)Smallholders' P a rty ’ shows tha t s ign ifican t d ifferences existed between the 
parties from  the outset. The SHP too, o f course, wished to  break up the 
mammoth estates, but i t  believed tha t the land should be given to  those who 
could expertly  and e ffic ie n tly  work it .  The party  considered th a t i t  was 
ecnom ically a m istake, as proposed by the NPP and HCP, to  red is tribu te  land to  
those who could just survive from  its  proceeds but could never establish a proper 
liv in g  out o f it .  To th is  extent, the party o rig ina lly  envisaged an upper l im it  o f 
reta inable land at 500 cadastral yokes, to  create econom ically viable farm s on 
which modern mechanisation could be introduced. These types o f farm s, i t  
stated, could be used to  teach the dw arf and smallholders be tte r methods o f 
cu ltiva tion  e tc., perhaps even to  encourage them in th e ir in terests to  'pool th e ir  
fragmented land’ in to  viable cooperatives. For the benefit o f a g ricu ltu ra l
- 242 -
production, the party stated, even some 1000  cadastral yokes holdings should be 
le f t  in ta c t to  serve as model farms. These proposals, however, remained on 
paper and were never accepted by the HCP.
Thus, giving land to  the peasants, in the fin a l fo rm  o f the re fo rm , was
not supposed to  enhance the development o f agricu ltu re  and increase
p roduc tiv ity . I t  had been c learly  envisaged as an in term ediate step, especially
fo r  the HCP, to  establish a p o lit ic a l basis o f support among the poor peasants
and agrarian p ro le ta ria t in order to  win th e ir sympathy fo r  the government. As
such, the re frm  re flec ted  the trans itiona l nature o f in te rna l p o lit ic a l forces. It
was not rea lly  a genuine land re form  since its  objective was neither to  give the
peasants permanent rights o f ownership nor to  help them become more e ffe c tive
(4)producers. The atomised ownership o f land which followed created, as
expected, a new set o f problems in almost a ll sections o f a g r ic u ltu ra l production
and marketing. Furtherm ore, poverty and unemployment remained a real
problem and, as discussed earlie r, the poor and landless s t il l remained a large
proportion o f the agrarian population. As shown earlie r, even during the pre-war
years, i t  was obvious tha t Hungary was in the throes o f an a g ricu ltu ra l crisis
which could not be solved w ithout a complete transform ation o f economic life .
Large-scale industria lisa tion to  absorb the growing population surplus and to
supply agricu lture  at reasonable prices and under easy conditions o f payment
w ith  the fe rtilise rs , machines and other industria l products i t  needed and at the
same tim e  to  extend the market were essential. Hungary’s ag ricu ltu ra l problems
could not be solved by a mere land re fo rm , which could not provide a live lihood
fo r  the por and landless agrarian p ro le ta ria t. A g ricu ltu re , in re la tio n  to  the
(5)techn ica l level and extensive structure  o f production, was overpopulated. The 
land rre fo rm , by the end o f 1947, brought about a commendable reduction in the 
v ir tu a lly  landless population, but, at the same tim e, i t  had concentrated the old 
problem w ith in  re la tive ly  narrow lim its . The land re form , which had given so
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many the independence they desired, created too many smallholdings to  be 
benefic ia l to  production. The new and s ligh tly  enlarged holdings covering about 
20 per cent o f the to ta l arable land, owned by some 889,000 peasants, relied 
heavily on fa m ily  labour w ithout any techn ica l sk ill and had no access to cap ita l, 
or only a very sm all amount, to  purchase even the most basic implements. Soon 
i t  became evident tha t many o f these holdings could not survive in the long run. 
Holdings over 20 cadastral yokes, numbering about 78,000, la rge ly  p riva te ly  
owned, including the Church, were generally regarded by the HCP and its  'le ft* 
coa lition  partners, as po ten tia lly  dangerous to  the regime and were hindered 
financ ia lly . Only about ha lf o f them managed to pa rtic ipa te  in the subsequent, 
constructive, ag ricu ltu ra l reorganisation process. The approxim ate ly 700,000 
peasants in the 5 to  20 cadastral yokes category, w ith  about 60 per cent o f to ta l 
arable land area, fu ll o f v ita l ity  and enthusiasm, made a desperate e ffo rt, 
despite compulsory deliveries (more about th is below), war losses and the severe
/g\
droughts in 1945, 1946 and 1947, to  revive ag ricu ltu ra l production. The ir
performance w ill be evaluated la te r. Suffice to  say here tha t despite lack o f
equipment they succeeded in making remarkable progress between 1945 and
1948. A t constant prices, gross ag ricu ltu ra l production recovered to  85 per cent 
(7)o f the 1939 level. The share o f marketed output was, o f course, sm aller since
(8)the poor peasants increased th e ir own consumption appreciably.
In the years fo llow ing  the land re form  it  became increasingly evident
tha t the s tructure  o f agricu ltu re  created by the re fo rm  was handicapped by two
fundam ental weaknesses. F irs t, the problem o f growing ru ra l poverty, associayd
w ith  increased ru ra l overpopulation. This created much d issatis faction among
those who did not receive land at a ll, but the new land owners too remained
dissatisfied. The persistence o f agrarian under-em ployment, which is
com plementary to  agrarian overpopulation, was w e ll illu s tra ted  by Peter Veres,
(9)in his book Paraszti Jovendo (Peasant Future). He cla im ed tha t the
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dw arfholder, w ith  less than 5 cadastral yokes o f land, was only adequately 
employed fo r  about 100-150 days per year and had no prospect o f im provem ent; 
the smallholder, w ith  land between 5 to  10 cadastral yokes had work fo r 150-200 
days. Only farm ers w ith  more than 15 cadastral yokes had a good 300 days of 
work in the year. While the land re fo rm  enabled most o f the v illage poor to 
subsist, i t  could not provide fu ll employment fo r  the ru ra l population. The ta lly  
o f unemployed increased rap id ly between 1946 and 1948 and th e ir number was 
also constantly swollen by masses o f prisoners-of-war re tu rn ing h o m e /* ^  The 
reconstructed and gradually expanding industria l sector created some 
oppportunities fo r employment but many o f the peasants, hopeful tha t th e ir  lo t 
m ight ye t improve, were unw illing  to  give up th e ir symbolic status as land­
owners.
Second, agricu lture  was in urgent need o f modernisation, in both methods 
o f production, to  increase p roductiv ity , and in marketing. The prerequis ite  fo r 
th is transform ation , to  substitute machinery fo r labour, was cap ita l. But the 
sm all production units created by the land reform  were not suitable fo r 
mechanisation or the application o f s c ie n tific  fa rm ing techniques. I t  had always 
been antic ipated tha t the new sm allholding system would prove to  be more 
uneconomic than the big estates. Small s trip  farm ing, in addition to  its  inherent 
ine ffic iency , also brought in s ta b ility  in to  agricu ltu re , as new farm ers have less 
sense o f the m arket and i f  crops succeed they tend to  overproduce, crea ting  
gluts in loca l markets.
A lthough ag ricu ltu ra l war damage was, large ly, overcome by 1948, there 
were hardly any resources le f t  over from  industria l reconstruction and expansion 
fo r fu rth e r ag ricu ltu ra l developments. Investment in agricu lture , prescribed by 
the Three-Year Plan, remained underfu lfilled : only 4400 o f the 7700 tra c to rs  
planned were actua lly  delivered. This res tr ic ted  tha t section o f the farm ers who 
grew cropps fo r the m a rk e t /* ^  The fa c t, on the other hand, tha t mechanisation
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in agricu ltu re  was retarded by the other claims of industry had, o f course, the
benefit o f not reducing agrarian employment too suddenly. But none o f the
three categories o f farm ers mentioned above, i.e., dwarfholders, smallholders
w ith  5 to  20 cad. yokes, and those w ith  over 20 cad. yokes, could muster even a
fra c tio n  o f the cap ita l required to  obtain the tools o f technological progress.
U ncerta in ty  o f landownership and the res tric ted  c red it po licy o f the regime
precluded the possib ility  o f long-term  loans fo r farm ers. So the necessary funds
(12)could only come from  public sources and government guarantees.
Thus, growing p a rtly  out o f the legacy o f pre-war Hungary and p a rtly  out 
o f the type o f land re form  introduced, la rge ly because o f p o lit ic a l dogma, the 
agrarian problem remained fa r from  solved. The course o f fu tu re  development 
o f agricu ltu re  had s t i l l  to  be decided. A lthough the land re form  accomplished 
what i t  set out to  do, namely the liqu idation o f the la tifund ia  in Hungary and 
red is tribu tion  o f the land to  those 'who t ille d  it ',  i t  fa iled  to  provide an 
unequivocal answer to the most im portant long-term  question: what was to  be 
the character o f fu rth e r agrarian development in the country? The parties o f 
the coa lition , under the prevailing p o lit ica l atmosphere o f antagonism and 
m istrust, were unable, and to  a large extent unw illing, to  conduct open, clear and 
ra tiona l discussions regarding the nature o f agricu lture  a fte r the land re fo rm  was 
completed. Most o f the long-term  proposals subm itted by the parties concerning 
the agrarian scene were extrem ely vague and unconstructive. I t  was fa ir ly  
obvious to a ll parties a fte r  the f ir s t  'storm ' consolidation would necessarily have 
to  fo llow  and tha t the question o f whether and, i f  so, fo r how long, th is  'harmony' 
in the new agrarian re lations would last would sooner or la te r have to  be faced. 
But while most parties entered the post-war p o lit ica l arena w ith  a prepared 
comprehensive plan, pub lic ly stated, fo r  the land re fo rm , no such plans seem to  
have existed, ce rta in ly  not in the im m ediate post-war years, fo r  fu rth e r agrarian 
development, as a sequence to  the land re form . I t  was c lear tha t the mere
-  246 -
red is tribu tion  o f land would not be enough to  establish successful peasant 
farm ing. I t  needed to  be accompanied by (i) some kind o f reorganisation, again, 
to  bring agricu ltu re  in to  an acceptable operating fo rm , (ii) education fo r  the 
peasants, since many had no previous fa rm ing experience and had now suddenly 
become owners o f land, and ( iii)  financ ia l support fo r  the new and old 
smallholders to  enable them to  consolidate the somewhat precarious position in 
which they were le f t  by the land re form  and which was fu rth e r aggravated by the 
problems o f war destruction. The fa ilu re  to  fo llow  up such red is tribu tion  as took 
place in Hungary w ith  the necessary complementary agrarian policies gave rise 
to  a whole series o f problems which, had a re a lis tic  and decisive 'second stage' 
agrarian progam me put in to  e ffe c t, could have been avoided or, at least, 
moderated.
From the beginning, however, the coa lition  regime faced a p o lit ic a l 
'd ilemm a' regarding the fu tu re  development o f agricu lture . Hungarian 
ag ricu ltu ra l specialists envisaged four possible, to  some degree in te rre la ted , 
a lte rna tive  scenarios:
1 . to  pursue a flex ib le  c red it assistance policy and to  fos te r 
development towards 'intensive cu ltiva tion ' based on the individual 
sm allholding system
2 . to  provide viable farm  units w ith  cap ita l and prom ote the 
consolidation o f scattered holdings through cooperation
3. to  allow the contro lled growth o f ru ra l capita lism , the poss ib ility
o f which was already projected by the land reform
4. to  turn , as in the Soviet Union, towards co llec tiv isa tion
On the theore tica l level, the m a jo rity  o f economists, libera ls and social 
democrats, the techn ica l journals and the press, wishing to  m ainta in the 
individual sm allholding system stressed tha t the predominance o f sm all fa rm  
units and the high density o f agrarian population urgently required Hungary to  
change production over to p rim arily  intensive cu ltiva tion , i.e., to  increase the
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value produced on one cadastral yoke o f ag ricu ltu ra l land. On th is  question the 
coa lition  partners, essentially, a ll agreed. They a ll believed tha t the re form  of 
production was unavoidable, and necessary, and tha t i t  should be accomplished 
w ithou t d isturbing the ownership re lations established by the land re fo rm . A t 
the tim e, th is was also accepted by the HCP which in the f ir s t  point o f its 
'Peasant Programme' stated tha t its  aim was 'to  consolidate and strengthen the 
sm allholding ownership system' and tha t i t  considered it  a fundam ental condition:
tha t the new and old plesant owner should equally fee l secure 
tha t no-one would d isturb them and that the ir land ownership 
was defended by peoples' dem ocratic laws, ensuring tha t they 
would enjoy the fru its  of th e ir labout, undisturbedJ13)
S im ila r sentiments were expressed by the party at its  3rd Congress, in 1946, in
its  report on agricu lture . T ac tica lly , th is was quite a natural position fo r  the
HCP to take. It, too, believed in the necessity to  re fo rm  the ag ricu ltu ra l
production structure . But to  change the ownership relations established by the
land re fo rm  under the prevailing p o lit ic a l circumstances would have entailed
consequences tha t were d if f ic u lt  to  foresee.
However, the public defence o f the newly evolved ownership system,
regarded by a ll coa lition  partners as o f paramount im portance, conceiled
d iffe re n t p o lit ic a l and agrarian policy aims. In the case o f the HCP, i t  meant
tha t by strengthening the new sm allholding system a new economic and social
polarisation could be prevented. I t  served as a too l by which the pa rty  could
(14)block the possib ility  o f a renewed expansion o f ru ra l capita lism . While the 
SHP, at the other extreme, hoped i t  would provide a safeguard against a slide 
towards co llec tiv isa tion . So, while the parties agreed on the need to  re fo rm  the 
production s tructure  w ithout any s ign ifican t change in ownership re la tions, th is 
did not mean tha t the p o lit ica l aims o f the parties were identica l.
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The issue o f the change in production s tructure  not only preoccupied the 
parties but was discussed widely by the entire  country. During the debate a 
number o f d iffe re n t concepts were born, which found expression, p rim a rily , in 
the rapid development o f intensive cu ltiva tion  in agricu lture . This, o f course, 
was not new, but a rev iva l o f an old idea which orig inated in the pre-w ar period, 
when i t  was popular, p a rticu la rly  w ith in  the populist movement. Accord ing to  
th is  view, fa ir ly  w idely held, i t  was believed tha t in Hungary one o f the main 
preconditions fo r increasing the National Income and standard o f liv in g  o f the 
country was the prom otion o f labour intensive crops. In the pre-w ar years the 
country ’s high population density, and the high proportion o f ag ricu ltu ra l 
population, combined w ith  the extensive grain cu ltiva tion  methods in use on most
big farms, resulted in widespread unemployment in agricu ltu re . The
consequences o f tha t were extrem ely low wages and unending financ ia l security 
fo r m illions. The plan was put forw ard to  transform  Hungary in to  a h o rticu ltu ra l 
country, to  correct the one-sided ag ricu ltu ra l production, and to  introduce labour 
intensive, high income, lu cra tive  crops - to  concentrate on vegetables, f ru it ,  
industria l crops such as sugarbeet and sunflower seeds, da iry products and
livestock, especially pigs and pou ltry . This view was expressed by many, but
pa rticu la rly  c learly  by Jozsef Takacs in his book, published soon a fte r  the land 
re fo rm  had begun. Thus,
fo r us there is no a lte rna tive  but to  change to  ho rticu ltu re . 
This is not only because the m arketing o f these crops created 
no problem even in the c r it ic a l years and because 
h o rticu ltu re  needs five  tim es more workers than extensive 
grain production, but because i t  results in higher incomes fo r  
the farm ers and raises the National Income many tim es. In 
h o rticu ltu ra l produce, at the present, we are unbeatable 
because our f ru i t  and vegetables surpass those o f a ll the 
other European countries in th e ir  high content o f v itam in . 
The h o rticu ltu ra l economy o f Denmark, Holland and Bulgaria 
is more developed than ours, but th e ir f ru it  and vegetables 
compare very unfavourably w ith  ours in term s of flavour, 
colour and v itam in  content because these countries have
d iffe re n t c l im a te s .^ )
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S im ila r sentim ents were expressed by Imre Kovacs:
our agricu ltu re  has to be transform ed onto intensive lines, 
grain production should only satisfy our domestic 
requirem ents and even th a t at a low cost so tha t i t  could 
w ithstand in te rna tiona l com petition, below world m arket 
prices. The land so released should be turned over to  the 
production o f industria l crops. F ru it and vegetables, because 
o f th e ir v itam in  and ca lorie  content, would be best fo r 
exports, but even domestic consumption could absorb large 
quantities; industria l crops, tobacco, hemp, flax , sugarbeet, 
casto r-o il p lant e tc., would be the most ra tiona l line towards 
which we should sh ift our production. Great emphasis should 
also be put on animal husbandry. I t  w ill take sometime to 
recover our losses (i.e., war losses), the domestic m arket 
could also absorb large quantities o f meat, fats, eggs but only
o f good quality.(16)
or, in a somewhat la te r period, Peter Veres also noted that:
The only saviour o f Hungary is to  sh ift as fa r as possible from
extensive grain production to  intensive cu ltiva tion  centered
around animal husbandry and fa tten ing , based on large-scale 
fodder p roduction .^? )
It  was proposed to  transform  Hungarian agricu lture  by means o f a judicious
c red it d is tribu tion  along the lines o f the ’Danish pattern ' suit the p o ten tia litie s  o f
(18)sm all farm s; to  transform  the fo rm er 'granary o f Europe' from  extensive 
production o f grain, the export o f which was heavily subsidised and d if f ic u lt ,  as 
shown earlie r, even in pre-war years, in to  a large vegetable garden, dotted w ith  
dairies and orchards, and producing wheat fo r domestic consumption only.
Intensive cu ltiva tion  was believed to  be v ita l not only to  boost Nationa l Income 
but also to ensure the v ia b ility  o f small farm s. Some experts, however,
cautiously pointed out tha t the Hungarian c lim a te  was harsher than th a t o f 
Denmark, Holland or Belgium, where intensive cu ltiva tion  was carried  on and 
they envisaged an in term ediate system, combining the mechanical large-scale 
production o f grain w ith  the intensive production o f vegetables, pigs, da iry 
products, f ru it ,  tobacco etc. I t  was also envisaged tha t para lle l to  the sh ift 
towards intensive agricu lture  the ag ricu ltu ra l processing industries should also be 
developed, and the area under irr ig a tio n  greatly  extended, together w ith
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techn ica l education. These concepts and ideas fo r fu rth e r agrarian development, 
qu ite  ra tiona l and a ttra c tive , im plied, however, tha t Hungary was to  remain part 
o f the West European system and tha t those countries would support, in th e ir 
own interests, a planned development o f th is kind in Hungary.
In the opinion o f many ag ricu ltu ra l experts the road to  fu rth e r 
ag ricu ltu ra l development in Hungary and, perhaps, to  s tave -o ff the establishment 
o f a Soviet-type o f co llec tive  system, was the creation o f a strong and broad 
network o f farm  cooperatives. I f  only the peasants could be persuaded and 
taught to  pool th e ir work, resources and marketing, d iv id ing th e ir group p ro fits  
equally, a greater measure o f ru ra l prosperity m ight be achieved. The advocates 
o f a cooperative movement, however, found l i t t le  enthusiasm: the task o f selling 
the cooperative idea to  the peasant who had just managed, fo r  the f ir s t  tim e, to  
obtain r ig h tfu l and legal ownership o f a small piece o f land, proved to  be a 
d if f ic u lt ,  almost hopeless, undertaking. The ind iv idua lis tic  peasant was 
convinced tha t he knew be tte r than anyone else how to  grow his crops; and i f  he 
had good horses, good ploughs, why share them w ith  other peasants. As fo r 
cooperative marketing, why trus t some other peasant, a com m unity 
representative, to  get be tte r prices than he him self would get.
Nonetheless, i t  was clear to  a ll coa lition  parties tha t, due to  the 
s truc tu ra l change in agricu lture , some form  o f cooperation had become 
necessary. However, no purposeful attem pts in th is  d irec tion  supported by 
resolute financ ia l measures were made by any o f the parties. There was an a ir 
o f uncerta in ty over the fu tu re  o f agrarian development. To a large exten t, the 
d if f ic u lty  in fo rm u la ting  a long-term  policy was created by the h is to rica l 
a ttitu d e  o f the HCP, which, inspite o f its  declared acceptance o f p riva te  
ownership relations, was looked upon by the sceptical peasants as a M arxist party  
w ith  a M arxist view o f agricu ltu re  and Lenin’s slogan 'abolish priva te  ownership' 
on its  banner despite its  ta c tic a l m odifica tion o f the orthodox M arxist doctrine .
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True, the HCP missed no opportun ity to  deny vehemently the rumours tha t 
co llec tiv isa tion  o f agricu ltu re  was its  u ltim a te  aim; nevertheless, there remained 
amongst the peasants a fee ling o f uncerta in ty and insecurity, a suspicion tha t it  
was probably just a question o f tim e before the red is tribu tion  o f land would lead 
to  the 'inev itab le ' establishment o f co llectives as in the Soviet Union.
However, to  promote the development o f a large scale cooperative 
movement also required the fu lf ilm e n t o f three basic conditions: (i) sizable
government funds, (ii) a broad educational programme and ( iii)  peasants 
s u ffic ie n tly  enlightened to  be receptive. In Hungary, at the tim e, a ll o f these 
conditions were lacking and none o f them could have been secured, except a fte r 
a period o f years o f concentrated e ffo rts .
Looking at the parties' ag ricu ltu ra l programmes b rie fly , tw o  things
become im m ediate ly noticeable. F irs t, as mentioned earlie r, apart from  the
programme fo r  land re form , no detailed agrarian po licy plan was prepared by any
o f the parties u n til 1946/47. The question o f fu rth e r agrarian development was
u n til then almost com plete ly neglected. Second, the programmes which began to
emerge during 1946/47 had been la rge ly designed to  serve e lectioneering
purposes, tak ing in to  account what was, more or less, undisputed and was
p o lit ic a lly  and econom ically acceptable to  the coa lition  partners and would not
(19)endanger th e ir  continued cooperation. These la rge ly avoided longer-te rm
projections, especially th e ir  ideological and conceptual aspects. Instead, a ll 
parties concentrated th e ir e ffo rts  on solving the most pressing p rac tica l aspects 
o f ag ricu ltu ra l tasks and problems. This was strange, since a ll parties includ ing 
the communists, were fu lly  aware tha t the land re fo rm  was only the s ta rtin g  
point o f a development process, and in its  f in a l s truc tu ra l fo rm  was c r ta in ly  not 
the u ltim a te  solution fo r Hungarian agricu ltu re . Words during th is  period, 
however, did not seem to  have su ffic ien t au tho rity  to  convey any long-te rm  
development plans.
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Insofar as the HCP was concerned, i t  c learly  stated tha t as a result o f
the land re fo rm  'the smallholding system became the basis o f production in
Hungary1^ ^  and the task o f People's Democracy was the 'ecnomic prosperity of
the country, which depended on the development and modernisation o f the
(21)sm allholding system'. In order to  achieve th is the party  also accepted the
need, as noted earlie r, fo r  the gradual transfe r o f agricu lture  to  'intensive
farm ing ' and the establishment o f a network o f agricu ltu ra l processing industries,
(22)on a cooperative basis. Under Section 5 o f its  'Peasant Programme', on
farm ing cooperatives, however, the party  lent its  cautious support to  the
encouragement, w ith  government help, o f the voluntary cooperation o f dw arf and
smallholders, to  secure the advantages o f large-scale farm ing. Its  support,
however, was noticeably less forthcom ing when the discussion turned to  the
(23)m ateria l requirements fo r cooperation. The party sim ply could not fo llow
any other po licy than to express its  support fo r  the new ownership s tructu re . The
low-key reference to cooperatives was not accidental but closely re la ted to  the
general anti-ko lkhoz sentiment amongst a ll peasant stra ta , which was
p a rticu la rly  strong in 1945/46, although it  la te r diminished somewhat due to  the
propaganda campaign by the HCP. It  re-emerged, however, w ith  great fo rce
towards the tu rn  o f 1947/48. In summoning the peasants o f Hungary to  break up
the large estates the HCP was merely applying a strategy the effectiveness o f
(24)which had been proven by history. I t  ce rta in ly  did not mean tha t the HCP,
fo llow ing  a M arxist-Len in is t programme, had changed its  be lie f about the
(25)v ia b ility  o f a smallholdings system. Indeed, Leninist strategy, on the whole, 
illum in ia tes w e ll the a ttitude  o f the HCP towards the peasants. The ir position in 
Hungary a fte r  the war was in some way analogous to  tha t o f the peasants in pre­
revo lu tionary Russia. Great feudal domains existed, making i t  possible to  divide 
the land in 1945. But, there were two im portan t d ifferences: though ob jective  
conditions may have favoured revo lu tionary mass movement, the peasants were
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in form ed about Russian developments. They did not believe the communists
were sincere about land division. Any reference, however vague, by the HCP
regarding the advantages to  be gained from  'cooperation* was received w ith  the
utm ost suspicion by the peasants. The HCP, however, did not at th is  point
propose e ither the co llec tiv isa tion  o f agricu lture , fo r reasons discussed at length
elsewhere, nor did i t  com m it its e lf to  any other c lear-cu t development
programme regarding the long-term  fu tu re  o f agricu lture . P rim a rily  fo r p o lit ic a l
reasons, the party  was caught in a dilem m a a fte r the land re fo rm : i t  knew what
i t  wanted to  achieve but the tim e  and atmosphere were inappropriate fo r its
purpose. There was sim ply no 'ra tiona lly ' possible a lte rna tive  policy available
a fte r the re fo rm . In lieu o f a long-term  programme the HCP focused its
a tten tion , p rim arily , on uncontroversial, imm ediate p rac tica l ag ricu ltu ra l
problems. Essentially, u n til the 'year o f change', in 1948, the pa rty  was
preoccupied w ith  the fu ll com pletion o f the land re form , dem onstrating its
concern to  consolidate the position o f new owners and to  increase ag ricu ltu ra l
(26)output w ith in  the re la tive ly  narrow l im it  o f state financ ia l support.
The other worker's party, the SDP, on the other hand, was qu ite  free  to 
assume a posture o f unequivocal com m itm ent on the cooperative question. 
Everybody knew, and to  d iffe re n tia te  its e lf the party made no secret o f it ,  tha t 
the SDP did not want the dreaded 'kolkhozes', the most worrying question and the 
'acid test' o f the parties' agrarian policy in tentions fo r the land-owning
peasantry. I t  could therefo re  declare w ith  candour, w ithout arousing any 
suspicion, its  longer-term  vision and its  support fo r the development o f a strong 
cooperative movement, on the 'Danish' princip le , when i t  presented its  detailed 
plans fo r agricu ltu re . Thus,
we want the new order in Hungarian agricu ltu re  to  be based 
on smallholdings, but w ith  a strong cooperative network 
which would progress towards the actual rea lisation o f the 
communal princip le  in the economic order.(27)
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The plan was a peculiar m ixture o f an action programme and a long-te rm  vision.
W ith regard to  the fu rthe r development o f agricu lture, in Chapter 2 the SDP
declared its  be lie f in the necessity o f increased centra l in te rven tion  and
emphasised the need to  establish a network o f 'Councils fo r  A g ricu ltu ra l
Reconstruction' at regional and centra l levels, to  'guide' ag ricu ltu ra l a c tiv itie s
(28)and to  safeguard the social w e lfare o f ag ricu ltu ra l workers. The party  also
stressed tha t the correct d irec tion  o f ag ricu ltu ra l development was to  s h ift to
intensive cu ltiva tion , ho rticu ltu re  and animal husbandry, which specia lly suited
(29)the natura l endowments o f the sm allholding system. Thus the main
d iffe rence  between the workers' parties, in respect o f agricu lture, was the way 
they handled the cooperate question and how they perceived the fu tu re . While 
the SDP adapted an old p o lit ica l line, f irs t  established in the in te r-w a r period to 
new conditions, the HCP, in response to  the 7th Comintern Congress, was obliged 
to  fo llow  a new p o litica l line in which pragmatism and ideology closely 
in teracted. For a tim e, however, the la tte r  was pushed in to the background and 
the party  devoted its  energy p rim arily  to solving the question o f p o lit ic a l power, 
which needed urgent and constant a tten tion . I t  ignored, or perhaps more 
accurate ly postponed, a ll the ideological questions related to  agricu ltu re . This 
was acknowledged la te r by Matyas Rakosi, when he adm itted that:
during the past three years we were fa r  too preoccupied w ith  
solving current problems, which needed our im m ediate 
a tten tion  ... and we devoted less e ffo r t  than required to  
questions o f ideology and theory.(30).
This statem ent must be open to  d iffe re n t in te rpre ta tions regarding the real 
reason fo r the neglect o f agricu lture. R e flec ting  on past and fu tu re  
develpments, there can be hardly any doubt tha t i t  was because the pa rty  wished 
to  'cloud' its  true  intentions on the fu tu re  o f agricu ltu re  u n til the p o lit ic a l power 
struggle was resolved in its  favour, when i t  decided to  come out in to  the open.
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The two agrarian parties, the SHP and NPP, while com ple te ly d iffe re n t 
in many other aspects, were both unquestionably ready to  go, at least in 
p rincip le , as fa r  as the two workers' parties in respect o f ag ricu ltu ra l 
reconstruction, mechanisation and modernisation. Hence i t  is only proposed here 
to re fe r only b r ie fly  to  the d ifferences in the ag ricu ltu ra l perspectives which 
they promised the peasants. The d ifference, especially in ideology, was greatest 
between the SHP and HCP. This was c learly  characterised by the SHP as 
fo llows:
the HCP is a M arxist party, while we are not a M arxist party.
We consider ourselves to  be a radical, progressive bourgeois 
party. The u ltim a te  goal inscribed on our banner is the 
establishment o f democracy. As a radica l party we may ca ll 
th is people's democracy ... although we regard th is as 
verbiage, since democracy is synonymous w ith  government by 
the people. What is the p o lit ica l goal o f the M arxist parties 
is no secret, they make no secret o f it ,  we are a ll clear about 
it .  Looking at the goals o f these parties, while some 
differences exist, nevertheless we can f irm ly  say tha t th e ir 
u ltim a te  goal is s o c i a l i s m . ^  1)
The SHP, having accepted the new ownership structure  as the s ta rtin g  point,
envisaged the development o f agricu lture  to  the leve l o f Denmark, Holland,
(32)
Finland and Belgium in production, cu lture  and life s ty le . The pa rty  promised 
the opportunity to a ll peasant s tra ta  to  'get rich ' on the basis o f honest p ro fits  
and the security fo r  priva te  investment needed to  develop agricu ltu re . From the 
party's fo rm al programme proposal i t  becomes clear tha t, like  the other parties, 
the SHP regarded the cooperatives as the fu tu re  basic organisational fo rm  in 
agricu lture . Thus,
cooperatives must become the basic organisational 
in s tit itu tio n  o f Hungarian economic life . The ind iv idual 
peasant should jo in  cooperative life  out o f free  w ill, w ithout
c o e rc io n .^ )
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The party  maintained tha t a ll agrarian-re lated cooperatives in other fie lds than 
production, e.g., Hangya (Ant), Futura, National C entra l C redit Cooperative, and 
others, should be given to  and operated by the peasants, to  serve th e ir  own 
in te re s ts /^
The NPP, on the other hand, faced a com plete ly d iffe re n t p o lit ic a l
s ituation. Since the pa rty  was w e ll aware o f its  own p o lit ica l lim ita tions , i t
knew fo r certa in  tha t i t  had no chance whatever to achieve a s ign ifican t share o f
p o lit ica l power and was thus to ta lly  permeated by the sp irit o f ’coa lition
po litics ’. For a long tim e, due to  an in terna l sp lit, the party did not even devote
any e ffo r t  to  producing an independent overall agrarian programme fo r  the
fu tu re . Only individual members o f the party attem pted to  fo rm u la te  some
(35)plans, amounting to  no more than sem i-o ffic ia l bare outlines. From these it  
transpired tha t both factions in the party believed in the necessity fo r some form  
of populist cooperative system in fu tu re .
Thus, in conclusion, i t  can be said tha t on current, p rac tica l tasks in 
agricu ltu re  the policies o f a ll parties were fa ir ly  s im ilar, but im portan t 
d ifferences existed in th e ir  views of the fu tu re  o f agricu lture . The HCP, as 
shown, only gave a decisive view on priva te  ownership. I t  would have liked to  be 
more decisive on the cooperative question, i f  only the ’n ightm arish’ consequences 
could have been avoided. But the party was not im patient. I t  knew th a t f ir s t  it  
must get p o lit ica l power and contro l over industry. The party was very cautious 
about u tte rin g  any statem ent regarding the fu tu re . The SDP, on the o ther hand, 
produced a much c learer vision and riche r programme fo r the fu tu re  o f 
agricu lture . Regarding the two agrarian parties the SHP programme contained 
many in teresting, i f  somewhat vague, concepts in the d irection  o f ’cooperative 
cap ita lism ’, while the NPP, the closest to  the la ten t communist view, wished to  
establish 'cooperative socialism'.
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On the whole, however, none o f the parties had provided a clear 
unequivocal perspective plan fo r the fu tu re  o f agricu lture. Looking at the 
h is to rica l events, perhaps, none o f them could have provided this. The peasants, 
on the whole, remained uncom m itted and at subsequent elections they voted fo r 
those parties which gave more im form ation  about perspective agrarian plans or, 
perhaps, voted on the basis o f what they guessed or perceived to  lie  behind those 
plans. The ideological d ifferences between the two extremes, the SHP and HCP, 
were o f course much greater than th e ir programmes revealed. Both parties 
acted w ith  circum spection regarding the fu tu re  in order tha t some proposal or 
statem ent about the fu tu re  should not unw itting ly  give p o litica l advantage to  the 
other party. The fin a l rea lisation o f these agrarian concepts depended,
p rim arily , on which party could gain the greater p o lit ica l and adm in is tra tive
power. The p o lit ica l dimensions and th e ir consequences became o f overrid ing 
im portance. I t  was not irre levant, fo r example, how much o f c red it and
investment was allocated to  agricu lture, how it  was divided between industry and 
agricu ltu re  and who contro lled and divided it .  The Supreme Economic Council - 
under the contro l o f the HCP - gave very l i t t le  support to  financ ia l policies 
which could possibly have strengthened the long-term  v ia b ility  o f sm all-scale 
peasant farm ing. While a ll these, and s im ila r questions, appeared as economic 
issues, in re a lity  they were not, since they influenced the results o f p o lit ic a l 
power relations. To th is extent, the economic problems rea lly  always appeared 
at the p o lit ica l level, which did not encourage th e ir  solution. The parties 
perceived tha t a ll decisions regarding po litics  or economics influenced the fu tu re  
and therefore they were cautious about com m itting  themselves to  any
conceptual solutions, lest these might adversely a ffe c t them tom orrow .
So, in respect o f agricu lture, the HCP remained in the background. It 
was more preoccupied w ith  the stabilisa tion o f existing re lations and its  major 
concern, to  which i t  devoted considerable energy, was to re s tr ic t the ad hoc
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development o f cap ita lis t in fluence in agricu lture . The party  system atica lly  
attacked any proposal which, a fte r closing the 'Prussian-Road' o f development, 
could conceivably lead towards the unrestricted development o f an 'Am erican 
patte rn ' o f farm ing. Indeed, Imre Nagy, o f the HCP, stressed tha t 'the 
re s tr ic tio n  o f the development o f cap ita lis tic  tendencies was the more im portant 
task o f the party's agrarian policy, i t  can be said o f our entire  economic
/ o c \
policy.' The closing o f the 'Prussian-Road' and the land re form , o f course, 
had not, on th e ir own, precluded the possib ility  that: (i) ag ricu ltu ra l development 
m ight unfold in the d irection  o f rura l capita lism , or (ii) tha t development m ight 
show the signs o f restric tions blocking these cap ita lis t tendencies. While the 
fo rm er position o f agrarian cap ita l was considerably weakened by the land 
re form , the possib ility  o f cap ita lis t ownership, in the form  o f the 100  and 200  
cadastral yoke holdings which remained a fte r the reform , could have form ed the 
basis o f a rev iva l in ru ra l capita lism . Under certa in  conditions even the new 
landowners represented a po tentia l fo r cap ita lis t development because ownership 
was the basis o f the land reform . I t  is, o f course, true tha t they were already 
res tric ted  to  a signicant degree since the land given to  the peasants under the 
land reform  could not be 'alienated', i.e., sold, w ith in  ten years, but i t  could be 
leased, and other fo rm er smallholders could sell th e ir land. An 'Am erican 
pattern ' o f development could only take root i f  the 'cap ita lis t' tendencies had 
f in a lly  won. But the characteristics o f p o lit ic a l developments contrad icted the 
'Am erican pattern ', both in theory and practice, because o f the decree 
preventing the new owners from  selling th e ir land, precisely to  prevent 
cap ita lis tic  concentration o f land. To th is extent, a fte r the re fo rm  the 
development po ten tia l o f agricu lture had changed from  the 'Prussian Road' to  an 
impure 'Am erican pa tte rn ' o f development. While the centra l figu re  o f the 
village was not the 'cap ita lis t' but the sm all peasant producer, agricu ltu re  was 
fu ll o f contrad ic tion  in these years. The HCP was determ ined to  prevent a
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development o f th is ’Am erican' kind, fearing tha t i t  would lead to  the 
entrenchm ent o f 'kulaks' who, once established, would be very d if f ic u lt  to 
dislodge.
The fin a l outcome regarding the alternatives fo r  fu rth e r agrarian
development depended on the course o f the p o lit ica l struggle. In the end,
p o lit ic a l considerations steered agrarian development in a d iffe re n t d irec tio n  -
towards co llectives. The development o f cooperatives, intensive cu ltiv a tio n  and
rura l capita lism  had to  give way to  co llectiv isa tion , w ith  emphasis on extensive
farm ing. The natural endowments o f the country, in terms o f population density
and land scarc ity  - where high p rodu c tiv ity  o f land was the proper ob jective  -
were to ta lly  ignored. The great need fo r intensive cu ltiva tion , however,
(37)emerged again in the post-1956 period. In the period under consideration, 
however, the arguments in favour o f i t  m istakenly had l i t t le  im pact on the fin a l 
policymakers.
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5.2 A g ricu ltu ra l performance and the emerging economic problems
Any large-scale change in the structure  o f a country ’s agricu ltu re  
in itia tes  a process o f sh ifting  and adaptation in the sphere o f production, which 
almost inevitab ly results in some d ificu ltie s  and waste o f resources. This would 
be true even i f  land re form  were carried out under normal circum stances but is 
a ll the more so i t  i t  is done at a tim e  when the whole economy has been severely 
damaged and dislocatd by a ruinous war, as was the case in Hungary.
A part from  the losses Hungarian agricu lture had suffered as a result o f
(38)the war , its  successful rev iva l was hindered by several factors. I t  is a known
fa c t tha t farm ing on small-scale holdings requires more draught animals and
equipment, on the same area, than on large-scale holdings. The demand fo r  both
therefo re  increased s ign ifican tly  w ith  the red is tribu tion  o f land to  fo rm e rly
landless and land-poor peasants. But, due to  the war losses and the re la tive
increase in demand fo r cap ita l, neither were available. Some o f the machinery
and equipment le ft  over from  the large estates was unsuitable fo r sm all-scale
farm ing. Indeed, a fte r the land reform  much of the tools, buildings, equipment
and machinery o f large estates, reta ined fo r communal ownership, remained idle,
(39)leading to  severe shortages. There was no small-scale m achinery and
equipment. The peasants, especially at the s ta rt, had no choce but to  use 
p rim itive  tools and methods, like  hoe and spade, fo r cu ltiva tin g  large tra c ts  o f 
land. Indeed, in many instances, peasants harnessed themselves in fro n t o f 
ploughs fo r  lack o f a n im a ls / ^  The enthusiasm o f the peasants, however, 
derived from  the satisfaction o f personal ownership o f land and th e ir  hopes fo r  
the fu tu re , w e ll compensated fo r  the shortage o f draught animals and lack o f 
sm all-scale machinery and equipment. Determ ined to  lay the foundations o f a 
be tte r life , they overcame great hardships and displayed superhuman e ffo rts  to  
show results. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the increase in land area 
brought under cu ltiva tion  during the f irs t  post-war years. Even in 1945, under
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the most adverse conditions, 86. 1  per cent o f the to ta l p re-w ar normal
ag ricu ltu ra l land area was under cu ltiva tion . This was fu rth e r increased to  93.9,
(41)97.2 and 98.4 per cent in 1946, 1947 and 1948 respectively.
A g ricu ltu ra l production results, in the f ir s t  three years were, however,
ra the r disappointing. This was so fo r several reasons. F irs t, the lack o f
fe rtilise rs , which was so cruc ia l fo r the exhausted and neglected land. The low
leve l o f chem ical fe r t il is e r  supply, even before the war, had contribu ted
s ign ifican tly  to  stagnating crop yields; now, w ith  the reduction in livestock
numbers the supply o f natura l fe r t il is e r  was cut d rastica lly , adversely a ffe c tin g
(42)the p rodu c tiv ity  o f the soil s t i l l  fu rthe r. Second, production was hindered by
acute seed shortages. In September 1945 the to ta l supply o f seed at the disposal
o f the government was a mere 1 0 0 ,0 0 0  quintals, when the fu ll requirem ent fo r
the 1945/46 economic year was more than 2,3000,000 quintals in wheat seed 
(43)alone. The government expected tha t subsequent requirements would be
secured by production from  peasant farms, but many, p a rticu la rly  the new
landowners, were not in a position to  do this. Most o f them could not re ly  on
previous reserves either. Third, and th is probably was the most serious e ffe c t,
the disastrous droughts that struck the country in three successive years, 1945,
1946 and 1947 crushed a ll expectations fo r the good harvests tha t were so badly
needed. The annual p rec ip ita tion  in 1945, 1946 and 1947, compared to  the
(44)average o f 1929-39 was 83 per cent, 69 per cent and 56 per cent respective ly.
Hungary’s major crop, bread grain, was worst a ffected ; in 1946 a ricu ltu re
(45)harvested less than needed fo r  its  own consumption. The results in o ther
crops were not much more favourable. The average yie ld o f bread grain, due to
the drought in 1947 -  the worst year -  had in many instances dropped to  as low as
2 .0 - 2 .5 quinta ls/cadastra l yoke and in some parts o f the country the crop was
burnt out a l to g e th e r /^  Besides c lim a tic  factors, the low average crop yie lds
were undoubtedly also the result o f de fic ien t methods o f cu ltiva tion . Table 5.1
shows the changes in yields o f major crops during the f ir s t  fou r post-war 
(47)years:
- 262 -
TABLE 5.1 -  Changes in yields of major crops
Crop
1931-40 average: 1938
yields o f major crops 
1945 1946 1947 1948
average yie ld, qu inta l/cad. yoke
Wheat 7.9 9.5 5.0 5.6 4.8 6 .6
Rye 6.5 7.3 4.6 5.2 5.0 7.3
Barley 7.8 9.2 4.6 5.1 5.2 9.1
Oats 7.1 7.9 5.1 5.1 4.4 8.8
Maize 10 .8 12 .0 8.3 6.2 7.7 12.3
Sugar-beet 117.1 126.4 51.4 49.5 68.4 89.9
Potatoes 39.5 42.3 30.8 23.5 21.9 44.0
Lucerne 23.5 27.5 17.5 15.8 14.1 2 1 .6
M ixture  o f oats
and vetch 60.7 64.1 49.4 48.7 48.1 6 8 .1
to ta l output as 96 o f the average o f
1931--1940
Wheat 100 122 30 51 52 72
Rye 100 113 43 60 69 110
Barley / 100 115 70 70 64 110
Oats 100 109 60 69 59 117
Maize 100 122 86 62 82 131
Sugar-beet 100 101 18 54 120 184
Potatoes 100 107 85 57 53 106
Lucerne 100 130 87 67 67 106
M ixture  o f oats
and vetch 100 104 85 88 82 102
S o w cg,« Xeci rvA i ■ k v  I
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The drought, increasing in severity over the years, f in a lly  abated in 1948, the 
f ir s t  post-war year when more or less normal weather conditions prevailed. It  
thus provided the f irs t  real opportun ity fo r  the sm allholding system and the 
peasant forces released by the reform  to  show results. I t  can be seen from  the 
table tha t the harvest improved considerably in tha t year. The average y ie ld  o f 
major crops, w ith  the exception o f wheat and sugar-beet, was s ig n ifica n tly  
be tte r in 1948 than, indeed, the average fo r  1931-1940. A lthough sugar-beet 
only reached 77 per cent o f the pre-war level, w ith  the 2 i  tim es increase in sown 
area the to ta l harvest increased by 84 per cent compared w ith  the pre-w ar level. 
For some crops the sown area was reduced, hence the pre-war levels could not be 
matched. Apart from  the improved weather, agricu ltu ra l prices, which by th is 
tim e had increased, provid ing greater incentives to  produce, were also a 
con tribu to ry  fa c to r in the improved p r o d u c t io n /^  The positon o f the 
smallholder was strengthened and, at last, i t  seemed as i f  the road had opened 
fo r  fu rth e r ag ricu ltu ra l growth, establishing a strong process o f development to  
middle-peasant holder.
Livestock production displays a greater degree o f u n ifo rm ity . The
drought did not s ign ifican tly  a ffe c t th e ir numbers -  although some had to  be
slaughtered because o f fodder shortage -  but ra ther th e ir qua lity  and conditions.
(49)Changes in livestock numbers during these years are shown in Table 5.2. As 
can be seen from  the table, the number o f c a ttle  by 1948 was 118,000 more than 
in 1938, while the number o f horses reached 80 per cent o f the pre -w ar level. 
The growth in output o f animal products, however, especially meat, was 
considerably less spectacular. The farm ers, apart from  favourable prices, 
received no financ ia l support from  the state fo r animal husbandry. Because of 
the fodder shortage the peasants favoured those animals which needed longer 
breeding tim e, e.g., ca ttle  and horses. Both o f these were, o f course, in 
especially great demand by the peasants because they represented the 
indispensible draught power.
- 264 -
TABLE 5.2 -  Changes in livs tock numbers
Time C a ttle Pigs Horses Sheep Standard animals
10 00  head
15th March 1938 1875 5224 814 1629 2863
31st May 1945 1070 1114 329 328 1270
31st May 1946 1100 1327 399 370 1377
31st May 1947 1841 2792 575 570 2292
31st May 1948 1993 2771 651 579 2473
1938 =: 100
31st May 1945 57.1 21.3 40.4 20.1 44.4
31st May 1946 58.7 25.4 49.0 22.7 48.1
31st May 1947 98.2 53.4 70.6 35.0 80.1
31st May 1948 106.3 53.0 80.0 35.5 86.4
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TABLE 5.3 -  Indices o f industria l, output (1938 = 100)
1946 1947 1948
Heavy Industry: 56.9 92.1 124.4
L igh t Industry: 21.7 62.2 86.4
Food Industry: 29.5 65.3 93.8
koUVGt •, Lee .
During the period between 1945 and 1948 the volume o f ag ricu ltu ra l production
increased by 50 per cent and by the end o f the period i t  reached approxim ate ly
85 per cent o f the pre-war level. The marketed production, however, even by
1949 remained about 25 per cent below the pre-war le v e l/* *^  There were two
main reasons fo r  this: f irs t,  the newly established farms, in a ll the m ajor crops,
fa iled  to  achieve the same average yields as large estates and second, a
considerable share o f the production was consumed on the farm s by peasants.
A g ricu ltu re  was the sector o f the economy which lagged fa rthest behind pre-war
levels: a ll other sectors grew fas te r than agricu lture, some considerably faste r,
e.g., m ining and m etallurgy output was 12 per cent above and m anufacturing and
(51)energy production reached 92 per cent o f the pre-war level. The food and
ligh t industries, however, remained below pre-war production levels. Changes in
(52)the structure  o f industria l output in th is period are shown in Table 5.3 The 
defic iency in agricu ltu ra l production, pa rticu la rly  the large-scale wheat and 
meat shortages, the fo rm er aggravated by the sh ift in po licy in favour o f 
industria l crops to supply the growing industry, the devastating in fla tion , 
a ffe c tin g  the entire economy, and the 'agrarian price scissors' th a t appeared had 
an adverse and cum ulative a ffe c t on the supply o f food to  the urban population. 
Because o f the level o f ag ricu ltu ra l production and the increased food 
requirements imposed by the reparation payments - fa llin g  heavily on ag ricu ltu re
- and the food supply to  the Soviet occupying forces, the imbalance in food 
supply became so severe tha t a number o f products were taken out o f the sphere 
o f normal market relations and collected by the state, at low o f f ic ia l ly  fixed  
compulsory deliverey prices. Because o f the low, and unpredictable, food rations
- supplied from  these 'contro lled ' products -  the 'black m arket' became an
im portan t source o f supply. The prices there, however, a t tim es reached five
(53)tim es the o ffic ia l prices. The general scarc ity  o f food, even o f fre e ly  
marketable products, was re flec ted  in soaring prices too. A part from  sca rc ity ,
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speculation undoubtedly also contributed to  the high prices. The m a jo rity  o f
sm all farm ers, especially the newly established ones, derived no com fo rt or
benefit from  the highly in fla tiona ry  price increases in food since they had hardly
anything to  sell. A fte r  fu lf i l l in g  th e ir quota obligations, because o f the low
average yields o f most products, they had just su ffic ien t food le f t  fo r  th e ir  own
consumption. Towards the last states o f the in fla tion , in early 1946, money lost
its  value so rap id ly tha t i t  was im practicab le to  sell. This applied to  the
m a jo rity  o f peasants, in a ll categories. Then, the money economy was replaced
by d irec t barte r o f products between town and countryside. Moreover, the land
reform , which established 1.4 m illion  holdings o f less than 5 cad. yokes -
subsistence holdings -  undoubtedly aggravated the food supply problem even
fu rthe r. I t  was the combined e ffe c t o f a ll these facto rs  tha t made the increase
in ru ra l consumption so s ign ificant during th is period.
The financ ia l stab ilisa tion programme, which introduced the new un it o f
currency, the Forin t, instead o f the defunct Pengo, on 1st August 1946, caused,
contrary to  expectations, even fu rth e r de te rio ra tion  in the position o f the
peasantry. The HCP, in charge o f the economy, could, o f course, have halted the
in fla tion , but found it  an expedient. and cheap way o f financing the country's
economic, i.e., industria l, recovery. The monetary re form  was biased heavily
(55)against the peasants. The prices o f ag ricu ltu ra l products in re la tio n  to  
industria l goods, were fixed  fa r  below what was ju s tifie d . The HCP played a 
great role in th is. A fte r  determ ination o f ag ricu ltu ra l prices the com m unist- 
dominatd 'Supreme Economic Council', which was responsible fo r  overa ll 
economic policy, presented estimates 'proving' tha t unless the industria l price
/cc\
level was raised, industria l production would be grea tly  endangered. The
necessity fo r  th is was also pub lic ly stated by Jeno Varga, the HCP's economic
spokesman, who pointed to the comparative reduction in the rea l incomes o f
(57)industria l workers. The emerging predominance o f the industria l sector over
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agricu ltu re  was already c learly  evident. Apart from  ideological, and domestic
economic, considerations, industry was also im portant to  the Soviet Union, since
a large proportion o f the reparation payment was to  be in industria l goods. No
allowance was made by the Russians fo r  the adverse economic conditions
prevailing in the country and Hungary was obliged to  begin reparation deliveries
(58)in 1945; in 1946/47 they amounted to  12 per cent o f National Income. The 
reparation payments, due to  the b i-la te ra l agreement imposed by the USSR, were 
fa r  in excess o f the orig ina l amount. A t the end o f July 1948, by which tim e 
Hungary was securely under fu ll and open Soviet dom ination, a new Soviet- 
Hungarian reparations agreement was signed, which reduced the amounts o f 
goods, industria l and agricu ltu ra l, to  be delivered. This, however, only resulted 
in a sh ift to  other methods o f economic exp lo ita tion.
The o ff ic ia lly  calculated 'agrarian price scissors' was 43.9 per cent. But
according to  other independent estimates, w ith  certa in  corrections, i t  had rea lly
amounted to  51.7 per cent. Even tha t fa iled  to  represent the true  p ic tu re  since
the peasants, due to  various deductions, did not receive the fu ll calcu la ted
amount fo r  th e ir product while, on the other hand, the prices they paid fo r
industria l goods were substantia lly higher than the wholesale prices on which the
ca lcu la tion was based. According to th is author ' i t  is not exaggerated to  say tha t
(59)the opening o f the agrarian price scissors is 100 per cent'. These extrem ely 
unfavourable term s o f trade had, o f course, fa r-reach ing consequences fo r  
agricu ltu ra l growth and development. A part from  destroying any incentive  to  
produce fo r  the market, adding to  the serious food supply d iff ic u lt ie s , i t  also 
prevented the much needed cap ita l accum ulation in the countryside because 
farm ers' money incomes were in su ffic ien t. This, in turn , hindered the process o f 
growth, the economic consolidation o f peasant holdings and the development o f 
agricu lture  towards intensive cu ltiva tion . The result o f th is  was p a rtic u la r ly  
strongly fe lt  because agricu lture -  being already v is ib ly trea ted  as a secondary
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sector by the policymakers in the communist contro lled ’Supreme Economic 
Council’ received a meagre financ ia l support from  them. These in it ia l price 
re lations between industry and agricu lture  could not be maintained fo r  long since 
they led to  hoarding o f stocks and encouraged ’black m arket’, both o f which 
jeopardised the aim of stab ilisa tion. By the end o f 1947 ag ricu ltu ra l prices had 
to  be increased, which had a favourable e ffe c t on incentives and production.
In the early post-war period, apart from  land and some nominal amount
o f seed, agricu lture  received v ir tu a lly  no other support at a l l : ^ ^  during what
was probably its  most v ita l period o f reconstruction agricu ltu re  was given no
cred it assistance but was le f t  to ta lly  to  its  own resources. A f te r  the
stabilisa tion between August 1946 and July 1947, agricu ltu re  was granted 434
m illion  Forints o f c red it, which was less than the c red it given to  industry in the
single month o f July 1947. The to ta l amount given over the period was only 16
(61)per cent o f the amount given to  industry. Whatever economic or p o lit ic a l
arguments are put forw ard in favour o f the degree o f support given to  industry,
i t  was to ta lly  un justifiab le  tha t the urgent needs o f ag ricu ltu re  were so
(62)com plete ly disregarded.
These d iff ic u ltie s  a ffected , to  a greater or lesser degree, the en tire  
cross section o f the fa rm ing population. They undoubtedly h it the new dw arf and 
smallholders proportionate ly much harder. The medium and w ea lth ie r peasants 
started out, a fte r  the war, w ith  a re la tive  advantage. This was only p a rity  on 
account o f the size o f th e ir land holdings. The ir main advantage was th a t the 
m a jo rity  o f them were, even before the war, w e ll established farm ers, o ften  w ith  
a certa in  amount o f seed in reserve and w ith  equipment, livestock and draught 
animals in reasonable quantity  at th e ir  disposal. They were also more 
experienced in the techniques and problems o f farm ing. To th is  exten t, they 
were much be tte r endowed not only to  survive the preva iling  hardships but to  
increase the economic differences between themselves and the newly landed.
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In the absence o f an e ffe c tive  agrarian policy, provid ing in it ia l sta te aid
to  the needy landowners, i t  was inevitab le tha t the de te rio ra ting  economic
conditions would lead to  the development o f 'ca p ita lis tic  tendencies', a te rm  used
by the HCP to  describe the 'opportunistic ' behaviour o f w ea lth ie r peasants who
exploited the handicaps o f th e ir less fo rtuna te  com patriots. A number o f the
new farm ers, unable to  succeed on th e ir  own under the p reva iling  economic
conditions, turned fo r help to  the be tte r established richer farm ers and traded
th e ir labour fo r the loan o f seed, draught animals, transport or equipment e.g.,
(63)the price o f ploughing 1 cad. yoke o f land was 6-10 days o f work. I t  was 
estimated tha t o f the 642,000 recip ients o f land some 400,000 were s t i l l  in need 
o f the most im portant basic farm  tools and equipment in 1947. O thers gave 
up hope a ltogether tem porarily  and leased th e ir land to  the w ea lth ie r peasants. 
Having become 'landless' again, they rejoined the ranks o f f lo a tin g  casual 
agricu ltu ra l workers, badly paid, inspite o f ag ricu ltu ra l Trade Union wage 
regulation in the spring o f 1947. Since much o f industry was in ruins i t  did not, 
fo r the tim e being, require labour from  agricu lture . In fac t, many urban workers 
flowed back in to ru ra l areas due to  lack o f employment opportun ities and food 
etc. Thus only agricu lture  could possibly provide employment fo r the large ru ra l 
population. A g ricu ltu re  s t i l l  represented 54.5 per cent o f a ll wage
(C  c \
earners. Later, the growing industries exerted some a ttra c tio n  fo r
ag ricu ltu ra l workers, but th is was lim ite d  because according to  the Census, as
la te  as 1st January 1949, fo u r-f if th s  o f the 126,000 registered unemployed were
industria l unemployed. Apart from  them, industry could also have drawn upon
the many who were employed in c learing the rubble, engaged on rebu ild ing  and 
(66)the like . Employment opportunities in agricu ltu re  were extrem e ly scarce. 
The re form , as discussed earlier, had le f t  the agrarian surplus labour problem 
large ly unresolved and w ith  the in flux  o f th is newly released labour the surplus 
increased considerably, aggravating fu rth e r the already tense labour m arket. The
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number o f wage-earners in agricu ltu re  was approxim ate ly between 300-400,000.
These could more than satisfy the labour requirements o f the riche r farm ers.
W ith the liqu idation o f the large estates the casual and seasonal agrarian labour
could now only look to  the more lim ite d  number o f riche r peasant farm s fo r
employment. To a llev ia te  tensions on the labour m arket, in 1947 the government
prohib ited the use o f threshing machines and harvesting had to  be done by 
(68)hand. U nfortunate ly, no accurate labour s ta tis tics  exist fo r  the period 
between 1945 and 1948. S ta tis tics  were published fo r 1949, but by then 
m igration from  agricu lture  to  industry has already begun. Even some m igration 
outside the country, e.g., from  Mezokovesd to  Sweden was reported, but la te r on 
em igration was b a n n e d /^
Working on th e ir  inadequate land, aggravated by the three years of 
drought, new and old, dw arf and small farm ers e ither became increasingly 
disillusioned or went bankrupt and sold th e ir land. The richer, more ambitious, 
farm ers wasted no opportun ity and by 1948 had exploited the inevitab le 
consequences o f the land re fo rm  and, by v io la ting  the law regarding ’non- 
a lienation ’ o f new holdings, a law which a ffected  approxim ately one-th ird  o f the 
to ta l agricu ltu ra l land, they bought up or rented some o f the land, thereby 
s ta rting  a process o f re-concentration o f land ownership. I t  is d if f ic u lt  to  
establish the importance o f th is process since no land purchase transactions were 
recorded at the tim e. According to  the Census taken in 1949 the to ta l number o f 
land purchasers between 1945 and 1948 was 33,760, o f whom some 28,602 owned 
land previously. The to ta l area a ffec ted  was less than 63,000 cadastral 
y o k e s / ^  These figures would not indicate an alarm ing degree o f land re- 
concentration. The a ffected  area was less than 2 per cent o f the to ta l re­
d istribu ted land area. I t  is, however, true  tha t i f  land ren ting  by the riche r 
peasants is taken in to  consideration, though this can only be regarded as o f a 
tem porary nature, the re-concentration o f land becomes more s ig n ifica n t. The
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proportion o f rented area, in re la tion  to  the to ta l area o f holdings, was 12.1 per
(71) . .cent. I t  is in te resting  to  note, en passant, tha t land re-concentra tion, e ither 
by purchase or tenancy, was most pronounced in the 20 to  35 cadastral yokes 
peasant fa rm  category. This, in a way, would tend to  v ind ica te  the correctness 
o f the SHP land reform  proposals to  create econom ically more viable units. The 
re-coneentration was a process o f 'na tura l selection'. But the HCP made fu ll use 
o f the preva iling  agrarian problems. W ith increasing frequency, p a rticu lrla y  
between 1947 and the summer o f 1948, i t  conducted a campaign against the 
richer peasants, accusing them o f grain hoarding, speculation and general 
'cap ita lis t' exp lo ita tion  o f the sm aller peasants. The party  procla im ed tha t i t  
was its  duty to  p ro tect the sm aller peasants against th is  exp lo ita tion . This, 
however, created some controversy among party  members. Many believed tha t 
the land re-concentra tion should be stopped. Others believed tha t the economy 
could not depend only on small farm ers, who barely produced enough fo r 
themselves, but tha t Hungary also needed the riche r peasants, who produced 
p rim arily  fo r com m ercial sale and were eager to grow progressively richer. The 
HCP's policy, however, became more and more re s tr ic tive . This trend was 
pa rticu la rly  noticeable from  the early mnths o f 1948. In the end i t  had serious 
p o litica l consequences and led to  even greater government in te rven tion , in the 
form  of heavily progressive taxation on the riche r peasants, who also had to  pay 
a cap ita l levy. Moreover, landless agrarian workers were recru ited  to  inspect 
the ir threshing in 1948.
While the re la tive  shortness o f the period under consideration may not 
perm it de fin ite  conclusions, i t  appears more than probable tha t sm all-scale 
peasants farm ing, even i f  le f t  to  its  own resources and despite the d if f ic u lt  
c lim a tic  conditions would, sooner or la te r, have been able to  equal the 
production results o f the large estate system. The period was fu ll o f opposing 
economic forces, some o f which, fo r example, the sheer peasant enthusiasm
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recognising no obstacle, propelled agricu ltu re  to  achieve a remarkable recovery. 
Behind the achievements, however, lay many unresolved problems inherent in 
sm all-scale farm ing, fo r which the system had not provided answers. The major 
problems were in the fo llow ing  spheres:
1 . the question o f unemployment, both open and hidden which could only be
solved in two ways: (i) moving increasingly towards 'intensive
cu ltiva tion ', (ii) i f  o ther branches o f the national ecnomy required the 
ru ra l manpower.
2 . the question o f marketed produce; while the standard o f liv in g  o f many 
peasants, by consuming on the farm , was raised by the re fo rm , the 
question of a be tte r supply to the urban population and fo r  exports, 
pa rticu la rly  im portant fo r the national economy, presented serious 
problems. There was only one way to  resolve this problem. By increased 
output and marketed production, w ith  an appropriate incentive  system. 
Increased marketed production could be achieved by: (i) p e rm ittin g  a 
measure o f contro lled and lim ite d  'cap ita lisa tion ' in the countryside, 
re inforced by a move in the d irec tion  o f 'intensive cu ltiva tion ', 
favourably a ffe c ting  the employment problem, which would have 
corrected the ills  o f the land re form . This solution was to ta l 'anathema' 
to  the HCP. A lte rn a tive ly  (ii) an appropriate ly organised and in tegra ted 
co-operative system, based on the prolonged maintenance o f ind iv idual 
small-scale peasant farm ing could be espoused. This, as shown 
previously, was supported by most parties in it ia lly  and, at least in a 
ta c tic a l sense, even by the HCP, but the m a jo rity  o f peasants did not 
want it .  Paralle l to  the above, ( iii)  e ithe r solution could have been 
reinforced by the development o f food industries, which would have
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provided additional employment to  many peasant fam ilies  not 
su ffic ie n tly  occupied on the small farm s. E ither o f these solutions would 
have been able to  provide the fram ew ork fo r industria lisa tion . What rate 
o f industria lisa tion e ithe r o f these solutions could support remained fo r 
ever untried. Because o f the rad ica l changes in the in te rna tiona l and 
in terna l p o lit ica l scenes, to  be discussed in Part III, both o f these 
possible a lterna tives were removed from  the agenda and replaced by 
co llectiv isa tion .
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5.3 Early adm in istra tive measures
In view o f the extrem ely unfavourable economic, c lim a tic  and
operational constraints agricu lture  had to  face in the f irs t  years a fte r  the war, i t
was, perhaps, unavoidable tha t ce rta in  transien t measures to  restore orderly
economic a c t iv ity  in agricu lture had to  be taken by the government. While the
extent o f state in tervention and the methods o f its  contro l were, at the
beginning, no stronger than during the war, in many aspects, however, i t
frequently  went beyond what was d ic ta ted  by purely social and economic
considerations. Sometimes overtly , sometimes covertly , some o f the measures
were taken by the HCP p rim arily  to  assist and fu rth e r its  p o lit ic a l and economic
contro l in the countryside and, p a rticu la rly  a fte r  the spring o f 1947, gradually to
prepare agricu lture  as fa r as possible fo r the party's concealed fin a l goal. The
influence o f the HCP on the economic li fe  o f the country was made possible
largely through the establishment o f the 'Supreme Economic Council' in
(72)December 1945. Although the nominal head o f the Council was a member o f
the SHP the real power was in the hands o f the Secretary General, Erno Gero, a
member o f the HCP. The adm in istra tive  power and supervisory ro le  o f the
'Council' in a ll m atters o f h igh-level economic po licy were more im portan t than
the increasing numbers o f m inistries charged w ith  supervision o f large sectors
(73)and advising on economic and financ ia l m atters. The newly created Planning 
O ffice  functioned as an in te r-m in is te ria l coordinating body.
The very f irs t  agrarian measures taken by the Provisional Government in 
1944-45 were concerned w ith  the regulation o f ag ricu ltu ra l labour and, because 
of great shortages, the u tilisa tio n  o f draught power and equipment. Farmers 
whose main occupation was in agricu ltu re  were obliged by law to  perform  a ll 
ag ricu ltu ra l work on th e ir own or w ith  the help o f th e ir  fam ily . E xtra  outside 
workers could only be employed i f  the fam ily 's  combined labour was in su ffic ie n t. 
Conversely, i f  a farm er's land was too sm all to  provide him w ith  fu ll- t im e
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employment he was obliged by law to  o ffe r  his labour fo r someone else's farm .
Anim al draught power, too, was system atica lly  regulated. The law, fo r  example,
prescribed in de ta il the size o f land area every team o f horses, or ca ttle , had to
cu ltiva te , and draught animals had to  be shared w ith  others, especially w ith  new
land owners, who in re tu rn  were obliged to  pay fo r  the service by th e ir  own
labour. S im ilar regulations applied fo r  trac to r-pow er and other machinery and
(7 4 )
equipment. These measures were considered necessary under the
circumstances in order to  secure the expedient use o f resources at the disposal
o f agricu lture ; they were, however, only p a rtia lly  successful in easing the
shortcomings tha t existed.
I t  was in the economic year 1945-46 tha t more system atic d irec t state
in tervention in agricu lture  began to  develop. From then on, the most im portan t
aspects o f agricu ltu ra l production came under detailed regulation. A  series o f
government decrees determ ined the proportion o f land to be ploughed, sown and
harrowed during the autumn and spring seasons. The government also
determ ined the area to  be allocated fo r wheat and other major crops, asking
Regional A dm in is tra tive  Organisations to  prepare and submit production plans
(75)fo r  most aspects o f ag ricu ltu ra l ac tiv itie s . S im ila rly , the production o f some
of the most im portant industria l crops, considered essential fo r  the envisaged
(76 )industria l development, also became closely regulated. Concerned, however,
tha t the peasants would be unw illing  to  im plem ent the regulation, since
industria l crops were grown on large estates previously, the government o ffe red
very advantageous term s to  growers, supplemented w ith  add itina l incentives fo r
(77)growing crops above the quota. In term s o f production the measure proved
to  be a success. I t  did, however, create some fr ic t io n  between the sm aller and
larger landowners because the b e tte r-o ff peasants, fa r from  a ttem p ting  to  resist
the production o f these crops, p a rticu la rly  sugar-beet, tried  to  squeeze the small
(78)peasants out o f this lu cra tive  business.
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Alongside the d irec t methods o f government in te rven tion  to  regulate
agricu ltu ra l production, the ’compulsory de livery system* (beszolgaltatas) based
on low o ff ic ia l prices in te r a lia , served also to  ensure the cu ltiva tio n  o f certa in
crops. The economic crises a fte r the war may have made re ten tion  o f a delivery
system, w ith  some m odifications, unavoidable fo r a tran s ito ry  period. It  was
scarcely possible to  supply the peasants adequately w ith  m anufactured goods to
ca ll fo rth  a m inimum amount o f food supply needed fo r  the towns, especially
since ag ricu ltu ra l production was also low. Compulsory deliveries at low prices,
consisting in e ffe c t o f a tax  payable in kind, there fo re  had to  be re lied upon to
prevent, or a llev ia te  excess consumption o f hoarding by the peasants. Thus in
May 1945, im m edia te ly a fte r  the ’explo itative* Jurcsek-system was abolished, a
m odified system which ’ostensibly’ had the peasants' in terest at heart, was
(79)introduced in its  place. The early 'ad hoc' decrees regulating compulsory
deliveries were grea tly  extended a fte r the s tab ilisa tion in August 1946 both in
scope, covering an increasing number o f products, and in severity. The decree
which abolished the old and introduced the new system, also ordered every
fa rm er to  surrender, at o ff ic ia lly  fixed prices, a ll the reserves o f wheat, rye,
barley, oat, maize, beans, le n til and potatoes above a specified quan tity  they
possessed u n til 31st May 1945 fo r communal use. A fte r  the b r ie f in it ia l period
when the ca lcu la tion o f de livery quotas was based on the size o f sown area, the
base was changed in 1946-47 to  the arable area o f land. In 1945-46 the de live ry
obligations, in kg/sown cadastral yoke, according to  the size o f holding were in
force and are shown in Table 5 .4 .^ ^
It  can be seen from  the table tha t some progressiv ity had already
prevailed from  year 1945/46; soon holdings w ith  less than 1 cad. yoke were
to ta lly  exempted from  de livery obligations. The decree which introduced the
system of compulsory deliveries, however, came under heavy c r itic ism  from  the
(81)dw arf and smallholders. Their c ritic ism  was not so much d irected against its
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TABLE 5.4 -  Compulsory delivery quotas in force in 1945/46
Sown area cad. 
yoke bread
grain
delivery quotas
barley, maize 
oat
in kg. 
potato m ille t
i- 2 200
1 - 1 - - 50 500 -
0 - 1 - - - - 50
1 -  2 . - - 100 1000 80
0 - 2 25 40 - - -
above 2 - - - 1500(a) -
2 - 4 50 60 150 - -
2 - 5 - - - - 100
above 5 - - - - 150
4 - 6 60 80 200 - -
6 - 8 60 100 250 - -
above 8 - - 300 - -
8 - 1 0 100 120 - - -
10 -  20 120 140 - - -
20 -  30 150 170 - - -
30 -  50 200 200 - - -
above 50 250 200
(a) in be tte r potato growing d is tr ic ts  o f the country 2 0 0 0  kg.
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princ ip le  but because they claim ed the decree was biased against the new land
owners, who were la rge ly  in the less than 10 cad. yokes category. They also
complained tha t the quota rates were not progressive enough and they objected
to  the use o f the same average yie ld  figures as the base fo r  sm all and large
(82)holdings. The widespread discontent seems lik e ly  to  have played a part in the
revision o f the decree when, at the tim e  o f the currency stab ilisa tion, the lower
lim it  o f holdings exempted from  delivery obligations was raised to  5 cad. 
(83)yokes. Every fa rm er, however, s t i l l  had to  pay the land-tax, introduced in the
summer o f 1945. In it ia lly  th is land-tax was payable in money (pengo) but la te r i t
was changed to  wheat: 1 kg. fo r every gold crown (aranykorona) o f net income
per cadastral yoke, w ithou t progressivity regarding the size o f h o ld in g / ^  It  ws
planned tha t in 1947/48 the exemption l im it  would be raised, f ir s t  to  8 and then
to  15 cad. yokes, bu due to  the adverse c lim a tic  conditions resu lting  in bad
(85)harvests in successive years th is never m aterialised. The ra ising o f the lower
lim it  gave the sm all holders access to  a much more favourable free  m arket
ou tle t fo r th e ir produce instead o f the low o ff ic ia l prices, which increased th e ir
incomes. The imposed de live ry system, however, fo r  the o ther farm ers meant
reduced incomes, hindering the necessary cap ita l accum ulation in the
countryside. A  s ign ifican t increase in de livery burden fo r  the riche r farm ers,
however, came w ith  the in troduction  o f a new de live ry quota system fo r  year
1946/47. In tha t year farm ers w ith  20 to  50 cad. yokes o f arable land had to
de liver 30 - 60 per cent and those w ith  above 50 cad. yokes 400 per cent more of
certa in  major crops than e.g., farm ers w ith  between 5 and 20 cad. yokes of
arable land. In the fo llow ing  economic year, 1947/48, quota rates were fu rth e r
increased, as i f  to  foreshadow things to  come. Moreover, s ig n ifica n tly  higher
grain de live ry quotas were fixed  in tha t year fo r  holdings above 15 cad. yokes o f
(86)arable land. S im ilar more progressive rates had also been in troduced fo r  the 
general taxes payable by a ll holdings. More about these in a moment. The
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compulsory de live ry  system, contrary to  expectations and promises, ra ther than 
being an emergency measure fo r  the reconstruction period featured prom inently 
among agrarian policies u n til 1956. In addition to  regulating production the 
system was designed w ith  a p o lit ica l aim in mind, to  put in to  e ffe c t, cautiously, 
certa in  soc io -po litica l principles. In th is  respect, the HCP -  always using the 
national economic crises as an excuse -  ensured tha t the compulsory de livery 
system contained an element o f 'cap ita lis t re s tr ic tio n ' in the coutryside from  
early 1945 on. This was most e ffe c tiv e ly  expressed in the steeply progressive 
d is tribu tion  o f burden which in the case o f the richer farm ers fu lf i l le d  the 
function  o f 'cap ita l draining'.
La ter, the exaggerated industria l growth policy pursued a fte r  1949 put a 
heavy demand on agricu lture  to secure at low cost the requirements o f industria l 
sectors. The delivery system was tightened and expanded beyond economic 
ra tio n a lity . Moreover, the steeply increasing progressivity o f the system, 
especially a fte r  1950, featured as one o f the most e ffe c tive  instrum ents in 
'dislodging' th  riche r peasants, or 'kulaks' as they became labelled, leading to  the 
liqu ida tion  o f the m a jo rity  o f kulak holdings. A fu ll discussion on the 
quan tita tive  and q ua n tita tive  aspects o f the system's evolution, and its  
consequences, is postponed u n til la te r.
Another method o f ex trac ting  produce from  the farm ers, in a sense a
part o f the compulsory de livery system, was the 't ith e ' (dezsma), which operated
on a ll holdings irresepctive o f size. I t  was a sort o f due paid fo r custom -grinding
(Vamorles) o f bread-grain, barley, maize etc. Farmers w ith  's e lf-s u ffic ie n t'
ce rtifica te s  could only obtain a pe rm it to  custom -grind fo r  th e ir  own
consumption -  up to  a lim it ,  o f curse, stipu lated by quota-rations per head ; i f
they f irs t  delivered a specified 'dezsma' quota to  state designated co llec ting
points. The quotas were fixed  as fo llows: one-quarter fo r bread grain, one-th ird
(87)fo r oil-pressing, one-tenth fo r barley and maize. I t  meant th a t a fa rm er
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wishing to  custom -grind 100 kg o f bread-grain had to  surrender 25 kg to  the
state; or, to  put i t  in another way, to  custom-grind the rations fo r 4 persons
meant the de live ry o f a f i f t h  portion to  the state -  instead o f eight he had to
(88)load 10 quintals on to  his ca rt. The ’dezsma*, o f course, d isproportionate ly
a ffec ted  the sm aller farm ers, causing great resentment. And when i t  was
reduced by 30 per cent in 1946/47 and 40 per cent in 1947/48, compared w ith
(89)1945/46, i t  brought considerable re lie f fo r  them. Nevertheless, i t  remained 
extrem ely unpopular w ith  th  peasants, who perceived i t  not as a 'grind ing fee* but 
as an ex tra  tax.
There was another im portan t sphere o f economic po licy measures which 
adversely a ffected  the development and operation o f peasant holdings. This was 
the d is tribu tion  o f d irec t 'rates and taxes' (kozterhek), w ith  a progressive scale 
according to  the size o f holding. Compared to  1938, 'rates and taxes' 
(kozterhek) in 1948 fo r a holding o f 10 to  15 cad. yokes w ith  good q ua lity  land 
giving 20 gold-crowns of net income/cad. yoke increased by 50 per cent, fo r  25
cad. yokes by nearly 200 per cent, while on holdings above 25 cad. yokes the
o c n  * ( 9 0 )incease was 250 per cent.
In addition to  the foregoing, the position o f the individual peasant was
also considerably a ffected  by the in troduction  o f a form  o f planning w ith  the
(91)Three-Year Plan. The Three Year Plan was em inently not a plan o f
ag ricu ltu ra l development. I t  was geared, in essence, to  the reconstruction  and 
development o f key industria l sectors, e.g., mining, heavy industry, transport and 
power supply etc., and agricu lture  was conspicuously neglected. The neglect o f 
agricu ltu re  was not, o f course, accidental but a concious policy. For ag ricu ltu re  
the Plan was, above all, an instrum ent o f compulsion to  secure the food and raw 
m ateria l requirements o f industry, to  enable the regime to  in it ia te  a rapid 
industria lisa tion programme at the expense o f agricu lture . The Plan, apart from  
certa in  industria l crops, fa iled to  in it ia te  a process o f change to  more in tensive
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methods o f farm ing, which as discussed earlie r, was regarded by experts as a
necessary concom m ittant o f the land re form . The more or less com partm ental
approach to agricu ltu re  prevented the ocrrection o f the maladjustments already
in evidence between agricu ltu re  and the other sectors o f the economy. Capita l
investment in agricu ltu re  is a precondition o f improved farm  technology, to
increase p roduc tiv ity  both per acre and per capita. O f the to ta l 6585 m illion
Forin ts, allocated to  finance the Plan's investment programme, however, only
912 m illion  Forints, i.e., 13.9 per cent, according to  o f f ic ia l sources, and only 9
per cent according to  U.N. figures, was apportioned to  serve d ire c tly  ag ricu ltu ra l
(92)development. A large proportion o f the so-called ag ricu ltu ra l investments 
were, in fac t, intended fo r  the reconstruction and construction o f plants 
m anufacturing ag ricu ltu ra l machinery and fe rtilise rs , fo r  e le c tr if ic a tio n  and 
build ing o f schools and roads in ru ra l areas, something to  which at th a t tim e, in
view o f the urgency o f o ther ag ricu ltu ra l needs, i t  was questionable to  give such
high p r io r ity . Although the budgeted figures were revised upwards w ith in  the 
period, due to in fla tiona ry  price movements i t  meant very l i t t le  in rea l term s fo r 
agricu lture . G reater financ ia l help in th is most c ruc ia l period could have 
changed the face o f agricu ltu re  and would have also ensured the fu lf ilm e n t o f 
the Plan's objective, stated c learly  in no uncertain term s that:
the purpose o f the Three Year Plan is to  establish a 
flouris ing  ag ricu ltu ra l economy and set up a w e ll-to -do  
cultured and contented ag ricu ltu ra l population. This w ill 
be achived by: the rad ica l re fo rm  and in tens ifica tion  o f 
agricu lture  which w ill bring about a m ate ria l
improvement in the standard o f liv in g  o f the fa rm ing
population.(93)
This promise was pa ten tly  not fu lf il le d  by the Plan. Indeed, i t  was not achieved 
w ith in  the period under consideration.
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In addition to  decrees requiring the peasants to  devote a certa in  amount
o f th e ir  land to  the cu ltiva tion  o f specified crops, as discussed earlie r, the
growing o f some produce was brought under more centralised contro l by
specialised agencies under the so-called 'con tractua l purchase' system, which
consisted o f contracts concluded between the individual peasants and centra l
agencies. The system secured the contracting  peasant a guaranteed price fo r  his
product and provided add itina l privileges, such as the supply o f qua lity  seed and
fe rt il is e r  and c red it fa c ilit ie s . In mid-1948 approxim ately 10 per cent o f arable
(94)land was under contractua l cu ltiva tion . I t  was regulated by decrees
according to  which contracts could only be concluded w ith  the permission o f the
M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re , acting on the recommendation o f the National Planning
O ffice . When entering in to  contracts centra l agencies were to give p r io r ity  to
(95)members of 'Farmers' Cooperatives' (Foldmuvesszovetkezet)
D irec t and ind irec t government in tervention in agricu ltu re  had a much 
wider foundation than discussed up to  now. A part from  contro l over labour, 
draught power, s tructure  o f production and land ownership, credits, tax  and price 
policies and state contro l o f trade in specified products, the in fluence o f the 
state was already developing in other im portant areas. A new and revo lu tionary 
feature o f the Three Year Plan was the in troduction  on 20th November 1947, on 
the in itia tive s  o f the HCP, o f the f ir s t  Machine T rac to r Stations (A llam i 
gepallomas). ^ ^  These were owned and operated by the state and th e ir  assets, 
on average 10 to  14 trac to rs  etc., had la rge ly orig inated from  the machinery 
expropriated from  the large estates. They were envisaged, as w ill be discussed 
in de ta il la te r, as the arms of socialied industry in agricu lture . They were, 
ostensibly, set up to  promote more e ffic ie n t, mechanised fa rm ing  and were to 
provide assistance to  small and medium-sized peasant holdings by ploughing th e ir  
land at prices fixed by the government and paid in kind. While in some cases 
these stations may have helped the individual peasants in fa rm ing th e ir  land, on
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the whole, because o f the prevalence o f small s trip  holdings as a result o f the
land re fo rm , and the in e ffec tive  organisation and operation o f the stations, the ir
contribu tion  to  e ffic ie n t fa rm ing  fe ll considerably short o f expectations. Their
early contribu tion , however, cannot be viewed only, or even p rim a rily , in terms
of economic e ffic iency . The real role o f these stations soon became evident
when, together w ith  State Farms - whose development from  1947 was also
stepped up, they were instrum enta l in extending the contro l over ag ricu ltu ra l
production and dim inishing the independence o f the peasantry. Towards the end
o f 1947 the sale o f trac to rs , threshing machines and other large ag ricu ltu ra l
equipment to  p riva te  persons had been prohibited. This guaranteed tha t the
riche r peasants could not s ign ifican tly  increase the number o f machines they
owned, though they could s t i l l  buy second-hand machines. The consolidation and
expansion o f Machine T rac to r Stations started in the spring o f 1948. By the end
(97)of 1948 they numbered 110 w ith  1484 tractors , out o f the to ta l o f 14,400. 
They were seen as essential instruments, f irs t,  to  re s tr ic t and then to  break the 
monopoly o f riche r farm ers over draught power. They played an im portan t 
in it ia l ro le in laying the foundations fo r the socia list transfo rm ation  o f 
agricu lture . Thus, compared to  the Soviet Union, a s ign ifican t d iffe rence  seems 
to  have been tha t the extension o f Machine T rac to r Stations in Hungary 
preceeded the development o f collectives and from  a very early stage they 
became an im portant basis fo r co llectiv isa tion .
State farm s in Hungary played a ra ther lim itd  ro le up to  the end o f 1948, 
being confined, essentially, to  the state or, more accurate ly, 'treasury-owned* 
ag ricu ltu ra l undertakings tha t existed in pre-war Hungary, which had been 
maintained as the mainstay o f modernisation in agricu lture . Before the war, 
apart from  a number o f m ilita ry  establishments -  provid ing the breeding grounds 
fo r some o f the finest horses -  six large and a number o f sm aller c iv ilia n , budget- 
financed, farms were under state contro l. A f te r  1945, only the three
- 284 -
in te rna tiona lly  most famous o f these large state-owned farm s, 'Mezohegyes',
'K isber' and 'Babolna' remained in state ownership and even th e ir  size was
(98)reduced. O f the pre-war to ta l o f 68,000, only 21,000 cad. yokes remained,
the rest was red is tribu ted  to  the peasants. During the land re form , however, in
addition to  these three another 59 and by mid-1948 a fu rth e r 37, state farms,
making a to ta l o f 96, were created. The ir land was large ly obtained from  form er
estates which were not red istribu ted by the re form  but expropriated and kept
in tac t, as w e ll as from  the 'Land Fund', which administered land rem aining from
the resettlem ent programme in the various regions, or land in areas vacated by
peasants o f German ethnic orig in  who were expelled. Thus, in the period up to
1948 there were 99 state farm s occupying an area o f 70,932 cadastral yokes, of
which a re la tive ly  low proportion, 43,470 cad. yokes, was arable land, the rest
being pasture, vineyards, forests and other land. The average size o f these farms
(99)was 716.4 cad. yokes. The to ta l area occupied by them was just over 2000
cad. yokes more than before the war. Their function, according to  the Decree 
which set them up, remained largely as before, i.e., to  introduce new
production methods and to  set an example to  the rest o f agricu ltu re  as large- 
scale 'model' production farms, highly e ffic ie n t and p ro fitab le . They were 
established as finan c ia lly  independent production units, supervised d ire c tly  by 
the C h ie f Departm ent o f State Farms, under the M in is try  fo  A g ricu ltu re . A long 
w ith  p o lit ic a lly  m otivated reasons, i t  was envisaged tha t they would play an 
im portant economic role in solving the country's ag ricu ltu ra l supply problems. 
According to  a report in the middle o f 1946, i t  was estim ated tha t the optim al 
to ta l area needed fo r  state farms, to cope w ith  the newly emerging ag ricu ltu ra l 
tasks, was 380,000 cad. yokes; of th is, 200,000cad. yokes was arable land, 
130,000 cad. yokes reserved fo r animal husbandry and a fu rth e r 50,000 cad. yokes 
fo r other specific  purposes, e.g., fo r ag ricu ltu ra l processing industries, 
experimental stations e t c / 1* ^  Thus the 70,932 cad. yokes towards the end o f
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1948 was less than 19 per cent o f what was considered op tim a lly  necessary fo r 
state farm s to  play th e ir fu ll ecnomic role.
The financ ia l performance o f state farms, especially the newly 
established ones, fe ll short o f the ideals set out in the decree. F inancia lly, 
ra the r than being independent, they became at an early state very much 
'dependent*. Only in terms o f operation did they remain re la tive ly  free. There 
were many problems tha t hindered th e ir e ffic ie n t operation. F irs t, much o f the 
land given to  them had been lying, o ften  fo r long periods, idle, uncu ltiva ted and 
un fe rtilised , which adversely a ffec ted  its  p roductiv ity . Second, many o f the 
newly established farm s received land from  the 'Land Reserve Fund', whose 
im m ediate concern was to  take care o f land which otherwise would have la in 
fa llow  and to  lease it ,  tem porarily , to  companies, institu tions, etc, w ith  the 
result tha t the fu tu re  o f these lands remained undecided, o ften fo r years. Thus, 
they were not looked a fte r properly. Third, disrepair, neglect and shortage of 
draught power, equipment, livestock and buildings added to  the farm s' 
operational d iff ic u ltie s . Fourth, the in te rna l disporportion in land structure , 
re la tive ly  sm all size and dispersed location fu rth e r aggravated th e ir  production 
problems. F ifth , there was a lack o f labour discipline on the workers w ith  high 
wage costs - compared to the national average - and overmanning, while 
management and agronomists recru ited  mainly from  the fo rm er large estates 
were o ften  p o lit ic a lly  not very sym pathetic and perceived th e ir  positions as 
te m p o r a r y . ^ ^  Moreover, like  a ll o ther farm s, they too had been a ffec ted  by 
the compulsory delivery system and were obliged to  deliver specified quotas to 
the state at low prices. It did not come as a surprise then tha t ra the r than being 
se lf-financ ing  and operating as 'model' farm s - as envisaged -  they incurred 
constantly increasing losses. In the economic yer 1946/47 th e ir  debts already 
amounted to  8.2 m illion  Forints. The communist contro lled 'Supreme Economic 
Council', however, in collaboration w ith  the M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re , and despite
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serious parliam entary c r it ic ism , paid th e ir b ills  and provided a fu rth e r 6 m illion 
Forin ts flo a t to  cover any operating loss incurred in fu tu re . The ir economic 
position, despite great hopes, fa iled  to  improve and by the summer o f 1948 
reports were c ircu la ting  re fe rrin g  to  the 'colossal debts' incurred by state farms, 
which by then had lost another 15 m illion  Forin ts on top o f the 6 m illion  already 
p ro v id e d /1* ^  Many experts, and the general public, considered them a great 
burden on state finances, at a tim e  when scarce resources could have been spent 
much more p ro fitab ly . In te rest in pu tting  them on an econom ically more viable 
foundation was expresed by the 'Supreme Economic Council' which, in March 
1947, instructed the M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re  to prepare a d ra ft plan to 
amalgamate them in to more viable units. No report, however, was produced. 
Further debts, however, rekindled in terest and at the Council's meeting in 
October 1947 the question was raised again, but no e ffe c tive  decision was 
t a k e n . E v i d e n t l y ,  fa r too l i t t le  was done during 1945-48 to  solve the 
problems of state farms. Perhaps the most im portant reason lies in the absence 
o f a c lear-cu t and openly stated concept on the part o f the p o lit ic a l parties 
regarding the ro le and fu tu re  o f state farms. W ithout any doubt, sta te  farms 
could have played an im portna t ro le in the post-land re fo rm  period, when 
e ffic ie n tly  function ing  'model' state farm s could have provided the assistance 
needed by many priva te  peasant farms, supplying at least some o f them w ith  
qua lity  seed and livestock, and encouraging fu rth e r ag ricu ltu ra l development. 
Most parties had expressed some in terest in them and agreed on a number of 
aspects o f th e ir im portance fo r the fu tu re . Despite th is degree o f consensus, the 
en tire  question o f state farm s was la rge ly neglected and pushed in to  the 
background and hardly ever mentioned in the agrarian programmes of the 
parties. The communists by th is tim e had, o f course, ample evidence tha t state 
fa rm ing could not im m ediate ly be made the prototype or even an im portan t part 
o f ag ricu ltu ra l organisation. Hence, they did not elevate them to  p r io r ity  status.
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Also they did not wish to  alarm the ag ricu ltu ra l population and believed tha t 
a fte r  the power struggle was decided there would be ample opportun ity  to 
reationalise and se ttle  the question. This, again, was one problem which was 
subordinated, or be tte r ignored, because o f longer-term  s t r a t e g y / * ^  The SDP 
exhibited s im ila r, and ambiguous, sentiments. On the whole, the pa rty  a llocated 
an im portan t role to  state farms, but in term s o f immediae po licy i t  remained 
undecided and in its  p rac tica l approach to  the problems o f agricu ltu re  i t  did not 
wish to  make too great sacrifices at th is  stage, but believed, too, tha t a fte r  the 
power struggle was decided the whole question o f state farm s could be settled 
much more simply and w ith  much less r i s k / * ^  With regard to the other two 
agrarian parties, the SHP and NPP, both had given some lim ite d  ro le to  state 
farm s in the ir programmes. The ir reference to them, however, was so lim ite d  
tha t the extent to  which they saw th e ir importance is d if f ic u lt  to  assess. The 
SHP, o f course, long before the war, had com m itted itse lf on the question o f 
'model' farm s and qua lity  seed, etc., so tha t i t  is possible to say tha t some role, 
much more lim ite d  than any o f the other parties envisaged, had been a llocated to 
state farms. I t  is also true to  say, however, tha t th is question, at th is stage, was 
not high on th e ir agenda as there were much more im portant problems fac ing  the 
party. Hence it ,  too, tended to  neglect the whole q u e s t io n .^ ^  This tendency 
to  'neglect' was, o f course, quite understandable. Since the aim o f the parties 
during th is period was not to  reveal too much o f th e ir stra tegy on sensitive 
issues, but ra ther to  conceal it ,  or ignore them altogether.
In conclusion, i t  can be seen tha t by early 1948, at which tim e 
co llec tiv isa tion  was fa r  from  being o ff ic ia lly  announced, most o f the main 
elements o f contro l soon to  be so w idely used during the co lle c tiv isa tion  drive, 
were already present in agricu lture.
- 288 -
Chapter 5
1. Joseph Held (ed.), The Modernisation o f A g ricu ltu re : Rural
Transform ation in Hungary, 1848-1975, East European Monographs, 
Boulder, dist. by Columbia U n ivers ity  Press, New York, 1980, pp.361-362
2. Sandor Szakacs, A Nepi Demokratikus Agrarfe ilbdes kezdetei, 
Magyarorszagon 1945-48, Bp. Akadem iai Kiado, 1971, p.96
3. See f ile  on Zoltan T ildy, la te r to  become the 'President o f the Republic', 
In s titu te  o f Party H is to ry  Archives, (hereafer c ited  P.I. Archives), 
285/2-8, A F liggetlen Kisgazda es Polgari Part program m tervezete
4. D. W arriner, Land Reform  in Princip le and P ractice , O xford, Oxford 
U n ivers ity  Press, 1964, p.14
5. Bela Fazekas, Mezogazdasagunk a felszabadulas utan, Bp. Mezogazdasagi 
Kiado, 1967, p.44
6. Ferenc Erdei, 'Agrarfe jlbdesiink a felszabadulas utan', Kozgazdasagi 
Szemle, No.12, 1965, p.415
7. Peter Szakal,, 'A magyar mezogazdasagi termeles fejlodese 1950-1956 
kozott'. A Magyar Tudomanyos Akademia Kozgazdasag Tudomanyi 
In tezet Kozlemenye, N o.16, 1961, p.3
8. Ivan T. Berend - Gyorgy Ranki, A magyar gazdasag szaz eve, Bp. 
Kossuth, 1972, p.243
9. Peter Veres, A paraszti jbvendb, Bp. Sarlo, 1948, pp.16-17
10. Ivan T. Berend - Gyorgy Ranki, A magyar gazdasag ... op .c it., p.238
11. Ibid., p.242
12. Lewis Fischer - Philip  Uren, The New Hungarian A g ricu ltu re , M cG ill- 
Queen's U nivers ity  Press, Montreal and London, 1973, p.30
13. A Magyar Kommunista Part Parasztprogrammja. Tervezet a
mezogazdasag helyzetenek jav itasara, (The Peasant programme o f the 
Hungarian Communist Party: Plan fo r the improvement o f agricu ltu re), 
bp. 1946. Szikra, pp.3-4
14. A Kozdazdasag Evkonyve (Yearbook o f the Economy), Bp. 1947, p.105
15. Jozef Takaes, Uj agrarpo litika  a magyar demokraciaban, Bp. Nepszava, 
1945, p.30
16. Imre Kovacs, A g ra rpo litika i fe lada tok, Bp. M iszto tfa lus i, 1946/47, pp.33- 
34
17. Peter Veres, A paraszti jovendb, ... op .c it., p . l l l
18. Imre Kovacs, A g ra rp o lit ika i, ... op .c it., p.35
-  289 -
19. This could not in re a lity  be protrayed as a genuine 'coa lition ', i t  was
more an in te r-p a rty  agreement based exclusive ly on the struggle fo r
positions
20. A Magyar Kommunista Part Parasztprogrammja ... op .c it., p.2
21. Ibid., p.3
22. Ibid., p .7-8
23. Ibid., p.10
24. As is well known, Lenin modified considerably the orthodox m arxist
doctrine on agricu lture , fo r s tr ic t ly  p o lit ica l reasons. Marx thought tha t 
the small peasant holdings would not in the long-term  stand up against 
com petition o f large estates, fo r only the la tte r  could a ffo rd  the
investments required fo r  the modernisation o f production methods.
Marxian doctrine also had a great disadvantage o f making i t  impossible 
fo r  the workers' parties, inspired by it ,  to  exp lo it the discontent o f 
smallholders.
25. Lenin's decision to  support the economic demands o f the peasants in the
hope of securing th e ir  p o lit ica l support did not im ply tha t he became 
converted to  the revisionist thesis o f the v ia b ility  o f smallholdings. He 
re jected as illusory the view, according to  which a system of
smallholdings could be established on the ruins o f feudalism. His answer
to  Kautsky, who in 1918, charged him w ith  deviating from  Marxism was:
"The proletarians said to the peasants: we shall help you 
reach 'ideal' capita lism , fo r equilaterian land tenure is 
the idealisation o f capitalsm by the small producer. A t 
the same tim e, we shall prove to  you its  inadequacy and 
the neccessity o f passing to  the cu ltiva tion  o f the land 
in common."
V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol.3, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
Moscow, 1960, p.458
In other words, Lenin wanted f irs t  o f a ll to  win the peasants as his allies. 
Then, he thought once his party was in power i t  would be easy to  steer 
the peasantry towards co llec tiv isa tion  by means o f the COOPERATIVE 
(stress is mine) movement. I t  must be borne in mind at a ll tim es tha t the 
Hungarian Communist Party was, and remained, a M arx is t-Len in is t 
party!
26. Ferenc Erdei, A foldhoz ju ta to tt  parasztsag sorsa, Bp. 1947 and
Ferenc Donath, 'A  fa lu  szocialista fejlodesenek kerdesei', Tarsadalm i 
Szemle, February, 1949
27. P.I. Archives 283-1/254, A Szocialdemokrata Part program tervezete a 
fbldmuvesnep helyzetenek megjavitasara es a mezogazdasagi term eles 
fejlesztesenek elomozditasara
The 'Programme' is w ithout a date, but assumed to  have been d ra fted  in 
the f irs t months o f 1947, fo r the spring General Elections.
- 290 -
28. Ibid., Chapter 2, Section 1 o f the ’programme’
29. Ibid.
I t  proposed to  establish a universal 'land register' tak ing  in to  account 
c lim a tic , soil, ra in fa ll and working conditions, then to  d ra ft a ra tiona l 
production plan, according to  local conditions, w ith  special a tten tion  
paid to  exports
30. Matyas Rakosi, Kovetkezo Lancszem, in 'Ep itjuk a nep orszagat', Bp. 
1949, Szikra, p.64
31. F iiggetlen Kisgazda Part P o lit ika i es Gazdasagi Ta jekozta to , No. 29, Bp. 
18th November 1947, pp.9-10
32. P.I Archives, 285/2-7, 'A fiiggetlen  Kisgazda es Polgari Part 
program m tervezete’; P.I. Archives 285/2-8, Ferenc Nagy, M it ke ll tudni 
a F iiggetlen Kisgazda, Foldmunkas es Polgari P a rtro l? K iskate.
33. P.I. Archives 285/1-40
34. P.I. Archives 295/2-7, K iskate ... op .c it., Section 32
35. Im re Kovaes, A g ra rpo litika i fe ladatok ... op.c it., and Peter Veres: A 
paraszti jovendo ... op.cit.
36. A Kozgazdasag Evkonyve, 1947, op .c it., p.105
37. Szabad Nep, 18th October 1956; Kozgazdasagi Szemle, No. 11-12, 1956,
p.1286 and no. 7, pp.546 and 711
38. See Chapter 3.1 pp. 204-211
39. Bela Fazekas, A mezogazdasagi term eloszovetkezeti mozgalom 
Magyarorszagon, Bp. Kossuth, 1976, pp.20-21
40. Ferenc Nagy, The struggle behind the iron cuta in, M acM illan, 1948,
pp.1 1 2
41. Bela Fazekas, Mezogazdasagunk a felszabadulas ... op. c it . ,  p.45
42. In 1946/47 the supply o f natura l fe rtilise rs  was 64 per cent, the
nitrogeneous fe r t il is e r  28 per cent, the phosphateous fe r t il is e r  3.5 per 
cent o f the quantity  used per cad. yoke in 1938/39
Ivan T. Berend, U jjaepites es nagytoke e llen i hare, Bp. Kozgazdasagi es 
Jogi Konyvkiado, 1962, p.269
43. Sandor Szakacs, Foldosztas es agrarfejlodes a magyar nepi
demokraciaban, Bp. Kozgazdasagi es Jogi Konyvkiado 1964, p.100
44. Bela Fazekas, A mezogazdasagi term eloszovetkezeti ... op .c it., p.21
45. Ferenc Nagy, The struggle behind .... op .c it., pp.257-258
46. Ivan T. Berend, U jjaepites es a nagytoke ... op .c it., p.269
- 291 -
47. Bela Fazekas, Mezogazdasagunk a felszabadulas ... op .c it., p.46
48. Bela Fazekas, Mezogazdasagi term elbszovetkezeti ... op .c it., p.22
49. Bela Fazekas, Mezogazdasagunk a felszabadulas ... op .c it., p.48
50. Ivan T. Berend - Gyorgy Ranki, A magyar gazdasag ... op .c it., p.243
51. Bela Fazekas, Mezogazdasagi term elbszovetkezeti ... op .c it., p.23
52. Ivan T. Berend - Gyorgy Ranki, A magyar gazdasag ... op .c it., p.241
53. Gyorgy Kemeny, Economic Planning in Hungary 1947-1949, Royal 
Ins titu te  o f In te rna tiona l A ffa irs , London, 1952, p.49
54. In 1946/47 e.g., only 45 per cent o f the 1938/39 amount o f ag ricu ltu ra l 
products were, in one fo rm  or another, marketed while the consumption 
o f peasants, as percentage o f the sum to ta l o f incomes, increased from  
the figu re  o f 38.1 per cent in 1938/39 to  55.1 per cent in 1946/47. This 
im plies tha t food consumption o f the agricu ltu ra l population was about 
80-85 per cent o f pre-war level, while the agricu ltu ra l production was 
s t i l l  approxim ately 40 per cent lower than before the war
Sandor Szakacs, Foldosztas es agrarfejlbdes, ... op.c it., p. 148
55. I t  was decided tha t 1 pengo = 3 Forints. But on average ag ricu ltu ra l
prices instead o f being m ultip lied by 3 were m ultip lied  by 2.0-2.5, while 
the m u ltip lie r fo r industria l prices was 6.0. Further com plications also 
arose from  the application o f d iffe ren tia ted  m ultip lie rs  fo r  ag ricu ltu ra l 
prices, but in a ll cases they were below 3.
Imre Kovacs, A g ra rpo litika i fe ladatok ... op .c it., p.42
56. Ferenc Nagy, The struggle behind ... op.c it., p.256
57. Szabad Nep, 23rd September 1946
58. Ivan T. Berend - Gyorgy Ranki, A magyar gazdasag ... op .c it., p.236
59. Im re Kovacs, A g ra rpo litika i fe ladatok ... op .c it., pp.44-45
60. Ferenc Donath, Demokratikus fo ld re fo rm  Magyarorszagon 1945-1947,
Bp. Akadem iai Kiado, 1969, p.375
61. Sandor Szakacs, Foldosztas es agrarfejlbdes ... op .c it., p.99
Industry in July 1947 was granted a c red it o f 505.44 m illion  Forin ts, and 
the to ta l fo r the corresponding period was 2654,89 m illion  Forin ts. 
During the f irs t  3 Year Plan, s ta rting  in August, 1947, ag ricu ltu ra l state 
support was about 16 per cent o f the to ta l cred it extended to  industry.
Gyorgy Ranki, Magyarorszag gazdasaga az elso harom eves te rv
idoszakaban, Bp. Kossuth, 1963, p.214
62. I t  was pa rticu la rly  ill-considered in view o f the fa c t tha t the war loss 
in flic te d  on agricu lture  amounted to 10-12,000 m illion  Forin ts, while 
industria l loss was approxim ately ha lf th is amount, i.e., 6 ,0 0 0  m illion  
Forints. Imre Kovacs. A g ra rpo litika i fe ladatok ... op .c it., p.53
- 292 -
63. Szabad Nep, 11th July 1948
64. Sandor Szakacs, Foldosztas es agrarfejlodes ... op.c it., p.135
65. Ferenc Donath, Reform es Forradalom: A magyar mezogazdasag
struk tu ra lis t atalakulasa 1945-1975, Bp. Akademiai Kiado, 1977, p.92
6 6 . Ivan T. Berend -  Gyorgy Ranki, A magyar gazdasag .... op .c it., p.238
67. A Kozgazdasagi Evkonyv, Bp. 1947, pp.449-457
6 8 . Decree No. 171 200/1947. F.M. and fu rth e r restric ted  by Decree No. 171
201/1947. F.M.
69. Rene Dumont, Types o f Rural Economy: Studies in World A g ricu ltu re ,
Methuen, 1957, p.469
70. Sandor Szakacs, Foldosztas es agrarfejlbdes ... op.c it., p.136
71. The proportion o f rented area in re la tion  to  the to ta l area o f holdings 
was 12.1 per cent. Its d is tribu tion  according to  the types o f holdings is 
shown in table below:
Types o f Holdings Rented Area in 96 o f the
(cad. yoke) area o f holdings
0 -  1 5.2
1 - 5 8 .1
5 - 1 0 9.9
10 -  20 14.6
20 - 25 22.7
25 - 35 17.8
35 - 50 10.9
50 - 100 6 .6
above 100 8 .6
Tota l holdings 12.1
Sandor Szakacs, Foldosztas es agrarfejlbdes ... op .c it., p.137
72. The Council was brought in to  existence by Decree No. 12090/1945, 
Magyar Kdzlony (Hungarian Gazette), 9th January 1945
73. Ivan T. Berend, U liaepites es a nagytoke ... op .c it., pp.94-95
Istvan Friss, fA magyar nepgazdasag fejlodese a felszabadulas utan ’, 
Kozgazdasagi Szemle, December 1954, p.279
74. On regulation o f employment see: Decree No. 25100/1945 F.M; 1700/1946 
U.M.; 8430/1946 U.M. in Magyar Kdzlony, 28th October 1945, 30th 
March 1946 and 19th May 1946 respective ly. For the u tilisa tio n  o f 
draught power, see Decree No. 50500/ 1946 F.M., 4100/1946 F.M. and 
72600/1947 F.M. in Magyar Kozlony, 31st October, 1945, 13th March 
1946 and 13th February 1947 respective ly
- 293 -
75. Decree No 25100/1945 F.M. stipulated tha t ha lf o f the to ta l cu ltiva tab le  
area was to  be farmed in the autumn and tha t one-th ird o f area was to 
be allocated to  wheat. The decree also specified tha t peasants w ithout 
equipment or seed or in shortage o f these should report w ithout delay to 
the 'Production Com m ittees' who would arrange assistance. Neglect or 
non-compliance was to  bring the charge o f sabotage and prosecution. 
Magyar Kozlony, 28th and 31st October 1945. See also Decree No. 
4000/1946 F.M. in Magyar Kdzlony, 18th October 1946
76. Decree No. 10060/1945 M.E. specified tha t 8 per cent o f to ta l arable 
land was to  be allocated to  industria l crops. The decree also gave 
detailed instructions fo r  the growing o f industria l crops on d iffe re n t 
types o f holdings. Thus, e.g., a farm  w ith  less than 4 cad. yokes o f 
arable land the area allocated to industria l crops was 6 per cent, while 
one above 25 cad. yokes i t  was 10 per cent. Magyar Kozlony, 31st 
October 1945
77. Those who fu lf il le d  th e ir  contractua l obligation in respect o f e.g., sugar- 
beet, hemp, fla x  etc., were given access to  sugar, hemp or fla x  products. 
A t a tim e  o f great shortage in these products, and many others, these 
were im portant privileges
78. Sandor Szakacs, Foldosztas es agrarfejlbdes ... op.c it., p.135
79. The infamous Jurcsek- system of compulsory delivery, introduced in 
1943, was abolished by Decree No. 11850/1945 K.M., Magyar Kozlony, 
4th May 1945; the new compulsory delivery system was re-established 
through a number o f decree. See fo r years 1945, 1946/47 and 1947/48 
Decrees Nos. 4300/1945 M.E., 10400/1946 K.M. and 100700/1947 K.M. 
respectively
80. Sandor Szakacs, A nepi demokratikus agrarfejlodes ... op .c it., p.107
81. Szabad Nep, 8 th  July 1946
82. Dokumentumok a Magyar Mezogazdasag Tbrtenetebol 1945-1948, 
Forrasok a Magyar Nepi Demokracia Tbrtenetebol, Vol.2., Document 42, 
Bp. Kossuth, 1977, pp.114-117
83. Decree No. 10850/1946, Magyar Kozlony, 3rd August 1946
84. Sandor Szakacs. A nepi demokratikus agrarfejlodes ... op .c it., p.135, 63 n
Gold Crown (Aranykorona) is a unit o f ca lcu la ting the qua lity  o f land. It 
represents the net income obtained from  one cad. yoke expressed in 1875 
value o f money. Since much had changed in the way o f production and 
qua lity  o f land since the middle o f the last century, th is  basis o f 
ca lcu la ting net income is outdated. Since no be tte r method o f land 
ra ting  system had been found this way o f ca lcu la ting net income from  
land is s t i l l  in use today. The national average value o f net income 
obtained from  one cad. yoke is 11 gold crown.
Imre Kovacs, A g ra rpo litika i fe ladatok ... op .c it., p.53
85. Szabad Nep, 6 th  June, 1947
- 294 -
8 6 . Ivan T. Berend, A szocialista gazdasag fejlodese Magyarorszagon 1945- 
1968, Bp. Kossuth, 1974, p.62
87. Sandor Szakacs, A Nepi Demokratikus Agrarfe jlbdes ... op .c it., p.162
8 8 . In re a lity  the fa rm er did not, o f course, put the entire  quan tity  fo r  the
year on his ca rt, because grinding occurred in small 'ra tion -po rtion ' over 
tim e
89. Ibid., p.163
90. Ivan T. Berend, A szocialista gazdasag ... op .c it., p.62
91. The Three Year Plan covered the period 1947-1949, embracing the en tire  
economy. I t  was introduced on 1st August 1947 and aimed to  increase 
investment and industria l production, but i t  consisted o f general 
d irectives and stopped short o f the Soviet model
92. The Hungarian Three Year Plan, Hungarian B u lle tin  (Mimeo), no pub.
date. p.4. For the breakdown o f the 2000 m illion  Forints to ta l, a llocated 
under various headings fo r agricu lture , see Appendix 1. For the UN 
figures, see Economic Survey o f Europe, UN, Geneva, 1949, p.203
93. The Hungarian Three Year Plan ... op.c it., p.4
94. Gyorgy Kemeny, Economic Planning in Hungary: 1947-1949 ... op .c it., 
p.103
95. Szabad Nep, 18th August 1948
Consumer, C red it and M arketing Cooperatives, operating according to  
the Rochdale princip le , had a long h istory in Hungary p rio r to  1945. Some 
o f these cooperatives continued to  function a fte r  the war. A t the same 
tim e, the newly organised 'Farmers’ Cooperatives' began to  sprout a ll 
over the country. A t th is tim e  they dealt w ith  the common use o f 
machines and equipment tha t became available from  the large estates; in 
addition they engaged in m arketing products to  a small extent and in 
re ta iling . They also established th e ir national organisation the ’Nationa l 
Centre o f Cooperatives’. Rezso Nyers: Szovetkezetek a Magyar Nepi 
Demokraciaban, Bp. Kossuth, 1959, pp.55-56
96. On 20th November 1947 the f ir s t  Machine T rac to r Station was set up at 
Kisszallas and in early December, 1948 the 100th at Tard. Hungarian 
news and In fo rm ation  Service: A g ricu ltu ra l News from  Hungary, 9th June 
1950, p.3
97. Bela Fazekas, Mezogazdasagunk a felszabadulas ... op .c it., p.267, p.269
98. Akos Varju, 'Az 1945-evi fo ldb irto k  re fo rm  eredmenyei es je lenegi 
a llapota’, Bp. Valosag, March 1947, p.69
99. Sandor Szakacs, A nepi demokratikus agrarfejlbdes ... op .c it., pp.10-12
100. Decree No. 90770/1945 F.M.
- 295 -
101. Sandor Szakacs, A nepi demokratikus agrarfejlodes ... op .c it., p.31
102. Ibid., p.208
103. Sandor Szakacs, A llam i gazdasagaink helyzetenek alakulasa 1945-1948, 
Bp. Akadem iai Kiado, 1969, pp.45-47
104. Sandor Szakacs, A nepi demokratikus agrarfejlbdes ... op .c it., p.201
105. Sandor Szakacs, A llam i gazdasagaink ... op .c it., p.1 0 0
106. Ibid., p.101
107. Ibid.
- 296 -
Chapter 6: Individual Peasant Agriculture: The Politics
6.1 Ideology and P o lit ica l Intentions o f the HCP
According to  th e ir ideological be lie f every communist regime is
com m itted to  carry ing out the c o lle c tiv isa tio n -o f a g r ic u ltu re .^  As is well
known, the peasantry as a social class never rea lly  f it te d  in to  M arx is t-
(2)Communist ideology. Marx did not know, understand or even like  peasants. He
was un fam ilia r w ith  th e ir s tra tif ic a tio n , considered them as a sack o f potatoes.
In ’The Communist M anifesto’ he put them together w ith  other 'reactionary
elements', e.g., the petty-bourgeoise, artisans and small re ta il traders. They
were looked upon w ith  suspicion and were regarded as the 'shepherds o f the old
s p ir it ’. Marx gave them no role to  play in his vision o f revo lu tion; in m arxist
ideology agricu lture and agricu ltu ra l production were considered more im portant
than the working peasant him self. Marx expected the same sort o f concentration
to  happen in agricu lture  as in industry and believed tha t land would fin a lly  be
taken in to  communal ownership from  a few  hands. Later, co lle c tiv isa tion  is
ju s tifie d  by ideological reference to  Stalin's 'law o f development', which asserts
tha t socialist industria lisation has to  be accompanied by a socia list
(3)transform ation o f the countryside. An independent peasantry, w ith  its  
spontaneous mode o f production, was considered incongruous in an otherwise 
fu lly  planned and contro lled economy. To th is extent the peasantry as a social 
group was predestined to  disappear. Its  status was to  be reduced to  tha t o f 
employed labourer, thereby pu tting  the peasants on to  a s im ila r foo ting  as 
industria l workers. Moreover, the socia list transform ation o f ag ricu ltu re  was 
also to  enable the state, apart from  securing contro l over food supply fo r  the 
rap id ly  growing industria l population, to  drain o f f  the surplus labour tha t existed 
in agricu lture  fo r industria lisation, through the in troduction  o f mechanisation 
in to  large-scale farm ing. F inally, and perhaps most im portan tly , i t  was to  enable
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the state to  squeeze out o f the ag ricu ltu ra l sector, on the cheapest possible 
terms, the economic surplus necessary to  finance rapid and large-scale 
industria lisation; an industria lisation programme such as was envisaged was 
obviously not possible in a system based on small-scale individual farm ing, the 
type generally favoured by the peasants.
The task o f transform ing the 'un-reform ed' Hungarian agricu ltu re , based 
on priva te  property, in to what in fa c t was to  be a m irro r image o f the Soviet 
'kolkhoz* system based on co llec tive  property, must have been viewed by the 
Hungarian communists in 1944/45 as extrem ely d if f ic u lt  i f  not impossible. The 
almost insurmountable opposition such a process was certa in  to  encounter from  
the peasantry had already been sampled in 1919 when just such an experiment 
was attem pted. The general a ttitude  o f the peasants towards co llec tiv isa tion  
had grown steadily worse during the in te r-w a r period when they gained ample 
in form ation on the actual meaning and results o f the Soviet kolkhoz system. The 
in te r-w ar regime in Hungary, concerned about the spread o f communist ideas, 
spared no e ffo r t  in disseminating in fo rm ation  among the peasants regarding the 
nature o f the Soviet co llec tiv isa tion  experiment and the hardships i t  had brought 
upon the Soviet peasant. That the Hungarian peasant 'absorbed' th is in fo rm ation  
is re flected  in Rakosi's speech, delivered to  the C entra l Com m ittee Plenum on 
5th-9th March 1949, when he warned against th is 'm yth ica l' image ingrained in 
the minds o f the Hungarian peasants regarding the Soviet kolkhoz system. He
stated, in te r a lia , tha t the d is trus tfu l a ttitu de  the peasants displayed towards
collectives could only be dispelled by to le ran t and exemplary work. A t tha t tim e 
he said:
co llec tive  fa rm ing symbolizes to  our peasantry not only a 
new way o f fa rm ing but in addition, due to  the te rr ib le
colours in which i t  has ben depicted to  them during the last
two decades, i t  means the things allegedly accompanying it  
like  the communal mess-tin and the tro u g h .^ )
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Moreover, i t  was a d if f ic u lt  task since Hungarian agricu ltu re  in 1945 was much 
more developed than Soviet agricu lture  in the 1920s; its  trad itions were d iffe re n t 
and i t  was much more deeply rooted in p riva te  ownership o f land. D if f ic u lt  it  
may have seemed, nevertheless, there was no doubt in the minds o f the 
communist leadership tha t somehow, at some stage, the transform ation  o f the 
country to  'socialism ' and w ith  i t  the transform ation  o f agricu ltu re  onto a 
socialist base would have to  be accomplished. The very f irs t  ind ica tion o f what 
m ight come appeared as early as September 1944 when, in its  m anifesto 
addressed to  the Hungarian people, the HCP f la t ly  and c learly  asserted tha t:
In the minds of the Hungarian people the Communist P arty  is 
closely iden tified  w ith  the in ten t o f wishing to  establish the 
'd ic ta torsh ip  o f the p ro le ta ria t' ... th is in ten tion the party did 
not and w ill now give up fo r ever! We know, the existence o f 
the Soviet Union proves it ,  tha t the problems of mankind and 
thus also o f Hungarian society can only be solved by 
socialism. For th is  reason, we can never, and never w ill we, 
relinguish the idea o f establishing a Hungarian socia list 
society as our u ltim a te  a im .(5)
Now, tak ing  in to  account the fa c t tha t the HCP's leaders had a very strong 
ideological orien ta tion  and to ta l subservience to  the Soviet Union -  m anifestly 
more so than in most other East European countries -  i t  can safely be assumed 
tha t they meant to  f u l f i l  the above proclam ation and tha t at the same tim e  the 
party regarded the socia list transform ation o f agricu ltu re  as an in teg ra l element 
o f its  concept o f socialism.
A fte r  the war, as shown previously, when, fo r the f ir s t  tim e , the 
opportun ity presented its e lf to  forge ahead w ith  the socialisation o f agricu ltu re , 
the HCP had opted fo r Land Reform and d itr ib u tio n  instead.’ Under the slogan 
'land to  the peasants' the HCP gave the illusion o f being com m ited to  a 
dem ocratic solution to  the agrarian problems. This was in accord w ith , and 
form ed an in tegra l part of, current Soviet and HCP 'general stra tegy ' fo r  working
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towards th e ir u ltim a te  goal o f to ta l power, when conditions became favourable. 
Since, in th e ir view, conditions m ight not be favourable fo r some tim e  - the HCP 
expected the 'coa lition-reg im e ' to  rule longer in Hungary -  perhaps th is  was also 
a reason which influenced the HCP decision to  introduce a Land Reform . In 
order not to  alienate the peasants, indeed hoping to  gain th e ir support, the party 
gave its  ta c it  support fo r the tem porary development o f ind iv idual peasant 
fa rm ing in Hungary. To be sure, i t  was not only contrary to  the HCP's socia list 
ideology but the re form , by the liqu ida tion  o f large ind iv idual farm s, also 
destroyed the fram ework o f large-scale farm ing.
The in teresting question which arises in th is connection is th is: was there 
such an in tention, form ula ted in a precise plan o f 'stra tegy', which fo r ta c tic a l 
reasons, was obviously not made public? U nfortunate ly, available data do not 
perm it a de fin ite  conclusion but the party's actions, its  behaviour towards its 
p o lit ica l adversaries and subsequent statements by senior party  members argue 
fo rece fu lly  tha t this was the goal towards which i t  worked consistently from  the 
o u ts e t .^
Between the end o f 1944 and the spring o f 1945 the HCP was, 
essentially, fu lly  preoccupied w ith  its  own organisational problems in the 
country. Having been in ille g a lity  i t  had to  build a functiona l nationa l network 
and to  establish w ith  other parties its  National Front policy. I t  re -a ffirm e d  tha t 
its  main objective was a free, dem ocratic and independent Hungary, a new type 
o f democracy, a People's Democracy, adm inistered by a government in which all 
the dem ocratic parties were represented. This, o f course, was also in accord 
w ith  the basic 'D eclaration ' drawn-up by the A llied  Powers, which stated tha t 
a fte r the war the countries in the region should establish governments which 
included 'a ll the representatives o f dem ocratic forces'. This was an accepted 
Soviet policy and Rakosi and his colleagues were instructed to  work towards this 
end. The 'Whitsun Conference', in May 1945, the f ir s t  legal gathering o f the party
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since 1919, discussed, in te r a lia , and endorsed the party's coa lition  and power 
sharing policy instead, as many expected, o f procla im ing im m edia te ly the 
'd icta torsh ip  o f the p ro le ta ria t'. In deciding to  adopt th is line i t  was not 
a ltogether w ithout opposition.
There were, w ith in  the party, two rig id  doctrina ire  groups in communist 
parlance 'le ft-oppos ition ' who were not in favour o f the o ff ic ia l line and who 
wanted a tough approach. One group, composed la rge ly o f the 'old guards' o f the 
1919 revolu tion, 'nostalgic' fo r the Hungarian Soviet Republic, was advocating 
the im m ediate assumption o f power. Although somewhat on the periphery, th is 
group was a cause o f some embarrassment to  the party which, precisely because 
o f the lessons o f 1919, wished to  proceed very cautiously and was try in g  to  
project an image o f loya l partner in the coa lition  and dem onstrating its  
eagerness to  partic ipa te  in the national recovery pro ject. A t a ll costs i t  wanted 
to avoid the impression tha t these old revo ltionaries ' ideology was to  be revived 
in 1945. They were too in flex ib le  to  understand the party's ta c tic a l N ational 
Front Policy, which they must have seen as the leadership's 'unprincip led ' 
courting o f brougeois po litic ians. Confined la rge ly to the Trans-Tisza region, the 
influence o f th is group had to  be suppressed. A t the 'Whitsun Conference' and 
la te r also, the party  did not cease to  c r it ic ise  them as 'sectarians', ' le f t -  
deviationists':
those 'le ftish ', 'sectarian' communists who cannot understand 
th is (i.e., the party's coa lition  policy) and stubbornly continue 
th e ir  harm fu l work have no place among the party's ranks.(^)
By dem onstrating its  re jection  o f th is group the party  hoped, also, to  tu rn  th is to
its  own advantage. Soon to  be. branded a '1919 revo lu tionary ' meant harsh
(8)trea tm ent, o ften  exclusion from  the party's ac tiv ities .
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The second group was made up by the indigenous communists, led by 
Laszlo Rajk. While the f irs t  group received wide pub lic ity , the la tte r , being 
uncom fortab ly near to  the locus o f party  power, received none at the tim e. The 
proof o f th e ir  existence only emerged years la te r when Rakosi, addressing the 
Party Academy, on 29th February, 1952, re fe rred  to  this early disagreement. 
Thus:
A t the begninning o f 1945, when our country was liberated 
and a fte r 25 years o f underground a c tiv ity , the HCP was able 
to  enter the p o lit ica l arena legally and openly, we soon
realised tha t the m a jo rity  o f our communists did not
understand the strategy and tac tics  o f our party ... The 
greater part o f those comrades who were not acquainted w ith  
or did not understand our s tra teg ica l plan devised during the 
war, were surprised at such a broad coa lition , composed of 
heterogenous elements, and trea ted  i t  o ften  w ith  antagonism.
How often, during those weeks, were we reproached by good 
comrades: ’th is is not what we expected o f you'. And they 
to ld  us what they wanted ’now tha t the Red Arm y has
liberated us - le t us p ro fit  by th is opportun ity to  restore the
pro le ta rian-d ic ta to rsh ip ’.(9)
Rajk, and his group believed tha t a fte r the war, w ith  Soviet help, the HCP would 
take contro l. They were undoubtedly g reatly  disappointed to learn from  Rakosi 
tha t, fo r a while anyway, they were expected to  work w ith in  the coa lition  and to  
share power. The 'coa lition  policy' created a sharp division in the HCP. Rajk 
argued fo r  an an ti-coa lition  line and pressed fo r the proclam ation o f 'p ro le ta rian - 
d ic ta torsh ip ' w ith  a ll the paraphernalia o f p o lit ic a l and economic concentration 
o f power, including the co llec tiv isa tion  o f a g r ic u ltu re /* ^  probably in a s im ila r 
way as the Yugoslavs nu llified  the coa lition  agreement In Romania and Bulgaria, 
too, where i t  was drawn up by the A llied  Powers, i t  had a short life . But since 
the coa lition  policy orig inated w ith  Stalin, Rajk could do very l i t t le  o ther than 
acquiesce in the o ffic ia l Stalin-Rakosi line. This ideological disagreement was, 
however, w ell concealed from  the public and, unlike in Poland where in tra -p a rty  
debates were conducted w ith  reasonable pub lic ity , the HCP succeeded in
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m aintaining a facade o f near complete un ity . S till, while grudgingly accepting 
the o ff ic ia l line, Rajk continued to display a measure o f im patience w ith  this 
strategy. A t the 3rd Congress o f th  HCP, in 1946 he stated tha t:
we have stopped half-w ay, although we are not sim ply a 
Bourgeois Democracy, nor even a People’s Democracy ... we 
shall shortly get out o f th is  ambiguous situation.(12)
Another group, denying the possib ility  o f the ’d ic ta torsh ip  o f the p ro le ta ria t',
also existed, outside the HCP. Their opposition too was re lated to  the events o f
1919. Composed large ly o f the pre-war Hungarian Populist w rite rs  , th is group
believed tha t Hungary should progress to  socialism by a 'Th ird Road', between
Western and Eastern versions o f democracy. Its programme, which sparked o ff  a
public debate in 1945, was based on the peasant masses led by the in te lligen ts ia
and envisaged a peasant 'revo lu tion ' in which western style social democracy
would be adapted to  the needs o f the peasantry. This group expressed the view
tha t w ith  the fa ilu re  o f the 1919 revolu tion the industria l working-class
movement had fo rfe ite d  its  h is to rica l role and was u n fit to  lead a 'new 
(13)revolu tion '. I t  argued tha t a dem ocratic re fo rm is t alliance o f the NPP and
SDP could prevent the polarisation o f p o lit ica l forces between the communists,
on the le ft ,  and the more conservative section o f the SHP, on the r igh t. I t  was
denounced by the communists, who said tha t such centre-dem ocra tic
(14)consolidation was a 'h is to rica l illusion'. This group's influence on subsequent 
events was neglible, although by its  tra d itio n  i t  influenced the minds o f some 
HCP members, especially those connected w ith  the People's Colleges. I t  is 
worth noting at th is stage tha t the group emerged again as an in flu e n tia l voice in 
the 'P e tro fi C irc le ' during the l956 uprising.
While the party leadership adopted a firm  ideological stand against these 
groups on the theore tica l question o f 'd ic ta to rsh ip  o f the p ro le ta ria t’, i t  had to
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take a position on the form  o f state system there was to  be while the process of
transform ation from  capita lism  to  socialism was completed. Socialism,
whichever way i t  was defined, and whatever elements i t  included, must have
been considered, under Hungarian conditins, as a d istant possib ility  which could
(15)only be achived through a 'transitional* system called 'People's Democracy'. 
This fo rm  o f state system, la te r rad ica lly  redefined, was a sort o f progressive 
bourgeois democracy which re flec ted  the fa c t tha t power was wielded by a 
number o f d iffe re n t social and p o lit ica l groups, and also tha t i t  did not preclude 
the existence o f small-scale priva te  ownership o f land. Unlike in Poland - where 
i t  could be argued tha t th is new idea o f a trans itiona l system m ight have 
represented a serious e ffo r t on the part o f the communists to  evolve a system 
com patible w ith  Polish conditions ra ther than just a 'Trojan Horse' put on record 
in public debates -  in Hungary, th is new concept o f democracy does not seem to  
have represented a serious and sincere be lie f. This was shown by subsequent 
e ffo rts  on the part o f the HCP to develop a system com patible w ith  the d iffe re n t 
conditions in Hungary compared w ith  the Soviet Union. C erta in ly , there was an 
ideological dilem m a here too in respect o f strategy, concerning the form  and 
name o f state system, and the a ttem pt to  find  an ideologica lly acceptable 
in te rp re ta tion  to  f i t  i t  in to  communist theory. But th is  ideological problem did 
not mean tha t the communist leadership, w ith  the possible exception o f Imre 
Nagy, believed in a d is tinc t 'Hungarian Path' to  socialism, w ithou t the 
co llec tiv isa tion  o f agricu lture.
The HCP could, o f course, have proclaimed 'p ro le ta rian d ic ta to rsh ip ' had 
this been Soviet policy; Stalin had d iffe re n t plans. Soviet discouragement o f an 
im m ediate sing le-party system, and the adoption o f a m u lti-p a rty  People's 
Democracy, a coa lition  regime, as a state system, was the stra tegy prepared 
during the war years. Now a va rie ty  o f reasons can be given why th is 
transnational policy was adopted. Both Stalin and Rakosi agreed th a t 1919 had
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(17)le f t  unhappy memories in Hngary among almost a ll social classes. This fa c t 
could not be ignored; they had to  act w ith  circum spection. I t  would seem tha t 
the communists quite seriously believed tha t a fte r the war, w ith  the ’libe ra tion ' 
from  Nazi Germany, and pa rtic ip a tion  in the re-construction pro ject, they would 
make good progress in securing popular support. That th is was a mistaken view 
only transpired la te r. W ith increased popularity and respectab ility  i t  m ight have 
been thought just possible tha t the 'f ig h t fo r socialism ' could be won w ithout 
recourse to  confronta tion, thereby avoiding the disruption, su ffe ring  and 
sacrifices which accompanied 1919, and through which the Soviet Union herself 
had to  go when she proclaimed the d icta torsh ip  o f the p ro le ta ria t. Hence the 
experiment w ith  People's Democracy, a period during which the party  could 
prepare the ground fo r becoming the repository o f sole p o lit ic a l power. A fte r  
a ll, the presence o f the Red A rm y ensured that even i f  th is strategy had fa iled  
an a lte rna tive , a lbe it much more costly and in e ffic ien t, one remained open. This 
line is c learly  re flec ted  by Rakosi, speaking at the HCP's Third Congress, in 
September 1946, when he said tha t:
we have learnt the more elements o f socialism we manage to  
introduce already at the People's Democracy stage, the 
easier and faste r the trans ition  to  socialism w ill become, the 
less sacrifice  and blood i t  w ill demand, and we can save much 
o f the suffe ring through which the Soviet people had to  go 
when they took the road to  s o c ia lis m .^ )
and
only People's Democracy w ill make i t  possible fo r  our 
country, on the road to  social development, to  progress to  
socialism w ithout c iv il war.(19)
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This line o f th ink ing  is also borne out by a speech, delivered by Revai, a leading 
party theoris t, to  the leadership, when he was re-defin ing  the character of 
People's Democracy. He then asserted tha t:
In the f ir s t  phase o f our People's Democracy when the 
struggle was not d irected s tra igh t fo rw ard ly  against 
capita lism  ... we said tha t the People's Demoracy was a 
plebeian, m ilita n t, consistent and popular kind o f bourgois 
democracy. In 1945, when the righ t-w ing  SHP wanted to 
provoke us in to fig h tin g  the election campaign around the 
question 'socialism or bourgeois p riva te  property?' we were 
not mistaken in evading the provocation ... I t  was correct at 
tha t tim e to  stress tha t the issue was not a choice between 
socialism or bourgeois priva te  property but ra ther the 
fo llow ing: should we compromise w ith  the forces o f the old 
system or should we liqu idate them? I t  was correct tha t, in 
the fig h t against big capita l, we did not stress tha t th is was a 
trans ition  in to  the struggle fo r socialism but tha t the 
measures in itia te d  against big cap ita l meant at the same 
tim e  the pro tection  o f small p riva te  properties. I t  was 
correct not to show our cards but o ften  even we fo rgo t tha t 
People's Democracy at th is tim e was more than just a 
plebeian va rie ty  o f bourgois democracy and tha t i t  was a step 
toward the socia lis tic  transition , which contained, even then, 
the elements o f development in to the d icta torsh ip  o f the
p ro le ta ria t.(2 0 )
Between 1945 and the spring o f 1948 the HCP had essentially two very closely
in te r-re la ted  aspirations, towards which its  purposeful e ffo rts  were d irected :
1 . to  execute the dem ocratic transform ation  o f the
country and,
2 . to  create, as rap id ly as circumstances perm itted , the
necessary pre-conditions fo r  the d icta torsh ip  o f the
p ro le ta ria t.
From the very beginning i t  was regognised by the HCP tha t im portan t externa l 
and, mainly, in te rna l constraints existed which had to  be removed before they 
could make a successful, not too disruptive, bid fo r to ta l p o lit ic a l power. One of 
the most im portant external pre-conditins was fu lf il le d  by the presence o f the 
Red Arm y. But there was another constra in t. The A n ti-Fasc is t coa lition  s t i l l
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existed, though at tim es cooperation between the wartim e A llie d  powers was
strained. Even before Y a lta , however, discontent was frequently  expressed by
the Western Powers, and the Romanian and Bulgarian Governments had been
accused o f v io la ting  the sp irit o f the 'D eclaration ' by se tting  up governments
(21)which were not 'representative enough'. The result o f th is was Am erican and 
B ritish  re luctance to  proceed w ith  the negotiations to  lead to  the signing o f 
Peace Treaties. The Soviet Union, responsible fo r Hungary, wanted d ip lom atic  
recognition fo r  Hungary and a Peace T rea try  signed w ithout delay. I t  did not 
wish to  antagonise and endanger its  re la tions w ith  the Western a llies prem ature ly 
especially, as long as B ritish  and Am erican armies were s t i l l  s trongly represented 
in Europe.
Several in te rna l constraints existed also. F irs tly  the party  was
extrem ely weak in the country and it  required tim e and peace to  overcome th is
position. The party, in it ia lly  w ith  a few  hundred followers, had leadership only,
w ithout tra ined cadres and mass membership. Indeed, i t  had two groups o f
leaders, the Muscovites, led by Rakosi, and the indigenous 'home' communists,
led by Rajk, although the locus o f power was w ith  the Muscovites. Secondly,
(2 2 )Hungary was lagging behind its  neighbours , where only le ft-b lo c  parties
partic ipa ted  in the coa lition ; the presence o f a bourgeois party in the Hungarian
coa lition  com plicated the p o lit ic a l process. Th ird ly , the ba ttle  to  gain con tro l o f
the economy, la rge ly in p riva te  hands, w ithout disruption s t i l l  had to  be won. The
operative words here are 'w ithout disruption'; there was a great need fo r  the
quick resumption o f economic ac tiv ities . This was in the in te rest o f the USSR,
which could not help the HCP econom ically to  enable i t  to  consolidate power.
Indeed, the Soviet Union herself, exhausted by the war, needed a ll the reparation
payments, in kind. Fourth ly, contro l over industria l workers was divided between
(23)the HCP and SDP. The frequent clashes o f interests and r iv a lry  between 
these two parties to  gain contro l over the labour movement, achieved u ltim a te ly
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by the fo rce fu l merger o f the tw o parties, presented serious obstacles to  the
extension o f the ’dem ocratic revo lu tion1. Influence over the peasantry was even
more fragmented, w ith  the HCP’s share fa ir ly  negligble. A lthough there were a
number o f ’fe llow  trave lle rs ' planted in the leadership o f both NPP and the SHP,
the NPP, activa ted  large ly by communist support, needed tim e to t ry  to
counteract the ru ra l support o f the SHP e ffe c tive ly . F ifth ly , although HCP
contro l over the police, including the secret police, was to ta l, especially a fte r
the appointment o f Rajk as M in ister o f the In te rio r in early 1946, the struggle
fo r contro l over the Armed Forces s t i l l  had to  be won. F ina lly , the HCP was
fu lly  aware o f the fa c t tha t the re-construction o f the war-damaged country
(24)would require much greater energies tha t the party could provide on its  own.
From the foregoing, the conclusion regarding the real intensions o f the
Soviet Union, and subsequently the strategy o f the HCP, is evident. F irs t,
determ ination to  secure Hungary in the Soviet sphere o f influence: th is  is fu rth e r
confirm ed by Ambassador Pushkin's revela tion to  A n ta l Ban o f the SDP, tha t 'we
have shed our blood fo r  Hungary and we do not want to  loosen our grip on her’. 
(25) Secondly, the fa c t tha t the fin a l goal was to  become the ru ling  party  can 
be fu rth e r confirm ed by the statements o f leading party o ffic ia ls . Thus Zoltan 
Vas, a senior party member belonging to  Rakosi's Muscovite entourage, in his 
memoirs, discussing his a ttitude  at tha t tim e, stated tha t:
we were aware tha t the forthcom ing tasks o f communists 
should be determ ined along the fo llow ing  line -  even i f  
fo rm a lly  we were not the ru ling  party, in p ractice  i t  would 
need a few years at the most, not even tha t perhaps, and we 
would be. U n til then, u n til th is came about, we communists 
were already and would continue to  be the m otive fo rce  in 
the National Independence Front.(26)
Furthermore, in a recent in terv iew , Erno Gero, one o f the most senior o f the 
famous 'foursome', and second to Rakosi, is rumoured to  have said th a t when he
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and Rakosi returned to  Hungary from  the Soviet Union, in February 1945, i t  was 
w ith  the :
in ten tion  o f transform ing Hungary in to  a communist state, on
the Soviet model w ith  which we became fa m ilia r in
Moscow.(27)
So, tha t there was a plan is evident. But what is, perhaps, imponderable is the 
question o f how long a trans itiona l period did the party antic ipate. One piece o f 
evidence on th is question, as noted earlie r, was provided by Zoltan Vas, who 
antic ipated tha t the trans ition  would take 'a few  years at the most, not even 
tha t, perhaps’. In re a lity  i t  took the HCP about a year and a ha lf to  com plete 
the process. I t  is probable tha t a longer period o f trans ition  than tha t was 
envisaged. Some evidence tends to  indicate tha t perhaps even the Soviet Union, 
S talin h im self, did not foresee precisely the ra te  o f 'developments’ during this 
period. I t  is possible tha t the exclusion o f communists, on the one hand, from  
West European governments and/or o f the in e ffe c tive  B ritish  and Am ericn 
representation on the A llied  Contro l Commission in Romania and Bulgaria, on 
the o ther hand, were in fluen tia l and encouraging factors. S ta lin, and 
consequently the Muscovite HCP leadership, expected greater opposition from  
the Western A llie d  Powers regarding the sovietisation o f Hungary and expected 
the 'coa lition-period ' to  be longer. Also, the unexpectedly smooth and very 
favourable progress the party had achieved, w ith in  a very lim ite d  tim e , in its e lf 
accelerated the process and shortened th is trans itiona l period. I t  seems tha t 
Church ill's 'Iron C urta in ' speech at Fulton on 5th March 1946 im pelled S ta lin  to  
accelerate the consolidation o f his western neighbours. The HCP was most 
probably instructed to  in tensify  its  bid fo r to ta l power. This is confirm ed by 
Rakosi's rem inder at the CC meeting o f the HCP, on 17th May 1946, tha t:
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f ir s t  i t  was necessary to  restra in  hotheads who advocated 
instant socialism and a Soviet Republic, but the tim e  had 
come to  remind our party  and the working class tha t we are
also socialists.(28)
It  would seem tha t in terna tiona l dimensions were no longer regarded as a main 
constra in t. The fa c t, however, tha t G ottw a ld  in Czechoslovakia, even in the 
summer o f 1947, seemed to  believe tha t they could partic ipa te  in the 'M arshall 
Plan' tends to suggest tha t discussions were s t i l l  not finalised. I t  would seem 
almost ce rta in  tha t a cruc ia l decision to  speed up po lit ica l and economic 
transform ation  was taken at the founding meeting o f the Com inform  at 
Szklarska Poreba in Poland, in September 1947.
From a ll the foregoing, i t  w^ld seem clear enough tha t the whole issue of 
ideology was barely more than a ta c tic a l smoke screen to  put the opposition 
parties, and the peasants, at ease. Strategy prevailed over doctrina ire  
considerations, which were relegated, fo r a while, to  the background. The 
decision to  by-pass the question o f co llec tiv isa tion  was not re la ted  to  any 
ideological dilemma. The main reason why the party did not go ahead w ith  it  
then and opted fo r re fo rm  was because i t  considered, quite co rre c tly , tha t, 
f irs t ly ,  the inevitable dislocation would have impeded the country's economic 
recovery which was im portant fo r  a ll parties, but pa rticu la rly  v ita l fo r  the 
popularity  o f the HCP, in charge o f ecnomic recovery. The a lte rna tive  would 
have jeopardised the party's p o lit ic a l consolidation. Secondly, by being w illin g  to 
postpone co llec tiv isa tion  the communists also avoided the bloody violence which 
would have undoubtedly followed such a measure. Such an occurence, in view of 
the Peace T reaty  negotiations s t i l l  in progress would have led to  prem ature open 
Russian in te rven tion  in Hungary thereby creating perhaps more than just an 
embarrassing in ternationa l s ituation. I t  was also clear to the HCP th a t i t  was 
not possible to  secure the required con tro l over the peasants and enable the 
communist leadership to  subject them to  its  grandiose industria lisa tion  plan
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through d irec t confron ta tion  im m ediate ly a fte r the war, but only through a 
process o f slow suffocation. These were, i t  would appear, some o f the 
considerations why Rakosi's 'moderate' and 'gradual' policy, in itia te d  by the 
Russians, was given a short, but v ita l, run. In the fie ld  o f agricu ltu re  its  main 
purpose was to re-assure the sceptica l peasants, r ig h tly  considered by the 
communists as the most problem atic section o f society, th a t p riva te  farm ing, 
w ith in  the conceptual fram ew ork o f 'People's Democracy' was a genuinely 
acceptable a lte rna tive  to  the HCP.
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6.2 The L iquidation o f Peasant P o lit ica l Opposition
A fte r  the war and the land re form , im portant changes had come about in
the social make-up and party po litics  in Hungary. The large landowning class
disappeared com plete ly and many o f the industria lis ts le f t  the country, some
never to  re tu rn . Those who decided to  remain soon became the ta rge t, to
varying degrees, o f the post-war p o lit ic a l parties, especially the HCP which
aimed to  l im it  th e ir  power through governmental con tro l and gradual
nationalisation. The fo rm er 'middle-class* stra ta , many o f whom were closely
associated w ith  the previous adm in istra tion, the m ilita ry  and the police services,
lost th e ir  influence. The c iv il service remained functiona l but were allowed to
operate only under new conditions o f service and w ith  the ir s u ita b ility  fo r o ffic e
closely vetted. The artisans and re ta il trade stra ta  were also adversely a ffected ,
p a rtly  owing to  the to ll taken by Jewish regulations and, o f course, H itle r 's
Germany and the war itse lf. In the early period, some of the small entrepreneurs
did financ ia lly  qu ite  w e ll as a result o f lim ita tions  placed on the big industria lis ts
by the government. The in te lle c tua l s tra ta , disillusioned both w ith  fascism and
the war, having lost h is to rica l perspective, became more like  passive observers
o f events; many o f them, unemployed and com plete ly w ithdrawn from  public life ,
took the posture o f 'w a it and see'. A fte r  the com pletion of the land re fo rm , the
landownership structu re  rad ica lly  changed the social p ro file  o f agricu ltu re . The
place o f the large land-owning class was taken by the numerous land-owning
peasantry, especially in the 5-10 cad. yokes category, which increased
s ign ifican tly  while the agrarian p ro le ta ria t was reduced by 300,000. Whatever
was claimed fo r the 'leading role o f the industria l working class', measured by its
size alone i t  was ce rta in ly  less in fluen tia l a p o lit ic a l force than the peasantry.
The number in m anufacturing industry was 289,000 in 1938, reaching a peak o f
329,000 in 1943, a fte r  which i t  declined and even in the summer o f 1946 it  was
(29)lower than in 1938, at 225,000 Thus, a rapid increase in the size o f industria l
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labour force, to  'lead the working class', became an im portant p o lit ic a l as w ell as 
economic objective o f the workers' parties. But the problem was which o f the 
tw o main workers' parties, the SDP or the HCP, was to  'speak fo r  the workers'. 
H is to rica lly , both parties believed tha t they were pre-ordained fo r  th is role. 
Thus, the ensuing period brought about a ba ttle , both from  'above' and 'below', to  
gain con tro l over the workers. The peasantry represented the largest section o f 
society, but they were s tra tif ie d . Most had no sk ill and experience in p o lit ic a l 
a ffa irs . Educationally and cu ltu ra lly  below the national average, the influence 
o f the church, especially the C atho lic Church, remained strong not only among 
the peasants but more generally in ru ra l areas. Consequently, the s tra tif ie d  
peasantry sought p o lit ica l representation fo r  its  interests, more or less, in a ll 
p o lit ic a l parties, to  d iffe re n t degrees, form ing the 'Independence Front'. 
Therefore, the question 'who speaks fo r the peasantry' u ltim a te ly , who gains 
th e ir allegiance as a whole became, perhaps, o f even greater p o lit ic a l 
im portance than the ba ttle  fo r the workers.
Before looking very b rie fly  -  w ithout any claim  to  completeness -  at the 
features o f the p o lit ica l parties pa rtic ipa ting  and moulding post-1945 p o lit ic a l 
developments, some general observations are in order. F irs t the A llie d  C ontro l 
Commission perm itted  the operation o f dem ocratic parties only and i t  strong ly 
considered the communists as one. Second, although most o f the main 
partic ipants in the post-1945 p o lit ica l scene were opposition parties from  the 
pre-war era, th e ir  structure  and p o lit ic a l alignment had changed, in some cases 
s ign ifican tly . Th ird ly , o rig ina lly  the 'Hungarian National Independence F ron t' was 
composed o f 5 parties, the HCP, SDP, SHP, NPP and 'Bourgeois D em ocratic  
Party (PDP); the PDP, perhaps the most righ t wing party, was soon 'squeezed' out 
o f the 'Independence Front'.
The narrow po lit ica l base and low membership o f the HCP was noted 
earlie r. I t  was the f irs t  party to  begin organisational a c tiv itie s  and by
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ind iscrim inate  re c ru iting  it  rap id ly bu ilt up membership from  some 30,000 in 
February 1945 to  150,000 by May and 500,000 by O c to b e r /* ^  I t  was helped 
grea tly  by the fa c t tha t i t  was the only p o lit ica l party, at the opening stages, 
which knew what i t  wanted, had a programme, an ideology and an e ffe c tive  
model o f organisation and operation which proved to  be a great asset. The party 
could cla im  some nominal and uneven influence among the peasants, especially 
concentrated in the Trans-Tisza region, where i t  was strongly challenged by the 
NPP. The Party counted on winning a mass fo llow ing  among the peasantry by 
tak ing  cred it fo r  the rad ica l land re form , discussed earlie r. Only a fte r  the land 
re fo rm  was w e ll on its  way was the communist M in ister o f A g ricu ltu re , Imre 
Nagy, replaced and given the M in is try  o f In te rio r p o rtfo lio  in September 1945. Its
a
main influence was, however, among the workers, but even here its  influence was 
unbalanced, stronger in some sectors, e.g., miners, and weak in others, e.g., iron 
and m anufacturing sectors, and im portant in the build ing and chem ical sectors. 
Generally, it  enjoyed l i t t le  support from  the population, which a fte r  i t  had 
recovered from  the shock o f the war and memories had receded, re-asserted its  
anti-com m unist predisposition in the new p o lit ic a l structure . The HCP was 
com m itted to  industria l and agrarian socialisation, to  the 'leading ro le o f the 
p ro le ta ria t' but, as noted earlier, these stra teg ic goals were subordinated, at th is 
stage, to  economic reconstruction by a 'national un ity ' government. But, c learly , 
the party  represented its e lf as the party o f rad ica l social and economic change.
The SDP in a sense was caught a fte r  the war somewhat unprepared and
was given some 'help' by the HCP to  organise its e lf. By the end o f 1945 the
(31)party  had some 400,000 card-carry ing members. The party 's influence, 
h is to rica lly , was p a rticu la rly  strong among the iron and steel and m anufacturing 
industria l workers. I t  could also claim  some influence among artisans and sm all 
re ta il traders. Its  influence was the weakest among the peasants. The SDP was 
deb ilita ted  by constant debates regarding its  re lations w ith  the HCP and other
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parties. An im portant agreement was, however, concluded w ith  the HCP to
establish a ’Jo in t Liaison Committee* to  ’coordinate1 the p o lit ic a l a c tiv itie s  o f
the two parties. Many party members, however, could not overcome th e ir  deep
suspicion o f communist designs regarding the fu tu re  o f th e ir  party, and this
created permanent tension and dissent w ith in  the party. The nominal alliance
w ith  the more popular SDP was a ta c tic a l move designed u ltim a te ly  to  liqu idate
the HCP’s main r iv a l fo r the role o f o f f ic ia l representative o f the industria l
(32)
working class. The 'works com m ittees' set up by the HCP were regarded by
the SDP as d irec t challenge to  obtain con tro l over the industria l workers. The
HCP was hoping to consolidate its  hold over the workers through the Trade Union
movement and the shop steward system. When the Trade Unions were revived in
Feburary 1945, the Russians ensured a 2 to  1 HCP m ajority  on the Council's
Secretaria t and Department s ta ff, but union members s t i l l  ra llied  to  the SDP. A
(33)b itte r  struggle ensued between the SDP and HCP over the contro l o f workers.
The weaker p o lit ica l in flunce o f both the SDP and the HCP among the
peasants was, to  some degree, counter-balanced by the NPP. The f ir s t  loca l
(34)organistion o f the party was formed on 1st December 1944, in Szeged. The
HCP regarded the NPP as its  a lly  in the countryside and took extrem e care to
nurture and deepen re lations between the tw o parties. As shown ea rlie r, i t  was
also to  act as the advocate o f the land re fo rm . The party was activa ted  by
communist support in the hope o f draw ing some rura l support away from  the 
(35)SHP. In the Szeged region 40-50 v illage organisations began th e ir  operations
and gradually a network was bu ilt up, f ir s t  in the Trans-Tisza region, then in
Budapest and the North, and fin a lly  in the region between th  Danube and the
Tisza, by the spring o f 1945. In August 1945 some 1400 cells were operating w ith  
(36)170,00 members. The party's main p o lit ic a l base was among the poor and
new landowners in impoverished regions, p a rticu la rly  in the Trans-Tisza. Inspite
(37)o f a ll its  e ffo rts  the party never rea lly  developed in to  a mass peasant party .
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By many, somewhat in co rrec tly  -  but not toa lly  w ithout reason - the party was 
regarded as a branch, a ru ra l extension, o f the HCP. Inco rrec tly , because 
against a ll odds the party showed, at times, a degree o f independence and 
in te rna l dissent and power struggle between the 'le f t ' and ’r ig h t’ wings o f the 
party , the la tte r  s triv ing  fo r independence from  the communists. Its  m ainly 
populist oriented leadership was divided between those, e.g., Ferenc Erdei, 
Jozsef Darvas, who were covert communists and Imre Kovacs and Istvan Bibo, 
who leaned towards a western sty le  democracy, subsuming a vague agrarian 
socialism. The m a jo rity  o f peasants, however, could not be s ign ifican tly  
influenced by le ft-w in g  parties. To this extent, i t  was always a strong possib ility  
tha t the peasantry, the largest ’class’ in society, would not be oriented towards 
the le f t  in po litics  but to  the other two function ing parties o f the 'Independence 
Front', namely e ithe r the SDP or SHP, but especially the SHP.
This party, a fte r a slow in it ia l organisational s ta rt -  due m ainly to  the
preva iling uncerta in ty and suspicions about its  own p o lit ic a l fu tu re , augmented
by Soviet and communist obstructions - emerged by the autumn o f 1945 as a
form idable p o lit ica l force, w ith  a membership over 900,000 strong and a regional
(38)network covering the entire  country. Its p o lit ica l representation had,
however, s ign ifican tly  changed from  being the spokesman fo r the landed
peasantry in the pre-war period to  one in which a ll the post-war s tra ta  found
p o lit ic a l refuge. The party evolved in to the princ ipa l ra lly in g  point o f a ll the
anti-com m unist, middle and upper classes and the peasantry, w ith  the last
rem aining the mass base o f the party; not only the rich  and middle peasants, but
in many areas even the poor peasants joined the SHP. The HCP's leadership was,
ju s tifia b ly , apprehensive at the rapid expansion o f the SHP from  the spring o f
1945, and prom ptly  accused the party o f abandoning its  'c lass-party ro le ' and
becoming a 'ca tch -a ll' party  fo r  the reactionary elements, who in a lliance w ith
(39)the 'kulaks', m ight obtain contro l over the le ft is t  m ino rity  o f the party.
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Looking at the p o lit ica l groupings w ith in  the SHP, three principa l p o lit ic a l groups 
can be c learly  id e n t if ie d :^ ^  1) the le ft ,  which accepted the p o lit ic a l 
programme o f the ’Independence Front', represented by Zoltan T ildy, 1st van Dobi, 
Gyula O rtu tay, some le ft-w in g  in te llectua ls  and the poor peasants. The HCP 
exploited th is le f t is t  o rien ta tion  w ith in  the SHP p o lit ica lly ; 2) the centre 
represented by Ferenc Nagy, Bela Kovacs and Bela Varga. They envisaged the 
establishment o f a form  o f peasant-bourgeois democracy, led by the w ealth ier 
peasantry. The centre, too, accepted the programme o f the 'Independence 
Front', but i t  was to  be carried out, exclusively, w ith in  the bourgeois dem ocratic 
order. Many believed its  cooperation in the 'Independence Front' would be 
lim ite d  to  the period u n til the Peace T reaty  was signed. The le f t is t  parties and 
factions o ften  re ferred to  th is group as the 'r igh t' o f the SHP; 3) the r igh t-w ing  
o f the party, not e ffe c tive ly  organised and generally successfully restrained by 
the party  itse lf, but also by the external p o lit ica l environment. I t  should be 
stressed, however, tha t the 'righ t-w ing ' o f the SHP was not righ t-w ing  by pre- 
1945 Hungarian standards.
During the entire  1945-1947 period the party  was unable to  tu rn  its  
popu la rity  and its  e lectora l strength, to  be shown in de ta il in a moment, to  its  
advantage because o f a number o f factors. The d ic ta t o f the occupying Russian 
A rm y enabled the HCP, w ith  Soviet approval and support, gradually to  obtain 
dominance over the law enforcem ent agencies, local government adm in istra tion  
etc., rendering the SHP v ir tu a lly  im potent. The social heterogeneity o f its  
membership, from  poor peasants to  financiers, worked against a coherent 
p o lit ic a l strategy. Also, by exp lo iting the sympathies o f its  le ft- in c lin e d  leaders, 
the HCP managed to  introduce some disagreements and cracks in the un ity  o f 
the party. On the whole, the party's leadership saw the purpose o f the 
reconstruction policy in rev iv ing  the priva te  sector, obtaining western credits, 
re tu rn ing confiscated property and a s ign ifican t reduction in the maintenance of 
the costly occupying power.
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Looking at these parties in term s o f models o f development, the SHP was
bourgeois-democratic, the NPP populist-agrarian, the HCP com m unist- 
. (41)industria l. Both the SDP and the SHP favoured evolutionary change through 
p lu ra lis tic  democracy.
The po litics  o f the ’Independence Front' tha t prevailed in the 'trans ition ' 
years o f 1945 and 1948 had taken a w e ll defined form : the re la tiosh ip  o f
p o lit ic a l forces was steadily modified in favour o f the HCP, which was engaged 
in a constant fig h t against its  re luctan t dem ocratic partners, against the 
troublesome elements o f what i t  called 'reaction ' in the other parties in the 
coa lition . The 'F ront' played a centra l p o lit ica l role: i t  constitu ted the 
fram ew ork fo r p o lit ica l reconstruction, allowed the HCP to  exclude not only 
r ig h tis t elements but also the libe ra l anti-com munists and assured the HCP its e lf 
o f a position o f strength. There were no revolutionary, radical, revisions in the 
ideological posture o f the party; i t  tried  to  pro ject its  image as more dem ocratic 
than the SDP, more public sp irited than e ither the SHP or NPP. Its declared 
respect fo r priva te  property was not changed and, up to 1947, even p riva te  trade 
and small-scale industries received positive encouragement. The HCP was 
active  in destroying any fo rm al opposition, organising labour unions under its  
dom ination - its  influence over them was shared, nom inally, up to 1948 w ith  the 
SDP - pushing through its  nationalisation programme in the industria l and 
financ ia l sectors and drawing up its  proposed 3 year plan, to  be employed to 
centralise industria l economic ac tiv ities . The party had l i t t le  tim e  to  spare fo r 
engaging in the discussion o f ideological issues. Apart from  occasional remarks, 
mostly w ithout overt ideological connotations, regarding th e ir  undesirable 
influence and speculative behaviour, no d irec t po lit ica l a ttack  was made on the 
w ealth ier peasants up to  1947. The few co llec tive  farm s tha t were form ed amid 
great in it ia l pub lic ity  almost en tire ly  by fo rm er landless agrarian workers soon 
a fte r the land reform  was launched, received some ocasional encouragement and
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p ub lic ity  in the communist press, but no conspicuous importance appeared to  
have been attached to  th e ir  existence. No one was allowed to  speak about 
co llectiv isa tion .
I t  is o f in terest to  look more closely at in te r-p a rty  re lations and the 
in it ia l a ttitu de  o f parties towards the peasants in the period im m edia te ly a fte r  
the war, and before the November 1945 General E lection, when the p o lit ic a l 
balance o f power became clearer.
The alliance o f the NPP w ith  the HCP was noted earlie r. This
undisturbed p o lit ic a l partnership, in which the NPP acknowledged the leading
role o f the HCP lasted only u n til about May 1945, when the land re form  in which
complete id e n tity  o f in te rest existed between the two parties - was w e ll under
way, and much o f i t  completed. Already, however, a fte r the spring o f 1945,
although cooperation between the two parties remained, on the whole,
unaffected, d ifferences emerged w ith in  the NPP's leadership -  u n til now united -
regarding the des irab ility  o f the continuance o f such a close alliance po licy w ith  
(42)the HCP. The dissenting ’r ig h tis t’ group, whose main spokesman was Imre 
Kovacs, maintained tha t close alliance was acceptable as a tem porary p o lit ic a l 
exigency, since the party  was, in it ia lly , too weak on its  own to  put in to  e ffe c t a 
progressive land re fo rm . As the party, however, became stronger and 
organisationally more e ffe c tive , th is reliance on the HCP not only lost its  
significance but became p o lit ic a lly  damaging. The tim e had arrived, he said, and 
the party could then a ffo rd  to  pursue a more independent p o lit ic a l line and be 
free  to  respond to  other, possibly more advantageous, p o lit ic a l o ffe rs  o f 
cooperation. Thus, the 'r ig h t' o f the party  demanded the loosening o f re la tions 
w ith  the HCP and exploration o f the possib ility  o f establishing closer cooperation 
w ith  the SHP. The 'le f t ' o f the party, the more in fluen tia l, represented by 
Ferenc Erdei, Jozsef Darvas and supported by the le ft-o f-c e n tre  Peter Veres, 
believed in the fu rth e r continuation o f the policy o f alliance w ith  the HCP. A fte r
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a protracted debate at a combined meeting o f the party's Steering and
Supervisory Committees, held on 5th June 1945, the le f t  won oand in the name o f
party  un ity , the challenge was contained. Nevertheless, early disagreement
w ith in  the NPP over its  re la tion  to the HCP was now in the open. I t  was an issue
which was to  emerge again and again during the period under consideration.
The sharp p o lit ica l differences tha t emerged w ith in  the NPP's leadership
inev itab ly  disturbed the party's relations w ith  the HCP as well as w ith  the other
parties o f the coa lition . In respect o f the overall p o lit ica l effectiveness o f the
'le f t ' w ith in  the coa lition  the SDP view o f the NPP's close alliance po licy w ith
the communists was also im portant. The SDP expected very early tha t the NPP
(53)would a lly  w ith  the HCP in the coa lition . To th is extent, the SDP viewed the
NPP not as an extension o f the people's dem ocratic forces of the le ft ,  but as an
a lly  o f th e ir ch ie f r iva l the HCP, Because of th is, from  the beginning, there was
tension and fr ic tio n , which marred the re lations between the SDP and the NPP.
But, o f course, antagonism between the parties was not en tire ly  new. I t  had its
roots, and found expression, in the pre-war populist rura lists, versus urbanists
debate, discussed earlie r. The tension in re lations between the tw o parties was
re inforced by other factors: f irs tly , the young NPP a ttracated many o f those
ag ricu ltu ra l workers who, before the war, were tra d itio n a lly  absorbed in agrarian
movements led by the SDP. Thus, the ru ra l expansion o f the NPP undermined
the SDP's chances among the peasants; secondly, im m ediate ly a fte r  the war, and
even more so la te r, the artisans, re ta ile rs  and salaried employees who jo ined the
SDP in ru ra l areas, because of th e ir social standing and p o lit ic a l o rien ta tion ,
favoured an alliance beteen the SDP and SHP, ra ther than w ith  e ithe r the HCP
(44)or the NPP. Thus, inspite o f numerous a ttem pts to  im prove re lations
between the tw o parties, differences were so deep-seated tha t success eluded 
them.
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From the communist viewpoint, however, i t  was v ita l to  keep a firm  grip 
on the NPP, to  keep it  w ith in  the worker-peasant alliance, together w ith  the 
SDP, and use it  to  a ttra c t the peasants and to  prevent them from  fa llin g  in to the 
lap o f the opposition. The communists were very much aware o f the growing 
strength o f the SHP and sought to  counteract i t  by establishing the ’un ity  o f the 
le ft*. This was, fo r the moment however, frustra ted  by the r i f t  w ith in  the NPP 
concerning its  a ttitude  towards the HCP and by its  strained re lations w ith  the 
SDP.
The SHP, meanwhile, did not remain inactive. From the very beginning
o f 1945 it  in itia ted  policies aimed at re s tr ic tin g  the p o lit ic a l aspirations and
possible advance o f the HCP. In addition, the party also strove to  widen its  net
in the countryside to achieve contro l over a united peasantry. The main th rust
o f its  policy was to  emphasise the pa rty ’s desire to  m aintain, and i f  possible,
expand, its  friend ly  re lations w ith  both the SDP and NPP. To achieve th is, i t
began negotiations w ith  the SDP w ith  a view to reviv ing the s p ir it o f cooperation
tha t developed between the two parties during the war. The basis fo r  tha t
w artim e cooperation was the concept tha t the exercise o f power in post-war
Hungary would be based on the fram ew ork o f bourgeois democracy, in which both
(45)parties would ac tive ly  partic ipa te . The SHP leadership, however, recognised 
tha t a fte r the war, the un ity  o f workers and the leading role assumed by the HCP 
in tha t un ity  m ight not favour the realisation o f th is concept. The party, 
however, did not com plete ly abandon the idea and spared no e ffo rts  to  bring i t  
about. The SHP, therefore, strove to  make its e lf a party which embraced a ll 
s tra ta  o f the bourgeoisie and the peasantry, to  organise the widest possible 
’a lliance camp' around itse lf. The rev iva l o f the wartim e cooperation w ith  the 
SDP served tha t purpose, in addition to  counter-balancing the close alliance tha t 
had developed between the HCP and NPP. To this extent, the pa rty  happily 
accepted the role o f representing a ll bourgeois interests. I t  absorbed most o f the
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other bourgois groups and, in e ffe c t, prevented the fo rm ation  o f any other major
/ A Ct\
party by the bourgeoisie to  represent th e ir  interests.
To extend its  ru ra l influence, more precisely its  base in the peasantry,
the SHP began preparations as early as the beginning o f A p ril 1945 to  revive and
(47)reorganise the 'Peasant A lliance ' (Parasztszovetseg). The party  was fu lly  
aware, o f course, tha t the peasant vote would be decisive in the fo rthcom ing 
elections. In view o f this, the reorganisation was accomplished w ith  great zeal 
and w ith in  a few weeks the 'A lliance ', under the d irec t contro l o f the SHP, began 
operation. In addition to  extending its  d irec t in fluence among the peasants the 
SHP leadership decided, to  the intense chagrin o f the communists, to  establish a 
closer cooperation w ith  the NPP, a party which, too, enjoyed respect among a 
certa in  section o f the peasantry. Had the party  been more powerfu l, perhaps, i t  
would have attem pted to prevent the re-establishment o f the NPP and its  
acceptance as a fu lly -fledged  member o f the coa lition  in order to  secure its  own 
sole representation o f a unified peasantry. This was, o f course, one reason why 
the HCP had given its  fu ll support and help to  re a c tiv ite  the NPP. The theme 
'un ified peasantry', as shown earlier, was not new. I t  was an im portant aspect o f 
SHP po licy before the war. Now the concept assumed even greater significance 
and fo r th is reason it  was prom ptly attacked by the HCP and its  le ft is t  allies.
For the SHP to  establish closer re lations w ith  the NPP im plied, o f 
course, tha t the NPP f irs t  had somehow to  be separated from  the d irec t 
influence o f the HCP. The most e ffe c tive  way to  achieve this, i t  appeared to  
the SHP leadership, was to involve the party  in the a c tiv itie s  o f the 'Peasant 
A lliance ', which could smooth the road, on the one hand, to  closer re la tions 
between the tw o parties and, on the other hand, could also achieve the other 
objective o f ru ra l iso lation o f the HCP. I t  was w ith  th is in mind tha t the SHP 
took the in it ia tiv e , as early as A p ril 1945, and Ferenc Nagy, also President o f the 
'Peasant A lliance ', (Parasztszovetseg), contacted the NPP's leaders and inv ited
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them to  partic ipa te , f irs t,  in the re-organisational work and then to  work in the 
’Peasant A lliance ' to  safeguard the interests o f the peasants. A lthough the o ffe r 
was a ttra c tiv e , i.e., irrespective o f re la tive  party strength equal a lloca tion of 
national and local posts in its  leadership, the NPP, s t i l l  at the early stages o f re- 
a c tiv ita tio n , re jected the o ffe r  because f irs t,  i t  feared i t  would have to  abandon 
its  rad ica l policies, especially vis-a-vis land re fo rm  and w ithdraw al from  the 
worker-peasant alliance and, second, because i t  saw i t  as a th rea t to  its  own 
independent existence.
Since the SHP assigned an im portant role to  the 'Peasant A lliance ', to  
bring about, and to represent the interests of, a unified peasantry, i t  required the 
pa rtic ipa tion  o f the NPP in it .  Reorganisation was s t i l l  possible, even w ithout 
thue support o f the NPP, but i t  would be considerably more d if f ic u lt  because the 
existence o f an agrarian party  outside the 'A lliance ' excluded the possib ility  o f a 
unified peasant representation. On 7th May 1945 the SHP leadershiup renewed 
its  in v ita tion  to  the NPP to  jo in . ^ ^  This tim e a protracted debate ensued in the 
party's Steering Com m ittee, which met on 8th May 1945, to consider the o ffe r. I t  
sp lit the NPP's leadership: Imre Kovacs, and a group around him, urged the party  
to  accept. He argued tha t the NPP needed the 'A lliance ', and the SHP, since the 
SDP was 'tied ' in e ffe c t to  the HCP by a w artim e agreement. He m aintained 
tha t a wider 'A lliance ' and closer re lations w ith  the SHP, not as close though as 
those between the SDP and the HCP, would strengthen the NPP. The 'le ft ',  
Ferenc Erdei and Jozsef Darvas, supported by Peter Veres, opposed the move on 
the grounds tha t i t  would make the NPP's ru ra l position more ra the r than less 
uncertain, both p o lit ic a lly  and organisationally. The NPP would not be able to  
sh ift the 'A lliance ' to  the 'le ft ',  i t  was argued, but ra ther the opposite would tend 
to  happen, the SHP, acting through the 'A lliance ', would push the NPP to  the 
'r igh t', an undesirable and unacceptable outcome. But fo r ta c tic a l reasons, to  
play fo r tim e, ra ther than re jec ting  i t  ou trigh t, a compromise was reached not to
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jo in  but to  leave the question open and pursue fu rth e r discussions la te r. Such a
ta c tic a l move was s t i l l  possible under the prevailing p o lit ica l arrangements in
the spring o f 1945 because more s ign ificant realignm ent o f p o lit ic a l forces only
began, shortly a fte r th is  meeting, in the early summer and was completed in the
autumn o f 1945. In view o f that development, when the question was
reconsidered by the National Conference o f the NPP held on 4th June 1945, the
resolution was passed tha t i t  was not in the in terest o f the party  to  seek closer
re lations w ith  the SHP, and tha t the ac tiv itie s  o f the 'Peasant A lliance ' should be
(49)hindered where possible.
By la te  summer o f 1945 a s ign ificant sh ift in favour o f the SHP occurred 
in the p o lit ica l li fe  o f the country. The p o lit ica l strength o f the SHP had 
increased largely because o f its  growing image as a 'ca tch -a ll' coa lition , favoured 
by bourgeois dem ocratic, peasant and anti-com m unist voters. This, in view of 
the forthcom ing elections, prompted the party to  increase pressure on the le ft .  
A lthough at its  Plenum meeting held on 19th and 20th August, due to  pressure 
exerted by its  le f t  and centre, the party accepted the m oderating proposal to 
enter the e lection campaign on the basis o f m aintaining the in te rna l peace and 
un ity  o f the 'Independent Front' -  adopting its  programme and acknowledging the 
necessity o f cooperation w ith  the other parties - some of the 'u ltim a tum  like ' 
resolutions adopted by the party, e.g., to  give the peasantry the rig h t to  s trike  
and the status o f Trade Union to  the 'Peasant A lliance ', unm istakably indicated 
by its  uncompromising, figh tin g  mood towards the ' l e f t ' / ^  These resolutions 
in fu ria ted  the HCP, which sharply attacked the SHP while the o ther tw o  le f t is t  
parties, the SDP and the NPP, remained silent. Meanwhile, the SHP s t i l l  
maintained high hopes tha t u ltim a te ly , some way, i t  would manage to  conclude 
an alliance w ith  the NPP. Im m ediate ly a fte r  the Plenum m eeting was over Bela 
Kovacs, general, secretary o f the party, on behalf o f the whole party, once more 
-  the th ird  tim e since the spring -  repeated the party's in v ita tio n  to  the NPP to
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jo in  the ’A lliance ’. But again, la rge ly due to  pressure by the HCP and the party's
own crypto-com m unist le ft ,  the o ffe r  was re jectd  ou trigh t by the party's
(51)Management Com m ittee.
This was, roughly, the s ituation in the la te summer o f 1945. During the
next few months but before the General E lection, la rge ly as the result o f the
highly com petitive  e lection campaign style, there were signs o f a worsening
p o lit ica l c lim ate . Relations deteriorated not only between the parties generally,
due to  increasing tension, but even between parties on the le ft .  They became
more and more isolated from  one another, especially, due to  heated grass roots
campaigns, at the middle and lower levels. But, im portant d ifferences openly
manifested themselves on most domestic and foreign policy issues.
The f irs t  opportunity fo r the parties to  demonstrate th e ir re la tive
p o lit ica l strength and popular support was provided by the General E lection,
scheduled fo r 4th November 1945. Preparations fo r  the e lection began as early
as the summer o f 1945. The 'May Day' ra lly , organised in Budapest and
elsewhere, and other demonstrations around the country, the successes achieved
in the economic reconstruction, the le ftw a rd  sh ift in government in June, a ll
seemed to  indicate increasing communist influence. I t  was enough to  persuade
the HCP leadership tha t the party enjoyed excellent e lecto ra l changes. Its
leadership, in fa c t, predicted a 'colossal' com munist-social democrat v ic to ry . The
two parties ea rlie r agreed to  present a s ing le -lis t e lectora l a lliance fo r  the
M unicipal e lection in Budapest on 7th October held f ir s t  in the hope th a t i t  too
(52)would favourably influence the results o f the General E lection. Indeed, i t  
was pa rtly  because the HCP calculated its  e lectora l chances as good tha t i t  
agreed to  free  elections, but stipulated tha t they be held in the autumn when the 
food s ituation was s t i l l  favourable, so as to  give another boost to  th e ir  chances. 
The Soviet Union, too, pressed Hungary to  hold an election in order to  com ply 
w ith  the western declaration o f non-recognition unless an election was held. The
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Hungarian communists assured the Russians tha t there was nothing to  fear. A fte r
the disastrous, and unexpected, defeat fo r the HCP-SDP alliance at the Budapest
elections, which resulted in a clear m ajority  fo r the SHP, which carried 50.54 per
cent o f the votes, on 16th October 1945, Marshall Voroshilov called in a ll pa rty
leaders and, to  ensure th is tim e  disproportionate communist in fluence a fte r  the
general e lection, attem pted to  ’recommend* a single lis t e lecto ra l a lliance and to
predeterm ine the respective shares o f parties in the National Assembly. The
SHP f la t ly  rejected the 40 per cent in it ia l o ffe r and a subsequent higher one o f
(53)47.5 per cent. The defeat at the Budapest m unicipal e lections was
pa rticu la rly  pa infu l fo r the HCP-SDP alliance, since tha t an agrarian pa rty  had
proved stronger and more popular even in the stronghold o f industria l workers.
A fte r  th is disastrous defeat the HCP concluded tha t an even more aggressive
stance must been taken towards the SHP and ag ita tion and propaganda
s ign ifican tly  increased.
The general e lectora l programmes of a ll parties were, o f course,
com m itted to reconstruction and social and economic reform s. In respect o f
agricu lture  the foca l points o f the programmes were la rge ly re la ted  to  the
(54)ongoing land re form . The HCP’s orig ina l programme, passed by the party 's
'Whitsun Conference' in May, was retained: its  resolution en title d  'For
ag ricu ltu ra l recovery’, demanded the speedy com pletion o f the land re fo rm  and
t it le  reg istra tion  o f new landowners to  provide 'security o f p roperty necessary
fo r undisturbed production'. But what was most d isturbing to  many peasants was
tha t the document raised - openly fo r the f ir s t  tim e, but, as was la te r
(55)acknowledged, 'prem ature ly ' -  the concept o f collectives. I t  proposed tha t in 
the in terest o f im proving the nation's food supply and o f b e tte r more national 
u tilisa tion  o f the machines and equipments o f the liquidated large estates, the 
new landowners should be combined in to  co llec tive  farm s in order to  transform  
food production on to  a modern basis. I t  declared its  support fo r  the
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establishment o f a wide network o f purchasing and m arketing cooperatives. This 
was an in te resting  contrad iction in HCP policy towards agricu lture , con firm ing  
the pa rty ’s hidden desire to  co llectiv ise  at the earliest opportun ity, and its  
unhappy a ttitu de  towards recent agrarian development. On the one hand, i t  
promoted property stabilisa tion; on the other, reorganisation on co llec tive  
principles. The proposls regarding co llectives were received w ith  alarm  and 
resentment by the new landowners and proved to  be e lec to ra lly  to ta lly  counter­
productive. Despite Rakosi's prompt denial, im m ediate ly p rio r to  the General 
E lection, o f communist intentions to  co llectiv ise . Thus,
the new farm ers are frightened w ith  rumours tha t the 
communists w ill establish kolkhozes ... we do not want 
kolkhozes, but strong and prosperous small farm s.(56)
For some tim e to  come, a fte r this in it ia l blunder, the issue was not openly raised 
again by the HCP. Indeed during the months to  fo llow  the HCP took every 
opportun ity to  a llev ia te  the fears o f the peasants tha t co llec tiv isa tion  fo r 
Hungary was a h is to ric  necessity. Thus, Erno Gero, in early 1947, very 
spec ifica lly  stated tha t:
i t  does not fo llow  from  the fa c t tha t the Soviet peasant needs 
the kolkhoz tha t i t  is also needed by the Hungarian peasant.
The h istory, customs and trad itions o f the Hungarian 
peasantry d iffe r  from  the history, customs and trad itions of 
the Russian peasant .... we would be s illy  and insane i f  we did 
not take in to  account tha t our peasantry wants to  prosper by 
way o f consolidating priva te  property and individual
farm ing .(57)
Moreover, to  counteract SHP endeavours to  un ify  th e ir  representation o f the 
peasant in terest, the HCP also proposed the reorganisation o f a g ricu ltu ra l 
production w ith in  the fram ework of people's democracy. This was to  be based on 
un iting  the 'P roduction Comm ittees' and the notorious 'Land-C la im ant-
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Comm ittees', to  form  an 'A g ricu ltu ra l Com m ittee ' which was to  serve the 
in terest o f the HCP.
The SDP, blaming its  defeat on the 'united fro n t' w ith  the HCP decided
to  run separately in the General Elections. The party, however, did not prepare
a specific  election programme but used and trie d  to  popularise its  resolu tion on
the 'A c tion  Programme' passed by its  XXXIV  Congress which had met on 18th- 
(58)20th August 1945. The Congress declared its  acceptance o f the party's, in 
certa in  areas outdated, 1903 programme in fu ll.  In i t  the party  had taken a 
positive stand on the question o f resettlem ent fo llow ing  the land re fo rm , but 
fa iled  to  re fe r to  the urgency o f t i t le  reg is tra tion  fo r d is tribu ted land, a v ita l 
concern o f a ll new landowners. Undoubtedly, the weakest section o f the party's 
entire  'A c tion  Programme' was tha t dealing w ith  the peasantry. In s im ila r, but 
more restrained, vein than the HCP, the SDP, too, emphasised the idea o f 
intensive farm ing w ith in  the fram ework o f large-scale farms. This, again, was 
received w ith  concern by the peasantry, especially those who had received th e ir  
land only a few months before.
Under these circumstances the peasantry, especially the low er s tra ta ,
awaited w ith  pa rticu la r in terest the e lection programme o f the NPP. When
published on 1st September 1945 the NPP's 'K iskate ja ' (Short-Cathecism) had,
(59)however, l i t t le  com forting  to  say to  the peasantry as a whole. The NPP 
regarded the land reform  as the f irs t  step in e ffo rts  to  improve conditions fo r  
the peasantry. Its policy was aimed la rge ly at the poor and dw arf peasants and 
had very l i t t le  com forting  to  say to  the middle peasants. I t  urged the easier 
ava ila b ility  o f credits and qua lity  seeds etc., fo r  the peasants, but regarding the 
organisation o f agricu lture, it ,  too, exto lled the advantages o f large-scale farm s 
and promoted the establishment o f 'genuine' cooperative farm s and consumer 
cooperatives. The party was am bivalent on agricu lture  declaring at the same 
tim e its  support fo r intensive agricu lture , based on individual smallholdings and 
priva te  ownerships.
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The centra l theme o f the SHP's e lection programme regarding 
agricu ltu re  was tw o-fo ld : f irs t,  its  general slogan o f the 'sanctity  o f p riva te  
property ' was adapted to  include a ll landed property. I t  declared tha t:
the SHP stands f irm ly  on the princip le  o f p riva te  property ... 
and it  wishes tha t land should remain the priva te  property o f 
peasants .... i t  w ill defend the property o f new landowners 
w ith  just the same determ ination and in te g rity  as i t  defended 
the priva te  property o f previous landowners.(°®)
and in a speech delivered by Zoltan T ildy, i t  stated tha t:
In defence o f priva te  property the party  is just as much 
opposed to  any po lit ica l designs to establish co llec tive  farm s, 
as to  the restora tion o f the feudal large estate system.(61)
Second, its  general theme of 'national un ity ' was extended to  include, more
specifica lly , 'peasant un ity ', including the ru ra l bourgeoisie as well. The SHP was
confident o f the support o f middle and b e tte r-o ff peasants, but its  in fluence
among the new landowners, ag ricu ltu ra l workers and poor peasants was more
uncertain. I t  ws fo r  th is reason tha t th is section o f the peasantry received
greater a tten tion  in its  e lection programme. To promote be tte r understanding
among the peasantry, the party  mounted a press campaign aimed at con firm ing
its  balanced approach to  the problems o f agricu ltu re  and to  reduce the
(62)differences between the w ealth ier and poorer peasants. Lastly, the C atho lic  
Church hierarchy, which opposed the communists, also put th e ir  support behind 
the SHP
To this extent, apart from  the SHP, a ll the other coa lition  parties, 
including the va c illa ting  NPP, supported a po licy  o f consolidating the sm all-scale 
peasant farm s in to  large-scale units; some w ithout defin ing exactly  the nature o f 
'large-scale' farm s and cooperation, some, e.g., the HCP, c learly  d isplaying a 
preference fo r co llec tive  farm s. This, at a tim e  when the land re fo rm  was just
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about completed. I t  was not lost on the peasant voters. Even cooperation was a 
d ir ty  word to  the peasant.
The General E lection resulted in a convincing v ic to ry  fo r the SHP which 
won an absolute m ajority , w ith  more than 57 per cent o f the votes. I t  was 
the biggest e lection v ic to ry  in the pa rty ’s en tire  existence. For the socia lists it  
was now ’two elections’, tw o defeats’. Closer examination o f the s ta tis tics  shows 
tha t the SHP did outstandingly well in poorer ru ra l areas and obtained a m a jo rity  
in more developed, b e tte r-o ff regions. Since other parties did not run i t  meant, 
o f course, tha t the SHP had obtained some votes which would have gone to  those 
o ther parties. I t  is in teresting to  note, in th is context, tha t in 1947 the HCP's 
tac tics  were to  adm it these other parties to  the election, precisely in order to  
divide the enormous bloc vote o f the SHP. The HCP's influence, looking at the 
results, was not negligible but extrem ely restric ted . The e lection  in 1945 
probably re flec ted  the real re la tion o f p o lit ica l forces in the country, w ith  the 
le ft-w in g  parties a ltogether receiving 43 per cent o f the votes, w ith  a share fo r 
the NPP o f a mere 6.87 per cent. The le ft ,  however, was somewhat stronger 
than the votes would suggest, pa rtly  thanks to the backing o f the Soviet Union 
and p a rtly  because o f the existence o f a vocal ’le f t ’ oriented group w ith in  the 
SHP, which was subsequently exploited by the communists.
The fa ilu re  at the election radicalised the HCP and led to  a harder 
p o lit ic a l line. The idea o f obtaining a dem ocratic m a jo rity  was abandoned. The 
goal was to  be reached by other means. I t  in fu ria ted  the Russians, and spurred 
the HCP to  the famous, and w ell known, ’sa lam i-tac tics ’, the progressive s lic ing 
up and deb ilita tion  o f an organised m a jo rity . The election ended a period o f 
pre lim inaries and in itia ted  the serious struggle between the HCP and SHP fo r 
p o lit ic a l contro l, in term s o f agricu lture fo r the allegiance o f the peasantry.
The tremendous popular support enjoyed by the SHP would only have 
meaning i f  i t  could be u tilised p o lit ica lly . The SHP soon found out th a t th e ir
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e lecto ra l success could not easily be translated in to p o lit ic a l power. Thus, the 
pa rty  had to  agree to  the HCP's demands, in itia ted  no doubt by the Russians, 
tha t the smallholders would not be allowed to  form  an exclusive ly SHP 
government. The reason fo r  th is was tha t under the p reva iling  in te rna tiona l 
s itua tion  i t  would not be recognised by the A llied  Powers, in e ffe c t by the 
R u s s ia n s /^  I t  was allowed to  have the premiership, which went to  Zoltan 
T ildy, who because o f his le f t  inc lina tion  was much more acceptable to  the HCP 
and the other le ft is t  parties, and about ha lf the cabinet posts. Subsequently, 
T ildy, in the name of 'coa lition  un ity ', announced a programme which in term s o f 
the major social and economic objectives hardly d iffe red  from  the e lecto ra l 
p la tfo rm  o f the HCP. During the period tha t followed, although the SHP had a 
m a jo rity  in the legislature, the HCP - confident o f Russian support -  behaved 
p o lit ic a lly  w ith in  the coa lition , and in the various executive organs e tc., as i f  i t  
ra ther than the SHP won the general election.
The convincing v ic to ry  at the elections, nevertheless, gave the SHP 
increased confidence. In the ensuing period helped by an upsurge in a n ti­
communist sentiments in the country, the SHP began its  arduous, and hopeless, 
task o f securing the p o lit ic a l upper-hand in the executive. The p a rty  was, o f 
course, fu lly  aware o f the fa c t tha t any s ign ifican t im provem ent in its  p o lit ic a l 
prospects was a function  o f the in te rna tiona l p o lit ica l scene, especia lly o f 
Soviet-W estern relations. By the end o f 1945, nominal im provem ents were
/j!C\
recorded in some spheres. Since the SHP perceived tha t its  p o lit ic a l
prospects were to  a s ign ifican t degree regulated by the Peace T rea ty  
negotiations, the good results achieved at the Foreign M inisters Conference 
spurred the party in to p o lit ic a l action a fte r two months og pause. Its  prim e 
objective was to make a rea lity , in a ll walks o f social, p o lit ic a l and economic 
life , o f its  57 per cent parliam entary m ajority . In view o f th is, its  f ir s t  demand 
was the 'proportional reappointm ent' o f a ll posts, to  be extended to  a ll s ta te  and
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(66)local public service adm in istra tion , w ith  50 per cent 'p ropo rtiona lity ' in the
police and security forces, then under the to ta l contro l o f the communists,
(671throughout the country. These demands were b itte r ly  resisted by a ll the 
other parties, especially the communists. A  b itte r  fig h t ensued fo r these 
positions o f power, v ita l fo r the SHP i f  i t  were to  become an e ffe c tiv e  p o lit ic a l 
force. A ttem p ts  were also made at th is tim e, as noted earlie r, to  co rrec t the 
alleged 'irregu la rities ' in the execution o f the land re form .
Janaury and February 1946 were probably the most c r it ic a l months in the 
early post-war life  o f the country. In fla tion  was at its  peak, the tempo of 
reconstruction declined, the shortage o f coal led to  restric tions, and food supply 
d iff ic u ltie s  appreared, endangering the live lihood o f many. Under these 
conditions i t  was not surprising tha t public discontent increased, leading to  
strikes in a number o f places and increased social and p o lit ic a l tensions between 
the parties themselves. Helped by the successful campaign against the le f t ,  
launched earlie r, the f irs t  months o f 1946 saw the strengthening o f the SHP. A 
detailed programme and a comprehensive ideology were to  be worked out by 
party experts, so the SHP concentrated its  a tten tion  on the da ily  p o lit ic a l issues 
as they had arisen. In the sphere o f agricu lture  its  p rim ary concern was to  
develop and strengthen its  organisational network, and to  w in the allegiance o f 
a ll the peasants -  creating complete peasant un ity  and a llow ing the SHP to  speak 
w ith  one voice fo r th e ir interests. Meanwhile, the HCP fo llow ing  the ta c tics  o f 
the Bolsheviks in Russia, pursued a vigorous po licy o f re s tr ic tin g  cap ita l, and 
introduced measures designed to  detach the sm all and medium peasants from  the 
influence o f the SHP, to  separate them from  the wealthy peasants and the urban 
and rura l bourgeoisie. The communists were very much aware tha t a fu l l fro n ta l 
a ttack on the SHP could achieve the opposite result. This was to  come la te r. 
They also perceived tha t they could not expect the d iffe re n tia te d  s truc tu re  o f 
the SHP to  disintegrate autom atica lly. What they needed to  do to  achieve th a t
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end was to  induce a process o f in te rna l d isin tegration in the SHP fas te r than the 
domestic p o lit ica l polarisation. The most im portant th ing  fo r  them was to  
strengthen the 'le ft* in the SHP and to  mobilise i t  against the ’r ig h t ’, while 
m aintaining increasing pressure on the party  from  the outside, from  both ’above’ 
and 'below', by mass movements.
The strength o f the SHP, and its  pressure on the 'le ft ',  also prom pted the
communists and th e ir allies to  renew th e ir attem pts to  form  a 'un ited fro n t'. On
the in it ia tiv e  o f the HCP, w ith  the pa rtic ipa tion  o f the SDP, NPP and TUC, a fte r
(68)b rie f preparations a 'Le ft-W ing  Bloc' was established on 5th March, 1946 to 
counterbalance the influence o f the SHP m ajority . The next day the Bloc 
proclaimed tha t i t  was not w illin g  to  cooperate w ith  the 'reactionary r ig h t' o f 
the SHP, blaming the la tte r  fo r  the state o f the nation and demanding its  
expulsion from  the party as an indispensible condition fo r the urgen tly  needed 
financ ia l reform s and reconstruction o f the country's economy. The Bloc 
announced its  willingness to  maintain cooperation w ith  the le ft-w in g  o f the SHP. 
W ith the help o f its  disciplined and highly e ffic ie n t organsing a b ility , the HCP 
succeeded in mobilising many people, especially in Budapest, in a number o f 
demonstrations against 'speculators' and 'stockjobbers', demonstrations against 
'reaction ', under the aegis o f the 'Le ft-W ing-B loc '.
The SHP leadership was powerless to  resist the onslaught o f the le f t  and, 
in a compromise, agreed to  expell a number o f its  representatives in the 
Assembly and, also, due to  a mounting campaign against him , to  fo rce  the 
resignation o f Bela Kovacs, the party's general secretary. On 23rd February 
1946, he was replaced as M in ister o f A g ricu ltu re  by the crypto-com m unist Istvan 
Dobi, a le ft-w in g e r in the SHp /® ^  Unquestionably, the degree o f freedom  o f 
the SHP to  react d iffe re n tly  was extrem ely lim ite d : in a sense, i t  was forced to 
maintain the coa lition ; i t  could not leave i t  and i t  could not take power on its  
own. The mounting economic problems in the country could not be solved by any
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single party on its  own; the mass demonstrations and strikes lik e ly  to  be 
organised by the HCP and SDP, had the SHP decided to  take power, would have 
paralysed a ll its  e ffo rts . To this extent, the SHP had no other choice but to  
accommodate the demands o f the 'Bloc' and t ry  to  d ilu te  them as much as 
possible. Nevertheless, a ’slice* was cut o ff  the party.
A fte r  12th March 1946 con flic ts  developed w ith in  the le f t is t  parties and 
by May the 'Le ft-W ing-B loc tem pora rily  lost its  p o lit ic a l influence. The SDP, 
refusing the HCP's request fo r a merger o f the tw o parties, was mainly 
responsible fo r  th is cooling o ff. The SDP began to  distance its e lf from  the 
c o m m u n is ts /*^  Also, the NPP and the SDP became less interested in fu rth e r 
mass demonstrations and actions. The villages were preoccupied w ith  the 
mounting spring ag ricu ltu ra l works and the peasants were also preoccupied w ith  
defending the ir rights to  th e ir new lands. The SHP saw an opportun ity  to  take 
the p o litica l in it ia t iv e  again during A p ril and May and to  come out w ith  demands 
against the le ft ,  to  t ry  to  isolate them w ith in  the coa lition . I t  is ne ither possible 
nor desirable here to  survey how the HCP's and SHP's tac tics  were applied in a ll 
the domains o f national life . Nor is th is the place to  give an account o f the 
para lle l movement which consisted in weakening not only the 'r ig h t' outside the 
'Independence Front', but also the HCP's partners w ith in  the government 
coa lition . The main thrust o f what is to  fo llow , in the c r it ic a l months ahead, is 
w ith  regard to  agricu lture ; to  survey the ru ra l ba ttle  tha t lay ahead fo r the 
allegiance o f the peasantry.
The ba ttle  fo r  th e ir p o lit ica l allegiance was not easily resolved. And th is 
ru ra l ba ttle  had many aspects. The f ir s t  move by the SHP was an a ttem p t to  put 
the cooperative movement in order. This essentially involved the problem o f 
assets d is tribu tion  between two po ten tia lly  r iv a l cooperative organisations, 
'Fogyasztasi Szovetkezetek Orszagos Kdzpontja' (FSzOK) Nationa l Association o f 
Consumer Cooperative Centre -  set up a few months before by the workers'
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parties in an a ttem pt to  extend th e ir ru ra l influence and 'Magyar Orszagos
Szovetkezeti Kozpont (MSzOK) -  Hungarian National Cooperative Centre -w hich
was approxim ately tw o-th irds contro lled by the SHP and NPP. O f th is the
princ ipa l and oldest component -  established in 1898 on the in it ia t iv e  o f Count
Sandor K aro ly i -  was the 'Hangya' (Ant), w ith  approxim ate ly 400,000 members; i t
(71)was however under the SDP contro l. The SHP aimed to  develop the MSzOK 
in to  a strong organisation and in January 1946 started negotiations w ith  the SDP 
regarding the fu tu re  o f 'Hangya', but the SDP s k illfu lly  managed to  postpone 
them. The SHP's demands tha t the le f t is t  parties should accept its  view 
regarding the fu tu re  structure and asset d is tribu tion  o f Hangya were subm itted 
on 21st May 1946 in the form  o f a memorandum and, at the same tim e, the party  
made preparations fo r p o litica l action. The SHP was determ ined tha t few  i f  any 
o f Hangya's assets should be given to  the r iva l FSzOK. A t th is tim e , many 
independent societies existed, mainly consumers, purchasing and c re d it 
cooperatives, w ithout any firm  centralised national coordination. They were the 
scource o f constant discussions and grass roots clashes between the main parties 
concerning th e ir  fu tu re  development. In essence, the two main contesting 
policies were: whether they were to  be organised on lines embracing a sm all 
section o f the population and in terlaced w ith  priva te  cap ita l or whether, as the 
HCP wanted, they were to  be a wide 'dem ocratic ' mass movement which would 
take up the fig h t against private capita l.
The HCP's in it ia l a ttem pt to set up a new r iv a l organisation was met 
w ith  energetic resistance on the part o f the SHP and, a fte r  p ro trac ted  
parliam entary debate, tem porarily  fa iled . Subsequently, the SHP, w ith  gradually 
declin ing influence, resisted a ll communist a ttem pts to  gain con tro l o f the 
cooperative movement, knowing only too w e ll tha t expansion and con tro l in th is 
sphere would provide the HCP w ith  an excellent base from  which to  gain con tro l 
over the en tire  peasantry; subsequent co llec tiv isa tion  o f agricu ltu re  could then 
be more easily precip itated.
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By A p ril 1947, however, due to  the advances made by the HCP in the
in terna l p o litica l arena and w ith  the SHP la rge ly incapacita ted, i t  became
(72)possible fo r  the HCP to  force through a 'United Cooperative Law' , which had
previously been successfully blocked by the SHP, enabling the HCP to  take 56
(73)per cent o f a ll adm in istra tive  positions in the ru ra l cooperative network. This 
new law regarded the cooperatives not only as com m ercial associations but also 
as units o f a social and economic movement. Its princip le fea ture  was tha t the 
state did not consider its e lf neutra l in the struggle between the cooperatives and 
priva te  capita l, but supported the form er. The law also regulated the 
establishment and operation o f cooperatives and it  dealt, a lbe it s t i l l  somewhat 
vaguely and b rie fly , w ith  the concept o f producer's cooperatives, i.e., co llec tive  
farms. The reorganisation o f the MSzOK shortly a fte r the law was enacted in to  
a single cooperative fram ew ork tha t served the HCP's in terests, s ign ified  an 
im portant step towards systematic coordination and increased in fluence o f the 
cooperative movement. Individual farm ers, at th is stage, were given the option 
whether or not to  jo in  the movement. This mounting communist o ffensive in the 
countryside was prom ptly attacked by the SHP, declaring tha t i t  was nothing less 
than the gradual in troduction o f the dreaded co llec tiv isa tion  through the back­
door. While th is was vehemently denied by the HCP the proof o f the correctness 
o f the accusation came some tim e la te r, when, w ith  the help o f the 'N ationa l 
Cooperative Centre', and its  network o f village cooperatives -  which by then 
became to ta lly  dominated by the HCP -  co llec tiv isa tion  was in fa c t launched.
Another aspect o f the ru ra l ba ttle  concerned the complex struggle fo r  
the representation o f the peasant in terest. The SHP, on ideologica l premies, 
renewed its  theme of 'peasant un ity '. The basis o f th is rev iva l was provided by 
Ferenc Nagy's speech at Pecs, on 30th March 1946. The 'le f t ' im m edia te ly
voiced its  opposition to  the whole concept o f peasant un ity  and a wide debate
(74)ensued in the national press. In the summer o f 1946 the o ffensive by the SHP
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and the role and im portance o f the ’Peasant A lliance ’ had s ig n ifica n tly  increased.
Although from  a fte r the e lection to  the spring o f 1946 the ’A lliance ’ was
p o lit ic a lly  ra ther quiet, i t  u tilised th is period to  develop an extensive
organisational network and it  had achieved im portant influence, especially strong
in the Trans-Danubian region, among a ll s tra ta  o f peasants. In fa c t, i t  was more
homegeneous than the SHP itse lf. A fte r  A p ril-M ay 1946 i t  was fu rth e r
developed and established its  own journal, Magyar Parasztelet (Hungarian
Peasant L ife ). In A p ril 1946 a new in v ita tio n  was delivered to  the NPP, in which
the SHP urged i t  to  jo in  the 'A lliance ', to  make i t  a common representative o f
the interests o f the peasant members o f both parties. A f te r  long silence,
indicating some disagreement w ith in  the NPP, i t  o f f ic ia lly  in form ed Ferenc Nagy
that the party re jected the in v ita tion  and severed its  re lations w ith  the SHP - to
the delight o f the communists, thereby fu rth e r stra in ing the re la tions between
the two parties. In ru ra l areas, at lower party levels, contrary  to  the wishes o f
the 'le ft ' dominated centra l leadership, the 'r igh t wing' o f the NPP wanted to
gain independence from  the HCP by moving closer towards establishing more
positive re lations w ith  the 'A lliance ' and the SHP. Many ru ra l loca l party
organisations did in fa c t jo in  the 'A lliance ' inspite o f the repeated re jections by
the centra l leadership. No details are available on how extensive th is  was, but
Magyar Parasztelet on 26th May 1946 stated tha t i t  was im portant. Some loca l
NPP organisations which joined could not be removed even fo rc ib ly  by the le f t
u n til a fte r February 1947, when the 'r igh t wing' o f the party  was defeated and
Imre Kovacs was fin a lly , on 24th February 1947, 'pushed' in to resigning from  the
(75)party. Some organisations indeed continued to  pa rtic ipa te  as la te  as the 
spring o f 1947. The increasing co n flic t between the 'le f t ' and the 'r ig h t' o f the 
NPP came to  a head when, in August 1946, Im re Kovacs and Gyula Illyes sent a 
memorandum to  the party's President, Peter Veres, as an u ltim a tum , demanding 
in e ffe c t an in terna l party purge, the removal o f a ll communist sympathisers and
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(76)
the 'loosening' o f relations between the HCP and NPP. The fa c t th a t the pro­
communist le f t  o f the NPP managed to  block this in it ia t iv e  shows the extent and 
continued grip o f the party's le f t  and the communists on the pa rty  leadership. 
The 'r igh t' o f the party was a fra id  tha t sooner or la te r the HCP would tu rn  to 
'd icta torsh ip  o f the p ro le ta ria t' and they wished to  change the p o lit ica l 
o rien ta tion o f the ir party. In October 1946 a re lated a ttem pt was made to  bring 
about a merger between the NPP and the SHP. This, again, could not be carried 
through because of communist pressure at the NPP's 'Nationa l Conference', held 
on 2nd-3rd November 1946 to  decide i f  the party should sp lit and what its  fu tu re  
relations w ith  the SHP should be. The le ft is t  Erdei-Darvas-Veres group managed 
once again to  get the ir way. A lthough th is crisis was resolved, d iff ic u lt ie s  
remained. Jozsef Revai, the ch ie f ideologist o f the HCP, denounced th is  merger
attem pt on 28th November 1946 as a 'reactionary p lo t' to  break up the 'L e ft-
(77)Wing-Bloc' and bring the poor peasants under 'kulak' dominance.
The reason fo r the alarm o f the 'r igh t' in the NPP was the disquieting
a ttem pt by the HCP to 'fu rth e r develop' the concept o f 'People's Democracy'.
This created tensions among the coa lition  members, between the ' le f t ' and the
'r ig h t' and brought about c o n flic t not only inside the NPP leadership, but also
w ith in  the SDP. In mid 1946, Anna Keth ly and Ferenc Szeder, in s im ila r vein,
began to  agita te in favour o f abandoning th e ir  alliance w ith  the HCP and
(78)exploring the a lterna tive  o f cooperation w ith  the SHP. The smallholders
also trie d  to  pressurise the HCP by declaring tha t unless concessions were 
forthcom ing they would reconsider th e ir willingness to  m aintain the coa lition . 
The SHP was looking fo r concessions which would ensure tha t the people's 
democracy would develop not in the d irection  o f socialism but towards the 
consolidation o f a 'bourgeois dem ocratic ' order, i.e., no fu rth e r change was to  be 
e ffected whch would overturn the free enterprise system.
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The u ltim a te  communist objective was to  secure the support o f the
whole working peasantry. Since there was not much hope fo r  the party  to
achieve tha t it ,  therefo re , directed its  a tten tion  to  the ag ricu ltu ra l workers and
to  the poor and new landowners. Here, the fig h t centred around the question o f
establishing an organised representation o f peasant interests. The SHP, as shown
earlier, proposed the ’Peasant A lliance ’ to  f u l f i l  th a t ro le. I t  presented its  case
to  the National Assembly tha t the ’A lliance ’ should be acknowledged as having
the status o f a 'trade union’ fo r the en tire  peasantry and its  undisturbed
(79)operation guaranteed. By th is the SHP not only hoped to  preserve its
influence among the peasants but to  make the ’A lliance ’ a to ta l and exclusive
representation agency. From the point o f view o f the HCP, a com munist-
controled peasant-oriented organisation -  Foldmunkasok es K isbirtokosok
Orszagos Szovetsege (FEKOSz), ’National Federation o f A g ricu ltu ra l Workers and
Smallholders - already existed and operated under the um brella o f the TUC. It
was its  largest constituent, w ith  160,000 members in la te  1945. One o f its
functions was to  operate as a labour exchange agency: the o ther was to  compete
w ith  the ’Peasant A lliance ’. Apart from  the Trans-Tisza region, where it
registered some influence, its  operation was not s u c c e s s fu l/^  The main
problem of the organisation was tha t its  overwhelm ingly labour image repelled
most o f the previous sm all and new landowners. The SHP’s a ttem pted expansion
to bring about ’peasant un ity ’ under its  leadership e lic ite d  renewed e ffo rts  during
August-September 1946 from  the HCP to  develop fu rth e r the national netw ork o f
the organisation called, Ujgazdak es F b ldhbz ju tta to ttak  Orszagos Szovetsege
(UFOSz) -  National Federation o f New Farmers and Land Recipients -
(81)established, under communist contro l, on 31st March 1946. UFOSz was 
designed to supplement FEKOSz and also to  compete w ith  the ’Peasant A lliance ’.
To win over the working peasant masses and to  popularise UFOSz, the 
HCP, in the summer, o f 1946 in itia ted  the Falujarasi Mozgalom - V illage V isitors
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(82)Movement. Volunteer urban industria l workers, from  a ll walks o f l i fe  and 
trades, in terlaced w ith  'good1 p o lit ica l agita tors, fanned out in to  the countryside 
to  bring p rac tica l help and, mostly, p o lit ic a l enlightenment and propaganda to 
the villagers, to  re in fo rce  ru ra l party  organisations and, at the same tim e, to 
establish personal contacts w ith  working peasants and to  woo them towards the 
HCP. To impress the fa ith fu l and to  persudade others o f its  significance, UFOSz 
organised its  F irs t Congress on 15th Septmeber 1946. The group around Imre 
Kovacs, in the NPP, trie d  desperately to  steer the party towards a ff i l ia t io n  w ith  
the 'Peasant A lliance ', but the le f t  w ith in  the party, Erdei-Darvas and including 
Veres at th is tim e, opted fo r U FO S z/® ^ In spite o f a ll the e ffo rts , UFOSz was 
not as successful as the HCP expected, as Jozsef Revai revealed when he 
reported:
the bulk o f the peasantry stands behind the SHP and we have 
not been successful in setting the poorer peasants against the 
kulaks.(84)
The HCP's a ttem pt to  develop the UFOSz in to a p o lit ic a lly  ac tive  mass 
organisation floundered.
The approaching Third Congress o f the HCP aroused fears in the SHP of 
a le ft-w in g  coup. To counteract th is possib ility  and to  show the le f t  and the 
workers tha t the peasant masses, irrespective  o f th e ir  party  a ff ilia t io n , were 
behind the SHP, tha t they too could come out in demonstrations on the streets in 
force, like  the workers, the SHP, in the name o f 'peasant un ity ', organised what 
were called 'National Peasant Days' in Budapest from  7th to  9th September 1946. 
Considered to  be p o lit ica lly  sensitive they were o ff ic ia lly  organised by the 
'Peasant A lliance ' instead o f the SHP. A t the main ra lly  in 'Heroes Square', 
Ferenc Nagy defined his party's demands regarding the establishment o f an 
organisation in defence o f universal ag ricu ltu ra l in terests and condemmed those
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who were determ ined to  fo rm ent con flic ts  between the peasants and the 
workers. This concept was, o f course, not new. A lready in November 1945 the 
issue o f representation o f various in terests was discussed. The SHP, recognising 
three major social components fo rm ing  the nation, i.e., peasants, workers, and 
employees or ’bourgeoisie’, demanded tha t these d iffe re n t social groups be 
allowed to  organise free ly  in defence o f th e ir interests.
The 'Peasant Days', from  the point o f SHP, were organisationally, at 
least, convincingly successful and passed w ithout any major provocation. O f the 
200-300,000 people expected to  pa rtic ipa te  in the demonstrations some 150.000- 
200,000 trave lled up to Budapest from  the provinces^*^ inspite o f HCP and SDP 
e ffo rts , in a jo in t declaration, to  dissaude peasants from  coming up to the 
c a p ita l/87*
Paralle l w ith  the 'Peasant Days' the SHP subm itted to  parliam ent on 23rd
August 1946 a modified version o f a d ra ft b ill, o rig ina lly  prepared by the party
on 5th A p ril 1946, regarding the establishment -  to  which Ferenc Nagy already
re fe rred  at the 'Peasant Days' meeting - o f 'Orszagos Mezogazdasagi Szovetseg'
(OMSz) -  National A g ricu ltu ra l Association. I t  was prepared under the aegis o f
the M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re , under the contro l o f the SHP, and the function  o f
the organisation was to  be to  represent the universal in terests o f the nation's
agricu lture and its  ag ricu ltu ra l population, the various peasant groups, v is-a-vis
the government, i.e., an organisation representing the combined in terests o f
workers and employers. Its  legal powers were to  include the power o f
in tervention in labour disputes -  up to  now the sole prerogative o f FEKOSz. The
le ft-w in g  parties, led by the HCP, opposed the creation o f such a body, since
they viewed i t  an SHP a ttem pt to  strengthen its  hold over the ru ra l population.
In the end, the d ra ft b ill was not even debated in parliam ent because the Russian
chairman o f the 'A llied  Contro l Commission' declared the 'Association ' as
(88)'co rpora tis t' in character and as such it  contravened the arm istice  term s.
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By the autumn o f 1946 the HCP c learly  saw the hopelessness o f its
e ffo rts  to  win over the landed peasantry. The economic problems o f the country
weakened its  case even more. The financ ia l stab ilisa tion programme, associated
w ith  the HCP had worsened the 'agrarian scissors' problem, making the landed
(89)peasantry even more disgruntled. The communists, there fo re , in fu tu re
concentrated on the ru ra l p ro le ta ria t and new landowners. They began to  wonder
i f  a fro n ta l a ttack on the m a jo rity  party  was not an easier task than the
seduction o f its constituents.
The Third Congress o f the HCP, its  f irs t  since 1930, was held between
29th September and 1st October 1 9 4 6 .^ ^  I t  was also the f ir s t  im portan t
gathering o f the party  since the end o f the war and, w ith  no e ffo r t  spared, the
party  prepared fo r i t  w ith  zeal a ll summer. C ontrary to some sceptica l views as
to  its  outcome in the ligh t o f the fo rm ation  o f the 'Le ft-W ing-B loc ' ea rlie r and
recent tensions between the parties regarding the nature o f 'People's
(91)Democracy', and some predictions o f a rad ica l tu rn  o f events , the Congress
proceeded w ithout any notable deviation from  the previous pa rty  policies.
(92)Revai's a rtic le  'Fordulopont' (Turningpoint) a few  days before the Congress
sta ting  tha t 'everyone is conscious tha t we are at a cross-roads' was la rge ly
responsible fo r the degree o f nervous expectation among the parties and public
alike. Many believed tha t, one way or another, the financ ia l s tab ilisa tion  ea rlie r
and the forthcom ing Peace T reaty would usher in a new stage o f p o lit ic a l
development. This, as yet, was not to  be.
The Congress c learly  stated tha t the long-term  aim was the 'construction
o f socialism ', the 'd ic ta torsh ip  o f the p ro le ta ria t', but tha t progress towards i t
had to  be slow to  avoid c iv il disorder. Therefore, i t  ta c tic a lly  accepted the
(93)peaceful trans itiona l programme towards socialism. 7 While the slow pace 
suited the SHP, nevertheless, the fa c t tha t 'construction o f socialism ' as an aim 
was on the agenda at a ll created much uncerta in ty among the peasant members
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of parliam ent and the centre and alarmed the righ t-w ing  dem ocratic parties in
the coa lition . In the ligh t o f the Congressional resolutions and the continued
com m itm ents by the HCP to  work towards rad ica l social transfo rm ation  o f the
country, at the end o f October Ferenc Nagy declared tha t the continued le ftw ard
( 9 4 )sh ift would eventually lead to  bolshevisation o f the country. The way 
’People’s Democracy’ linked up w ith  the 'construction o f socialism ' was 
elaborated by Revai:
People's Democracy is a type o f bourgeois democracy which 
curta ils  p ro fit-o rie n ted  exp lo ita tion  by big cap ita l and places 
under the working people's supervision the dem ocratic state, 
w ith  workers and peasants exercising the decisive influence.
In a people's democracy the peasantry is the equal a lly  o f the 
working class against the economic exp lo ita tion and p o lit ic a l 
reaction o f big cap ita l, whereas in an ordinary bourgeois 
democracy the peasantry is the defrauded and subservient 
too l o f big cap ita l against the working c l a s s . ( 9 5 )
The Congressional slogan 'out w ith  the peoples' enemies from  the coa lition ', 
therefore, re flected  the p o lit ic a l d irection  the HCP was to  take: to  deprive the 
’bourgeoisie' o f a share in power. Its concept o f the 'bourgoisie' was w ider than 
just the righ t wing o f the SHP; the 'Independence Front' could only be maintained 
i f  i t  'purged' the bourgeoisie from  its  ranks, reducing the SHP to  no more than a 
purely peasant party.
In harmony w ith  these p o lit ica l programmes the resolutions o f the 
Congress elaborated the next stage o f liqu ida tion  o f capita lism : in te r a lia , state 
con tro l o f production and finance, banks and foreign trade, the nationa lisa tion o f 
flo u r m ills and factories -  where owners 'obstructed economic grow th ' -  and the 
drawing up o f a three-year plan. I t  explained tha t the struggle w ith in  the 
coa lition  was essentially concerned w ith  the question 'w ith  whom w ill the 
m a jo rity  o f peasants a lly  themselves', w ith  the workers to  go 'fo rw ard  on the 
road o f dem ocratic development' or w ith  big cap ita l 'backward, where the
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reactionaries want to  take the country’/ ^  The Congress, accordingly, stressed
the c r it ic a l role o f the peasantry.
The key speaker on agricu lture  a fte r Rakosi's speech on general domestic
and fore ign a ffa irs  - was Imre Nagy. He touched on topics such as the need to
increase agricu ltu ra l production and mechanisnation, promised pro tection  to
peasants against exp lo ita tion  by carte ls and banks and easier a va ila b ility  to
credits. He also noted the need to  develop the cooperative system, both in the
urban and ru ra l areas. The resolutions adopted by the Congress at its  closing
session on the whole v indicated the pa rty ’s earlie r policies in agricu ltu re . I t
proclaimed its  support fo r  the sm all individual fa rm ing system, acknowledging,
at the same tim e, the indispensability o f small industries and small re ta il trade
outlets, because ’by supplying the population they play an im portant ro le in the 
(9 7 )
national in te rest’. As a special item  on the agenda the Congress discussed 
the general development o f agricu lture  and the question o f im proving the 
conditions o f the peasantry. I t  stated that:
a fte r the com pletion o f the land reform  the new tasks to  be 
faced are the economic consolidation o f the small-scale 
farm ing system, the in tens ifica tion  and d ive rs ifica tion  o f 
ag ricu ltu ra l production and increasing its  p r o f i t a b i l i t y . ^ )
The Congress adopted a d ra ft programme fo r the improvement o f the conditions
of the peasantry - the whole peasantry -  including the middle peasants, in order
to  win th e ir  support. This, i t  adm itted, was to  be a long and arduous task and,
therefore, i t  antic ipated the fig h t fo r the support o f the working peasant would
(99)be neither short nor w ithou t d iff ic u ltie s . Form ulated in ra ther cautious 
verbiage, the Congress advanced the thesis tha t the 'desirable' re fo rm  in 
agricu ltu ra l production was ’beyond the strength and scope o f the single 
individual fa rm er’, and asserted tha t the solution lay in c o o p e ra tio n .^ ^ T h e  
Congress, however, concluded tha t while th is was an u ltim a te  aim, fo r the
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present the development o f m arketing and purchasing cooperatives must be given 
p r io r ity  because 'these are the cooperative form s which could most easily perm it 
the incorporation o f the m a jo rity  o f peasant holdings’. The party  studiously 
avoided the question o f co lle c tiv is a tio n /*^ *^
A fte r  the Congresss o f the HCP it  became more urgent than ever before 
fo r  the SHP to  renew its  endeavours to  check the po lit ica l advance o f the HCP 
and seriously to  begin preparations fo r  the p o lit ic a l struggle expected to  ensue 
a fte r the Peace T reaty process was completed. In reply to  the HCP’s Congress 
resolutions, Ferenc Nagy, in a speech at Kecskemet on 7th October 1946 strongly 
denied the accusations tha t his party was pro tecting  the in terests o f big 
c a p i t a l / * ^  Soon a fte r, in another speech, ce lebrating the pa rty ’s 16th b irthday 
on 22nd October at Bekes and announcing its  counter-programme, he declared in 
reply to  the HCP's redefined ’People’s Democracy’ tha t the SHP considered the 
state form  as ’Republic’, regarded this as permanent and warned tha t his party 
would not agree to  any fu rth e r attem pts at nationalisation, unless i t  was 
considered to  be in the in terest o f the Hungarian people. Moreover, at an in te r- 
party conference on 30th October 1946 the SHP had in tim ated to  the HCP tha t 
the party  would resist a ll fu rth e r sh ift to  the le ft ,  nor would i t  agree to 
’socialism ’, and the le f t  could not expect any more po lit ica l c o n c e s s io n s /* ^  In 
spite o f communist v ic to ries in Bulgaria and Romania, the SHP refused to  accept 
the in e v ita b ility  o f le ft-w in g  rule. This, in e ffe c t, sealed the im m ediate fu tu re  
of the SHP, especially tha t o f Ferenc Nagy, and w ith  preparations already in 
progress fo r a fro n ta l a ttack by the HCP, i t  ce rta in ly  brought the eventual 
liqu idation o f the party  tha t much nearer.
For the present, however, the SHP maintained its  resolve to  t ry  and 
break the un ity  o f the le ft .  A t a confidentia l SHP-NPP in te r-p a rty  conference 
on 26th November 1946 the SHP, in the sp ir it o f peasant un ity  renewed its  
in v ita tion  to the NPP to  merge and form  a new p o lit ica l organisation, under the
name ’Independent Peasant P a r ty '/*® ^  I t  was planned that Im re Kovacs, w ith  
the group around him, would jo in  the SHP leaving the ’le f t ’ to  th e ir  fa te  in the 
NPP i f  the merger o f the tw o parties fa iled . Under great pressure in
parliam ent, and outside, in connection w ith  the slogan 'out w ith  the people’s 
enemies from  the coa lition ', at the in te r-pa rty  conference, the SHP offe red the 
NPP compliance w ith  the HCP Congressional resolution to  sh ift the party to  the 
le f t  by expelling the ’reaction ’ and accepting the sacrifice  o f purging the party o f 
its  60-70 'reactionary elements' in the Assembly, i f  in re tu rn  the SHP's attem pts 
to  establish 'peasant un ity ' by merging what was le f t  o f the SHP w ith  the NPP 
in to a new party were not obstructed and i t  were allowed to  bring about a 
realignm ent in peasant po litics . In December at another in te r-p a rty  conference 
the SHP returned to  th is theme and rea ffirm ed  its willingness to  ’regroup’ so that 
there would then be no fu rth e r need fo r the 'Bloc', i f  its  proposals to  merge were 
accepted. The negotiations, however, were very closely watched by both the 
HCP and SDP, and both Rakosi and Szakasits strongly opposed and, in a terse 
communique, re jected the plan and the conditions. The HCP declared tha t the 
merger would assist the ’reaction ’ since th is peasant-wing o f the coa lition , the 
wealthy peasants, would take the lead. While the ’B loc’ would be dissolved a 
dangerous new s ituation would arise in which a unified peasantry would face 
unified w o r k e r s / * ^  In a strongly worded a rtic le , Revai had also expressed 
s im ila r sentiments and ideological opposition to  the planned m e r g e r / * ^  Apart 
from  the NPP's own le ft ,  opposition was also expressed by Peter Veres and the 
centre o f the party. Veres declared tha t i t  the planned merger were accepted 
the NPP would have to  renounce its  'peasant radica lism '. He agreed, however, 
tha t some form  o f closer cooperation between the tw o parties, in the fie lds o f 
popular culture, defence o f peasant interests, cooperative po licy  and even 
partic ipa tion  in the 'Peasant A lliance ' was acceptable to  the NPP, provided in 
re tu rn  the SHP purged its  'r igh t' from  the Assembly and confirm ed its  w illingness
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to  cooperate w ith  the le ft .  This d iluted form  o f peasant un ity , however, fa iled  
to  sa tis fy  the SHP's centra l leadership and was re jected. The fa ilu re  to  reach 
any fo rm  o f agreement resulted in the NPP, too, f in a lly  declin ing the o ffe r  and 
the whole issue was removed from  the party ’s agenda. So, e ffo rts  to  loosen or 
break the cohesion o f the ’Bloc’, to  isolate the HCP, by merging or s p littin g  the 
NPP ended not only in defeat fo r the SHP but also in a defeat fo r NPP's ’r ig h t’. 
In trapa rty  tensions, however, remained w ith in  the NPP and fo r months to  come 
the pa rty  struggled w ith  the tasks o f try in g  to  repair the damage caused by the 
sp lit. A lm ost as a reply to  the NPP’s u ltim a te  re jection  o f its  proposals, the 
SHP, w ithout any p rio r consultations w ith  the other partners in the coa lition , 
introduced personnel changes in the composition o f the government, to  sh ift its 
p o lit ic a l p ro file  more to  the righ t. The le ft is t  Istvan Dobi, favoured by the poor 
peasant wing o f the party and the NPP and HCP, was suddenly replaced as 
M in ister o f A g ricu ltu re  by the r ig h tis t Karoly B a ra n y o s /* ^  This a rb itra ry  
move angered the le ft is t  parties which condemned the SHP in a terse jo in t 
communication. Follow ing this, the SHP pursued a policy o f ’m arking tim e ’ its  
prim ary concern being to  maintain its  parliam entary m a jo rity  in ta c t u n til the 
Peace T reaty was ra tifie d . In th is i t  was helped by the growing de te rio ra tion  o f 
re lations between the SDP and HCP.
I t  was not only the NPP's ’r ig h t’ tha t was active in try in g  to  loosen the 
party's re lations w ith  the HCP. A para lle l process was also in itia te d  in the SDP. 
In early December 1946, the 'r igh t', under the leadership o f Karo ly Peyer, 
produced a memorandum sharply a ttack ing  the pa rty ’s centra l leadership fo r  the 
pro-communist policies they had pursued ever since the paty's XX X IV  Congress. 
The memorandum branded the party's alliance w ith  the HCP as de trim en ta l to  
the influence and p o lit ica l in it ia tiv e  o f the party. A change in 'p o lit ic a l 
d irection ' was demanded which, i f  adopted, could have resulted in breaking o ff  
SDP-HCP relations and the possib ility o f the establishment o f a coa lition  which
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excluded the HCP. I t  in fu ria ted  the communists, and the centra l leadership, led 
by Arpad Szakasits, was quick to  repudiate the whole concept o f the Peyer 
proposal w ithout, however, tak ing any discip linary action. The question o f 
d isc ip lina ry action was re fe rred  to  the forthcom ing XXXV Congress o f the party 
fo r  discussion and d e c is io n .^ ^
Thus the principa l characteris tics o f the in terna l p o lit ica l s itua tion  at 
the end fo 1946 and the beginning o f 1947 were, f irs t,  the increasingly frequent 
and progressively deepening crises among the coa lition  partners and, second, the 
great expectations attending the signing o f the Peace Treaty on 10th February 
1947. The SHP which believed tha t the Soviet Union would w ithdraw  from  
Hungary a fte r the signing o f the Peace T reaty had already adjusted its  po licy fo r 
p o lit ic a l survival. But, perhaps w ithout the SHP even suspecting it ,  i t  was a 
double-edged weapon, since the conclusion o f the Peace T reaty  also freed the 
hands o f the HCP. In view o f th is p o lit ica l s ituation the HCP began its  drive 
against its  coa lition  partners at the end o f 1946. The replacem ent o f the 
moderate Imre Nagy, earlie r on, w ith  the fana tic  Laszlo Rajk, as M in is te r o f the 
In te rio r, to  spearhead the offensive fo r  dism antling the coa lition  regime, can be 
considered an im portant state in the evolution o f HCP policy.
The trans ition  from  a coa lition  regime to, f irs t, a subserviant 'un ified - 
bloc' and then to  HCP single-party state was not a smooth one. The le ft ,  in a 
m ino rity  in the Assembly, could not assume the role o f government unless i t  
secured the collaboration o f the 'dem ocratic ' wing o f the SHP. This required 
tha t the 'le ft ' o f the SHP and, more s ign ifican tly , its  in fluen tia l centre, should be 
made to  take the steps to  the le ft .  This, however, required a showdown w ith  the 
'reactionaries', a radica l purge o f the SHP's 'r igh t' to  squeeze them out o f the 
coa lition  and to  'persuade' the remaining centre to  renounce its  aspirations to  
p o lit ica l power.
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In th is p o lit ic a l s itua tion  came suddently the 'discovery' o f the alleged 
anti-Russian and anti-dem ocra tic  state 'conspiracy' in m id-December 1946, but 
only revealed in January 1947. This ws the method used by the HCP to  liqu idate  
the opposition. Between the end o f 1946 and May 1947, in a pro tracted  tu g -o f- 
war, prom inent SHP leaders, one cabinet m in ister and a number o f members o f 
parliam ent, whose im m unities were removed, were arrested on fabrica ted  
charges o f conspiring against the occupying forces and the dem ocratic 
s ta te /*  Moreover, scores o f SHP activ is ts  were deported to  the Soviet Union. 
The tu rn ing  point was the arrest o f the SHP's General Secretary, Bela Kovacs, a 
most outspoken communist c r it ic ,  on 24th February 1947. He was deported to  
Russia, only to  re tu rn  in 1956. Later, in May 1947, Ferenc Nagy, the SHP Prim e 
M inister, who was also im plica ted in the 'conspiracy', seeing his fa te  sealed, 
resigned while on holiday in Switzerland. He was soon fo llowed by Bela Varga, 
SHP leader o f the Assembly and many o ther prom inent anti-com m unists. W ith 
this, the road was open fo r  the HCP to  sh ift power decisive ly to  the le f t  w ithout 
a ltering, fo r the moment, the fo rm a l fram ew ork o f the coa lition . Soon, a fte r  a 
pro tracted parliam entary debate, the le ft-w in g  forces managed to  push through 
the Assembly a b ill fo r  the three year plan which introduced the next stage to  
destroy capita lism , provid ing not only fo r the nationalisation o f banks but also 
fo r the establishment o f a Planning Council and a National Planning O ffic e  to  aid 
fu rth e r economic so c ia lisa tion /***^
The 'conspiracy a ffa ir ', as was calculated by the HCP, had brought about 
wide ranging p o lit ic a l consequences, a ffe c tin g  a ll the coa lition  parties. Insofar 
as the SHP was concerned, in addition to  creating d isunity w ith in  the party  and, 
w ith  Nagy's departure, marking the beginning o f the dissolution o f the party, i t  
also undermined its  influence w ith in  the mass peasant movement and created 
crises in the 'Peasant A llia n c e '/*  * ^  The subsequent e lection o f Istvan Dobi, 
much more amenable to  HCP requests, to  replace Ferend Nagy, made the party
- 349 -
very sensitive, almost subservient, to  communist in terests. A lmost a ll fu rthe r 
resistance in the SHP came to  a standstill and only persons fu lly  susceptible to 
communist pressure were allowed to  occupy im portant executive posts. 
Communist in f i lt ra t io n  in to  a ll other parties was accomplished to e lim ina te 
resisting elements.
A t the same tim e, the ’a ffa ir ' compromised the 'r ig h t' o f both the SDP, 
where Peyer - especially a fte r the party's XXXV. Congress - was to ta lly  isolated 
and those opposing the 'B loc' were forced in to  the background^**^, and the NPP, 
where i t  made th e ir presence in the party impossible. In the NPP, the 'le f t ' 
regained its  freedom fo r action and, from  February 1947, the party increased its 
a c tiv itie s  in the mass peasant organisations o f the le ft ,  which were previously 
neglected because of the pressure exerted by the 'r igh t'. The party called on 
loca l organisations to partic ipa te  in the ac tiv itie s  o f UFOSz and FEKOSz^**4  ^
One day before th  party's P o litica l Com m ittee met, on 25th February 1947, Imre 
Kovacs, in a pre-em ptive move, resigned from  the party. The Com m ittee, a fte r 
long debate, however, managed to establish a frag ile  peace w ith in  the party  and 
no other members o f Kovac's group decided to  fo llow  him. Those who remained 
maintained tha t th is resignation, fo r ta c tic a l reasons, was ill- tim e d  and believed 
tha t by rem aining they could 'save' as much as possible from  the party  i f  and 
when, as was planned, Kovacs should succeed in fo rm ing a new agrarian 
p a r t y / * * ^  W ith the election o f Ferenc Erdei as the new General Secretary, the 
'le f t ' from  then on dominated the party. The expected mass purge in the party  
was, however, postponed in order not to  scare o f f  the peasants who began, 
slowly, to  leave the SHP and the 'Peasant A lliance ' and move towards the 
NPp / * * ^  An ill- t im e d  purge, i t  was believed, would have adversely a ffec ted  
the party's recru itm en t campaigns demanded by the forthcom ing General 
Elections.
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In view o f the General Elections from  M arch-A pril 1947, a recru itm en t 
r iv a lry  developed between the le ft-w in g  parties, to  win over the peasantry. The 
increasing p o lit ica l pressure on the SHP resulted in the w ithdraw al o f peasants 
from  the party and the 'Peasant A lliance '. This development not only paralysed 
but, in a number o f places, dissolved the local SHP organisations. But very few 
peasants moved over to  the HCP, to  its  great disappointment, although the party 
tr ie d  very hard to  re c ru it them in to its  ranks. Its Third Congress, in September 
1946, had already made recru itm en t considerably easier by dispensing w ith  the 
requirem ent tha t prospective candidates needed the nominations o f two fu ll 
members. A ll workers, peasants and in te llectua ls  who subscribed to  the HCP's 
objectives were welcomed in to  the party. A t the tim e o f its  Third Congress, 
membership was 653,000 which represented 6.7 per cent o f the population. By 
occupational p ro file  it  was, roughly, 45 per cent workers, 39 per cent peasants, 5 
per cent in te llectua ls  and 13 per cent others, e.g., artisans and shopkeepers 
e t c / * * ^  The party's influence among the peasants in the spring o f 1947 was on 
the increase and, although most peasants did not actua lly  jo in  the pa rty  ranks, 
but ra ther the com m unist-contro lled mass organisations e.g., UFOSz and 
FEKOSz and the Farm er’s Cooperatives (Foldmuvesszovetkezetek), w ith  
membrships o f 300,000, 400,000 and 600,000 respectively, the party  obtained 
im portant influence among the poor and new landow ners/***^  The new 
recru itm en t campaign launched by the party  was designed to  boost membership 
among these groups.
Meanwhile, the SDP did not remain inactive. From the tim e  o f the 
party's XXXV Congress on ls t-3 rd  February 1947, more than any tim e  since the 
end o f the war, i t  turned w ith  enthusiastic in terest towards the peasants. Its 
Congress adopted a new 'A g ricu ltu ra l A ction  Programme' ^ * ^ ,  the f irs t  
independent programme o f the party  since 1945. I t  was an updated version o f 
the party's 1930 programme, to  take in to  account the changed conditions
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resu lting from  the war and post-war p o lit ica l developments. The programme 
again stressed, in te r a lia , the importance o f the economic, p o lit ic a l and cu ltu ra l 
development o f the ag ricu ltu ra l population and, through voluntary means, the 
establishment o f c o o p e ra t iv e s /* ^  Further evidence o f the party 's increased in 
agricu lture  was provided by the three day 'Peasant Congress' i t  organised at the 
end o f March 1 9 4 7 / * ^  Its  aim was to  draw a tten tion  to the SDP's cla im  to  be 
the party o f the peasants too and to assist its  ru ra l recru itm en t campaign. The 
congress helped to  move the party organisatoinally closer to  ru ra l life , but its  
success in term s o f recru itm en t was lim ite d . The SDP found it  very d if f ic u lt  to 
break in to  areas where i t  had no previous roots, and num erica lly was most 
successful in Budapest. But, although the number o f peasants jo in ing  the party 
had improved it  did not, s ign ifican tly , change the social composition o f the 
party. Its  e ffo rts  in the fie ld  o f recru itm en t, however, brought the party in to 
d irec t c o n flic t w ith  both the HCP and NPP, by adversely a ffe c tin g  th e ir  ru ra l 
interests. I t  created much fr ic tio n  between the parties, especially at grass-roots 
leve l.(122)
Follow ing the defeat o f the 'r igh t' in the NPP, in tra -p a rty  tensions
remained even a fte r the resignation o f Imre Kovacs and, fo r a while, as noted
earlie r, the party 's new leadership spent most o f its  energy on try in g  to  resolve
its  in trapa rty  problems. It had no tim e to  address its e lf to action-program m es or
recru itm en t campaigns. The agrarian programme promised by the party's
P o litica l Com m ittee, which met on 25th February 1947, was delayed u n til May
and unlike the SDP and HCP the party did not s ta rt its  recru itm en t campaign in 
(123)March 1947. In spite o f this, the disillusioned peasants leaving the SHP
(124)found the NPP the most acceptable a lte rna tive  and therefore , from  the end 
o f February, the party's influence among the peasantry began, slow ly, to  
increase, and in most regions the party became organisationally stronger. This 
created confusion and embarrassment in the ranks o f the SHP. A f te r  the NPP
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began recru itm en t in June as part o f its  e lecto ra l campaign, i t  surpassed both 
the HCP and SDP. This did not, however, mean tha t the party managed to  win 
the support o f the previous sm all- and medium peasants. The party 's success 
was, largely, among the poor and new landowners, through its  a c tiv itie s  in 
UFOSz and FEKOSz. Regionally, the party was strongest in Eastern Hungary and 
the weakest in Trans-Sanubia and the N o r t h / * ^  The riva lries  among the 
parties seeking to  rec ru it members created serious con flic ts  between the NPP 
and the other two le ft-w in g  parties, the HCP and SDP. Even the mass 
organisations, UFOSz and FEKOSz, were transform ed in to a th rea tre  o f open 
war.
The long-awaited 'Agrarian Programme' o f the NPP was made public on
(1 ?fi)'Dozsa Day' at a meeting in M ezotur, on 11th May 1947. The need fo r a
comprehensive programme had existed ever since 1945 when the NPP had
published its  short and ra ther general 'K iskate', the best i t  could do because o f
the 'le f t ' and 'r igh t' sp lit in the party. The defeat o f the 'r ig h t' made i t  possible
fo r  the 'le f t ' to  d ra ft a programme. While the proposal put the party, more than
ever before, f irm ly  on the 'le f t ' i t  did not renounce its  determ ination to  compete
fo r the support o f the peasants. The main thrust o f the proposal was to  gain the
support o f poor - middle peasants, hence, the party  remained w ith in  the
fram ew ork o f the worker-peasant alliance. It  proposed tha t power be given to
the people in a system o f 'peasant democracy', since the peasants form ed the
(127)m a jo rity  in the country. The proposal promised 'economic dem ocracy' and
simultaneously w ith  its  support fo r p riva te  ownership stressed tha t the most 
e ffe c tive  too l in the hands o f the working peasants against any fo rm  o f cap ita lis t 
and com m ercia l exp lo ita tion was cooperation:
individual small producers w ith  co llec tive  production 
purchasing and marketing, co llec tive  procurement o f 
machines and other equipment, which otherwise would be out
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o f th e ir reach, could make th e ir farm s stronger, more 
p ro fitab le  and v i a b l e . ( 1 2 8 )
The programme, on the whole, was designed to  demonstrate the un ity  o f the
party  fo r recru itm en t purposes and, by making i t  acceptable to  a large number o f
peasants, to  hasten the dissolution o f the SHP before the General E lection.
The HCP decided tha t despite successes in e lim ina ting  opposition i t
needed to  consolidate its  increasing influence through a general e lection fo r  a
new government. The whole issue o f a new general e lection was raised by the
'Le ft-W ing-B loe ', because of the frequent crises in the coalition, as early as the
autumn o f 1946 and i t  was hoped tha t i t  would be held before the mandate o f the
Assembly ran out sometime during the summer o f 1947. Insofar as the HCP was
concerned the tim e was now righ t: the ’r ig h t1 was re la tive ly  dispersed, the food
supply in the summer was always favourable, w ith  Truman's spech in March and
the Marshall Plan in June the in terna tiona l s ituation was becoming more acute
and the Peace Treaty was to  become e ffe c tive  in September. By tha t tim e  the
party  wanted to c la r ify  the re la tive  po lit ica l balance o f forces and to  m odify the
(129)
unfavourable parliam entary situation. The HCP was not merely th ink ing  in 
term s o f increasing its  share o f the votes but o f winning con tro l o f the 
leg is la ture in order to  put in to  fu ll e ffe c t the resolutions o f the party 's Third 
Congress, namely, to  develop fu rth e r the concept o f 'People's Democracy'. The 
election, in itia ted  by the HCP, was strongly supported by the NPP, which saw 
the possib ility  to  increase its  parliam entary strength. The SDP was not over- 
enthusiastic but on the whole hoped to  c la r ify  the re la tive  strength o f the 
workers parties in its  favour and le f t  o f the SHP, under the transparent 
communist guidance o f Dobi since June 1947, hoped to  decide the in tra p a rty  
power balance f in a lly  in favour o f the le ft .  O therwise, the SHP as a whole not 
unnatura lly feared the election, knowing only too w e ll tha t the 1945 resu lt would 
not be r e p e a te d /* ^  Apart from  the party's general weakness, another reason
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fo r  th is was the new e lectora l law, passed by the Assembly on 23rd June 1947,
pe rm ittin g  other parties to  run in the election. Together w ith  the
fraudulent action o f the Registering Comm ittees, under the contro l o f the HCP,
in preparing the e lecto ra l lis ts  so as to  disenfranchise as many o f the opposition
as possible, the new e lecto ra l law aimed at e lim ina ting  any po tentia l support fo r
the SHP. P rio r to  the e lection the le ft-w in g  parties agreed to  form  an e lecto ra l
a lliance and, since there was then no fu rth e r need fo r the 'Le ft-W ing-B loc ', to
dissolve it .  But, in the fin a l analysis, the HCP opposed the scheme and the ’Bloc*
(132)was never fo rm a lly  dissolved.
Most o f the parties did not prepare a separate e lectora l programme but
adapted and popularised th e ir la test Congressional programmes. Insofar as
agricu ltu re  was concerned, the e lecto ra l p la tfo rm  o f the HCP published on 3rd
(133)August 1947, was a model o f moderation. Its focus was on the three-year
plan just adopted a couple o f days before and it  emphasised the im m ediate 
benefits to  workers and peasants. It f irm ly  demanded the com pletion o f legal 
con firm ation  o f land tit le s  fo r new landowners by 1st October 1947 and promised 
the newly landed peasantry m ateria l aid to  lessen th e ir burden. In an a ttem pt to 
disperse fears among the peasants regarding co llectiv isa tion , fears encourged by 
the non-communist parties, i t  stressed the option o f independent farm ing:
the fu tu re  prosperity o f Hungarian agricu lture  lies in the 
strengthening o f peasant ownership and priva te  cu ltiva tion  
and in the energetic development o f ag ricu ltu ra l cooperative 
m ovem ent.(134)
The e lecto ra l p la tfo rm  said nothing about 'socialism ' or the fu tu re  development 
o f society. I t  ce rta in ly  put the peasant's mind at rest by declaring tha t the 
property o f the ' l i t t le  people' was 'sacrosanct and u n to u c h a b le '.^ ^
In an a ttem pt to  reassure the peasants tha t the land they owned 
remained th e ir property, Jozsef Revai in an impressive a rtic le  in Szabad Nep 
declared:
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i t  is rumoured by others tha t i f  the communists win the 
election the peasants w ill be driven in to one big herd ... The 
kolkhoz is a Russian word, meaning communal farm ing. I t  
does not, however, fo llow  tha t i f  the Russian peasant wanted 
the kolkhoz system, the Hungarian peasant wants i t  too. We 
communists know and appreciate this. We would be mad and 
stupid i f  we fa iled  to  take in to  our calculations tha t our 
peasants wish to  prosper through the consolidation o f 
individual p riva te  farm ing. We acknowledge priva te  peasant 
property has to  be conslidated. Those who ag ita te  against 
the communists w ith  the invented story o f kolkhozes are 
agents of reaction, w o lf in sheep's c l o t h i n g . ( ^ 6 )
While w ritin g  these words Revai, o f course, must have known tha t even the 
Russian peasant did not want kolkhozes, tha t m illions o f them were k illed  by 
S talin because they have resisted. He must have also known tha t the 'kolkhozes' 
was not a story invented by 'reaction ' since the HCP was already working on its 
preparations.
The SDP leadership o ften  ideologica lly confused and invariab ly divided
on tac tics , was m om entarily united in a fin a l e ffo rt to  ra lly  the industria l
working class and middle class to  social democracy. But during the election
campaign recurring in terna l disagreements, and communist assaults, le f t  the
party  organisatonally weak and w ith  a confused membership to  prove, ye t again,
its  chronic in a b ility  to  mobilise its  otherwise not inconsiderably power, in
(137)defence o f social democracy. Its e lecto ra l p la tfo rm , published on 18th Ju ly 
(138)1947, like  tha t o f the HCP's, made the three-year plan the centre o f
in terest. The otherwise long, and in places radica l sounding, p la tfo rm  had very
l i t t le  to  say to  an und iffe ren tia ted  peasantry. For the landed peasants i t
demanded the cheap supply o f machinery and equipment and the establishment o f
'Machine T racto r Stations' in a ll parts o f the country. I t  also demanded the
m ateria l and moral support fo r the development o f fu rth e r cooperative 
(139)a c tiv itie s . On the whole i t  was not w ell received by its  peasant
membership.
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The NPP, in its  e lecto ra l p la tfo rm , adapting and popularising its  11th
May M ezotur ’A g ricu ltu ra l Programme’ unlike the other two workers’ parties,
directed its  a tten tion  to  the peasantry and in te llectua ls  hoping to  win th e ir
support, and had nothing to  say to  other stra ta  o f s o c ie t y / * ^  For ta c tic a l
reasons a shade o f nationalism  and even 'r ig h tis t' tendencies could be observed in
the pa rty ’s e lecto ra l campaign, to  allure the undecided p e a s a n ts .^ ^  The party
did not re tre a t from  its  M ezotur programme but sh ifted its  emphasis away from
cooperatives to  support fo r the fo r independent smallholders.
The SHP, constantly under po lit ica l pressure by the le ft ,  and preoccupied
w ith  its  in te rna l problems, did not d ra ft a separate e lectora l programme. The
party, o f course, was fu lly  aware tha t its  fu tu re  was to  be decided by the size o f
(142)
the peasant vote i t  could muster. Inspite o f this, perhaps not unexpectedly 
under the le f t is t  Istvan Dobi’s leadership, the party  fa iled  to  provide a concrete 
’message’ regarding fu tu re  developments, required by the peasants. The p a rty ’s 
e lectora l p la tfo rm  was fa r  too general and w ithout any obvious and d irec t appeal 
to  the peasants. Dobi’s proclam ation, in cla im ing to  speak fo r the SHP, tha t:
our enemies during the election should not be sought among 
the le ft-w in g  parties, but ra ther among the newly formed
bourgeois parties.(142)
must have alienated a sizeable share o f the voters, perhaps even driven them to  
the very parties to  which he re ferred. Indeed, la te r i t  became clear th a t many 
small and medium peasants who, in many places, le f t  the SHP were not a ttra c te d  
to the le f t is t  parties, including the NPP, but voted in favour o f the o ther new 
opposition p a r t ie s / * ^
The actual conduct o f the e lectora l campaign between the SHP and the 
other members o f the coa lition  partners and, perhaps more in te res ting ly , 
between the le ft-w in g  parties form ing the e lecto ra l alliance, could provide l i t t le
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com fo rt as regards the performance o f e ithe r the HCP or its  le ft-w in g  allies. A ll 
the le ft-w in g  parties were determ ined to  weaken the e lecto ra l chances o f the 
SHP and each reckoned on winning a share o f its  voters.
In ru ra l areas the SHP, during much o f the campaign, ran in to  serious
co n flic t w ith  the NPP. The NPP, to  the ir r ita t io n  and embarrassment o f the
SHP, published in its  da ily newspaper the numbers and names o f peasants who
(145)le f t  the SHP and joined the NPP. NPP speakers at election meetings and the 
pa rty ’s da ily  o ften attacked and pub lic ly condemmed the SHP fo r  its  ’r ig h tis t' 
po litics  but the party, in teresting ly, re fra ined from  c ritic is in g  personally Istvan 
Dobi and the new leadership. Towards the end o f the campaign relations 
between the two parties had improved, since i t  was recognised tha t continued 
r iv a lry  between them brought no real benefit to  e ither party. Indeed, w ith  the 
increasingly aggressive e lectioneering o f the opposition parties amongst the 
peasants, too hostile a relationship reduced the electora l chances o f both the 
SHP and NPp / * ^  The SHP's policy towards the SDP was never rea lly  
consistent. In it ia lly , in some areas the two parties even formed a 'common fro n t' 
against the communists and frequently  the SHP defended the SDP against 
communist attacks. But th is a ttitude  was not uniform  or widespread throughout 
the country. In most places the two parties behaved as rivals. The SDP wanted 
to  replace the SHP, in both urban and ru ra l areas. Numerous con flic ts  developed 
between the parties, as the campaign progressed, and fin a lly  they turned 
com plete ly against one another. There was l i t t le  doubt tha t the SHP considered
(147)
the NPP as the only possible a lly. During the election campaign the SHP
not only became isolated from  the SDP and NPP but its  re la tions w ith  the HCP 
too, perhaps predictably, progressively deteriorated. The HCP delivered almost 
continuous attacks on the SHP fo r its  ’r ig h tis t ’ propaganda campaign and strongly 
c ritic ised  its  leadership fo r its  over-com pliant a ttitude  towards the party's 
’r ig h t’.
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Regarding re lations between the parties form ing the e lecto ra l alliance,
here too, inspite o f earlie r promises and agreements, notable d is-un ity, con flic ts
o f in terest and, often, serious confrontations marked the e lection campaign. The
most serious fr ic tio n , perhaps, tha t developed was between the NPP and SDP.
During much o f the tim e  in its  desperate fig h t fo r  the peasant vote, the SDP,
hoping to  lure the peasants away from  the NPP, re ferred to  the NPP as the
'sister-branch' o f the HCP. The SDP often critic ised  the NPP's nationalist
posters and slogans. Relations fu rth e r deteriorated to  the point where the SDP
renounced any fu rth e r cooperation and abrogated the e lecto ra l a lliance w ith  the 
Npp (148)
Relations between the SDP and HCP too le f t  much to  be desired. The
SDP, o f course, desperately wanted to  become the most in flu e n tia l party o f the
le f t  and to increase its  weight in the coalition. Thus it  went in to  the election
(149)w ith  great energy, sending thousands of ac tiv is its  to ru ra l areas. While the 
centra l leadership, on the whole, respected the agreements between the two 
workers' parties they were frequently  v io lated at the gass-roots level. In a 
number o f villages, local SDP organisations, in the ir propaganda campaign, 
accused the HCP o f drawing up plans fo r the establishment o f 'kolkhozes' and 
generally displayed strong anti-com m unist s e n t im e n ts / * ^  The HCP many 
tim es had warned the party to  restra in  itse lf. What, more than anything else, 
poisoned re lations between the two parties was when Matyas Rakosi, at an 
election meeting in Csepel at the beginning o f August, raised tahe question o f 
the possible merger o f the two parties. This in fu ria ted  the SDP and, on behalf o f 
the entire  party, Arpad Szakasits prom ptly re fu ted the whole idea and declared 
tha t 'the road is wide enough fo r both o f us' and ’cooperation fo r  ever, fusion 
n e v e r ' / * ^  The SDP, encouraged by the frequently  v is iting  B ritish  Labour Party 
o ffic ia ls , believed tha t the tim e had come when i t  could become the leading 
party in the c o u n try /* * *^  The NPP, on the whole, worked fa ir ly  closely w ith  the
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HCP w ithout much disturbance and re lations between the two parties remained 
quite reasonable.
The communists attem pted to  humanise th e ir party through clever 
propaganda, e.g., the promise o f re tu rn  o f prisoners from  the Soviet Union; 
children thanking the party fo r sending them on holidays etc. Rakosi, on the 
other hand, promised to  obtain Soviet economic concessions and, on the other, 
warned the population tha t should the party  fa il to  get mass support the Soviet 
Union would in te r v e n e / * ^  In te rpa rty  bickerings o f the le ft ,  o f course, tended 
to  help the other parties. These non-communist parties focused th e ir a tten tion  
o f fe rm enting  fear o f co llectiv isa ton among the peasants and pointed out tha t 
communism was alien to  the country’s h istory and cu lture.
'W ith everyone figh tin g  everyone else' the day o f the General E lection
came on 31st August 1947. The actual e lection and the results have o ften  been
described in de ta il elsewhere. Suffice i t  to say, f irs t ly ,  that i t  was fraudu len tly
managed. The HCP, not satisfied w ith  the results o f its  ea rlie r
disenfranchisement drive through the Registering Committees, and its  vastly
superior campaign resources, had resorted to  exp lo iting  the notorious 'b lue-slip '
reg is tra tion  cards, issued by the communist contro lled M in istry  o f the In te rio r
under Laszlo Rajk to  voters who were absent, prisoners o f war etc. Many 'ex tra '
blue-slips were printed and offered to  le ft-w in g  parties. The SDP, confident o f
its  e lecto ra l chances, declined to  use them, but both the NPP and HCP made
(154)extensive use of th is 'double-voting' system.
According to  o ff ic ia l sta tis tics, announced on 5th September 1947, the 
biggest change, predictably, was the dram atic decline in the SHP's support, from  
its  1945 57 per cent e lection m ajority  down to  15.4 per cent. Also, by increasing 
its  share to  22.3 per cent the HCP became the largest single party, both in the 
country and in the coa lition . The share o f the SDP declined to  14.9 per cent and 
that o f the NPP increased to 8.3 per cent. The coa lition  parties received 60 per
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cent o f the votes, while the more m arxist parties, form ing the e lecto ra l alliance,
obtained 45.5 per cent o f the votes. But the opposition bourgeois righ t-w ing
parties, added together, w ith  40 per cent o f the votes, s t i l l  represented an
(155)im portan t force in the country. Although the HCP could cla im  the overall 
p lu ra lity  only 40 per cent o f new landowners voted fo r the p a r ty /*  ^  Thus, in 
respect o f winning the support o f the masses, especially the working peasants, 
the HCP was disappointed by its  re la tive  lack o f success. Even the new 
landowners' 'p ro leta rian consciousness' was ob literated by the fa c t o f becoming 
owners o f land.
While the HCP clearly  achieved its  objective of becoming the strongest 
single party in the country, its  v ic to ry  at the election, even i f  the results are 
accepted at face value and the various frauds overlooked, could hardly be 
considered to have represented a major sh ift in support among the e lectora te . 
Moreover, while the election greatly weakened the anti-com m unist forces in the 
coa lition , reduced the strength o f the SDP, and divided the opposition, these 
could not be construed as having given the HCP a mandate to  begin the radica l 
transform ation o f the p o lit ica l and economic sytems o f the country. But, of 
course, such lega lis tic  niceties did not trouble the HCP. In September, w ith  the 
'Peace Treaty ' becoming fin a lly  e ffe c tive  and Stalin's establishment o f the 
'C om inform ' in the same month, giving the signal openly to  step up the pace of 
the seizure o f power, a new phase o f the country's p o lit ica l system, a new era fo r 
the people's dem ocratic revolu tion began.
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6.3 C o llec tiv isa tion  on the Agenda
Sometime between the la te  autumn and early w in ter o f 1947 communist 
a ttitudes towards p o lit ica l and economic policies in general, and spec ifica lly  
towards agricu lture, began to show the f ir s t  signs o f real hardening. There is no 
doubt tha t the most s ign ifican t event tha t rad ica lly  changed communist a ttitudes 
was the hastily  convoked Conference at Szklerska Poreba, near Wroclaw, Poland 
between 22nd and 27th September 1947, which ended in the foundation o f the 
C o m in fo rm .^ ^  In view of the rapid ly changing and worsening East-West 
relations, the Russians brought to  th is Conference a new set o f guidelines and 
then manipulated the ensuing discussions so as to  produce, at the end, a united 
fro n t against the growing western ’im pe ria lis tic ' th rea t. In his opening address, 
Zhdanov evaluated the po lit ica l significance and im plications o f the 'Trum an- 
doctrine ', the 'M arshall-P lan' and the pro-Western disposition o f the French and 
Ita lian  Communist Parties (in attendance), using these as evidence o f Am erican 
war-mongering and im peria lis t designs w ith  the result o f d ivid ing the World in to  
two antagonistic camps. This demanded jo in t fo rm ula tion  o f po licy and action by 
East European countries, which had broken away from  the im peria lis t system and 
created a new type o f state form , the 'People’s Democracy’, where 'power 
belonged to  the people and the lion's share o f the economy belonged to  the state 
and the leading force was the working c la s s ' / * ^  He was fo llowed by Malenkov 
who delivered a 'glowing' report on the Soviet party's achievements, c lea rly  
designed to  press East European countries to  adopt the Soviet model and draw 
upon the vast experience o f the Soviet Union, gained during its  march to  
socialism.
The HCP's delegates were Jozsef Revai and M ihaly Farkas. Revai's tu rn ,
amongst the delegates -  each reporting on the position o f th e ir respective parties
(159)-  came on 24th September and he, f irs t,  appraised the recent General 
Elections and observed that:
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we have taken a step forw ard but our plan was not as 
successful as we had expected ... our influence w ith in  the 
working class is not yet overwhelm ing. In certa in  enterprises 
and mines the socialists are stronger than us.(160)
A fte r  th is Revai, to  reassure the conference, raised the prospects o f merger 
between the HCP and SDP, a move which he considered could sh ift workers 
support at once to  the communists, thereby s ign ifican tly  weakening the SDP's 
claims to  share power. He noted tha t the HCP was, on the whole, w e ll 
entrenched in the government. The NPP’s secretary, he revealed, was a 
communist and many o f tha t party's members o f parliam ent were also 
communists, or communist sympathisers. C ontro l over many leading positions in 
the country was also, already in th e ir hands/**’ ^
From available in form ation, i t  can be safely assumed tha t the question
(1621o f co llec tiv isa tion  was also among the topics discussed. While the Russians, 
at the meeting, did not press fo r  an imm ediate change in ag ricu ltu ra l policies, 
did not demand yet an a ll out drive fo r co llectiv isa tion , it  seems, nevertheless, 
highly like ly  tha t instructions were given to commence serious preparations fo r  
the socia list transform ation o f agricu lture  para lle l to tha t o f industry. T im e was 
s t i l l  needed, in Hungary, fo r the fu ll acquisition o f p o lit ic a l power. 
C o llec tiv isa tion  was s t i l l  considered in-opportune, as transpired la te r, 
e ffe c tiv e ly  opposed not only by the peasants, but also by some in flu e n tia l c irc les 
w ith in  the party. A fu ll-sca le  co llec tiv isa tion  was, therefore , perceived as a 
much more d if f ic u lt  task than any the party  had previously undertaken. 
Representations to  this e ffe c t must have been made to  the Russians. As a resu lt 
o f the a ttem pt to  reconcile increasing Soviet pressure fo r co lle c tiv isa tion , to  
which Matyas Rakosi, on the whole, readily subscribed, w ith  dom estic rea litie s , 
the period a fte r  the Conference up to  the spring o f 1948 was characterised by an 
a ttitu d e  o f ta c tic a l ambivalence on the part o f the HCP regarding the fu tu re  
development o f agricu lture and the issues concerning priva te  versus 'cooperative '
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and co llec tive  farm ing. Nevertheless, co llec tiv isa tion  was already f irm ly  on the 
agenda and i t  must have remained a permanent top ic o f discussion w ith in  the 
party. Indeed, preparations fo r i t  had already begun. Insofar as Hungary was 
concerned, the outcome o f the conference was to  take on board im m edia te ly 
S ta lin ist orthodoxy which, in te r a lia , had meant: the establishment o f a single 
party d ictatorsh ip, the re jection  o f a dem ocratic road to  socialism, the p o lit ic a l 
destruction o f the social democrats -  who were fa r too sensitive to  'im pe ria lis t' 
influence - and the transform ation o f the economic system on the S ta lin is t 
model.
On the ir re turn, Revai and Farkas subm itted th e ir report to  the 
Politbureau and noted w ith  some satisfaction tha t the Conference had included 
Hungary, w ithout fu rth e r qua lifica tion , in the lis t o f 'People's Democracies' 
inspite o f her re la tive  lag in social and po lit ica l changes v is-a-v is  her 
neighbours. The report observed tha t the resolution o f the Conference did 
not require a major sh ift in HCP policy but required the party's leadership: (i) to 
replace 'pragm atic tac tics ' w ith  more elaborate planning, (ii) to  consider th e ir 
fo rm er a lly  the Social Democrats and especially the 'righ t-w ing ' o f the Social 
Democrats, as dangerous enemies because they supported Am erican im peria lism  
which had now replaced German fascism, ( iii)  in th e ir  pursuit o f monopoly power 
parliam entary tools had to  be supplemented by other methods to  acquire power. 
The report concluded tha t the immediate tasks o f the party were: to  accelerate 
the creation o f a new coa lition , to  review economic policy, w ith  the aim of 
gradual exclusion o f the bourgeoise and to  in s titu te  measures to  fa c il ita te  the 
rapid acquisition o f monopoly pow e r/***^
A t its  session on 9th October 1947 the Politbureau approved the report by 
Revai and Farkas and appointed three Commissions to  review: general policy, 
economic policy and party and mass organisational work. The deta iled d ra ftin g  
o f the 'Guidelines fo r Economic Policy' began im m ediate ly a fte r  th is  meeting.
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Although completed by December the document was not published in the 
contemporary press. Indeed, i t  was not fu lly  known u n til the Politbureau, a fte r 
p ro tracted  preparatory debates, ra tif ie d  the guidelines and published them on 
12th February 1948. in his address to  the P o litica l Academy on 19th
December 1947, Erno Gero, however, made its  existence known and reported on 
its  most essential a s p e c ts / * ^  The main reason fo r  the delayed ra tif ic a t io n  was 
tha t in early December the d ra ft guidelines proposals o f Erno Gero provoked an 
in tra -pa rty  debate on ideology. The guidelines, in te r a lia , stressed tha t, due to  
the established centralised agencies the character o f state power in Hungary 
could no longer be described as ’cap ita lis t' in economic structure . But Im re Nagy 
opposed th is view and maintained tha t although the nationalisation im plemented 
by state, led by the working classes made i t  dem ocratic, i t  did not a lte r the 
’cap ita lis t’ nature o f production. Furtherm ore, since ’people's democracy’ was a 
variant o f ’bourgeois democracy' i t  was com patible w ith  residual cap ita lism . Imre 
Nagy's concept was re jected as obsolete and Erno Gero in his speech to  the 
P o litica l Academy on 19th December proclaimed tha t 'today we can decisive ly 
say tha t Hungary is no longer advancing on the road o f capita lism  but has crossed
1 1 C\ *7 \
the rubicon between bourgeois and people's democracies’, and tha t the
nationalised industries had essentially form ed the basis o f the socia list economic 
system.
The d ra fting  state o f the guidelines not only brought the problems o f 
assessment and perspectives o f economic development in to  focus, but i t  also 
brought about the appraisal o f the position and role o f ag ricu ltu ra l co llectives. 
On this issue, too, the views of Imre Nagy d iffe red  fundam entally from  those o f 
Erno Gero and Matyas Rakosi. There was agreement regarding the role 
collectives played against cap ita lis t exp lo ita tion, but Im re Nagy emphasised 
increased ag ricu ltu ra l output as o f paramount importance, and because o f th is, 
while supporting the development o f collectives, envisaged an im portan t place
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fo r  p riva te  peasant holdings, working side-by-side w ith  co llectives. Erno
Gero on the other hand, was more concerned w ith  the sharp d iffe re n tia tio n  
among the peasantry and the increasing influence o f the riche r peasants, and 
perceived the collectives as both a defensive and offensive instrum ent against 
the growing influence of the riche r peasants. A t th is stage, however, Erno 
Gero’s view did not carry any operational significance. But, unm istakably, i t  
already carried the germs o f the pa rty ’s fu tu re  agricu ltu ra l policies. The 
disagreement between Imre Nagy and Matyas Rakosi over ag ricu ltu ra l policies 
dates approxim ately from  this period and w ill re-appear even more sharply la te r.
The debate on the guidelines continued. A t the 3rd National A c tiv is ts  
Conference o f the HCP, on 10th January 1948, Imre Nagy, speaking from  the 
floo r, explained his views to the delegates. Nevertheless, a sh ift in emphasis to 
the ’socia list' content o f 'People's Democracy' was evident at the conference 
when it  accepted the slogan 'The country is yours, you are build ing i t  fo r 
y o u r s e l f ' / * ^  Explaining the significance o f th is changed content, Janos Kadar, 
in his opening speech, stated:
s ign ifican t change has occurred in the in terna l p o lit ic a l and 
economic conditions o f our country, our people. We have 
reached a higher level o f development, we have closed ranks 
w ith  our progresive, dem ocratic neighbours: we have
decisively advanced on the road o f democracy, the road o f 
building socialism .(170)
Follow ing Janos Kadar, Erno Gero was hard pressed to  'produce' a theory which 
d iffe ren tia ted  'People's Democracy' from  'pro le ta rian d ictatorsh ip '. He argued 
tha t in both cases the government was made up o f workers and peasants, but 
while the fo rm er was a 'worker-peasant state ', the la tte r  was a 'workers state '. I t  
was the v ic to ry  o f the Soviet Union which made i t  possible fo r  Hungary to 
proceed to  'socialism w ithout its  own pro le tarian d ic ta to r s h ip .^ ^
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A fte r  a th ird  debate, in early February, the document 'Guidelines fo r  the
Economy' was fin a lly  approved and published. In conjunction w ith  the changed
'socia list content' o f people's democracy the document was, perhaps, the clearest
indication to  date o f the party's intentions w ith  regard to  the fu tu re  o f
agricu lture  and the peasants. The major general goals outlined in the document
included the liqu ida tion  o f priva te  capita l and the extension o f the sta te  sector.
The document iden tified  four types o f production sectors in the national
(172)economy, w ith in  which, i t  said, changing but continuous r iva lry  takes place:
1. Simple com modity production: excluding 'kulak
holdings, a ll peasant farms, and small-scale industria l 
production units, not based on exp lo ita tion;
2. P riva te  cap ita lis t production: a ll the 'kulak' holdings
and a ll industria l producton units operating on cap ita lis t 
principles;
3. State cap ita lis t production: a ll p riva te  cap ita lis t firm s  
under the d irec t and continuous supervision and contro l 
o f the state;
4. Socialist production: a ll nationalised, communal
industries and enterprises and cooperatives, provided 
they operated on 'genuine' cooperative principles, and 
not as cap ita lis t businesses managed in a cooperative 
fo rm .
The document emphasised tha t while the socialist sector was predominant in the
economy, and the country was progressing towards socialism, fu rth e r res tr ic tio ns
were required to  fig h t against the s t i l l  im portant cap ita lis t sector. A f te r  the
nationalisation o f banks and financia l institu tions in October and November,
(173)1947 , converting them on the Soviet model -  a measure which brought some
major firm s wholly or pa rtly  owned by the banks under state con tro l -  the 
document called fo r fu rth e r nationalisation o f major industries, state con tro l o f 
in terna l trade, state monopoly o f fore ign trade, and more e ffe c tiv e  sta te  
planning to  complete the three-year plan.
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I f  th is was insu ffic ien t to  induce the sceptics to ponder about the fu tu re ,
the sp irit o f things to  come was c learly  re flec ted  by the fo llow ing  points in the
guidelines, dealing w ith  agricu lture. F irs tly , they observed tha t, resu lting  from
the series o f severe droughts, the new landowners and poor peasants were coming
increasingly under the influence and con tro l o f p riva te  trade and the 'kulaks'. In
order to  p ro tect them from  this undesirable trend towards ru ra l d iffe re n tia tio n ,
augmented by the increasing ru ra l unemployment problem, new regulations had
to  be introduced, since the poorly developed producer's cooperative system was
unable to  arrest and counterbalance th is development. A lthough in 1945,
according to  some w rite rs  and w ritings, there was almost a 'cooperative fever' in
(174)the country, w ith  many claims tha t the 'Hungarian solution was in
cooperation', tha t i t  was needed as an 'ob jective condition', nevertheless,
according to  Ferenc Erdei, no more than 4-5 'genuine' producer's cooperatives
(i.e., co llec tive  farms) had been established by the middle o f 1 9 4 8 . ^ ^  The
reasons fo r th e ir neglect were prejudice, opposition by the new landowners and
the defensive a ttitude  o f the HCP, which allowed no m ateria l support to
encourage th e ir development. The party, i t  seemed, had by now become worried
about the fu rthe r development prospects. The richer peasants, i t  cla im ed were
ge tting  richer, many o f the more e ffic ie n t old and new landowners had become
econom ically stronger during the preceding 2-3 years; while the less e ffic ie n t
new landowners -  the greatest po ten tia l supporters o f the HCP - were ge tting
(176 )poorer and poorer. The guidelines, however, c learly  stated th a t, at th is
pa rticu la r stage, 'general adm in istra tive  measures against the kulaks' were 
prem ature and ta c tic a lly  erronous, because such measures would adversely 
a ffe c t agricu ltu ra l output and would also alienate the middle peasants. I t  was, 
however, seen as im portant to c u rta il the growing influence o f the 'kulaks': th is  
was the reason fo r a series o f an ti- 'ku lak ' measures, e.g., progressively heavier 
taxation, higher in terest rates on credits, re s tr ic tio n  o f sales o f new m achinery
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and trac to rs  to  state, communal and cooperative establishments only, denying
them to  'kulaks’, tigh ten ing the law on the buying and selling o f land to  such an
extent as to  make it  impossible fo r the 'kulaks' to  obtain t i t le  ownership to  land.
A ttacks on the more prosperous peasants, re fe rred to  as 'ru ra l cap ita lis ts ',
became somewhat sharper and more frequent during the subsequent period. But
the measures recommended, aim ing to  restra in th e ir influence, s t i l l  fe l l  fa r  short
o f the physical in tim ida tion  to  be introduced la te r. Secondly, para lle l w ith  these
negative measures the document urged an increase in support fo r  the poor and
new landowners, by giving them tax and c red it concessions and by provid ing
security  fo r the middle peasants to  encourage them to  change to  intensive
cu ltiva tion . The document also urged the extension o f state ownership in
agricu lture  by the development o f state and model farms, to  assist the peasants
in ag ricu ltu ra l techniques. And perhaps the most im portant open step towards
co llec tiv isa tion  was indicated by the recommendation to  begin seriously the
organisation and expansion o f a network o f state-owned 'Machine T rac to r
(177)
Stations' established, as shown in November 1947 by the Three Year Plan. 
F ina lly , the producer's cooperative system (i.e., collectives) was seen by the 
guidelines as an im portant 'weapon o f the working class' tha t would remove 
bourgeois influences and encourage the modernisation o f agricu ltu re . The 
sm allholding system, based on individual peasant farm ing, i t  was cla im ed, was 
not only incapable o f consolidating and increasing its  strength, but could not in 
the long run even sustain itse lf. Therefore, gradual extension o f the cooperative
movement was recommended, especially in the sphere o f ag ricu ltu ra l
. .. (178)production..
In the meantime, the NPP did not remain inactive. The problems of the 
cooperative movement, pa rticu la rly  o f 'Farmer's Cooperatives', 
(Foldm iivesszdvetkezet) had, as shown earlier, been on the party 's agenda, in 
some form  or other, ever since 1945. I t  was also noted tha t, as w ell as tak ing  its
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cue from  the HCP on the question of land reform , the NPP had generally adopted
(179)
a common p la tfo rm  on the issues o f cooperatives w ith  the HCP. Follow ing 
th is tra d itio n a l pattern, the HCP, no doubt fo r ta c tic a l reasons, again pushed the 
NPP - by now under the fu ll contro l o f the pro-comm unist leadership - to  act as 
its  'front* and take the lead in preparing the ground n the uncom fortable question 
o f co llec tiv isa tion . Shortly a fte r the General E lection, the whole issue o f the 
cooperative movement was suddenly revived, w ith  great zeal, and became the 
centre o f NPP ac tiv ities . As in the land re form  period the NPP was, u n til the 
early spring o f 1948, always a step ahead of the HCP, w ith  rad ica l plans 
regarding fu rth e r development o f the cooperative movement. In M arch -A pril o f 
1948, however, prompted by in ternationa l developments, the two parties, 
predictably, w ithout any 'soul-searching', again quickly adopted a common 
ideological p la tfo rm  on the question o f co llectiv isa tion .
The conceptual fram ework o f the party's cooperative programme was 
drawn up by its  'Cooperative Com m ittee', which met on 17th September 
1947 .^® ^ F irs t, i t  decided to establish, at national level, a 'C ooperative 
Departm ent' w ith  the task o f prom oting the development o f cooperatives, w ith in  
its  party  organisations, and to  explain and popularise the concept among the 
peasants. Second, the approved policy dealt w ith  a ll aspects o f cooperation but 
singled out agrarian cooperatives as po ten tia lly  by fa r the most im portan t fo r 
fu tu re  development. The policy favoured the development o f 'General 
Cooperatives (A ltalanos Szovetkezetek) in ru ra l and 'A rtisan  Cooperatives' 
(Szakszovetkezetek) in urban areas. I t  based the entire  ru ra l cooperative 
movement on the existing network o f Farmer's Cooperatives', a propsal which, 
predictably, pleased the communists, who also wished to  u tilise  these 
cooperatives; they did in fa c t subsequently fo rm  the basis fo r co llec tiv isa tion . By 
October 1947, about 2415 o f these 'Farmer's Cooperatives 
(Fbldmiivesszovetkezetek) were operating, w ith  approxim ately 200,000 members,
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mostly on the princip le o f general cooperatives and, predom inantly, under
communist leadership. According to  party a f f ilia tio n  th e ir  leadership
composition in 1948 was 57 per cent HCP, 15 per cent NPP, 12 per cent SHP and
16 per cent non-party m e m b e rs /* ^  The ir p o lit ica l usefulness to  the HCP, to
ra lly  the ru ra l masses, was enhanced by the fa c t tha t th e ir  membership was
large ly made up o f poor and small peasant farm ers, who were perhaps the most
dependent on assistance and the most susceptible to  new ways in farm ing. The
social composition o f the leadership was 91 per cent working peasants, 3 per cent
artisans, 3 per cent p riva te  and public employees and others; and about 80 per
cent o f the working peasants were e ither landless or w ith  less than 10 cad. yokes 
(182)land, so the Farmer's Cooperatives (Fdldmuvesszovetkezetek) acquired a
pro le tarian image. Thus, the NPP and the communists hoped, by strengthening
them and extending th e ir ac tiv itie s  much more in the d irection  o f production to
develop them in to fu lly -fledged  collectives. For th is purpose the NPP called
upon its  members, especially the new landowners, to jo in  these cooperatives and
in itia ted  various tra in ing  programmes fo r  technical s ta ff, cadres etc. The party
had taken such a serious in terest in the prom otion o f the cooperative movement,
expecting to achieve good results from  th e ir development, tha t i t  repeatedly
(183)emphasised tha t '1948 w ill be the year o f cooperatives'.
The po lit ica l and ideological statem ent by the HCP regarding the fu tu re  
development o f the economic structure  and 'people's democracy' was also, 
in teresting ly, preceeded by a statem ent o f 'c la rifica tio n ' regarding the a ttitu de  
o f the NPP on the question o f 'people's democracy'. A t its  N a tiona l C om m ittee 
Conference on 1-2 November 1947, Ferenc Erdei posed tw o th e o re tica l options 
betweeen which the NPP had to  choose: e ither, to  side w ith  those who wished to 
see development towards 'bourgeois democracy' or to  work fo r  'people's 
democracy'. In line w ith  his recommendation, predictably, the conference f irm ly  
rejected the f irs t and endorsed the second a lterna tive . I t  also demanded
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increased state in tervention in the economy, i.e., fu rth e r nationalisation, and
greater support fo r cooperatives. Underlining the HCP resolution, the NPP also
expressed the desire to see closer relations w ith  the Soviet Union and the
neighbouring ’people's d e m o c ra c ie s '.^ ^
In line w ith  the conference resolutions, to  prove its  com m ittm ent on the
questions o f fu rth e r development o f 'people's democracy’ and the cooperative
movement; the NPP leadership set up by a working party in early December 1947
under the chairmanship o f Ferenc Erdei, to  elaborate on the theo re tica l and
'185)p ractica l problems of the Hungarian socia list cooperative movement. 
A lready, at th is early stage, there were signs tha t the development o f 
cooperatives was regarded not only, or ch ie fly , as sound economics and in the 
interests o f the peasants but as a social and p o lit ic a l measure tha t would play a 
decisive role in the liqu idation o f the individual sm all-hold ing and its  
replacement by a socialist system. A t an 'A g ricu ltu ra l Cooperative' conference 
in Szabolcs county one o f the local party o ffic ia ls  stated ca tegorica lly  th a t a 
major function  o f cooperatives was to  destroy ru ra l capita lism  and tha t members 
should get ready fo r an economic transform ation. Thus,
today, we see the cooperative question in a d iffe re n t lig h t 
from  a year ago. Today, we have the courage to  say tha t 
cooperatives can be regarded as a strong weapon in the 
struggle against capita lism  and, at the same tim e, we want 
them to  be developed to  be almost the only organisational 
form  o f people's dem ocracy .^® )
To assist in the preparation and policy fo rm u la tion  several im portan t measures 
were adopted by te NPP. F irs t, between December 1947 and February 1948, an 
extensive national survey was conducted by the party's Cooperative Departm ent, 
embracing the entire  cooperative movement, but w ith  special emphasis on 
'Farmer's Cooperatives' (Foldm iiveszovetkezetek), to  establish th e ir  strength , 
economic policy, leadership and membership d is tribu tion  according to  pa rty
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a ffilia tio n  and, most im portantly , the a ttitu de  o f peasants towards Farm er’s and
(187)General Cooperatives. Second, to  provide in fo rm ation  regarding
developments in the cooperative movement in neighbouring people's
democracies, the 'M iddle East European Cooperative Press Review’ was compiled
by Ferenc Erdei, w ith  the recommendation tha t i t  should, in fu tu re , be published
(188)regularly, under jo in t editorship w ith  the HCP. Third, fu rth e r preparatory
ac tiv itie s  could be detected in the fa c t tha t in December 1947 and January 1948
an o ff ic ia l delegation, composed o f leading NPP and HCP members, v is ited
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to carry out an on-the-spot study o f the progress, extent
(189)and problems of co llective  systems established in these countries.
On 11th February 1948 a conference was organised by the NPP in the 
’Forum Klub’, characteris tica lly , one day before the HCP’s own 'Guide fo r  the 
Economy’, to  report pub lic ly on the results o f the two months study o f the 
theore tica l and p ractica l questions regarding the fu tu re  o f the cooperative 
movement.(190) repor^  delivered by Ferenc Erdei fo llow ing  Len in ist
principles, paid due regard to  ’vo luntarism ’ and ’gradualism’, but w ithou t doubt 
represented new th inking and was yet another turn ing point regarding fu tu re  
ag ricu ltu ra l development. The g igantic task o f ’socialist trans fo rm a tion ’ o f 
agricu ltu re  had been brought s ign ifican tly  nearer. Erdei explained the ra tiona le  
behind the need fo r change. Compared w ith  the fundamental p o lit ic a l and 
economic changes achieved in the country, he said, agricu ltu re  and the 
development o f the cooperative system had lagged considerably behind. In his 
report he outlined the need and method fo r fu rth e r development o f sm all-scale 
agricu lture  towards what he called a ’people’s cooperative’ system. A f te r  
ind ica ting five  possible degrees o f cooperation, he suggested th a t only two 
m erited fu rth e r a ttention: (i) the basic type e.g., the ’Farm er’s C ooperative ’ 
(Foldmuvesszovetkezet) and (ii) the more progressive type Producer’s 
Cooperative (Term eloszovetkezet). In th is la tte r , w ith  the exclusion o f
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’household plots', members pooled not only the ir land, while re ta in ing  ownership
rights, but also th e ir  equipment and la b o u r/*® ^  Undoubtedly, fo r  ta c tic a l
reasons, he tried  very hard to  d iffe re n tia te  between his 'people’s cooperative
(192)system' and the Soviet 'kolkhoz system'. Nevertheless, i t  is ins truc tive  tha t
the system he so ca re fu lly  outlined had been introduced, in a ll its  essential
aspects, w ith in  a year. Only the name o f the cooperatives was d iffe re n t and the
model statutes which regulated th e ir  operation were more detailed. This
im portant conference was also attended by Imre Nagy, from  the HCP, and Janos
Gyongyosi, General Secretary and fo rm er Foreign M in is te r o f the SHP, but
(193)ne ither voiced any objection to  any aspect o f the report. I t  was obviously a
plan which, at tha t stage, em inently suited the HCP too as a programme.
As regards the SHP itse lf, as po ltica l power both in the country and
w ith in  the party moved rapid ly to the le f t  it  became a shadow o f its  fo rm er self,
under the fa ir ly  transparent guidance o f the HCP. In it ia lly , a fte r  the e lection,
the SHP s t il l maintained some hope of being able to  postpone a 'soc ia lis t' turn ing.
But by 12th November 1947, under the le ft is t ,  pro-comm unist in fluence o f Istvan
Dobi et al., the party was 'persuaded' to  announce its  opposition to  'bourgeois
democracy' and declare its  support fo r 'people's democracy', although i t  s t i l l
(194)drew a line between the la tte r  and 'socialism '. But on 6 th -7 th  March 1948,
at the party's F irs t Balatonkenese Conference, i t  approved the new p o lit ic a l
d irection  o f 'people's democracy' w ith  its  increased 'socia list content', and a ll the
plans fo r fu rthe r nationalisation. Indeed, Jozsef Bognar, a member o f the party 's
Politbureau (and elected Executive V ice-Chairman a month la te r) went as fa r  as
declaring people's democracy a form  o f socialism. The party  conference
endorsed the development o f a state-assisted cooperative system, on a vo lun tary
basis, as the most appropriate way to  solve Hungary's agrarian development 
(195)problem. F inally, a fte r  its  Plenum meeting on 17th-19th A p ril 1948 -  when, 
re fle c tin g  the sp irit o f the Balatonkenese Conference, a new le f t is t  leadership
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was elected -  an extensive reorganisation o f local party  organisations, depriving 
them o f th e ir autonomy, and a fu ll purge o f membership were ordered. The new 
leadership structure  tha t emerged from  th is purge was large ly made up o f poor 
peasants. The influence o f the b e tte r-o ff pleasants was elim inated and sm all and 
poor peasants moved in to  prominence in party  p o l i t i c s / * ^
In ternationa l developments, however, outstripped the gradual pace o f 
nationalism  and co llec tiv isa tion  envisaged by the HCP in its  guidelines and by 
the NPP in its  ’people’s cooperative’ programme. The combined e ffe c t o f the 
consolidation o f non-communist forces in Western Europe, the p o lit ic a l and 
economic advance achieved in the neighbouring countries, especially the 
communist coup in Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet response to  a ll these 
developments demanded that the pace o f socialisation in Hungary be
accelerated. Interesting, and im portant, evidence has recen tly  emerged
confirm ing this. In March 1948 Stalin and Molotov sent a le tte r  to  the Hungarian 
party leaders urging them to  ’build socialism in the villages', i.e., to  speed up
(197)
co llectiv isa tion . A t the meeting o f the Politbureau on 3rd March 1948, Erno 
Gero ju s tifie d  the proposed ’accelerated’ po licy in the industria l sphere:
the domestic and in ternational p o lit ica l s ituation has made 
possible a new and im portant forw ard step in the
nationalisation o f industry, and, in part, commerce although 
th is departs from  our orig ina l conception ... we did not take 
in to  account the rapid development o f the in te rna tiona l
p o lit ica l s ituation ... the Czechoslovakian and other events.
In my view i t  would be a mistake to  adhere to  the orig ina l 
schedule and not explo it the favourable c ircum stances.^^8)
On 25th March 1948 w ith  the slogan 'The fa c to ry  is yours, you work fo r
yourselves’ a ll enterprises employing more than 100 workers were nationalised.
W ith th is deepening s truc tu ra l change, a ffe c tin g  some 594 enterprises, em ploying
some 160,000 workers, 83.5 per cent o f industria l workers were in the state 
(199)sector. The dissolution o f the 'N ationa l Association o f Industria lis ts '
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(Gyariparosok Orszagos Szovetsege) symbolised the h is to rica l change -  the fin a l 
liqu ida tion  o f the free enterprise system in industry. In May 1948, some 20 
industria l d irectorates, under the various branch m inistries, were established to 
adm in ister these nationalised industries. By December 1948, fu rth e r sweeping 
nationalisation decrees brought every f irm  w ith  more than 10 workers under 
state contro l.
Turning to  the more complex question o f agricu ltu re , the im pact o f 
Soviet demands to  speed up the co llec tiv isa tion  process was not im m edia te ly 
visible. Several factors, to  be discussed below, would account fo r the seemingly 
delayed response. The next few months, from  March to  the end o f June 1948 - 
perhaps the most ambiguous and least documented in this entire  period -  were 
characterised by fra n tic  behind-the-scenes in tra -pa rty  debate, w e ll concealed 
from  the public which, together w ith  other considerations, delayed the process o f 
accommodation o f the Soviet request. U n til these d iff ic u ltie s  were resolved, old 
policies continued to be applied.
That is c learly  demonstrated by the fa c t tha t, a fte r  months o f 
preparations, the f irs t  comprehensive ag ricu ltu ra l po licy statem ent by the HCP, 
the 'Guidelines fo r  Cooperatives' was la rge ly out o f date when it  was considered 
by the Politbureau on 22nd A p ril 1948, since it  fa iled  to re fle c t the changed 
in ternationa l situation and the March note to the HCP leadership from  the Soviet 
Union. This may be one o f the main reasons why i t  was not made public at the 
t i m e / ^ ^  U n til the beginning o f 1948 HCP policy on the cooperatives was only 
known in outline. The some extent i t  had been set out in the party 's general 
po licy statement, the 'Guidelines fo r the Economy' and also p a rtly  in the NPP's 
policy statem ent in the 'Forum -K lub', which had been endorsed by the HCP. Both 
parties, then, based the development o f a co llectiv ised ag ricu ltu re  on the 
'Farmer's Cooperatives' (Foldmuvesszovetkezetek) and planned to  extend th e ir 
existing general a c tiv itie s  in the d irection  o f production. This line  was
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in tensively promoted by both parties during March-May 1948, w ith  numerous
cooperative conferences throughout the country, many organised jo in t ly  by the
NPP and the H C P . ^ ^  There the parties took a stand on the development o f
the cooperative system, demanded greater assistance and tr ie d  hard to  dispel
th e ir 'm ess-tin' image. Another feature  o f th e ir  work was the number o f
’com petitions' organised between existing Farm er’s Cooperatives
(Foldm iivesszbvetkezetek), to  show th e ir perform ance and achievements, thereby
(202)making them a ttra c tive  to  the peasants. These were the forerunners o f the
'socialist com petitions' so extensively employed la te r. The preparatory stages
envisaged tha t these 'Farmer's Cooperatives' (Foldmuvesszovetkezetek) would be
strengthened p o lit ica lly , under communist contro l, and developed in the d irec tion
o f production to  form  the basis o f the co llectives. In the spring o f 1948 both the
NPP and HCP were in open harmony regarding the fu rth e r development o f the
cooperative movement and the p o lit ica l development o f the country. In his
Presidentia l address at the Fu ll Plenum, on 4 th-5 th  A p ril 1948, Peter Veres
declared the development o f the cooperative movement the party 's most
im portant task. A fte r  three years o f vacc illa tion , m isunderstanding and
uncerta in ty, he said the party was f in a lly  on the correct road, the road o f
people's democracy. S trik ing  the same note, Ferenc Erdei went even fu rth e r
when he declared tha t the 'fu rth e r development o f people's dem ocracy' was the
(203)party's most im portant task. The resolution adopted endorsed th is  p o lit ic a l 
d irection. The same trend was re flec ted  in the 'Guidelines fo r  Cooperatives'. 
They stressed tha t the fu tu re  development o f agricu lture  was through 'socia lis t 
transform ation ', i.e., co llectiv isa tion , but in the case o f Hungary the conditions 
under which co llectives could extensively replace priva te  fa rm ing  did not ye t 
exist. That would come gradually, through the prom otion o f low er form s o f 
co llectives to begin w ith , and w ill fu ll regard to  the vo luntary princ ip le :
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in people’s dem ocratic Hungary the development o f socia list 
agricu ltu re  was through producer's cooperatives (i.e., 
collectives). Today, however, the pre-conditions in our 
country to  replace priva te  fa rm ing extensively do not ye t 
exist ... the trans ition  from  private  to  co llec tive  fa rm ing is a 
slow process which requires the vo luntary decision and 
patient re-education o f the peasant.(204)
Despite the continued 'gradualist' approach, the guidelines also contained a 
number o f negative aspects which indicated a certa in  degree o f im patience 
regarding the unsatisfactory pace o f cooperative development and p o lit ic a l 
readiness to  deal w ith  the riche r peasants. F irs t, the guidelines 'expected' tha t 
increased cooperative a c tiv itie s  would lead to  sharpening 'class-struggle' and 
urged the cooperatives to  provide help to  the middle-peasants in order to  free  
themselves from  'kulak' in fluence and move onto the side o f the working 
c la s s . ^ ^  Second, in s im ila r vein to  the NPP, the guidelines also emphasised 
the disappointing fa c t tha t the development o f ru ra l cooperatives was lagging 
behind tha t o f the economy as a whole and pointed to  the fa c t tha t existing 
members o f 'Farmers' Cooperatives' hardly partic ipa ted  in the p o lit ic a l l i fe  o f 
the cooperative movement and tha t many peasants were not even members. I t  
complained tha t Hungary had fa llen  behind the cooperative development 
achieved by neighbouring countries. I t  quoted Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, where 
already 80 per cent o f the working population were members o f cooperatives. In 
Hungary, in contrast, the Farmer's Cooperatives (Foldm iivesszovetkezetek) were 
merely an empty fram ework. The guidelines lis ted the reasons fo r  th is lag 
and explained the ways in which i t  could be remedied.
To this extent, while the guidelines undoubtedly represented a fu rth e r 
step towards the inevitable co llectiv isa tion , they s t i l l  perceived th is  as a longer 
term  objective, but w ith  some indication already tha t the unsa tis factory pace o f 
progress should be reviewed in the near fu tu re . They did not, however, re fle c t 
the urgency o f the Soviet message a few  weeks earlie r to  accelerate the
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agricu ltu ra l transform ation process, nor did they openly indicate tha t the party 
wished to  embark on forced co llec tiv isa tion  against the w ill o f the peasants. This 
seemingly unchanged a ttitu de  on the question o f co llec tiv isa tion  could no doubt 
be imputed to  the existence o f various factors, ideological, p o lit ic a l and 
economic, which appear to  have been instrum enta l in delaying the Rakosi 
leadership's adoption o f a firm e r, more urgent and decisive a ttitu d e  towards 
agricu lture. Yet th is tim e must have appeared to  many communists as the f irs t  
real opportun ity to  proceed a fte r the party had basically secured its  prim acy in 
both p o lit ica l and economic spheres -  except in re la tion  to  the SDP and, o f 
course, in agricu lture . There is reason to  believe tha t Matyas Rakosi and, 
especially, Erno Gero, devoted to  the Soviet cause and by conviction eager to 
'get on w ith  the job', were obliged to  slow down the commencement of 
co llec tiv isa tion  in the face o f countervailing forces. This was inspite o f the fa c t 
tha t in February 1948, when the Soviet Union began its  campaign fo r 
co llec tiv isa tion  o f agricu lture  in Latvia , L ithuania and Estonia, there was a 
general Soviet ca ll fo r  increased co llec tiv isa tion  in a ll East European countries. 
On 9th February, 1948, in a broadcast to  Soviet farm ers the Moscow 
com mentator, Konstantinovsky, spoke o f the peasants in the new democracies:
a fte r the f irs t  World War the landowners and the bourgeoisie 
fa iled  to satisfy the peasants' just cla im  fo r land. Today the 
governments o f the new democracies know tha t the present 
small peasant holdings are not a paying proposition and th a t 
the peasants’ road to  wealth lies in cooperation and the 
un iting o f small holdings in to  large co llec tive  estates. The 
example o f the USSR, where co llec tive  fa rm ing  has resulted 
in a great increase in y ie ld  and in peasant welfare , is having a 
tremendous influence and the movement fo r  se tting  up 
cooperative agricu lture  is growing apace. For the present 
these cooperatives unite  only the most progressive peasant 
elements, but i t  may be confidently  expected tha t they w ill 
help in fu tu re  to  rebuild agricu lture  on a socia list basis. The 
fu tu re  o f the new democracies lies in socialism ...(207)
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This was fo llowed a month la te r by the special S ta lin-M olotov note to  the HCP
leadership. I t  was a note which must have caught the party  leadership by
surprise and unprepared. The party was, o f course, w e ll aware -  ever since the
F irs t Com inform  Conference -  o f its  com m itm ent to  co llectiv ise  at the earliest
practicab le moment. But i t  fa iled  to  an tic ipate  co rre c tly  the v o la t i l i ty  of
in terna tiona l po litics  and may have been out o f touch w ith  Soviet th ink ing  and
reactions to the changed p o lit ica l s ituation.
One of the main obstacles to  compliance w ith  Soviet demands was Imre
Nagy, who, when inform ed of the requests to  speed up co llec tiv isa tion , was
appalled. Hardly three years had passed since the Hungarian peasant was given
land and now it  was to be taken away again. As the party's policies moved more
and more to  the le ft  and began more seriously to  antic ipate  co llec tiv isa tion ,
what in a communist parlance was called a 'r ig h t' opposition came in to  being
w ith in  the party at the end of 1947, under the leadership o f Imre Nagy. A t th is
tim e he was the head o f the party's Com m ittee on A g ricu ltu ra l Po licy and its
secretariat's 'Departm ent o f Rural A ffa irs ' (Falusi oszta ly). W ithin his capacity,
he cautiously attem pted to  promote w ith in  the party a 'Hungarian Path' a
people's dem ocratic road to  socialism and disagreed w ith  the rig id  ideological
(208)arguments which, fo llow ing  the Soviet model, called fo r co llec tiv isa tion .
Imre Nagy believed, w ithout any reservation, in the superiority  and des irab ility
o f a ru ra l economy based on large-scale co llectives. But he also believed that
this could only be painlessly achieved gradually over a long period, perhaps even 
(209)20-40 years. During tha t tim e  both priva te  and co llec tive  sectors should be 
encouraged and developed side by s id e .^ " ^  Im re Nagy was against an ill- tim e d , 
hastily  conceived and conducted co llec tiv isa tion  w ithout any rea l economic 
foundation, inspired purely by p o lit ic a l and ideological motives. As a fo rm er 
kolkhoz manager in Siberia during the early 1930's, Imre Nagy was able to  
observe the catastrophic results o f the Russian co llec tiv isa tion  process and
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wished to  save Hungary -  a country which, by its  size, could even less a ffo rd  i t  -
from  such an experiment. He argued against hasty co llec tiv isa tion  on three
main grounds. F irs t, he maintained tha t, in view o f the extrem ely ind iv idua lis tic
nature o f the Hungarian peasant, his conversion to  communism and co llec tive
fa rm ing  could only be achieved gradually. He constantly called fo r  extreme
moderation fo r a slower tempo to  be adopted fo r the ’socia list transform ation ' o f
the countryside in Hungary. Second, he maintained tha t one o f the main
obstacles to  a successful co llec tiv isa tion  programme was the extrem ely low -
level o f mechanisation in agricu ltu re . The 'Machine T racto r Stations', considered
one o f the most v ita l elements o f co llec tiv isa tion , were s t i l l  in th e ir  infancy,
w ithout any proper foundation. He argued that i t  was im portant f ir s t  to  expand
the network o f MTS before co llec tiv isa tion , or indeed even an in tens ified  policy
(212)of re s tr ic tio n  o f the 'kulaks', could be tackled. A re la ted  although
unmentioned economic consideration was the fa c t tha t from  early spring to la te  
autumn is the busiest tim e fo r agricu lture , the most cruc ia l fo r  ag ricu ltu ra l 
output. An announcement o f co llec tiv isa tion  in the spring would have caused 
great disruption in agricu lture . Third, Im re Nagy argued th a t under the 
conditions prevailing in Hungary, namely, the 'trans itiona l' period, re fle c tin g  the 
progress from  'bourgois' dem ocratic to  'socia list' society, instead o f the policies 
adopted in the Soviet Union in the early 1930s, the principles o f Lenin's NEP 
were more applicable. Thus,
the NEP is the specific  means and form  fo r build ing socialism 
and is absolutely necessary in every country where there is a 
s ign ifican tly  large number o f sm all peasants. Consequently, 
during the trans itiona l period the NEP is the basis fo r  our 
entire  economic policy. This means tha t the elements o f the 
NEP are not operative to  the same extent throughout the 
entire  transitiona l period but i t  w ithers away to  the extent 
tha t the build ing o f socialism proceeds and to  the extent th a t 
the socialist sectors o f the economy develop.(213)
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On the basis o f Lenin's NEP, Imre Nagy argued in favour o f m aintaining the 
p riva te  m arket fo r ag ricu ltu ra l produce, in te r-a lia , because:
the guiding po licy  o f NEP is to  ensure v ic to ry  over the 
cap ita lis t elements the p ro le ta ria t in power and the build ing 
o f socialism through economic so lida rity  based on exchange 
o f goods between the working class and the sm all peasant. In 
the interests o f the la tte r, the economy uses even the 
cap ita lis t elements so tha t they w ill be overcome and a 
socialist economy be bu ilt through the m arket and by the use 
o f the m arket ra ther than through d irec t exchange (barter) o f 
goods, or w ithout a market, simply to  avoid the m a r k e t . ( 2 l 4 )
Imre Nagy, to  be sure, opposed the basic structure  o f what Matyas Rakosi, and 
his group, stood fo r and, u n til 30th June 1948, the party leadership seems to  have 
been deadlocked by the d iffe re n t positions held by Rakosi and Nagy.
Another major obstacle to an early response to  Soviet demands was the 
fa c t tha t the HCP at th is tim e was com plete ly preoccupied w ith  the destruction 
of the last remnants o f un ified p o lit ica l opposition in Hungary through the 
merging o f the two workers parties, namely the SDP and HCP, to  seize monopoly 
power. Hungary was about to  fo llow  the examle o f Romania, where the two 
parties were fused on 21-23rd February, 1948. Between 13th and 23rd February 
1948, an o ff ic ia l delegation led by Rakosi and including the pro-com m unist 1st van 
Dobi, o f the SHP, the le ft is t  Peter Veres, from  the NPP and Karo ly Szakasits of 
the SDP, v is ited Moscow to  discuss, in te r a lia , the merger. A lthough Szakasits 
returned dissatisfied and protested tha t there should not be a forced merger, 
under le ft-so c ia lis t orchestrated pressure w ith in  thd party  led by Gyorgy 
Marosan, the HCP's too l and servant o f the merger, he soon had to  accept the 
in e v i ta b le . ^ ^  The party's XXXVI Congress, held on 6 th -8 th  March 1948, 
confirm ed tha t th is communist led coup had succeeded. The Jo in t Liaison 
Com m ittee o f the Politbureau, established on 10th March, decided tha t the tw o 
parties would be merged by 1st July 1948. By 21st A p ril the Jo in t Politbureau
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decided tha t the name of the merged partis  would be 'Magyar Dolgozok Partja ' 
(MDP), i.e., Hungarian Workers Party (HWP).
Thus, when the Soviet note was sent in March the HCP leadership was 
c learly  working hard on the problems o f un ifica tion  so tha t the party  could 
conclude the last stages o f seizure o f to ta l power, by bringing about the un ity  o f 
the M a rx is t-L e ft so as to  clear the road fo r  the fu ll 'socialist transform ation '. 
Subsequently, the party was preoccupied w ith  the preparation fo r  the 
fo rthcom ing F irs t Congress o f the un ified parties and found no tim e  to  spare fo r 
the thorny problems of agricu lture.
( 9 1 fi)The resolutions o f the Congress, which met on 12th-14th June 1948, 
bringing to  an end the Hungarian 'Kerensky era', was its e lf la rge ly  concerned 
w ith  the problems o f un ifica tion  and said very l i t t le  on agricu lture. The congress 
approved the new basic rules fo r the merged party and proclaimed th a t i t  was 
guided by M arxist-Len in ist ideology, which had v ic to rious ly  com pleted the 
struggle against 're form ism ' and 'opportunism '. A fte r  assessing the social, 
economic and p o lit ica l changes in the country since 'libe ra tion ', the Congress 
enumerated the most im portant tasks fac ing  the country: the purging o f the 
remnants o f 'reactionary ' elements from  the state adm in istra tion, passing a new 
law fo r the Constitu tion, reorganising the 'Independent Front' to  suit communist 
interests, consolidation o f the system o f planning and d ra ftin g  o f a five -year 
plan, nationalisation o f the Church Schools and the in troduction  o f re form s in 
education.
The Congress said very l i t t le  new and orig ina l on agricu lture . What l i t t le  
i t  did say was mainly adopted d ire c tly  from  the party's earlie r 'Guidelines fo r  the 
Cooperatives'. Some increased im patience and urgency may be detected in the 
greater emphasis on the urgent development o f producer's cooperatives and 
Machine T racto r Stations and in the demand fo r  greater p ro tec tion  fo r  the 
'defenceless' poor peasants against the 'v illage cap ita lis ts ' who explo ited them.
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The resolution declared tha t the 'decisive task is to  provide the opportun ity fo r
small-scale peasant fa rm ing and the application o f technology and science' called
fo r fu rth e r restra in ing measures on the influence o f the riche r peasants, by
increasing fu rth e r the burden o f taxation. While the Congress s t i l l  paid lip
service to  the defence o f p riva te  property, i t  declared its  opposition to fu rth e r
d is tribu tion  o f smallholdings and demanded the pre-em ptive r ig h t o f transfe r of
land to  the state and the compulsory surrender o f large land leases, acquired by
the wealthy peasants, in order to  establish land-leased cooperatives fo r the
(217)benefit o f landless agrarian workers and smallholder peasants.
During the summer o f 1948, however, events began to  move fast. The 
po licy o f gradual trans ition  was com plete ly abandoned, the theory o f people's 
democracies was redefined and policies were replaced by to ta l mechanical 
application o f Soviet economic practices, accompanied by the unconditional 
'sharpening o f the class-struggle'. The peasants, indeed the en tire  population -  
a fte r the p o lit ica l and economic developments tha t had taken place -  expected 
the F irs t Congress o f the merged parties to  announce the process o f 
co llectiv isa tion . A lthough no policy decision was made a fee ling  o f uncerta in ty  
swept through the country. The peasants began to  make pa in fu l m ental 
preparations fo r any possible confronta tion and the ensuing b itte r  struggle. They 
s t i l l  hoped, however, tha t they m ight be reprieved, at least fo r  some tim e  to 
come. This, however, was not to  be.
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Chapter 6
1. While the disslution o f collectives in Poland, in 1956, was accepted only 
as a trans itiona l solution, the various debates suggests tha t the party 
leadership s t i l l  f irm ly  believes in the u ltim a te  socia list transform ation o f 
agricu lture . See discussions by M. Mieszczankowski The system of 
gradual socia lisation, Zycie Gospodarcze, No. 15, 1967.
To achieve an u ltim a te  socialised agricu ltu re  there exist fou r schools:
(i) who advocate the use o f ’ag ricu ltu ra l c irc les ’ as a vehicle
(ii) who favour the expansion o f contractua l deliveries as means o f
gradual socialisation
( iii)  who consider the above two groups as unrea lis tic  and believes tha t 
co llec tiv isa tion  is the only way
(iv) advocates o f the so-called ’e ta tisa tion ’. They urge the state to
acquire land owned by old or in e ffic ie n t peasants in tu rn  o f an
annuity. This land would be used to  expand or create State Farms.
A ll agree, however, tha t application o f force fo r the purpose o f 
socialisation is unacceptable. See: ed. Jerzy F. Karcz Soviet and East 
European A g ricu ltu re , U nivers ity  o f C a lifo rn ia  Press, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1967.
2. David M itrany, in his fundamental work, Marx against the Peasant, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1951, on the other hand, showed tha t 
marxism and peasant populism are irreconcib le concepts, excluding one 
another. See also, m arxist arguments in: K. Marx & F.Engels: The 
Communist M anifesto; F. Engels, The German Peasant War; Marx-Engels 
Selected Works Vol. 1; F. Engels The Peasant Problem in France and 
West Germany; Marx-Engels Selected Works Vol. 2.
3. J. Stalin, Voprosi Len in iizm a, Gosudarstvenqoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy 
L ite ra tu r i,  1945, p.150.
4. Szabad Nep, 2nd July 1950, p.7.
5. Felszabadulas 1944 szeptember 26 -  1945 aprilis . Dokumentumok hazank 
felszabadulasanak es a magyar demokracia megsziiletesenek 
to rtene tebo l, Bp. Szikra, 1955, pp. 17-18.
6 . Views of historians d iffe r  on th is question. The o ff ic ia l Hungarian view, 
accepted by some western historians, is tha t no such 'blue p r in t ’ existed. 
That the HCP, in 1945, its e lf in the unknown was ready to  play the game 
o f dem ocratic fron ts. For an in teresting western view see: M. Molnar, A 
short h is tory o f the Hungarian Communist P a rty , Westview Press, 
Colorado, 1978, pp. 113-116.
7. Rakosi’s speech and the resolutions o f the ’Whitsun Conference’ in S. 
Balogh -  L. Izsak, Partok es Partprogram ok Magyarorszagon (1944-1948), 
Tankonyvkiado, Bp. 1977, p.188.
8. Gyorgy Kiss, Jegyzetek az elso evekrol 1944-1948, Gondolat, Bp. 1976, 
pp. 184-185.
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9. Matyas Rakosi, A nepi demokracia utjan, Va logato tt beszedek es c ikkek, 
(Selected speeches and artic les), Bp. Szikra, 1955, p.67.
10. P. Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution, Stanford U n ive rs ity  Press, 
1961, p.23.
11. The Yugoslavs moved to establish a single party -s ta te  by in troducing the 
s ing le -lis t, in November 1945, too quickly fo r  Stalin's purposes.
12. E. Strassenreiter - P. Sipos, Rajk Laszlo, Akadem iai Kiado, Bp. 1978, 
p.163.
13. Gyorgy Kiss, Jegyzetek az elso evekrol ... op.c it., p.89.
14. Ba lin t Szabo, Nepi demokracia es forrada lom elm elet. A m arxista
forrada lom olm elet fejlodesenek nehany kerdese Magyarorszagon 1935- 
1949, Bp. Kosuth, 1970, pp.153-158.
15. This was the most commonly used te rm . But 'People's Dem ocratic
Transform ation ' was also used and as tim e  went more and more 
frequently  the name 'People's Dem ocratic Revolution' was used.
16. Compared to  western 'F ront Populairet', the main d iffe rence  is tha t in 
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PART HI: SOCIALISED AGRICULTURE, 1948-1953:
THE PHASE OF COLLECTIVISATION
In the summer o f 1948, now tha t the SDP was incorporated, the 
opposition e ffe c tiv e ly  silenced, the facto ries and banks nationalised, the HCP 
achieved, v ir tu a lly , sole p o lit ic a l power. I t  could now tu rn  its  a tten tion  to  the 
communist reorganisation o f the nation’s economic and p o lit ic a l life  which, as in 
other East European countries, essentially meant the subservient copying o f 
S ta lin is t economic and p o lit ica l policies. A fte r  a b rie f in it ia l state o f 
tentativeness over tac tics  and the p o lit ic a l s tructu re  fo r tha t power in People's 
Democracy, a ll pretence o f gradualism and regard fo r loca l conditions was 
abandoned. Hungary was to  be transform ed from  an ag ricu ltu ra l to  an industria l 
country. In the in terest o f rapid, forced, industria lisa tion -  which was a bru ta l 
action programme ra ther than sound economic planning -  agricu ltu re  was 
subordinated and economic development was regulated by purely p o lit ic a l 
considerations which served Soviet interests.
U n til then, success had fo llowed success and nothing seemed impossible 
fo r the HCP. The task the Party now wished to  accomplish, however, surpassed 
everything: w ith in  a few years i t  wanted to  liqu idate the ru ra l w e ll-to -do  
peasants and force the entire  ru ra l population to  jo in  the co llectives, fo r  which 
the Soviet 'kolkhoz' system served as the example. I t  wished to  build 'socialism  
in the countryside' as soon as possible. Instrum enta l in the decision was the 
onset o f the 'Cold War' and the Com inform  m eeting which discussed the 
controversy tha t surrounded T ito 's  defection and the subsequent Soviet-Yugoslav 
sp lit. Stalin moved quickly to  consolidate his empire and created the excuse the 
Hungarian communists needed fo r tu rn ing  Hungary in to  a m in iature carbon-copy 
o f the USSR. One o f the accusations against the Yugoslavs was tha t they had 
pursued a 'ku lak-policy ' and denied the necessity o f co llec tiv isa tion . The
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exemplary Hungarian communists, w ith  th e ir  over-zealous basic a ttitude , 
re fle c tin g  what Moscow wanted from  Hungary, were determ ined to  show how to 
pursue genuine, socia list, an ti-ku lak po licy in the countryside. Somewhat la te r 
than in other East European c o u n tr ie s ^ , the actual announcement o f 
co llec tiv isa tion  was made at the fUj Kenyer Unnep* (Harvest Festiva l) m eeting in 
Kecskemet, on 20th August, 1948. The announcement put the fin ish ing  touch to 
the numerous po licy pronouncements, lies and deceits, claims and denials and 
counterchanges tha t had characterised the HCP’s ag ricu ltu ra l po licy  since its  
foundation in 1918.
The process o f co llec tiv isa tion , during the period between August 1948 
and June 1953, and the methods employed, to ta lly  alienated the peasantry and, 
w ith  the i l l  conceived emphasis on heavy industry, brought an economic disaster 
fo r  the country which had c learly  not been foreseen.
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Chapter 7: The Process of Collectivisation; the first stage
7.1 Decision to  C o llectiv ise
June 1948 was one o f the most eventfu l and im portan t months in the
post-war h istory o f the HCP. Everyth ing seemed to  happen at once. The f ir s t
major event was the merger w ith , or more accurate ly absorption of, the SDP By
this ’merger' the HCP elim inated the last challenge to  its  cla im s to  be the
spokesman o f the working class. The new Party, named 'Hungarian Workers'
(2)Party ’ (Magyar Dolgozok P artja ) , essentially the HCP in disguise, became the
sole repository o f p o lit ic a l power. The p o lit ic a l s tructure  to  exercise tha t power
and the ta c tics  to  bring about a faste r trans ition  to  the d ic ta to rsh ip  o f the
p ro le ta ria t, the possib ility  fo r which was created by the ’merger’, were s t i l l  in a
state o f flu x . The ’Congress o f U n ity ’, on 12th-14th June, fo r reasons discussed
earlier, s t i l l  adopted a re la tive ly  gradualist, cautious programme. But in the
im mediate post-Congress adjustment process, focused on the fu rth e r tasks o f
socialist construction, in it ia lly  in an atmosphere o f ’se lf-g lo ry ’ and ’se lf-
congratulation', fo r the v ic to ry  over the SDP, serious work had already begun,
behind the scenes, to  evolve and introduce new tac tics  fo r the im position o f fu ll
socialism. F irs t, however, the Party had not only to  resolve the problems arising
out o f the absorption o f the SDP i.e., to  begin a p u rifica tio n  process o f the now
somewhat d ilu ted new party, to  rid  its e lf o f the vestiges o f the ideology o f
’social democracy', but to  overcome th is  problem at a tim e  when the HWP its e lf
was not to ta lly  free from  ’sectarianism ’ and ’revisionism ’, represented on the one
hand, as noted earlie r, by the Muscovite, Imre Nagy, and on the o ther by the
group o f indigenous ’home’ communists loosely centered around Laszlo Rajk. I t
has already been shown tha t Rakosi and his friends, Gero, Farkas and Revai while
s t il l in Russia, decided tha t when the tim e came they would not share the real
(3)power w ith  the home communists in the Party.
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Meanwhile, preparations were being made fo r  the second im portan t
event o f the month, the removal o f Zoltan T ildy, the last outpost o f SHP power,
from  the post o f President o f the Republic, which he occupied since 1946. He
was im p lica ted  in an in te rna l p o lit ic a l scandal which erupted around V ic to r
(4)Csornoky, his son-in-law. T ildy  was forced to  resign in July, and w ith  his fa ll
the SHP was com plete ly destroyed as a p o lit ic a l fac to r. T ildy  was succeeded by
the pro-comm unist leader o f the now defunct and 'submerged' SDP, Arpad
Szakasits, as a reward fo r his services in helping to  align his fo rm er pa rty  w ith  
(5)the communists.
I t  was in th is  m ilieu tha t, in la te  June, the th ird  im portan t event o f the
month, the harm fu l Soviet-Yugoslav controversy, erupted in to  open
confronta tion, imposing im portant m odifica tions on the P arty  by the new
Com inform  line. This meeting marked a tu rn ing  point in the Soviet a ttitu d e
towards Eastern Europe, and produced fa r  reaching e ffe c ts  in Hungary's
economic and social environment.
There is no doubt tha t the Fourth Cominform  meeting, gathered in
Bucharest between 19th and 23rd June, and the subsequent sp lit between
Com inform  and T ito , was, from  Communist viewpoint, the most im portan t event
in the calendar o f 1948. I t  resulted, in te r alia, in a dram atic tu rn ing  po in t in the
Party's ag ricu ltu ra l po licy I t  was an em otionally charged meeting, not attended
(6)by the Yugoslavs, and its  resolution , published on 27th June, accused the 
Yugoslavs o f believing in the possib ility  o f e lim ina ting  capita lism  and the class 
struggle w ithout resorting to  co llec tiv isa tion . A b rie f summary o f the 
accusations runs as fo llows:
(i) pursuing an incorrec t line on the main questions 
o f home and fore ign policy
(ii) fa llin g  in to the Menshevik 'heresy' o f absorbing, 
instead o f liqu idating , the cap ita lis ts  and o ther 
counter-revo lu tionary elements.
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( iii)  foste ring  nationalism  and pursuing an unfriend ly
po licy towards the Soviet Union and the CPSU(B)
(iv) favouring the People's Front instead o f the Party
(v) denying the growth o f cap ita lis t elements in th e ir
country and consequently, the sharpening o f class- 
struggle in the countryside:
(a) they were pursuing an incorrect po licy  by 
ingnoring the class d iffe re n tia tio n  and 
regarding the individual peasantry is a single 
e n tity , contrary to  M arx is t-Len in is t 
doctrine o f classes and class-struggle, 
con tra ry  to  the w e ll known Lenin ist thesis 
tha t 'sm all individual farm ing gives b irth  to 
capita lism  and the bourgeoisie continually, 
daily, hourly, spontaneously on a mass 
scale’.
(b) pursuing a po licy under which individual 
fa rm ing predominated, land was not 
nationalised, there was priva te  property in 
land and land could be bought and sold, 
much o f the land was concentrated in the 
hands o f the kulaks and hired labour was 
employed.
The Cominform  resolution indicated tha t the liqu ida tion  o f the cap ita lis t 
elements and, hence, the kulaks as a class could not be achieved
as long as individual peasant economy predominates in the 
country, which inev itab ly  gives b irth  to  capita lism , as long as 
conditions have not been created fo r  the large-scale 
co llec tiv isa tion  o f agricu ltu re ; and as long as the m a jo rity  of 
the working peasantry is not convinced o f the advantages o f 
co llec tive  methods o f farm ing. The experience o f the 
CPSU(B) shows tha t the e lim ina tion  o f the last and biggest 
explo iting class - the kulak class -  is possible only on the 
basis o f the mss co llec tiv isa tion  o f agricu lture , and the 
e lim ina tion o f the kulak as a class is an organic and in tegra l 
part o f the co llec tiv isa tion  o f a g r ic u ltu re .^
Not only did the Soviet Union accuse the Yugoslavs o f making mistakes, but, by
drawing on its  own h is to rica l experience, the USSR provided 'guidance' as to  the
correc t po licy tha t should be fo llowed.
Behind a ll these accusations, o f course, lie  Soviet c ritic ism s  o f the
behaviour and doctrine o f the Yugoslav Communist P arty  its e lf. W ithout
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supporters among Cominform  members, although what was said p riva te ly  among 
communists was not known, the meeting unanimously f ir s t  condemned and then 
expelled the Yugoslavs from  the brotherhood o f th is recen tly  founded 'League o f 
Communist Nations'.
(8)The Soviet-Yugoslav sp lit, apart from  its  in te rna tiona l dimensions ,
s ign ifican tly  a ffec ted  the in te rna l party  po litics  and economic policies o f a ll
East European countries, especially w ith  regard to  agricu lture . The 'r igh t-w ing '
nationalist 1 deviation had to  be crushed throughout Eastern Europe. The
communist leaders in these countries were reproached fo r having fa iled  to
acknowledge the va lid ity  o f M arxist theory o f classes and class-struggle; to
antic ipate  the 're form ulated ', changing, S ta lin ist line tha t class-struggle in
agricu lture , as taught by M arxism-Leninism, was ge tting  stronger and sharper
during the period o f trans ition  from  capita lism  to  socialism, and not less intense
as stated by Bukharin, and tha t the use o f adm in istra tive  meaures were
necessary to  e lim ina te  the enemy. The example o f Poland - where the C entra l
Com m ittee o f the Party passed a resolution censuring the deviation o f the 
(9)Gomulka leadership , together w ith  the Com inform  resolution, were to  serve as 
the S ta lin is t guidelines fo r  a ll other East European countries.
How did the Hungarian communists react to  the Com inform  resolution? 
I t  is d if f ic u lt ,  even now, to  get a clear p ic tu re  on th is  question. I t  would appear 
from  available in fo rm ation  and public statements tha t the resolution caught 
them unaware, creating a certa in  degree o f ideological confusion and perp lex ity  
among them. The issue was, apparently, debated fo r  a few  weeks in d iffe re n t 
party  c ir c le s /1 ^  I t  was s t i l l  possible to  conduct theo re tica l debates, at least in 
party  circ les, and there were a number o f c r it ic s  who pointed out the in te rna l 
contradictions in the Com inform  statem ent and what Yugoslavia's expulsion 
meant fo r  the communist movement. Despite th is  i t  seems un like ly  tha t the 
Rakosi inner leadership, as d is tin c t from  leading Hungarian communists
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generally, could have been taken by surprise by the S ta lin -T ito  sp lit and, in fa c t,
the evidence was c learly  there signalling these developments. The 'apparent1
confusion and hesitations manifested in the post-Com inform  public statem ents
had d iffe re n t origins. F irs t, when a fte r an o ffic a l v is it to  Yugoslavia, in la te
1947, Rakosi was summoned to  Moscow to report, his praise o f T ito  was received
in silence by S ta lin /11  ^ Second, the quarrel between Stalin and T ito  was carried
on from  about m id-March to  the end o f May in the fo rm  of several exchanges o f
(12)le tte rs  between the two' countries. For example, a le tte r , dated 4th May,
giving a lesson to  the Yugoslavs in doctrine -  w ith  special reference to  the
position o f the peasants in a communist state -  alleged tha t T ito  rated the
peasants above the working class and had also fa iled  to  distinguish between
kulaks and other peasants as Lenin required. Several other, s im ila r,
communications were exchanged between the tw o countries and the f in a l note
was sent on 22nd May. These must have been known generally, i f  not in fu ll
details, and ce rta in ly  communists were aware tha t not everyth ing was in order
w ith  Yugoslavia. Indeed, everyone was a ttack ing  Yugoslavia then and, like  its
sister parties, the Hungarian Communist Party too quickly im ita ted  the Russians
(13)by sending c r it ic a l le tte rs  to  Belgrade in the spring o f 1948. Third , according
to  one account, before the actual Com inform  statem ent there were already
rumours and pointed remarks by insiders 'in  the know' from  which i t  would have
been possible to  construe tha t the s ituation regarding Yugoslavia was
(14)c r it ic a l.  Hungarian communists re tu rn ing  from  o ff ic ia l v is its  to  Yugoslavia, 
p rio r to  the Com inform  resolution, made the occasional comment on the 
d ifferences between the People's Democracies o f Hungary and Yugoslavia, 
especially w ith  respect to  the re la tions between the Party and the People's 
Front. These comments, seemingly, inspired very l i t t le  in te rest in Hungary but 
they did so in Moscow. Understandably, perhaps, as i t  was not so long since the 
Com inform  founding meeting had endorsed the Yugoslav model and the
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Hungarian communists made the Yugoslavs, noted fo r th e ir  revo lu tionary zeal,
an example to  fo llow , at any ra te , up to  the early spring o f 1948. Fourth,
according to  the same source, Rakosi and Farkas, during an earlie r o f f ic ia l v is it
to  Moscow, were in fa c t the f ir s t  to  denounce T ito  and his colleagues in fro n t o f
(15)the Soviet leadership. F ifth , as noted earlie r, Stalin and M olotov had already 
requested in March 1948 th a t co llec tiv isa tion  o f agricu ltu re  in Hungary be 
speeded up. Thus, on balance, there is l i t t le  doubt tha t at least the inner c irc le  
o f the Rakosi leadership was fu lly  aware o f these developments, possibly even 
welcomed them. I t  is like ly , however, tha t those communists who did not belong 
to  the Muscovite 'inner tem ple' o f Rakosi, and the lower echeleons o f the Party 
hierarchy, may not have been fu lly  aware o f these developments; to  them they 
may have come as a surprise, a shock, 'ligh tn ing  out o f the, perhaps, not so blue 
sky'.
The real reason, i t  is argued fo r the apparent 'confusion' and 'pe rp lex ity ' 
tha t undoubtedly could be observed in the various public statem ents tha t 
followed the Com inform  resolution was quite  d iffe re n t. Instead o f being 
manifestations o f genuine surprise, as suggested o ff ic ia lly  and by others, they 
were, in fa c t, the d irec t product o f the deliberate policies o f the Rakosi 
leadership, designed:
(i) to  generate a degree o f confusion and uncerta in ty
not only amongst the public, and more spec ifica lly  
amongst the peasants, but, perhaps p rim arily , 
amongst the various in tra -p a rty  groups and 
factions, and
(ii) to  conceal and/or to  d is to rt the essence o f events,
the nature o f the measures planned, before they 
were ready to  be put in to  e ffe c t.
Such motives would be consistent w ith  the character and a ttitu d e  o f the HCP,
especially the Rakosi leadership, ever since the in te r-w a r period.
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From the available in fo rm ation  i t  is clear tha t a fte r  lengthy discussions 
and several requests made by the Russians in the early part o f 1948, the question 
o f co llec tiv isa tion  was irrevocably decided by the Com inform  resolution. When 
the Com inform  met in June to  approve the resolution denouncing T ito ’s ’heresy’ 
the Hungarian delegation, Matyas Rakosi, Erno Gero and M ihaly Farkas, the 
senior ’M uscovite’ hardliners, na tu ra lly  voted in favour. The resolution also 
included sections which dealt w ith  the question o f co llec tiv isa tion . The 
Hungarian delegates agreed to  th is  too w ithout, i t  appears, e ithe r consulting the 
fu ll C entra l Com m ittee or having obtained its  p rio r approval. This was to  be 
done, ex post, la te r. Indeed, both the specially enlarged C entra l Com m ittee, 
which met on 30th June, and the Politbureau, which met on 13th July, were 
presented w ith  a fa it  accom pli. The decision was 'approved' as expected, though 
not w ithou t opposition. The im portance o f a ll th is  is tha t the co lle c tiv isa tion  
decision taken f irs t  at the Com inform  meeting and subsequently approved was 
de libera te ly not fo llowed by a public announcement u n til almost tw o months 
la te r. The new Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP) did not make its  changed 
a ttitu d e  public, i.e., tha t i t  had moved away from  the Spring 'C ooperative ' 
p rincip le . So, o ff ic ia lly  and in p ractice  fo r  a b rie f period, the slower, gradual, 
reorganisation o f agricu lture , w ith in  the fram ew ork o f the 'General V illage 
Cooperative' concept, was s t i l l  va lid . The significance o f the Com inform  
meeting in deciding to co llectiv ise  cannot be overestim ated. Hungarian 
communists never fa iled, even years la te r, to  emphasise the Com inform  
resolution in June 1948. This can be seen, fo r  instance, in the in fo rm a tive  
lec tu re  by Andras HegedUs, a spokesman on ag ricu ltu ra l m atters, addressing the 
Party College, on 5th October, 1950. He stated tha t,
in the changed circumstances the development o f our party 's
ru ra l po licy was greatly helped by the memorable resolution
o f the CominformOG)
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and th a t the resolution was
a warning to  our party too tha t the build ing o f socialism in 
the villages was a h is to rica l necessity in a ll People’s 
Dem ocratic countries, and therefore  in our country too.
The consequence o f th is ’memorable’ resolution wre not long coming. In its  main 
aspects i t  meant tha t:
(i) there was no ’d iffe re n t Hungarian road', i f  ever 
there was one
(ii) the class struggle had to  be waged vigorously, 
notably in agricu lture
( iii)  a p o lit ica l monolith had to  be created at the
expense o f the sem i-p lu ra lis tic  facade envisaged 
in the new 'Independence F ront'.
Follow ing the anti-Yugoslav resolution o f the Com inform , the HWP began to
reappraise its  p o lit ic a l d irec tion  and, very soon, previous form s and methods,
established during the People's Dem ocratic stage, began to  be liqu idated. The
party  its e lf was soon thoroughly reorganised and those opposing, in te r a lia , the
new agricu ltu ra l policies, e.g., the Debrecen group, Laszlo Rajk, the national
communists, Janos Kadar, Gyula Kallay, Geza Losonczy and the 'M uscovite ' Im re
Nagy, were f irs t  neutralised and then, by 1949, e ither removed from  power,
imprisioned or executed. The party  had to  become an e ffe c tive  instrum ent o f
the new line.
The fu ll elaboration o f the im pact o f th  new dogma emerged only
gradually. In it ia lly , from  the ambiguous, o ften  contrad ic to ry , public statem ents
made in June and July on agrarian and cooperative policies by the HWP, no one
could have predicted the im m inent commencement o f co lle c tiv isa tion . The
am biguity and contradictions can c learly  be seen in the long speech delivered by
Matyas Rakosi to  the M etropo litan Party Functionaries on 2nd July, the second
(18)day o f the enlarged Centra l Com m ittee Plenum. Analysing the im pact o f the
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Com inform  resolution, and c ritic is in g  Yugoslavia's ru ra l policies, Rakosi argued 
tha t the Cominform 's ca ll fo r socialist transform ation o f agricu ltu re  did not 
mean co llec tiv isa tion . I t  is worthwhile to  quote him in fu ll.  Thus,
many comrades have raised the question whether the 
Com inform  resolution does not mean tha t our party  has to  
put the kolkhoz question, im m ediate ly, on the agenda. I t  is a 
w e ll ju s tifie d  question since I hear our enemies are spreading 
th is rumour up and down the country and use th is fo r th e ir  
propaganda purposes ... the communists do not hide th e ir  
views and aims ... when we dra fted  our programme, held our 
Congress and indicated the road to  be followed, fo r a long 
tim e ahead, we already knew about the Yugoslav question. 
Inspite o f tha t neither the Congress nor our programme 
demanded a change in the ru ra l policies o f the HWP Those 
who now procla im  tha t the communists, from  one day to  the 
next, suddenly raise the question o f kolkhozes natura lly  wish 
to  create confusion and mislead the peasantry. The 
Com inform  resolution, in fa c t, does not mean tha t a ll 
Communist parties have to  put the question o f 
co llec tiv isa tion  on the agenda ... (but the resolution warns) ... 
tha t i t  is not enough to  build socialism in the towns and tha t 
i t  is impossible to  establish socialism i f  socialism is not b u ilt 
in the villages ... it  is impossible to  build socialism in the 
villages as long as the exp lo iting elements, the peasant-blood 
sucking w e ll-to -do  farmers, the kulaks, the speculators are 
growing there free ly , u n til the m a jo rity  o f working peasants 
... do not seek the way out o f th e ir m i s e r y . ( 1 9 )
The whole situation, as a result, was most confusing and the main cu lp rit, o f 
course, was the centra l leadership. This can be seen from  another confusing 
statem ent, added by Erno Gero, speaking at the F irs t Cooperative Conference, a 
few days la te r, tak ing a d iffe re n t position from  Rakosi and blaming the Yugoslav 
Communist Party fo r  changing d irec tion  to  'liqu idate  the last vestiges o f 
capita lism  too q u ic k ly ' / ^  A t tim es, confusion was created by changing the 
order o f conditions, designating the development o f advanced socialist 
cooperatives as the instruments tha t would liqu idate exp lo ita tion  by w e ll-to -do  
peasants. Nevertheless, there was one major theme o f consistency tha t can 
c learly  be discerned in a ll the various concepts: they a ll pointed towards the 
sharpening o f class-struggle against the wealthy peasants. Indeed these,
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seemingly orchestrated, attacks on the wealthy peasants were continued by 
M ihaly Farkas in a statem ent on 5th July, when he added his voice to  the debate 
on the build ing o f socialism in Hungary, fo r which, he declared, conditions must 
be created in the towns and villages. Thus,
the working class w ill find  tha t by cooperating w ith , and not 
opposing the peasantry, com plete v ic to ry  fo r socialism w ill 
be possib le.^ 1)
Furtherm ore, in his view, i t  was essential to  liquidate the reactionary groups 
ra lly ing  around the kulaks, just as capita lism  had been liqu idated in the towns. I f  
the peasants had misgivings about the party  po licy then,
they must come from  the ranks o f the kulaks, fo r  small 
farm ers, oppressed by the kulaks, can hardly be anxious.(22)
The attacks against the V illage cap ita lis ts ’ rap id ly became even sharper, as the 
s itua tion  a fte r the Cominform  resolution was ge tting  tense, and more and more 
communist ru ra l experts, e.g., Ferenc Donath, added th e ir  voices to  the 
onslaught. On 12th July, fo r example, he declared tha t the kulaks were 
becoming w ealth ier at the expense o f working peasants and tha t
these exp lo iting forces are doing everyth ing to m aintain and 
increase th e ir accumulated wealth and th e ir p o lit ic a l power 
... The cooperatives are the main fro n t o f the class-struggle 
in the villages and the in f i lt ra t in g  exploiters must be 
excluded from  the leadership.(23)
On lO th - l l th  July 1948 the F irs t Cooperative Conference o f the H W P ^ ^  met in 
Budapest. Erno Gero, the economic overlord and member o f the Politbureau, in 
his key address to  the Conference, generated fu rth e r confusion by endorsing, in 
his closing statem ent, in essence the continuation o f the agrarian po licy  o f the
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Party as published in the ’Guidelines fo r Cooperatives’ in A p ril 1948. The only
outward sign o f a changed agrarian policy was tha t the Conference, more than
ever before, was in tensive ly pre-occupied w ith  the question o f the Cooperative
Movement. Gero, in de fin ing  the tasks ahead, stated tha t i t  was tim e  to  develop
cooperatives not only in m arketing but also in ag ricu ltu ra l production. He
emphasised tha t th is  was not because the Party had changed its  ideological
stance, but because Hungary had seriously 'lagged behind in the fie ld  o f
cooperation' since fo r o ther ’tem porary and more im portant reasons' i t  had
(25)neglected th is extrem ely im portant area.
The im m ediate reason, paradoxically, fo r ca lling  a Conference was to 
provide guidelines to  communist activ is ts  in the Cooperative Movement and to 
ru ra l party appartch ik i who, not surprisingly, were ge tting  more and more 
confused on the cooperative question. The Conference, however, three weeks 
a fte r the Com inform  resolution, s t i l l  ruled tha t conditions in Hungary were not 
ye t ripe fo r  mass co llec tiv isa tion  and declared tha t to  'jump' a stage o f 
development could prove to  be a d if f ic u lt  and dangerous task. The Conference, 
nevertheless, stressed tha t cooperation should be helped, but only those form s 
should be encouraged which were vo lun ta rily  wanted and favoured by the working 
peasants themselves. This statem ent was, o f course, s t i l l  in  accordance w ith  the 
A p ril 'Guidelines fo r Cooperatives'. The only real sign o f im patience was shown 
by the lengthy discussion on the question o f 'sharpening class-struggle' and on 
th is question the Conference warned tha t the main danger to  the cooperative 
movement had come from  'ru ra l capita lism '. I t  recommended the tran s fe r o f 
A g ricu ltu ra l to  General V illage Cooperatives, as the most im portan t im m ediate 
task, to  create thereby the conditions fo r se tting  up Producers' Cooperatives, 
i.e., kolkhozes, and to  reorganise and 'democratise' the Hungarian N ationa l 
Cooperative Centre, 'Magyar Orszagos Szovetkezti Kozpont* (MOSzK). This, i t  
was claimed, would be more easily understood and accepted by the peasants.
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Before dispersing, the Conference resolved to  hold cooperative conferences, 
between 15th August and 15th September, in a ll counties to  promote and 
publicise the cause o f cooperative policy.
Im m ediate ly a fte r the Cooperative Conference was over the Politbureau 
met on 13th Ju ly to  discuss the kulak question. A fte r  lengthy discussion, and not 
w ithout opposition from  Laszlo Rajk, a member o f the Politbureau, the m eeting 
decided tha t the 'dominant' ro le o f the kulaks in the villages must be undermined. 
A series o f re s tr ic tive  measures fo llowed, fo r  example, w ith  regared to  'lease- 
holdings' (haszonberlet). The meeting issued a d irec tive  which stated tha t the
decisive consideration was the iso lation o f the kulak, the 
re s tr ic tio n  o f his economic and p o lit ic a l influence. A l l o ther 
considerations, fo r example, ag ricu ltu ra l production, have to  
be subordinated to  tha t a im .(26)
S trik ing, pub lic ly, the same note w ith  regard to  the kulaks the fo llow ing  day, in
an a rtic le  in the party daily, Ferenc Donath drew a para lle l between serfdom and
exp lo ita tion  by the w e ll-to -do  peasants and described the class-struggle which
(27)fla red  up and sharpened against them.
I t  can thus be seen tha t as fa r as the public and, especially, the peasants 
were concerned, at th is  la te  state they s t i l l  knew very l i t t le  about the aims o f 
cooperation. They knew tha t the three year plan, which did not put the 
establishment o f socialism on its  agenda, was proceeding sa tis fa c to rily ; they 
knew tha t the 'Programme D eclaration ' o f the Congress o f U n ity  (i) s t i l l  
accepted an ag ricu ltu ra l scenario based on small-scale peasant fa rm ing  and (ii) 
declared tha t the cooperative po licy o f the HWP, in the long te rm , was to  
strengthen the 'General Village Cooperatives'; they also knew from  the 
Cooperative Conference in July tha t the Party ruled tha t the development o f 
Producers' Cooperatives, i.e., co llectives, was premature, although i t  supported 
th e ir  development as the u ltim a te  aim. Thus, as la te  as the end o f Ju ly, i.e.,
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barely three weeks before co llec tiv isa tion  was announced, the public and the
peasants were s t i l l  in almost com plete darkness, unaware o f the real s ituation,
although by th is tim e  the changed party  stance would be fe lt  by lower party
organisations. Due to  the numerous, in ten tiona lly , confusing and contrad ic to ry
o ff ic ia l statements, however, a degree o f uncerta in ty and anxiety had prevailed
in the country as a whole ever since the Cominform  resolution. The Hungarian
communists, o f course, were w e ll aware o f the peasant feelings about the
collectives. And under these circumstances they were more or less forced to
perform  several ideological gyrations, o ften at the expense o f consistency and
effectiveness, and i t  was not surprising tha t everyone, even the party's ru ra l
apparatchiki, were becoming confused. Confusion was the order o f the day. Even
at th is la te  hour, however, no e ffo r t  was spared by no less o ff ic ia l figures than
Ferenc Dinnyes and Istvan Dobi, Prime M inister and M in is te r o f A g ricu ltu re
respective ly, to  deny repeatedly tha t the co llec tiv isa tion  o f agricu ltu re  was
impending. These statements were perhaps designed as attem pts to  re lax the
(28)near-panic tension tha t had rap id ly bu ilt up since the Com inform  resolution.
Rakosi's sharper policy line, in consequence of the Com inform  resolution,
was accepted by the Centra l Com m ittee on 2nd July, and the po licy o ff ic ia lly
approved by the Politbureau, on 13th July, was based on the decision to  fo llow
(29)the Soviet model and, o f course, to  re jec t the Yugoslav 'heretics'. Rakosi 
could now use the Yugoslav 'heresy' as an excuse to  silence in tra -p a rty  
opposition, led by th  veteran Muscovite Imre Nagy. Having lived in Moscow 
during the in te r-w a r years, and experienced the purges then, Im re Nagy realised 
tha t the moment had come to  remain quiet, at least fo r a while. His tem porary 
silence i t  now appears, did not however mean the end o f a ll opposition to 
Rakosi's ag ricu ltu ra l policies. According to  one a c c o u n t^ \  which must be 
considered seriously, a new in tra -pa rty  co n flic t had developed, over in te rna l 
po litics , between Muscovites and indigenous or 'home' communist factions o f the
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Party, involving two of the most fo rce fu l and strong-w illed individuals, Erno
Gero and Laszlo Rajk respective ly. This was the f irs t  serious confron ta tion
between Muscovites and 'home' communists. When the Muscovites arrived from
Russia, the task to  which a ll home and exiled party  leaders a like addressed
themselves w ith  equal determ ination was to  create a communist contro lled state 
(31)w ith in  three years. The Muscovite Rakosi leadership seemed to  have been
reasonably happy w ith  the ’home' communists u n til early 1948. D ifferences had
developed, a fte r tha t tim e, between Rakosi and Rajk, the la tte r  becoming
increasingly suspicious o f the Muscovites, over party tac tics  and strategy,
possibly even on more fundamental m atters. Rajk posed the th rea t o f opposition,
(32)possibly even o f r iva lry  to  Rakosi's leadership. The nucleus o f the present
disagreement was over the kulak question. In princip le  Rajk, o f course, accepted
the va lid ity  o f Leninist ru ra l po litics  but maintained tha t i t  should be applied, in
p ractice , in a M arxist way appropriate to  Hungarian conditions. Rajk denied the
cen tra l im portance o f the kulak question and argued tha t the wealthy peasants
were ready fo r  submission and would not fig h t. He insisted tha t they should not
be elim inated but, on the contrary, th e ir expert knowledge u tilised  in the
in terest o f ag ricu ltu ra l production. Rajk fu lly  accepted co llec tiv isa tion  as an
u ltim a te  aim, but insisted tha t i t  was to  be done by a gradual transform ation ,
supported by an appropriate propaganda campaign to  convince the peasants o f
the superiority  o f co llectives and tha t i t  should not be done by force. He argued
tha t Hungary should not 'ape' Soviet experiences and methods unquestioningly but
(33)ra the r should learn from  them. The entire  dispute was conducted behind the 
'closed doors' o f the Politbureau but, inevitab ly, some details leaked out. Some 
o f the old illega l communists also regarded the rig id  application o f S ta lin is t ru ra l 
po litics  as extrem e and harm ful to  Hungarian agricu lture . I t  was a sm all loosely 
organied group o f fo llowers which form ed spontaneously around the rom antic  
figure  o f Rajk, who had fought in the In te rnationa l Brigade of the Spanish C iv il
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War and in the resistance movement, but never form alised its  views in to  action.
Rajk's real centre o f power, in addition to  being the M in ister o f In te rio r, was
based on the People’s Colleges (NEKOSz). They were s t i l l  ’cha tting ’ about the
possib ility  o f a 'separate Hungarian road', an illusion which was encouraged,
perhaps, by the outward ly passive a ttitude  o f the Russians, at least up to  A p ril-
May 1948, to  Hungarian a ffa irs . Stalin proceeded more cautiously regarding
Hungary than other East European countries because he was conscious o f
Hungarian m istrust o f communism. In la te  July, cha racte ris tica lly , the Party
gave Rajk the task o f investigating and reporting to  the Politbureau on the ways
in which the reactionary elements could be removed from  the villages. His
assignment remained uncompleted because ten days la te r, on 4th August, 1948,
the Politbureau was convened fo r an early morning meeting and there Gero
accused Rajk, openly, not only o f holding incorrect views on agricu ltu re  but,
(34)more fundam entally, o f ostensibly preparing a putsch against the leadership.
On 5th August, 1948, Rajk was replaced as M in ister o f In te rio r by Janos Kadar,
but not yet purged. On Moscow's insistence he was put in charge o f the
considerably less in fluen tia l Foreign A ffa irs  po rtfo lio . A few months la te r he
was sent to  Moscow fo r a few  weeks o f 'character observation' where he had,
reportedly, continued to  hold excessively independent opinions and was ta lk ing  to
his Russian counterparts as equals. This v is it may have put the fin a l seal on his
u ltim a te  fa te . In June 1949, he was arrested and framed as an accom plice o f
T ito  and an im peria lis t police spy o f long standing. He was put on 'show -tria l',
(35)found gu ilty  and was hanged in October 1949. It  was a trium ph fo r  the 
Moscovite section o f the HWP and put Hungary in the fo re fron t o f the campaign 
against Yugoslavia.
The setting fo r the fin a l stage, to  announce pub lic ly the commencement 
o f co llectiv isa tion , was provided by the 'Harvest Festiva l' (Uj Kenyer tinnep) 
celebrations in Kecskemet, on 20th August 1948. W ith the help o f the HWP the
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c ity  was bedecked w ith  flags and placards fo r  the occasion, demanding strong
measures against the kulaks. The key address o f the gathering was delivered by
(36)Matyas Rakosi. In his memorable speech , coming almost to  the day, one year 
a fte r Revai's e lection a rtic le , a fte r paying trib u te  to  the great achievements o f 
the past three years, he said just the opposite to  Revai's em pty promises, tha t 
w ith  the existing ag ricu ltu ra l methods i t  was impossible to  improve fu rth e r the 
standard o f liv in g  o f the peasantry. In the last few months, he declared, i t  was 
o ften heard tha t,
the Hungarian peasantry reached a cross-roads, a change of 
destination. Now is the tim e to  raise the question, what road 
o f fu rth e r development should peasant farm ing take ... Two 
roads are open to  the Hungarian peasantry. The older o f 
exaggerated individual farm ing is ruled by the princ ip le  tha t 
'm ight is r igh t', w ith  the unavoidable consequence, tha t big 
fishes eat small fishes; the large kulak farm ers continue to  
grow strong, increase the ir wealth, and ru in the poorer 
working peasantry. There are hundreds o f villages which are 
ruled by 8 -1 0  bully ing kulaks ... we desire tha t the worker in 
the countryside should also share in a ll th  rewards o f 
cu ltiva tion  ... tha t the d iffe rence between town and country 
should disappear ... w ith  present methods o f production on 5 
to  20 acres i t  is not possible to  a tta in  tha t m ate ria l and 
cu ltu ra l standard o f liv in g  ...(37)
Then Rakosi indicated the other, the only a lte rna tive  road open to  the Hungarian 
peasants, namely, communal work and co llec tiv isa tion  and he announced a s tring  
o f measures re s tr ic tin g  the wealthy peasant. Thus,
the question, which road the working peasants should take is 
posed and the answer is clear. The working peasant chooses 
the road o f cooperation, mutual assistance and communal
work.(38)
F ifteen months earlie r, the same Rakosi, during an e lecto ra l meeting a t Pecs on 
11th May, 1947, had asserted the need 'to  guarantee absolutely the sm all and 
medium farm ers in th e ir  continuing and hered itory righ t to  th e ir  property.'
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In its  earlie r position, the Party invariab ly approached the question o f 
producers1 cooperatives, i.e., kolkozy, by link ing  it ,  cautiously, to  the question o f 
the 'General V illage Cooperatives' (A lta lanos Falusi Szovetkezetek). Now 
Rakosi's line was tha t 'the working peasants themselves chose the road o f 
co llec tive  work', and the state only used the co llective  fo rm  as a device to  
'p ro tec t' the peasantry from  the exp lo ita tion  o f the kulaks, who brought 'poverty ' 
and 'm isery' to  the working peasants. I t  is in teresting to  note tha t Rakosi 
announced the co llec tiv isa tion  programme w ithout any reference to  the Party's 
earlie r 'Programme Declaration ', thereby ignoring com plete ly a Programme 
which was, a fte r  a ll, adopted by highest organ o f the Party, the Congress. 
Although the announcement was couched in ra ther moderate term s, in it ia l ly  
w ithout even specifying a ta rge t com pletion date, the announcement came as a 
shock, not only to  the peasants, but to  the whole nation. The communists who 
fo r three years had forbidden everyone w ith in  the Party even to  m ention the 
dreaded word 'kolkhoz', at last came clean -  as many predicted -  and embarked 
on 20th August, 1948, on a co llec tiv isa tion  programme which was to  fo llow  the 
Soviet road.
The decision to co llectiv ise  -  in response to  the Com inform  resolu tion - 
na tura lly  cannot be assigned one single date. The elucidation o f the new po licy  
line took place in mid-1948, the po licy measures to  perm it the development o f 
co llectives were announced in the second ha lf o f 1948, the general socia lis t 
reorganisation o f agricu lture  was proclaim ed by Ralosi in his speech on 20th 
August, 1948. A fte r  th is date, the question o f socia list reorganisation was 
discussed openly and unequivocally. For th is reason, 20th August can be 
regarded as the date o f the decision to  commence co llec tiv isa tion . By th is  tim e , 
the struggle fo r the tangible economic and p o lit ica l power supremacy was 
decided and the pre-conditions fo r the ag ricu ltu ra l reorganisation were already 
there. A fte r  th is date events began to  move very fast, in accordance w ith  the
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ideological preconceptions o f the communist leadership, which paid no regard to  
environm ental d ifferences. The campaign now launched continued u n til June 
1953. During th is period fou r d is tinc tive  stages o f co llec tiv isa tion  can be noted. 
These w ill be taken up, in turns, below.
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7.2 The Preparatory Stage, August 1948-March 1949
Now, a fte r three years o f ta c tic a l manouvering, i t  remained fo r  the 
Government to  launch the co llec tiv isa tion  programme o ff ic ia lly .  Aware o f the 
widespread unpopularity o f th is prospect, and knowing the d iff ic u lt ie s  ahead, 
Rakosi launched the campaign preparations in a low key, observing in it ia lly  the 
’vo luntary princ ip le ’ and focusing a tten tion  on the sim pler form s o f cooperative 
associations, thought to  be more acceptable to  the peasants. Accordingly, the 
system grew ra ther slowly at the beginning. S til l displaying a degree o f caution, 
and guarding against overhaste, Rakosi and others in it ia lly  re fra ined from  
adm itting  pub lic ly  the radica l, and fundamental, nature o f the change in the 
P arty ’s a ttitu de  to  agricu lture. This can be seen, fo r instance, w ith  respect to  
the question o f priva te  peasant property, on which the P arty ’s a ttitu d e  c learly  
changed rad ica lly  from  its  defence o f i t  barely two months ea rlie r in its  
'Programme D eclaration ' at the Congress o f U n ity . In a le tte r  to  Im re Nagy, a 
dissenting voice as shown earlier, Rakosi warned him tha t in his proposed speech 
to  the 'Model Farmers Conference', held on 9th September 1948,
under no circumstances should you t ie  the Party to  any 
concept o f peasant p riva te  property whatsoever; be tte r keep 
silent on th is q u e s tio n .^ )
A lthough nationalisation o f ag ricu ltu ra l land was also considered by the pa rty  
leadership im m ediate ly a fte r the June Com inform  meeting, to  avoid a 
considerable degree o f unrest among the peasants at the cruc ia l in it ia l states o f 
co llec tiv isa tion , the Party re treated on th is issue. While the party  continued to  
denounce T ito  i t  was forced to  recognise tha t his arguments against the princ ip le  
o f nationalisation were valid fo r Hungarian, as well as Yugoslavia, and th a t these 
countries could not, in th is respect, fo llow  the Soviet example. In 1918 the 
Russian peasant accepted nationalisation because the measure was an ti-feuda l
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ra the r than anti-bourgeoisie and the breaking-up o f large estates, in a
revo lu tionary fervour, made the peasants de faeto  owners o f the land they
already cu ltiva ted . The Hungarian peasants, as shown earlie r, wanted not only
de fac to  but de jure ownership o f the lands they obtained under the Land Reform
o f 1945. They would have re jected this re form  had i t  been im plem ented in the
guise o f nationalisation, which they would have considered as ou trigh t
confiscation o f th e ir land by the state. For th is reason, in urging peasants now
to  fo rm  agricu ltu ra l cooperatives, or some type o f co llec tive  farm s, the
communists ca re fu lly  avoided any mention o f n a t io n a lis a t io n /^
The new strategy a ffe c tin g  the entire  po lit ica l and economic life  o f the
country, preparing in te r alia fo r  the co llec tiv isa tion  o f agricu ltu re , began to
evolve soon a fte r the Com inform  resolution. In the sphere o f po litics  moves
began to  adjust the p o lit ica l institu tions to  the new Cominform  line  and power
structure . This essentially meant gradual transform ation to  the Soviet-type one-
party system. To accomplish this, the HWP wished to  create a re la tiv e ly  broadly
based, People’s Front type o f movement, to  liqu idate the bourgeoisie opposition
and transform  the peasant parties, the NPP and SHP, in to  mass organisations,
depriving them of th e ir p o lit ica l independence and allow ing them to  operate as
one o f several 'transmission belts' to  be u tilised by the HWP in its  ru ra l policies.
As early as June-July, People's Front meetings were organised by the HWP a ll
over the country in an a ttem pt to  popularise and fam ilia rise  the ru ra l population
and the working peasants w ith  the idea o f reorganisation o f the 'Independence 
(41)Front'. A t about the same tim e  the HWP resurrected the coa lition 's  in te r-  
party  conferences, w ith  the aim o f un iting  the le ft-w in g  forces w ith in  the 
peasant parties and iso lating a ll those, leaders and party members, who openly 
opposed the idea o f eventual establishment o f pro le tarian d ic ta torsh ip . The 
achievement o f these p o lit ic a l aims was greatly  helped, on the one hand, by the 
fa c t tha t, by this tim e, the HWP's contro l both urban and ru ra l areas had
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s ign ifica n tly  increased and, on the other hand, by the reduction o f the peasant 
parties to  th e ir  crypto-com m unist remnants which, under communist contro l, 
were 'seeking* closer cooperation w ith  the HWP. To enable the HWP to  
transform  the 'Independence Front' in to a unified, single, mass organisation the 
process o f purging, which had already begun in both parties, had been 
accelerated from  the second ha lf o f 1948. Under the pretence o f 'righ t-w ing ism ' 
many small and medium peasants and in te llectua ls  were removed from  party  
o ffic e  or expelled a ltogether from  both peasant parties, the NPP and the SHP. In 
th is  process o f 'transform ation ' i t  was the NPP which f irs t  accepted the 
inevitab le leading ro le o f the HWP. A t its  national conference, held on 14th 
September 1948 the NPP declared its  to ta l acceptance, w ithout any reservations, 
o f the p o lit ica l d irections charted by the HWP. The party also declared its  
agreement w ith  the ideology o f Marxism-Lennism, endorsed the Com inform  
resolution and the po licy o f socialist transform ation, i.e., co llec tiv isa tion , o f 
agricu lture . Thus,
the alliance o f working peasants w ith  the leading class, the
working class, which figh ts  against capita lism , must be
s tre n g th e n e d .^ )
And to  demonstrte its  s incerity , the party charged some 10,000 o f its  18,000
members, i.e., more than 50 per cent, w ith  'bourgois influence' and being
(43)'spokesmen o f kulaks' and expelled them from  its  m etropo litan organisation.
The response o f the SHP, predictably, was s im ilar. A fte r  purging its  
ranks o f 'undesirable elements', mostly kulaks and lower level party ac tiv is ts  who 
expressed disagreement w ith  the idea o f closer cooperation w ith  the communists 
(a process which continued u n til 1949), at its  second 'Balatonkenese' N ational 
Conference, held between 28th-29th October, 1948, the SHP endorsed
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government policy: (i) on the question o f development o f heavy industry, (ii) on
the need to  establish a planned economy and ( iii)  on the need to  co llectiv ise
(44)agricu ltu re . The party re jected the 'fa lse slogan o f peasant un ity ' and the
(45)po litics  o f 'a separate peasant road' and also endorsed the leading role o f the 
working class in the process o f build ing socialism, and the fig h t against 'c le rica l 
reaction ', hiding w ith in  the Church. Needless to  say, 'acceptance o f the 
inevitab le ', under some pressure, played a much greater role in the SHP decision 
than conscious and voluntary agreement w ith  the policy o f the HWP.
The reorganisation o f the 'Independence Front' o f f ic ia lly  began at the 
in te r-p a rty  conference held on 10th September, 1948. The conference appointed 
a sm all select com m ittee w ith  the task o f d ra fting  a programme fo r  the 
reo rgan isa tion /4^  The HWP delegates, in view o f the Com inform  resolution, 
which c ritic ised  the Yugoslav Party fo r in troducing a sing le-party system there 
too soon, announced the neccessity to  review  the whole position o f the Party 
regarding the concept o f the 'Independence Front'. For a b rie f period a degree o f 
confusion followed, during which Jozsef Revai, the ch ie f ideologist, entrusted 
w ith  the task o f re-exam ination o f the 'Independence Front, showed h im se lf to  be 
out o f touch w ith  the new Stalin ist dogma. To the HWP's educational conference 
he presented an obsolescent fo rm ula tion  regarding the nature o f state power. He 
stated tha t,
the people's dem ocratic state belongs to  the same category 
as the Soviet state, the state o f the trans ition  from  
capita lism  to  socialism .(47)
In th is context, the new 'Independence Front' was essentially,
the unique p o lit ica l structure  tha t linked the leading workers' 
class w ith  the allied masses o f working people, p rim a rily  w ith  
the peasantry and also w ith  the urban lower-m iddle class and
in te llig e n ts ia /4**)
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and he warned that,
in our country, People's Democracy, coa lition  classes and 
class differences prevailed between workers and peasants.
Under these circumstances i t  would be misleading to 
liquidate other parties before the disappearance o f class 
d is tin c tio n s /4**)
Revai also indicated tha t the co lectiv isa tion o f agricu ltu re  was s t i l l  in a 
p re lim inary stage and tha t learning from  the Soviet Party did not mean servile 
im ita tion , that,
Stalin does not do our th ink ing nor does he act in our 
stead /50)
This is an extraord inary, muddled, gradualist statement, at th is stage o f socia list
transform ation, which had, o f course, no place in the new p o lit ic a l th inking.
Despite th is, in a few weeks tim e, when the reorganisation o f the 'Independence
Front' began, a com plete ly d iffe re n t d irection was taken as, under Soviet
pressure, the dogma o f p ro le tarian d ictatorsh ip 'gained' a greater number o f
adherents among the HWP leadership, which by then 'saw c lea rly ' th a t the
fundamental cause o f the Yugoslav 'slip ' was tha t class alien elements there had
(51)managed to  penetrate the People's Front.
By the 27th November 1948 Centra l Com m ittee Plenum, se tting  out the 
above princip le, Rakosi, however, in his key address, much o f which remained 
unpublished, stressed the importance o f 'liqu idating old form s and ins titu tions ' 
(meaning the allied parties), the 'Independence Front', 'People's Democracy, the 
expropriation o f kulak lands and the co llectiv isa tion  o f agricu ltu re . He declared 
that,
those o f us who cling to  institu tions or measures because we 
ourselves in itia ted  them two or three years ago w ill, w ith  the 
best o f intentions, cause h a rm /5 2 )
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He lashed out against those who s t i l l  maintained the ’erroneous’ view th a t the 
build ing o f socialism, during the trans itiona l period, was q u a n tita tive ly  d iffe re n t 
under conditions o f People’s Democracy. He said tha t,
i t  becomes clearer than ever tha t a ll the main features o f 
build ing socialism in the Soviet Union are applicable 
everywhere,
and regarding
the ways and means o f build ing socialism, each people can 
and w ill add features o f its  own, but in the main essential and 
decisive questions there is no special ’national' road.(54)
The November Plenum, where Rakosi, despite the developing in tra -p a rty  
disagreement -  or because o f i t  - claimed complete unity, openwd a new chapter 
in the h istory o f social and economic policies in Hungary, ind icating, already, 
tha t pro le tarian d ictatorsh ip was just around the corner.
Be iru t, in Poland, and D im itrov, in Bulgaria, at th e ir respective Party 
Congresses in mid-December 1948, proclaimed the id e n tity  o f people's 
democracy and prole tarian dictatorship. Erno Gero, a fte r his v is it to  Poland, 
where he fu lly  digested the significance o f S ta lin ’s line, pointed out in a le tte r  to  
the Party Secretaria t on 26th December 1948 tha t the HWP
must draw lessons from  comrade S ta lin ’s la test, theo re tica lly  
highly ign ifican t pronouncement,(55)
tha t a ’people’s democracy fu lf ils  the basic functions o f a p ro le ta rian  
d icta torsh ip ’, which meant tha t 'a people's democracy is essentially a varian t o f 
pro le tarian d icta torsh ip  brought about by special circumstances o f h is to rica l
/ r M
evolution'. The p ractica l conclusion was tha t socialism could not be b u ilt 
w ithout d ictatorsh ip. Therefore, Gero stressed that,
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we must strengthen the d ic ta to ria l character o f people’s 
democracy, we must strengthen the role o f the pa rty  and 
working class in the state, the economy and the p o lit ic a l and 
cu ltu ra l life  o f the country.(57)
The HWP leadership hurried ly endorsed the new line. Rakosi, in January 1949, 
declared in some deta il that,
people’s democracy regarding its  function is iden tica l to  
pro le tarian d ictatorsh ip, w ithout the Soviet f o r m , ( 5 8 )
meaning tha t people’s democracy is incomplete, as a fo rm , since the working
class -  because o f the existnce o f m u lti-pa rty  system - can only exercise power
in alliance w ith  the other parties. Therefore, i t  was necessary to  move from
people’s democracy to  fu ll pro le ta rian dictatorship, as developed in the Soviet
Union. To achieve this i t  was necessary, he stressed, to  step up the class
struggle, to  exercise the d ic ta to r ia l power o f the state more trenchantly  and to
(59)liqu idate the m u lti-pa rty  system. The problem of reconciling  the nominal 
sharing of power w ith  the peasantry was fu rthe r debated at considerable
i (60)length.
A t its  Centra l Com m ittee Plenum on 5th March 1949, coincid ing w ith
the 30th Anniversary o f the proclam ation o f the f irs t  'g lorious Hungarian
dictatorship, the Party fu rth e r developed and confirm ed the new dogma. I t  made
i t  clear tha t the sheer existence o f the dem ocratic parties acted as a ’reservo ir’
fo r the class enemy. G reater emphasis was put by the m eeting on the f ig h t
against the kulaks, who had to  be destroyed to  win the m iddle peasant, and on
the necessity to  develop the tools o f coercion and adm in istra tive  solutions, by a
(611single party dictatorship. The leadership, however, s t i l l  cautioned th a t the 
sh ift to  d ictatorship should not be implemented by excessively coercive 
measures.
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Revai, somewhat belatedly, 'accepted’ th is new iden tity , explaining tha t 
th is was not so at the beginning, but i t  became so during the struggle fo r  fu ll 
power. Having won th is power, Revai declared, the HWP could not share i t  w ith  
any other group or party, not even w ith  the peasantry. Thus,
the d icta torsh ip  o f the p ro le ta ria t, as i t  was defined by Lenin 
and Stalin, means tha t power is undivided, in the hands o f the 
p ro le ta ria t, and tha t the working class does not share power 
w ith  other classes, therefore, it  does not share power w ith
the peasantry.(62)
He then asked why could this power not be exercised along w ith  the peasantry, 
and answered:
because in that case the the state would cease to  be a 
weapon w ith  which to  establish socialism. For the peasantry, 
even its  working section, is ha lf-hearted ly  fo r p riva te  
property, ha lf-hearted ly fo r  the co llectives -  i t  vacilla tes. I t  
should be supported and educated so tha t i t  accepts the way 
to  co llectives. This leadership, education and support must 
be provided by the state too, and tha t is why power cannot be 
shared w ith  the peasantry. Moreover, vac illa tion  in respect 
o f the development o f ru ra l socialism means concurrently  
va c illa tion  between capita lism  and socialism, va c illa tion  in 
the fig h t against kulaks ... but a state, transform ing its e lf 
in to  socialism, a state figh tin g  against the kulaks ... must not
v a c i l la te .^ )
Revai then stated tha t the consequence o f p ro le ta rian  d icta torsh ip  was tha t,
the power in the possession of the working class must be, and 
w ill be, even more f irm ly  and s tr ic t ly  exercised than i t  has 
been up to  now.(64)
In concluding, Revai declared tha t although the Hungarian pro le ta rian  
d ictatorship was w ithout the Soviet form  it  did not, o f course, mean th a t there 
was noting to  be learned and adopted from  the Soviet Union. He pointed out, 
e xp lic itly , tha t 'the organisation o f our state should become closer to  the Soviet
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type*. Revai re ite ra ted  Rakosi's ea rlie r statem ent th a t the entire
transform ation o f the countryside, indeed o f the whole country, was to  be 
carried out on identica l lines to  tha t o f the Soviet Union, its  u ltim a te  model. He 
dispersed the doubts o f those such as Imre Nagy who s t il l enterta ined the be lie f 
tha t there was a possib ility  o f a moderate transform ation policy. Thus, the 
communists’ o ffe r  to  the peasants, whose alliance they allegedly wished to  
secure, was war on the kulaks and a subordinate ro le in a regime d irected  by the 
p ro le ta ria t.
In these developments the role o f the 'Independence F ron t' was not to  
concentrate a llied forces but to  be a too l to  liqu idate the m u lti-p a rty  system, by 
'm e lting ' the remnants o f a ll other parties in to  th is organisation, which meant 
the to ta l surrender o f the ir independence. As a prerequisite fo r  the com pletion 
o f the take-over and the promulgamation o f a new constitu tion on the Soviet 
model, the 'Hungarian Independent People's Front (Magyar F iiggetlen N epfron t) 
was form ed in February, 1949, in which ne ither leaders nor members were given 
any fo rm a l role to  play. When Parliam ent was dissolved in A p ril, the Front 
published a single programme and lis t  o f candidates fo r the General E lections 
tha t was held in May 1949, at which 96.5 per cent o f the e lecto ra te  voted fo r  its  
candidates. Soon, as the p o lit ica l campaign in tensified, Rakosi, paraphrasing 
the Bible, charged even non-voters w ith  being a p rio ri enemies o f the people;
/gc\
'those who are not w ith  us are against us'. Follow ing the e lection, the new
National Assembly proclaimed Hungary at State o f People's Republic, not a
socialist state like  the Soviet Union, since Hungary, at th is stage -  because o f
agricu ltu re  -  corresponded approxim ately to  the Soviet Union in about 1926, and
proceeded to  adopt a constitution, on 20th August, 1949, modelled on th a t o f the
(67)Soviet Union, and the coup was complete.
The intensive socialist transform ation which began a fte r the Com inform  
resolution was extended to the im plantation o f M arx ist-Len in is t ideology, w ith
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the aim o f transform ing cu ltu ra l and religious values as w e ll as the social
structure . The HWP, having posited a ra ther spurious id e n tity  between its
ideology and the interests o f the working classes, proceeded to  ensure its
unquestioned monopoly o f values in a ll spheres o f life . A f te r  the absorption o f
the SDP and the p o lit ica l eclipse o f other non-communist parties, the Church
remained the only external enemy and the last foca l point o f ideological
resistance, since i t  retained moral au thority  and represented an a lte rna tive ,
however remote, to  communism. The churches in Hungary, but especially the
Catho lic Church -  led by Cardinal M indszenty -  had tra d itio n a lly  played a leading
role in agricu lture and in the educational system which inev itab ly  came in to
c o n flic t w ith  the new p o lit ica l line o f co llec tiv isa tion  and indoctrina tion . During
the early post-war period, as discussed earlier, the position o f the Church was
seriously weakened by the 1945 Land Reform and now, in autumn 1948, w ith  the
nationalisation o f schools, representing a signficant trium ph fo r  the regim e, its
position was fu rth e r weakened. According to the 1949 Census, the population o f
Hungary divided in proportions o f approxim ately 67 per cent ca tho lic  and 21 per
cent Calv in ist and 6 per cent Lutheran m inorities. A part from  its  num erical
superiority, the Catholic Church, as the biggest landowner, w ith  over 1 m illion
cadastral yokes, had great influence in the ag ricu ltu ra l sector. The Land Reform
confiscated, w ithout compensation, approxim ately 800,000 cadastral yokes to
which the Church never rea lly  reconciled itse lf, but even a fte r  the re fo rm  it
remained, w ith  approxim ately 180,000 cadastral yokes, the largest
(68)landowner. Since, in practice the Land Reform  allowed a ll parish Churches 
to  re ta in  holdings below the size o f 100  cadastral yokes, th is  represented a 
greatly  reduced, but s t i l l  im portant, source o f income fo r  the Church and 
enabled i t  to  re ta in  some form  o f economic independence from  the sta te . The 
new regulations enacted by Decree 9000/1948, which reduced the upper lim its  of 
holdings, and the subsequent drive fo r co llec tiv isa tion  a ll but e lim ina ted the
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power o f the Church in landowership. But, apart from  landownership, the 
Catholic Church had im portant influence among a ll s tra ta  o f the peasantry 
because i t  was an essential part o f the people’s life , p a rticu la rly  o f peasant life . 
One o f the aims o f the measures against the Church was to  liqu ida te  its  
influence over the peasantry, to  t ry  to  alienate especially the poor and middle 
peasants from  the Church, and to  a lly  them against the kulaks. The HWP tried , 
ra ther ine ffec tive ly , to  convince the peasants tha t the Church was th e ir enemy, 
s t i l l  aspiring and waiting, fo r a convenient moment to  annul the Land Reform  
and the sm all-holding system established by it .  This propaganda had l i t t le  e ffe c t 
on the peasants, who were much more preoccupied and concerned at th is tim e  
w ith  the prospect o f co llectiv isa tion . The Catho lic Church fought its  fin a l ba ttle  
on the issue o f education where, together w ith  the Protestant Churches, i t  
administered approxim ately tw o-th irds o f prim ary and secondary schools in the 
country. The communists, w ith  the help o f the le ft-co n tro lle d  SHP, had launched 
th e ir offensive against the Church in May by m obilising the teacher’s union and 
organising pe titio n  campaigns, w ith  in tim ida tion , in favour o f secularisation o f 
education. Thw HWP then responded to  these ’spontaneous’ demands w ith  a d ra ft 
law that, amid widespread popular protest, on 16th June, 1948, prom ulgated, 
under Decree 33/1948, the nationalisation o f a ll denom inational schools. 
A ltogether some 4885 schools were taken over the by the state, 3148 o f which 
were administered by the Catholic C h u r c h / ^  The C atho lic Church was only 
allowed to  re ta in  a few, but even these were w ith in  s tr ic t  con fo rm ity  to  the 
state-prescribed curriculum . The Catho lic Peasant Youth Organisation, KALO T 
under the pre text o f the murder o f a Russian solider, im plica ted in the incident, 
was disbanded. A fte r  lengthy 'negotiations’ between State and Church the 
Protestant and Jewish Churches, in October 1948, assented. Some members o f 
the Catholic clergy favoured a compromise w ith  the communists, wh ile a large 
section, led by Cardinal Mindszenty, remained adamant and fought a lengthy and
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losing ba ttle  to  obstruct the im p lem ta tion  o f the schools nationalisation decree. 
In November the HWP began a new in tensified pe titio n  campaign against the 
C atho lic Church and Cardinal Mindszenty. Eventually the Party resorted to  the 
w e ll proven 'an ti-s ta te  conspiracy' ta c tic  and, on 16th December 1948, Cardinal 
M indszenty was arrested and charged w ith  treason and, a fte r  a show t r ia l on 3rd 
February 1949, was given li fe  im prisonm ent.^*^ A fte r  th is, under duress, the 
Church signed a Concordat w ith  the state to  save what remained o f the Church. 
The clergy was required pub lic ly  to  endorse the government's policies, such as 
co llectiv isa tion , and had to  to le ra te  a 'C le rica l Peace Movement', composed of 
'Peace Priests' sym pathetic to  communism, which was created by the regime.
W ith the destruction o f c le rica l resistance, and nationa lisa tion o f
schools, the next notable v ic tim  o f the drive to  destroy a ll remnants o f p lura lism
was the People's College Movement (Nepi Kollegium Mozgalom). This was a
specifica lly  Hungarian phenomenon, w ith  its  roots going back to  the 'V illage
Explorers', the 'March Front' and the 'G yo rffy  College' movements o f the 1930s,
(71)as discussed earlier, and its  na tiona lis tic  and peasant o rien ta tion  could not 
be reconciled w ith  the HCP's pro-Soviet and urban pro le tarian line. D uring the 
war a new generation o f peasant youth attending the G yo rffy  College came 
under Populist influence, but the illega l Communist Party managed to  convert a 
few  o f them, notably Andras Hegediis, to  communism. In early  1946, some o f 
these communist students called fo r  the creation o f a network o f s im ila r colleges 
so as to  democratise education in general and assist the prom otion o f young 
workers and peasant cadres to  form  the new e lite . The idea was endorsed by the 
HCP, ra ther enthusiastically, in fa c t, since i t  promised to  aid the rad ica lisa tion  
o f the peasants and to  isolate them from  smallholder influence. A  period o f 
rapid development fo llowed during which many colleges were established a ll over 
the country and leaders and members, predom inantly rad ica l peasant youth, were 
recru ited  under, largely communist, influence. Between 1946 and 1948, w ithou t
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any doubt, they played leading role in the youth movement o f the country,
indeed overshadowing even the communist youth movement, and succeeded in
a ttra c tin g  the best o f peasant youth. By 1947, w ith  active  support from  the HCP
and NPP, the movement had prospered and grown to  10,000 members, in over 100
colleges, under the aegis o f the National Federation o f People’s College, or
(72)NEKOSz, (Nepi Kollegium ok Orszagos Szovetsege). From the beginning,
however, the ir re la tion  to  the HCP and its  ideology was somewhat irregu lar. This
was because o f the emphasis o f the Colleges on inculcating dem ocratic principles
and national cu ltu ra l values, which was consonant w ith  le ft-w in g  Populism. Their
educational programmes were oriented towards innovative experiments in
communal learning and enthusiastic exploration o f peasant l i fe  and trad itions,
instead o f pursuing more serious academic work or the teachings o f communist
ideology. Indeed, Laszlo Rajk, who became the college’s most in flu e n tia l
(73)supporter , and in tu rn  used them as a mass power base, declared th a t his 
party, the HCP, did not insist on the prim acy o f M arx is t-Len in is t ideology in the 
curriculum . In re a lity , however, the HCP, fo r  the tim e  being, opportun is tica lly  
adjusted its e lf to  freedom o f NEKOSz from  the party con tro l; i t  defended it  
against the attacks o f the SHP but, at the same tim e, watched cautiously lest 
NEKOSz should become too strong a movement. From about the spring o f 1948, 
however, th is guarded tolerance o f the HCP a ll but disappeared, as the party  
reached fo r  monopoly power. W ith the change in the educational system it  
became the universities' task to  tra in  the pro le ta rian  youth fo r  the 
transform ation o f the economy. The People's Colleges, w ith  th e ir  re la tiv e ly  
anarchic and peasant character, and more im portan tly , perhaps, because they 
took the party's slogan 'worker-peasant alliance' too lite ra lly ,  i.e., meaning on 
the basis o f equality, became more o f a hindrance than a help, especia lly since 
only about 1 0 -1 2  per cent o f th e ir students came from  the industria l working 
class. A lready, in May 1948 the party's Educational C om m ittee, under the
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d irection o f Jozsef Revai, strongly c ritic ised  NEKOSz because o f the
preponderance o f peasants in its  colleges, its  an ti-M arx is t peasant rom anticism
(74)and because, as he said, instead o f studying they began to  play po litics . A t
its  September 1948 meeting the Politbureau passed a resolu tion which
condemned NEKOSz organisers fo r neglecting the Party, propagating confused
anti-Len in is t ideology, d is to rting  the worker-peasant alliance, to le ra tin g  the cu lt
o f the peasantry, distancing themselves from  the young workers movement and
allow ing the colleges to  be penetrated by 'kulak-youngsters'. Perhaps the most
serious accusation against them, in the d ic tionary o f a communist, was tha t they
(75)were gu ilty  o f form ing a ’narodnik’ faction . The resolution passed called upon
the communist members o f NEKOSz to  put themselves under the d iscip line o f
the party, which meant the end o f its  autonomy and, assisted by the decline o f
Rajk’s power, i t  ceased to  exist as a spontaneous movement. In the process o f
in tegra tion which was under way in the educational system the NEKOSz
leadership was replaced and the colleges subordinated to the M in is try  o f C u lture .
By the end o f 1948 the 160 colleges, w ith  th e ir 10,000 students, were absorbed as
ordinary student residences in the in tegrated and centralised educational system.
The independence of NEKOSz, w ith  its  m ild ly  nationalist, independent peasant-
populist o rien ta tion  could not be allowed to  obstruct the process o f
(7 6 )co llec tiv isa tion  and the creation o f the new communist in te lligen ts ia . I t  is 
arguable tha t the liqu idation o f Laszlo Rajk, as the princ ipa l com munist mentor 
o f the People’s College movement, was both cause and e ffe c t o f the u ltim a te  fa ll 
o f the People’s College movement. I t  may be pertinent to  note th a t one o f the 
accuations against Rajk at his t r ia l was his long cooperation w ith  the populists.
Turning to  the economy, especially the ag ricu ltu ra l sector, the new 
p o lit ica l dogma introduced profound changes here too. A new banking system 
was created, in which the National Bank, in addition to  its  functions as a Bank o f 
issue, also monopolised the supply o f short-term  credits and was given con tro l
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over the entire  range of monetary transactions by enterprises. I t  was 
supplemented by a network o f banks w ith  special functions. A t the same tim e, 
new form s fo r d irec ting  industria l production were established: nationalised 
industries, fo rm a lly  autonomous units, were brought under the con tro l and 
supervision o f industria l trusts, d irectorates and m inistries, one fo r  each 
industry. A centra l plan, adopted by Parliam ent, govered the economy. In the 
second ha lf o f 1948 the transform ation  o f the Three Year Reconstruction Plan, 
adopted in 1947, had also begun. But fu ll cen tra l planning w ith  the w e ll known 
obligatory plan indicators, did not begin u n til January 1950, w ith  the F irs t F ive- 
Year Plan.(77)
In the sphere o f agricu lture  a series o f preparatory adm in is tra tive
d irectives was enacted, e ither just before or soon a fte r the Com inform  meeting.
Some of these were designed to aid the transform ation o f 'Farm er’s Cooperatives
(Foldmuvesszovetkezetek), discussed earlier, in to  'General V illage Cooperatives',
while other d irectives enabled the fo rm ation  o f 'Lease-holding' and 'Producing'
(78)groups w ith in  the overa ll fram ew ork o f 'Tenants' and 'Farmers' Cooperatives.
The 'General V illage Cooperatives' were eventually wound up betwewen October 
1948 and A p ril 1949.
(79)On 13th August 1948, a Government Decree redefined, in greater 
de ta il, the tasks o f 'Farmers' Cooperatives' and la id down how they were to  be 
organised and the rules fo r th e ir adm in istra tion. Accordingly, the new tasks and 
aims o f the 'Farmers' Cooperatives' were:
(i) to  guide and aid planned ag ricu ltu ra l
production on the land owned (rented) by its  
members
(ii) to  organise ag ricu ltu ra l machinery
operations
(iii)  to  procure the m ateria ls required fo r
production
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(iv) to  process and m arket ag ricu ltu ra l produce
(v) to  manage and u tilise  the allocated assets
(vi) to  produce on the land owned (rented) by the 
Farmers’ Cooperative
(v ii) to  set up a network o f re ta il ou tle ts  fo r  
marketing
The Decree la id  down tha t, w ith  the exception o f the establishment o f re ta il
outle ts, a ll o ther functions could be carried on w ith in  the fram ew ork o f the
Farmers’ or Tenants’ Cooperatives. Most im portan tly , i t  extended the
agricu ltu ra l a c tiv itie s  o f the Farmers’ Cooperatives, operating in more than 2500
villages, in to ag ricu ltu ra l p ro d u c tio n /*^  The Decree also extended the range of
a c tiv itie s  o f Farmers’ Cooperatives in to  the consumer fie ld . A ll th is, however,
was merely leg is la tion fo r already w ell established practices, since Farmers’
Cooperatives had already opened re ta il outle ts. More in teresting, perhaps, was
tha t the Decree defined, fo r the f irs t  tim e, the concept o f the 'w ork ing peasant'
as someone who e ither carried out most o f the necessary work on his own fa rm ,
by him self, or w ith  the help o f his im m ediate fam ily , or made his liv ing ,
(81)predom inantly, from  h iring his labour.
In the wake o f the measure tha t fo llowed, the am algamation o f 'V illage
Cooperatives', e.g., 'Hangya', in to  Farmers' Cooperatives also began on a large
scale. During th is amalgamation campaign, a po licy o f mass recru itm en t o f
members was also pursued. The numerous public meetings called to  approve
these amalgamations were completed by the middle o f 1949 and as a result, in
May 1949 some 3010 'Farmers' Cooperatives' were operating, w ith  a membership 
(82)o f 834,000. A t th is stage, the Farmers' and A g ric u ltu ra l Producers'
Cooperatives, (APC, i.e., co llectives) mezogazdasagi te rm eloszovetkezetek, 
developed along common lines and fo r  a b rie f period the Farmers' Cooperatives 
became the 'General Village Cooperative' in agricu ltu re . The Farmers'
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Cooperatives can in fa c t be seen as the 'prep-schools' o f the A g ricu ltu ra l 
Producers' Cooperative movement. Later, when A g ric u ltu ra l Producers' 
Cooperatives became independent, the Farmers' Cooperatives assumed the role 
o f, essentially, Consumers' Societies fo r  the ru ra l population and, u n til 1955, i t  
was la rge ly th e ir re ta ilin g  businesses tha t developed, fo r  example, grocers and 
butchers, shops and pubs/**^
Paralle l to  the preparations to  in tegrate Farmers' Cooperatives to  take 
on the role o f A g ricu ltu ra l Producers' Cooperatives, the organisation o f 
ag ricu ltu ra l 'Lease-holding' and 'Producing' Groups had also begun, a fte r  the sale 
and purchase o f land was prohibited; th is meant tha t even impoverished peasants 
were forced to  sell to  the state. The f irs t  and most e ffe c tiv e  measure 
introduced by the regime against the w ealth ier peasants was the Government 
Decree o f 29th August 1 9 4 8 ^ ^ , i.e., almost im m edia te ly a fte r  the
announcement o f co llectiv isa tion , which abolished most ren ting  o f land by 
se tting  the upper lim it  o f individual ren ting  at 25 cad. yokes (i.e., 14.4 hectare) 
and the to ta l size o f a holding, together w ith  the land already owned, at 40 cad. 
yokes (23 hectare). A ll land above these respective sizes was requisitioned by 
the state. Obviously the Decree la rge ly  a ffected  the land owned or rented by 
the w ealth ier 'kulak' and medium peasants. Moreover, a ll land above the size o f 
5 cad. yokes (2.9 hectare) was requisitioned by the state from  those whose main 
occupation was not farm ing. The land so acquired was d is tribu ted  to  the 
peasants. In theory, those en titled  to  cla im  land could free ly  decide whether 
they wished to  work i t  as small ind iv idual leaseholders or, while s t i l l  keeping 
th e ir own land in tac t, to  form  e ithe r a 'Leaseholding Group' w ith in  a Farmers' 
Cooperative or a 'Tenant Cooperative', which could be form ed in d is tr ic ts  where 
no Farmers' Cooperatives existed. In practice , th is was in many places ignored 
and p r io r ity , and favourable trea tm ent, were given to  those who agreed to  put 
the land they received in to  an 'A g ricu ltu ra l Producer Cooperative'
(85)(mezogazdasagi term eloszovetkezet), i.e., a co llec tive  fa rm .' 1 The in ten tion
o f the regime was ’land red is tribu tion ' in favour o f some fo rm  o f communal work,
to  ease the process o f co llec tiv isa tion . Later, both 'Tenants’ Cooperatives' and
'Leaseholding Groups’ were transform ed in to  'A g ricu ltu ra l Producers'
Cooperatives. Thus, the f irs t  preparatory stage o f the development o f the
Producer’s Cooperative movement (co llectiv isa tion ) essentially began w ith  the
imm ediate transfer o f land fo rm erly  leased out by the ’kulaks' and now
requisitioned by the state to cooperatives form ed jo in t ly  by ag ricu ltu ra l workers
and poor peasants. Under th is Decree the government ordered the expropria tion
and red is tribu tion  oof 245,943 cad. yokes o f land fo rm erly  leaseheld by the 
(86)kulaks. The land was taken away by the newly created ’V illage Land-lease
Com m ittees' and red istribu ted to  landless peasants and dwarfholders, at a
nominal ren ta l charge, provided the size o f th e ir  farm s die not exceed 10 cad.
yokes. The to ta l number o f those en titled  to  cla im  land was 113,439 (332,799
w ith  fam ily  dependants) o f whom 50,336 were landless, 42,600 had land up to  5
cad. yokes, the rest between 5-10 cad. yokes. In the event, some 61,487 were
given land to ta llin g  245,943 cad. yokes. Despite governmental pressure, in many
places, to  jo in  the co llectives 43 per cent o f land recip ients remained outside the
cooperative movement. The other 57 per cent o f recip ients w ith  147,500 cad.
yokes o f land, i.e., 60 per cent o f the to ta l red istribu ted land, came e ithe r from
the ’Land-lease Cooperatives' (24.029, w ith  44 per cent o f land to ta llin g  108,172
cad. yokes) or decided to  form  a proper 'ag ricu ltu ra l producing group' w ith in  a
Farmers' Cooperative. Thus, only 10.537 land recip ients, w ith  16 per cent o f
(87)red istribu ted land, to ta llin g  39.328 cad. yokes, opted fo r  genuine co llectives.
This move, however, at once treb led the to ta l number o f co llectives th a t existed
up to  then. Most peasants had no desire to  establish any form  o f cooperative.
They regarded the whole measure as a ’supplementary land re fo rm ', a 'new land
(88)red istribu tion '. About ha lf o f these farm s were operating w ith in  the
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fram ew ork o f Farm er’s cooperatives. The ir development was p a rticu la rly  strong
(89)and im portant in the Trans-Tisza region.
The fu ll im pact o f the 27th November 1948 C entra l C om m ittee Plenum 
in the sphere o f agricu ltu re  was just as rad ica l as in the sphere o f p o lit ica l 
developments and it  a ttrac ted  just as much in tra -pa rty  a tten tion . Turning to  
agricu lture , Rakosi, in his report to  the Plenum, dwelt in de ta il on one subject o f 
build ing socialism in the countryside. The scattered peasant holdings, he said, 
were able to  reach the pre-war level o f production in a m a tte r o f three years and 
were doing w e ll fo r  the moment. But, he observed tha t,
they are a long way behind the leve l o f the more developed 
agricu ltu ra l countries and s t i l l  more behind the leve l o f the 
Soviet Union.(^0)
He then stressed the need to  learn from  the experience o f the Soviet Union.'This, 
he adm itted, was up to  now very much, and wrongly, neglected and he declared 
that,
we must, w ith  everything in our power, give the opportun ity  
to  our working peasantry to  become acquainted w ith  the 
Soviet co llectiv ised a g r i c u l t u r e . ^  1)
Rakosi’s statem ent was s ign ifican t since i t  made i t  c lear th a t a m in ia ture  
carbon-copy o f the Soviet ag ricu ltu ra l model was the Party's aim. Also, his 
reference to  the sa tis factory progress made by priva te  ind iv idual sm all-scale 
farm ing, even under the specific  conditions o f governmental neglect, during the 
reconstruction period, was most in teresting. It  constitu ted an admission tha t 
there was no economic reason to  announce the co llec tiv isa tion  in August 1948. 
Given some governmental aid, Hungarian agricu lture  could have continued to  
develop at a reasonably high rate, even a fte r  the reconstruction period came to
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an end. There could now be no doubt tha t co llec tiv isa tion  was announced f irs t  o f
a ll fo r  p o lit ica l and ideological reasons, w ith  the emphasis on class struggle and
the liqu ida tion  o f the kulaks, and tha t economic considerations played a
secondary ro le. I t  is, o f course, arguable tha t purely economic considerations
came to  the fo re  w ith  the announcement and outline o f the F irs t F ive-Y ear Plan
at the Centra l Com m ittee Plenum in March 1949, to  begin in January 1950. The
Plan itse lf, however, was in tu rn  a p o lit ica l decision.
Rakosi’s report to the Plenum fin a lly  dispelled any rem aining in tra -pa rty
uncerta in ty or obscurity and ended a ll speculation regarding not only the model
but also the proposed ra te  o f co llec tiv isa tion . Rakosi said tha t, 'the question o f
co llec tiv isa tion ' was 'bo iling  in the villages' and the peasants themselves would
(92)not to le ra te  'liv in g  in uncerta in ty  fo r years'. He to ld  the C entra l Com m ittee 
Plenum that,
we have to  take th is question (co llectiv isa tion) to  the point 
tha t w ith in  three to  four years 90 per cent o f the peasants 
are cu ltiva ting  th e ir  lands in common, in standard socia list
co llectives.^**)
and went on to  say tha t achievement o f th is accelerated tempo unavoidably 
necessitated the sharpening o f the class struggle. Then he posed the question o f 
liqu ida ting  the wealthy, kulak peasants. Thus,
we can only deal w ith  them (the kulaks) fundam entally by 
tak ing away th e ir land, houses and machinery and what we do 
w ith  them, I  do not ye t k n o w . ( 9 4 )
I t  must, however, be stressed tha t, as noted earlie r, none o f the Plenum's 
discussion was made public. The general public and the peasants were s t i l l  in the 
dark as regards the proposed ra te  o f socia list transform ation.
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The acquisition o f kulak lands in addition to  th e ir  own, Rakosi
antic ipated, would be su ffic ie n t incentive to  provide a 'giant-push' to  small and
(95)medium peasants to  jo in  the collectives. This proposed plan was opposed by 
Imre Nagy. He was alarmed and to ld  Rakosi th a t i t  was the wrong way to  build 
socialism. Thus,
in September 1948, the idea began to  preva il ... tha t 
Hungarian agricu lture  would have to  be co llectiv ised w ith in  a 
few  years. I do not agree. I consider such plans ... 
unrea lis tic , erronous and excessive. The ir execution would 
inev itab ly  mean tha t we would leap over an en tire  
trans itiona l phase o f our revolu tion. This would isolate us 
from  the most im portant representatives o f the peasantry 
and would deal a blow to  the foundation o f the w orker- 
peasant alliance which is the only solid basis fo r socialism in 
the countryside, as w e ll as in the towns.(96)
Nagy's objection was re jected and he soon found h im self isolated w ith in  the 
Party, and a number o f his supporters began to  leave him. In December 1948, 
Erno Gero fie rce ly  attacked him in an a rtic le , w ithou t naming him. Gero put a ll 
the blame on him fo r his desire to  postpone the fig h t against the 'cap ita lis t 
elements' in the countryside and fo r lack o f vig ilance tha t existed w ith in  the 
Party. This can be seen from  the fo llow ing  passage:
one member o f our Po litburo o f our P arty  was o f the opinion 
tha t i t  was no longer possible fo r  capita lism  to  develop in the 
Hungarian countryside. From this m istaken idea na tu ra lly  
fo llowed the view tha t there was no need to  in tens ify  the 
struggle against the kulaks. The Politburo re jected th is 
righ t-opportun is t v iew po in t.(97)
Nagy, undeterred, maintained his views even a fte r  th is 'censure' and cautiously 
pressed fo r  moderation u n til the fin a l 'show-down, in A p ril 1949. This w ill be 
taken up again la te r.
During December 1948, in response to  the November Plenum Resolution, 
the d iffe re n t types o f A g ricu ltu ra l Producing Cooperative Groups began to
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separate from  the Farmer's Cooperatives and assume independent, self-governing
status while a ll other V illage Cooperatives and 'Hangya' merged w ith  the local
Farmers' Cooperatives, which began to  transform  themselves in to  ordinary
village re ta il shops w ith  an organic lin k  to  the state wholesale trade system. This
change was p a rtly  brought about a fte r the m ills, d is tille ries , trac to rs  and
harvester-machines -  up to  now under th e ir  management -  were handed over to
(98)the Machine T rac to r Stations and other nationalised undertakings. A fte r
th e ir  separation from  the Farmers' Cooperatives was completed, a t the tu rn  o f
1948/49, these independent ag ricu ltu ra l producing cooperative groups
(term eloszovetkezeti csoportok) were inspected fo r  'p o lit ic a l re lia b ility ' and
some 13 per cent, suspected to  be 'kulak's or under kulak’s and cap ita lis t'
(99)influence, were dissolved. They were then classified according to  th e ir  level 
o f 'com m unality ', i.e., the common u tilisa tio n  o f the means o f production and the 
type o f d is tribu tion  o f th e ir income. By the Autum n of 1948, due to  the number 
and va rie ty  o f these 'producing groups', which created a ra the r confusing 
scenario, some ra tiona lisa tion  was needed. A Government Decree was d ra fted  
and published on 18th December, 1948, establishing 'Model S tatutes' fo r  the 
d iffe re n t types o f co llec tive  o rg a n isa tio n s .^ *^  This decree, i t  was proudly 
stated, was based large ly on the experience and reports o f the numerous 
delegations which v is ited Soviet and Bulgarian co llec tive  farm s during the 
Summer o f 1 9 4 8 .^ *^  Each co llec tive  fa rm  had its  own 'Model S tatute ', fo r 
which the one developed in the Soviet Union served as a model. This S tatute, in 
substance, enumerated the conditions under which a specific  co lle c tive  fa rm  was 
perm itted  to  be established. Approval had to  be obtained from  the M in is try  o f 
A g ricu ltu re , but refusal was the exception ra ther than the ru le . The Statutes 
also stipulated the in terna l organisational structure  and the operating fram e o f 
reference fo r the co llective . While its  t i t le  'Model' may im ply th a t an individual 
co llec tive  was, w ith in  the broad fram ew ork, free to  adopt a S ta tu te  somewhat
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m odified to  suit its  own specific  local conditions and circumstancs, th is in fa c t 
was not the case. The ’o f f ic ia l1 sta tu te  was a r ig id  document which had to  be 
observed w ithout any a lte ra tion  down to  the last le tte r . As such i t  was a corpus 
ju ris  which d irected the en tire  economic and social function ing  o f the 
c o l le e t iv e .^ ^  The highest au tho rity  in the co llec tive  fa rm  was, notionally, the 
General M eeting o f a ll its  members. This body elected the Executive Com m ittee 
(w ith  a minimum o f three members), the Contro l Com m ittee and the D isc ip linary 
Com m ittee. The Executive Com m ittee was entrusted w ith  a ll the business 
arising from  the co llective 's  a c t iv ity  between General Meetings and was obliged 
to  submit a report once a month. Its Chairman, in fa c t the manager o f the 
co llective , was elected fo r  a te rm  o f one y e a r . ^ * ^  In p ractice , however, 
elections to  the post o f Chairman, or to  the various com m ittees, was not as 
s tra igh tfo rw ard  as the regulations tended to  suggest. More o ften  than not 
acceptance o f the candidates was strongly 'recommended', or they were sim ply 
appointed by loca l party o ffic ia ls  in collaboration w ith  the leaders o f the loca l 
councils, themselves party members, and they were subsequently 'in fluenced' by 
them in th e ir running o f the co llective . Needless to say, the c r ite r io n  fo r  
selection was based on party lo ya lty  ra ther than expert knowledge in agrarian 
matters. The princ ipa l organs entrusted to deal w ith  the d irectives issued by the 
centra l agencies were the local councils, which operated at the county, d is tr ic t  
and village levels. Each elected a President, a Secretary and an Executive 
Com m ittee, the la tte r  being responsible to  its  own council and also to  the 
Executive Com m ittee im m ediate ly above i t  in the h iera rch ica l order. The ir ro le 
and status was defined in co n flic tin g  term s by Rakosi when, addressing the 
National Assembly on 17th August, 1949, he stated tha t they were 'not only 
autonomous organisations but, at the same tim e, the executive organs o f the 
centra l p o w e r ' / * ^  I t  soon, however, became evident tha t in re a lity  th e ir  main 
function was the servile execution o f centra l orders. Among th is  loca l executive
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network it .  was the Village Council which enjoyed the most influence. Being the 
closest to  the ru ra l population i t  was given the task o f conducting the 
programme o f co llec tiv isa tion  and as such acquired not unim portant 
d iscretionary powers. These were subsequently used in a very a rb itra ry  manner, 
as w ill be shown, in imposing taxes and assessing land fo r compulsory de livery 
quotas. N a tura lly , the cen tra l authorities took great care regarding the 'proper* 
composition o f th is organisation. The leading posts o f the Councils were 
invariab ly given to  party members who e x p lic itly  demonstrated th e ir  w illingness 
and eagerness to  promote 'class warfare* and the establishment o f co llec tives  in 
the respective villages. Thus, the sphere o f competence le f t  to  the co llective 's  
leadership was extrem ely lim ite d , since centra l authorities, through th e ir  local 
networks, prescribed a number o f indicators, including the to ta l acreage o f 
individual crops, the targets fo r output, the proportion o f overheads, the fees fo r 
Machine T rac to r S tation services, taxes, a lloca tion o f net income between 
investm ent and reserve fund, the maximum amount o f landrent payable and, 
consequently, the rem aining residual which was le f t  fo r payments to  members as 
income. The duties o f the co llective 's  leadership were confined to  devising the 
most e ffic ie n t methods to  satis fy  the d irectives issued by the government and 
achieving, or be tte r s t ill,  surpassing the targets set.
The Decree specified three types o f producer's cooperatives which m ight 
be form ed, Types I, II and III, depending on how the product and income was 
divided. Types I and II, the lowest form s, were close to  individual fa rm ing, while 
Type III was characterised by the predominance o f communal fa rm ing. The 
preamble o f the Decree solemnly declared tha t,
w ith  the libera tion  o f our country, w ith  the im plem entation 
o f the land re form , w ith  the nationalisation o f facto ries and 
banks and the consolidation o f the people's dem ocratic state, 
the working peasantry o f Hungary embarked now on a road 
which leads to  a more human l i f e . (*05)
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The next stage o f progress was declared to  come from  the superior advantages 
o ffe red by the establishment o f large-scale, co llec tive  farm ing. Small peasants 
had to  be made to  understand the superio rity  o f co llec tive  farm s. In the course 
o f events tha t fo llowed, i t  soon became evident tha t ra ther than bring ing about a 
be tte r li fe  fo r the peasants, as promised by the decree, i t  marked the beginning 
o f perhaps the hardest period they had ever experienced.
The communists believed tha t once a few co llectives were organised in 
each region, say tw o or three, th e ir  sheer example would be su ffic ie n t to 
convince the average peasant tha t co llec tive  fa rm ing was advantageous and 
p ro f ita b le .^ ® )  From th is ’co llec tive  nucleus’ then, expansion would meet no 
resistance from  the working peasants, and together w ith  the landless, dw arf and 
smallholders they would jo in  the co llectives en masse. This be lie f was also based 
on the fa c t tha t ever since the land re form  o f 1945 the Party had done nothing to 
support the new recip ients of land. They were given land but no capita l, 
implements or livestock, and only ra re ly  ever seed. This neglect was en tire ly  
in ten tiona l, in the in te rest o f la te r co llec tiv isa tion  programme, so tha t the 
peasants would see no a lte rna tive  to  th e ir problems but to  jo in  the 
co lle c tive .(107) ,po e r j-ent entire  process o f transform ation  to
collectiv ised agricu lture , as stated frequently  and em phatically, was to  be based 
on the 'vo luntary princ ip le ', tha t i t  was le f t  en tire ly  to  the peasants themselves 
to  decide whether or not they wished to  jo in  a form  o f co llec tive . To make it  
more a ttra c tive  to  the peasants, especially to  the 'vac illa ting ' middle peasants, 
three main organisational form s were decided upon. These form s were designed 
to  take in to  account the degree o f peasant attachm ent to  his land and livestock. 
The three types o f co llectives re flec ted  the:
(i) degree o f collectiveness o f carry ing out
ag ricu ltu ra l operations,
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( ii)  extent to  which priva te  property rights 
were observed, and
( iii)  method o f payment fo r the work
Thus,
Type I the lowest fo rm : 'b ig-parce l group' -  'association fo r  jo in t
cu ltiva tion  o f land' -  a ll work o f ploughing and a ll sowing tha t can 
be mechanised, are carried out co lle c tive ly  on land pooled 
together, but individual harvesting and gathering in, on land 
designated, in turn , by drawing o f lots, conducted by a management 
com m ittee. A ll costs incurred, plus contributions to  two reserve 
funds, are borne, in proportion to  the size o f land contributed, by 
each member. Crop, a fte r these deductions, is reta ined as income. 
P riva te ly  owned land, livestock, implements, buildings etc., are 
reta ined by members fo r th e ir own use.
Type II in term edia te  fo rm ; 'Average D is tribu tion  Group', the 'a rte l'; a ll the
work is perform ed co llec tive ly ; a fte r proportionate cost deductions 
net proceeds are d istribu ted according to  the size o f land 
contributed. As in Type I, p riva te ly  property rights are reta ined.
Type III highest form ; 'Producer's Cooperative Farm ' (i.e., co llec tive
proper); a ll p rperty, i.e., not only land, but d ra ft animals, livestock, 
implements, buildings etc., are pooled, socialised, to  become -a fte r  
compensation - co lle c tive ly  owned. Members are paid in w ork- 
units (trudoden), according to  work perform ed. A lthough the 
regime was eager to  remind the peasant tha t even Type III did not 
fu lly  correspond to  the Soviet 'kolkhoz' fo rm , since land was not 
nationalised and a ground-rent was paid to  owners, in a ll o ther 
aspects i t  operated like  the Soviet 'kolkhoz'. Members were 
allowed, as in the 'kolkhozy', up to  1.5 cad. yokes (0.9 hectare) o f 
land, including a garden p lo t around the house, as 'p riva te  p lo t' and 
were allowed to  keep livestock.
The lower form s, Types I and II were intended to  be trans itiona l form s, only to  
help the peasants to  see the advantages co llec tive  fa rm ing  was to  o ffe r, and 
were expected gradually to  progress vo lun ta rily  towards the higher co llec tive  
farm  type. These d iffe re n t form s also had the added benefit o f suggesting the 
existence o f free w ill on the part o f the peasantry to  'choose' whichever fo rm  
suited them best. Moreover, in order to  help them to  decide to jo in , i t  was 
stated tha t co llec tive  members were allowed to  leave the co llec tive  a fte r three 
years i f  they w is h e d / * ^
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In an a ttem pt to  destroy the image tha t s t i l l  persisted among the 
peasants regarding Soviet agricu lture  and to  demonstrate the advantages o f 
co llec tiv isa tion  the Party resorted to  fa r-reach ing  propaganda and educational 
campaigns. The 'glorious' achievements o f Soviet co llec tive  fa rm ing  were given 
wide p u b lic ity  in the press and learned journals. Also, a number o f ca re fu lly  
selected peasant delegations, composed m ostly o f members o f the previously 
landless agrarian p ro le ta ria t and sym pathetic towards co llectives, were sent to  
the Soviet Union to  study ag ricu ltu ra l conditions. On th e ir re tu rn  they spoke 
h ighly favourably about co llec tive  fa rm ing  there and published glow ing reports 
on th e ir  experiences under such tit le s  as e.g., 'F ive weeks in the world's most 
developed ag ricu ltu re '. ^ ^  Their im pact on the average peasant, however, was 
m inim al.
The p o lit ic a l aspect o f the ru ra l campaign fo r co llec tiv isa tion , re la ted to  
the three main s tra ta  o f peasantry, was to  be guided by the w e ll known Lenin ist 
triad , 're ly  upon the poor peasants, enter in to  alliance w ith  the m iddle peasant 
and fig h t against the kulak'. rp^g f amj j j ar s]0gan -  adopted ea rlie r, as
shown -  took on a d iffe re n t meaning now in view of the changed p o lit ic a l 
circumstances. Previously, alliance w ith  the middle peasant was sought on the 
basis o f defending sm all-scale individual fa rm ing and priva te  property. Now, th is 
alliance was to  be founded on the princip le  o f securing th e ir co llabora tion fo r the 
'build ing o f socialism ' through the establishment o f co llec tive  fa rm ing  in the 
countryside. I t  was considered tha t, even w ithout compulsion, the co llec tive  
farm s would 'detach the middle peasant from  kulak influence ... and put him on 
the side o f the working classes'. Nothing is more illu s tra tive , perhaps, in
th is  respect than Rakosi's own classic elaboration o f the changing a ttitu d e  o f the 
Party towards the peasantry, when addressing the C entra l C om m ittee Plenum, 
convoked fo r  5 th-6 th  March 1949:
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.... a fte r  the libe ra tion  o f the country our party, together 
w ith  the peasantry, including the kulaks, fought against 
the feudal landlords ... u n til the Summer o f 1947 ... we 
could not set ourselves the aim o f draw ing the medium 
peasant over to  our side. Our main objective was to  
neutralise the medium peasant ... In the W inter o f 1947/48 
we took the line o f turn ing the medium peasant in to  our 
a lly . A t the same tim e, we started a struggle against the 
kulaks and did everyth ing to re s tr ic t th e ir development
and in fluence .^  1 2 )
The entire  programme o f figh tin g  and persecuting the kulaks was in itia ted , and 
subsequently a r t if ic u a lly  in tensified, 'from  above' by the cen tra l leadership. 
Contrary to  expectations, as noted earlie r, no class antagonism developed a fte r 
the land re form  between the three, a r t if ic ia lly ,  divided s tra ta  o f the peasantry. 
The Party grossly underestimated the degree o f so lida rity  tha t existed among the 
d iffe re n t categories and even fo rm er landless agrarian labourers, le t alone the 
small and medium peasants, who received land under the land re fo rm  showed no 
desire to  commence class warfare against the kulaks. I t  is, o f course, true  to  say 
tha t a degree o f jealousy and envy towards the wealthy peasants had existed, 
but, at the same tim e, they were also respected on account o f th e ir e ffic iency , 
knowledge and industrious character. They were o ften  help up by the poorer 
peasants as an example. But, i f  class c o n flic t did not develop na tu ra lly  i t  had to 
be created. In term s o f ever sharpening class struggle the po licy  o f 're s tr ic tio n ' 
o f the kulak f irs t  became more system atic and deliberate and, soon, in addition 
to  taking away the land 'leased' by them and applying economic pressures, 
adm in istra tive measures, social ostracism and other methods o f harassment were 
deployed to  drive them o f f  the land. I t  was declared at the beginning tha t kulaks 
were not desirable recru its  to the collectives, because th e ir  property-owning and 
labour-explo iting m en ta lity  was bound to make them hostile  to  socialism. Hence, 
they were to  be trea ted  as 'sworn enemies' o f the people. The Party maintained 
tha t were they adm itted they m ight a ttem pt to  influence, to  demoralise, 
undermine and disorganise the operation o f the co llec tive  from  w ith in , and the
- 444 -
detection  o f th e ir  undesirable a c tiv itie s  would be much more d if f ic u lt . (H 3 )  Qn 
the other hand, i f  they were to  be excluded and le f t  as independent producers 
they would compete against the co llectives. Thus, the a lte rna tive  po licy was to 
e lim ina te  them. Prevented, on the one hand, from  disposing o f th e ir  land and 
banned from  jo in ing  the co llective , on the o ther hand, the only options rem aining 
open to  them were e ither to  cling, tenaciously, onto th e ir land and face the 
prospects o f being squeezed o f th e ir  very last drop o f v ita l ity  or to  ’o ffe r ' th e ir  
land to  the state. A fte r  a period o f intense struggle many opted fo r  the la tte r, 
thereby fu lf i l l in g  the regime's u ltim a te  goal o f fo rc ing  them o f f  the land.
The o ff ic ia l Hungarian po licy adopted against the kulaks fo llow ed, in 
princip le , the Soviet example and experience, as taught by Stalin's 'va lid  and 
universally applicable' theory. This was c learly  stated by Politbureau member 
Erno Gero in his speech to the C entra l Party School, in early 1949. He said tha t,
the e lim ina tion  o f the kulak as a class is to  be 
accomplished in the same manner as i t  was done in the 
Soviet-Union -  in two statges. The f irs t  stage, the 
present stage, is the stage o f re s tr ic tin g  the kulaks, which 
w ill, a t a suitable moment, when the necessary p o lit ic a l 
and economic conditions obtain, be followed by th e ir 
dislodgement, then th e ir liqu ida tion  is a class.^1*4)
The o ff ic ia l po licy o f 'res tric tion ', explained Gero, meant to  subject the kulaks to 
economic, p o lit ic a l and adm in istra tive  measures in order to  weaken th e ir 
p o lit ic a l and economic s ta tu s /* * ^  But, unlike in the Soviet Union, where i t  may 
be argued tha t they held im portant p o lit ic a l and economic power before th e ir  
decline, in Hungary, a fte r the Land Reform , the kulaks held ne ither strong 
economic nor p o lit ica l power.
The de fin ition  o f the term  'kulak' was a r t if ic ia l ly  applied w ith  great 
f le x ib il ity  according to the p o lit ic a l needs o f the moment. O ff ic ia lly ,  as a rough 
guide, the various peasant categories were defined as fo llows:
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(a) Kulak a fa rm er who owned more than 25 cad.
yokes (14.4 hectare) o f land, or whose 
net income was more than 35o golden 
crow n(H 7) or who employed labour other 
than members o f his im m ediate fam ily .
There are, o f course, notable d ifferences between these lim its . Under the f irs t 
rule, a small number o f wealthy peasants would have remained inside the l im it  
(i.e., rated as medium peasant), while under the second ru le, used more 
extensively la te r, many medium peasants came in to  the kulak category. Under 
th is ru le, a fte r taking account the qua lity  and size o f holding, a ll o ther earnings 
derived from , say, some other employment or business was, a fte r  adjustment, 
added to  the to ta l net cadastral income obtained from  the land, (e.g., 15 cad.
yokes holding w ith  a net income o f 150 golden crown, plus 5000 Forin ts money
income derived from  other sources, add to g e th e r)/*
b) Medium Peasant: a fa rm er w ith  more than 10 but
less than 25 cad. yokes o f land, 
who did not employ hired labour, 
but worked his land w ith  his
im m ediate fa m ily  and did not
undertake work fo r others at a ll, or 
only exceptionally.
But, quite apart from  the fa c t tha t the boundaries between these two categories 
were flex ib le , the kulak designation was used not only in the context o f wealth 
and exp lo ita tion  on the land. Exp lo ita tion, i t  was noted, could take place in 
form s other than h iring  o f labour, e.g., lending, speculation or some fo rm  o f 
business a c tiv ity , e.g., m ill, pub ownership or butcher shop. O ften, even the 
sheer ownership o f a nice house, wanted by some party  o ff ic ia l,  combined w ith  
the ownership o f a small p lo t o f land, or indeed, mere personal enm ity  were 
su ffic ie n t grounds to  put the 'kulak' tag on a person. The designation o f kulak 
was, in fa c t used to  denote the 'class enemy' amongst the peasants, as against 
the working peasants. No exact de fin ition  was ever rea lly  given and the
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vagueness o f the te rm  was convenient, since its  meaning could be, and was, 
especially la te r on, easily extended. The medium peasants were the most poorly 
defined group. The ruthless e lim ina tion  o f the kulaks was expected to  ’soften* 
the medium peasants. Just the opposite happened, as w ill be shown la te r, and as 
they refused to  budge during the co llec tiv isa tion  drive they became kulaks w ith  
more or less the same fa te .
c) Small Peasant: a fa rm er w ith  land between 5 and
10 cad. yokes, who lived 
predom inantly from  his own land, 
but fo r  extra  income undertook, 
system atica lly, work fo r others.
d) Agrarian Semi- fa rm er w ith  land between 1 and 5
P ro le ta ria t: cad. yokes from  which he generally
covered ha lf o f subsistence costs, 
the other ha lf came from  h iring  his 
labour
e) Agrarian P ro le ta ria t: fa rm er w ith  land between 0 and
1 cad. yoke garden around the 
house he owned who hired his 
labour out fo r wage-work or share- 
cropping.
A t the same tim e o f the announcement o f co llec tiv isa tion  and the 
sharpening class struggle, there were over 2 m illion  farms in H u n g a ry .^ * ^  Those 
peasants who, according to  the above defin itions, could be considered 'kulaks’, 
numbered around 70,000, according to  a Census compiled around the tu rn  o f 
1 9 4 8 /1 9 4 9 .^ ^  This figure included many who did not actua lly  own a fa rm  o f 75 
cad. yokes size, but whose net cadastral income derived from  th e ir  land was over 
350 golden crownsd. Also, some 16,000 o f them were engaged in o ther thn 
fa rm ing a c tiv ity , but th e ir combined net income reached the 350 golden crown 
mark. Consequently, about ha lf o f the 70,000 or more on the notorious 'kulak 
lis t ' were no more than medium peasants. The 'kulak lis t ' was com piled in early 
1949 fo r the purposes o f establishing on whom taxation  and compulsory deliveries
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could be increased and defin ing who could not be allowed to  jo in  a co llec tive . By
fa rm  size c rite rion  alone a wealthy peasant could, in fa c t, begin at around 50
cad. yokes since under th is  size i t  is d if f ic u lt  to  employ any outside labour.
I t  is d if f ic u lt  to  provide a precise figu re  as to  how many o f the 70,000 kulaks
actua lly  owned farm s above the 25 cad. yoke size, since there are a va rie ty  o f
estimates: according to  one, the to ta l number o f kulaks was 40,000, w ith
dependents about 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 -2 5 0 ,0 0 0 ^^ , others put the figu re  at 30,000-35,000,
w ith  an average o f 4 persons per fam ily , making 120,000-140,000 including 
(123)dependents. Another estim ate, the most conservative, but which
s ta tis tic a lly  would appear to  be the most consistent and is there fo re  adopted
here, puts th e ir  numbers at about 47,000, representing about 3.3 per cent o f
those active ly  engaged in ag ricu ltu ra l ac tiv ities , together w ith  th e ir  dependents.
The share o f kulak land in the to ta l p riva te ly  owned arable land was 16.5 per
(124)cent and 10-12 per cent of to ta l livestock belonged to  them. Undoubtedly, 
they owned most o f the large ag ricu ltu ra l machinery. The ir share o f marketed 
grain was approxim ate ly 20  per cent, an im portant source fo r  the economy. 
G enerally, the marketable surplus o f production had come, p rim a rily , from  the 
kulaks. Furtherm ore, crops were usually o f be tte r qua lity  on kulak la n d s / * ^  I t  
was the most e ffic ie n t, industrious, best educated and tra ined stra tum  in 
agricu ltu re , most fa m ilia r w ith  ag ricu ltu ra l techniques. Many o f them had 
reached th e ir be tte r economic position in life  la rgely through th e ir  own personal 
e ffo rts . I t  was this group o f peasants which was, allegedly, the only ta rg e t o f 
communist warfare in the countryside. But, as the co lle c tiv isa tio n  drive  
unfolded the measures adopted a ffec ted  not only th is section but almost the 
en tire  peasantry.
The Party ’s move against the kulaks began, as shown, w ith  the 
requ is ition ing o f 'Lease-holding land' outlined under Decree 9000/1948, soon 
a fte r  the announcement o f the co llec tiv isa tion  programme. The po licy  proposed
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fo r the 'opening gam bit' o f class struggle was, in many ways, a d irec t 
continuation o f the po licy o f 're s tric tion ' (korlatozas) pursued in respect o f the 
'ru ra l cap ita lis ts ' from  the beginning o f 1948. The p rim ary object o f tha t po licy 
was to  close a ll available avenues to  kulak expansion and to  reduce th e ir  
influence over the rest o f the peasantry. Although, even at tha t early  stage, 
they were openly destined to  u ltim a te  economic strangulation i t  was pointed out, 
then, tha t the tim e  was not ye t ripe fo r  th e ir  'dislodgement' (k iszoritas) or 
'liqu ida tion ' (felszamolas). This o f f ic ia l policy, however, was shortly  ignored in 
p ractice  and replaced by an indiscrim inate nationwide assault on them, aimed, in 
many places at the im plem entation level, at th e ir  dislodgement and o ften  
liqu idation . The po licy was also d istorted in p ractice  in another im portan t 
dimension, namely in its  scope since in many places i t  was extended, even at the 
early stages, i.e., from  the second-half o f 1948, to  a ffe c t not only the medium 
but also the sm all peasants, who were, at least o ff ic ia lly ,  considered an 
im portan t a lly  o f the working class in the countryside. This can be seen c lea rly  
from  the c ircu la r sent by the centra l party leadership to  local, ru ra l, party  
organisations on 13th December 1948. Thus,
in many places our local party organisations attem pted to  
win the p o lit ic a l f ig h t against the kulak by resorting 
exclusively to  adm in istra tive  measures ... in many places 
our comrades lost sight o f the fundamental aim tha t we 
have to  fo rce  the kulaks to  produce fo r  the democracy. 
The task in hand was to  select and punish the 'fa tte s t' 
(i.e., the wealth iest), most obnoxious kulak in the d is tr ic t 
and, by using his example, make other kulaks work. 
Instead, in many places, our comrades organised a 
complete 'w itch -hun t' and arrested kulaks who completed 
the required work ... repeatedly, an incorrect a ttitu de  
towards the po licy o f alliance w ith  the medium peasant 
was shown ... and ... not only kulaks but medium, o ften 
even sm all peasants were rounded up and p u n i s h e d . ( 1 2 6 )
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But th is  apparent divergence between o ff ic ia l ’theory' and 'p ractice ', between
higher and lower party  organisations was, in fa c t, an inherent part o f the
fram ew ork in which the entire  'kulak question was approached and form ulated.
This was so on several levels. F irs t, there was not a c learly  defined and
consistent kulak theory form ulated, and r ig id ly  adhered to, at high levels, which
could have been handed down, more or less, as a 'package d irec tive ' upon which
the lower, local party  o ffic ia ls  could take the action required o f them. This, o f
course, was not accidental or due to  in a b ility  on the part o f the centra l
leadership, but was c learly  in ten tiona lly  arranged. T actica l expediency required
tha t the various measures to  be taken should not be explained beforehand.
Second, there was the genuine d iff ic u lty ,  in the o ff ic ia l view, o f defin ing
unambiguously who was a 'kulak' and drawing a sharp, indentifiab le , dem arcation
line between kulaks and medium peasants. Farm size, as a sole c rite ro n  was, fo r
obvious reasons, unsatisfactory and in e ffic ie n t. A medium peasant, ra ted by size
o f holding, fo r  example, but w ith  an excellent piece o f land, in tensive ly
cu ltiva ted , prosperous and strong, was, by o ff ic ia l logic, considered more o f a
kulak than a kulak w ith  in fe rio r land, cu ltiva ted  say, w ith  moderate in tens ity ,
(127)hence securing less prosperity and economic power to  the owner. To this
extent, re la tive  wealth, another c rite rion , appeared as a log ica l extension to 
other c r ite r ia , like  land area, employment o f labour or some other form s of 
'exp lo ita tion '. Unlike, fo r  example, land size, which can be uniquely quantified , 
re la tive  wealth cannot and as such i t  easily len t its e lf to  the poss ib ility  o f 
m isapplication. This is only one example, others could easily be c ited  on s im ila r 
lines. But i t  is su ffic ien t to  demonstrate the inherently ambiguous nature o f 
defin ing who was a 'kulak', which gave rise to  numerous d iff ic u lt ie s . T h ird , 
which perhaps most often led to  a rb itra ry  excesses and abuses, were the 
confusing, o ften  contrad ictory, demands from  above regarding the actions loca l 
party o ffic ia ls  were expected to  take. Such were, fo r example, the slogans o f
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'res tric tions ’ (korlatozas), but not 'dislodgement' (k iszoritas) or 'liqu ida tion '
(felszamolas), o f the kulaks. Here the d if f ic u lty  was to  p red ict i f  a pa rticu la r
action would have a result w ith in  the required lim its . I f  the action resulted in
'in su ffic ien t res tr ic tio n ', especially at the in it ia l stages, or reports were
subm itted to  higher party  organisations s ta ting  tha t there were no kulaks or only
'good kulaks' in th e ir  respective d is tr ic ts  -  as often happened, e.g., in the
Transdanubian regions -  then party  actives were accused o f 'leniency', or 'lack o f
vig ilence' and were denounced as 'righ t-w ing ' deviation ists who allowed kulaks to
disguide themselves as medium peasants to  re ta in  th e ir  'destructive
(128)influence'. To confuse the issue even fu rthe r, while the medium peasants
had been declared allies o f the working class, nevertheless, they also had, i t  was 
said o ff ic ia lly , 'cap ita lis t tendancies'. I t  was hardly surprising, then, th a t party  
actives at lower levels, confronted w ith  these am biguities and contradictions, on 
the one hand, and faced w ith  pressure from  above to show 'glorious' results on 
the 'kulak fro n t', on the other hand, chose eventually the simplest, and what they 
in tu itiv e ly  fe lt  to  be the expected, way out o f th e ir predicament and began to  
resort to  fo rce  and adm in istra tive  measures which would, in the f in a l analysis, 
produce the required results.
From early 1949 onwards, prompted probably by Stalin's repeated 
warnings regarding the in to lerable discrepancy between socialised industry and 
priva te  farm ing, and pa rtly  because o f reasonably successful in it ia l kulak 
resistance in reply to  regime's economic measures, any gradualism was 
abandoned and the po licy o f 're s tric tion ' was, in p ractice , supplanted by the 
policy o f 'dislodgement' by excluding the kulak from  the new system o f contracts 
-  under which kulaks were given contracts fo r seeds and various industria l crops - 
depriving them o f p ro fitab le  sources o f income and access to  credits, a r t i f ic ia l 
fe rt iliz e rs  and scarce industria l products. In addition, steep taxa tion , harsh 
delivery obligations, o ften 3.5 tim es more per cad. yoke o f land than fo r  sm all
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peasants, confiscation o f grain surplus and denial o f admission to  jo in  new 
co llectives -  ostensibly organised by medium and poor peasants -  and f in a lly , 
d ire c t pressures were a ll designed to  force them o ff  the land. By the end o f 
1948, Politbureau member Erno Gero fe lt  i t  necessary to  warn party  ac tiv is ts  
against what he called the ’senseless' and 'clumsy' manner in which the class 
warfare against the kulaks was being conducted, by attem pts to  transform  the 
fig h t against them in to expropriation o f kulaks and grain purchasing in to  
expropria tion o f surpluses, fo rge tting , he said, tha t
under present conditions exproproria tion o f the kulak is 
fo lly  and the surplus expropriation means not an alliance 
w ith , but a fig h t against the medium peasant.(129)
But, at the same tim e, as i f  to  abrogate his c r itic ism , he praised them fo r  the 
results achieved in the grain co llection  fro n t, by stating, w ith  satis faction, tha t,
by the middle o f October (i.e., 1948) 50 per cent more 
wheat was delivered to  the state than during the whole o f
the previous y e a r . ( 1 3 0 )
This may w e ll have been in terpre ted by party  activ is ts  as an endorsement o f 
th e ir  methods and Gero's d is tin c tly  equivocal warning brought no lasting 
im provement in the countryside. The persecution o f kulaks, and frequently  
medium pesants, continued unabated and w ith in  a few months, in many places, 
the im plem entation o f the o ff ic ia l po licy o f 're s tric tio n ' o f the kulak had already 
grown, in practice , in to  the policy o f 'dislodgement'. By March 1949 i t  increased 
to  such a level tha t Rakosi fe lt  i t  necessary to  warn against the over-zealous 
application o f the policy o f dislodgement. Speaking at the C entra l C om m ittee 
Plenum, convoked on March 5th-6th, 1 9 4 9 ^ Rakosi ,  in te r a lia , analysed the 
grave mistakes com m itted by 'le ft-w in g  deviation ists in executing the po licy 
form ulated against the kulak. His main concern, however, was not so much the
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harsh and a rb itra ry  measures d irected against them -  and leading to  th e ir 
prem ature dislodgement -  but ra ther the fa c t tha t party activ is ts , by focusing 
th e ir  a tten tion  on the kulaks, had neglected the im portance o f constant 
strengthening o f the alliance w ith  the small peasants, on whose support the party 
depended, and had fa iled to  distinguish between kulaks and medium peasants, 
whose support the party sought to  ra lly . I t  was wrong, he said, tha t
in many places the pa rty  organisations seemed to  th ink  
tha t once the slogan o f w inning the medium peasant over 
was adopted, the poor peasants were no longer im portant
and consequently there was no need to  bother about ......
measures must be taken to  secure the leading role o f the 
poor peasant, our true a lly , in the DEFOSz organisations 
and the leading ro le  o f the workers in the MTS's ... 
Another serious mistake was tha t our party  organisations, 
in many places, made no d is tinc tion  between the kulak 
and the medium peasants. The blow designed fo r  the 
kulak must not fa ll on the medium peasant.(132)
and
in general we consider those who own more than 25 cad. 
yokes o f land to  be kulaks. But our comrades in the 
villages have considered farm ers owning more than 15 
cad. yokes as k u l a k s . ( 1 3 3 )
Insofar as the genuine 'kulaks’ were concerned, alleged Rakosi in his address, the 
measures empoyed so fa r  against them seemed inadequate since they continued 
to  grow richer. To change th is, he observed, i t  was
high tim e  tha t the fig h t against the kulaks was seriously 
tackled ... whenever the kulak dares to  v io la te  the laws 
o f democracy he must be ruth lessly called to  order.(134)
He re ffe red  to  the kulaks as the 'wheel-drags' o f co llec tiv isa tion , who only 
respond to  f irm  measures which, according to  his demagogic sta tem ent, also 
'inspired respect among the medium p e a s a n ts '/* *^
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The s itua tion  regarding the medium peasant, constitu ting  in 1949 about 
18 per cent o f the ag ricu ltu ra l population, remained, however, as am bivalent as 
ever. While Rakosi denounced the mistaken practice  o f lumping the kulaks and 
medium peasants together neither he, nor the centra l leadership, made any 
genuine e ffo rts  now to  combat the undesirable 'le ft-w in g 1 deviation they were 
accused o f by provid ing clearer, more operationally defined guidelines and 
insisting on its  r ig id  enforcem ent, i f  necessary by taking pun itive measures 
against the offenders. Surely, in view o f the size o f the country, con tro l over 
zealous party  activ is ts , i f  desired, could have been re la tive ly  easily put in to  
e ffe c t. I t  is o f in te rest to  note, however, tha t a t no tim e  was a party  a c tiv is t 
brought to  t r ia l fo r  'le ft-w in g ' deviation, nor fo r  any non-observance o f cen tra l 
d irectives, nor indeed, was any d isc ip linary action taken against any one o f them.
Rakosi's in tervention on behalf o f the working, and especially the 
medium peasants, could perhaps be in terpreted as a 'ta c tic a l re trea t'. The f irm -  
hand policy o f the government against the kulaks created much anxiety and 
alarm among the entire  land-owning peasantry. They already began to  wonder 
whose tu rn  i t  would be next to  be put in to the dreaded 'kulak' category. A t the 
leve l o f im plem entation, however, his in tervention had l i t t le  e ffe c t. The 
persecution o f kulaks went on undiminished and its  extension to  the medium, and 
o ften  even the small, peasants remained a serious problem. This can be seen 
c lea rly  from  the reve la tion by Andras Hegedus, w ritin g  shortly  a fte r Rakosi's 
speech at the C entra l Com m ittee Plenum, in the party theo re tica l m onthly, 
rem inding the party  activ is ts  o f Rakosi's speech regarding 'le ft-w in g ' deviation. 
Hegediis observed, w ith  disapproval, tha t
during the last two months, le ft-w in g  deviation occurred in 
almost a ll ru ra l d is tr ic ts  and they created serious disruptions 
in many villages. These had pa rticu la rly  bad e ffec ts  on the 
medium peasants. In many villages, the achievementss o f 
many years o f hard work became e n d a n g e r e d . ^ f O
-  454 -
What, in fa c t, was happening is c learly  illus tra ted  by his reference to  some loca l 
pa rty  o ffic ia ls  who reported tha t 'in  our village the liqu idation o f the kulaks has 
already been completed'. And these were not isolated cases only. He observed 
tha t, 'some party activ is ts ' in fa c t 'went out o f th e ir  way to  id e n tify  kulaks and 
then daubed slogans, not only on th e ir houses but o ften  on houses belonging to
(137)
medium peasants too ' , or 'smashed the windows o f kulak houses and looted
(138)the shops belonging to  them'. He also complained tha t 'no d is tin c tion  was
made between kulaks and other working peasants, and o ften a sm all peasant,
w ith  7-8 cad. yokes o f land, was declared a kulak simply because he owned a 
(139)horse or a cow. In his conclusion, however, Hegediis too displayed the
typ ica l ambivalent a ttitude  o f the regime regarding the problem o f 'le ft-w in g ' 
deviation. Condemnation, seemingly, always had to  be accompanied by a 
qua lify ing  clause and Hegediis was no exception, when he observed tha t while due 
a tten tion  must be paid to  the dangers o f 'le ft-w in g ' deviation 'we must never 
fo rg e t tha t the main danger fac ing our agrarian policy is s t i l l  r ig h t-w in g  
d e v ia tio n '.^ ^
I t  is not easy, even today, to  find  a sa tis fac to ry  explanation o f the 
purpose o f Rakosi's famous 'ta c tic a l re tre a t' speech. A number o f possible 
prepositions can, however, be advanced. F irs t, w ith  an eye fixed  on the 
fo rthcom ing General Elections, which in fa c t was held on 15th May, 1949, i.e., 
only tw o months away, Rakosi, wishing to  calm the situation, may have believed 
tha t sh ifting  the blame from  the leve l o f centra l party  au thorities  to  local 
organisations would enable him to  create a tem porary atmosphere o f greater 
confidence and to  persuade the panic-stricken peasantry, epecially the sm all and 
medium peasants, tha t his in te rven tion  on the ir behalf would bring co rrec tive  
measures which would help the working peasants. Second, the im portance o f the 
spring sowing fo r  the whole ag ricu ltu ra l year is w e ll k n o w n .^ ^  In th is  instance, 
in view o f the im m inent commencement o f the F irs t F ive-Year Plan, w ith  its
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coro lla ry, the increased ra te  o f co llectiv isa tion , th is was p a rticu la rly  im portant. 
Thus i t  could be argued tha t, in order to  avoid fu rth e r disruptions in the spring 
sowing, through peasant discontent and lack o f incentives, Rakosi's speech was 
designed to  woo the peasant in to  continued production. The anti-ku lak po licy 
had already alienated, and frightened, most o f the peasants. Rather than 
in c iting  the hatred o f the working peasant against the kulak the po licy created a 
fee ling o f so lida rity  and united a ll the land-owning peasantry in abhorrence o f 
the regime. Moreover, fu rth e r anger and discontent was generated by the 
decision o f the government, at about th is tim e, to  raise taxes on independent 
p riva te  farm ers and by the unrea lis tica lly  increased compulsory de live ry quotas, 
the severe penalties fo r  underfu lfilm ent and the pe tty  persecutions. T h ird , 
which may be considered to  be a somewhat cynical view, but which is not 
a ltogether inconceivable, is tha t Rakosi, being the 'best pupil o f S talin ', wanted 
to  arrange his own th ea trica l equivalent o f his great mentor's 'D izzy w ith  
Success' speech. Fourth, was the moderating influence o f Im re Nagy and the 
resistance o f working peasants to  co llectiv isa tion . I t  would be reasonable to  
assume tha t any one o f these motives or more like ly  a com bination o f them may 
have pushed Rakosi in to  action.
Paralle l to  the offensive against the kulaks the government also ordered 
the in tens ifica tion  o f pressure to  organise some form  o f co llec tive , i.e., e ithe r a 
simple producing association or fu lly  fledged co llec tive  farm s. The whole 
process o f co llec tiv isa tion  d iffe red  from  tha t in some other East European 
countries. The co llec tive  farm s in Hungary were not created on the large 
estates, some of which were nationalised ra ther than d istribu ted, but instead 
they were expected to  come in to being, in the f irs t  instance, by converting the 
land confiscated from  kulak lease-holdings and by re-pooling peasant sm all­
holdings d istributed to  them by the Land Reform . As a resu lt, the most 
im portan t social re form  o f the post-war period, the communist sponsored land
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Reform  o f 1945, was to  be com plete ly reversed. The fo rm ation  o f the
co llectives was encouraged and supported by the state, especially in the early
period, by providing them w ith the main facto rs o f production: p rim arily , by the
d irec t, or ind irect provision of land and machinery. O ther forms o f tem pta tion
were also forthcom ing; in December 1948 a Decree was passed which cancelled
the debts o f peasants -  fo r assets received during the land re form  -  provided
they worked in a co llective . Much o f the land to  set up collectives at th is  stage
was provided by the confiscated kulak 'leaseholdings' and, in addition, by the end
o f 1949 some 22,600 cad. yokes o f land under the management o f Farmers'
Cooperatives was transferred to co llectives, together w ith  other assets o f farm
buildings and equipment managed by them, including some 600 stables, 2 0 0  barns,
cellars, vine press-houses and 132 large machines, o f which 66  were
t r a c t o r s / * ^  A s ign ificant amount o f land fo r collectives was also provided
from  the 'State Land Reserve Fund': some 869,500 cad. yokes came from  th is
source by the middle o f 1 9 5 3 .^ ^  Mention must also be made o f the fa c t tha t
some church and priva te  land 'o ffered ' or simply abandoned a fte r the 1945 Land
Reform  also went to  the state reserve. By the end o f 1948 some 1783 farm s in
the above 50 cad. yokes category had had to surrender land to ta llin g  90,000 cad.
(144)yokes, which in one form  or another was now contro lled by the state.
Intense propaganda campaigns were organised to  educate the peasants to  
recognise tha t to  improve the standard o f liv ing, both inside and outside the 
ag ricu ltu ra l sector, i t  was necessary to  liquidate backward methods o f 
cu ltiva tio n  and adopt modern large-scale farm ing methods. A m ajor ro le  in 
l i f t in g  agricu lture  out o f the backwardness and fa c ilita tin g  the development o f 
large-scale co llective  farm ing was assigned to  the development o f the network 
o f 'Machine T rac to r Stations' (A llam i Gepallomasok) and 'State Farms' (A lla m i 
Gazdasagok). A fu ll discussion on these is more conveniently postponed u n til 
la te r.
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In theory, the co llectives were to  be organised, spontaneously, by the
peasants themselves. However, only the agricu ltu ra l p ro le ta ria t welcomed the
fo rm ation  o f collectives; the land-owning peasantry showed no desire to  jo in  or
form  any type o f co llectives. Hence, despite positive d iscrim ination , progress in
organising collectives was slow and disappointing fo r the regim e. By early  1949
the to ta l number o f co llectives, o f a ll forms, approved by the M in is try  o f
A g ricu ltu re , was only 500. O f these, 468 were organised during the previous
autumn's intensive campaign. They occupied 95,500 cad. yokes, or about 0.5 per
(145)cent o f to ta l arable land area. There was s ign ifican t regional va ria tion  in
th e ir fo rm ation , e.g., in the Trans-Tisza region (Bekes, Hajdu and Csongrad
counties), trad ition a lly  noted as a rad ica l region o f the country, the proportion o f
co llectives, w ith  1 .5-2.0 per cent o f to ta l arable land, was s ig n ifica n tly  above
the national a v e r a g e /* ^  The founding members o f these early co llec tives  were
predom inantly the less competent landless agrarian proletarians, fo rm e r seasonal
workers or farmhands on the pre-war large estates, w ith  l i t t le  knowledge o f
modern production methods. They u tilised the confiscated land previously rented
by the kulaks. There were also new landowners who received land during the
land re fo rm , and found th e ir holdings unprofitab le because they lacked the
necessary d ra ft power and equipment. Such landowners were doomed to  fa ilu re .
The social composition o f the founder members o f co llectives can be seen from
the survey conducted at the end o f 1948, which showed tha t only 5 per cent o f
them came from  fo rm er sm all and medium peasants, i.e., they owned some land
even before the land re fo rm , 38 per cent from  those who received land in 1945
(147)and 57 per cent were landless, ru ra l proletarians. Looking at the fo rm a tion  
o f genuine collectives, i.e., Type III farm s, the proportion o f fo rm er land-owning 
peasantry declines from  5 to  3 per cent and the proportion o f landless p ro le ta ria t 
increases from  57 to  62 per cent, according to  some estim ates even to  70 per 
c e n t . ^ ^  The survey also shows tha t o f the 468 co llectives form ed by the end o f
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1948, 70 were Type I, 119 Type II and 279 Type I I I . ^ ^  The predominance o f 
Type III co llectives, over tw o-th irds, form ed by landless ru ra l pro letarians is 
c learly  visib le. This can be p a rtia lly  explained by the fa c t tha t most o f these 
co llectives were created on leased land, where land ownership and crop-sharing 
played no s ign ifican t roles, and by the fa c t tha t the state was g iving the greatest 
help to  th is type o f co llective . Also, only th is form  o f co llec tive  gave the 
landless founding member permanent work opportun ity and live lihood. A part 
from  isolated cases the small and medium peasant w ith  his land, remained 
outside the co llec tive  sector. The average number o f households per co lle c tive  
was about 20 and the average land area 173 cad. y o k e s . ^ ^  A number o f these 
newly organised collectives began to  operate w ith  the autumn sowing, but 
system atic communal work was carried on only from  the beginning o f 1949.
The social composition o f these early co llectives determ ined not only the 
beginnings o f the co llec tive  movement, and the agrarian transform ation , but also 
its  fu tu re  development and operation. La ter, w ith  the development o f 
co llectiv isa tion , the proportion o f fo rm er ag ricu ltu ra l labourers declined but 
even in the mid-1950's th e ir num erical superio rity  in the co llectives remained 
disproportionate. The most serious obstacle fac ing  th e ir e ffic ie n t operation was 
caused, both in qua lita tive  and quan tita tive  term s, by the de fic iency o f the most 
im portant fa c to r o f production, land. About 90 per cent o f the land was 
provided by the state, from  expropriated leased land, and less than 10 per cent o f 
the land was p riva te ly  owned. A report to  the Politbureau on 3rd February 1949 
noted w ith  d issatisfaction tha t,
the working peasants fa iled to  bring in the land they had 
owned ... but le f t  it^m iis id e  the cooperative, to  work i t  
in tensively, p riva te ly .
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Some individual peasants, at the early stages, envisaged tha t while working in 
the co llec tive  they s t i l l  could m aintain th e ir individual, p riva te , holdings. Up to  
the middle o f 1949, fo r example, 37 per cent o f members s t i l l  had ind iv idual 
p riva te  holdings. But by the end o f 1949 th is almost to ta lly  d is a p p e a re d /* ^  
The same report also observed tha t those land-owning peasants who decided to  
jo in  the co llectives -  w ith  th e ir  land -  were mostly new landowners who were 
in e ffic ie n t, had le t th e ir land run down and joined w ithout any d ra ft animals. 
O ften, even the agrarian proletarians who jo ined did not do so out o f conviction  
but because o f the continuing serious unemployment problem. Another report 
noted tha t in about one-th ird o f the co llectives the main com pla int was th a t the 
amount o f land was in su ffic ien t to  function  e f f i c ie n t l y / * ^  But many o f the 
'new landowners' had no real desire to  jo in  the collectives. A good illu s tra tio n  
o f th e ir way o f th inking is given by a new landowner, who reasoned against i t  as 
follows:
p rio r to  the libera tion  I was a have not, today I have land. In 
the f ir s t  year, I had neither cow nor seed, today I have a cow 
and seed too. Before, we were dressed in rags and many o f 
our children had no shoes, today we a ll wear decent clothes 
and shoes. Before, I lived in someone else's house, by now I 
have already bu ilt my house, we live  in our own home. Why 
should I go in to a c o l l e c t i v e ? ( 1 5 4 )
This sentim ent, doubtless was shared by many land-owning peasantry.
Due to  government in a b ility  to  provide guidance and s u ffic ie n t
machinery and other equipment, most o f the co llec tive  farm s, despite some help
from  state reserves, operated under serious d iff ic u ltie s  and w ithou t proper
economic foundation. The most im portant common fea ture  o f these early
collectives, according to  reports, was the almost complete absence o f the most
im portant basic tools, the shortage o f machines and equipment, d ra ft animals,
(155)livestock or financia l resources fo r  running expenditure. The p rim ary
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reason fo r  th is was because a fte r  the expropriation o f rented land, most o f the
equipment and animals remained w ith  the previous 'ren tie r' or, as o ften  was the
case, in the priva te  ownership o f m e m b e rs /* ^  Even agrarian pro le tarians who
owned some equipment did not wish to  contribu te i t  to  the common pool. This is
c learly  demonstrated by the fa c t, tha t the proportion o f lives tock in the
collectives was one th ird  o f the national a v e r a g e .^ ^  S im ila r problems
prevailed w ith  regard to  farm  buildings. Most o f these, taken away from  the
wealthy peasants, or le f t  behind by the old gentry estates, were in d ilap idated
condition and in desperate need o f repairs. The MTS network a t its  in it ia l stages
o f development, at the tu rn  o f 1948/1949, created to  support the co lle c tiv isa tion
programme, was unable to f i l l  the gap in machinery requirements and in any case
these were o ften  established along way from  the needy co llectives. In the spring
o f 1949, the view prevailed in the party tha t the machinery necessary fo r  large-
scale production should not be allocated to  the 'unstable' co llectives. This meant
tha t not only the 'Farmer's Cooperatives' had to  part w ith  th e ir  m achinery but
tha t collectives were not allowed to  buy and/or own trac to rs , combine
harvesters, e tc., but a ll these were given to  the developing MTS n e t w o r k / * ^
Most individual peasants resented these MTS because o f th e ir  repu ta tion  fo r
sending agita tors to  'convince' the peasants to  jo in  the co llec tive . Thus, o ften
the co llec tive  was forced to  re ly  on the w ealth ier peasants fo r  tra c to r  power.
Due to  lack o f financ ia l resources many o f the co llectives could not a ffo rd  to
pay th e ir members in advance o f the next year's harvest. From the very
beginning members were o ften  forced to  undertake day-work fo r  others or they
(159)could hardly have survived u n til the next year. A survey carried  out at the
end o f 1948 noted tha t because o f the
disorganisation and appalling conditions tha t prevailed in the 
collectives, established up to  now, they would endanger the 
fu tu re  development o f the cooperative sector.(160)
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W ithout doubt the peasants were hardly able to  tu rn  these farm s in to  a ttra c tiv e  
a lterna tives fo r  the outsiders. Faced w ith  th is s ituation i t  was not surprising 
tha t w ith in  a few  months, while the co llec tiv isa tion  struggle had hardly begun, 
some 1300 members, mostly land-owning peasants, le f t  the lower, s im pler, fo rm  
o f collectives, i.e., Type I and II, where w ithdraw al was s t i l l  p e r m it te d .^  1)
The major problem w ith  the establishment o f these co llectives was tha t
the Party leadership, at both the centra l and local levels, fo r p o lit ic a l reasons 
was mainly interested in the quan tita tive  development o f co llectives. I t  showed 
l i t t le  concern about th e ir v ia b ility . Due to  government pressure, fie rce  
com petition had developed between the various d is tr ic ts  to  show quan tita tive  
results and during the Autumn campaign i t  was noted that
d is tr ic t party secretaries, seeing tha t the establishment o f 
co llectives in th e ir d is tr ic ts  was few er than in th e ir  
neighbours’, began, at break-neck speed, to  set up new 
collectives, while ignoring com plete ly the management o f 
existing ones.(162)
C red it support fo r these newly established collectives, up to  the m iddle o f 1949, 
was 40 m illion  Forin ts which, fo r the problem in hand, was to ta lly  inadequate, as 
w e ll as unreliable and inappropriate in its  s t r u c t u r e / * ^  The social and 
economic conditions o f members in the co llectives was so weak th a t much o f the 
c red it was allocated to  grain, food supply or paying fo r o ther consumer goods 
re q u ire m e n ts .^ ^  Very l i t t le  was invested in constructing communal fa rm  
buildings or acquiring machinery to  improve the positions o f these co llectives 
and to  make them more a ttra c tive  fo r  the peasants to  jo in.
The in tra c t ib ility  o f the peasants was w e ll illu s tra ted  by the a tte m p t o f 
the HWP to  resort to  mass m obilisation The tw o fo rm er rad ica l peasant 
organisations, FEKOSz and UFOSz, discussed earlie r, were merged on 18th 
December, 1948, in to  the ’National Union o f Working Peasants and A g ric u ltu ra l
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Labourers’, DEFOSz (Dolgozo Parasztok es Foldmunkasok Orszagos 
Szovetsege).^^5) was given the single po lit ica l task o f w inning over the sm all 
and medium peasant members o f the 'deceased' peasant parties to  socialism  and 
thereby prom oting the rapid socialist transform ation o f agricu ltu re . A l l o ther 
tasks were subordinate, the representation o f peasant in te rest was pushed 
com plete ly in to the background. By early February 1949, however, the HWP had 
changed its  previous views regarding the character o f DEFOSz. The elections 
fo r local DEFOSz leaders in January 1949, in some 1013 places e lec ting  11,442 
o ffic ia ls , produced only 48.3 per cent support fo r  the communists, 17.1 fo r  the 
NPP, 15.5 fo r the SHP and 19.1 per cent fo r independent c a n d id a te s / * ^  The 
dissatisfied communist party leadership demanded be tte r representation and the 
dissolution o f those DEFOSz units which were 'penetrated by the class enemy'. 
During the next few months DEFOSz units came under close p o lit ic a l scru tiny 
and where the proportion o f communists was below 60 per cent changes were
/ ■ t  /»  r ? \
made in the ir favour, or the unit was dissolved. Also, to  secure working
class leadership, worker's sanctions were formed w ith in  DEFOSz, w ith  70 per
/ I C O N
cent communist representation , which tended to  a lte r the o rig ina l aim o f
a ttra c tin g  middle peasants, and th e ir a c tiv ity  changed towards trade unionism.
These changes, combined w ith  the bru ta l measures tha t ensued im proved the
position o f the HWP by a mere 1.9 per cent while, a t the same tim e, c rea ting  an
atmosphere o f te rro r in the countryside. Indeed, Rakosi la te r adm itted  tha t
(169)DEFOSz 'was one o f our biggest mistakes in fou r years'. The dogm atic
leadership o f DEFOSz had to  resort to  recurren t, and essentia lly 
counterproductive, purges and persecution among the peasantry during 
subsequent years, which led to  a decrease o f communist membership among the 
peasants. Rakosi had revealed to  the Centra l C om m ittee Plenum on 27th 
October, 1950 tha t
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i t  must be said, comrades, c learly  and openly tha t in v illage 
a fte r v illage our party organisations have lost ground and 
weakened over the last two y e a r s . ( l ^ O )
Indeed, the proportion o f peasants in the HWP had declined from  18 per cent in 
1948 to  13 per cent in 1 9 5 0 .^ ^  An HWP m a jo rity  was f in a lly  achieved by the 
simple recourse o f reducing th e ir com petitors ' numbers by purges. Having fa iled  
to  fu l f i l  its  envisaged role as an agent o f co llec tiv isa tion , DEFOSz was 
u ltim a te ly  dissolved in January 1952 and replaced by a simple trade union fo r  
ag ricu ltu ra l workers.
I t  can thus be seen tha t, by the spring o f 1949, before the 
co llec tiv isa tion  drive, only a sm all m ino rity  o f peasants, m ainly agrarian 
proletarians, belonged to  co llective  farm s and the proportion o f land area in the 
co llec tive  sector was nominal. The small number o f co llectives tha t existed 
were disorganised and w ithout proper economic foundation. The social 
conditions and the economic disadvantages preva iling  w ith in  these co llectives 
rendered them to ta lly  unsuited to  persuade most individual peasants to  
vo lun ta rily  relinquish th e ir trad ition a l way o f life . Nevertheless, the f ir s t  steps 
o f co llec tiv isa tion  had begun and w ith  the establishment o f independent, se lf- 
governing agricu ltu ra l producer's cooperatives the preparatory stage was closed. 
The task o f 'convincing the small and medium peasants, however, s t i l l  remained 
to  be solved. The F irs t F ive-Year Plan, d ra fted  before the com pletion o f the 
Three Year Plan, in March 1949, indicated tha t in the next few  years ag ricu ltu re  
was to  play a key, i f  not cruc ia l role. The success o f the Plan depended on the 
success o f co llec tiv isa tion  and the generation o f an adequate marketed surplus o f 
food and ag ricu ltu ra l raw m aterials. A l l these, however, demanded drastic 
changes in the party's economic policies. I t  was to  these tasks tha t the party  
now turned.
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Chapter 8: The Process of Collectivisation: the second stage
8.1 Towards a new stage, March 1949-January 1951
There is no doubt tha t the C entra l Com m ittee m eeting in March 1949 
signalled a doctrina l change, and marked the s ta rt o f a new phase in the Party's 
ag ricu ltu ra l policies, to last u n til early 1953. The co llec tiv isa tion  po licy  in the 
period presently under investigation went through two d is tin c t stages. The f irs t  
stage, from  the March Centra l Com m ittee Plenum o f 1949, a 're la tiv e ly ' m ilder 
stage fo r the working peasants, except the kulaks, o f course, lasted u n til the end 
o f 1950. In the second stage, from  early 1951, when new form s o f economic and 
adm in istra tive  measures and compulsion were introduced, the 'line  toughened' 
and the government started applying indiscrim ate 'dekulakisation' and te rro r  on a 
mass scale. This continued u n til early 1953. During the stage the regim e 
conducted an undisguised war against the entire  peasantry which may not have 
matched the overall level and extent o f the b ru ta lity  o f the Soviet 
co llec tiv isa tion  drive o f the 1930s but i t  ce rta in ly  came very close to  it .
The change in policy was ushered in by the o ff ic ia l announcement, at the
March 1949 C entra l Com m ittee meeting, ou tlin ing  Hungary's F irs t F ive -Y ear
Plan, covering the period 1st January 1950-31st December, 1 9 5 4 .^  L ike  the
Three-Year Plan, which was in its  last year, the F ive-Y ear Plan was f ir s t
published as a proposal. Unlike the Three-Year Plan, which envisaged a balanced
development o f the economy, the overrid ing objective the new Plan, according to
its  ch ie f domestic a rch itect, Erno Gero, was 'to  tu rn  Hungary in to  a coun try  o f
iron and steel'. Rakosi, too, proudly boasted about the Plan, c la im ing  th a t i t
'would make o f the peasants' endless " puszta" a land o f iron and steel and to  th is
(2)glorious end any means were appropriate'. The plan was designed 'transfo rm  
Hungary from  an agricu ltu ra l to  an industria l country, w ith  a h igh ly developed 
agricu lture ', to  accelerate the tempo both in investment and output, w ith
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(3)prim ary emphasis on m anufacturing, especially the growth o f heavy industry.' 
Besides economic aims, the main purpose o f the Plan was to  ca rry  socialism to 
v ic to ry  in the whole o f the Hungarian economy. W ith the socialist 
transform ation p rac tica lly  complete in industry, where on 28th December 1949, 
a ll enterprises employing more than 10 and less than 100  workers, were 
nationalised and, in 1950, 91 per cent o f to ta l output orig inated in the state 
sector (1 per cent handicraft-cooperative and 8 per cent was p riva te), the
prim ary ta rge t o f socialisation now was agricu lture  where, in 1950, more than 80
(4)per cent o f the land s t i l l  belonged to  small-scale ind iv idual p riva te  holdings.
But the Plan also had a th ird  aim, the strengthening o f the 'defensive powers' o f
the Hungarian People's Republic' on the side o f the Soviet Union and other
friend ly  people's democracies and freedom -loving peoples o f the world against
(5)the war-mongering im peria lis t arsonists.' The most im portan t external 
influence fo r the drastic change in policy was the Soviet au tark ic  model and 
Stalin's new 'war economy', which resulted from  the sudden im pact o f Stalin's 
war hysteria  to  such an extent tha t the 1949 Defence Budget was increased fo u r­
fo ld  w ith in  weeks o f its  fo rm ula tion  in September 1948.
The change in policy can best be seen from  the proposed a lloca tion  o f 
investment funds. While the Three-Year Plan allocated 25 per cent o f to ta l 
investment to industry and 31 per cent to  agricu lture , the F ive-Y ear Plan, in its  
o rig ina l version, allocated 42 per cent to  industry, 80 per cent o f which was to 
serve heavy industry, and 16 per cent to  agricu lture . The net investm ent leve l 
was to  reach 25 per cent o f National Income. The Plan set very am bitious 
targets fo r  the whole economy. Its  proposed increase in Nationa l Income, from  
the 1949 level, was 63 per cent, o f industria l production 86  per cent, w ith in  
which heavy industry was to  increase by 104 per cent. The pred icted  rise in 
liv in g  standards was 35 per cent.
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The ag ricu ltu ra l section o f the Plan was to  serve the 'socia list 
transform ation ' o f the economy and proposed to  increase ag ricu ltu ra l production 
by 42 per cent, to  supply food fo r the expected growth in urban population -  a 
basic fa c to r in the standard o f liv in g  -  and to  supply the largest possible amount 
o f raw m ateria ls fo r  industry. In view o f the fa c t tha t, as noted earlie r, in the 
15 years o f the in te r-w a r period, between 1924-25 and 1938-39, the gross value 
o f ag ricu ltu ra l production had increased by 35 per cent, in constant prices, th is
/g \
was a very ambitous ta rge t indeed. To achieve these results p r io r ity  was
given to  the development o f State and C o llec tive  Farms and Machine T rac to r
Stations (MTS). The number o f trac to rs  was to  increase from  just over 14,000 to
22,000, o f which 19,500 were to  be operated by MTS's -  the number o f which was
to  increase to  500. A t the end o f 1949, there were 331 MTS's operating 3897
trac to rs . There were to  be corresponding increases in o ther machinery.
Investment in agricu lture  was to  be 8000 m illion  Forin ts w ith  ind irec t investm ent
raising the to ta l to  12,500 m illion  Forin ts. H a lf o f the to ta l amount spent on
agricu ltu re  was to  serve mechanisation. Research in agricu ltu re  was to  be
in tensified and the system of crop ro ta tion  successfully practised in the Soviet
Union was to  be tested and adopted and new crops, including cotton, were to  be
introduced. The cotton area, in an experim enta l stage only in 1949, was planned
to reach 94,000 cad. yokes in 1954. Last, but not least, e le c tr ic  power was to  be
(7)introduced in 1250 villages.
The March Centra l Com m ittee Plenum also reappraised the Party's 
'a lliance policy'. Gradually, by th is tim e, the 'dogm atist', 'le ft-w in g  dev ia tion is t', 
'sectarian ' view began vis ib ly to  gain the upper hand. Compared w ith  1948 -when 
elements o f th is 'sectarian' po licy were already noticeable at the po licy  
im plem entation leve l -  the March Plenum now produced a fundam ental change in 
the Party's 'a lliance policy'. The resistance o f working peasants to  
co llectiv isa tion , the abortive a ttem pt o f the DEFOSz to  win over the m iddle
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peasant, combined, perhaps w ith  Im re Nagy’s opposition to  the 'over-hasty*
co llec tiv isa tion  programme influenced the Party's ag ricu ltu ra l po licy in tw o main
ways. F irs t, the planned ra te  o f co llec tiv isa tion  was reduced. A t the 27th
November, 1948 Centra l C om m ittee Plenum Rakosi proposed, in tra  muros tha t
w ith in  a period o f 3 to  4 years 90 per cent o f a ll peasants and 95 per cent o f a ll
arable land should be under co llec tive  farm ing. The March 1949 Plenum,
however, proposed a more modest ta rge t o f 60 per cent o f a ll land under 'kolkhoz
(8)type cooperatives' and 5 to  6 per cent under State Farms by 1952/1953.
Second, th is more modest ra te  o f co llec tiv isa tion , however, was to  be
accompanied by an in tensified fig h t against the kulaks and, perhaps more
im portan tly , by a changed a ttitu de  towards the small scale peasant producer.
Throughout 1948, and s t i l l  at the 27th November, 1948 C entra l C om m ittee
Plenum, Rakosi placed the winning over o f middle peasants at the focus o f the
Party's a tten tion  and critic ised  the leadership o f both the FEKOSz and UFOSz
fo r th e ir bias against the middle peasants. The 5th March Plenum represented a
'U -tu rn ' in the Party ’s 'a lliance po licy ’. Rakosi, at th is meeting, declared the
poor peasants to be the Party's 'most re liab le allies' and c ritic ise d  the DEFOSz
leadership and local party organisations fo r  m is in te rpre ting  the Party's po licy
towards the middle peasants at the expense, and neglect, o f the poor peasants.
To correct th is, Rakosi declared tha t the most urgent task o f the P a rty  was to
'reactiva te  the Party's alliance policy and to  put the poor peasants in the
(9)fo re fron t o f its  policy'. Thus, while the party leadership, during the Autum n 
of 1948, la rge ly sacrificed the agrarian proletarians and poor peasants in the 
in terest o f a compromise w ith  the middle peasants, now to  correc t th is  m istake, 
the new po licy proposed to  sacrifice  the middle peasants.
The March Plenum also resolved and specified the stages o f 
co llectiv isa tion , leading progressively to  the planned ta rge t: the acreage under 
the co llectives was to  reach 250,000, 500,000 and 1 m illion  cad. yokes by the end
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of 1949, 1950 and 1951 re sp e c tive ly /**^  Accord ing to  the guidelines, th is was to  
be achieved by the liqu ida tion  o f kulak land and by the mechanisation o f 
agricu lture , through the investments allocated by the F ive-Y ear plan. Indeed, 
Gero declared tha t,
the line we have to  take is to  bring about a decisive change in 
agricu lture , w ith in  the next few years, by mechanisation and 
the development o f Machine T rac to r S ta tions.^
The Party's changing a ttitu de  to  the kulaks and agricu ltu re  generally -  setting, in 
fac t, the tone fo r the C entra l Com m ittee meeting, tw o days la te r -  can also be 
c learly  seen from  the minutes o f the Politbureau m eeting o f 3rd March 1949, 
stating that,
by 1952 a ll the preconditions w ill exist to  tu rn  to  the po licy 
o f liqu ida ting  the kulaks and fo r the mass entry o f working 
peasants in to  the co llec tives .(1 2 )
The Party ’s a ttitu de  to  the d iffe re n t layers o f peasantry began to  crysta lise. And
the conceptual solution to  the problems o f the kulaks and w e ll-to -do  peasants
and the creation o f co llectives began, more and more, to  resemble the course o f
action taken against the peasants during the Soviet co llec tiv isa tion  process. In
his speech to  the March Plenum, Rakosi h im self in fa c t several tim es re fe rred  to
the experience and example o f the Bolshevik Party during tha t tim e  and,
fo llow ing an 'a lliance po licy ' according the Len in ist triad , he demanded the
unconditional in tens ifica tion  o f the class struggle, saying tha t the sta te  must h it
out hard against the kulaks, tha t 'th is layer o f peasants would have to  be
(13)elim inated from  Hungarian society'. Gero, too, declared tha t the 'destruction
of the kulak class could only be accomplished in the Soviet manner’ since, he
(14)said, 'we do not believe tha t the kulaks could grow in to  socialism .'
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C ollectiv isa tion , Rakosi declared, was the road tha t Soviet peasants were
fo llow ing  w ith  great success and it  was the road tha t the masses o f p riva te
(15)peasant farm ers in the people's democracies must also fo llow .
This drastic ag ricu ltu ra l po licy change provoked a heated debate w ith in
the party leadership around A p ril 1949. The disagreement th a t had existed
between Rakosi and Imre Nagy over ag ricu ltu ra l policies ever since September
1948 fla red up again, according to o f f ic ia l parlance over 'fundam ental questions
(16)re lated to  agricu ltu re .' Nagy disagreed w ith  the over-hasty tempo o f
'socialist reorganisation', i.e., co llec tiv isa tion , o f agricu lture  and considered the
policy o f liqu ida ting  the kulaks premature. He was c r it ic a l o f the agrarian po licy
which equated the kulaks and middle peasants, a po licy which sought to
accomplish the 'socia list reorganisation' through the destruction o f sm all and
medium peasants. This, in his view, v io la ted the 'vo luntary p rinc ip le ' and
gradualism. Nagy accused Rakosi and his plan o f being 'excessive', ' le f t
devia tion ist' and 'adventurist' and, as so o ften  before, he persisted in advocating
(17)a policy o f 'constructive ' a lliance w ith  the middle peasants. Soviet po licy 
d irectives, however, put aside such marginal reservations. For expressing 
'deviant', 'r ig h tis t' views on co llec tiv isa tion , Nagy was expelled from  the 
membership o f the Politbureau on 3rd September 1949. As a 'M uscovite ', w ith  
the experience o f the 1930's purges in the Soviet Union, he knew th a t the tim e  
had come to  remain silent. When a one tim e  'strong man' o f the M in is try  o f 
In te rio r, Laszlo Rajk, could be arrested and, on 24th September 1949, sentenced 
to  death, and Szakasits sent to  prison, the best po licy was to  be s ilen t. Nagy 
then w ithdrew to  academic li fe  as V ice-Chancellor o f the A g ric u ltu ra l U n ivers ity  
o f Gddollo, where he established a rapport w ith  some concurren tly  disgraced 
le ft-w in g  Populists, and taught young agronomists the princip les o f cooperative 
farm ing, the production methods used in Soviet kolkhozy and the Len in ist 
principles o f agricu lture . He was in tem porary disgrace and did not p a rtic ip a te
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in po litics . La ter, a fte r  perform ing a hum ila ting  's e lf-c r it ic is m ' and being
compelled to  confess to  'opportunism ', Nagy was re -adm itted  to  the Party
leadership and became one o f a number o f Secretaries at the tim e  o f the Party's
(18)Second Congress, in February 1951. The lesson, however, remained clear in
his mind; i f  he wanted to  survive he would have to  learn to  hold his tongue. This
he successfully accomplished, and w ith  determ ination he executed a ll the orders
o f the Party w ithout shrinking from  his duty. Perhaps to  hum ilia te  and
embarrass him  fu rth e r on 8 th May 1950, the Party put him in charge o f the
sensitive post o f M in ister o f Crop Collection, w ith  responsib ility  fo r  procurem ent
o f agricu ltu ra l produce from  the peasants, u n til 16th November 1952, when he
(19)became one o f five  Deputy Prime M inisters.
W ith the sole dissenting voice now silenced the P arty  leadership, 
fo llow ing the March Plenum, was ready to  mount the campaign against the 
kulaks in earnest and to  organise the peasants in to  co llectives. For a successful 
outcome, Erno Gero's young understudy Andras Hegediis, an a g ricu ltu ra l expert, 
in his capacity as D ire c to r o f the C entra l Com m ittee's A g ric u ltu ra l D epartm ent, 
was given the task o f overseeing the co llec tiv isa tion  d r i v e / ^  The d riv ing  fo rce  
in this co llec tiv isa tion  process was the economic and adm in is tra tive  d irec tion  
exercised by the organs o f the Party and State adm in istra tion. And the main 
adm in istra tive fie lds in which the economic po licy o f co lle c tiv isa tion  operated 
were the fig h t against the kulaks, taxa tion  and compulsory de live ry  systems, 
commassation o f land (consolidation o f small strips in to  la rger holdings), 
management o f the Machine T rac to r Stations, planning and sta te  subsidy to  
co llective  farm s and regulation o f th e ir  working conditions. Its  main fea tu re  was 
a .succession o f 'campaigns’ w ith  the targets set by centra l and loca l au thorities  
and s tr ic t insistence on compliance w ith  them.
The o ff ic ia l po licy adopted by the Party at its  March Plenum w ith  regard 
to the kulaks was th e ir dislodgement as a class. This meant th a t the
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appropriation o f land leased by the kulaks, which lasted from  Autum n 1948 to
Spring 1949, was now fo llowed by the expropriation o f the land and other
property owned by the kulaks. In addition to  economic compulsion, the kulaks
were to  be subject to, o ften  unnecessary, p o lit ica l, adm in is tra tive  and social
measures o f harrassment, pa rticu la rly  from  the beginning o f 1950, when
persecution changed to  a ruthless te rro r campaign executed w ith  great fe ro c ity  
(21)against them. Very o ften  th is  was unnecessary because cha rac te ris tica lly ,
a fte r the f irs t  fro n ta l a ttack  by the regime, many kulaks showed l i t t le  resistance
and to  save themselves from  the hardships and the prospect o f im prisonment
were soon ready, in a process o f 'se lf- liqu ida tion ' e ithe r to  reduce th e ir holdings
to  15 cad. yokes and/or 'o ffe r ' part or a ll th e ir  land to the state . Under the
various economic lim ita tions  th e ir days would have been numbered, anyway, even
i f  they had attem pted to  c ling onto th e ir land. Increasing labour shortage from
the beginning, lack of draught animals, fe rtilise rs , cred it, bu ild ing m ateria ls,
tools, equipment at low prices (often only the 'b lack m arket' was open to  them)
and w ith  the MTS's forbidden to  work fo r them, u ltim a te ly  they would have had
to  give up th e ir  land. But the regime, in view o f its  com m itm ent to  a rapid
industria lisa tion programme and rapid 'socia list transform ation o f agricu ltu re ',
i.e., creation o f co llectives, was not prepared to  w a it u n til th is  'na tura l'
evolutionary process took its  course and decided to  expedite it .  While i t  is true
tha t around A p ril-M ay 1949, occasional references can s t i l l  be found regarding
the fu tu re  o f those kulaks 'who decided to  o ffe r  th e ir  land', suggesting th a t some
sort o f ’perspective' ought to  be found fo r  them, such as a llow ing those who were
judged suitable on an individual m erit basis to  jo in  the co llectives. These
concepts, however, remained isolated and apparently were designed as
trans itiona l ta c tics  to  placate public opinion in view o f the fo rthcom ing  General
(22)Election. On ideological grounds th is  was to  the party  an unacceptable
solution. F irs t, because of 'good kulak theory' was considered 'opportun is tic ' and,
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second, i t  denied the va lid ity  o f the dogma o f 'sharpening class struggle ' in the 
countryside. The solution to  th e ir fu tu re , as w ill be shown in a moment, was 
found in persecuting and scatte ring  them in to  prisons, in ternm ent camps, fa c to ry  
work, resettlem ent and, occasionally, sentencing them to  death or d riv ing  them 
to  com m it suicide.
Soon a fte r the General E lection was over, in its  harvest campaign the
Party instructed local secretaries, on 9th June 1949, to  be v ig ila n t and look out
fo r  kulak resistance and law breaking and to  take measures against a few as a
warning to  others. They were also warned against persecuting a ll peasants
branded by local activ is ts  as kulaks since many o f them m ight tu rn  out to  be
(23)medium and even poor peasants. Such marginal reservations, however, were
soon abandoned. A fte r  the summer the regime ordered the in ten s ifica tio n  o f the
fig h t against the kulaks. Perhaps the most dram atic and c ruc ia l element in
'liqu ida ting ' the wealthy peasants was the 'kulak lis t'. This lis t, as noted earlie r,
was introduced in early 1949 w ith  the ostensible purpose o f establishing who
should play higher rates o f taxes and compulsory deliveries and who should be
barred from  jo in ing the co llectives. The 'kulak lis t', however, was employed by
the authorities especially ruth lessly from  1950/1951 and w ith  f le x ib il ity  to
'brand' and persecute not only kulaks but also once poor peasants, who, by th e ir
diligence and hard work, had become small and medium farm ers. The 'kulak lis ts '
were drawn up and trea ted  as secret by a ll villages, up and down the country, and
were subm itted fo r approval, in the f irs t  instance, to  D is tr ic t Councils and then
to  the M in is try  o f the In te rio r. The secrecy surrounding the 'kulak lis ts ' and th e ir
frequent widening to  include medium peasants, in te llectua ls , artisans e tc., was
used to create a fee ling o f insecurity and fea r among those who believed they
(24)m ight be put on the lis t next. In spite o f declared cen tra l po licy  almost 
anyone's name could appear on the lis t. Thus a sm all peasant w ith  5 cad. yokes 
o f land was put on the lis t fo r refusing to  give 5 litre s  o f wine demanded by a
(25)drunken d is tr ic t pa rty  secretary. Once on the lis t, i t  was impossible lega lly
to  gain release from  it .  The basis o f the 'kulak lis ts  s t i l l  in use in 1951 was the
pre-1948 landownership structure . This was highly d is to rtive  as many changes
had happened since then, and a person could, fo r example, have le f t  fa rm ing
altogether. But whether or not s t i l l  engaged in fa rm ing  his name was included on
tha t basis. The only way to  'get o ff ' the lis t  was fo r  the peasant to  'o ffe r ' a ll his
(26)land to  the state and change occupation and even residence. But o ften  even
this fa iled  to  guarantee freedom from  persecution. La ter, the 'kulak lis t ' was
very useful to  the regime to  d iscipline and punish workers who had ea rlie r lived
in villages, or s t i l l  commuted- to  the c ities  and facto ries. When the kulaks
disappeared in to  mining, facto ries or in ternm ent camps, where they were used as
'forced labour', w ith  a red stripe painted on th e ir backs, i t  was the tu rn  o f the
middle peasants, o rig ina lly  the king-pin o f the party's ag ricu ltu ra l policy,
because they were 'contam inated' by the kulaks. Since a name could not be
erased from  the lis t  - the number o f kulaks could not, even theo re tica lly , be
reduced -  the only way the kulak numbers could be maintained was to  replace the
(27)already liquidated kulak farms w ith  medium peasant farm s. In add ition to
the 16.5 per cent kulak land, the medium peasants owned 35.3 per cent o f the
(28)to ta l area o f individual holdings. In other words, not only the approxim ate 3 
per cent o f kulaks but the approximate 18 per cent o f medium peasants, not to  
mention the large section o f small peasants, were persecuted under the p re tex t 
o f being kulaks. C erta in ly , at the im plem entation level, ru ra l pa rty  ac tiv is ts  
often, inspite o f frequent warnings at the beginning, just could not be bothered 
to  d iffe re n tia te  between 'strong medium peasants' and 'weak kulaks'. La te r, even 
o ffic ia lly , due to  increased taxation and compulsory de live ry quotas, there was a 
tendency to  group them together. By way o f illu s tra tio n , in his rem iniscence an 
old peasant made the fo llow ing  observation:
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yes, we were declared to  be kulaks. I inherited 7 cad. yokes 
from  my fa ther, th is was the base. Then, my w ife  brought 
some land w ith  the marriage and la te r my son-in-law also 
contribu ted and a ltogether we had some 26-28 cad. yokes.
But th is land, in the Great Plain, where the average net 
income is 5 golden crowns per cad. yoke, was rea lly  w orth 
only a quarter o f i t  and anyway, 20  cad. yokes was woodland 
and pasture. I f  we wanted to  prosper we had to  take on 
leased land. Then in 1948 or 1949, I am not sure when, tim es 
began to  tu rn  fo r  the worse, the au thorities  using God knows 
what m u ltip lie r eventually declared th a t we were worth 34 
cad. yokes o f land and declared us to  be kulaks.(29)
In p ractice , the kulak persecution a ffec ted  almost the entire  peasantry. The 
authorities were very ’inventive ' and 'im ag ina tive ' in find ing ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r  the 
persecution and arrest o f kulaks. From the summer o f 1949 onwards the 
newspapers began to  give wide p u b lic ity  to  the arrest and im prisonm ent o f 
kulaks, the heavy sentences passed on them and the confisca tion o f th e ir 
properties. During this period, kulaks and alleged kulaks were persecuted under 
many varied pretexts. V ivid reminiscences o f persecutions o f rea l or alleged 
kulaks can be found in the excellent sociological study o f Gyorgy Moldova, 
investigating a small d is tr ic t in western Hungary, and the autobiographical work 
o f Jozsef H o g y o r / ^  For illu s tra tio n  purposes, some grounds to  in it ia te  
c rim ina l proceedings, most o f which could be 'anonymously' reported to  the 
police, were as fo llows: fa ilin g  to  feed his livestock properly or refusing or being 
la te  w ith  threshing, w ith  spring sowing, w ith  deep ploughing; slaughtering 
livestock or digging up f ru it  trees w ithout permission, feeding grain or maize to 
th e ir animals; fa ilin g  to  de liver compulsory de live ry quotas in tim e  (o ften  even 1 
or 2 days o f lateness exacted reprisals); evading contractua l obligations; 
in ten tiona lly  provoking, by le tt in g  his dog bark at a policeman passing by; having 
a manure heep insu ffic ien t distance from  a well; having no ligh ts  on a b icycle ; 
'ag ita ting ' against democracy and co llectives. These were a ll construed as 
ind ica ting crim ina l in ten t or even sabotage and w ithout any fu rth e r investigation 
the kulak, or 'alleged kulak' was arrested and imprisoned, fined and/or rese ttled
(31)and his property confiscated. The lis t o f alleged crim es could easily be
fu rth e r extended. In sum, the 'kulak' or 'alleged kulak' was blamed fo r everyth ing
and frequently  used in propaganda campaigns as a scape goat fo r  fa ilu res caused
e ither by natural phenomena or by the regime's unrea lis tic  plan targets. He was
also accused o f 'c rea ting  a hostile  atmosphere' at crop co llec tion  campaigns and
blamed fo r  the growing food shortage. The severity o f the sentences passed had
no meaningful re la tion  to  the alleged crim e com m itted. From a number o f tr ia ls
i t  would seem tha t i t  was a haphazard function  o f the ind iv idual kulak or local
party ac tiv is ts  involved or the com position and arbitrariness o f the County
Tribuals. For example, non compliance w ith  f ire  regulations (no ladder found at
hand) or le tt in g  the dog loose, could bring a fine  between 20,000 and 25,000 
(32)Forints; feeding bread, grain or maize to  ca ttle  and pigs could lead, in
addition to  6-8,000 Forin ts fine, to  1 to  3 years imprisonment, confisca tion o f
(33)property and banishment fo r ever from  his v illage. A kulak who allegedly
de libera te ly delayed harvesting u n til the crop was over-ripe was sentenced to  10
months imprisonment, a 3000 Forin ts fine and p a rtia l confisca tion o f his
property. The land and houses o f a kulak could be confiscated, and he h im self
(34)sent to  prison fo r 5 years, because he k illed  his p ig w ithout permission.
These were not isolated instances. Many kulaks, and alleged kulaks, were in fa c t
arrested and interned throughout the country. For a ll these, the continued
ju s tific a tio n  was given by the 'kulak lis t'.  By la te  1950, i t  was o f f ic ia l ly
adm itted by the M in is te r o f the In te rio r tha t some 21,632 'kulaks' were 
(35)imprisoned. Accord ing to a survey in the period between mid-1950 and m id-
1952 the to ta l number o f legal proceedings, resulting in shorter or longer periods
(36)o f imprisonment was 280,000, on average 4 proceedings fo r each kulaks. The 
interned kulaks were employed by the regime as forced labour, ca re fu lly  
guarded, on various road construction programmes and State Farms. The 
a rb itra ry  manner in which arrests were made, usually in the middle o f the n ight,
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and the sentences passed created, in ten tiona lly , an a ir o f insecurity  and
lawlessness throughout the country. The fines, paid in cash p rio r to  every
deportation, and the loss o f labour through imprisonment were heavy additions to
the standard economic burdens o f h ighly progressive taxa tion  and compulsory
delivery systems meted out according to  the size o f holdings o f wealthy
peasants. The system o f highly progressive taxation and heavier compulsory
deliveries, based on acreage owned and golden crown net income, and th e ir
exclusion from  certa in  rights, were among the other po licy tools th a t were
employed by the regime to  'liqu ida te ' the w ealth ier peasants. Since these
measures a ffec ted  a ll peasants to  d iffe re n t degrees, a deta iled discussion on
them is postponed u n til la te r. I t  w il l su ffice  here to  say tha t tax and de live ry
obligations o f kulaks were characterised by extrem ely steep progression and
were raised d rastica lly  every year from  1948 onwards. The decree regu la ting  the
delivery rates fo r 1948/1949 stipu lated three tim es greater quotas per un it of
land area fo r  a 25 cad. yokes holding compared w ith  a holding o f 5 cad. yokes. In
(37)1949/1950, a ll the rates were increased fou rfo ld . Para lle l to  each increase in
quotas the manner in which the produce was collected was severely in tensified .
There was, in fa c t, a 'double-squeeze' which a ffec ted  a ll peasants, but m ainly the
kulaks, since increased deliveries at low prices le f t  less, o ften  nothing, fo r  the
kulak to  sell on the more p ro fitab le  free  m arket. The s itua tion  was s im ila r in
the case o f taxes. These increased th ree fo ld  during the period and, in addition,
the kulak was obliged to  pay a special 'ag ricu ltu ra l development tax ', id e n tified
by the peasants as 'ku lak-tax ', which was levied according to  area on a ll holdings
(38)above the size o f 25 cad. yokes. In addition to  normal tax obligations an extra  
burden was placed on the kulaks in the form  of heavy fines in the rap id ly  ris ing  
number o f cases o f non-payment o f taxes and non -fu lfilm en t o f deliveries. A 
study undertaken by the Party on the financ ia l position o f large farm s at the end 
o f 1949 indicated tha t the heavy economic burdens had not only lim ite d
(39)p ro f ita b ility  o f large farm s but caused many to  operate at a great loss. The
next stage, as a result o f heavy taxes and fines, was the accumulated debts,
’arrears’, resulting in the confiscation o f the houses, machinery, animals and land
o f kulaks. During the five  years between 1949 and 1953, 6500 houses, 16,000
farm  buildings, many animals and a ll the large machinery were d ire c tly
confiscated or the kulak was forced to  ’o ffe r ’ them to  the s t a t e . T h e
confiscation o f machinery and its  surrender to  the developing Machine T rac to r
Stations h it the kulaks pa rticu la rly  hard. These ruthless and crude measures had
a dual purpose. On the one hand, in con fo rm ity  w ith  the March Resolution, to
liqu idate the kulaks, as a class and, on the other hand, to  prove tha t individual
fa rm ing  was in e ffic ie n t, tha t the individual peasant could not prosper. The
regim e a r t if ic ia l ly  res tric ted  the e ffic iency  o f kulak farm s by other means too.
In addition to the losses created by harrassment and im prisonment, the kulaks
were excluded from  credits, were unable to  obtain m ateria l inputs and were not
(41)allowed to  keep male animals. Because o f these measures, p ro f ita b ility ,  
incomes and production had declined. The leadership was, o f course, fu lly  aware 
tha t the kulaks, and alleged kulaks, were e ffic ie n t farm ers, but p o lit ic a lly  i t  was 
considered v ita l to  break th e ir po litico-econom ic independence and in fluence, at 
any cost. And the costs were, as w ill be seen, high indeed. The regim e fa iled  in 
only one o f its  main policy objectives. Contrary to  expectations, at no tim e  did 
the peasantry exhib it any willingness to  endorse and support the regime's a n ti­
kulak policy. The policy o f 'class struggle’ was unsuccessful and as the
persecution o f kulaks unfolded the peasantry increasingly turned towards them
(42)
w ith  p ity , sympathy and active so lida rity . The leadership, concerned about
the increasingly sym pathetic public opinion towards the p ligh t o f the kulaks,
(43)attem pted to  stop the 'good kulak' concept spreading even fu rth e r, and to  
form ent em nity between the 'v illage rich ' and the 'v illage poor' by making 
increasing use o f ordinary peasants as witnesses at kulak tr ia ls . The only ru ra l
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support the regim e had recived in its  f ig h t agaist the kulaks came, not
surprisingly, from  the members o f village, d is tr ic t  and county councils and ru ra l
(44)party organisations. These organisations were exhorted continuously to  play
th e ir part in a ll im portan t ag ricu ltu ra l a c tiv itie s , such as ploughing, sowing,
(45)harvesting etc., and in the 'exemplary punishment o f kulaks'.
The e ffe c t o f th is trucu len t 'dekulakisation ' po licy can best be seen in 
the changes in land area and livestock in kulak ownership. Faced w ith  the 
continua lly increasing taxes, fines, social and p o lit ic a l harrassment, 
imprisonment, resettlem ent and deportation, as expected, the kulaks began to  
free themselves, by ge tting  rid  of, 'o ffe ring ' th e ir land, or part o f i t ,  to  the state 
in the hope tha t they could then lead a qu ie ter l i fe  e ither o f f  the land or on th e ir  
rem aining land. The ra te  o f 'land o ffe r ' at the beginning was low and was large ly 
the result o f the po licy o f pa rtia l 'se lf- liqu ida tion ' o f kulaks to  a lower farm  and 
social category. This is indicated by the reduction in arable kulak farm  land area 
from  20 per cent o f the to ta l, in 1948, to  16.5 per cent by the end o f 1 9 4 9 .^ ^  
During 1950, however, as a result o f increasing kulak persecution, the ra te  o f 
reduction was accelerated. Rakosi, addressing the Second Party Congress in 
February 1951, observed w ith  satis faction tha t:
tw o years ago the number o f kulaks was 63,000. This figu re  
includes only those who had more than 25 cad. yokes o f land 
or paid taxes on more than 350 golden crowns ... since July,
1949, 22,000 kulaks o ffe red 662,000 cad. yokes o f land to  the 
state, o f which 340,000 cad. yokes have already been taken 
over from  17,000 kulaks.^?)
Thus, by the end o f 1950, the to ta l arable land area in kulak hands was reduced 
to  1,230,000 cad. yokes, which represented 12.9 per cent o f the country's to ta l 
arable a re a .^ ^  During these years th is  reserve pool o f 'o ffe red ' kulak land 
played an im portant role in the development o f C o llective  and State Farms. 
Later, as w ill be shown, under the pressure o f co llec tiv isa tion , so much land was
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’offered* by the rest o f the peasantry tha t the State was unable to  absorb i t  and
much o f i t  remained in the ’land-reserve-pool’, where i t  was le f t  uncu ltivated.
The s itua tion  in respect o f livestock , on kulak farm s fo llowed a s im ila r pattern .
During these early years o f co llec tiv isa tion  an em bittered struggle took place
between the regime and the kulaks to  gain contro l over the coun try ’s stock o f 
(49)draught power. The kulaks, by th e ir  own diligence, during the post-war years 
had slow ly re bu ilt and now owned a large share o f . the draught animals such as 
horses, oxen, cows etc., and enjoyed a new monopoly position in the country. 
W ith the expansion o f C o llective  and State Farms, on the one hand, and the 
in a b ility  to  sa tis fy  th e ir requirements fo r mechanical tra c to r power, on the other 
hand, the regime faced a predicament, fearing the growth o f peasant dependence 
on the kulaks, and therefore decided to  intervene to  break the draught power 
base o f the kulak. The quickest and most e ffe c tive  way to  achieve th is  was the 
w e ll proven Soviet method of d irec t confiscation o f the large animals under 
various pretexts. The campaign to th is e ffe c t began in the Autum n o f 1948 and 
was conveniently exended, through taxation  and compulsory deliveries, to  include 
even pigs and sheep. Faced w ith  confiscation, the kulaks began to  dispose o f 
th e ir  livestock, e ithe r by sale, sometimes fic t it io u s , or slaughter, or concealed 
d is tribu tion  asmong re latives. A survey o f 600 kulak holdings showed tha t, while 
the number o f large animals per fa rm  averaged 14.9, in 1935, the corresponding 
figu re  was 4.6 by the end o f 1 9 4 9 .^ ^  La ter, kulaks were required by law to  
make available to  the state the sm all number o f draught animals le f t  fo r 
’continued and sustained* use, at very low prices, determ ined by loca l councils. 
Non-compliance was punishable by im prisonment. Under these circum stances 
the livestock position o f kulak farm s rap id ly deterio ra ted even fu rthe r.
The over-hasty manner in which the dislogement and o ften  liqu ida tion  o f 
kulaks began, pred ictab ly caused a serious setback fo r the regime: by depriv ing 
them o f th e ir  property, ag ricu ltu ra l production was lessened. This was so,
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m ainly fo r tw o reasons: f i r s t , due to  the actual reduction in land area, and
second, because o f the general neglect o f previously productive farm s, soil 
conditions and yields had deterio ra ted. Faced w ith  ever increasing uncerta in ty, 
harrassment, lack o f draught power, m ateria ls, fe rtilise rs  and the possib ility  o f 
imprisonment, amongst other restric tions, many kulak lands became p it i fu l ly  
neglected long before they were f in a lly  turned over to  the state. Many o f those 
who managed to  survive the in it ia l a ttack  often operated th e ir rem aining land at 
a subsistence level, producing enough to  feed themselves and th e ir  fam ilies. 
Personal in t it ia t iv e , in term s o f production, was considerably reduced by th is 
fear o f persecution as kulaks.
The serious consequences o f the an ti-ku lak policy, expected perhaps even 
by the regime, did not lag fa r behind. By undermining the economic basis o f 
kulak production, the marketed production, especially o f grain and livestock, 
from  kulak farm s began to decline. The decline was considerably fas te r than the 
slow ly developing, econom ically poor, in e ffic ie n t and disorganised C o llec tive  and 
State Farms were able to  o ffse t. Consequently, the country's food supply 
suffered a serious setback. I t  must, however, be noted tha t despite these 
measures th is stra tum  of peasants s t i l l  produced more than the co llectives, u n til 
the ’kulak farm s', in te r a lia , were almost com plete ly e lim inated from  the 
ag ricu ltu ra l scene by early 1953, when the food supply o f the country almost 
to ta lly  collapsed.
I t  can thus be seen tha t while the regime could le g itim a te ly  c la im  great 
success in its  ’dekulakisation' campaign, the cost in term s o f lost production was 
substantial. This, however, was not a ll. Under the im pact o f forced 
co llec tiv isa tion  running, w ith  increasing in tensity , para lle l w ith  the an ti-ku lak  
campaign, and a ffe c tin g  a ll other stra ta  o f the peasantry, the problems o f the 
regime and o f the peasants, had m ultip lied  and production figures, in te r a lia , 
were fu rth e r adversely a ffected .
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During the tw o years fo llow ing  the announcement o f the F ive-Y ear Plan 
at th  March Plenum the HWP leadership generally speaking did not engage much 
in doc trina l discussions. The Party was much more concerned, apart from  its  
concentration on the ’fig h t against the kulaks’, w ith  the p rac tica l problems o f the 
fo rm ation  o f co llec tive  farms, ra the r than any specific  theory. A  ra the r sudden 
tu rn  in the doctrina l fie ld , to  be discussed in fu ll in a moment, came w ith  the 
announcement in February 1951, o f the amended F ive-Year Plan, which 
d ras tica lly  revised upwards the output targets fo r industry and, to  a lesser 
extent, agricu ltu re  and stepped up the ra te  o f co llectiv isa tion .
To re tu rn  to  the h istory o f co llectiv isa ton , i t  has been pointed out tha t 
up to  the March Plenum the essential fea ture  in the social composition o f 
co llectives was the predominance o f landless agrarian proletarians, the ’have- 
nots' and new landholders, who could not work th e ir farm s successfully and 
pre ferred to  co llectiv ise . These social groups, on the whole, needed l i t t le  
persuasion, especially in view o f the fa c t tha t the state, in addition to  provid ing 
the land, granted a ll possible advantages fo r  them to  jo in  the, p r im a rily , Type III 
co llectives. For these social groups income prospects did not de te rio ra te  by 
jo in ing  the co llec tive  and o ften even improved. Also, a lim ite d  number o f long­
standing sm all and medium peasants, a ttrac ted  by these numerous governmental 
concessions, decided to  jo in  the co llectives. According to o f f ic ia l data, the to ta l 
number o f co llectives approved by 17th May 1949, was 562, w ith  a to ta l 
membership o f 11,746; the composition o f tha t membership was 6440 landless 
agrarian proletarians, 4797 new landowners -  who had received land under the 
1945 Land Reform  -  454 old established smallholders and 14 old established 
medium p e a sa n ts .^^
Two o f the standard com plaints o f the Party, from  the beginning, were 
the unconsolidated nature o f co llec tive  fa rm  land and the tendency on the part 
o f the landowners jo in ing  the co llec tive  to  leave a s ign ifican t part o f th e ir  land
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outside the co llective . F irs t, much o f the land expropriated under Decree 9000
was undoubtedly in myriads o f sm all scattered parcels. The C o llective  Farm
Decree stipulated tha t a co llec tive  fa rm  could only be form ed if ,  at least, i t
possessed 30 cad. yokes o f land. While the government a llocated much o f the
land, in the in it ia l period, th is condition was easily fu lf il le d : the overa ll average
land area o f collectives was 135 cad. yokes and, somewhat higher, at 165 cad.
yokes, fo r  Type III co llec tive  farm s. This was, o f course, s t i l l  a long way below
the 800-1000 cad. yokes, which was considered by the Party as the optim al size
fo r  co llec tive  farms. Thus, at th is stage, the size o f land area was not cause fo r
concern. But the land was divided in to  numerous separate pieces scattered a ll
over d iffe re n t locations; one co llec tive  had 85 cad. yokes land in 8 d iffe re n t
strips or locations and an individual s trip  often was no bigger than 4-5 cad.
yokes. This was a major concern to  the Party, since i t  wished to  create highly
(52)e ffic ie n t large-scale fa rm ing units. Second, many o f those owning land who
joined le ft  a s ign ifican t part o f th e ir holdings, on average - i t  was claim ed -  4
cad. yokes, but in many cases as much as 9-10 cad. yokes o f land, outside the 
(53)co llective . This tendency, too, caused grave concern to  the Party, which 
o ff ic ia lly  adm itted th a t , '
the m a jo rity  o f the land-owning peasantry only entered the 
co llec tive  w ith  one foo t, the other foo t remained f irm ly  
outside, in p riva te  fa rm in g .^ )
Undoubtedly, the main reason fo r th is  was tha t peasants who jo ined the 
co llectives were interested only in receiv ing the various government concessions 
and o ther privileges given to  co llec tive  farm  members, but denied to  p riva te  
farm ers, which could then be used to  benefit th e ir own p riva te  farm s. These 
problems, which the Party declared had to be rap id ly resolved, had fa r  reaching 
repercussions la te r, during the autumn o f 1949.
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From mid 1949 onwards the stage management o f agricu ltu re  was
considerably fu rth e r centralised. The highly developed centra lisation, involv ing
a high degree o f detailed planning and bureaucracy, le f t  l i t t le  freedom fo r  the
individual farms. The d irec ting  organisations prescribed, in de ta il, the schedules
fo r ag ricu ltu ra l a c tiv itie s , e.g., sowing, ploughing, harvesting, etc. The planning
o f the national economy was carried in to  C o llective  and indeed State Farms, and
the various bureaucratic adm in istra tive  organs obliged them to  d ra ft production
plans in the smallest de ta il. Then, 'f ly in g  com m ittees' were organised, which
descended on the peasants to  check tha t the execution o f the various ag ricu ltu ra l
works was completed on tim e. Competitions, which in fu tu re  years, became a
permanent feature  in agricu lture , were organised at d iffe re n t levels, aimed at
(55)the earliest com pletion o f agricu ltu ra l works, e.g., threshing, sowing etc. A 
typ ica l way to  organise these 'com petitions' was to  select a fo rce  two ind iv idual 
peasants 'to  challenge each other' in some ag ricu ltu ra l work. A t th is stage they 
were badly organised and nobody yet seemed to  take them too seriously. They 
were accompanied by a great 'fanfare ', but the results were hardly ever 
publicised.
Despite the not inconsiderable state support, conditions inside the 
co llectives remained una ttrac tive  fo r the m a jo rity  o f land-owning peasants. The 
40 m illion  Forin ts o f c red it provided by the state up to  the middle o f 1949, in 
addition to  other m ateria l support, in re la tion  to  the general poverty o f the early 
founder members, was to ta lly  indequate. The most these founder members could 
a ffo rd  to  bring w ith  them in to  the co llectives was 1 or 2 pigs, perhaps one cow. 
The livestock numbers were extrem ely low in re la tion  to  the land area. Out o f
/ c c \
the 562 co llectives, 300 had no livestock at a ll. These co llectives ce rta in ly  
could not operate as h ighly e ffic ie n t large-scale production units as envisaged 
and promised by the Party. Under these circumstancs, fa rm ing was reduced, 
largely to  cereal farm ing, especially grain and maize, and animal husbandry was
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extrem ely underdeveloped. By the end o f 1950, w ith  the increasing pressure on
the land-owning peasantry to  jo in , state support declined but i t  s t i l l  remained
s ign ifican t: 65 per cent o f to ta l assets o f collectives orig inated from  state
investm ent or c red it, 49 per cent o f horses, 50 per cent o f ca ttle , 35 per cent o f
pigs and 63 per cent of sheep in the co llectives also orig inated e ither d ire c tly  or
(5 7 )
in d ire c tly  from  state a llocation.
These trends continued u n til the autumn o f 1949. The progress o f
co llec tiv isa tion  proved pa in fu lly  slow fo r  the regime. The econom ically
reasonably strong sm all and medium peasants, despite the increasingly hostile
economic and p o lit ica l environment, were determ ined to  remain independent,
outside the co llec tive  sector as long as they could. W ith tremendous e ffo rts ,
during 1949, the government succeeded in se tting  up only a few more co llectives,
based la rge ly on the landless agrarian proletarians. This source fo r
co llec tiv isa tion , obviously, was becoming exhausted and the Party had to  look
seriously in other directions. On 17th August 1949, Rakosi, in his speech on the
occasion o f the ’New C onstitu tion ', observed w ith  great d issatisfaction tha t w ith
a to ta l o f 587 collectives, occupying 1 per cent o f to ta l arable land area,
(58)co llec tiv isa tion  was s t i l l  in its  in it ia l stages. The working land-owning
peasantry, he declared, 'was s t i l l  undecided, the m a jo rity  o f them were s t i l l  the
(59)prisoners o f p riva te  property '. Because o f th e ir sheer numbers i t  was v ita l fo r 
the regime to  win over the middle peasants and induce them, somehow, to  begin 
to  jo in  the collectives. This stratum , as noted earlie r, represented 18.1 per cent 
o f the to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l labour force and farm ed 35.3 per cent o f a ll arable 
la n d /® ^  They made a s ign ifican t contribu tion  to  the food supply o f the country. 
While the P arty  was s t i l l  constantly using the rhe to ric  o f 'a lliance w ith  the 
middle peasants', by this tim e it  no longer believed tha t the m a jo rity  o f m iddle 
peasants would jo in  the collectives vo lun ta rily , w ithu t coercion. Obviously, the 
Party had fa iled  to  take adequately in to  account the attachm ent o f working 
peasants to th e ir land.
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Soon a fte r  the Rakosi speech, in August, policies began to  change as i t  
was now the tu rn  o f the middle peasants to  be 'convinced' to  jo in  the co llectives. 
A countryw ide co llec tive  development and membership recru itm en t campaign 
began on 1st September and lasted u n til 1st November, 1949. The methods o f 
inducing the farm ers to  jo in  the collectives, from  the outset, were extrem ely 
fie rce  and tough, w ith  adm in istra tive  solutions beginning to come more and more 
to  the fo re fro n t. U n til the la te  Autum n o f 1948, medium peasants only 
represented 0.7 per cent o f the membership. A year la te r, in the Autum n o f 
1949, there were s t i l l  only 200 medium peasants, representing not quite 1.5 per 
cent in a to ta l membership o f 13,000. By the end o f 1949, a fte r  two short 
months o f campaign pressures, th e ir share in the to ta l membership increased to  
13.7 per cent, and by the end o f 1950 it  had reached 19.7 per c e n t / ^  W ith th is 
new trend, the balance o f social composition o f co llectives began to  move in 
favour o f the old and new land-owning peasants. While in early 1949 the landless 
agrarian workers constitu ted 57 per cent o f the to ta l membership, th e ir  share
( C O )
declined by the end o f 1949 to  34.2 per cent, w ith  the land-owning peasants
now constitu ting  57.5 per cent.
When the autumn recru itm en t campaign was introduced, the au thorities
planned to  increase the number o f co llectives to  1500, the to ta l membership to
45-50,000 and the to ta l land area farmed by co llectives to 350,000 cad. yokes,
w ith  an average acreage in existing co llectives o f 300 and in newly form ed
(63)collectives 200 cad. yokes. A lthough most o f the planned targets remained 
underfu lfilled , the overa ll results nevertheless came close enough to  the targets 
set fo r the regime to  cla im  a moderate success. By the end o f 1949 the number 
o f co llectives increased to 1367, w ith  a to ta l membership o f 36,400, which was 
an underfu lfilm en t o f 20 per cent, and occupied an area o f 316,000 cad. yokes. 
There was a s ign ifican t sh ift in the regional pa tte rn  o f recru itm en t o f members. 
The highest increases in membership, at 282 per cent, was in the richest region
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o f Transdanubia, a region farm ed mostly by medium peasants; next w ith  182 per
cent increase was the North-Hungary region, and the lowest increase, a ’mere'
112 per cent, was in the Trans-Tisza region where, as noted earlie r, most o f the
expansion took place p rio r to  the autumn c a m p a ig n /^  Another in te resting
fea ture  o f the autumn co llec tiv isa tion  and recru itm en t campaign was the drastic
s h ift in po licy to  favour the creation o f Type III collectives, w ith  almost
com plete disregard fo r the sim pler form s o f Types I and II co llectives; these
were declared ’trans itiona l1 only, very ’unsound’ and fa r removed from  the ’ideal’,
the Type III 'kolkhoz' . ^ ^  Thus, while at the end o f 1948 40 per cent o f the to ta l
number o f co llectives were o f Types I and II, by the end o f 1949, th e ir  share had
declined to  6 per cent. This trend, in fa c t, continued and by the end o f 1950
th e ir share had fu rth e r declined, to  below 2 per cent. Insistence, by the
regim e, on the creation o f Type III co llectives, however, made recru itm en t
(67)among the medium and small peasants even more d iff ic u lt.  I t  is in teresting, 
and somewhat perplexing, to  note tha t when i t  was the tu rn  o f the medium and 
sm all peasants to  be foced in to  co llectives the choice o f the sim pler form s of 
Type I and II co llectives almost com ple te ly disappeared and the princ ip le  o f 
gradualism was to ta lly  abandoned. Apparently, im patient w ith  the progress o f 
co llec tiv isa tion  -  and in an a ttem pt to  rem ain on target -  w ith  the 'socia list 
transform ation  o f agricu lture ' -  the regime was prepared to  jump the tim e -
/gg\
wasting 'trans itiona l' stage and go im m ediate ly fo r the higher fo rm .
Another s ign ificant feature  o f the autumn campaign was the regime's 
a ttem pt to  consolidate the scattered farm land o f collectives and to  prevent the 
land-owning peasantry from  keeping part o f th e ir  land outside the co llectives 
when they jo ined. Concentration o f the land, belonging to  those who jo ined the 
co llec tive  farm s was considered a necessary conditon fo r large-scale fa rm ing. A 
special Presidentia l Council Decree, published on 28th August, 1949, enabled the 
government to  introduce 'pa rtia l commassation' o f scattered a g ricu ltu ra l and
- 498 -
fo rest la n d /® ^  Commassation, especially la te r on, was one o f the most 
im portan t adm in istra tive  means tha t played a special role in harrassing and 
coercing the peasants in to  jo in ing  the co llec tive  farm s. Later, land 
'commassation' became one o f the most w idely used adm in istra tive  methods and 
was repeated tim e and again, each tim e making the peasants involved worse o ff  
than before, thereby fo rc ing  the land-owning peasant to  jo in  the co llec tive . The 
continued commassation caused widespread resentment among the peasantry and 
resulted in widespread de re lic tion  o f land tha t was then o ffe red to  the state land 
reserve. This, o f course, also furthered reduced production. The regime, 
nevertheless, considered i t  absolutely v ita l to  resolve the con trad ic tion  tha t 
developed when a large part o f the land was le ft  outside the co llec tive  sector by 
the individual peasants when they joined collectives. Thus, i t  was stated that,
had we overlooked th is (ie., the land le f t  outside) the 
development o f co llectives would have come to  an abrupt 
halt and co llec tive  groups could have b r o k e n - u p . ( ^ O )
The f irs t  'pa rtia l commassation' begain in September 1949, and a ffec ted  20 per 
cent o f working peasants' farm land; 80 per cent o f the a ffec ted  land was 
previously gentry and kulak land. The contribu tion o f 'pa rtia l commassation' to  
the development o f co llectives at th is early stage is shown in the table
K  1 (71)below. :
In villages, designated fo r  Before A fte r  Increase
p a rtia l commassation commassation commassation
number o f co llectives 
average membership 
average land area o f co ll.
275 423
23 , 35
188 cad. yokes 303 cad. yokes
54%
52%
61%
- 499 -
W ithin a few  weeks a fte r  the p a rtia l commassation, land reorganisations were
carried out in 102  villages o f 'se ttle rs ', w ith  the same aim, which, as can be seen
(72)from  the table below, fu rth e r contribu ted to  the development o f co llectives :
In villages, designated fo r  Before A fte r  Increase
land reorganisations reorganisation reorganisation
number o f co llectives 38 116 305%
average membership 27 33 22%
average land area o f co ll. 118 cad. yokes 206 cad. yokes 75%
While the targeted 300 cad. yokes average acreage fo r existing co llectives, at
303 cad. yokes, was just achieved w ith  the 'p a rtia l commassation', the ta rg e t o f
200  cad. yokes fo r  new co llectives remained, at 166 cad. yokes,
(73)underfu lfilled . The regime had castigated the o ffic ia ls  fo r  the
underfu lfilm ent, accusing them o f neglecting th e ir p o lit ic a l tasks by paying more 
a tten tion  to  'p a rtia l commassation’ than to  the fo rm ation  o f new 'Producers’ 
Cooperative Groups' (term eloszovetkezeti csoport), or Type III co llectives. From 
the communist viewpoint, perhaps, the underfu lfilm en t o f the ta rge t fo r  
increased to ta l embership must have been even more disappointing. Rakosi, in 
his speech to  the f ir s t  conference o f the ’Nationa l Council o f Producers' 
Cooperatives and Machine T rac to r Stations’, held on 25th-26th January, 1950, 
blamed the widespread anti-women and anti-you th  a ttitude  tha t prevailed 
amongst both ru ra l party  activ is ts  and landless co llectives members, who did not 
wish to  adm it them in to  the collectives. This had to  be changed: women and
young people, Rakosi declared, had to  be mobilised and given th e ir  r ig h tfu l and
. . (74)im portant role to  play w ith in  the collectives.
A new wave o f nationwide recru itm en t o f new co llec tive  members and
e ffo rts  to consolidate existing collectives, as w e ll as moves to  strengthen sta te
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con tro l over agricu lture , began, ra ther unusually early, in the summer o f 1950.
The im m ediate reasons fo r th is sudden tu rn  o f events were tw ofo ld . F irs t, the
outbreak o f the Korean war, on 25th June 1950, and the resu lting  tension
between East and West. Thus, defence and m ilita ry  preparations played an
im portant part in the speeding-up process. Second, signs o f serious strains in the
(75)economy were becoming evident, despite e ffo rts  to  conceal them. The
Chairman o f the People's Economic Council, reporting  in June on the progress o f
the economy to  the C entra l Executive Com m ittee o f the HWP, drew a revealing
and gloomy p icture . According to  th is statem ent the alleged increase in
standard o f liv ing , in te r a lia , was endangering the execution o f the investm ent
(76)programme and dangerous lags were beginning to  show in fu lf i l l in g  the plan.
In fore ign trade, during the f irs t  four months o f 1950, im ports had increased by
56 per cent over the corresponding period in 1949, while the increase in exports
(77)was only 1 per cent. As regards agricu lture  in Hungary, especially the early
part o f the year is norm ally noted fo r higher prices, as the stocks o f food decline
before the new crops begin to  come in. That year, however, severe drought
damaged most crops. The f irs t six months o f 1950 saw a continuous
deterio ra tion  in the food situation. Im portant staples, e.g., potatoes, la rd, meat,
m ilk  products, vegetables etc., which had been available in su ffic ien t quantities
since 1947/1948 were in short supply in the middle o f the year. O ff ic ia l
explanations blamed higher consumption, the drought and the fa ilu re  o f the new
national enterprises responsible fo r d is tribu tion  fo r  the shortages, which were
also said to  have been aggravated by kulak h o s tility  towards the regim e and, i t
(78)was hinted, by the resentfu l peasantry w itho ld ing food under kulak in fluence.
Rumours at the tim e  spoke o f forced food exports to  East Germany and
(79)emergency stockpiling. Judged by the scope and severity o f the counter­
measures which began to  be introduced soon a fte r the C entra l C om m ittee 
Plenum, held on 31st M ay-ls t June, 1950, the unfolding streses and dangers in
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the economy, from  the communist viewpoint, must have been very real indeed.
Speaking at the Centra l Com m ittee, a fte r  the meeting enlarged its  own and the
Centra l C ontro l Commission’s membership, Erno Gero, in a mood o f grim
determ ination, outlined the im m ediate tasks and d irection  o f fu rth e r
development o f the e co n o m y .^^
In early 1950 over 4000 fo rm er social democrats, includ ing such
prom inent 'fe llow  trave lle rs ' as Karoly Szakasits, then President o f the Republic,
were purged. As the result o f 'com plaints' regarding the lack o f d iscip line - both
o f workers and managers -  in e ffic ie n t planning in the centra l agencies and
slackness in the enforcem ent o f government d irectives, large scale purges were
organised in the Trade Unions and facto ries to  improve labour d iscip line and to
increase output. Great e ffo rts  were made to  encourage priva te  savings by the
launching o f cooperative housing schemes. A  new wage system was also
introduced, which reduced earnings, unless output was increased s ign ifican tly .
There was, however, no slackening in the execution o f the investm ent
programme. On 16th June, 1950 investment scheduled fo r 1950 was increased by 
(81)900 m illion  Forints. In the fie ld  o f agricu lture , great e ffo rts  were made to
bring in the harvest and move i t  in to  the safekeeping o f the government. In
addition to  the recru itm enm t campaign fo r collectives, other measures were
taken to  strengthen the co llective  movement. A Government Decree, on 12th
August 1950, m odified the 'Model Statutes' o f self-governing, independent
'A g ricu ltu ra l Producers' Cooperatives' (Mezogazdasagi term eldszovetkezet) and
Type III 'A g ricu ltu ra l Producer Cooperative Groups' (mezogazdasagi
term eloszovetkezeti csoport). A t th is tim e, the econom ically viable Type III
'A g ricu ltu ra l Producer Cooperative Groups' began to  be transform ed in to
independent 'A g ricu ltu ra l Producers' Cooperatives', i.e., fu ll kolkhozy. By the
end o f 1950 some 125 such APCs were in operation. A fte r  th is, Farmers'
(82)Cooperatives and APCs, even legally, began to  move away from  one another.
The modified 'Model Statutes' specified
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i) the size o f p riva te  plots; members, depending on the 
size o f th e ir fa m ily  were en title d  to  between \  and 3/4 
cad. yoke.
ii)  members were perm itted  to  keep one cow, one sow w ith  
sucklings, 5 sheep or goats, 1 or 2 fa ttened pigs -  
depending on the needs o f the fa m iliy  -  and un lim ited  
bees, rabbits and pou ltry.
i i i)  members entering the co llectives were obliged to  take 
w ith  them qua lity  seeds, d ra ft and domestic animals 
and fodder, a ll in proportion to  the acreage o f th e ir 
land, brought in to  the co llec tive ; 15 per cent o f its  
to ta l value was to  be contributed d ire c tly  in to  the 
common pool o f the co llective 's  assets, the rem aining 
85 per cent was to  be paid to  the peasant in four equal 
yearly instalments.
iv) co llectives were obliged to  establish a 'social fund' fo r 
the aged, invalid and fo r nursery services etc.
In the in terest o f securing the uninterrupted process o f production, and to  obtain 
more work from  the co llec tive  farm  members, work discipline, the subject o f 
much c ritic ism  was to  be strengthened too. The modified 'Model S tatutes' 
prescribed tha t every co llec tive  farm  male member had to  perform  a minimum 
of 80 workday-units (munkaegyseg), women w ith  young children 40 workday- 
units, in every season. Severe d iscip linary action was to be taken against those, 
who v io la ted this regulation and fa iled  to  fu l f i l  the prescribed n o rm s .^ ^
The main task, as perceived by the Party, was to  get rid  o f the harm fu l 
in fluence o f the kulaks over the peasantry and to arrest the widening r i f t  and 
rap id ly  worsening relations between the Party and the peasants. One method 
used by the Party to  improve re lations and to  persuade the peasants to  jo in  the 
co llectives 'vo lun ta rily ' was the intense propaganda campaign which began in the 
summer o f 1950. A 200 member delegation, headed by no less than the M in is te r 
o f A g ricu ltu re , Ferenc Erdei, vis ited the Soviet Union -  another group o f 50 the 
Soviet Ukraine -  to  'study' the Soviet kolkhozes. On th e ir re tu rn, at a N ationa l 
Conference organised fo r the purpose on 22nd August, 1950, addressed by Erno 
Gero, the delegates called upon the working peasants to  fo llow  the glorious
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example o f the Russian kolkhoz peasant ’where a happy communal sp ir it prevails
and where life  is much easier than fo r  the peasants o f Hungary, who s t i l l  fa rm
(85)ind iv idua lly ’ and jo in  the co llectives. In his address, Gero declared tha t to  be 
able to  employ machinery on a large-scale, co llective  farm s must extend over at 
least 845 cad. yokes. To achieve th is during the autumn, existing ’cooperative 
groups’ would have to  be expanded and sm aller ’cooperative groups’ merged in to 
la rger units. Up to  then, he said, 70,000 fam ilies had jo ined the co llectives, but 
one m illion  ought to have joined them. Setting the pace o f co llec tiv isa tion  fo r 
the autumn, Gero stated tha t,
during the next 10 weeks we have to  persuade not a few 
hundreds, but a few thousands o f men and women and 
fam ilies to  vo lun ta rily  jo in  the c o lle c t iv e s .^ )
A fte r  the conference, in im ita tio n  o f Soviet practice, an extensive ’public 
education' exercise was staged by the government throughout the country, using 
the delegates who had returned from  th e ir v is it to  the Soviet Union, as w e ll as 
party activ is ts , in order to  'educate' the peasants by popularising the 
achievements o f Soviet kolkhozes as the world's most progressive and e ffic ie n t 
large-scale agricu ltu ra l production system.
From tha t tim e on, amidst increasingly b ru ta l coercion, more and more 
small and medium peasants were forced by various methods in to  the co llectives. 
The coercion employed was in many places so intense th a t even o ff ic ia l 
pronouncements openly adm itted tha t the 'vo luntary ' p rinc ip le  was com ple te ly 
ignored. S till, w ith in  a short space o f tim e Erno Gero was able to  observe, w ith  
great confidence and satisfaction, tha t a 'tu rn ing  point' had been reached in the . 
co llec tiv isa tion  drive and peasants by the thousand were entering new and 
existing collectives. As he put it ,
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the ice is being broken and the cooperative movement is 
beginning to  establish deep roots in the v i l l a g e s . ^ ? )
The continuation o f th is trend was cautiously confirm ed by Matyas Rakosi a few
months la te r. Addressing the Centra l Com m ittee meeting held on 27th October
1950, on the main problems o f peace and the rap id ly  de terio ra ting  in te rna tiona l
p o lit ica l s itua tion  -  resulting from  the Korean war -  Rakosi touched also on the
domestic s ituation and reported to  the meeting, in connection w ith  agricu lture ,
tha t the progress o f co llec tiv isa tion  was, on the whole, sa tis facto ry  and la rge ly
(88)in con fo rm ity  w ith  the plan. He paid tr ib u te  to  the countryw ide propaganda
campaign conducted by the delegates fo r having passed on the experiences
gained and methods learn t on the ir v is it to  the Soviet Union, together w ith  the
un tiring  e ffo rts  o f ru ra l party activ is ts  in 'educating' the peasants. W ithout th e ir
help and devotion, progress would have been considerably more d if f ic u lt .  The
meeting, in conclusion, endorsed the resolution ca lling  fo r the convening o f the
Second Party Congress in February 1951.
I t  would appear tha t the party leadership genuinely believed tha t a
'turn ing point' had indeed been achieved and tha t w ith  the use o f su ffic ie n t
coercion and pressures the small and medium peasants, as antic ipated, had begun
to enter the co llectives en masse. This was despite the fa c t, and con tra ry  to
Rakosi's statem ent to  the C entra l Com m ittee, tha t the progress o f
co llec tiv isa tion  was behind ta rge t, since the government had fa iled  to  achieve
the doubling o f the acreage under co llectives planned fo r the period between
(89)30th July and 31st October, 1950. Indeed, the unsatisfactory progress made 
was raised at the Politbureau meeting held on 10th November, 1950, hardly tw o 
weeks l a t e r / ^  Discussing, in te r a lia , the reasons fo r  fa llin g  below the planned 
rates set fo r  co llectiv isa tion , Rakosi adm itted tha t the co llec tiv isa tion  was s t i l l  
a movement o f the poor and new land-owners; the established sm all and medium 
peasants, the prim ary ta rge t o f the regime, were not rea lly  entering the
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collectives in strength. The solution to  the problem, according to  the resolution 
adopted by the meeting, was to  re jec t gradualism and to  increase the pressure, 
to  accelerate the co llec tiv isa tion  drive even fu rthe r.
To tu rn  the co llec tive  farm s in to more a ttra c tive  a lte rna tives fo r  the 
outsiders, since the regime was unable to  provide proper guidance and machinery 
fo r the existing collectives, and at the same tim e to  improve the de te rio ra ting  
worker-peasant relations, an i l l  conceived 'patronage1 system was in s titu ted  to 
send 'volunteer' worker activ is ts  from  the facto ries to  co llec tive  farm s to  o ffe r  
advice and help to demonstrate the worker-peasant alliance. The Party 
Secretaria t, however, in November 1950, instructed that,
the patronage work must be launched in such a way tha t 
Producers’ Cooperative Groups themselves ask fo r the help o f 
the designated fa c to ry .(^ l)
Instead o f e ithe r provid ing sound guidance or im proving worker-peasant 
relations, the Party succeeded only in creating widespread resentm ent and 
fu rth e r alienation among the peasants because o f the general incompetence and 
insensitiv ity  o f urban activ is ts .
In .the same vein, in addition to  making co llec tive  fa rm ing  more 
a ttra c tive  to  the land-owning peasants, other financ ia l measures were introduced 
to  increase the importance o f 'p riva te  plots' and household production. P riva te  
plots, u n til then, had to  a considerable extent been under-rated and neglected by 
the predom inantly poor and landless agrarian pro le tarian co llec tive  members. A 
new Government Decree, m odifying an earlie r d irec tive , was introduced to 
encourage peasants to  bring th e ir domestic farm  animals and other assets w ith  
them when jo in ing  a co llective . The decree obliged co llectives to  reimburse the 
peasants fo r  85 per cent o f th is to ta l value contributed to  the common pool in 
one years, instead o f the earlie r 4 years, and also stipulated tha t 50 per cent o f
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(92)th is payment was to  be made in cash. Evidence showed tha t, out o f the to ta l
o f 77,000 fam ilies in collectives, only 38,000 had a ’p riva te  p lo t’ and 53,000 kept
(93)only a lim ite d  number o f animals. In order to  upgrade th e ir  ro le and to
improve 'p riva te  p lo t' production, thereby easing the burden on co llectives, the
government also made short and long-term  c red it available to  co lle c tive
members, on favourable terms, to  encourage them to  purchase dom estic fa rm
animals fo r 'p riva te  p lo t' operation. The value o f the short-term  credits provided
was 1500 Forin ts to purchase a cow and 300 Forin ts to  purchase a sow.
A pplica tion fo r the cred it had to be made to  the A g ricu ltu ra l Departm ent o f the 
(94)D is tr ic t Council. A t the same tim e, w ith  the slogan 'to  strengthen
cooperative democracy' -  in re a lity  to  extend Party contro l over the co llectives - 
new selections o f co llec tive  farm  leaders were ordered by the M in is te r o f 
A gricu ltu re . Accordingly, between 15th December 1950 and 15th January 1951, 
a ll co llectives were instructed to  scrutin ize p o lit ic a lly  a ll co lle c tive  fa rm  
chairmen, members o f Management Comm ittees, D iscip linary and C ontro l
Commissions and where i t  proved 'ju s tified ' to  replace them w ith  younger, more
i • .  ^ (95)'progressive' cadres.
By the end o f 1950, under increasing pressure, 5.7 per cent o f the active
agrarian earners were in co llectives and the regim e succeeded in extending
co llec tive  fa rm ing to  5-6 per cent o f to ta l arable land area. Some 15,000
medium peasant fam ilies, i.e., 5 per cent o f a ll medium peasants, jo ined the
collectives. During the same period, however, while the to ta l co lle c tive
membership had grown to  1 2 0 ,0 0 0  approxim ately, 180,000 ag ricu ltu ra l workers
looked fo r employment outside agricu lture, most m igra ting to  industry or o ther
sectors o f the economy. Also, while 15,000 medium peasants 'decided' to  jo in  the
collectives, more than 1 1 ,0 0 0  decided to  liqu idate th e ir  farm s and transfe rred
land ownership to  the state, and they too sought o ther e m p lo y m e n t/^
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N um erically, the development o f co llec tiv isa tion  between December
(9711948 and December 1950 is shown in table 8.1 :
Table 8.1: Development in the number, area, and membership of collectives 
between December 1948 and December 1950
Time
No. o f co llectives 
Type I & II Type III To ta l
No. o f 
members
Tota l 
area in 
cad.yokes
Average 
area in 
cad.yokes
December 1948 189 279 468 - _ -
June 1949 140 444 585 12,900 95,500 163.5
31st December 1949 77 1290 1367 36,400 316,700 231.3
30th June 1950 50 1738 1788 67,600 482,800 269.5
1st December 1950 36 2159 2185 119,500 772,000 353.0
5  sec /u . , b . S 'S lr
I t  can be c learly  seen from  the above table tha t from  the beginning o f
co llec tiv isa tion , but especially from  the end o f 1949, the regime favoured the
fo rm ation  o f Type III, the superior type o f co llec tive  farm  groups. By the end o f
1950 th is  type dominated the co llec tiv isa tion  scene. During this period many o f
the co llectives which started out as e ithe r Type I or Type II were hurried ly , o ften
w ith in  one or two months o f the ir fo rm ation , converted in to  Type III co llectives.
By the end o f 1950 the number o f sim pler Type I and II co llectives declined by
tw o -th irds  to  a to ta l o f 36, o f which 17 and 19 were Type I and Type II
(98)respective ly. This policy o f favouring Type III co llectives, however, was soon 
to  change, as the regim e’s a ttem pt to  extend co llec tiv isa tion  to  the sm all and 
medium peasants encountered growing opposition. This opposition, which was
- 508 -
becoming more apparent frm  1951 onwards, made the authorities resort to 
increasingly b ru ta l repression.
Although these policies succeeded in augmenting the co llectiv ised
sector, th e ir consequences on the domestic scene appeared in the demoralised
reaction o f the peasantry, in troducing additional uncerta in ties and leading to  a
decline in production and fu rth e r deterio ra tion in the country ’s food supply, a
basic fa c to r in the standard o f liv ing , thus w iping out, most o f the gain in liv in g
standards achieved during the previous period by the end o f 1950. Inspite o f the
growing food shortage, however, export o f food continued to  increase unabated.
(99)The growing imbalance in food supply posed a serious th rea t to  the regime.
A t the beginning o f 1951 selective ra tion ing  had to  be introduced fo r bread, 
flou r, sugar, butter, fa ts, soap and, in Budapest, m ilk  and certa in  industria l 
products, to  fo res ta ll domestic chaos. The strong propensity to  spend, both in 
the towns and in the countryside, was shown by the fa c t tha t in s titu tio n a l savings 
hardly increased during 1950. In order to  stim ulate savings, the National Savings 
Bank was reorganised and lo tte ry  savings books were introduced in addition to  
the F irs t Peace Loan issue in September 1949. A ttem p ts  were also made to  
stim ula te  priva te  savings through the organisation o f Build ing C o o p e ra t iv e s /* ^  
Yet, as i f  to  h in t at things to  come, Rakosi would insist at the Politbureau 
meeting held on 10th November 1950 that,
the peasants must be forced to  sacrifice  more fo r  the
build ing o f socialism .(1 0 1 )
Despite the fa c t tha t, from  the outset agricu lture  did not receive the necessary 
m ateria l support fo r co llec tiv isa tion  and many o f the targets set by the 
leadership remained, repeatedly, under fu lf il le d  -  notably in respect o f 
investment and mechanisation and the supply o f machines to  the Machine
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Trac to r Stations -  the leadership did not fo r  some tim e to  come give up its  
targets fo r  agricu ltu ra l reorganisation and production. On the contrary, the 
Hungarian leadership favoured sectors which displayed rapid growth. Thus, 
agricu ltu re  already lagging, was le f t  w ith  inadequate investments fo r  rapid 
development and had to  fend fo r  its e lf. The Second Congress o f the HWP set 
even bigger targets fo r  agricu lture  and fo r co llec tiv isa tion .
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8.2 The a ll-ou t drive fo r  comprehensive co llec tiv isa tion , February 1951-
December 1952
There is no doubt tha t the Second HWP's Congress gave the signal fo r  the 
s ta rt o f a new ’tougher1 stage in the Party's agricu ltu ra l policy, which was to  last 
u n til early 1953. P a rtly  as a result o f Soviet demands fo r  s t i l l  more heavy 
industry and more m ilita ry  expenditure, in connection w ith  the increased 
in ternationa l tension brought on by the communist aggression in N orth  Korea, 
greater stress was placed on heavy industry than o rig ina lly  antic ipated. Industria l 
and agricu ltu ra l targets o f the F ive-Year Plan were fu rth e r increased. 
Undoubtedly, the outbreak o f the Korean War played its  part, perhaps even an 
im portant part, in the revision o f the Five Year Plan, but i t  was essentia lly the 
struggle between economic re a lity  and communist goals tha t was u ltim a te ly  
responsible fo r the eventual stagnation and decline o f agricu ltu re  in Hungary 
under communist r u l e / * ^  That is to  say, the dismal s itua tion  th a t had 
developed in Hungarian fa rm ing would not have been very much d iffe re n t had the 
Korean War not broken out. The Soviet demands only augmented the alrady 
worsening situation in agricu lture , and tha t o f the peasants.
During December and January 1951 co llec tiv isa tion  picked up speed. In 
preparation fo r the fo rthcom ing Congress many speakers stressed the need fo r 
the entire  peasantry to  jo in  the co llec tive  system and complained th a t many 
people tended to  forget the fa c t tha t only 7-8 per cent o f the peasants had 
formed collectives. Designed to  change attitudes, to  persuade the peasants to  
form  collectives, numerous slogans, e.g. ’long live  Producers' Cooperatives, State 
Farms and Machine T rac to r Stations, the m ilita n t vanguards o f flou rish ing  
socialist agricu ltu re ’, decorated the streets o f towns and villages during the pre- 
Congress p e r io d / * ^  There was, however, another more specific  and e ffe c tiv e  
pre-Congress campaign method employed by the regime, in an a tte m p t to  cajole 
the m a jo rity  o f the peasants by means o f 'persuasion and convic tion ’, to  test the
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fe a s ib ility  o f 'comprehensive co llec tiv isa tion ' in im portant areas, perhaps before 
the details o f such a policy were spelled out by the Party Congress. Special 
areas, designated as 'Model D is tric ts ', were created, w ith  th e ir  own town and 
village centres, where 'Cooperative Towns' or 'Cooperative V illages' could be 
established; in County Szolnok, fo r  example, fou r towns were singled out as 'show 
cases', to  demonstrate to  the peasants the rapid progress in c o l le c t iv is a t io n / * ^  
On 16th January, 1951, county o ffic ia ls  -  under pressure o f 'd isc ip lina ry  
proceedings' against them -  were forced to  subm it 'requests', 'from  below', to  
centra l authorities to  'pe rm it' th e ir towns to  be declared 'Cooperative Towns' i f  
by the Second Congress, at least 70 per cent o f the peasants in th e ir d is tr ic ts  had 
entered co llectives. An extensive, and intensive, organisational campaign was 
mounted by respective 'C ollectives Development Com m ittees', on 21st January, 
to  assist in the achievement o f this ostensibly unsolicited pledge. For th is  
purpose, da ily v is iting  delegations -  composed, o ften  o f as many as 350-380 
members -and invited m in is te ria l speakers descended on the d is tr ic ts , towns and 
villages to  agita te and persuade the peasants tha t i t  was 'in  th e ir  best in te res t' to  
enter the collectives. On 30th January, even Rakosi, amid much fan fa re  o f 
trumpets, vis ited one selected town, Turkeve, to  lend his au tho rity  to  the ensuing 
campaign. The s k illfu lly  orchestrated campaign, accompanied by an atmosphere 
of intense coercion and te rro r, succeeded in producing such a psychological 
e ffe c t tha t even the most determ ined peasant found i t  d if f ic u lt  to  resist, 
especially when he saw tha t some o f his most admired and respected neighbours 
had 'decided' to  jo in  the co llec tive  farms. In the last stages o f the campaign a 
network o f 'street-stewards' was established w ith  the task o f organising 
'contro lled ' street-m eetings to  pressurize resisting peasants ind iv idua lly . When 
only 10 per cent was needed to achieve the set ta rge t a revised 'kulak lis t ' was 
produced to  'shock' some o f the s t i l l  resisting and va c illa ting  peasants -  those 
especially, who could not establish w ith  any degree o f accuracy in which group
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they belonged -  in to  submission. In fear o f increased economic burdens and 
p o lit ic a l reprisals, many ’decided' to  enter the collectives. W ith in weeks, f irs t  
Turkeve - in tim e to  greet the Congress gathering -  then, soon, Karcag, 
Kisujszallas and M ezotur, amongst others, were declared to  be 'C ooperative 
Towns'.
What began as an intensive pre-Congress preparatory campaign ac tua lly  
continued w ithout respite at an unprecedented ra te  during and im m edia te ly  a fte r  
the Second Congress had met. Local o ffic ia ls  eager to  please th e ir  superiors 
coerced large numbers o f peasants to  jo in  the co llec tive  farm s, causing great 
unrest in the villages. I t  may be in teresting to  look in de ta il at the im m ediate 
results o f these five  weeks o f co llec tiv isa tion  at a break-neck speed 
unparallelled e ither before or a fte r. These are shown in the tab le b e lo w ^ *^ V
Time
number o f collectives 
formed
increase in new increse in
co llec tive  members arable land area
in cad. yokes
13th-20th Feb. 1951 
20th-26th Feb. 1951 
26th February -  
6 th  March, 1951 
6th-13th March, 1951 
13th-20th March, 1951
194
617
446
272
16
14,810
31,278
41,010
23,164
9,409
71,752
186,632
175,874
102,573
40,654
Taken as a whole, the big jump in the to ta l number o f co llectives, membership 
and area, during the Congress preparatory campaign, shown in the tab le  below, 
te lls  the s to r y ^ * ^ :
31st December, 1950 
20th March, 1951
2272
4258
137,561
283,344
818,717
1,495,019
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I t  is to  be noted tha t a ll but approxim ate ly 10-12 per cent o f the newly form ed 
collectives were o f the 'in fe r io r1 Type I and II, i.e ., which paid rent to  the ir 
members. This reversal o f ea rlie r po licy was encouraged by the P arty  during the 
preparatory campaign and was la te r confirm ed by the congress, in order to  show 
rapid results by making i t  easier fo r the medium and small peasant farm ers to  
enter the collectives. To achieve this, in many places, zealous loca l o ffic ia ls  
often recru ited members by o ffe ring  them a ttra c tiv e  privileges, especially i f  
joined by March (a p ractice  which continued) in the fo rm  o f income tax 
exemptions, government loans, reduced delivery quotas.^®?) In some cases, 
these privileges had o f course o ff ic ia l sanction but local o ffic ia ls  went beyond 
tha t, p riva te ly  assuring peasants extra privileges. The sudden decrease, almost a 
halt, in the ra te  o f co llec tive  fo rm ation  was due, large ly, to  the resolution, 
subsequently pssed at the Congress, instructing  the M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re  not 
to  authorise the fo rm ation  o f new collectives from  10th March to  1st August. A 
decree issued on 10th March, 1951, prohibited the fo rm ation  o f new co llec tive  
farm s but the recru itm en t o f new members fo r  existing farm s continued w ithout 
r e s t r ic t io n / * ^  The reason fo r th is decision was p a rtly  to  give tim e  fo r  the 
consolidation o f the hastily  established co llec tive  farm s and pa rtly , perhaps more 
im portantly , to  reassure the peasants and thus not to  d isrupt the spring and 
summer ag ricu ltu ra l work.
A fte r  tw o months o f intensive preparations the Second Congress o f the 
HWP met, on 25th February-2nd March, 1951. I t  came at the height o f the 
purges and Rakosi's d ic ta to ria l powers. The opening address, by M ihaly Farkas, 
was followed by the 754 handpicked voting delegates going through the motions 
o f e lecting the Party's executive bodies and approving the leadership's 
recommendations. In his keynote s p e e c h /* ^  on the economy, Rakosi began by 
over-estim ating the results o f the completed Three-Year Plan and exaggerating 
the f irs t  year's performance of the F ive-Year Plan: industria l production, he
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claimed increased by 27 per cent in 1950, compared w ith  the previous year, 
instead o f the planned 21.4 ag ricu ltu ra l production increased by 5-6 per cent in 
1950 and reached the level o f production in the last peace year before the war, 
1938. This, in fa c t, was untrue. The level o f ag ricu ltu ra l production was about 
10 per cent below tha t o f 1938. But there were also im portan t annual 
fluctuations, e.g., in 1949, ag ricu ltu ra l production was 16-18 per cent lower. The 
pre-war level, in fa c t, was only reached, on a permanent basis, in 1 9 5 7 .^ * ^  The 
d iffe re n t rates o f growth o f industry and agricu ltu re  had already begun to  show. 
Rakosi then moved on to emphasise the gathering th rea t o f war and the 
assistance provided by the Soviet Union, especially its  help to  build modern 
facto ries and to  ’give us the best machines, the most up-to-date m anufacturing 
processes' and, what was no less im portan t, he said ’put her best socia lis t ace 
workers at our d is p o s a l . '^ F in a l ly ,  he reached the cruc ia l point: an immense 
increase would be required in the current plan's economic targets:
the experience o f the last year convinced us tha t our targets 
were too low and therefore we have prepared a new plan, 
which w ill a llocate 65-70 per cent more to  investment than 
the orig ina l p la n .^ 1^)
With regard to  agricu lture , he declared tha t ’ i t  was the greatest brake on the 
acceleration o f socia list development’ -  which demanded increased f o o d / * * ^  In 
an usually frank statem ent concerning yields, Rakosi remarked tha t
the y ie ld  o f our prim ary crops per cadastral yoke exceeded 
the pre-war average by barely 9.2 per cent, at any ra te  to  a 
negligible extent ... The yie ld  o f ce rta in  crops, such as maize, 
is even below the pre-war level, while tha t o f potatoes 
remained unchanged ... our raising o f crops and vegetables 
has lagged behind our requirements and real po ten tia lities  fo r  
pro d u ctio n s^ )
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Rakosi then went on to  say tha t the increased demand fo r  foodstu ffs  and 
industria l crops meant tha t the country must produce more than in the tim es o f 
Horthy. But the increases in average yields were extrem ely low in every fie ld . 
He blamed the peasants fo r  the worsening food s itua tion  and low yields. 
According to  him, they were due to  the slow progress made in co llec tiv isa tion  
and improvement was impossible u n til the bulk o f the peasantry jo ined the 
c o lle c t iv e s /* * ^  To liqu idate  the ’backward state o f agricu ltu re ' by acce lera ting 
the process o f co llec tiv isa tion , the Congress issued an urgent appeal to  peasant 
party members, approxim ate ly 100,000, in early 1951, th a t the 'communist 
peasants must set an example to  the other peasants’. Rakosi then called fo r the 
in tens ifica tion  o f the class-struggle, fo r greater vig ilance and ’communist iron 
discipline '. W ith regard to  the kulaks, he observed tha t although many had 
o ffe red th e ir land, 13 per cent o f arable land was s t i l l  in kulak hands. He 
stressed tha t the struggle to e lim ina te  the rest must continue, as w e ll as e ffo rts  
to  crush the 'remnants o f the cap ita lis t class'/**®^ Rakosi's concluding remarks 
were devoted, in te r a lia , to  the question o f fu rth e r tasks o f the Party in 
agricu lture . Form ulating his own proposals, he said tha t the new augmented 
F ive-Year Plan
includes a greater increase in the development o f the 
socialist construction o f agricu lture  than ever before. This is 
one o f the most im portant problems o f the F irs t F ive-Year 
Plan, which must be solved in the next few years and on the 
proper solution o f which the fu rth e r course o f socia list 
construction, in many respects, de p e n d s .^? )
Rakosi indicated tha t the increased ra te  o f development o f the socia lis t sector in 
the village was to  come from  the fu rth e r extension o f Machine T ra c to r Stations, 
State Farms and Producer's Cooperatives. Assessing th e ir positions, he observed 
tha t the development o f MTS's, numbering 361 at the end o f 1950, w ith  6895 
trac to rs  and employing 29,000 workers, was inadequate and they fa ile d  to  fu l f i l
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the P arty ’s expectations. State Farms, on the other hand, had grown 
sa tis fac to rily  by 53 per cent in 1950 and now occupied 570,000 cad. yokes o f 
arable la n d / * * ^  And to  improve the ra te  o f co llec tiv isa tion  by a fu rth e r 
a ttem pt to  lure the medium peasants who s t i l l  remained conspiciously outside 
the socia list sector he said that where conditions were not ye t ripe the highest 
form , Type III, co llectives should not be ’suggested*. He warned local organs 
against too rig id  insistence on establishing the higher form  o f co llectives. Thus
we should be satisfied w ith  the simplest form , or the f irs t  
type, which has the advantage o f giving the opportun ity  to 
the individual fa rm er and the s t i l l  hesita ting peasant to  try  
out the good side o f cooperation, at a tim e, when they are 
s t i l l  a fra id  o f a more advanced, higher, fo rm  which is too 
co llective  fo r  them. We should not be a fra id  o f the f ir s t  type 
o f cooperation. The superiority  o f cooperative production 
w ill show its e lf even at th is simplest stage in tha t, as the 
experience o f the past years has proved, in the m a jo rity  o f 
cases the members o f the f irs t  class cooperative w ill move 
towards a higher cooperative grading im m ediate ly a fte r  the 
f irs t  harvestJH 9)
It  was le f t  to  Politbureau member Erno Gero, M in ister o f State, President o f the 
People's Economic Council, to  disclose -  on the second day o f the Congress - the 
fu ll deta ils and im plications o f the augmented plan. The revised plan had from  
the beginning generated some controversy between Erno Gero, heading the 
Muscovigte zealots, and the more cautious economic experts.(120) 
d rastica lly  revised plan, fin a lly  passed by the National Assembly, on 8 th  May 
1951, m otivated by an e ffo r t to  accelerate industria lisa tion  fu rth e r, and 
especially to  increase the ra te  o f development o f heavy industry, set more 
ambitious targets in every f ie ld . ^ ^ T h e  modified F ive-Y ear Plan set the highest 
goal fo r  the development o f industria l production by ra ising the orig ina l 1949 
target index from  186 per cent to  310 per cent, an annual grow th o f 42 per cent 
(a fan tas tic  380 per cent fo r heavy industry, 438 per cent fo r  p lant construction 
and 245 per cent fo r lig h t industries). Compared to  1949 the revised Plan set a
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growth ta rge t fo r ag ricu ltu ra l production o f 54 per cent between 1949 and 1954.
The ra te  o f increase in the standard o f liv in g  was also revised, from  35 per cent
in the orig ina l plan, to  50 per cent over the same period, to  a leve l tw ice  as high
as i t  was before the war. The cap ita l investm ent funds fo r  the rea lisa tion  o f
these targets were correspondingly revised upwards from  51,000 m illion  Forin ts
to  85,000 m illion  Forints, to  reach more than 35 per cent o f National 
(122)Income. O f the to ta l investm ent, 41,000 m illion  Forin ts was a llocated to
industry, up by 87 per cent compared to  the orig ina l plan, and representing 48.3 
per cent o f a ll investment, 37,500 m illion  Forin ts o f which was to  go to  heavy 
industry and 3,500 m illion  Forin ts to  ligh t industry. A g ricu ltu re  was to  receive
11,000 m illion  Forints, its  share was reduced from  15.7 per cent (8,000 m illion
(123)Forin ts in the orig ina l version o f the plan) to  12.9 per cent. The revised plan 
promised 26-28,000 new trac to rs  to  agricu lture , an increase in fe r t i l iz e r  use
from  12 kg to  73 kg per cad. yoke and an e igh tfo ld  increase in the irr iga ted  area,
(124)compared to  the orig inal plan, to  reach 370,000 cad. yokes. The augmented
plan c learly  shows the adoption o f an exaggerated industria l development, in
con fo rm ity  w ith  the 'law o f socia list industria lisation ', p ro jecting  a change in the
ra tio  o f the output values o f industry to  agricu ltu re  from  53-47 in favour o f
industry before the war, to  80-20 in favour o f industry, by the end o f 1 9 5 4 . ^ ^
The Party's centra l leadership declared tha t 'investm ent must be regulated solely
by p o lit ic a l considerations, a ll the economic indexes can only play a secondary 
(126)role'. Hence, i t  emphasised investm ent in heavy industry, at the expense o f 
both agricu lture  and light-consum er- industries. The regim e seemed to  believe 
that the low p rio r ity  o f investment in agricu lture , imposed on them by th e ir  
decision to  go fo r  rapid industria lisation , could to  some degree be compensated 
by the increased e ffic iency o f production to  be achieved i f  p riva te  s tr ip  fa rm ing  
were consolidated in to the large farm s in which they seemed to  believe so 
firm ly . The continued endeavour to  increase the size o f farm s, o ften  by
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repeated commassation, seem to  re fle c t a be lie f on the part o f the leadership
(127)
tha t the bigger the fa rm  the greater the po ten tia l fo r  e ffic ie n t production.
The Party leadership com plete ly overestim ated the possib ilities o f the
’cooperative movement’, thereby imposing a heavy burden upon agricu lture , on
three main accounts: (i) the low investment p r io r ity  given to  agricu lture
combined w ith  the high demand imposed upon it ,  in respect o f (ii) releasing
labour to  satis fy  the growing industria l labour requirem ent -  which, in fac t,
increased by 400,000, i.e., by 50 per cent, in fou r years -  and ( iii)  to  provide
enough food, w ith  the reduced labour force and the low leve l o f mechanisation,
fo r the increased urban industria l population. I t  can, o f course, be argued tha t
industria lisation and ag ricu ltu ra l co llec tiv isa tion  serve both economic and
p o lit ica l objectives and it  is sometimes d if f ic u lt  to  distinguish which m otive is
paramount. Enforced industria lisa tion in Hungary, as elsewhere, apart from
serving certa in  economic and s tra teg ic purposes, could absorb surplus
agricu ltu ra l population and by the transfer o f manpower in to  industry reduce the
pressure o f la ten t unemployment in agricu lture  and open up the way to  raising
the level o f ag ricu ltu ra l p roduc tiv ity  in the fu tu re , as long as the m anufacture of
farm  equipment does not continue to  be sacrificed  in the in terests o f heavy
industry and armaments. But the growth o f industry should operate as an
increasingly favourable fa c to r in the pursuit o f agrarian progress. A t the tim e,
however, the rate o f investm ent in the land was insu ffic ien t to  exp lo it the
(128)possibilities o ffe red by the consolidation o f holdings.
I t  was an unrea lis tic  plan, to  be denounced la te r as 'irresponsible' and 
'adventurous' , but at the tim e, i t  was prom ptly  greeted by the Second Congress 
w ith  enthusiasm and approval. Opposition to  the plan, however, grew w ith  the 
increase in the ta rge t figures and w ith  the devastating e ffec ts  o f the plan upon 
the manufacture o f consumer goods -  and thus liv in g  standards -  and upon 
agricu lture. Whatever were the eventual achievements o f the plan w ith in  the
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industria l and, especially, the armaments sectors -  and there were some notable 
achievements -  the financia l, techn ica l and p o lit ic a l preconditions did not exist, 
and the complete fu lf ilm e n t o f the plan was impossible. In 1951 the harvest was 
good which, tem porarily , a llevia ted the consequences o f the po licy  mistakes 
made in agricu lture . I t  was only mid-1953 tha t the reduction in consumption 
enforced by the bad 1952 harvest, the increasing frequency o f bottlenecks in 
industry, the a fte rm ath  o f S ta lin ’s death and a be lie f tha t the in te rna tiona l 
p o lit ic a l c lim ate  had improved seem to  have combined to  persuade a new 
government, led by the p o lit ic a lly  controversia l Im re Nagy, fo r  a b r ie f period, to  
make a drastic downward revision o f the Plan targets fo r both industry and 
agricu lture.
Unquestionably, agricu lture  in p a rticu la r proved to  be one o f the most
disappointing sectors o f the plan. Accord ing to  a report on the operation o f the
F ive-Year Plan issued by the C entra l S ta tis tica l o ffice  in May 1955, the
projected targets in agricu lture  remained grossly und e r-fu lfilled . A  b rie f, global,
look at the actual fu lfu lm en t o f the main ag ricu ltu ra l targets o f 1951 version o f
the Plan, by the end o f the planned period in 1953 is pertinent at th is  point. The
planned m ateria l resources actua lly  put at the disposal o f agricu ltu re  to  achieve
(129)the projected ra te  o f growth in production were as fo llows : (i) the overa ll 
u tilisa tio n  o f fe rt il iz e rs  reached 56.5 kg per cad. yoke, representing a fu lf ilm e n t 
o f only 45 per cent; fe r t il iz e r  use in the co llectives was considerably less, up 
only 16.3 per cent compared to  1949; (ii) la rge ly  because o f the fa ilu re  to  
complete the planned irriga tion  plant at T isza lok, the actual irr iga ted  area had 
increased to  132,000 cad. yokes only instead o f the planned 370,000 cad. yokes; 
( iii)  the supply o f new tractors, which stagnated u n til 1951 increased by a mere 
4649, compared to  1949, instead o f the plan figu re  o f 26-28,000; (iv) investm ent 
allocated to  agricu lture  was 9,300 m illion  Forints, instead o f the 11,000 m illion  
Forints planned, i.e., a fu lf ilm e n t o f 84 per cent; o f th is actual investm ent, 42
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per cent was allocated to  the State Farms, which made up approxim ate ly 10-12
per cent o f to ta l arable land but where the e ffic ie n cy  o f investm ent was lowest,
16 per cent went to  the Machine T rac to r Stations network -  whose development
was included in the Plan, and only 16 per cent o f to ta l investm ent d ire c tly  served
the development o f c o lle c tiv e s /***^  But, at the same tim e, the 9,300 m illion
Forin ts actua lly  a llocated to  agricu ltu re  were amply recouped through
compulsory deliveries, taxes and the price system, by which agricu ltu re  paid fo r
industria l and other developments, depriving i t  o f its  own development resources.
Fixed cap ita l fo rm ation , including livestock, in agriculure grew by only 22 per
cent over the five  year period. Perhaps one o f the most s trik ing  features o f
investment a lloca tion to  agricu lture  was its  d is tribu tion  w ith  regard to  tim e.
About ha lf o f a ll the investment was actua lly  carried out in the last 18 months o f
the planned period: up to  the middle o f 1953, agricu ltu re  received only 5000
m illion  Forin ts fo r  investm ent/****^ Largely, but not only, because o f the under
fu lfilm e n ts  in these areas ag ricu ltu ra l production grew only 11 per cent by the
end o f the plan period,instead o f the planned 54 per cent, a grow th index which
(132)was, in te resting ly, only achieved as la te  as 1968
To re tu rn  to  the h is to ry  o f co llec tiv isa tion , one o f the most fundam ental
policy changes adopted by the Second Congress was the goal o f comprehensive
co llec tiv isa tion  o f agricu lture . This was to  be carried out at the same tim e  as
the augmented plan -  as in the Soviet Union at the tim e  o f its  F irs t F ive -Y ear
Plan. The adoption o f such a policy, already hinted at by the intensive pre-
Congress campaign in Turkeve, Karcag, Kisujszallas and M ezotur, and several
other loca lities , was not to ta lly  unexpected. In fa c t, Andras Hegediis confirm ed
in his speech to  the Congress on point 1 o f the agenda tha t these towns were
8133)used as testing grounds fo r such a policy.
Delivered by Matyas Rakosi, the 'wind o f change' address on 
co llec tiv isa tion  emphasised that
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the most decisive, s tra teg ic, task before the Party and 
the country is to  e lim ina te  the dual nature o f the national 
economy, by the socia list reorganisation o f agricu ltu re , to  
establish a homogenous socia list foundation in our
e c o n o m y . ( 1 3 4 )
Translated in to  p ra c tica l term s, the ta rg e t set fo r to ta l arable land to  be 
co llectiv ised was to  be increased to  reach 8 1 . 6  per cent by 1 9 5 3 - 1 9 5 4 ,  instead o f 
the 5 5 - 6 0  per cent set in March 1 9 4 9 ,  which was now thought not to  be 
e n o u g h /* ^  I t  has been o ff ic ia lly  adm itted since tha t th is  ta rg e t was to ta lly  
unfounded and could not possibly be achieved. The economic and social 
conditions, which may have been su ffic ie n t fo r  a gradual and, necessarily, slow 
expansion o f the cooperative movement, were to ta lly  inadequate fo r  complete 
co llec tiv isa tion  w ith in  a tim e-sca le o f 2 - 3  years. In the event, as w ill be shown, 
the planned targets remained un fu lfille d  during the period under consideration, 
because the economic and especially the agrarian po licy o f the HWP fa iled  and 
by the end o f 1 9 5 2  the country became v ir tu a lly  bankrupt. Despite the fa<. tha t 
agricu lture  was not given even the low planned financ ia l resources the demands 
to  fu l f i l  the new revised targets set fo r  co llec tiv isa tion  and increased 
agricu ltu ra l production remained unchanged u n til about December 1 9 5 2 .  While 
the importance o f agrarian production was repeatedly emphasised, in re a lity  it  
was considered secondary and subordinate to  the quan tita tive  achievments in 
co llectiv isa tion .
Thus, from  early 1 9 5 1  onwards greater e ffo rts  than ever before were 
made a ll over the country to  re c ru it members in to  the co llectives. What was 
lacking in social and economic conditions was made up in adm in is tra tive  
measures and economic coercion. A l l o f these were w e ll known and used in the 
1 9 4 9 - 1 9 5 0  period, but they became accepted and universal in 1 9 5 1  and exclusive 
in 1 9 5 2 .  The years 1 9 5 1  and 1 9 5 2  were the worst years not only fo r  the peasants 
but fo r  the Hungarian people as a whole. C o llec tiv isa tion  went fas te r and more
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ruth lessly in Hungary than in most other East European countries. The process 
o f fo rm a tion  o f co llectives was essentially a spasmodic one, w ith  the highest 
increase in 1951, especially, as shown, in the f ir s t  few months o f tha t year. The 
lu ll in the fo rm ation  o f co llectives, called fo r by the Party leadership - pa rtly  to  
avoid aggravating fu rth e r the already rap id ly  de te rio ra ting  ru ra l labour s ituation 
-continued u n til August 1951. An o ff ic ia l o f the People's Economic Council, 
Gyorgy Pogacsacs, revealed on 12th May 1951 tha t the greatest obstacle in the 
way o f the planners was the harvest, which was like ly  to  be a good one, he said.
The harvest w ill present considerable problems th is year, as 
there w ill be less labour available owing to  the drain o f 
manpower fo r industry and other sectos o f the economy. Only 
State Farms and Machine T rac to r Stations are en titled  to  
employ outside workers to  help w ith  the harvest, but even 
they have to  make the best use o f th e ir  resources.
Collectives and individual farm ers w ill have to carry  out 
harvesting and threshing w ith  th e ir  own manpower resources.
Only in exceptional circumstances w ill they be allowed to  
employ hired h e lp e r s .36)
Since tim e im m em orial, large, medium and sm all holders had re lied on outside 
help to  get the harvest in and to  do the threshing. No regime ever suggested 
tha t the peasants be denied help at harvest tim e. From spring u n til the autumn 
the peasants, e ithe r members o f co llectives or individual, l ite ra lly  had to  work 
from  dawn to  dusk, under great pressure from  the regime. This order created 
much bitterness and resentment among the peasants. To th is extent, the 
continuation o f the co llec tiv isa tion  campaign during th is c r it ic a l period, w ith  the 
accompanying peasant unrest, would almost ce rta in ly  have jeopardised the spring 
sowing and the co llection  o f grain etc., during the summer, on which the 
augmented plan largely depended. In the event, despite a good harvest 
ag ricu ltu ra l production stagnated. On 27th July, 1951, i t  was adm itted  tha t the 
harvest, which came at the end o f a ra ther wet spell, suffered not only because 
o f the weather, the shortage o f workers and machinery but, also, i t  was stated,
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because o f the 'slackness on the part o f ru ra l councils in fa ilin g  to  impose
adequate discipline '. There is no doubt, however, tha t the fa ilu re  o f peasant
wives and fam ilies to  jo in  the co llec tive  farm s was an im portan t con tribu to ry
fa c to r  to  the labour shortage, which was fe lt  most acutely at harvest tim e. The
authorities tried  to  remedy the shortage o f labour by reducing the areas of
p riva te  household plots, which o ften  aroused great resentment among the
landless co llec tive  members. The harvest co llection  problems were also blamed
on the kulaks who 'created an atmosphere hostile to  co llection , in te rfe red  w ith
threshing machines, prevented the surrender o f large surpluses against 'C ' ticke ts
(i.e., fo r which peasants could buy cheap industria l products) and organised i l l ic i t
threshing, and also on o ffic ia ls  o f co llectives who subm itted inaccurate reports
(137)o f lower crop averages than had been realised.
While the co llec tiv isa tion  drive was tem pora rily  suspended, the 
in tens ifica tion  o f the 'class struggle ' in the countryside continued unabated, in 
the preparation fo r the fin a l showdown w ith  the kulaks. On 11th May, 1951, the 
Chairman o f the People's Economic Council, Zoltan Vas, complained in the 
National Assembly tha t subversive a c tiv itie s  by the kulaks had retarded the 
development o f agricu lture . Despite the Government's continued campaign, he 
said, the kulaks s t il l represented a serious economic fo rce  in the country. Vas 
noted that,
there has been very extensive illega l slaughter o f kulak
owned livestock.(138)
He warned tha t meat consumption would be reduced s t i l l  fu rth e r because the 
country's c a ttle  population was on the decline. But, he said, co lle c tiv isa tion  
must continue. So, i t  was the kulak sabotage tha t had retarded ag ricu ltu ra l 
development and kulak slaughtering was responsible fo r less meat fo r  the towns. 
This provided the regime w ith  the excuse fo r the w ildest persecution o f kulaks
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and wealthy peasants. Many were sentenced fo r illega l slaughtering. On 4th
June, 1951, Rakosi adm itted tha t a to ta l o f 3516 head o f c a ttle  had been
(139)slaughtered ille g a lly  in A p ril.
Theore tica lly  the goal o f comprehensive co llec tiv isa tion  posed the 
problem o f the kulak in a much more acute form  than before. When a ll the 
medium and sm all peasant landholders jo ined the co llectives, as the regim e now 
envisaged, what was to  be done w ith  the kulaks. A  semblance o f ’le g a lity ' fo r  the 
'liqu idation o f the kulaks as a class' was o ff ic ia lly  provided by Rakosi's speech at, 
and the subsequent resolution passed by, the Second Congress. By th is  decison 
local organisations were given the righ t to  take a ll the necessary measures in 
com batting the kulaks, including fu ll confiscation o f th e ir property i f  needed, 
which as before bacame the 'ind iv is ib le  funds' o f the co llectives. An even more 
drastic plan existed in a d ra ft fo rm . According to a fo rm er o f f ic ia l o f the 
Hungarian Planning O ffice , in June-July 1951 the party leadership, apparently 
toyed w ith  the idea, in im ita tio n  o f Stalin's method, o f ca rry ing  out fu l l  
co llec tiv isa tion  w ith  the aid o f mass deportation o f kulak fam ilies, to  as to  break 
the passive resistance o f the peasants by in tim ida tion  and te rro r. A t th is  tim e  a 
great number o f fam ilies  -  generally, fo rm er government o ffic ia ls , arm y and a ir 
force o ffice rs , a ris tocra ts and in te lle c tua l members o f the middle class -  were 
deported from  Budapest and o ther large c itie s  in to  d istant v illages,(140) pa r t jy  to 
a llev ia te  the housing problems caused by the rapid urbanisation which had to  
accompany the forced pace o f industria lisa tion and p a rtly  to  provide housing fo r 
the new communist e lite . Since Hungary had no Siberia to which to  deport her 
kulaks i t  was proposed to  transplant them from  one part o f the coun try to  
another -  peasants from  Transdanubia in the West, to  be deported to  the country 
beyond the Tisza R iver, in the East, and v ic e - v e r s a / * ^  The plan envisaged on 
this mass scale was, however, never implemented. But, o f course, many kulaks 
and th e ir fam ilies  were individually, and less system atica lly , deported and 
banned from  th e ir villages.
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As earlie r, high de live ry  quotas and taxes were only some o f the means
applied to  liqu ida te  the kulaks. Between 1951 and 1953 the overa ll economic
burden on kulak holdings was again d ras tica lly  increased. In 1952 i t  was 168 per
(142)cent greater than in 1950. While in 1950 kulaks were le f t  no surplus rye and
potatoes to  sell on the free  market, in 1951 th is  was extended also to  wheat. A
report on de live ry quotas, compiled on 16th July, 1951, stated tha t i f  kulaks
complied fu lly  w ith  th e ir de livery obligations there would be no surplus le f t  at
th e ir  d is p o s a l / * ^  In earlie r years one o f the most im portant tax burdens on
kulak holdings was the 'development tax '. From 1950/1951, onwards due to
progressive increases, the general tax levied on land area became the most
im portant burden. In 1952/1953 th is tax on kulak holdings varied between 477
(144)and 576 Forin ts per cadastral yoke. In addition monetary fines and 'cla im s
fo r damages’ increased steeply due to  non -fu lfilm en t o f de live ry obligations. In
1952/1953 kulak holdings unde rfu lfilled  these s ign ifican tly , fo r a ll kinds o f
produce, the highest ra te  o f fu lf ilm e n t o f quotas being 73.4 per cent fo r  wheat,
(145)the lowest 46 per cent fo r pigs. A s im ila r s itua tion  prevailed w ith  regard
to  tax  payments. Except fo r  the good harvest year o f 1951, a progressively
sm aller proportion o f these taxes was paid a fte r  1950 and, in 1952 only 73.8 per
cent o f the to ta l taxes on kulak holdings was m e t . ^ ^  While in 1950 tax  arrears
by kulaks were 252 Forin ts/cad. yoke, by the end o f 1952 and the middle o f 1953
(147)they had increased to  637 and 1400 Forin ts per cadastral yoke respective ly.
As the an ti-ku lak 'o ffensive ' moved to  its  concluding phase from  1951 
onwards, w ith  continua lly increasing economic, adm in istra tive  and p o lit ic a l 
pressure, many o f the kulaks sh ifted to  a lower land category or, predom inantly, 
'o ffe red ' th e ir land to  the state. O ften the mere act o f 'o ffe ring ' part o f th e ir  
land fa iled  to  help them much because, in many places, local au thorities  would 
not accept it ,  since the land could only be p a rtia lly  absorbed e ithe r by the State 
Farms or the Collectives; and progressively more and more kulak land was le f t
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uncu ltivated. And i f  loca l authorities were in a position to  accept the land the
kulak was s t i l l  le f t  on the ’kulak lis t ’. The only escape from  th is  cat-and-mouse
game was to  give one's land up com plete ly and move from  the v illage to  the
towns. During the period 1951-1953, in fa c t, more and more kulaks and 'w ealthy '
peasants sought a qu ie te r li fe  in the facto ries, m ining and big construction sites
like  Sztalinvaros. Even there some o f them  were not en tire ly  free  from
persecution by a revengeful loca l party  machinery. While much o f the
persecution was prescribed from  above, much also depended on the local
au tho rity  o ffic ia ls  -  but there were not many humane local leaders. Many cases
were recorded where local party  organisations attem pted to  'e x trad ite ' kulaks
from  'socia list industries' which, in a number o f cases, refused on the excuse tha t
the kulak was 'indispensible' a n d . 'was a very good worker’/ * ^  Working
peasants, too, began to  'o ffe r ' th e ir land from  about 1951 onwards, reaching a
peak in 1952/1953, but on the one hand this did not reach the same proportions as
in the case o f the kulaks and, on the other hand, while the 'o ffe r ' o f land by the
kulaks, in the m a jo rity  o f cases, resulted in the dissolution o f the fa rm , most
working pesants m erely reduced th e ir  land holding to  bring themselves in to  a less
(149)progressive compulsory quota category. The kulaks, and the working
peasnts, had also lost land in favour o f co llectives by the repeated 
'commassation'.
Those who had the assiduity and courage to  resist and a ttem p t to  c ling  to  
th e ir land fo r a while, despite the increasingly in to lerable burden o f 'norm al' 
taxation, high compulsory de livery quotas at low prices, and m onetary fines, 
a ffe c tin g  a ll s tra ta  o f peasants, but the kulaks most heavily, o f course, were at 
the mercy o f pa rty  o ffic ia ls , narks and spies, the Security Police and the County 
Penal Councils, which passed heavy sentences, including to  'forced labour camps', 
and o ften  death, w ith  the greatest o f ease. By now, large scale persecution o f 
kulaks had become a major feature o f the period and was p a rtic u la rly  intense at
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harvesting campaigns. Instances o f penalties imposed on kulaks, who fa iled  to 
com ply w ith  regim e ’laws' appeared continuously in the press. There is no need, 
perhaps, to  dw ell here on the b ru ta lity  w ith  which the kulaks were handled during 
the period 1951 to  1953. But i t  is perhaps pertinent and su ffic ien t to  c ite  a few 
ind iv idual cases, by way o f examples, from  the party  daily, Szabad Nep, which 
recorded the fo llow ing  sentences imposed on kulaks during the summer o f 1952, 
fo r threshing w ithout permission, keeping grain from  the state and fa ilin g  to 
com plete harvesting on t i m e : ^ ^
1. Laszlo Kovacs owner o f 27 cad. yokes has been
sentenced to  4 months in prison and a fine o f 3000 
Forin ts fo r taking home 21 sheaves o f rye and feeding it  
to  his animals ...
2. Janos Kardos: was sentenced to  8 months imprisonment
and a fine o f 2000 Forin ts fo r  threshing rye w ithout
permission...
3. Erno H orvath: was sentenced to 7 months in prison, a
fine  o f 1000 Forin ts and the confiscation o f 2000
Forin ts (property) on the charge tha t he had not
completed harvesting on tim e  (often, kulaks were given 
3 days to  harvest 8 cad. yokes, which was impossible; 
even the strongest man could do no more than 1 cad. 
yoke per day).
4. Gyula Szabo: owner o f a m ill and 28 cad. yokes, who, i t  
was stated, since his release from  prison has been 
try in g  to  cause more damage by harvesting too la te, 
when the crop was over-ripe ... he was denounced and 
fined 3000 Forints, sentenced to 10 months in prison 
and the pa rtia l confiscation o f his property.
5. Jozsef Pandur: owner o f 28 cad. yokes, while the 
industrious village people were enthusiastica lly 
harvesting, i t  was stated, th is kulak sought to  cause 
damage by resorting to  base schemes ... a fte r  having 
cut his wheat, growing along the road, he reported tha t 
he had completed harvesting. The to ilin g  peasants, 
however, discovered tha t in the fie lds fu rth e r away 
from  the road the crop had been le f t  unharvested and 
tha t the loss in grain exceeded 5 per cent ... he was 
im m ediate ly denounced ... and sentenced to  15 months 
imprisonment, fined 3000 Forin ts and had his property 
confiscated.
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Thousands o f s im ila r examples could be c ited from  th is  period, in addition to  the 
examples given ea rlie r o f how the kulaks were persecuted and used as scapegoats 
fo r  damage o f various types they allegedly caused. Many o f them, and th e ir 
fam ilies, were o ften  sim ply taken away, usually at m idnight, by the Secret 
Police. For example, one kulak, years la te r, had th is  to  say:
they (i.e., the secret police) came w ith  lo rries at m idnight 
and had taken us to  the tra in . I f  somebody spoke out o f order 
to  the police, generally, the punishment was tha t they did not 
allow one to  take one's belongings. They did not behave to  
badly w ith  us: they allowed us to  take 2 beds, 4 chairs, we 
were even allowed to  load our sowing machine; in our 
personal bags we packed 4 plates, 4 spoons, bedding, c lo th ing  
and some smoked meat we prepared fo r the w in ter. The 
house was then locked and the key handed over to  the local 
council. The police fed the animals we le f t  behind.(151)
By the f ir s t  ha lf o f 1953 some 280,000 legal proceedings were recorded against 
kulaks, on average, four per k u la k /*  ^
The overall results o f the continued campaign can best be seen from  the 
changes in the numbers o f ind iv idua lly  owned farm s and th e ir  area under 
cu ltiva tion , according to  fa rm  categories, between 1949 and 1953, in Table 8.2 
on p .529 )/153)
I t  can be seen from  the tab le tha t s ign ifican t change occurred in the 
bigger and especially the kulak farm  categories. While in 1949 the number o f 
ind iv idua lly  owned farm s at and above the 25 cad. yokes category was 47,200, by 
mid-1953 th e ir  number was reduced to  10,500 and th e ir  area o f land under 
cu ltiva tion  from  1,926,200 cad. yokes to  336,300 cad. yokes. A lm ost 37,000 
kulaks in th is category had, in the overwhelm ing m a jo rity  o f cases, surrendered 
th e ir land to  the state and ceased to  exist a ltogether. A lthough th e ir  numbers 
and th e ir area declined from  year to  year, even at the end o f 1952, however, the 
'kulak lis t ' registered 71,600 kulak fam ilies: o f these, 21,900 were already 
w ithou t farm s, 36,300, including many village store owners, traders, e tc., owned 
a fa rm  below the o ff ic ia l 25 cad. yokes lim it  and only some 12,800 had more than 
this.<154)
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The r itu a l tw ice  yearly  co llec tiv isa tion  campaign -  before the spring
ag ricu ltu ra l works began and a fte r the harvest was collected -  had resumed on
3rd August. As usual, the campaign was opened amid much fan fare  o f trum pets
by a peasant delegation, composed o f some 200  members, re tu rn ing  from  the
Soviet Union and long ed ito ria l leaders in glowing terms urging the peasants to
jo in  the co llectives and to  show s ign ifican t increase in co llec tiv isa tion  to
(155)celebrate the fo rthcom ing 'C onstitu tion  Day' on 20th August 1951. During
August and September many more la rge ly  medium peasants were forced to  jo in
the co llectives. The most advanced Type III co llectives held no a ttra c tio n  fo r
the medium peasants as life  there was miserable. The regim e fo r th is reason
allowed the continued fo rm ation  o f Type I and II co llec tive  farm s, where
peasants just managed somehow. For the regime the continued development of
Types I and II co llectives was a pre-condition to  maintain momentum and to
extend the cooperative movement. The centra l leadership, however, instructed
local o ffic ia ls  tha t 'we must see to i t  tha t the ir members w ill vo lun ta rily  ask fo r
permission to convert themelves la te r in to  Type III co llec tive  farm s’/ * ^  Thus,
during 1951, besides a number o f Type III co llective  farm s, Type I and II were
form ed by the hundred. While at the end o f 1950 there were only 30-40 Type I &
II co llec tive  farms, by the end o f 1951 , 1890 Type I and 80 Type II were formed,
most o f them at the beginning o f the year. More than 50 per cent o f th e ir
membership were medium peasants, who had joined under pressure and in the
hope tha t i t  would not d ras tica lly  a lte r th e ir  position and they could continue to
farm  more or less as independently as b e f o r e / * ^  The ir hopes, at least in the
short run, were fu lf il le d . One o f the com plaints o f the party  leadership was,
indeed, tha t many o f the co llectives were only established 'on paper' and tha t
8159)th e ir  members continued to  farm  independently. Local o ffic ia ls  were
'blamed' fo r the continued 'o ffe r ' o f a ttra c tiv e  concessions to  induce the peasants 
to  jo in . In th e ir recru itm en t campaigns they o ften to ld  the peasants tha t by
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jo in ing  th e ir  position would not rad ica lly  change, tha t the only d iffe rence  would 
be to  enjoy the numerous benefits and privileges handed out by the s ta te /*® ^  
About 10-12 per cent o f these Type I & II co llectives, i.e., 244 in 1951 and 140 in 
1952, in fa c t, existed nom inally, 'on paper', but fa iled  to  operate even as 
'in fe rio r ' Type I or II co llectives. A  number o f them were la te r wound-up, while 
others did begin to  operate. Furtherm ore, many o f the Type III co llectives, some 
600 in 1952, fa iled  to  reach the organisational leve l to  enable them to  prepare 
reports and accounts on th e ir fa rm ing  or o ther economic a c t iv ity .^ ® ^
Another princip le  fea ture  o f the co llec tiv isa tion  campaign during this 
period was the continued and rapid establishment o f 'Cooperative Towns and 
Villages' (Szovetkezeti Varosok es Faluk). In the f irs t  few  months o f 1951 only 
36 towns and villages had been established, places where the m a jo rity  of 
peasants worked in the co llectives. They were mainly in the Transdanubian 
region and mostly in villages where only 30-40 fam ilies lived altogether. During 
1951 th e ir numbers had increased to  352, a trend which had continued to  the end 
o f the period.(162)
The excessively rapid expansion o f co llectives, especially in the f ir s t  few  
months o f 1951, created many problems and tensions w ith in  the cooperative 
movement. Despite some not inconsiderable e ffo rts  by the regime to  resolve 
them, they remained an almost permanent feature  o f co llectives during th is 
period. While in December 1951 the M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re  proudly announced 
tha t the to ta l number o f co llectives had increased to  4625, th e ir  membership to  
311,000, working on a to ta l arable land area o f 1,742,6000 cad. yokes, Rakosi, at 
the same tim e, revealed tha t the m a jo rity  o f the peasants jo ined early in the 
year, under extrem e pressure and 'worked very l i t t le  and badly'. He adm itted  
tha t in many co llec tive  farm s 30-40 per cent o f the members were absent at the 
tim e o f most urgent agricu ltu ra l tasks and tha t many members sim ply le f t  
co llectives w ithout even taking the trouble to  give notice o f th e ir  in ten tions to
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the management. A fu rth e r com plaint, concerning production, was made
soon a fte r  by Andras Hegediis, who stated that' because o f bad work organisation 
and serious lack o f labour d iscipline output and yields in ’several' co llectives (he 
could have said almost a ll) were s ig n ifica n tly  lower than those o f individual 
peasants in the same r e g io n / * ^  Medium peasants forced in to the co llectives 
tended to  lack drive and v ita l ity  and o ften paid more a tten tion  to  th e ir  p riva te  
household plots than to  work in the co llectives. Furthermore, while 35,000 
fam ilies joined the co llectives during the w in te r o f 1951/1952, and th e ir  arable 
land area had doubled from  9 to  18 per cent, th e ir livestock had increased by 
only 62 per cent. One would expect a d iffe rence, Hegediis said, but th is was 
s ign ifican tly  more than accep tab le /*® ^  Unquestionably, c a ttle  breeding 
suffered, perhaps, the most under co llec tiv isa tion . The peasants, in a pre­
em ptive move, slaughtered or sold th e ir  livestock before entering the 
co llectives. Also, many had wasted away because o f poor livestock care in 
co llectives. Hegediis, like  many before him, called fo r the fu rth e r strengthening 
o f the co llec tive  movement, in para lle l w ith  its  num erical expansion. I t  was 
v ita l fo r  the regime tha t peasants should bring th e ir livestock in w ith  them. To 
ensure this, i t  was proposed tha t those who slaughter th e ir livestock ille g a lly  
should, in addition to  'norm al’ fines, be forced to  contribu te 15 per cent o f its 
value to  the comunal funds/*®®^
To remedy the prevailing problems in co llectives a Council o f M inisters
Decree, published on 8 th  July, 1951, rad ica lly  revised the system o f d is tribu iton
i l 6 7 )of incomes in Type III collectives. The reason fo r this, i t  was said, was
because up to  then income d is tribu tion  had been in monetary terms, e ithe r on the 
basis o f ’equa lity ’ or the number o f hours worked by each member, w ith  the 
result tha t ’payment in kind’ was made inequitably, not in accordance w ith  the 
amount o f work done and results. This undermined labour d iscipline. 
Accordingly, the Type III collectives adopted the ’socia list princ ip le  o f
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d is tribu tion ’ fo r  both monetary and ’in kind’ payments, based on the number o f
worked more e ffic ie n tly  and exceeded the production targets were to  be 
rewarded w ith  bonuses. Another step taken to  improve labour d iscip line 
concerned the size o f p riva te  household plots. I t  was claim ed tha t in many 
places the ir size exceeded the legal lim its  and d istracted labour from  the 
collectives, since members tended to  spend more tim e  on th e ir  plots. P riva te  
household plots were not to  exceed the legal lim it  o f j -  3/4 cad. yoke set by the 
Model S ta tu e s .^ *^  I t  was proposed, and a fte r a lengthy debate accepted, tha t 
the minimum number o f ’working-day units' be increased from  80 to  120  fo r adult 
members, instead o f the 150 proposed, and to  80 fo r mothers w ith  young 
c h ild re n .^ * ^  But a ll these were only part, perhaps even a sm all part, o f the 
real problems re la ting  to  labour re lations. In most co llectives there was sim ply 
not enough work fo r the members, especially during the w in te r months. A survey 
revealed tha t in the 6 months between 1st November 1951 and 31st March 1952 
25 per cent o f members, i.e., about 64,000, had no work at a ll, while 15 per cent 
had done less than 10 working-day units in to ta l, at a tim e  when by law 120  
working-day units were prescribed. Also, about 10-15 per cent o f the members 
had only signed the agreement to  jo in  the co llec tive  but never in fa c t worked in
La te r in the year a long communique was published, a fte r  the m eeting o f 
the Politbureau in September 1951, which again stressed the urgent need to  
improve labour d iscipline and to  strengthen the cooperative movement both
produced can be seen from  the fa c t tha t the same theme was taken up ye t again 
by Rakosi at the 'N ationa l Conference o f Vanguard Workers o f C o llectives and 
Machine T rac to r Stations’ (Term eloszovetkezetek es Gepallomasok elenjaro 
dolgozoinak Orszagos Tanacskozasa), held on 27th-28th December 1951. In a
/■1 go\
'working-day un its ’ (munkaegyseg) and production results. Members who
(172)organisationally and p o lit ica lly . What l i t t le  e ffe c t these repeated calls
- 534 -
long speech, almost en tire ly  devoted to  the questions o f labour d iscip line and the 
tasks o f strengthening and consolidating the collectives, Rakosi castigated both 
co llec tive  farm s and local state and party  o ffic ia ls  fo r th e ir  selfish and 
'opportunistic ' a ttitu de  towards the co llec tive  movement, in the fo llow ing  words:
comrades, when you ta lk  about d iscipline you should 
remember c itizens' d iscipline towards the state, o f which the 
fa c t tha t the co llectives should discharge th e ir duties 
towards the state is an in tegra l p a rt.(1^3)
But, he said, in the sphere o f discipline there was much to  be desired, because
a s trik ing  feature  o f the a ttitudes o f our co llectives is tha t 
many o f them want only to  receive from  the state w ithout 
recognising the fa c t tha t they also have duties towards the 
s ta te .(i?4 )
Many local state and party o ffic ia ls , he declared, had greater experience in the 
quan tita tive  dvelopment o f co llectives than in how to  strengthen and consolidate 
them, which was also made more d if f ic u lt  by the a ttitudes o f comrades who 
o ften  only thought
tha t period ica lly, at one stage the num erical development o f 
co llectives is on the agenda, to  be fo llowed by a stage ca lling  
fo r  th e ir strengthening which in tu rn  is fo llowed by another 
stage ca lling  fo r th e ir num erical development ye t again.(1^5)
U nderfu lfilm en t o f the Plans fo r  crop production and, especially lives tock 
breeding fo llowed from  this m istaken view, since state and party organs fa iled  to  
concern themselves w ith  the production tasks o f the co llectives nor w ith  the 
strengthening o f work discipline t h e r e . ^ ^  The Plan, i t  was re-emphasised, was 
the fundam ental and basic law o f the economy. Its  fu lf ilm e n t was compulsory 
fo r every co llec tive  and Machine T rac to r Station. In re a lity  the consolidation o f 
co llectives was s ign ifican tly  hampered by th e ir lack o f economic independence.
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Procurement agencies were free  to  prescribe, w ithout due regard to  local 
conditions, what they should produce and in what quantities and even the MTSs 
had the righ t to  intervene in th e ir production plans. Furtherm ore, the Banking 
system issued instructions on how they should d is tribu te  th e ir  income and 
investm ent.(177)
During the w in te r o f 1951 the collectives were reorganised. While
paying lip-service to  'in te rna l democracy', a Council o f M inisters Decree was
passd on 11th November 1951 which regulated the tasks o f managers and the ir
renum eration and increased the power o f chairmen, by in s titu tin g  a 'C on tro l and
D iscip linary Com m ittee ', composed o f active party m ilitan ts . Managers were
authorised to  impose sanctions on undisciplined or 'fradu len t' members, ranging
from  fines to expulsion from  the co llective , a fte r two d isc ip lina ry actions had
(178)been taken against them. A fte r  May 1952 members had to  obtain
(179)permission from  th e ir Charman to  take on outside work. Moreover,
co llectives became subject to greater tute lage and s tr ic te r  con tro l from  local 
pa rty  organisations and centra l government o ffices. Members o f the co llectives 
were grouped in to permanent work-brigades, like  those on State Farms, each 
brigade being made up o f 15-20 workers in dairies and 50-80 in the fie lds, 
depending on labour input requirements. They were in charge o f a given piece o f 
land and a given quan tity  o f equipment and livestock. Brigade leaders were 
made d ire c tly  responsible to  Chairman and were also given d isc ip lina ry  powers, 
as in the Soviet Union when i t  adopted the system in 1932.^® ^
Because o f growing disproportions which had developed in the economy, 
due to  forced industria lisation, and in order to  carry  out its  investm ent policy, 
the government introduced a price and wage re fo rm  at the end o f 1951. The 
speech announcing the measures was delivered by Rakosi at the C entra l 
C om m ittee Plenum on 30th November 1951 and published the next d a y /* ® ^  The 
need fo r  the measures, the Party stated, was to  prevent a black m arket and
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speculation, reduce food shortages and the high free -m arke t prices tha t had 
developed because o f rationing, and to  stop the de te rio ra ting  m ate ria l position of 
workers and employees. The aim was to  improve the supply o f consumer goods 
to  the population, to  increase the share o f national income going to  wages and 
salaries and to  provide greater incentives to  increase ag ricu ltu ra l production, 
since the re s tr ic tio n  on free-m arket sales, especially o f meat, resulted in la rger 
peasant consumption instead o f la rger production. F ina lly, i t  was to  increase the 
budgetary revenue o f the government. The measures to  secure the achievement 
o f these goals, as announced by the government, were the abo lition  o f ra tion ing  
o f most products and the in troduction o f free trade in many ag ricu ltu ra l 
products, e.g., barley, cereals, flou r, oats, but only a fte r  the compulsory de live ry 
quotas were met and products on contractua l deliveries were handed over to  the 
state. Also, a drastic increase in consumer prices and wages was announced by 
the government. Rakosi described the abo lition o f ra tion ing  and the re - 
in troduction  o f free trade in ag ricu ltu ra l products in glowing term s to  the 
Plenum, cla im ing tha t they proved tha t his policies were on the correct line and 
were working and tha t i t  was,
the la test glorious achievement o f our People’s Democracy 
and a new demonstration o f its  economic and p o lit ic a l 
strength ... which w ill fu rth e r promote the cause o f the 
worker-peasant a lliance.(182)
An im portan t precondition to  abolish ra tion ing  was the a va ila b ility  o f 
s u ffic ie n tly  large stocks to  meet the expected in it ia l increase in demand by 
consumers. Owing to  the low level o f stocks because o f the u n d e r-fu lfilled  
deliveries o f fa ttened pigs -  and perhaps more im po rtan tly  because o f la rger 
peasant consumption o f meat due to  the free  market p roh ib ition  -  ra tion ing  o f 
meat and fa ts  was only abolished on 1st and 18th February, 1952 respective ly. 
Restrictions on trade in cereals, e.g., barley, grain, oats and maize, were lif te d
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only u n til 30th June, 1952 when the s ituation was to  be reviewed in re la tion  to
(183)the harvest results. In the event, certa in  restric tions on cereals trade
were reimposed in June 1952. Ostensibly, those who delivered th e ir quotas could 
now sell anywhere and to  whom they liked. But only the state could purchase 
grain intended fo r  resale. The ban on m illing  grain in to  cereals fo r payment in 
cash or kind was lifte d . Permission was also given fo r  free  trade in potatoes, 
m ilk, eggs and dairy produce. The new measures, i t  was hoped, would encourage 
the peasants to  produce more w illing ly  and in greater quantity  in the f u tu r e / '* '^  
In order to  generate higher levels o f reserves, and because o f the good harvest in
1951, the authorities changed in mid-1951 to  a new sytem whereby compulsory
de live ry quotas were calculated according to the qua lity  o f soil, based on 'golden
crown' net income which, coupled w ith  the 'normal r itu a l yearly  increase in
de livery rates, doubled or even treb led compulsory deliveries in many
in s ta n c e s /* ^  The 1951 and 1952 state procurement plans increased compulsory
de livery rates drastica lly , and as the good 1951 harvest results unfolded, de live ry
rates were fu rth e r increased in response to  it ,  to  get 'every single surplus grain
to  the procurement agencies'. In p ractice  the increased procurement plan aimed
at the confiscation o f a ll surplus products. To achieve this, party  and local
council organs conducted a ruthless campaign against the entire  peasantry.
Furtherm ore not only were the compulsory delivery quotas raised, but the range
of products subject to  compulsory deliveries was also extended from  17 to
(186)37. Cereals and the various root crops had to  be taken to  co llec tion  points
w ith in  8 days o f threshing and gathering. Failure to  comply w ith  deadlines 
carried a 5 per cent fine, 10 per cent a fte r 15 days o f delay and, from  A p ril
1952, the peasants had to  pay the free m arket price o f the products plus a 20 per 
cent surcharge as a fine  on a ll outstanding balances. In case o f 'proven' 
deliberate non -fu lfilm en t o f de livery obligations a maximum o f 5 years prison 
sentence could be given to  offenders. The 1951 harvest was so good tha t
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procurement plans were easily achieved. In the five  months from  June 1951 1
m illion  quintals more o f cereals were procured by the state than in the previous
12 months: wheat was up by 75 per cent, barley and oats by 50 per cent, maize
(187)by 100 per cent and sunflower seed by 50 per cent.
To bring prices closer to  the free  market level, the Government
announced a drastic price  re form , which almost doubled the prices o f foodstuffs,
raised the prices fo r  c lo th ing  and tex tile s  by 70 per cent and fo r other industria l
consumer goods by 40-50 per cent. The increase in the prices fo r services, e.g.,
(188)rented accommodation, was less. A t the same tim e, the wages o f industria l
and ag ricu ltu ra l workers were increased by 21 and 15 per cent respective ly,
while those o f w h ite -co lla r workers increased by 15-18 per cent. Pensions and
fa m ily  allowances were also increased. As a result o f the price re fo rm  the
consumer price index, ignoring qua lity  deterio ra tion, was 38 per cent higher in
1952 than in 1951, 88  per cent higher than in 1949, and by 1953 had almost 
(189)doubled. The value o f the Forin t declined to  38 per cent o f its  fo rm er
value, stabilized in 1946. The volume o f re ta il trade, based on constant prices,
had declined by more than 10 per c e n t / * ^
In consequence o f these measures, the per capita real incomes o f wage
earners in 1952-1953 were 20-22 per cent lower than when the F ive-Y ear Plan
commenced in 1 9 5 0 ,^ ^ ,  and the income d is tribu tion  had also changed. The
price re form  h it the peasants considerably more than the industria l workers. For
the workers, the price increases had been, p a rtia lly , o ffse t by increased wages,
but peasant incomes -  because o f the a ltered term s o f trade, increased
compulsory de livery quotas at nominal prices, and the extrem ely bad harvest in
(192)1952, resulting in a 26 per cent lower to ta l production than in 1951
(193)declined s ign ifican tly , as can be seen from  the table below.
The state obliged the peasants to  de liver an increasing proportion o f
th e ir production to  state procurement agencies. In 1951, because o f the
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Per capita real personal incomes 
Index: 1949=100
Workers & employees a ll peasants
1950 10 2 .8 101.7
1951 97.8 117.8
1952 87.5 6 6 .0
favourable weather and consequent increase in agricu ltu ra l output there was a
large harvest from  which to  procure. But in 1952, because o f adverse weather
conditions, the harvest was bad and in many places not enough was produced
even fo r  fa m ily  provision. Despite th is, compulsory delivery quotas were not
reduced but fu rth e r increased. I f  the peasant’s production was in su ffic ien t, or
the meat was not available to  fu l f i l  the prescribed de live ry quotas, then
according to  a Council o f M in ister’s Decree published in A p r il 1952, both
individual peasants and collectives were obliged to  purchase the required
amounts on the free  market, at high prices, and fu l f i l  de livery obligations in tha t
(194)manner. Moreover, one o f the most serious problems facing the peasants in 
respect o f compulsory deliveries was tha t although the quota was fixed  at, say 
200  kgs. o f meat, the peasant had to de live r a whole animal, because he could 
not ’cu t' tha t amount o f ’flesh ’ from  an animal weighing, say 500-600 kgs. 
A lte rna tive ly , the peasant had to  buy the whole quota on the free  m arket, i f  he 
could, at free  m arket prices. I t  was only la te r tha t two peasants were pe rm itted
to  fo rm  a partnership and to  e ffe c t a combined fu lf ilm e n t o f the meat de live ry
«. (195)quota.
The result o f the greatly  reduced agricu ltu ra l production, and the 
increased leve l o f state co llection  o f produce through the various channels, e.g. 
compulsory deliveries, free and contractua l state purchases and the fees fo r  the
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various ag ricu ltu ra l services, was tha t in 1952 more than 800,000 peasant
fam ilies, including individual farm ers and co llec tive  members, i.e ., tw o-th irds  o f
a ll peasant fam ilies, were le f t  w ithout adequate grain fo r  the w in te r, bread and
seed fo r  the next y e a r . ^ ^  And Jozsef Revai, who in 1947 re fe rred  to  ’rumours’
o f impending co llec tiv isa tion  plans as ’fa iry  tales', w ithou t substance, now
acknowledged tha t the communist state was explo iting the peasants by taxa tion
and compulsory deliveries to  such an extent tha t hardly anything was le f t  fo r  
(197)them. The shortage o f grain in 1952 amounted to  some 3.7 m illion  quintals.
In the same year, i t  should be noted, there was a net export o f 2.1 m illion  
(198)quintals. There was an unprecedented shortage o f bread and potatoes in the
villages o f Hungary and much hunger, and great scarcities in the c itie s  too.
During the autumn of 1952, since many villages were le f t  w ithou t the necessary
seed, local councils promised money to  peasants in an a ttem pt to  e lic it  some
seed grain to  d is tribu te  fo r  next year. For this purpose ag ricu ltu ra l cred its  to
the value o f 300 m illion  Forin ts were extended and 21 m illion  Forin ts new cred its
(199)were created to  pay fo r seed-grain. Many council o ffic ia ls  trave lled  to
distant ’b e tte r-o ff ’ counties in the hope o f find ing and purchasing seed suitable 
fo r s o w in g .^ ^  Meanwhile, from  peasant fam ilies w ithout any surpluses the 
agencies confiscated every single grain the peasant managed to  put aside fo r his 
own seed and ra tion requirements. Retention o f even rations and seed became a 
crim e in 1952. A t the same tim e the kulaks were forced by the police to  
continue sowing. Many were imprisoned, but those fa m ily  members who 
remained behind could not f u l f i l  the de livery obligations. During these years 
some 400,000 peasants, about 10 per cent o f whom were kulaks, went to  court 
and were convicted, la rge ly o f offences re la ting  to  the public supply o f 
f o o d . ^ ^  The number against whom the authorities s ta rted  c r im ina l 
proceedings fo r m inor offences such as in fringem ent o f some adm in is tra tive  
regulation re la ting  to  some phase o f agricu ltu ra l a c t iv ity  was considerably
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higher. In addition, thousands o f peasants were summoned, e ithe r by state or
local authorities, because o f ’alleged* compulsory de livery offences, or o ffic ia ls
vis ited them in th e ir home. The largest number convicted, some 120,000, was
(2 0 2 )between the years o f 1951 and 1952. Masses o f working peasants were at
the mercy o f the authorities, through the compulsory de livery system. Peasants
stood at a tten tion , making deep bows, in fron t o f party  o ffic ia ls , hum ilia ted
(203)worse than under the Horthy regime. O ften th is fee ling  o f helplessness was
intensified by the fa c t tha t individual de livery fu lfilm en ts  were not recorded by
the village council. The compulsory collections, therefore , went on b lind ly and
the peasants did not know exactly  th e ir balances and arrears, but even i f  they
had i t  would not have helped them since ’Se ttling  Com m ittees’ (E lszam oltato
Bizottsagok), going from  house to house, had mercilessly taken whatever they
found, often from  peasants who e ither had no surplus or had already fu lf il le d
the ir delivery obligations. The peasants looked upon these ’v is its ’ o f the ’S e ttling
Comm ittees’ w ith  great h o s tility , they o ften barricaded the entrance gates to
th e ir houses and frequently  chased the com m ittees out o f th e ir  villages. This
was o f no avail because in the end the authorities proved to  be the stronger and
the b a iliffs  moved in, w ith  suitable police escort. Many o f the more
, compassionate com m ittee members resigned because they could not reconcile
the methods o f co llection  w ith  th e ir conscience, especially during the drought
year o f 1952 when, in many places, the com m ittees had to  be reorganised and
(204)’re in forced ’ by industria l workers. By the beginning o f 1953 some 330,000
working peasants 'owed' 164 m illion  Forin ts o f ’damages' to  the state in
connection w ith  compulsory delivery arrears. This was, o f course, only part o f 
the burden in flic te d  on the working peasants. Between 1949 and 1953, tax 
obligations, calculated on one cadastral yoke o f p riva te  land, increased 
threefo ld , resulting in hundreds o f thousands o f peasants being unable to  pay or 
forced to accumulate tax a r r e a r s . ^ ^  In the event, many small and medium
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peasant holdings were forced in to  liqu idation or the peasant owner was made to  
jo in  the co llective . Peasant dramas were common occurrences in these years. 
One such a case is v iv id ly  described in Ferenc Santa's book, en title d  'Twenty 
Hours', (Husz Ora) . ^ ^  The story is about A n ta l Balogh who, w ith  his fa m ily  
and grandson, who was liv in g  w ith  them, were starving in 1952. He recalled tha t 
i t  was a year when 300 grammes o f bread was given to  a peasant to  last over a 
week and when the womenfolk were forced to co llec t nettles from  the ditchside 
to  cook and feed the fam ily . One o f Balogh's re latives, a railwaym an from  Gyor, 
managed to obtain 30 kgs o f flo u r and kindly sent i t  to Balogh as a gesture since 
the five  year old boy liv in g  w ith  them was his god-child. By noon on the morning 
the flo u r consignment arrived, the v illage party secretary, accompanied by 
Council members and a policeman, arrived at Balogh's house and demanded tha t 
Balogh should hand over the flou r, because it  was a crim e 'to  hoard' flou r. Balogh 
cried out tha t 'as long as I can not feed my grand-child properly no-one should 
set foo t in my house'. For this, he was accused of being an 'enemy o f the people'. 
Balogh then grabs an axe, ready to k il l anyone who takes the f ir s t  step in to  his 
house, but his w ife  runs out o f the house and restrains him. In his helpless, 
im potent rage, Balogh then h its  his head against the w a ll and w ith  a blood- 
covered head he runs amok through the village, shouting 'shoot here, communist 
policeman, shoot here'. The end o f the story is tha t his flo u r was u ltim a te ly  
confiscated and a notice put on his gate saying tha t 'an agent o f im peria lism  
lives in th is house' and the party  secretary reported him to  the au thorities  fo r 
'inc item ent' and 'violence'.
The high compulsory de live ry  obligations would not, perhaps, have 
m attered had the state paid a reasonable price fo r the produce. But prices paid 
fo r  compulsory deliveries were fixed  at extrem ely low levels, o ften  below 
production costs, and hardly increased over the years, so tha t in re la tive  term s 
they actua lly  declined as production costs and delivery obligations increased,
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increasing thereby the tax nature o f these prices. Prices paid by the state fo r
purchases outside the compulsory delivery system, i.e., free  state and
contractua l purchases, were higher than compulsory de live ry prices and, in
response to  free m arket prices, increased over the years, in the case o f some
products considerably, but generally the increase was much less than tha t in free
market prices. As compulsory delivery obligations were stepped up there was an
increasing divergence between compulsory delivery and free  m arket prices. But
a fte r compulsory de livery obligations had been satisfied, and the peasant's own
consumption taken in to  account, not much remained fo r  the free  m arket, while
free and contractua l state purchases remained re la tive ly  sm all and tended to
decline fu rth e r over the years. Prices o f industria l goods bought by the peasants,
on the other hand, were set at high levels and increased over the years. The
'agrarian scissors' which began in 1950, had fu rth e r widened: while the average
price level o f ag ricu ltu ra l produce, by 1952, had declined by just over 10 per
cent, because of the increased weight o f compulsory deliveries in to ta l peasant
sales, the prices o f industria l goods bought by the peasants increased by 37 per
(207)cent. The income-reducing e ffe c t o f the 'agrarian scissors' was generally
counterbalanced, at least u n til 1951, by the fa c t tha t the peasants were able, by 
hard work and favourable weather, to  increase to ta l and marketed production. 
But in 1952, because o f the bad harvest, a serious burden was put on the 
peasants, and on ag ricu ltu ra l cap ita l accumulation, by the incom e-reducing and 
stockpiling e ffo rts  o f the state. In the bad year o f 1952 the leve l o f state 
procurement was almost identica l to  tha t in the good year o f 1951. I t  was not 
surprising then, tha t w ith in  a year the real incomes o f a ll peasants had not only 
ceased to  grow but suddenly declined greatly  and in fa c t were almost halved 
compared w ith  1951. In e ffe c t, the wide differences between sta te  prices and 
free m arket prices magnified the fluctua tions in the peasantry's income: in a bad 
harvest year nothing remained fo r sale on the free  m arket a fte r  compulsory
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deliveries were fu lf il le d , whereas in good years the earnings were high. While
compulsory de livery prices were low, hardly enough, o ften, to  cover the various
taxes, the state was selling to  consumers through the re ta il trade netw ork at
300-400 and o ften  more than 500 per cent p ro fit .  In 1952, fo r  example, the
compulsory de live ry  price paid by the state fo r  wheat was 60 F orin ts /qu in ta l,
(208)while its  free  market price, at 240 Forin ts /qu in ta l, was four tim es higher.
A ll th is, o f course, did nothing to  help food provision, since i t  probably impeded 
the growth o f ag ricu ltu ra l production. The steeply progressive quotas le f t  l i t t le  
possib ility  fo r the peasant to adjust his production according to the conditions o f 
his soil. The cereal production plan was s ign ifican tly  underfu lfilled  and, in the 
event, even exports o f food had to  be s ign ifican tly  reduced. In fa c t, from  the 
autumn o f 1952, as an emergency measure, much grain had to  be im ported from  
neighbouring 'friend ly  socialist countries' -  as was revealed by both Erno Gero, at 
the Centra l Com m ittee Plenum held on 29th November 1952 and Matyas Rakosi 
at the meeting o f the National Assembly on 15th December 1952 -  to  re lieve  the 
pressures on the c o l le c t iv e s .^ ^
C learly, one im portant reason -  as perceived by the regim e -  fo r  the 
'need' to  red is tribu te  incomes was the sudden rise in peasants' rea l incomes 
im m ediate ly p rio r to  the price and wage reform s. This, o f course, was la rge ly  
the result o f the good harvest in 1951. Because o f th is, the re la tive  con tribu tion  
o f peasants to  the industria lisation e ffo r t  and defence expenditure had declined 
and was less than tha t o f workers, although it  should be noted, the absolute level 
o f peasant real incomes was lower than tha t o f workers. And this, in the view o f 
the regime, needed correction. But i t  apparently fa iled  to  en ter in to  the 
equation the the growing disincentive e ffe c ts  o f its  policies on a g ricu ltu ra l 
production and obviously made no allowance fo r  the possib ility  o f a bad harvest 
due to  varia tion  in weather conditions. B rie f reference should also be made to  
another, related, po licy instrum ent which was employed by the government to
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reduce the purchasing power not only o f the the peasants but indeed the entire  
working population, to  reduce the growing disequilibrium  in the economy, by 
forced re s tr ic tio n  on demand. This was the 2nd and 3rd Peace Loan 
subscriptions, introduced in September 1951 and 1952 re s p e c tiv e ly .^ 1*^ The 
Peace Loans were allocated from  above to  each village and f in a lly  d is tribu ted  by 
the v illage council. While these loans were theo re tica lly  not compulsory, 
nevertheless, a 'vo luntary pledge' o f such loans was o ften a question o f l i fe  or 
death since i f  the pledged amount was not forthcom ing the peasant's belongings 
could be confiscated and he him self sent to  prison. O ften peasants would bargain 
fo r days w ith  the V illage Council to  have the size o f the loan reduced. A fu rth e r 
method o f ex trac ting  money from  the peasants was in the form  o f 'crop 
insurance'. This was compulsory, but in case o f to ta l crop destruction the 
maximum compensation was only about tw ice  the yearly prem ium. In addition, 
the assessors often cheated in th e ir estimates o f the damage. The co llec tive  
farm s were compensated at a higher ra te  than independent fa rm e rs .^  ^
Apart from  the independent peasants, a great burden was also put on the 
collectives, since lack o f proper economic foundations due to  undue haste and 
low compulsory de livery prices and high taxes adversely a ffe c ted  th e ir 
development and th e ir  members, in a number o f in te rre la ted  ways: f ir s t  o f a ll, 
the co llectives were deprived o f the opportun ity to  develop th e ir  own investm ent 
resources, reducing thereby th e ir means to  increase production, to ta l and 
marketed which, in turn , reduced the incomes of members. A lthough average 
cereal yields in some collectives were be tte r than in many ind iv idual farm s due 
la rge ly to  the mechanised assistance provided by the Machine T ra c to r Stations, 
much o f the resulting extra production was absorbed by the 'payments in kind' 
the co llectives were obliged to  pay fo r  the MTS work. For o ther produce, e.g., 
vegetables and livestock, the production results o f co llectives were considerably 
below the national average of individual farm s fo r many years to  come. As w e ll
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as reducing the po ten tia l fo r growth in ag ricu ltu ra l production, the low prices
acted d ire c tly  as a brake on marketed production, since they encouraged the
co llectives to  d is tribu te , a fte r compulsory delivery obligations were fu lf il le d ,
and taxes and MTS fees were paid, an increasingly la rger share o f the residual
product 'in  kind' among th e ir  members, in accordance w ith  the working-day units
earned. This meant tha t the state, on the one hand, obtained less production
from  the co llectives than i t  had hoped fo r and, on the other hand, the m a jo rity  o f
members recived l i t t le  in cash payments. I f  they worked hard, th e ir  income 'in
kind' obtained from  the collectives and th e ir income from  the household p lo t,
more or less, covered th e ir  food requirements, but th e ir money incomes were
inadequate to  satisfy th e ir other needs. In 1952 and 1953, however, even the
increased share o f 'in-k ind ' dividend represented a small quantity , p rim a rily ,
because the income per working day unit had declined: while in 1951 the money
value o f an 'in -k ind ' working day unit was 8.91 Forints, by 1952 i t  had declined to 
(212)5.15 Forin ts. Many collectives in fa c t had l i t t le  or no money le f t  at th e ir
disposal to  pay th e ir members. Many had to  ignore even the payment o f 'ground
rent' to  those o f th e ir members who had entered the co llec tive  w ith  land. The
'Model Statutes' governing the operation o f co llectives stipu lated tha t 10-20 per
cent o f co llec tive  income had to  be d istribu ted in accordance w ith  the area o f
land contributed to  the co llective . In it ia lly , th is ru le had applied to  Type I and II
co llectives, to  make i t  more a ttra c tive  fo r the landowing peasantry, especially
the medium peasant, to  jo in  the co llective . The rule was la te r extended to  cover
Type III collectives. Most o f the co llectives, however, fa iled  to  observe the
sta tu te  and paid no 'ground ren t' to en titled  members because, i t  was cla im ed, i t
would have offended members who joined w ithou t land. This, too, contribu ted  to
(213)the resistance o f the landowning peasantry to  jo in ing  co llectives.
Because o f inadequte state support and the various economic burdens on 
co llectives, th e ir economic consolidation was seriously impeded. The high
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compulsory delivery obligations, the unfavourable re la tionship between
production costs and procurement prices, the land tax  and the MTSs fee
combined to  place a great burden on the co llectives. The compulsory de live ry
quota rates in may cases surpassed the levels established fo r  many individual
farm ers, and the ir fu lf ilm e n t was even more s tr ic t ly  enforced. Whereas in 1951
and 1952 individual farm ers were able to  sell 32.6 and 26.8 per cent o f th e ir  to ta l
production respectively on the free  market, the collectives, in the same years,
(214)were only able to  sell 11.6 and 12.1 per cent. Furtherm ore, the preva iling  
producers' prices were unfavourable fo r  co llectives. The prices o f cereals were 
set, s ign ifican tly , lower than the prices fo r  livestock. But, co llectives were 
engaged p rim arily  in crop production, mainly grain and maize, and th e ir  livestock 
production was very underdeveloped. Thus, the prices established fo r  cereals and 
livestock h it them tw ice , the f irs t  in th e ir capacity as sellers, the second in th e ir  
capacity as buyers. Coupled w ith  the ever-increasing 'agrarian scissors' th e ir  
e ffe c t was pa rticu la rly  depressive in the fie ld  o f investm ent: since the prices o f 
those m ateria ls and equipment which represented the m ajor share o f th e ir 
communal investments increased the most. Under the circum stances, the 
procurement prices paid by the state represented almost the only source o f 
income o f collectives; these prices, however, were so low tha t, in many cases, 
they fa iled  to  cover even production costs. Consequently, the co llec tives  had to  
re ly  increasingly on credits to  carry  out th e ir  most v ita l investments and i t  was 
not surprising tha t th e ir indebtedness roe a larm ingly, reaching a figu re  o f 1800 
m illion  Forin ts by the middle o f 1953.(215)
High compulsory deliveries and low incomes fo r  co llectives gave rise, in 
many places, to  intense dissatisfaction and b itte r  resentment among co lle c tive  
members. They expected much more favourable trea tm ent and a b e tte r life  
a fte r they had joined the collectives. Those who entered the co llec tives  never 
fo rgo t the promises made by the agita tors, which did not m ate ria lise . The
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resultant low work morale tha t obtained in co llectives -  in a number o f places
much of the harvest was le f t  ro tt in g  on the land, potatoes remained under
ground, maize unpicked etc. -  counteracted the e ffo rts  and propaganda
campaigns o f the state to  improve the flagg ing work d iscip line and reduced the
incentives fo r members to  increase production. Because the main emphasis was
on numbers during this period, the national average o f to ta l fa m ily  incomes, i.e.,
both ’in-kind' and monetary, earned according to  working day units, declined
every consecutive year: compared to  1949, fa m ily  incomes in co llectives
declined to  80.1, 55.7 and 30.8 per cent by 1950, 1951 and 1952 re s p e c tiv e ly .^ 1*^
Incomes in many co llectives declined to  such low levels, o ften  below subsistence
level, tha t members, risk ing imprisonment, ignored th e ir  de live ry  obligations
altogether and d istribu ted the entire  production among themselves. The average
per capita income o f co llec tive  members was only 67.5 per cent o f tha t of 
(217)individual peasants. While the decline in fa m ily  incomes o f members from
co llective  work had, u n til 1950, been p a rtia lly  o ffse t by incomes obtained from
private household plots and/or by the fa c t tha t more and more fa m ily  members
took up work in industry, Machine T racto r Stations and State Farms, where the
wages earned boosted fa m ily  incomes, from  1951 onwards even to ta l average
(218)fa m ily  incomes had declined year a fte r year. Many young peasants turned
the ir back on collectives, because o f the d iff ic u lt ie s  o f making a live lihood
there, and moved to  the towns, and many o f the old ones devoted more and more
attention to  th e ir  p riva te  household plots. The large-scale move to  industry,
where higher earnings led to  fu rth e r m igra tion from  the villages, resulted in
massive ru ra l depopulation. The demographic erosion and natura l and forced
m igration in to  urban areas le ft  an increasingly ageing ru ra l population. The
'f lig h t to  c ities ', natura lly  had many causes but the co llec tiv isa tion  drive  must be
(219)considered as one o f the most im portant.
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In addition to  the problems o f declin ing incomes in co llectives, severe
food shortages also developed. This, to  take the most obvious example, was
indicated by the general shortages in bread, which became p a rticu la rly  acute
during the w in te r o f 1952/1953, and the recurren t pleas by co llectives fo r
supplies o f flo u r and fa ts. I t  was no accident tha t during th is  w in te r there was
an increased number o f com plaints th a t co llec tive  members were not given
perm its to  slaughter the ir pigs, despite the fa c t tha t a large number o f th e ir
livestock could not be kept through the w in te r because o f fodder shortage, and
(220)pigs, sheep, ca ttle  and horses perished by the thousand. Many peasants,
both individual and co llective  members, risked imprisonment when, because of
the food s ituation, they resorted to  unlaw fu l slaughtering and stealing wheat and
rye from  the fie lds, p rio r to  compulsory deliveries. Peasants went to  the fie lds
at night on bicycles which they turned over on a large sheet and started
(221)threshing by to rch -ligh t, between the spokes o f th e ir  b icycle wheels. Also,
because o f the serious shortage o f bread and bread-grains in pa rticu la r, a ca re fu l 
i f  b izarre eye was kept on the peasants, or ra the r on th e ir animals, to  prevent 
them, not only from  hoarding but from  feeding grain to  th e ir livestock. Thus,
on early mornings, when the herd was driven out fo r pasture, 
council o ffic ia ls , w ith  a briefcase under th e ir  arm and a s tick  
in th e ir hand, fo llowed the herd and th e ir s tick  probed in to  
the droppings o f animals to see i f  they could find  any grain in 
t h e m . ^ )
I f  they did so, the owner o f the animal was imprisoned fo r sabotaging the bread 
supply o f the nation. Many innocent peasants were imprisoned fo r  1-2 weeks, 
often even fo r months, since th e ir livestock could, in fa c t, have picked up the 
grain e ithe r on the stubble-fie ld  or sim ply on the road. People re fe rred  to  these 
council o ffic ia ls  as the 'm uck-rakers’ and hated them.
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Despite considerable propaganda e ffo rts  by the regim e, the low and
declin ing trends in co llec tive  incomes, the problems o f food provision, the
general a ttitude  and morale o f the workers in the co llectives, made the ir
consolidation not only extrem ely d if f ic u lt  but also both weakened the
cooperative movement in te rna lly  and increased the resistance o f individual
working peasants to  entering the collectives. News about the conditions o f li fe
inside the collectives, o f course, reached the ind iv idua l peasants and convinced
them tha t, despite the coercion and growing economic burdens, they were be tte r
o f f  staying out. Between the years 1951 and 1953 collectives in fa c t became
weaker, both organisationally and economically, than before. This is illus tra ted
by the fa c t tha t while the area under co llec tive  cu ltiva tion  had grown by 274 per
cent, mechanisation and especially the number o f trac to rs  in the MTS's, had
grown by only 37 per cent. Moreover, while the to ta l area in the co llec tive
sector was about 24 per cent o f to ta l arable land, th e ir livestock represented
only 9 per cent o f the national to ta l. Yields, too, were on average generally 15-
30 per cent lower than the averages o f ind iv idual farms. A lso, the use o f
fe rtilise rs  on co llec tive  land declined over the period: while in 1950/1951 one
cadastral yoke received 86  kgs. o f a r t if ic ia l fe r t il iz e r ,  by 1953 th is  had declined
to  29 kgs. The amount o f natura l fe r t il iz e r , due to  the low leve l o f livestock,
would have made natura l fe r t il iz a t io n  o f th e ir area possible only once every 9-15 
(223)years. Another im portant reason fo r th e ir  economic weakness was the 
shortage o f e ffic ie n t, competent managers, w ith  experience in ag ricu ltu ra l 
m atters. Even the party's highest organ, the Politbureau, was forced to  adm it 
that,
at present, the consolidation o f co llectives is made d if f ic u lt  
by the lack o f p o lit ic a lly  re liab le  cadres, equipped w ith  the 
necessary knowledge in agrarian m atters .^224)
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Kulaks, and o ther more e ffic ie n t farm ers were barred from  entering the 
co llective . The f lig h t, deportation or imprisonment o f fo rm er medium and large 
landowners in any case elim inated most experts. The few  who remained at 
lib e rty  were o ffe red  jobs on State Farms. Managers in the co llec tive  sector 
were inadequately acquainted w ith  loca l conditions and la rge ly  w ithou t tra in ing  
in agricu lture . A t the end o f 1952 the to ta l number o f agrarian experts w ith  
higher education was only 945 to  service over 3,600 Type III co llectives. The 
level o f tra in ing  o f chairmen was p a rticu la rly  low. Accord ing to  a survey 
conducted at the end o f 1953, tw o-th irds  o f chairmen had no qua lifica tion
/ o n  e \
whatsoever and only 4.4 per cent had middle or higher education. V illage,
d is tr ic t and county o ffic ia ls  provided no concrete assistance and inexperienced
leaders, and members, made mistakes upon mistakes. Transplanted urban people
or e xp lic itly  industria l workers, o ften  ignorant labourers, who were o ften  not
even good workers, and whose only credentia ls fo r  the job were th a t the party
trusted them, were sent to  manage co llectives. These people, unwanted by the
co llec tive  members, were regarded by the peasants as 'aliens', 'vagrants' in the
villages and were o ften  re ferred to  as the 'lumpenproletarians' and because o f
th e ir  lack o f knowledge in ag ricu ltu ra l maters earned no respect at a ll from  the
(226)peasants. I t  was not only lack o f expert leadership and mismanagement
which made the co llectives in e ffic ie n t. Widespread in tra -co lle c tive  antagonism 
was also an im portant source o f tension between members, which led to  
ine ffic iency. Hard working industrious and, in it ia lly ,  am bitious co llec tive  
members were angered and demoralised by the fa c t tha t a large proportion o f 
the membership, driven or lured in to  the co llectives, did not work w e ll and th e ir 
work, too, had to  be done by them.
I t  is not surprising then, in view o f these trends and problems, tha t 
despite relentless campaigns throughout 1951 and 1952 the regim e found it  
impossible to  achieve its  target o f consolidating and strengthening the
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co llectives, to  improve and generally to  develop an in te rna lly  strong co llec tive
system which, by its  example, would have shown the way ahead and a ttrac ted  the
working peasants. This is conspicuously confirm ed by the almost constantly
recurring  theme in the numerous statements by the regime throughout these
(227)years regarding the need to  consolidate the co llectives, a theme which was
(228)also the subject o f a Council o f M inisters Decree and, fo llow ing  the Soviet
(229)example, the main objective o f the newly established ’Kolkhoz C ouncil’. In
an a ttem pt to improve the financ ia l position o f co llectives, the 'Kolkhoz
Council's Conference’ m odified the ’Model Statutes' o f co llectives in November
1952. New entrants were required, from  tha t tim e on, to put 30 per cent o f the
to ta l assets which they brought in to  the co llec tive  in to  the common fund, not 15
per cent as before. This meant tha t peasants were compensated fo r  only 70 per
cent, ra ther than 85 per cent, o f the 'estim ated' value they had brought w ith
(230)them when they entered the co llec tive . The 'estim ated' value, however, was 
very o ften  considerably lower than the m arket value o f the assets.
The headlong rush to  achieve comprehensive co llec tiv isa tion , regardless 
o f costs and in to ta l disregard o f peasant feelings, s tiffened  the resistance o f 
individual farmers. The years 1951 and, especially, 1952 were c r it ic a l years fo r 
a ll the peasants in Hungary and th e ir mood, during these years, was p a rticu la rly  
em bittered. C o llectiv isa tion  during 1952 was applied w ith  considerable coercion 
and, in addition to  economic devices re lied heavily on moral and police pressure, 
v is its  from  party activ is ts , and very o ften  on violence. Considerable use was 
also made o f the special device o f repeated land reorganisation and 
commassation to  break the resistance and independence o f the ind iv idua l farm ers 
and to  compel them to  jo in  the co llec tive  sector. By th is tim e, o f course, the 
'wealthy' peasants were already, largely, liquidated and as the coercion increased 
more and more small and medium peasants were forced in to  the co llectives. 
Undoubtedly, many leading party members must have been w atching the
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developments in agricu ltu re  during 1952 and the early  months o f 1953 w ith  great 
apprehension.
The process o f organising co llectives always began, not o f course 
’spontaneously' by the peasants themselves, as o ff ic ia l ly  claimed, but by party 
and state representatives descending on a v illage and searching out and v is itin g  
agrarian proletarians, poor farm ers and, in some cases, the p o lit ic a lly  most 
'progressive' medium peasants known in the area. They then inv ited  them to  a 
meeting where they trie d  to  'persuade' them in to  agreeing to fo rm  a co llec tive  
and to  rec ru it, from  th e ir own c irc le  o f friends, the number o f members required 
by law to  establish a co llec tive . I f  th is method fa iled  to  produce the required 
result, e.g., the number o f peasants, or the area was lower than tha t specified by 
the d is tr ic t's  or county's co llec tiv isa tion  plan, passed down from  the centre, then 
pressure was applied. This might take many form s. More o ften  than not, 
economic blackm ail, threatening the fa rm er w ith  tax  increases e tc., was used. I f  
tha t fa iled  they threatened the peasant w ith  beating or prison. Despite th is, the 
number o f peasants necessary to  form  a co llec tive  was- o ften  not reached. 
O ffic ia ls  would then 'discover' tha t a pa rticu la r fa rm er was under the influence 
o f kulaks and single him out fo r bad trea tm en t, harrassment. The fa rm er was 
called in by the authorities to  th e ir o ffices  where he was detained u n til he had 
'agreed' to  sign the en try papers. Emphasis, over the years, sh ifted, in fa c t, from  
group to  individual ag ita tion  among peasants. There were cases when a known 
kulak would o ffe r to  re c ru it the required number o f peasants, provided he was 
allowed to  jo in  the co llec tive . Despite o f f ic ia l po licy  not to  a llow  kulaks to  jo in  
collectives, there is evidence tha t in some places a compromise was reached. 
Theory and practice  d iffe red  in d iffe re n t regions.
The most ruthless campaign o f coercion began in the autumn o f 1952 
when incomes obtained in collectives would not even sa tis fy  the poorest fo rm er 
peasant and, at the same tim e, the rapid development o f industry o ffe red  almost
un lim ited  employment opportunities. Looking at the development o f co llectives
over the period, however, what was remarkable was how unsuccessful the
co llec tiv isa tion  drive had proved to  be, despite a ll the pressures, in tim ida tion
and te rro r. The target o f comprehensive co llec tiv isa tion , set by the Second
Congress in February 1951, was not achieved. Despite the considerable e ffo rts
by the regime the co llec tiv isa tion  drive  reached its  highpoint in early  1953.
A fte r  th is tim e  i t  began to  decline and by June 1953 i t  embraced 24.7 per cent o f
the country ’s arable land, or 26 per cent including the area o f p riva te  household
plots. W ithin th is to ta l the area occupied by Type III co llectives was 20.3 per
(231)cent. On average about one co lle c tive  farm  was operating in every fou rth
village. The degree o f co llec tiv isa tion  in d iffe re n t regions o f the country,
however, varied more or less in d irec t ra tio  to  the pressure employed. By the
beginning o f 1953, taking the socia list sector as a whole, i.e., co llectives and
State Farms, only about a th ird  o f the active  ru ra l labour fo rce  jo ined, 19.1 per
cent in the co llectives while tw o-th irds  sim ply refused to  give in to  the pressure
by the authorities. The co llectiv ised programme had not captured enough o f the
countryside to  displace the independent peasant as the main supplier o f fa rm
produce. In 1952 the sm all and medium peasants, under extrem ely d if f ic u lt
conditions, s t i l l  produced 70 per cent o f the to ta l grain crop and accounted fo r
(232)more than 60 per cent o f the sta te ’s grain co llection .
The enormous e ffo rts  put in to  the transform ation o f ag ricu ltu re  by the
regime had only p a rtia lly  paid o ff.  The num erical development o f co llectives,
th e ir area, membership and regional d is tribu tion , according to  counties fo r  the
(233)whole o f th is period, is shown in the Tables 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5 on pp.555-556).
As can be seen, the to ta l number o f co llectives o f a ll types, grew to  5224, o f
which 3768 were Type III. The to ta l membership was 376,000, o f which 300,400
(234)were in Type III collectives, according to  the Government’s new programme 
in June 1953. The ra te  o f expansion was the highest in 1951, when the largest 
number o f co llectives were formed, and the greatest annual increase in area was
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Table 8.5: Regional distribution of collectivised arable land area, 
according to counties, between 1950 and 1953
End of year data 
Arable land/cadastral yokes
County 1950 (1) 1951 1952 1953
Transdanubia
Baranya 47,442 128,035 123,752 88,862
Fejer 26,773 59,950 84,616 75,155
Gyor-Sopron 29,640 52,317 64,492 56,407
Komarom 8,770 14,846 23,492 18,341
Somogy 26,823 56,120 117,291 58,734
Tolna 29,116 62,205 69,620 60,835
Vas 21,603 46,755 80,077 63,432
Veszprem 14,365 25,874 37,168 33,347
Zala 15,057 28,355 38,613 31,644
Together 219,589 474,457 639,121 486, 757
Plain
Bacs-Kiskun 54,148 100,239 130,131 105,921
Bekes 53,533 110,054 265,113 166,739
Csongrad 39,606 63,458 121,679 89,973
Hajdu-Bihar 60,445 105,621 172,021 133,892
Pest (2) 37,405 115,075 124,913 114,170
Szabolcs-Szatmar 45,283 115,843 255,609 112,905
Szolnok 58,196 200,960 239,634 222,450
Together (2) 348,616 811,250 1309,100 946,050
North
Borsod-Abauj-Ze mplen 33,592 90.771 130,341 97,432
Heves 16,693 46,504 60,788 41,791
Nograd 9,184 18,900 25,855 18,837
Together 59,469 156,175 216,984 158,060
Budapest - 7,816 8,734 8,593
Tota l 627,674 1,449,698 2,173,939 1,599,460
(1) Data on December 1.
(2) Together w ith  Budapest
WV Cc • ^  y '■
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achieved. 1952 was marked by an appreciable slow down in the ra te  o f growth in 
the number o f co llectives and membership, although not in term s o f area. This 
was due to  the fa c t tha t from  tha t year on the campaign was fu lly  geared to  
pressure the landowning peasantry to  give up individual fa rm ing  and jo in  the 
collectives. Because o f th is, the character o f membership d ras tica lly  changed. 
While in earlie r years, as shown earlie r, a great proportion o f the members 
jo in ing the co llectives consisted o f landless agrarian proletarians, by the end o f 
1952 the land-owning peasantry became by fa r  the largest section o f the 
members: th e ir share in Type III co llectives was 77 per cent and in the lower,
/oqc\
Type I and Type II i t  was 95 per cent. Moreover, while at the end o f 1950 
only 19.7 per cent o f members came from  the medium peasants, by June 1953 
th e ir share had increased to  over a th ird , most o f them jo in ing  during the autumn
/ n o
of 1952 and early 1953. Because o f this, the average size o f the new farm s 
adm itted in to  the co llectives, in 1952, was bigger than before. Hence, the to ta l 
land area brought under the cu ltiva tion  o f co llectives increased from  772,000 
cad. yokes to  2,817,390 cad. yokes, in which the share o f Type III co lle c tive  farm  
area was about 2,200,000 cad. yokes. What can also be seen from  the tables is 
tha t the regime, in establishing the collectives, favoured the more progressive 
Type III co llec tive  farm s: the number o f Type I & II co llectives declined by 27 
per cent during the 18 months a fte r  1951 while tha t o f Type III inceased by 44 
per cent. This was apparently because the party leadership changed its  mind 
regarding the wisdom o f having authorised the sim pler form s; i t  now feared tha t 
ra ther than prom oting large-scale production based on co llectiv ised  property 
they would sim ply represent p ro tec tion  fo r land-owners unable to  evade the 
various pressures but seeking to  pursue individual fa rm ing  as long as possible 
w ith in  these sim pler form s.
Behind these numbers lay much coercion, compulsion and te rro r . One of 
the main tools o f coercion devised by the regime to  extend the co lle c tive  sector
(237)was land reorganisation (foldrendezes) and commassation (tagositas). These,
as noted earlie r, were f irs t  employed as early as the autumn o f 1949, a ffe c tin g
la rge ly gentry and kulak land then. From th a t tim e on, in d is tr ic ts  where
collectives were form ed i t  became, in a sense, inevitab le  tha t the scattered land
should be reorganised and commassed, again and again, in succeeding years. The
expansion in co llec tive  land area, numbers and membership was in fa c t linked at
the same tim e to  repeated land reorganisation and commassation campaigns.
Apart from  the fa c t tha t these coincided in tim e, th is is also shown by the
system o f reporting  which, as a rule, gave the development in the number o f
co llectives and commassation together. Both land reorganisation and
commassation were a special sort o f forced exchange of land plots, which were
then reorganised and/or commassed in to  a large continuous parcel o f the
C o llective  or State Farm. Land reorganisation or commassation did not mean,
however, the exchange o f a pa rticu la r p lo t fo r  land o f identica l qua lity . Rather,
i t  meant th a t the best land o f the resisting sm all or medium peasant, w ith in  the
designated area, was taken away fo rc ib ly , i f  the peasant refused to  jo in  the
co llec tive , and in exchange he was 'compensated' w ith  other land o f much worse
qua lity  which was, also, generally more distant from  his home than his o rig ina l
land. An o ff ic ia l s ta tis tica l survey, based on a sample o f 400 holdings in four
counties, showed tha t in exchange fo r th e ir o rig ina l land the individual p riva te
farm ers had received land which, in case o f reorganisation was 20  per cent and in
case o f commassation 15 per cent poorer in q ua lity  (expressed in net income
(238)equivalent) and respective ly 92.9 and 41.7 per cent fu rth e r from  th e ir  home.
A ll o f these 'exchanges' were, o f course, accompanied by considerable 
harrassment, coercion and human tragedies. Under these circumstances working 
peasants, nationwide, were faced w ith  three choices: they could enter the
co llec tive  w ith  th e ir  land, carry on individual fa rm ing  on the poorer land, they 
received in exchange, or the th ird  option, which was taken up by many, 'o ffe r
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vo lun ta rily 1 th e ir  land to  the state, abandon fa rm ing a ltogether and take up work
in state-owned industria l or ag ricu ltu ra l enterprises. This last was not an
en tire ly  undesirable development from  the regim e’s point o f view. Under the
second option, however, the fa rm er could expect to  face a second or more
commassation procedure, on each occasion receiv ing poorer land. The fu ll
extent o f these land reorganisations and commassations can be appreciated when
the areas a ffec ted  by the Land Reform  o f 1945 and land reorganisations and
commassations, over the whole period o f 1949 and 1956 are compared: while
under the Land Reform  the to ta l area o f land red istribu ted was 5.6 m illion  cad.
yokes, under reorganisations and commassations the to ta l a ffec ted  area was
about 9.0 m illion  cad. yokes, in which the share o f land reorganisations was 5.12
(239)m illion  cad. yokes. And what is, perhaps, even more revealing, regarding
the scale o f the operation, is tha t from  the autumn o f 1949 u n til 1953 land 
reorganisations were carried out in 70 percent o f a ll villages, in more than ha lf 
o f them it  was perform ed tw ice  or more, and nearly 4.0 m illion  cad. yokes were 
a ffe c ted .(240)
The im pact o f the policy o f land reorganisation and commassation, and 
the accompanying in tensity  o f pressure fo r  co llec tiv isa tion  on the ind iv idual 
peasant can be seen from  the changes in the land area le f t  fa llow , shown in 
Table 8 .6 :<241)
Table 8.6: Changes in Agricultural Land left Fallow
Year cad. yokes Index
1949 76,625 100
1950 66,790 93
1951 76.244 111
1952 133,058 193
1953 97,508 142
1954 71,404 104
1955 105,567 153
SLotAiQ2  S f \A  . % h \
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The data shown in the above table ind icate a corre la tion  between the in tensity  o f
co llec tiv isa tion  in the area le f t  fa llow . According to  an o ff ic ia l survey carried
out in 1952, investigating 400 plots accepted in exchange fo r  the orig ina l land, as
resu lt o f commassation, i t  was found tha t 6 months a fte r the commassation was
completed 70 per cent o f the land was le f t  fa llow , uncu ltiva ted, by the individual 
(242)peasant. And where commassation was repeated tw ice , or three tim es, the
second and th ird  tim es the ind iv idual peasant, generally refused to  accept the
(243)land he was o ffe red  in exchange by the state fo r cu ltiva tion . Land
reorganisations and commassations created great tensions and con flic ts  amongst
individual peasants and co llec tive  peasants. The repeated reorganisations and
commasssations, in te r a lia , upset the balance o f ag ricu ltu ra l production and
disrupted the normal l i fe  pa tte rn  o f farm ing. The absence o f proper
(244)compensation reduced the w ill o f the individual fa rm er to  produce. Because 
o f the constant danger o f reorganisaton and commassation the ind iv idual peasant 
was disinclined to  invest and re luctan t to  use the necessary quan tity  o f fe r t i l iz e r  
on his land. Both the increase in the area le f t  fa llow  and the reduced investm ent 
and use o f fe r t i l iz e r  adversely a ffec ted  the p rodu c tiv ity  o f ind iv idual holdings. 
The in tens ity  o f land reorganisation and commassation, and co llec tiv isa tion ,
shows a high corre la tion  w ith  the changes in wheat yields and livestock
. (245)numbers.
The increasing employment opportunities in industry, the system atic and 
repeated land reorganisations and commassations, the increasing economic 
burdens, the harassments and coercion, a ll, to  varying degrees, contribu ted to  
the progressively increasing 'land-offe rs ' and m igration from  the land by the 
individual peasants. When an individual peasant refused to  enter the co llec tive  
w ith  his orig ina l land, and did not accept the land o ffe red  in exchange fo r his 
orig ina l land, the only option tha t remained open to  him was to  ’o ffe r ' his land to  
the state and opt out o f fa rm ing altogether. A t the ea rlie r stages o f
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co llec tiv isa tion  such ’o ffe rs ', as noted earlie r, were made by the 'w ea lth ie r 
peasants' and by working peasants who by 'o ffe ring ' part o f th e ir  land reduced the 
size o f th e ir  holdings so as to  move in to  a lower category to  escape or reduce the 
burden o f taxation. As tim e  passed, however, the number and amount o f land 
o ffe red  gradually gained momentum. What actua lly  happened can be seen from  
Table 8.7:(246)
Table 8.7: The number of holdings and the total land area 
offered to the state, between 1 June 1949 and 31 March 1953
Number o f holdings o ffe red (in 1000's)
To ta l area
Categories 1 June 1949- 1 Jan- 1 Jan 1952- To ta l o ffe red  and
o f 31 Dec 1950 31 Dec 1951 31 March 1953 taken over by
farm ers the state in
cad. yokes(b)
working peasants 14.8 16.2 37.0 6 8 .0 350,608
'Amphibious'^3)
workers 0.4 4.9 61.0 66.3 295,652
kulaks 12.4 16.0 11 .2 39.6- 963,478
Legal persons 0 .8 3.9 13.1 17.8 213.913
Tota l 28.4 41.0 122.3 191.7 1,823,651
(a) 'Amphibious' workers (ke tla k i): worked both in industry and agricu ltu re  or
industria l workers, o rig ina lly  peasant 
farm ers o ffe rin g  th e ir  land from  th e ir  place 
o f industry.
(b) coverted from  hectares in to  cadastral yokes by the author.
S .u .c e .1  ^< 2 - i
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A t f irs t,  the ’amphibious’ worker-peasants began to  ’o ffe r ' th e ir land and, as can
be seen from  the above table, the numbers o f such o ffe rs  steadily increased from
1950 onwards. This was because o f a Council o f M inisters Decree which
regulated the 'land -o ffe r' o f industria l and transport workers, published on 1 0 th  
(247)December 1950. Due to  adm in is tra tive  pressure and intense propaganda
campaigns, by the spring o f 1953 a to ta l o f 66,300 'o ffe red ' nearly 300,000 cad.
yokes o f land to  the state. Approxim ate ly 60 per cent o f them were o rig ina lly
working peasants. Many o f them, f irs t,  went to  work in industry, and it  was from
th e ir new place in industry tha t they ’o ffe red ’ th e ir land, because they could then
be much more certa in  tha t the state, under these circumstances, would be
(248)w illin g  to  take i t  over from  them. I t  should be noted, however, tha t by law
land had to  be cu ltiva ted  and those who le f t  land fa llow  faced monetary fines.
A fte r  1950, and especially in 1952, however, the working peasants, too, began ’to
o ffe r ’ th e ir land to  the state in numbers and moved in to  state industria l and
agricu ltu ra l occupations. This ’m igra tion ’ was in essence a desirable
development, and in accord w ith  government plans announced in the revised
F ive-Year Plan in 1951, which envisaged the transfe r o f some 650,000 people
from  the ru ra l areas, beginning w ith  the landless agrarian workers and fo llowed
by the land-owning peasantry. This is confirm ed by looking at the reduction in
the number o f holdings o f or ga in fu lly  employed in p riva te  agricu ltu re  in 1951-
1952, which, fo r the single year, was tw ice  as great as in the previous tw o years.
During the four years a to ta l o f 363,500 producers moved from  agricu ltu re  to ,
mainly, industria l locations, the m a jo rity  o f which occurred during the last tw o 
(249)years. Some such m igration was needed in Hungary to  syphon o ff  the
surplus agrarian population, but th is ra te  was excessive.
The trend in ’land-o ffe rs ’ by the working peasants can be seen in Table 
8.8:<250)
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Table 8.8: Land 'Offers1 by working peasants
Time Number o f holdings o ffe red Area in cad. yokes
2nd ha lf o f 1949 1 ,0 0 0 1 1 ,0 0 0
2nd ha lf o f 1950 13,700 70,000
2nd ha lf o f 1951 16,200 91,000
2nd ha lf o f 1952 34,000 163,000
1st quarte r o f 1953 2,700 15,000
Tota l 6 8 ,0 0 0 350,000
^  £ > u v C e ,  '« ^  ^
By early 1953 tak ing  the 'amphibious' workers (ke tla k i) and working peasants 
together a to ta l o f 134,300 had 'o ffe red ' nearly 650,000 cad. yokes. I t  can also 
be seen from  the above table tha t while the peak o f the 'o ffe rs ' made by the 
kulaks and w ea lth ie r peasants was in 1951, the o ffe rs  made by the working 
peasants continued to  increase in 1952, when almost ha lf o f the to ta l 'o ffe rs ’ 
were made.
The programme o f land reorganisation and commassation, in add ition to  
the growing economic burdens and p o lit ica l pressures, was a major in fluence on 
the flow  o f these 'o ffe rs '. From the regime's point o f view, however, the rapid 
increase in 'land-o ffe rs ' also had undesirable results, apparently unforeseen by 
the government. So whereas the communist leadership had campaigned ea rlie r 
to  break the power o f the 'ru ra l cap ita lis ts ', to  release land fo r the co llectives, 
and welcomed the flow  o f 'land-offe rs ' to  the state w ith  great enthusiasm, now 
the leadership suddenly realised w ith  dismay th a t many o f these 'land-o ffe rs ' and 
the mass exodus from  the land represented an 'undesirable and unhealthy process' 
in as much as i t  com plete ly shattered the peasant's attachm ent to  land and 
ruined a s ign ifican t share o f trad ition a l production capacity o f peasant farm ing. 
I t  soon became clear tha t much of the land on 'o ffe r ' to  the state could not, in
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fa c t, be absorbed p ro fita b ly  by the socialised sector, i.e., by e ithe r the 
C o llec tive  or State Farms. As a consequence, much o f the land had to  go in to 
the 'S tate Land Reserve Fund, where i t  remained, fo r  shorter or longer periods, 
uncu ltiva ted . From the po in t o f view o f cu ltiva tion  the s itua tion  was greatly  
com plicated by the fa c t tha t these 'reserve land areas' did not grow gradually but 
in 'waves', coincid ing w ith  the peaks o f co llec tiv isa tion  and commassations. In 
1952 the 'State Reserve Lands' suddenly increased from  350,000 cad. yokes, in 
January, to  820,000 cad. yokes by the end o f the y e a r . ^ ^  In the second ha lf o f 
1952 alone more than 400,000 cad. yokes was abandoned and consequently in
/ o r o \
certa in  industria l areas, agricu ltu re  became to ta lly  depopulated. By 1953,
the 'State Reserve Lands' area reached 10 per cent o f the to ta l arable land o f the
f n  c o \
country. Much o f this abandoned land became waste land. The 'land o ffers ', 
en masse, created almost insoluble problems fo r  the state, in respect o f the 
con tro l o f production and land use. This, in a sense, is confirm ed by a statem ent, 
ind ica ting  the nature o f the growing problem. Thus,
only at the beginning could the large-scale socia list 
production units make use o f the land reserve areas. La ter, 
because the pre-conditions fo r  large-scale farm ing were 
lacking -  p rim arily  because o f the low leve l o f mechanisation, 
investm ent and labour shortages -  the reserve lands could 
only be used and cu ltiva ted , in tensively, to  a very small
ex ten t.(254)
The problem, however, was not so much the question o f 'intensive cu ltiva to n ' but 
how land u tilisa tio n  could be secured at a ll. In rea lity , some o f the lands 
confiscated even from  kulaks were not fu lly  used. Now, w ith  the repeated land 
reorganisations and commassations the problem became considerably more 
acute. In 1952, fo r example, one th ird  o f the to ta l 'land o ffe rs ' fo r  the whole 
year was taken over by the state at the tim e  o f the summer commassations. 
While a large proportion o f the land given 'in  exchange' was 'o ffe red ' or sim ply
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(255)abandoned im m edia te ly a fte r  the commassation. Thus the most im portant
fa c to r o f production, land, became a burden fo r  both: i t  was a burden fo r  those 
who le f t  i t  and i t  became, essentially, useless fo r  the socia list sector, where the 
goal was to  establish large-scale farm ing by the very action o f repeated pa rtia l 
or general commassations. Since the ’sta te reserve lands’ were beyond the
/ n r e \
socialised sector’s u tilisa tio n  capacity, these lands became superfluous.
Thus, while in ea rlie r years the main problem was lack o f land fo r  the socia list 
sector, now the main problem was a land-g lu t. Ever since co llec tiv isa tion  began 
the regime, using every means o f pressure available, forced the peasants to 
'o ffe r ' th e ir  land to  the state. I t  took land away from  the kulaks, the 
'amphibious' worker-peasants, the ra ilw ay men and workers who were born in the 
villages. W ith in a few  years, under the guise o f 'land-offe rs ' the regime managed 
to  amass some 2 m illion  cad. yokes o f agricu ltua l land, and then i t  did not know 
what to  do w ith  it .  By 1953 an estimated 3 to  3.5 m illion  cad. yokes o f land was
/ O C I 7 \
abandoned, w ithou t owners in the country. This was the same, i f  not more, 
than the amount o f land red istribu ted under the Land Reform  o f 1945. While 
a fte r  the land re fo rm  the peasants' attachm ent to  land was strong, by 1952 they 
were glad to  get rid  o f it .  And what was even more disturbing from  the regime's 
point o f view was tha t soon even collectives began to  'o ffe r ' land to  the state, 
and members too began to  leave the co llectives w ithout permission, to  jo in  the 
flow  o f independent working peasants out o f agricu lture .
In sum, tak ing  co llec tiv isa tion  as a whole, i t  was not surprising tha t 
under these circumstances: (i) despite great e ffo rts  by the regime the num erical 
expansion o f co llec tiv isa tion , f irs t,  slowed down, then stagnated and fin a lly , 
between March and June 1953, when the number o f new entrants no longer 
matched the number leaving the co llectives, began to  decline and fu rth e r 
co llec tiv isa tion  became imposible, (ii) because o f the large ag ricu ltu ra l areas 
tha t were le f t  fa llow , the low returns o f co llectives and the re s tr ic tio n  and
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harassment o f the individual farm ers, whose p roduc tiv ity  began to  decline, the 
ag ricu ltu ra l production index dropped to  a dangerously low level. These aspects, 
together w ith  the role the State Farms and Machine T racto r Stations played in 
the co llec tiv isa tion  process, w ill be discussed below.
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8.3 Stagnation, decline and collapse, January-June 1953
The la te  autumn o f 1952 witnesses the beginning o f a new, i f  b rie f, stage 
in the process o f co llec tiv isa tion . By then, as a result o f rap id ly  mounting in tra ­
co llec tive  problems the fu rth e r extension o f co llec tiv isa tion  became, in practice, 
impossible. The fa ilu re  o f the ag ricu ltu ra l policies pursued by the regime, 
especially a fte r February 1951, the kulak persecution, the coercion o f working 
peasants, the incompetent management in collectives, the compulsory de livery 
quotas - combined w ith  the e ffec ts  o f the bad ag ricu ltu ra l year o f 1952 - a ll 
unavoidably pushed the country towards disaster, both human and economic. As 
the agricu ltu ra l output had declined and economic burdens on a ll s tra ta  o f the 
peasantry had increased, incomes in the co llectives continued to  decline rapid ly, 
to  reach a level where an increasing number o f co llectives could no longer 
guarantee even a meagre live lihood fo r th e ir members. The reduction in 
ag ricu ltu ra l production, a consequence o f co llec tiv isa tion , as w e ll as o f bad 
weather, also became an obstacle to  fu rthe r co llec tiv isa tion . Despite th is, the 
leadership, paying no a tten tion  to  the fa c t tha t even the harshest methods would 
fa il to  produce fu rth e r results, continued w ithu t respite between the autumn o f 
1952 and the spring o f 1953 to  fo rce  the num erical, extension o f co llectives, 
re ly ing  exclusively on te rro r  and compulsion. What had been achieved up to  then 
was apparently considered by the regime to  be on the whole a qua lified  success, 
ju s tify in g  the forced continuation o f co llec tiv isa tion . This is confirm ed by the 
fa c t tha t the regime planned to increase the ra te  o f growth o f co llec tiv isa tion  by
/ o c o \
a fu rth e r 30 per cent during 1953. This, however, was not to  be.
During these months the number o f co llectives unable to  pay the 'labour- 
day' dividends earned by th e ir  members had grown rapid ly. C o llectives, re ly ing  
on government credits, had moved fu rth e r and fu rth e r in to  debt. Mounting 
debts, low incomes or losses, and increasing discontent among members, qu ick ly
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led to  a process o f ferm ent and d is in tegration w ith in  the cooperative movement.
Members, in many places, spontaneously dissolved and/or sim ply le f t  the
econom ically weak collectives. Dissolutions continued despite the proclam ation
o f a new, more severe, law which was passed to  prevent 'fluc tua tions ’ in
membership. Accord ingly, members deciding to  leave the co llec tive  could not
(259)w ithdraw  th e ir assets fo r three years. In it ia lly , the leadership continued to
argue, in an extensive propaganda campaign, tha t the underlying causes fo r  the
basic weaknesses o f many co llectives were slack labour discipline,
underdeveloped in te rna l organisation o f work and the weak leadership preva iling
in many co llectives. I f  these were overcome, the leadership appealed, then
the resultant process o f consolidation o f the cooperative movement would lead
to  a greatly  improved m ateria l l i fe  fo r  a ll o f its  members. The 'appeal' evidently
made l i t t le  impression e ither on the number o f members leaving the co llectives
or on the growing number o f co llectives d r if in g  towards a state o f bankruptcy
and subsequent dissolution. In an a ttem pt to  slow down th is  spontaneous
dissolution process, which c learly  worried the regime, the government passed a
financ ia l b ill in December 1952 which allocated 350 m illion  Forin ts subsidy to
loss-making co llectives, 54 m illion  Forin ts o f which went d ire c tly  in to  payments
(261)o f 'labour-day' dividends earned by members. The b ill also rescheduled
existing loans o f co llectives. This enabled the regime to  slow down but not to 
stop the dissolution process. This was evidenced by the continued 'land-o ffe rs ' 
made by collectives.
The scattered in form ation available, and the lack o f monthly figures, do 
not pe rm it a precise fo rm ula tion  on the scale o f f lig h t o f members and 
dissolutions. O ff ic ia l Hungarian sources give the number o f co llectives and the 
size o f th e ir membership as 5110 and 369,203 and 5224 and 376,088 at the end o f 
1952 and in June 1953 respectively. The figures are given, in both instances as 
the net balance o f new recru its  less members leaving the co llectives. But,
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curiously, on 15th December 1952, Rakosi delivered an address to  the National 
Assembly on the pace o f co llec tiv isa tion  in the country in which, as an in te rim  
figure , he gave the to ta l number o f members as 4 4 6 ,9 0 0 .^ ^  Undoubtedly, 
during the fo llow ing  months forced co llec tiv isa tion  continued and the number o f 
co llectives and th e ir membership increased. As a result, i t  is reasonable to 
assume tha t a co llec tiv isa tion  peak was reached sometime during the beginning 
o f 1953. During th is tim e  the re la tive  growth ra te  o f co llectives continued to  
decline to  reach a point where the number o f people leaving the co llectives just 
matched the number o f new recru its . A fte r  a b r ie f spell o f stagnation an
/ o c o \
absolute decline in co llec tiv isa tion  set in from  M arch /A pril to  June 1953, 
when increasing peasant resistance and withdrawals from  co llectives reduced the 
number o f new recru its  below the number o f peasants leaving the co llectives. A t 
tha t point a ll ra tiona le fo r  num erica lly increasing co llec tiv isa tion  was lost. A t 
its  peak, i t  would seem, the number o f co llectives was 5315, or more, w ith  an 
active membership o f approxim ately 500,000 to 5 1 5 ,0 0 0 .^ ^  The rea l decline 
must be measured from  these figures. I t  must be remembered, however, tha t 
peasants had always le f t  the co llectives. Bu this had begun to  happen on a la rger 
scale during 1952, especially in the la tte r  part o f the year, and the f ir s t  few  
months o f 1953, when approxim ate ly 10,000 to  15,000 members le f t  the 
co llectives every tw o to  three months, and went to  urban industria l 
occupations. More than 100,000 people le f t  the co llectives up to  the middle 
o f June 1953. Those who le ft  were, in the main, landless and young fa m ily  
members. Heads o f fam ilies, on the whole, tended to  remain in the co llectives. 
Many fam ilies, so to  speak, 'kept two irons in the f ire ',  some fa m ily  members 
remained in the co llective , others le f t  fo r  work in industry. This can be seen by 
looking at the development o f members per 100  fam ilies:
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1 December 1950 155 members/100 fam ilies 5.2 cad.yokes/member
31 December 1951 155 members/100 fam ilies  4.7 cad. yokes/member
31 December 1952 131 members/100 fam ilies 5.9 cad. yokes/member
30 June 1953 128 members/100 fam ilies 6.3 cad. yokes/member
The re la tive  decline in the number o f members increased the area to  be 
cu ltiva ted  per member. Moreover, in 13 per cent o f co llectives the area o f land 
per member reached 13 cad. yokes .^® ^
The National Production Conference, convened by the Council of 
M inisters, on 23rd-24th February, 1953, c learly  marked the defeat o f the Party's 
ag ricu ltu ra l po licy. The conference was attended by leaders and top workers in 
State and C o llective  farm s and Machine T racto r Stations, working peasants, w ith  
good production records, leaders o f responsible ag ricu ltu ra l agencies and experts 
in a g r o n o m y . ( 2 6 9 )  <phe fa c t tha t, in addition to  the above lis t, six m inisters were 
present gave special im portance to  the meeting. These included Ferenc Erdei, 
M in iste r o f A g ricu ltu re , Andras Hegediis, M in ister o f State Farms and Forests, 
both o f whom were sharply c ritic ised  by the main speaker at the Conference, 
Imre Nagy, now Deputy Prime M in ister and fo rm e rly  M in iste r fo r  Crop 
C o llection (u n til 16th November 1952), who had apparently taken over the 
d irec tion  o f ag ricu ltu ra l policy in the Politbureau and whose re tu rn  may already 
have meant a ta c it  recognition o f the fa ilu re  o f the ag ricu ltu ra l po licy o f Rakosi. 
In his address to  the Conference, Nagy said tha t,
as a result o f the unusually bad weather conditions th is 
spring, and the blunders o f responsible elements, we must 
face exceptionally great problems in our agricu ltu re . I t  is a 
well-known fa c t tha t the la te  spring fros t, fo llowed by 
drought, caused serious damage to  our crop, which made 
its e lf fe lt  as a food shortage and as an adverse fa c to r in 
production ... the new year also began discouragingly w ith
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excessive ra in  fa ll.  This s itua tion  was aggravated by 
negligence and mistakes com m itted by leading ag ricu ltu ra l 
agencies, the M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re  and the M in is try  o f 
State Farms and Forests, as w e ll as organisations responsible 
to  these M inistries.(270)
In summarising the errors, Nagy concluded by saying that,
one o f the gravest mistakes was the delay in autumn 
ploughing. The other, equally grave error, was the delay in 
autumn sowing. The situation was fu rth e r aggravated by the 
fa c t tha t unreliable reports were subm itted, deceiving the 
government. This increases the gu ilt o f the leading 
personalities in ag ricu ltu ra l m a tte rs .^ 71)
Thus, the com bination o f bad weather, governmental mishandling o f agricu lture ,
the s ilent resistance o f the individual peasantry and the great m a jo rity  of
peasants in the co llectives, sabotaging and slowing down co llec tive  work, to
which they had subscribed only under great pressure, brought about an
agricu ltu ra l crisis in Hungary. The struggle which, in the f ir s t  instance was
fought between the state and ind iv idual peasants, attached to  th e ir
smallholdings, was now fought w ith in  the co llectives themselves. I t  is, o f course,
extrem ely d if f ic u lt  to  measure peasants' resistance as a social fo rce . I t  can
show its e lf in many form s and disguises, both in open revo lt and passive
resistance. This is, perhaps, because peasant fee ling ra re ly  expresses its e lf in an
organised form , but more commonly in ind iv idual economic acts, e.g., by ceasing
to  invest in th e ir farms, reducing production and marketing, reducing the qua lity
o f th e ir  work, slowing down or even sabotaging th e ir work, reluctance to  use the
necessary amount o f fe r t il iz e r  on th e ir  land, etc., etc. In modern history,
governments have found i t  d if f ic u lt  to  e lic it  fana tica l lo ya lty  from  the peasant,
whether in East or West; at best he is obedient. Rarely are peasants drawn in to
(272)organised revo lu tionary movements. Hence the awakening peasant feelings, 
expressed in demonstrations in Hungary, as w ill be shown, were witness to  the
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extrem ely bad circumstances there. I t  has been shown in the foregoing, tha t 
since 1948 the HWP had been engaged in an open struggle to  co llectiv ise  
agricu lture . Its unwillingness or, perhaps, more accurate ly, in a b ility  to  roo t-ou t 
the individual fa rm er as ruth lessly as Stalin did in the Soviet Union had been one 
o f the key weaknesses in its  ag ricu ltu ra l policy. The other fa ta l m istake the 
Party had made was th a t i t  allowed the rapid increase in liv in g  standards 
between 1946 and 1949, arousing higher expectations. There were, o f course, 
other reasons too fo r its  fa ilu re . The low p r io r ity  given to  agricu lture  by the 
government, its  subordination to  the excessive industria lisation programme and 
the f lig h t o f labour, a ttrac ted  by the expanding industry, le f t  the countryside 
deprived o f resources. In addition to  the geographical (w ith  its  vastness), 
h is to rica l (e.g., the Russian peasants were perhaps more submissive than th e ir 
Hungarian counterparts and had some tra d itio n  in co llec tive  farm ing), and 
population density d ifferences tha t existed between the Soviet Union and 
Hungary, these factors, perhaps, explain why the HWP could not successfully 
emulate the Soviet example.
Imre Nagy also revealed at the Conference th a t the 1953 crop would 
again be poor, since i t  was seriously threatened, among other things, by a grave 
seed shortage. Because o f the continued insistence by the regime on forced 
deliveries etc., w ithout regard to  the disastrous crop s ituation, seed stores were 
so seriously depleted tha t the government was forced to  pass a decree, in 
January 1953, to  the e ffe c t tha t both individual and co llec tive  farm ers had to  
secure th e ir  own seed:
ag ricu ltu ra l cooperatives and individual farm ers must obain
th e ir  own seed fo r s o w i n g . ( 2 7 3 )
This measure, however, had proved to  be unsuccessful and Imre Nagy revealed at 
the Conference tha t seeds fo r spring sowing had to  be supplied by the Soviet 
Union. Thus,
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our government was successful in obtaining the necessary 
seed fo r  spring sowing from  the Soviet U n i o n J 2 7 4 )
This ’aid1 was provided 'in exchange fo r o ther products' and Hungarian farm ers 
were deprived o f th e ir reserves o f o il and fib re  plants.
By early 1953 the tax and forced de live ry backlog was so great tha t i t  
proved impossible to  fu l f i l  i t .  Chronic shortages existed in the towns and in the 
countryside, which had been swept bare by forced deliveries. Conditions there 
were such tha t the peasants themselves were nearly starving. In an a ttem pt to  
a llev ia te  the urban s ituation, in A p ril 1953 the Council o f M inisters decreed tha t 
those peasants who fu l f i l  deliveries fo r the f ir s t  ha lf o f the year by 30 June were
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to  be exempled from  payment o f the previous year's tax debts. Moreover,
confronted w ith  the s ituation in which farm ers continued to  'o ffe r ' th e ir land at a 
tim e when there was no one to  cu ltiva te  it ,  the regime declared through the 
Council o f M inisters that,
those individual farm ers who leave th e ir  land and do not 
perform  a ll the necessary ag ricu ltu ra l tasks must be punished
by up to  three years i m p r i s o n m e n t . ( ^ 7 6 )
And when th is proved ine ffec tive  the Council o f M inisters went s t i l l  fu rth e r and
adopted a resolution on 5th March 1953 according to  which p riva te ly  owned land
could not be o ffe red  to  the state, and the state refused to  take over the land,
( 2 7 7 )u n til 1st September 1953. W ith th is  measure the co lle c tiv isa tion
programme pursued by the Rakosi regime between 1949 and 1953 was, in e ffe c t, 
brought to  a tem porary ha lt. This, o f course, was by no means a change in 
policy, at best i t  was a change of tactics , forced upon the regime by the rap id ly  
de te rio ra ting  general economic s ituation in the country; everyth ing was ge tting  
out o f hand.
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This happened at the very moment when Stalin died. His passing from  
the scene brought about a tu rm o il in the Hungarian p o lit ica l system tha t went 
deeper, perhaps, than in some other East European countries. W hilst Rakosi's 
p o lit ic a l position at th is tim e  appeared to  be unshakable, the appearance o f 
strength and s ta b ility  o f his regim e, however, was somewhat deceptive. In tra ­
party  dissent over policies had been suecessfuly silenced by Rakosi and while 
Stalin was alive the disagreements tha t undoubtedly remained w ith in  the top 
party  leadership could not surface and a ffe c t the s ta b ility  o f the regim e. Stalin's 
death on 5th March 1953 disturbed this 'id y llic ' s ituation and opened the way to  
change. Stalin's successors introduced changes in the existing power s tructure  by 
separating Party and Government positions and in Hungary too, on Soviet 
demand, Rakosi's c e n tra lis ts , one-man rule was to  be replaced by a 'dual­
leadership'. This, unw itting ly , reopened the old unsettled po licy  issues, perhaps 
even personality problems, w ithout, as w ill be seen, a llow ing them to  be resolved 
fu lly  on a new basis.
I t  is im portant to  note tha t, even before Stalin's death, Moscow was 
fa ir ly  dissatisfied w ith  the way Rakosi was running Hungary’s economic a ffa irs . 
The leadership in Moscow was aware o f the crisis s ituation in Hungary, from  
reports subm itted by the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, and was becoming v is ib ly 
more and more im patient w ith  Rakosi. This is indicated by the harsh c ritic ism  
Nagy was 'allowed' to  de liver at the Conference in February, p rio r to  Stalin's 
death, on the economy as a whole and, especially, on ag ricu ltu ra l policies. The 
economic and social s ituation in Hungary and the general distress, in the spring 
a fte r Stalin's death, had become so acute as to  cause great concern in the Soviet 
Union, and i t  also rekindled past disagreements over po licy even w ith in  the 
leadership o f the HWP. I t  was, o f course, by now clear to  everyone th a t Rakosi's 
over-am bitious industria lisation programme and his disastrous a g ricu ltu ra l po licy 
had ruined the country's economic life . Industria l unrest, resu lting  in strikes in a
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number o f industria l centres, as w e ll as spontaneous mass peasant
demonstrations, because o f Government exactions, especially on the Great Plan
(278)and 'Viharsarok' (Stormy-Corner), the country's granary, were the most
v isib le signs o f growing popular discontent in the country. This s itua tion  may not
have presented a th rea t to  the party's rule, but i t  must have made the Russian
leaders, grappling w ith  the problem o f succession, very apprehensive. The
g rav ity  o f the cris is must also have impressed the Soviet delegation which
arrived in Hungary in A p ril 1953 to  survey and report on the s ituation.
S ignficantly, on 15th A p ril, 1953 Malenkov had already advised the East German
regime to  adopt an NEP-like 'New Course', m itiga tin g  the rigours o f forced
(279)co llec tiv isa tion , in order to  end the acute economic crisis there. Since the
same applied to  Hungary, s im ila r instructions were given by Malenkov to  Rakosi,
in early May 1953, to  take remedial measures to  avert a complete economic
collapse, and, in keeping w ith  the new orthodoxy o f separating the leadership o f
(280)the party  and government, to appoint a new prim e m inister. But Rakosi
deferred action and, apparently 'unable' to  propose a candidate docile enough to  
take instructions from  him and acceptable to  the Russian leaders, la rge ly  ignored 
the 'requests' and instead o f fo llow ing  the K rem lin  edict fu lly , planned to  embark 
on a new Five Year Plan, tha t pursued the same am bitious goals in 
industria lisation and co llec tiv isa tion  as its  predecessor. His only concession was 
to  acknowledge some o f the mistakes tha t had been made, in the deta ils ra the r 
than the substance o f agricu ltu ra l policy. These can be deduced from  the 
speeches he made during the pre-e lection propaganda campaigns. E lections were 
held in Hungary on 17th May 1953, some six weeks a fte r  Stalin's death. A t a 
mass meeting in the big square in fro n t o f the Parliam ent build ing in Budapest, 
Rakosi, pa inting a 'rosy' p ic ture  o f the s itua tion  in Hugary, cred ited  his 
government w ith  success in launching the build ing o f socialism, the recent 
industria lisation and the new co llec tive  farm ing. A f te r  another such F ive-Y ear 
Plan fo r  which reserves, he said, existed in the country,
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Hungary would surpass much o f the advanced cap ita lis t 
countries in every fie ld  o f activ ity .(281)
These achievements were closely linked, the newspapers said, w ith  the name of 
Rakosi and his name was exto lled throughout the propaganda campaign, the 
length and breadth o f the country. On 17th May, the single lis t o f members to
the National Assembly was approved by the obligatory 98.2 per cent of
«. (282) voters.
On 26th May 1953, Im re Nagy, ris ing rapid ly as the main c r it ic  o f
Rakosi's po licy and spokesman on agricu lture , delivered his inaugural lectu re  at
the 'Hungarian Academy o f Sciences' en titled  'Economic Problems in the People's
Dem ocratic Countries during the Transition from  Capita lism  to 
(283)Communism'. In th is lecture  Nagy expressed his views on socia list economic
development, under spec ifica lly  Hungary conditions. W ith regard to  agricu ltu re
Nagy, w ithout naming names, attacked Rakosi's po licy o f forced co lle c tiv isa tion
and spoke about the significance o f crop co llection  in the people's economy. He
stated tha t during the period o f trans ition  the production o f consumer goods
rested decisively w ith  the independent smallholders and not w ith  the socia list 
(284)sector. Rakosi, in reply, while refusing to  take fu ll responsib ility  fo r  the
fa ilu re  o f his ag ricu ltu ra l policy, in a speech in May went as fa r  as declaring 
tha t,
during the advance towards the consolidation o f farm  units, 
which is inevitable i f  the large-scale organisation o f 
agricu ltu ra l production is to  be achieved, the authorities have 
o ften  lost sight o f the in terest o f the working peasantry. On 
several occasions, during the socialisation o f a v illage, we 
have noticed tha t generally speaking not enough 
consideration was given to  the peasants who worked on th e ir 
own account and who, a fte r a ll, make up the greater part o f 
the ru ra l population.(285)
Rakosi also adm itted that,
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we have made errors in our po licy towards the peasants. The 
organistion o f de live ry  norms is lacking in s im p lic ity  and the 
changes which have been made almost every year prevent the 
working peasantry from  managing th e ir  land w ith  fu ll 
knowledge of the s ituation fo r they are not aware o f th e ir
fu tu re  obligation.(286)
This was a cautious and insubstantive admission regarding the im plem entation o f
po licy details, ra ther than an admission tha t his entire  po licy  w ith  regard to  both
individual and co llec tive  farm ers had ended in fa ilu re . In 1949 Rakosi coined the
slogan 'fo r everyth ing tha t happens in th is country, we communists are 
(287)responsible'. This is, o f course, la rge ly true, w ith  one serious qua lifica tion : 
i t  was the Rakosi-led 'foursome', and th e ir Soviet mentors, who were the most 
responsible. This, however, was s light consolation fo r  the sufferings o f the 
Hungarian people. I t  was indeed tim e  fo r Rakosi and his colleagues to  take fu ll 
responsib ility fo r the consequences o f th e ir policies and allow others, such as 
Imre Nagy, to  take corrective  measures. Had th is responsib ility  been w illin g ly  
and genuinely taken by Rakosi, not only could much fu rth e r su ffe ring  have been 
avoided but so m ight even the uprising in 1956.
The acute tensions tha t had developed throughout Eastern Europe 
demanded urgent rem edial measures from  the Soviet leadership. The ir sense o f 
urgency was increased by the rio ts  in Plzen on 1st June and la te r by the outbreak 
o f open uprising in East Germany on 17th June, 1953. Before the events the new 
Soviet leadership s t il l ,  apparently believed in the possib ility  o f a slow, gradual 
in troduction o f the new po licy line in Hungary. This can be deducted from  the 
preparatory work associated w ith  convening the newly elected National 
Assembly and, also, from  the corrective  measures already introduced, or were 
being introduced, in some other socialist countries. A t the meeting o f the P arty  
Secretaria t, held on 3rd June, 1953, a fte r the discussion o f the item  on the 
agenda 'Convening the National Assembly and the fo rm ation  o f the Government', 
the Secretaria t passed the resolution sta ting  that,
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the level and rate o f investments in the country is so high 
th a t because o f i t  we cannot develop s u ffic ie n tly  those 
branches o f the economy which d ire c tly  serve the increase o f 
liv in g  standards o f the working m a s s e s . ( 2 8 8 )
The Secretaria t thought i t  necessary tha t the Party ’s C entra l C om m ittee,
scheduled to  meet on 15th June (in the event the meeting did not take place),
should ins truc t the National Planning O ffic e  (Orszagos Tervh iva ta l) to  review  its
plans fo r  the coming years, including i f  possible plan year 1953, w ith  a view to
find ing  ways to  s ign ifican tly  increase the quan tity  and qua lity  o f consumer goods
production and the construction o f new housing in order to  improve the standard
of liv in g  o f working people. The resolution also re ferred to  the thorny issue of
separating the posts o f General Secretary o f the Party and Prim e M in is te r on
Soviet lines, and instructions, and recommended, in te resting ly, tha t Rakosi,
(289)holding both posts, should relinquish the f ir s t  while re ta in ing  the second.
While the resolution raised some in te resting  new points its  im portance, however,
should not be overrated. Apart from  certa in  personal and lim ite d  organisational
changes i t  recommended a reduction in the volume o f investments only and said
nothing, at th is stage, about the urgency o f re-assessing the en tire  p o lit ic a l
d irec tion  o f the party.
A fte r  Berlin, however, there was no tim e fo r gradualism, fo r  hesita tion,
fo r p a rtia l solutions. The new Soviet leadership in Moscow was anxious to
prevent s im ila r happenings in Hungary. In view o f the rap id ly  worsening
economic s ituation there and the beginings o f industria l unrest and peasant
demonstrations th is looked a ll too possible. But, whatever the demands o f
dom estic circumstances, the signal fo r  change always came from  the Soviet
(290)Union, and now was no exception. On 13th June, tw o weeks a fte r  the Plzen 
uprising, Rakosi was summoned to  Moscow w ith  the utm ost urgency. He was to ld  
by the Soviet leadership to  bring w ith  him Erno Gero, the only member o f his 
Muscovite 'foursome* (Revai and Farkas were not invited), and, ra the r ominously,
(291)Imre Nagy, as well. In Moscow, during the discussions las ting  two fu ll
(292)days, the Soviet leadership to ld  Rakosi tha t he had brought the Hungarian
economy to  the point o f collapse: he had given no consideration to  Hungary’s
basic resource possibilities and, over a period o f several years, had subjected the
country to  a pace o f industria lisation , especially in heavy industry, th a t nothing
could ju s tify . The once famous agricu lture  o f Hungary, he was accused, had
come to  a standstill. The co llec tiv isa tion  o f agricu ltu re  was carried to
extremes: the re ca lc itran t peasantry was coerced in to  co llectives and class
warfare in the countryside assumed inadmissable characteris tics, and under the
pre text o f liqu ida ting  the kulaks, his regime had introduced a number o f
measures which caused many thousands o f working peasants to  leave the land.
The abandoned farm land, re fe rred  to  in Rakosi's report as 'reserves’, amounted to
10 per cent o f Hungary's arable land. The mistakes in economic policies were,
above all, due to  the fa c t tha t Hungary was governed by a 'c lique ’, the Russian
leaders said, and a 'personality cu lt' had grown up. The mistakes com m itted  by
the Rakosi-led 'foursome' had pushed the country towards a precip ice and unless
radica l changes were introduced the people could, at any moment, rise against 
(293)th e ir  leaders. O f course, both accused and accusers knew very w e ll tha t
neither the excessive industria lisa tion , nor the zealous co llec tiv isa tion , nor the 
persoa lity cu lt, nor the assumption o f both Party and State power, nor the 
com m itm ent o f the series o f ille ga lities  against the people, were spec ifica lly  
Hungarian inventions. A l l these measures were 'approved' or indeed ordered by 
the Soviet Union, even i f  Rakosi was anxious to  'o v e rfu lf il l ' the orders o f his 
master. Why then this reversal in the a ttitudes o f the Soviet leadership? One 
reason, obviously, was Stalin's death and the subsequent succession struggle. But, 
more im portan tly , the drastic  change in Soviet a ttitudes was due to  the events in 
East Germany and Czechoslovakia, which were viewed by the Soviet leadership 
not as isolated cases but as danger signals, since in Hungary too there were
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already w ildca t strikes and peasant demonstrations. The Soviet leadership was 
fu lly  aware tha t these events were not set in m otion by 'im peria lis ts ' or 'fo re ign 
agents', but were sim ply caused by the widespread discontent o f the masses, due 
to  S ta lin ist policies. Also, the armistance in Korea reduced the need fo r  the high 
defence budget and fo r  the excessive Five Year Plan, which had provided fo r  the 
expansion o f m ilita ry  spending. The new Soviet leadership, under th is p o lit ic a l 
c lim ate , had quickly agreed to  a number o f economic and p o lit ic a l changes, not 
only in Hungary but in Eastern Europe as a whole. They ordered a rad ica l 
revision in Hungary's economic plan and demanded a new p o lit ic a l and economic 
course: to  reduce the ra te  o f growth o f industry, strengthen agricu ltu re , 
including g iving increased support to  individual farm ers, and even to  a llow  the 
dissolution o f collectives which had been established by coercion. Rakosi at th is 
point plucked-up enough courage to express some concern over dissolution, but 
M olotov to ld  the Hungarian delegates tha t,
there must be no systematic dissolution o f the co llectives.
But do not restra in  those peasants who are ind ica ting th e ir
desire to  leave. This w ill not cause any harm .(294)
Then the Hungarian delegates were to ld  th a t two men from  Rakosi's 'foursome', 
M ihaly Farkas, M in ister o f Defence, and Jozsef Revai, M in iste r o f C u lture , must 
be replaced and Rakosi h im self must renounce his position as Prime M in ister, but 
tha t he would be allowed to  re ta in  his position as F irs t Secretary o f the HWP, 
thereby g iving him the opportunity to  co rrect his past mistakes. W ith regard to  
Rakosi's successor as Prime M inister, the Soviet leaders proposed Im re Nagy 
since Rakosi 'had been unable to  name his successor' since May, when Malenkov 
asked him. He was proposed by the Soviet leadership, i f  only because fo r  five  
years, since 1948-1949, he had predicted tha t the po licy o f forced 
co llec tiv isa tion  would end in disaster. The HWP leadership had ignored his views
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then and even labelled him an 'opportunist* and expelled him from  the 
Politbureau. But tim e had proved tha t he was righ t. Thus, the Moscow 
discussions made i t  abundantly clear to  the Hungarian leadership tha t there was 
no poss ib ility  fo r pa rtia l solutions, fo r  vague organisational changes, fo r  plan 
m odifications only. But, tha t they had to  introduce a rad ica lly  d iffe re n t, new, 
p o lit ica l and economic course and review th e ir methods o f a c tiv itie s  in p ractice  
and re-define th e ir fu tu re  tasks. Rakosi and a ll members o f the Hungarian 
delegation received the Soviet proposal w ith  silent approval and returned home.
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Chapter 9: The State Sector of Agriculture
9.1 Development and Role o f State Farms in C o llectiv isa tion
A b rie f discussion is necessary to  throw  some ligh t on the partic ipa tion  
o f State Farms and Machine T rac to r Stations in the co llectiv isa ton  process. On 
the pa tte rn  o f Soviet agricu lture, in accordance w ith  S ta lin is t teaching, the 
socialist transform ation o f Hungarian agricu lture , as elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe, did not result in uniform  ag ricu ltu ra l structure . Besides C o llective  
Farms, two other main socialist ag ricu ltu ra l institu tions developed, The State 
Farms (A llam i Gazdasagok) and the network o f State Machine T rac to r Stations 
(A llam i Gepallomasok), both playing an im portan t role in ag ricu ltu ra l production 
and the co llec tiv isa tion  drive.
To establish a viable ag ricu ltu ra l sector capable o f sustaining the 
ambitious e ffo rts  fo r  rapid industria lisa tion outlined in the Five Year Plans, the 
Soviet leaders had to  preserve a number o f incentives, including a free  market, 
which ruled out the im m ediate in troduction o f a fo rm  o f ag ricu ltu ra l 
organisation based exclusively on State farm ing. In term s of communist long- 
range planning, however, i t  is the State Farms, Sovkhozy, which remain, as in the 
past, the prototype o f the Communist P arty ’s ideal in rura l o rg a n is a tio n .^  By 
the tim e the Soviet Union came to  dominate the countries o f Eastern Europe it  
had ample evidence tha t State fa rm ing could not, and should not, im m ediate ly be 
made the prototype o f ag ricu ltu ra l organisation. The regime in Hungary, as 
elsewhere, had to  take in to account the peasant's deep-seated love fo r his land 
and the communist leadership had learned tha t the individual peasants do not 
w illin g ly  become a ru ra l p ro le ta ria t, and tha t i f  th is conversion is forced upon 
them, production suffers disastrously. In term s o f long range planning the 
communist in a b ility  to pass an overa ll land nationalisation law meant tha t State 
Farms could only be created in specific  areas which, on the whole, were not in
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the procession o f small and medium private  farm ers at the tim e  the Party
assumed power in 1948. The role and num erical extent o f State Farms, at that
(2)early, has been discussed earlie r. Up to  1948 the state's in it ia t iv e  in the fie ld  
o f ag ricu ltu ra l exp lo ita tion  remained centered, essentially, in the pre-war sta te- 
owned agricu ltu ra l undertakings. Thus, in 1948 Hungary had 99 State Farms, 
extending over 70,932 cad. yokes, o f which 43,470 cad. yokes were arable land, 
representing appproxim ately 0.4 per cent o f the country's arable land; the rest 
was pasture, vineyards, forests and land used fo r other purposes. Hence, up to 
the beginning o f 1949 the state played a ra ther lim ite d  role in agricu lture .
Paralle l w ith  the drive fo r co llec tiv isa tion  there began a drive fo r rapid
extension o f the area o f ag ricu ltu ra l land held by the State. This was closely
corre lated w ith  the overa ll po litics  o f agricu lture : f irs t  the res tr ic tio n , then the
liqu ida tion  o f kulak holdings, the neglect o f security o f ag ricu ltu ra l production
on individual farms and the emergency created by the rapid ly increasing 'State
Reserve Lands' area through growing 'land-offe rs ' due to  the forced tempo of
co llec tiv isa tion . State Farms were seen by the regime as im portan t facto rs  in
the creation o f the 'socia list base’ in the reorganisation o f agricu ltu re . Rakosi
defined th e ir role as 'acting  like  an engine pulling the whole o f socialist
(3)agricu ltu re  ... the forw ard bastions o f the state in the villages.' The various
tasks which the Party leadership assigned to  the State Farms can be grouped,
(4)essentially, under three main headings:
(i) to  become highly e ffic ie n t, mechanised large-scale 
production enterprises con tribu ting  to  the nation's food 
production and supply and helping to  overcome the 
in it ia l d iff ic u ltie s , which m ight arise, during the period 
o f trans ition  in agricu lture , i.e., to  secure some 
minimum am oun t^F ag ricu ltu ra l output fo r  the state, in 
case o f d iff ic u ltie s .
(ii) to  become exemplary model farms, capable o f supplying 
agricu lture as a whole w ith  h igh-quality  seed and 
pedigree livestock and to  share w ith  agricu ltu re  some 
of the ir equipment.
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( iii)  last, but not least, to  become school o f modern large- 
scale farm ing, to  teach the co llectives the management 
methods o f socialist large-scale fa rm ing and to  
demonstrate the individual working farm ers the 
superio rity  o f large-scale over small peasant farm ing, 
thereby, helping to convert them to  communal farm ing.
As w ill be shown, the State Farms did not succeed in accomplishing any o f these 
tasks w ith in  the period under consideration, and the hopes placed in them by the 
leadership were disappointed. Some o f the reasons fo r th is were outside the 
farm s' contro l
The new era fo r  the State Farms opened on 1st January 1949, when the
'Supreme Economic Counncil' (Gazdasagi Fotanacs), which had pressed fo r the
regularisation o f th e ir position since 1947, set-up the 'State A g ricu ltu ra l Centre '
(A llam i Mezogazdasagi Kozpont), entrusted w ith  the task o f organising the old
State holdings and the scattered lands already in the hands o f the state in to
(5)proper state enterprises. Under the management o f th is  new in s titu tio n , from  
the beginning o f the year, the acreage o f state holdings expanded rapid ly - 
ch ie fly , as discussed earlie r, due to the e ffec ts  on the peasants o f the system of 
compulsory deliveries and the associated adm in is tra tive  measures - and State 
Farms were form ed in numbers. By the end o f 1949 State Farms accounted fo r  
three tim es more arable land than in 1949 and represented approxim ate ly 1.2 per 
cent o f arable land in the country. La ter, some tim e in 1950, a ll State Farms 
came under the management o f the M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re , whose con tro l over 
individual farm s was put in to e ffe c t through a line o f supervision reaching from  
its  'C h ie f Departm ent' (A llam i Gazdasagok Foigazgatosaga) level down through a 
highly organised adm in istra tive  machine in charge o f farm  management, the 
structures o f which were altered frequently. The whole set up was patterned on 
the methods o f con tro l exercised over industria l enterprises. The managers, 
ch ief accountants and agronomists were appointed by the centra l government 
and were c iv il servants. Work was organised at the level o f brigades, w ith  farm
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labourers being wage earners paid by the state. In term s o f p o lit ic a l contro l o f 
the countryside, one 'sovkhoz' was regarded as worth much more than one 
'kolkhoz'. Whereas the party had to  'in f i lt ra te ' the co llec tive  by try in g  to place 
party men in key adm in in is tra tive  and supervisory posts, and while the whole 
co llective  fa rm  structure  necessitated establishing state machinery centres and 
organs o f p o lit ica l contro l and dom ination, the sovkhoz, as a state creation could 
be fashioned from  top to  bottom  in accordance w ith  the party's needs. The 
essential d iffe rence lay in the fa c t tha t in fo rm ing co llectives the communists 
had to  deal w ith  what already existed: they had to  handle a group o f fo rm erly  
independent farm ers who, almost by de fin ition , were opposed to  the party's aim. 
With State Farms, on the other hand, there was no such d iff ic u lty . They can be 
sta ffed w ith  people o f the regime's choice and these state employees can be 
dismissed.
Most o f the land expropriated from  kulaks and re ca lc itra n t peasants, 
land previously p riva te ly  owned by riche r peasants -  whom the regime had made 
bankrupt - 'State Reserve Lands', o ffe red  or simply abandoned by sm all and 
medium peasants, and fa llow  land put under cu ltiva tion , went to  increase the 
holdings o f the state. In general, sm all and medium priva te  farm s were not 
d ire c tly  converted in to State Farms. A fte r  the beginning o f the second phase o f 
co llectiv isa tion , from  1949 to  1953, but especially during 1951 and 1952, at the 
tim e of mass 'o ffe r ' o f land to the state, much land came under state 
management and was allocated to  the State Farms already established. Many o f 
these were s t i l l  operating under great d iff ic u lt ie s  and could not, in fa c t, take a ll 
the land 'o ffe red ' and/or available in state reserves, under th e ir management.
(C\
The num erical development o f State farm s is indicated in the in Table 9.1
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Table 9.1: Development of State Farms between 1949 and 1955
Time
mid-year
arable land area 
in 1 0 0 0 s o f cad. yokes
as percentage of 
o f to ta l arable land
1949 113.2 1.2
1950 462.7 4.8
1951 684.5 7.1
1952 1049.8 10.9
1953 1300.0 13.6
1954 1257.1 13.3
1955 1228.7 13.1
As can be seen from  the above table, in term s o f acreage State Farms were
essentially set-up between the years 1949 and 1953. The ir arable land area at
the ir peak in the middle o f 1953 was 1.3 m illion  cad. yokes, a figure  which, in
fac t, had exceeded the ta rge t called fo r by the F ive-Year Plan. On th is area,
which was 13.6 per cent o f the country ’s arable land, 489 State Farms 
(7)operated. Their number decreased la te r, because o f mergers, to  466 at the
end o f 1956, but th e ir acreage essentially remained unchanged.
The State Farms in Hungary met w ith  the greatest o f d iff ic u lt ie s  from
the very outset. The rapid increase in th e ir  land area was, f ir s t  o f a ll, not
accompanied by an increase in other facto rs  o f production. Indeed, fo r a number
o f years, even the ir land area was unsuitable fo r ra tiona l large-scale ag ricu ltu ra l
production and farm  management. The reason fo r th is, in te r a lia , was the
scattered, strip , nature and, in the early years, frequently  poor q ua lity  o f the ir
land. Later, as more and more land was ’o ffe red ’ the state, State Farms had the
opportunity to  choose among the land tha t became available and they tended to
keep the be tte r qua lity  land and were frequently  able to  exchange low fo r  high 
(8)qua lity  land. For example, in 1950-1951, 20 per cent o f State Farms operated
(9)on land which was in more than 50 separate parcels. The remedy fo r th is, as 
in the case o f collectives and individual farms, was in repeated p a rtia l or general
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land reorganisations or commassations. Between 1950 and 1954 there were four 
s ign ifican t commssations. As a result, the average size o f parcels increased 
from  47 to  197 cad. yokes. But even a fte r th is almost 40 per cent o f parcels 
were s t i l l  less than 10 cad. yokes. In 1953 the to ta l land area o f the 489 State 
Farms was 8,600 p a rc e ls .^ ^  I t  must, however, be noted tha t commassations 
were p rim a rily  carried out to  sa tis fy  the in terests o f the co llectives and land was 
o ften  'commassed away* from  State Farms by zelous local o ffic ia ls  in villages 
where the in terest o f the co llec tive  demanded it .  The neglect o f the in terests o f 
State Farms, in favour o f collectives, aroused many complaints and in the 
autumn o f 1952 State Farms were given the 'r igh t o f veto ' in a ll cases o f 
commassation, which enabled them to  defend th e ir own in terests more 
e f fe c t iv e ly .^ ^  The number and type o f farm s, by social sector, and the area o f 
th e ir land a ffected  by commassations and land reorganisations between 1949 and 
1955 is shown in Table 9.2.^^^
The number of farms and total land area affected by commassations and 
land reorganisations between 1949 and 1955
Type of farm
number o f farms 
a ffected  by
pa rtia l general 
commassations
Tota l 
number o f 
farm s
Tota l area a ffec ted  
by commassations in 
in 1 0 0 0 s o f 
cad. yokes
State Farms 1.438 581 2019 1,732.2
C o llective  Farms 4.181 3023 7204 3,420.8
Individual Farms 390,835 153,682 544,517 1,690.4
c, crsixvG? • . I ^ g
During the period many complaints were raised against the ine ffic ienc ies
o f State Farms. The causes o f th e ir shortcomings were many and varied. L ike
the collectives, they too were plagued w ith  permanent shortages o f labour,
especially at high seasons, lack o f labour d iscip line and personal com m itm ent -
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much o f which was due to  the inappropriate wage system and lack o f incentives,
low standard o f management -  much o f i t  caused by the lack o f qua lified
personnel; a ll these were frequently  mentioned as the main sources o f th e ir low
(13)level o f p roduc tiv ity  and high costs o f production.
The extreme seasonality was not a new phenomenon. But, w ith  the
w ithdrawal o f labour from  the land owing to  the forced industria lisa tion , and the
decrease in m ob ility , when large estates gave place to  sm all peasant farm ing,
the seasonal peaks became a p a rticu la rly  acute problem, which, o f course,
mechanisation could have helped. While deliveries o f machines lagged behind the
plans - despite the fa c t tha t much came from  the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries, mainly from  the GDR and Czechoslovakia - as can be seen in 
(14)Table 9.3 on p.605. State Farms received a major share o f most o f the 
machines and especially o f heavy machinery. As a result, the average arable 
land area per tra c to r  was 320 cad. yokes, while the national average was 800 
cad. yokes. Moreover, more than 65 per cent o f to ta l universal tra c to rs  worked
(15)
on the land o f State Farms. Even so, what was delivered to  them was
considerably less than they needed and the type o f machinery they receive did
(16)not s ign ifican tly  reduce th e ir acute labour shortage. Then there was the 
problem of labour discipline. Despite the s tr ic t labour code, s tipu la ting  tha t a
(17)
worker could not leave his place o f employment, many did so w ithout
permission or proper reason, even during the period o f greatest seasonal demand. 
Workers who started work la te , or le f t  th e ir place o f work a rb itra r ily , in 
v io la tion  o f th e ir  contract w ith  the state, were gu ilty  o f an o ffence which was 
punishable by a fine  o f up to  3000 Forin ts, which represented about 4 months 
wages fo r a State Farm worker. Offences o f a more serious nature, e.g., staying 
away from  one's place o f work w ithout proper reason was considered to  be a 
crim e punishable by, e.g., 2 years imprisonment. 'Volunteer assistance', 
especially from  1951 onwards, composed o f college and secondary school
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Table 9.3: Deliveries of Farm Machinery between 1949 and 1954
in 1000’s
Plan (1951 version)(a) A ctua l
T ractors 26.1 13.20
T rac to r ploughs 17.3 1 2 .2 0
C ultiva to rs 6 .8 4.90
T rac to r d rills 5.3 4.90
Potato planters 0 . 8 6 0.13(b)
Reaper binders 9.1 3.60
Combine-harvesters 2.6 2 .2 0
(a) the other two version o f the plan did not give d ta ils  
o f deliveries planned
(b) four years, 1949-1953
S  £ ? c x i ) Q g , rw . ^  i
students and industria l workers, went to  State Farms, o ften even on Sundays, to  
pick cotton or generally to  help in ag ricu ltu ra l works. This ’duty', in fa c t, could 
fa ll on anyone, both in town and country, at almost anytim e but p a rticu la rly  
during spring and summer seasons. Even this could not fu lly  o ffse t the labour
v, * (18)shortage.
No wonder, then, tha t the m a jo rity  o f farm ers preferred to  subsist on 
th e ir meager earnings ra ther than enter in to contracts w ith  State Farms. The 
m a jo rity  o f State Farm workers had never owned land. Many o f them belonged 
to  the urban-tained c le rica l and mechanical s ta ff, and a good proportion o f the 
farm  labourers were made up by the persons who were fo rm er tenants, agrarian 
proletarians o f or farm-hands on large estates, now converted in to  State Farms. 
Others had worked fo r the pre-war regime on State property. Also, many people 
employed on State Farms worked there because no a lte rna tive  employment was 
open to  them, e.g., persons who were ordered by the regime to  leave urban
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centres, fo r p o lit ica l and economic reasons, or persons who had spent some tim e 
in concentration camps, used as ’forced labour' or 'freed' on condition tha t they 
jo ined a State Farm. Except fo r  a m ino rity  o f dedicated party men, then, the 
m a jo rity  o f State Farm workers had l i t t le  reason to  fee l the slightest 
attachm ent, e ithe r fo r  the land they worked on or to  the 'boss', in th is case the 
state they worked fo r. I t  was true tha t the 'free  fa rm er' lost much o f his sense 
o f ownership on jo in ing  the co llec tive , even though the land was not nationalised. 
The main d iffe rence in a ttt itu d e  and performance between C o llective  and State 
Farm worker was not exclusively determ ined by the ideological fram ew ork 
underlying the farms' statutes: th e ir reaction, often, was a more im m ediate 
response to  organisational features. Because the State Farm was, essentially, a 
'land-fac to ry ' the worker had no contro l over the disposition o f the fru its  o f his 
labour. S im ila rly , precisely because the co llectives were not yet a ltogether in 
the hands o f the state, the co llec tive  peasant was allowed to  dispose, at least in 
theory, o f part o f his share o f production. In p rac tica l terms this meant tha t the 
co llec tive  peasant had the incentive to  produce as much as possible. The more 
tha t was le ft  at the end o f the year, a fte r the state deliveries, taxes e tc., were 
met, the greater the portion d istribu ted among members fo r sale on the free  
m arket. But because o f the high de livery quotas, discussed earlie r, there was 
o ften  nothing le f t  fo r the free m arket. I f  the co llec tive  member was lazy or 
shirked work in any manner he robbed him self unless, which was o ften  the case, 
he worked instead on his more lucra tive  priva te  household p lot. But, i f  a State 
Farm worker behaved in the same way, the chances were tha t he would cheat the 
state and not h im self. For example, i f  the State Farm worker reported th a t he 
had done a certa in  amount o f work, when in fa c t he had not, the brigade leader 
m ight discover i t  and the worker would then be paid only a percentage o f the 
wage, proportionate to  the percentage o f the norm fu lf il le d . But the brigade 
leader might not discover the cheating, or m ight not want to  know, fo r  i f  his
workers o ve rfu lfille d  th e ir  norms, he was en titled  to a bonus. Very often, 
therefore, the whole State Farm, from  the managers down to  the common farm  
labourers, worked in collusion against the state. This was on top  o f collusion in 
the widespread th e ft from  State Farms, which plagued the regim e fo r  a long 
tim e.
One of the main reasons why State Farm workers did not cooperate w ith  
the state, and displayed slack work d iscipline was undoubtedly the inadequate 
wage system and lack o f incentives. The wage system introduced was, on the 
whole, on s im ila r lines to  industry although, curiously, o f f ic ia l m inimum wage 
rates did not apply. State Farm workers were paid both in money and in kind, 
but m ostly in money. Wages were based on hourly tim e rates and piece rates 
based on the amount o f work done in re la tion  to an in tr ica te  ’categorised norm- 
bonus’ wage system. Since priva te  and co llec tive  farm ers earned much less than 
industria l workers i t  would appear tha t, on the surface, State Farm workers, as 
state employees enjoyed a priv ilaged position. This is true , but only in a lim ite d  
financ ia l sense. The average m onthly pay o f State Farm workers, in Forin ts in 
1950, 1951, 1952 and 1953 was 402, 488, 617 and 714 re s p e c t iv e ly /" ^  Compared 
to  industria l workers, th e ir  earnings, in corresponding years, was only 58.7, 6 6 .6 , 
64.9 and 72.0 per cent r e s p e c t iv e ly /^  Since the incomes o f co llec tive  farm  
members were lower s t il l ,  th is  la rge ly explains why more o f the released 
ag ricu ltu ra l population went to  work in industry than e ither co lle c tive  or State 
Farms. The piece ra te  wage system resulted in work o f lower .quality and 
disproportionate wage varia tion, due to  d ifferences, say, in soil conditions and in 
the ’help’ fo rthcom ing from  the supervisor in evaluating perform ance. An 
evalution based on yields would have been a considerably more re a lis tic  measure 
o f performance and one which would have made the workers finan c ia lly  more 
interested. O ff ic ia l figures on to ta l wages paid to  State Farm workers were, 
often, misleading, i.e., based on highly paid categories and based on the
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assumption tha t norms were fu lf il le d . In actual practice during 1950 and 1951,
norms were set so high tha t few people could keep up w ith  them fo r any length
of tim e and many workers fa iled  to  reach a 100  per cent fu lf ilm e n t o f the norms.
In such cases, workers who fa iled  to  f u l f i l  the da ily  norms due to  th e ir own fa u lt
were paid wages at a percentage corresponding to  the percentage o f fu lf ilm e n t.
During 1952 and 1953 wage-norm adjustments had to  be introduced and, in 1954,
(21)wages had to  be raised s ign ifican tly . Note should, however, be taken o f the
fa c t tha t, as in collectives, State Farm workers had the rig h t to  m aintain the ir
'p riva te  household p lot', and th e ir food and lodgings cost them re la tive ly  l i t t le ,
thus, th e ir rea l wages were, perhaps, not as fa r  below those o f industria l workers
as indicated, but they were, nevertheless, s ig n ifica n tly  lower.
A fu rth e r shortcoming o f State Farms was the shortage o f personnel
qua lified in agrarian m atters. P o litica l considerations played a greater ro le  in
the selection o f managers than in industry. A g ricu ltu ra l specialists who had
worked on large estates before, were as a rule not employed. Local party
o ffic ia ls , on the whole, tended to d iscrim inate  against qua lified persons, looked
upon them w ith  suspicion and very o ften  trea ted  them as enemies, fa ilin g  to  help
them in solving th e ir problems. They o ften  allowed th e ir sm aller or bigger
mistakes to  accumulate and then threatened them w ith  fines and prison. A ll
(22)in it ia t iv e  was thus s tifled . Agronomists, tra ined quickly on short courses by
the regime, w ith  inadequate knowledge, assumed many o f the leading positions.
Frequent com plaints were made tha t the princ ip le  o f 'one-man management'
(egyszemelyi vezetes) fa iled  to  operate in the m a jo rity  o f State Farms because
'cadres' selected, mostly, from  urban tra ined people to  manage the farm s knew
(23)l i t t le  about ag ricu ltu ra l production problems and financ ia l management. Here 
Rakosi invoked Stalin, c la im ing tha t what S talin said in 1931 was va lid  fo r 
Hungary,
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often they ask us, why do we not have one-man management.
There is not and w ill not be u n til they assim ilate the 
techniques, u n til there are enough managers who know the 
techniques, the economic and financ ia l questions o f the fa rm .
U n til then, we shall not have one-m an m anagem ent.(24)
In many instances managers in fa c t le f t  the d irection  o f production to  the Chief 
Agronom ist. In many State Farms the management team contained only a single 
'expert1, the m a jo rity  o f the s ta ff  was merely fa m ilia r w ith  simple adm in is tra tive  
work. In an a ttem pt to improve the s ituation the regime constantly stressed tha t 
the 'r ig h t' kind o f people ought to  be sent to  the State Farms. But the 'r ig h t' 
people were scarce, and the s ituation became worse as the number and area o f 
State Farms expanded, fo r  even good communists were not above robbing the 
state and many were found to  be incompetent tha t even when they were honest, 
th e ir management cost the regime huge amounts o f additional investm ent. The 
M in is try  o f A gricu lture 's  concern w ith  th is state o f a ffa irs  was re fle c ted  in the 
high turnover o f leading positions. The dismissal and replacement o f managers 
and specialists was frequent and system atic. There were State Farms where the 
manager was replaced five  tim es during 1951 and the Chief Agronom ist, together
(25)
w ith  other leaders, such as brigade leaders, four tim es. A l l th is, o f course, 
was hardly conducive to  improved management. Managers, and o ther leading 
personnel, found it  d if f ic u lt ,  under these circumstances, to  run th e ir  farm s 
e ffic ie n tly , since they had barely enough tim e to  fam ilia rise  themselves w ith  the 
problems and requirements o f th e ir jobs. Also, obviously, where the manager 
was replaced frequently  he could not be blamed, in practice , fo r the m istake o f 
his predecessor, not to mention the d if f ic u lty  o f checking a manager's work, 
since by the tim e a 'team of inspectors' had arrived he would be fa r  away in a 
d iffe re n t position.
While communist economic organisations are invariably handicapped by a 
paralyzing amount o f 'red tape', the State Famrs were probably more heavily
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bureaucratised than any other sector in government adm in istra tion. This was so
because the en tire  State Farm structure  rested on the foundation tha t what
could not be obtained through in it ia t iv e  from  below had to  be made up through
centra lisa tion and m inute contro l from  above. Furtherm ore, while th is
phenomenon was common to a ll state-owned and d irected enterprises, State
Farms, like  State Machine T rac to r Stations (SMTS), were in a special category
because of the distance tha t separated them from  urban centres o f party  contro l.
Unlike the SMTS, however, State Farms covered great areas o f land; the average
(26)size o f a State Farm in Hungary, by 1953, was about 4,000-4,500 cad. yokes ,
and they were meant to  be independent and self-contained. State Farms had to
engage in a greater va rie ty  o f functions than were performed in any other rura l
sector. The SMTS attended, in te r a lia , to  the mechanical side o f co llec tive
production, while the collectives attended to  the other aspects o f land
cu ltiva tion ; the State Farms combined a ll these functions, and also had to
pioneer new methods, be tte r crops and improved livestock production. Because
it  was com plete ly under state contro l, a State Farm operated according to
instructions, regulations, decrees, orders, plans and many other types o f paper
d irectives. For each face t o f State Farm a c t iv ity  there was a special series o f
such d irectives. The size o f the adm in istra tive s ta ff on State Farms, therefore ,
was invariab ly out o f a ll proportion to  the number o f people who ac tua lly  worked
the land. And yet, though th e ir o ffices were over-sta ffed, State Farms were
unable to  cope w ith  the paper work, the m ultitude o f d irectives, o ften
contrad ictory, tha t descended upon them from  high echelons, day a fte r  day. This
can be illus tra ted  by a fa ir ly  typ ica l example: December 1951 the C h ief
Agronom ist o f a State Farm revealed tha t they had co llected a ll the c ircu lars
and d irectives received from  higher authorities fo r the year and they came to
(27)more than 6000, though many, he confessed, were lost during the year. State 
Farms were almost lite ra lly  swamped under stacks o f papers, much o f which
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remained un-read, and the more the regime attem pted to  contro l the operation 
o f State Farms, through more and more edicts and repeated organisations o f 
th e ir h iera rch ica l structure, the more perplexed farm  o ffic ia ls  became in try ing  
to  determ ine what they were supposed to  do.
An in tegra l part o f th is  bureaucracy was a com plicated system o f book­
keeping. Everything received, spent, bought and produced, every hour o f the 
work o f every worker, had to  be recorded in m inute de ta il. I f  a worker was 
engaged in ploughing i t  had to  be determ ined whether he had done shallow, deep 
or very deep ploughing, whether he fu lf il le d  or o ve r-fu lfille d  his quota and to 
what extent, and so fo rth . The amount and type o f production, fo r each State 
Farm, was m inutely planned, at least on paper, in higher level adm in is tra tive  
o ffices. The highly developed centra lisation, involving a great amount o f 
detailed planning and bureaucracy, le ft  l i t t le  scope fo r individual in it ia tiv e .
The basic source o f State Farm planning and supervision was the 'C h ie f
Departm ent fo r  State Farms' (A llam i Gazdasagok Foigazgatosaga), w ith in  the
M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re . From there, orders went to  19 'County Centres' (Megyei
Kozpontok), each w ith  about 50-60 permanent s ta ff, supervising, in h ighly
(28)cen tra lis tic  manner, the individual State Farms. This was the adm in is tra tive  
set-up o f State Farm management w ith , o f course, the usual linkage to  the State 
Planning O ffice  and its apex in the c lu tte red  file s  o f urban Party organisations, 
u n til the end o f 1951. By tha t year i t  became clear tha t the State Farms, under 
th is arrangement, had fa iled to  fu l f i l  the tasks the regime had set fo r them , and 
th e ir economic performance was extrem ely disappointing in view o f the not 
inconsiderable funds tha t had been spent on them. C learly, they had fa iled  to  
become the expected 'exemplary model farm s' to  stim ula te  the mass 
movemement o f peasants in to the co llective .
I t  was the extrem ely unfavourable results achieved by State Farms in 
1950 and 1951, generating widespread and sharp c ritic ism , which brought things
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to  a head and paved the way to  s ign ificant changes in the adm in istra tive
structure  and supervision o f State Farms. Rakosi, at the C entra l Com m ittee
Plenum held on 30th November, 1951, revealed some o f the grotesque
ine ffic ienc ies  and anomalies which had grown up over the past tw o years, and in
discussing th e ir poor performance, he stressed tha t the reasons fo r th is  were not
to  be sought, solely, in the ’ob jective, external fac to rs ’ but were p rim a rily  a
re flec tion  o f the poor leadership, adm in istra tion and management exercised over
the State Farms, by the M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re  and its  Chief Departm ent o f
(29)State Farms. The accusations against them were many and varied and the
more im portant points could be summarised as follows:
(i) Lack o f proper planning and supervision; fo r 1951 were 
merely fo rm a l documents, ’on paper', co llec ting  dust, 
amongst other documents in the desks o f o ffic ia ls  and 
o ften could not even be found at the end o f the year, 
resulting in incompetent management and haphazard 
production; e.g., fa ilu re  to  have the sowing plan ready, 
not only by February, but even by A p ril; bad work 
organisation, harvesting and co llection  o f crops too 
la te, w ith  much crop l o s s . ( 3 0 )
(ii) fa ilu re  to  provide assistance to  State Farms in the 
provision o f p o lit ic a lly  and techn ica lly  w e ll tra ined and 
educated 'new cadres'.
( iii)  fa ilu re  to  in it ia te  appropriate measures against slack, 
and deterio ra ting , labour discipline.
(iv) issuing muddled, often, contrad icto ry, d irectives to  
State Farms concerning production tasks, creating 
great and unnecessary confusion among the leadership 
and workers alike.
(v) in the sphere o f personal m atters, irresponsible and fa r 
too frequent removal and replacement o f fa rm  
managers, and fa ilu re  to  keep proper records o f un filled  
posts both in State Farms and County Centres; fa ilu re  
to  appoint 11 D irectors out o f the 19 County Centres.
While the main th rust o f the accusations was d irected against the ag ricu ltu ra l 
adm in istra tive  organs, especially the M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re , the in fluence o f
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’ob jective  facto rs ' a ffec ing  performance, like  the scattered nature o f State Farm 
land, making unified management, adm in istra tion and supervision d if f ic u lt  as 
w e ll as the ine ffic iencies inherent in State Farms, were also acknowledged. The 
M in ister o f A g ricu ltu re  who was castigated was the 'fe llo w -tra ve lle r ' ex-Peasant 
Party leader, Ferenc Erdei.
Follow ing the Plenum's resolution, a Council o f M inisters Decree on 6 th
Janaury 1952 announced a new adm in istra tive  order, which was to  last u n til 4th
July 1953. To make top leadership more responsive to the needs o f production
units, the M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re  was stripped o f its  po licy-m aking and
executive functions over the State Farms. A t the same tim e, a new m in istry ,
w ith  regional subsidiaries, called the 'M in is try  o f State Farms and Forests'
(A lla m i Gazdasagok es Erdok M iniszterium a) was established, headed by Andras
Hegediis, to  provide more d irec t, specialised adm in istra tion and supervision over
State Farms. Five new regional 'D irecto ra tes ' (Igazgatosag) amd 26 'Trusts'
(Troszt), replacing the 19 old 'County Centres', were established to  help the new
M in is try  in its  work. In retu rn, the 'D irecto ra tes ' were assisted by the M in istry 's
branch and functiona l C h ief Departments and Departments. But i t  was the
combined responsib ility o f the 'D irecto ra tes ’, together w ith  the 'Trusts' d ire c tly
to  manage the a ffa irs  o f a ll the State Farms located w ith in  th e ir  te rr ito ry . The
main task o f the 'D irecto ra tes ' was to  break-down the yearly plan among the
Trusts and to  supervise th e ir plan fu lf ilm e n t and to  ensure tha t the d irec tives o f
the M in is try  were executed. Each 'D irec to ra te ' was headed by a D ire c to r who, in
addition to  his own 'D irec to ra te ', had ju risd ic tio n  over and supervised the work o f
each Trust D irecto r. The fin a l stage o f reorganisation was at the Farm level,
where a more e ffe c tive  form  of management and organisation was elaborated
(31)and put in to  practice . The re form  was presented as a move towards
decentra lisation, a 'v ic to ry  over bureacracy' and the in troduction  o f an 
adm in istra tive  strucure, w ith in  which the princip le  o f 'one-man management'
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(egyszemelyi vezetes) could be made more e ffec tive , since the d iffe re n t areas of 
responsib ility  o f each d irec to r, ch ie f department, departm ent and trus t could be 
easily defined and demarcated. The actual work on the fie ld  was patterned on 
the organisation o f labour in collectives, w ith  the main d iffe rence tha t each 
State Farm possessed a ll the machinery i t  needed to the brigades in State Farms 
were actua lly  an in tegra tion o f personnel and functions found separately in SMTS 
and Collectives.
On the whole, i t  was a fa ir ly  impressive reorganisation, a ffec ting , to  
d iffe r in g  degrees, the entire  state sector o f agricu lture. While i t  yielded some 
success, in specific areas, i t  apparently contributed very l i t t le  in practice  e ither 
to  reduction in bureacracy or the e ffic ie n t running o f State Farms. W ith regard 
to  the bureaucracy, complaints continued to appear constantly in the press long 
a fte r the reorganisation. Typica l o f such complaints, as la te  as 1954, was the 
exasparation evident in the remark that,
soon there w ill be more persons s ittin g  in offices, than there
are persons working in the f ie ld s . ^ )
W ith regard to the actual economic performance and e ffic ien cy  o f State Farms, 
a general measure is whether they could ju s tify  the high expectations placed on 
them by the regime, and to  what extent did they become ’ideal, highly e ffic ie n t 
mechanised large-scale farms, con tribu ting  s ign ifican tly  to  the nation ’s food 
production'.
One way o f evaluating the State Farms as production units is to  adopt 
Stalin's approach and see the crux o f the problem in the re la tive  amounts o f 
produce extracted by the state from  the various ag ricu ltu ra l sectors. Seen in 
tha t ligh t the State Farms were, indeed, ’ideal' in tha t everyth ing tha t they 
produced was autom atica lly  and by de fin ition  state property. Consequently, in 
term s o f state deliveries, a State Farm was, once again, more valuable than a
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co llec tive , even i f  its  production per cadastral yoke was l i t t le  or no be tte r and
more costly. In 1953, o f the to ta l amount o f farm  produce procured by the state,
22 per cent o f wheat, 19.7 per cent o f rye, 61.1 per cent o f pigs, 26.3 per cent o f
(33)bee f-ca ttle  and 20.0 per cent o f m ilk  was delivered by State Farms. Thus, 
although the State Farms held only 13.0 per cent o f to ta l arable land in the 
country, th e ir contribu tion  to  the state was proportionate ly much higher. This 
high ra te  o f deliveries was made possible, not only because everyth ing a State 
Farm had produced belonged to  the state, but also because the in te rna l ra te  o f 
consumption was com parative ly low, among other reasons because the number o f 
people employed is proportionate ly lower than in the other sectors. Even i f  
collectives and individual farm ers delivered a ll th e ir  surplus produce to  the 
state, w ithout making use o f the free market, the proportion o f th e ir  m arketable 
production would s t i l l  be lower than tha t o f State Farms. Hence, the 
government derived an advantage from  the State Farms as a supply basis fo r  the 
growing non-agricu ltura l population.
A lthough State Farms employed few er people per un it o f arable land 
they were not more e ffic ie n t than e ither co llectives or individual farm s. They 
ranked highest w ith  respect to  deliveries, but not to ta l production or 
p roductiv ity . I t  has frequently  been acknowledged by the regime tha t inspite of 
the tremendous advantages given to State Farms, in term s o f constantly 
im proving qua lity  o f land, financ ia l assistance, amount and type o f machinery, 
fe rtiliz e rs , even tra ined personnel, etc., the returns from  them were meagre and 
th e ir economic performance mediocre.
Looking f irs t  at the investment o f the F irs t F ive-Year Plan, i t  is clear
tha t State Farms received the lion's share: almost 43 per cent o f to ta l
agricu ltu ra l investment went to  them, although they held just over 13 per cent of
the to ta l arable land. The a llocation o f actual state investm ent between the
(34)various sectors is shown in Table 9.4 on p.616:
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The high cost o f production o f State Farms is also evident from  an
analysis o f the proportion o f machinery devoted to  State Farms, in re la tion  to
the machinery made available to  the rest o f agricu lture. The table below shows
(35)th is approximate relationship, w ith  the relevant s ta tis tica l data fo r  1953 , this
w ill be examined in more de ta il in the section dealing w ith  the SMTS and 
Mechanisation o f A g ricu ltu re .
Number o f trac to rs 96 o f to ta l Number of 96 o f arable land
in State Farms arable land serviced tracto rs  in serviced by SMTS
by State Farm in SMTS machinery
machinery Coll. P riva te  Tota l
4000 13.6 1 0 ,0 0 0 24.7(a) 61.7 86.4
Note: (a) excluding private household plots
The figures show tha t the State Farm -C ollective  Farm re lationship w ith  respect
to  machinery, i t  taken on its  own, s ligh tly  favours the co llectives. But this
would leave the priva te  sector denuded o f a ll machinery. A c tu a lly  although
SMTS were p rim arily  designed to  service collectives, they had to  take care of, at
least, some o f the needs o f p riva te  farm ers, and also help State Farms whenever
necessary. Looking at SMTS ploughing work, however, i t  can be seen tha t in
fac t, l i t t le  was done to  help the priva te  farm ers who worked over 60 per cent o f
land especially in 1952 while the proportion o f work done fo r  State Farms
steadily increased.
In a ttem pting  to evaluate fu rth e r the actual perform ance o f the state
sector, the contribu tion  o f various ag ricu ltu ra l sectors to  the to ta l value o f
agricu ltu ra l production can be used to  give some indication. This is shown in
(36)Table 9.5 on p.618, fo r  the year 1954, expressed in current prices:
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Related to  the respective shares o f to ta l arable land area, the figures c learly  
show the superiority  o f individual farm s, both in the category o f crops (overall) 
and in livestock raising, over State Farms, in tha t the la tte r ’s percentage share 
o f to ta l production was lower than th e ir percentage share o f arable land. The 
performance o f C o llective  Farms, to  be sure, was even poorer.
Another way to  look a t the p rodu c tiv ity  o f State Farms is to analyse the
average yields o f the major crops in the d iffe re n t agricu ltu ra l sectors. This is
given in Table 9.6 (see p.620) As can be seen, State Farms tended to do
somewhat be tte r in cereals, but th is was more than outweighed by the
superiority  o f individual farm s in labour intensive cu ltiva tion . I t  should be
recalled, however, tha t the individual farm ers, as shown earlie r, achieved these
results under extrem ely adverse conditions. W ith regard to  livestock output, the
measure to  be used is the ’productive increase' (hasznosult szaporu lat) in
livestock operations, per 100 head of livestock. The figures fo r  the years
(38)between 1950 and 1954 are shown below.
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
the number o f production increase per 100 cows
State Farms 74 77 77 82 88
Coll. Farms 60 67 80 37 56
Ind. Farms 64 65 70 51 61
the number o f production increase per 100  sows
State Farms 629 469 707 792 860
Coll. Farms 630 432 474 266 625
Ind. Farms 605 560 692 498 ' 787
the average annual m ilk  y ie ld /cow  in lit re
State Farms 2254 2212 2500 2336 2744
Coll. Farms 2 0 0 0 1563 1285 1178 1500
Ind. Farms 1424 1578 1544 1485 1630
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These figures show tha t State Farms produced the best results in the livestock
sector; th is  was largely because they were able to  purchase the best breeding
stock and conditions fo r  animal husbandry were be tte r on State Farms than on
e ithe r C o llective  or Individual Farms. Livestock production on C o llec tive  Farms
was even less successful than crop production. I t  is in teresting to  look at the
crop structu re  fo r State Farms; in 1952 i t  was as follows: grains 50 per cent;
maize 8 .6  per cent; potatoes, 2.5 per cent; industria l crops, 7.5 per cent; lucerne,
20 per cent; beet, 2.3 per cent; rice , 3.1 per cent and oats, 6 per cent o f sown
(39)area. State Farms were also concerned w ith  the production o f grain seed and 
ca ttle  o f superior qua lity  fo r d is tribu tion  to  co llectives and, to  a sm aller extent, 
to individual farms as well. This aspect o f State farm ing was p a rticu la rly  
stressed in Hungary, together w ith  the task o f growing industria l crops. Thus, 
having perhaps learned a lesson from  the Soviet Union, the Hungarian regim e, as 
a rule, did not a ttem pt to make State Farms over-specialised.
In conclusion, as can read ily be seen from  the foregoing, State Farms in 
Hungary were fa r from  being 'models’ fo r the other agricu ltu ra l sectors. In no 
production category was th e ir share commensurate w ith  the ag ricu ltu ra l land 
they held and the special privileges and advantages they had received, even over 
the collectives, in the a llocation o f cred it, which was autom atic i f  and when 
required; fe r t il iz e r , o f which they received 4-5 tim es more than the nationa l 
average; and machinery and investment in buildings etc., w ith  the help o f heavy 
subsidies. Despite these advantages th e ir  economic performance was o ften  
lower or only s ligh tly  be tte r than tha t o f individual farms. A t the same tim e, 
the ir production cost per un it o f output was s ign ifican tly  higher, i.e ., they 
produced too l i t t le  and at a high cost. The superiority  o f large-scale production 
was not proven during the period. This was acknowledged in the f ir s t  year o f the 
'new course' programme, by Andras Hegediis, by then M inister o f A g ricu ltu re , 
and once M in ister o f State Farms and Forests,
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the m a jo rity  o f State Farms are not ye t model large-scale 
farm s: th e ir production averages, pa rticu la rly  fo r  cereal 
crops, are very low and animal yields are unsatisfactory ... 
The State Farms have been unable to  use the help o ffe red by 
the state to  explo it the possibilities o f large-scale
fa rm in g .^ )
Furtherm ore, even Rakosi had to  adm it tha t 'the m a jo rity  o f State Farms 
(41)operated at a loss'. There are no figures at hand, fo r earlie r years but the ir
d e fic it  in 1954, at 1900 m illion  Forints, should give some ind ica tion o f the rate
o f losses during earlie r years. Their financ ia l position in subsequent years
deteriorated even fu rth e r and the ir losses in 1955 and 1956, expressed at 1954
(42)prices, amounted to  1300 and 2600 m illion  Forin ts respectively.
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9.2 Development and Role o f State Machine T rac to r Stations and 
Mechanisations in co llec tiv isa tion
Despite th e ir ra ther prosaic t it le ,  the State Machine T rac to r Stations
(SMTS), (A llam i Gepallomasok) played a major ro le in the co llec tiv isa tion  of
Hungarian agricu lture. The f ir s t  few  were set up towards the end o f 1947,
before mass co llectiv isa tion  was announced, and they were subsequently
(43)expanded and consolidated from  the la te  spring o f 1949 onwards. The 
nationwide network o f SMTS, patterned on the Soviet model, perhaps more than 
any other in s titu tio n  embodied the com bination o f p o lit ic a l and economic 
considerations. They were intended to  enable the state to exercise p o lit ic a l and 
adm in istra tive  contro l and supervision over the co llectives and th e ir 
management, to  ensure compliance w ith  party d irectives and adherence to state 
plans. The f irs t  c lear statement o f this conception o f centralised ag ricu ltu ra l 
mechanisation in Hungary emerged from  high party circles in the spring o f 1949. 
In a lecture  delivered on 10th March, 1949 to students o f the Party Academy, 
Andras Hegediis, re flec ting  no doubt a consensus view reached among the 
leadership, came out in favour o f the princip le  o f state monopoly o f the main 
machinery resources in the co llectiv ised sector. He stated tha t,
the concept o f the SMTS system orig inated from  Stalin. And 
the essence of th is concept was tha t the state should not 
'throw-in* the machinery e ither in to  individual farm s or even 
in to the vac illa ting , shaky, co llec tive  farms, but was to  
establish a large-scale socialist enterprise in the v i l la g e .^ )
Thus, unlike State Farms, not only would Farmers' Cooperatives and, o f course,
individual priva te  farm ers not be allowed to  purchase or own large ag ricu ltu ra l
machinery such as tractors, combine-harvesters, threshers, but ne ither would 
(45)collectives. Except fo r a small and declin ing number o f generally obsolete 
pre-war ag ricu ltu ra l machines and transport fa c ilit ie s , e.g., lo rries, the state
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assumed a complete monopoly over the ownership and operation o f ag ricu ltu ra l 
machinery, which was concentrated large ly in the SMTS. In addition to  the 
37,700 two-team  horse-carriages they possessed in 1953 the changes in the stock
o f main ag ricu ltu ra l machines w ith in  the collectives is shown in the table
k i (46) below:
Year 
(Dec.31)
Tractors Threshers Lorries
1950 120 90 _
1951 200 92 190
1952 100 80 305
1953 48 68 323
Needless to  say, this declin ing machine stock, even i f  two-team  horse-carriages 
are included was fa r from  su ffic ie n t fo r  the work to  be done.
In playing a prom inent role in the 'socia list transfo rm ation ' o f 
agricu ltu re , the SMTS were assigned im portant tasks in the 'p o lit ic a l 
strengthening' o f the collectives. The p o lit ica l tasks entrusted to  them  were 
discharged by the 'p o litica l deputy' (p o lit ika i helyettes), a functiona ry  who was
established in a ll MTS and who o ften  fu lf i l le d  the role o f Party Secretary
(47) . .also. While theo re tica lly  the p o lit ic a l deputy was the deputy to  the D ire c to r
o f the SMTS, because he received orders from  higher party authorities, usually
the D is tr ic t or County Party Comm ittees, and exercised great in fluence w ith in
the ru ra l party structure  as w e ll as o ften having links w ith  the Secret Police
(AVO), he usually wielded greater power than the D irec to r him self. The p o lit ic a l
departments o f the SMTS and the p o lit ica l deputies came under the supervision
o f the p o lit ica l departments established at the D is tr ic t (Jarasi), County (Megye)
and National, i.e., M in is try  (M iniszterium ) le v e ls / ^  The system o f p o lit ica l 
departments, s ta ffed  by party o ffic ia ls , was designed to  secure party  contro l at 
a ll levels and to  be the party's 'eyes and ears' in a ll spheres o f l i fe  and work not 
only w ith in  the SMTS but also, and possibily even more, w ith in  the co llec tive  
served by the SMTS as w e ll as the State Farms themselves. In addition to 
supplying 'reports' on actual or alleged 'subversive' and 'fraudulent' a c tiv itie s  at 
the various levels, which o ften serve as the basis fo r  imprisonment o f peasants, 
the po lit ica l departments were called upon to  conduct p o lit ica l propaganda and 
agita tion, both among co llec tive  farm  members and individual farm ers, to  'v is it ' 
and 'persuade' them to  jo in  the co llective . Because o f th e ir harsh and coercive 
methods o f p o lit ica l ag ita tion  and th e ir close involvement in the process o f 
co llec tiv isa tion  the peasants hated the SMTS.
From the outset, i t  was assumed tha t the SMTS would play an im portant
(49)ro le in the process o f co llectiv isa tion . A Government Decree had specified 
tha t w ith  the ir machinery and specialists they would:
assist, organise and develop collectives, by 
provid ing technical guidance and contro l o f 
production and management
be instrum ental in the transform ation o f 
agricu lture  from  p rim itive  small-scale priva te  
farm ing in to  large-scale socialist fa rm ing
partic ipa te  in the preparation and execution o f 
local production plans, in close cooperation w ith  
the collectives
perform  a r t if ic ia l- fe r t ilis a t io n  and soil 
am elioration on co llective  arable land, transport 
produce and fe r t il is e r  and act as repair stations 
fo r the co llective 's machinery
become the cu ltu ra l centre o f the v illage and 
assist in the cu ltu ra l, p o lit ica l and technica l 
education o f the working peasants
(i)
(ii) 
(in)
(iv)
(v)
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The princip le  economic role assigned to  the SMTS, as 'vanguards o f socia list 
industry in the countryside', was to  provide the 'techn ica l base' fo r  the new 
collectives, to  assist them to  increase th e ir output and reduce th e ir costs. The ir 
main task was to  perform  agricu ltu ra l machinery work fo r the co llectives w ith in  
th e ir loca lities . In re tu rn  fo r  th e ir mechanical services and agro-technica l 
guidance the collectives were obliged to  pay the SMTS 'in kind' at rates fixed  by 
the state as the f irs t  charge a fte r compulsory deliveries to the state, thereby the 
state secure access to  a s ign ificnat volume of badly needed food supplies. The 
relations between the SMTS and C o llective  Farm were regulated by annual plans 
and contracts (szerzodes) signed by the SMTS w ith  each o f its  c o lle c t iv e s .^ ^ ,  
which set out the production targets and the duties o f both the SMTS and the 
co llective . The national plans were drawn up in term s o f to ta l acreage fo r a ll 
collectives and fo r SMTS. In the process o f planning this was disaggregated, at 
the various levels, and the individual SMTS and C o llective  Farms u ltim a te ly  were 
given the ir own production plans. Needless to say, problems often  arose over the 
coordination o f the SMTS plan w ith  those o f the co llective , because although 
both plans were derived from  the same national plan the results in term s of 
acreage were usually d iffe ren t. The various ag ricu ltu ra l organs, i.e., 
A g ricu ltu ra l Departments o f the M in istry , County, D is tr ic t and Village, worked 
out the plans fo r each individual SMTS, prescribing in de ta il a ll the main 
agricu ltu ra l tasks, e.g., to ta l acreage o f soft, medium-hard, hard, shallow and 
deep ploughing w ith  subtotals fo r each type of tra c to r operation to  be 
performed. The SMTS was then supposed to  reconcile and coordinate its  own 
tra c to r work plans w ith  the production plans o f the co llective , using the con trac t 
to  define in de ta il the amount, the sequence and com pletion date o f the work fo r 
each co llective  farm  w ith in  its  lo ca lity . Under the contract i t  was the duty o f 
the SMTS to  assist the co llective  in the fo rm u la tion  o f its  production plan. In 
rea lity , the contract empowered the SMTS to  intervene in a ll spheres o f the
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co llec tive ’s operation to  impose cu ltiva tion  and production plans which, on the 
whole, tended to  favour the SMTS even to  the detrim ent o f the co lle c tive  which 
i t  was supposed to  serve. This na tura lly  created a major source o f f r ic t io n  not 
only vis-a-vis the co llective , but also w ith  the D is tr ic t A g ricu ltu ra l Departm ent 
(Jarasi Mezogazdasagi O sztaly). But, because the SMTS operation was evaluated 
according to  the fu lf ilm e n t o f its  operational and financ ia l plans, as much as on 
the volume o f payments ’in kind’ delivered to  the State, the D ire c to r o f the SMTS 
was under great pressure to  give the co llectives plans which made his s ta tion 
emerge in the best possible ligh t. In practice , therefore the co llectives had very 
l i t t le  real contro l, e ithe r over the qua lity , quantity  or tim ing , o f the service 
provided by the SMTS, since these were fixed  in the annual production plan and 
contract on which the SMTS had an overwhelm ing influence. I t  is im portan t, 
however, to point out tha t in these manipulations the SMTS were not free  to  
reduce state targets fo r compulsory deliveres and to ta l procurements. In th e ir  
con flic ts  w ith  the D is tr ic t A g ricu ltu ra l Department the SMTS enjoyed an obvious 
advantage because of th e ir d irec t involvement in the co llectives ' production 
processes. The SMTS were in a strong position to  impose real sanctions on 
co llective  farm  chairmen who 'refused to  cooperate’. In add ition to  the 
overwhelm ing influence o f the SMTS, many other agencies, such as the State 
Bank - which distributed cap ita l and c red it fa c ilit ie s  -  the State Procurem ent 
Agencies - which stipulated what produce they would accept -  also in tervened in 
the operation o f collectives.
Although created p rim a rily  to  service the co llec tive  netw ork the SMTS, 
in princip le, were allowed to  provide services to  individual, p riva te , farm s, 
provided th e ir owners signed a contract w ith  them and agreed to  the prices fixed  
fo r the service by the government. In addition, i f  and when they could a ffo rd  the 
tim e the SMTS were required to  'lend a helping hand1 to  the netw ork o f State 
Farms in th e ir lo ca lity , i f  th e ir services were needed.
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The evolution o f the SMTS network from  its  early beginnings in to  a
centra l in s titu tio na l bulwark o f the co llec tive  farm  system took place speedily,
in a single phase, during w ith  the early expansion o f C o llective  and State Farms,
and was basically completed by the end o f 1950. This expansion, however, was
not d is tribu ted un ifo rm ly throughout the country. G reater urgency was given, at
the outset, to  establishing SMTS sites in the fou r p r io r ity  towns, i.e., Turkeve,
Karcag;, Kisujszallas and M ezotur, selected to  become the f ir s t  'Cooperative
Towns'. Indeed, three fo  the f irs t  13 SMTS sites were located on the Great Plain,
Trans-Tisza region o f County Szolnok, in which these towns were located: an
SMTS site was established in Kisujszallas in early May 1948, a month la te r in
(51)Mezotur and in Turkeve and Karcag in January and March 1949 respective ly.
The SMTS located in these four towns enjoyed s im ila r high p rio r itie s  w ith  regard
to  the supply o f machinery. The tra c to r stock o f Turkeve and Karcag increased
from  22 to  62 between January 1950 and 1951. In the summer-autumn o f 1951
the tra c to r stock o f Kisujszallas and Mezotur SMTS reported to  have been 64 and
53 respective ly. The average tra c to r stock o f the SMTS in these four
(52)settlem ents was 53 compared to  the national average of 29. The same SMTS 
had enjoyed s im ila r p r ir it ie s  w ith  regard to  the a llocation o f o ther ag ricu ltu ra l 
machinery. Because o f the advantageous position enjoyed by these SMTS in the 
supply o f machinery, the mechanisation o f fie ld  (tillin g ) work in the co llectives 
served by these SMTS was fu rthe r advanced than in other regions. As a 
consequence o f 'high p rio ritie s ' in was expected tha t the co llectives located in 
these areas would be in the fo re fron t o f production campaigns and set an 
example to  others. The c r ite r ia  fo r selection o f SMTS sites varied. G enerally, i f  
and when a town achieved the status o f 'Cooperative Town' the SMTS in its  
region was developed qu ickly and its  machinery stock grew correspondingly fast. 
O ther c r ite r ia  fo r selection o f SMTS sites in a certa in  lo c a lity  included the 
presence o f grain, maize and cotton growing areas pa rticu la rly  suitab le fo r
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mechanical cu ltiva tion ; ru ra l population centres where the ecnomic and p o lit ica l
preparation fo r co llectiv isa tion  by local authorities had been most thorough; the
existence and expansion o f co llec tive  farm s in the area, enabling the SMTS to
play a role in the fu rth e r development o f the co llec tiv isa tion  process its e lf and
the ava ilab ility  of su ffic ien t numbers o f party and local government o ffic ia ls  to
apply pressure fo r co llec tiv isa tion  and against w ithdrawal.
The overall development o f the SMTS network and the grow th in the
number o f main types o f ag icu ltu ra l machinery owned by the SMTS during the
period between 1949 and 1953 is shown in Table 9.7 (see p.630). The data re fe r
(53)to  the end o f the year. A lthough the network o f SMTS had almost fu lly
developed by the end o f 1950 the leve l o f agricu ltu ra l mechanisation remained
low and a s ign ificnat proportion o f the machine stock was made up o f techn ica lly
(54)obsolete and o ften worn-out models. The growth in machine stock fa iled  to
keep pace w ith  the rapid growth in the number and area o f C o llec tive  Farms and
the rapid decline in the agricu ltu ra l labour force. The to ta l number o f trac to rs
was already just over 14,000 in 1948. During the next 4-5 years i t  fa iled  to
increase, and i f  anything declined s ligh tly . While the land area o f co llec tives
increased from  316.700 cad. yokes in 1949 to  2,817,400 cad. yokes in 1953, an
increase o f 790 per cent, the increase in the number o f trac to rs  in the stations
and th e ir tra c tive  power capacity measured in horse-power (HP) at the draw-bar,
were 136 and 156 per cent respectively. The corresponding figures fo r  1951 and
1953, the tim e when the co llec tiv isa tion  process was stepped-up considerably,
are even more revealing: while the land area o f collectives more than doubled,
the number o f tractors and th e ir trac tive -pow er capacity increased by only 37
and 3.3 per cent respectively. Thus, the rapid co llec tiv isa tion  drive  a fte r  1951
resulted in a sharp, and continued, increase in the ra tio  o f acreage cu ltiva te d  per
tra c to r. Hence the re la tive  level o f mechanisation in 1953 was considerably 
(55)lower than in 1951. Due to  the decline and stagnation in the investm ent 
funds devoted to  agricu ltu ra l mechanisation (from  411 m illion  Forin ts in 1950 to
- 630 -
Table 9.7: The change in the main agricultural machinery of SMTS
between 1949 and 1953
Item 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
1. Number o f T rac to r Stations 221 361 368 364 364
2 . Total number o f Tractors 13,021 13,377 13,642 13,357 14,149
o f which in SMTS 3,897 6,730 8,611 9,342 9,215
3. Tota l in tra c to r  units 12,341 12,708 12,982 13,428 14,308
its  percentage d is tribu tion  
according to
social sector(a)
State Farms 5.5 16.5 19.5 28.7 33.0
SMTS 31.0 51.9 66.5 69.3 63.1 .
C ollective 0.7 0.9 1.5 0.7 0.3
4. Total tra c tiv e  power in 
HP, measured at the 
draw-bar 50,668 97,978 125,853 128,371 129,996
5. Total number o f Combine- 
Harvester 7 25 160 764 1657
of which in SMTS - 3 51 180 785
6 . Reaper-binder in SMTS - 38 929 1,547 1,968
7. Threshing-Machine in 
SMTS 1303 3175 6315 10,353 10,615
Note: (a) the percentage o f the three sectors do not add up to  100  
because part o f the tractors, up to  September 1951, were 
located in the Farmer's Cooperatives and la te r  i t  went to  
Forestry and in to  the ownership o f o ther enterprises.
S  c£?LAM(jg^  v ^ (p Do
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310 m illion  Forin ts in 1951) agricu lture  fa iled  to  receive even ha lf o f the planned
new trac to rs  targeted by the Five Year Plan. More than a quarter o f the tra c to r
stock had been manufactured during the pre-war or pre-plan periods, a high
proportion being obsolete and/or unsuitable models. The average age o f
(57)trac to rs  in 1950 was 6 1 years. To sum up the typ ica l level o f mechanisation
i t  is perhaps su ffic ien t to  mention tha t the to ta l numbers o f such indispensable
machines as potato-planters and potato and beetroot harvesters owned by the
(58)SMTS were 43 and 32 respectively. As can be seen from  the tab le , the f ir s t
combine-harvesters appeared in the country in 1949 and in the SMTS in 1950.
Their numbers had grown from  a to ta l o f 7 in 1949 to 1657 by 1953, but more
than ha lf o f these scarce machines belonged to  State Farms. Despite the fa c t
tha t by 1953 the SMTS had reduced th e ir mechanical services to  ind iv idua l
farm ers to  a m inim ium (1.3 per cent) they were s t i l l  only able to  perfo rm  75 per
(59)cent o f the v ita lly  needed t i l l in g  work fo r the collectives. Thus, while the 
machine stock at the disposal o f the SMTS enabled them to  provide some 
assistance to collectives in th e ir early fo rm a tive  years, by 1952 they could not 
a llev ia te  the persistent scarc ity  o f labour available fo r production in re la tio n  to  
acreage under the collectives. The capacity o f accessory machinery was not 
adjusted to  tha t o f the tractors , fu rth e r preventing the e ffic ie n t u tilis a tio n  o f 
tra c tiv e  power. The proportion o f mechanical harvesting, hoeing and pota to  
gathering, fo r  example, in the co llectives was 27.7 and 7.7 and 2.0 per cent 
re s p e c tiv e ly .^ ^  Mechanical grain harvesting, even on C o llec tive  Farms, 
remained fa ir ly  uncommon; much o f the crop was harvested by scythe. Both 
individual and co llec tive  farm  peasants worked w ith  p rim itive  tools and simple 
machines. The hoe and scythe were s t i l l  indispensable tools o f production.
Nevertheless, as the machinery stock o f SMTS had grown, the to ta l 
amount o f work and, particu la rly , the share o f t i l l in g  work w ith in  it ,  perform ed 
by the stations did increase continuously during the period, as the data in Table 
9.9 indicate (see p .6 3 4 ) / ^
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Compared w ith  1950, the amount o f to ta l machine work perform ed by
the SMTS network had more than doubled by 1953. Ther percentage share of
t i l l in g  work, however, shows a re la tive  decline because the stations' machine
work was increasingly devoted to threshing and gathering in the harvest. The
rapid expansion o f the co llectiv ised land area, epecia lly during 1952 and the
f irs t-h a lf  o f 1953, created increasing pressure, however, and the SMTS were
unable to  cope w ith  the increased work load presented by the co llectives, in
addition to  the growing demands o f State Farms. The ir work fo r  ind iv idual
farm ers consequently declined rapid ly. In 1952 the stations provided hard ly any
assistance in tilling -w o rks  or individual farm ers. I t  was indeed not u n t il the 'New
Course' programme was announced, in June 1953 tha t the help fo r  ind iv idual
farm ers was stressed. But even then, the tillin g -w o rk  perform ed fo r  ind iv idua l
farm ers, just below 350,000 normal yokes (see note to  tab le below), was ha lf o f
the work done fo r  them in 1951. In subsequent years th e ir  share increased again
but i t  never reached its  previous level. The d is tribu tion  o f SMTS machine t i l l in g -
(62)work according to  social sector is shown in Table 9.8 (see p.633) Thus, in the
year before the new government programme, the SMTS hardly provided any
assistance to  individual farm ers, apart from  threshing. In add ition to  the
overload on SMTS the very steep ploughing fees, which had to  be paid 'in  kind'
and 'in  advance', made it  almost impossible fo r many ind iv idual fa rm ers to  use 
(63)th e ir services. The concentration o f machines in SMTS and o f m achine-work 
on collectives le f t  the individual farm ers in a very d if f ic u lt  position. Because of 
the lack o f consideration o f the SMTS fo r  the needs o f the ind iv idua l farm ers, 
numerous complaints were levelled against them, fu rth e r reducing th e ir  rap id ly  
declin ing popularity among the peasants. Individual farm ers were, on the whole, 
le f t  to  th e ir own ingenuity. They continued to  work under the most d if f ic u lt  
circumstances and many, because o f th e ir  uncertain fu tu re , had very l i t t le  desire 
to  invest and modernise. A special problem facing them was tha t a fte r  1949
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industry d ras tica lly  reduced its  production o f sm all ag ricu ltu ra l im plements, e.g.,
ploughs, harrows and ohorse-drawn sowing machines. In 1951, fo r  example, while
the annual demand fo r ploughs by the priva te  sector was approxim ate ly 30,000,
only 3,500 were p ro d u c e d /^  I f  and when old equipment became worn out and
beyond repair, replacement was impossible. An ind ica tion o f just how poorly
individual farm s were equipped, even w ith  the most basic means o f production,
can be obtained from  the fo llow ing  data: the equipment at the disposal o f an
average individual fa rm er amounted to  no more than a horse-plough, a harrow
and a ro lle r. Larger, more sophisticated machinery, a horse-drawn threshing
machine, a mower and a horse-drawn rake, fo r  example, could only be found on
one farm  in every 1000, 300 and 200 respective ly. The basic and universally used
ch a ff-cu tte r and root-chopper was only to  be found even where c a ttle  and/or
horses were kept, on every second f a r m / ^
Thus, because o f the lack o f the simplest tools and equipment, in
addition to  the general absence o f adequate incentives fo r e ffo r t ,  the in tens ity
o f cu ltiva tion  in the s t i l l  predominant p riva te  sector o f ag ricu ltu re  was
considerably reduced. I t  should however, be pointed out tha t because o f
unrecorded, ’m oon-lighting', work carried out by SMT tra c to r-d rive rs , the to ta l
amount o f machine work done fo r individual farm ers was s ligh tly  more than
indicated in the above table (see p.633). Against the background described, i t
was not surprising tha t bribes o f money, 5 litre s  o f brandy and/or free  drinks and
meals were o ffe red by individual farm ers to  tra c to r-d riv re s  to  obtain th e ir
services. Money payments went d ire c tly  in to  the pockets o f tra c to r-d riv e rs  who
fa ls ified  th e ir  records, cla im ing tha t they had worked fo r  co llectives, which then
(661had to  pay fo r  these services they had not received. Furtherm ore, the above
table, c lassify ing the amount o f t illin g -w o rk  according to  social sector, brings
out very c learly  the rapid ly growing amount o f work fo r 'others' -  th is  can be
(67)iden tified  as work performed predom inantly fo r  State Farms by SMTS. A
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trend developed whereby a growing number o f SMTS fu lf il le d  a s ign ifican t part 
o f th e ir plan in State Farms.
In addition to  mechanical f ie ld  services the SMTS were also called upon
to  provide ag ricu ltu ra l specialists and agro-technical guidance to  the C o llective
Farms o f the d is tr ic t they served. The re la tive ly  small number o f spcecialists
available were concentrated in the SMTS (and State Farms) and the agro-
technica l guidance was provided by a network o f agronomists and brigade-
leaders, headed, respectively, by the Chief Agronom ist and Chief Engineer. The
SMTS management divided the area o f th e ir d is tr ic t  in to  sm aller units, ’bridgade-
areas’, which were headed by the brigade leader and his assistants, each o f whom
had several trac to rs  and drivers in th e ir team. Each tra c to r was served by four
persons, generally two more experienced men and two 18-20 year old g irls  as
(68)assistant drivers. The leading managerial personnel, the D irec to r, the Chief 
Agronomists, the Chief Engineers and the C h ie f Accountants, were appointed 
and dismissed, in close consultation w ith  party  authorities by the M in is te r o f 
A g ricu ltu re  while the Deputy D ire c to r fo r the p o lit ic a l section was appointed by 
centra l party authorities. The middle management, specialised and sector 
agronomists, repair-shop manager, sector mechanics and brigade-leaders and 
trac to r-d rive rs  were appointed, again in many instances w ith  close party 
consultations, by the D irec to r and/or the C h ie f Engineer and, as members o f the 
SMTS, independent o f the co llective , together w ith  other machine operators, 
were under the d irection  o f the SMTS and were, u n til the end o f 1951, paid by 
the SMTS -  the drivers having enjoyed a special incentive s c h e m e /^
The rapid growth in the number o f SMTS was accompanied by several 
negative features. In addition to  the extrem e scarc ity  o f trac to rs  and other 
machinery because o f chronic under-investment in productive capacity, 
inexperience, shortage o f competent d irectors, agronomists and skilled 
specialised production workers, and fa ilures o f the system o f organisation and
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adm in istra tion a ll caused great d iff ic u ltie s  fo r  the SMTS. The resu lt was 
continued c o n flic t o f in terest between the C o llec tive  Farms and the SMTS in the 
u tilisa tio n  o f machinery, the quan tity  and qua lity  o f th e ir service, as w e ll as the 
. agro-technica l guidance provded by SMTS specialists. These were o ften  a cause 
o f chaos ra ther than order, a hindrance ra the r than a help. The p o lit ic a l 
functions th rust upon the SMTS and the continued in te rfe rence o f pa rty  and 
higher adm in istra tive organs aggravated the s itua tion  fu ther, because th  SMTS 
were expected to  in te rfe re  in the co llec tive  farm 's a ffa irs  in situations when 
they were, more o ften  than not, incapable o f being useful. On the whole, the 
SMTS probably represented the weakest lin k  in the tria d  o f State Farms, 
C o llective  Farms and SMTS.
One o f the most common reasons fo r the clash o f in te rest between the 
co llec tive  and the SMTS was v io la tion  o f contracts (szerzodes). Despite much 
party and governmental pressure, there were com plaints fo r years th a t the SMTS 
trea ted  the co llec tive  as i f  they had done a favour fo r them w ith  th e ir  work, or 
as i f  they were individual farm ers. The SMTS were accused o f v io la tin g  and 
dishonouring contractua l obligations, in term s o f e ithe r the qua n tity  or the 
qua lity  o f th e ir work. Complaints o f poor qua lity  work, such as uneven or 
shallow ploughing, and fa ilu re  to  pay a tten tion  to  the im portance o f spec ific  
operations, never rea lly  ceased during the en tire  period. Another com pla int was 
tha t they fa iled  to  perform  the various operations at the appropriate tim es, 
specified by the decree o f the Council o f M in is te rs .^ ^  Delayed work was most 
harm fu l to  production. The SMTS o ften  decided a rb itra r ily , which co lle c tive  in 
its  region was to  be provided w ith  machiery and which was not, very o ften  i t  
provided the machines too la te, so a large acreage o f crop was lost because i t  
remained in the fie lds or because, fo r lack o f transport, i t  was le f t  ro ttin g . Much 
o f th is  was also due to  shortage o f machinery, but much, too, was because lack 
o f proper maintenance, misuse or lack o f spares rendered the machines unusable
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when most needed. Moreover, as in the case o f industria l enterprises, the SMTS 
were m ate ria lly  interested in the fu lles t u tilisa tio n  o f th e ir  machines and in 
fu lf ilm e n t o f th e ir plan -  expressed in tra c to r  work units, i.e., the number o f 
normal yokes o f ploughing perform ed per tra c to r, which was by fa r the most 
im portant ind icator, fo llowed by fue l consumption -  even at the expense o f the 
qua lity  o f th e ir work, e.g., by m in im izing the amount o f work by shallow instead
(71)
o f deep ploughing specified. Poor qua lity  o f work o ften  led them in to  
co n flic t w ith  the co llective , w ith  each side accusing the o ther o f bad fa ith  and 
dishonesty. In practice, the tra c to r  drivers could do whatever they wanted; they 
fe lt  themselves above the law and society. The ir p rinc ip le  concern was to  over­
fu l f i l  th e ir plan in q u a n titita tive  terms, and frequent com plaints were heard
against them because they o ften  recorded the whole parcel as ploughing work,
(7 9 )
e.g., even if ,  say, tw o-th irds  o f i t  was sown w ith  maize. Com plaints about
under-u tilisa tion o f equipment and lack o f coordination between SMTS and
collectives were ceaseless, ind ica ting a low degree o f e ffic ien cy . In 1951, fo r
example, w ith  a planned ta rge t o f 991 norm al yokes per tra c to r , actual
(7 3 )
fu lfilm e n t was only 754 normal yokes.
Combined w ith  the low level o f mechanisation, the low qua lity  o f SMTS
service - due, largely, to  th e ir system o f incentives and th e ir  monopoly o f
tra c tive  power -  and th e ir  high fees placed serious burdens on the co llectives.
The 912.5 m illion  Forin ts o f fees, in addition to  the 100,000 tons o f gra in paid 'in
kind', received by the SMTS, during the period 1950-1953, i.e., more than 1000
m illion  Forin ts a ll together, was a heavy burden fo r  the co llectives. I t  was more
(7 4 )
than the to ta l amount o f investment c red it a llocated to  them. In fa c t, one o f
the major problems o f SMTS adm in istra tion was the very high cost o f th e ir
operations. The main reason fo r  th is  was th e ir low p ro d u c tiv ity , waste o f
m ateria l and human resources and lack o f proper maintenance o f the 
( 7 5 )
machinery. Another reason was disorganisation: work schedules o f drivers
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and tra c to rs  were irra tio n a lly  compiled; both were sent to  and from  places in a
disorganised manner. O ften, even the D ire c to r o f an SMTS had no knowledge
where his drivers and tractor-brigades were working. W ith th e ir slipshod,
incom petent and unpunctual work the tra c to r-d rive rs  turned the en tire  v illage
population, especially the individual peasants, who disliked them anyway, against 
(77)the SMTS. Owing to  these deficiencies, i t  was not surprising tha t the more
the co llec tive  system developed the greater were the losses, both financ ia l and
in term s o f ag ricu ltu ra l production.
One o f the main problems in im proving the performance o f the SMTS,
and the new co llectiv ised sector o f agricu lture , was the recru itm en t o f su ffien t
numbers o f competent managerial and technica l personnel. There was continual
c ritic ism  o f the qua lity  o f management and o f the agro-technical guidance and
assistance provided by the SMTS fo r co llectives. I t  was fa ir ly  common, fo r
example, tha t the D irec to r or Chief Agronom ist o f the SMTS had been a cobler
or other s im ila r artisan a year before and had no more than 4 years e lem entary
school education. He obtained a ll his ag ricu ltu ra l knowledge from  a six-weeks
tra in ing  course, which hardly made him an expert on the organisation o f la rge-
scale production and management. But i f  he was able 'to  use his tongue w e ll' he
(78)was appointed, say, Chief Agronom ist. Then, to  avoid trouble, because o f
lack o f expertise, such people tended to assume a passive a ttitu de . The ir maxim
was to  'be care fu l and avoid being accused o f any damage', 'w ith  a passive
approach you cannot be accused of harm, because whatever you do not do you
cannot be accused of, they can not use i t  against you and i t  cannot be 
(79)proved'. The C h ief Agronomist, together w ith  the network o f agronomists, 
were p rim a rily  preoccupied w ith  the co llec tion  and supply o f s ta tis tic a l 
in form ation to  higher authorities and adm in is tra tive  organs, ra the r than the 
organisaton o f p roduc tion /**^
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I t  was the brigade-leader, moving about usually on a b icycle, who
maintained contact between the SMTS and trac to r-d rive rs . The lazy brigade-
leader could lead a fa ir ly  com fortab le  li fe  since once in every 10 days he
recorded the amount o f work done by each tra c to r  and, a fte r  obtain ing a
signature and stamp fo rm  the co llective 's  o ffice , he handed in the accumulated
(81)papers to  the SMTS. The conscientious brigade-leader had to  move fast
from  place to place, w ith in  his area but despite th is was blamed fo r  everyth ing 
tha t went wrong. The reports presented a the SMTS conference were inaccurate 
and fa ls ified . I t  was more im portan t fo r the managment to  subm it 'glowing 
reports ' to  higher adm in istra tive  organs than to see tha t the actua l work was 
done p ro p e rly /**^
\
Thus the network o f SMTS presented s im ila r problems fo r  the regime as 
the State Farms. Several e ffo rts  were made, throughout the period, to  improve 
the operation and image o f SMTS but w ith  l i t t le  success. In his report to  the 
Second Congress o f the Party, on 25th February, 1951, Matyas Rakosi, 
summarising the fu tu re  tasks o f the SMTS, concluded by saying tha t,
The development o f ag ricu ltu ra l machine tra c to r  stations 
has, up to  now, only p a rtia lly  fu lf il le d  the hopes attached to  
them. There are s t i l l  a tremendous number o f things to  be 
done in raising the p o lit ic a l level, work d iscip line, 
organisation, economy o f m ateria ls and responsible individual 
leadership etc. We must solve these questions rap id ly  so tha t 
the state ag ricu ltu ra l machine tra c to r  stations can be 
suitable levers in the socia list construction o f villages, 
especially, in the years o f t r a n s i t i o n . ^ )
This appeal, which apparently made l i t t le  impression on SMTS operations and 
e ffic iency, was fo llowed by a meeting o f the 'Nationa l Conference o f Vanguard 
Workers o f Collectives and Machine T rac to r Stations’ (Term eloszovetkezetek es 
Gepallomasok Elenjaro dolgozoinak Orszagos Tanacskozasa) held on December 
27th-28th, 1951, at which the respective delegates strongly c r it ic ise d  each other
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fo r  the deplorable s ituation and poor re lations between the co llectives and
S M T S .^^  In response to  a Council o f M inisters Decree, passed a few days
earlie r, on 24th December 1951, the Conference confirm ed tha t one o f the major
shortcomings o f SMTS operatons was the loose, unsatis factory re lationship tha t
had developed between SMTS and the co llectives and discussed ways o f
im proving these re lations. Accordingly, the delegates demanded the restoration,
in fu ll, o f the V a lid ity  o f contracts ' between SMTS and the co llectives they
served, which, they declared, tended to  become m erely 'pieces o f paper' because
many of th e ir points were com plete ly ignored and the partners more o ften  than
not turned a blind eye to  each other's mistakes, incompetence and negligence: it
was adm itted tha t, on the one hand, the SMTS overlooked the co llectives '
widespread fa ilu re  to  co llec t the crop from  the fie ld  before ploughing had begun
while, on the other hand, the co llec tive  accepted the incompetent, poor qua lity
(85)work carried out by the SMTS trac to r-d rive rs . I t  was fa r  too troublesome 
and risky, because o f re ta lia tion , to  go to court or to  'quarre ll' w ith  th e ir SMTS.
In order to  reverse these trends and to  strengthen and improve the 
qua lity  o f re lations, various measures were introduced by the Government. F irs t, 
to  make trac to r-d rive rs  more interested in the harvest results o f the co llec tive , 
in accordance w ith  Soviet practice, a resolution was passed which made the 
trac to r-d rive rs  and mechanics, while s t i l l  under the d irec tion  o f the SMTS, 
members o f the co llectives and paid a share o f the co llective 's  income, in w ork­
day units (munkaegyseg), in accordance w ith  the quan tity  and qua lity  o f the work 
performed, but at a higher ra te  than ordinary m em bers.^*^ The regim e hoped 
tha t this would make trac to r-d rive rs  more in terested in increasing production by 
improving the qua lity  o f th e ir work, because th e ir  income would depend on it .  
Second, as part o f the strengthening o f re lations between the SMTS and the 
collectives, the Government decreed a fu ll re insta tem ent o f con trac tua l 
procedures, placed greater emphasis on qua lity  contro l, and introduced higher
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(87)penalities fo r  shoddy or incom plete work by the SMTS. Third , a resolution 
was passed which called fo r an im provement in the p o lit ica l work o f ru ra l party 
organisations. A t the Conference, Rakosi had stressed th a t success in 
establishing healthy re lations between the SMTS and collectives on the new basis 
depended greatly on the qua lity  o f p o lit ic a l work by the respective partic ipants. 
Thus,
one can state ca tegorica lly , even w ithout investigation, tha t 
SMTS and collectives are strong in places where the p o lit ic a l 
work o f the party organisations is good and, conversely they 
are weak and troubled w ith  problems o f discipline, where 
th e ir work is f a u l t y . ^ )
None of these attem pts to  improve the performance o f the SMTS was successful.
Throughout the period under consideration the exp lo ita tive  image o f the SMTS
th e ir  poor performance and the mere 'fo rm a lity ' o f the contracts remained a
permanent feature. The regime was not prepared to  sanction the rad ica l changes
tha t were necessary to  give real meaning to  the contract, to  tu rn  i t  in to  an
e ffe c tive  guide to  local p ractice  and to  make the SMTS and the co llectives
genuinely interested in fu lf i l l in g  the ir contractua l obligations and im proving the
qua lity  o f th e ir work and th e ir re lationship. This is demonstrated by the fa c t
tha t just over a year la te r because of the continued problems a f f l ic t in g  the
relationship between SMTS and collectives, another Council o f M inisters Decree
had to  be passed, in February 1953, which, like  its  predecessor, again called fo r
improvement in the qua lity  o f work by SMTS and stressed tha t the con trac t
(89)signed by the SMTS and the co llec tive  i t  served must be observed.
While, s tr ic t ly  speaking, they do not come under the heading o f 
mechanisation, a few words are necessary about the role o f techniques other 
than mechanisation in the transform ation from  sm all to  large-scale socia list 
fa rm ing and in increasing production. The s itua tion  regarding the m odernisation
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o f animal breeding and husbandry was even less favourable than in the case o f 
p lant cu ltiva tion . The main problem faced by regime here was not only to  
replace the sm all-scale individual methods by more modern large-scale methods
-  fo r  which the construction o f modern buildings fo r  animals was a pre-requis ite
-  but there was also the im m ediate and desparate need to provide housing fo r the
livestock brought in to  the co llectives by the p e a s a n ts /^  Lack o f build ing
m ateria ls g reatly  hindered the construction o f new, large-scale housing, and not
much was bu ilt. In many villages the animals belonging to  the co llectives were
housed, o ften fo r  long periods, in the la rger sheds o f individual peasant farms.
The peasant fam ilies forced to  jo in  the co llec tive , brought land, implements,
livestock and, o f course, th e ir labour w ith  them in to  the co llec tive , but not
buildings etc. The growth o f housing capacity fa iled  to  keep up w ith  the pace o f
co llectiv isa tion , as in the case o f general mechanisation. This was la rge ly the
reason why most co llectives, during the period, concentrated on crop cu ltiva tion .
While much new construction capacity was allocated to  State Farm , even fo r
them it  was grossly inadequate and need fa r outstripped supply. Because the
investment policy pursued by the regime favoured projects provid ing ’quick
returns' much o f the new construction was o f cheap and in fe r io r q u a lity  which
did not last and the billions o f Forin ts spent on new construction between 1949
and 1956 fa iled  to  result in the increased production tha t was hoped fo r  by the 
(91)regime.
A s im ila r s itua tion  prevailed in the im portant areas o f soil am eliora tion, 
irr iga tion  and the application o f fe rtilise rs . A lthough the last comes under 
current expenditure, ra ther than investm ent, its  long-te rm  e ffe c t on the 
productive power o f the soil is, nevertheless, im portan t. The regime's 
investment policy, favouring one-sided mechanisation in ag ricu ltu re  -  although 
the actual targets were not achieved - d iscrim inated against costly  investm ent 
projects in the co llec tive  sector w ith  the long am ortisation period cha rac te ris tic
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o f both soil am elioration and irr iga tion . Hence the neglect in the extension o f 
irr iga ted  and am eliorated areas by the regime, which is c lea rly  shown by the 
figures in Table 9 .1 0 :^ ^
Table 9.10: Development in Irrigated and Ameliorated Land Areas
between 1950 and 1953
Year
Irriga ted  area in 
1 0 0 0 s cad.yokes
Am eliorated area 
in 1 0 0 0 s cad. yokes
% share o f 
State & C o llective  
Farms
C o llective Tota l C o llective Tota l
1950 9.1 56.7 0.6 7.0 100
1951 14.0 74.7 2.9 16.8 100
1952 19.6 98.2 3.4 2 0 .2 99
1953 40.7 150.3 3.7 26.0 100
^  <D UL-U C£_ \
Since the to ta l irriga ted  area represented less than 2 per cent and the to ta l soil
am elioration could only be expressed in thousandths o f the to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l
land, in the country, th e ir  insignificance, in absolute term s, is clear. The ir
re la tive  insignificance becomes even greater i f  it  is considered tha t during the
same period the to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l area under the cu ltiva tion  o f the co llectives
(93)had increased by more than five -fo ld .
Looking at the annual app lication o f a r t if ic ia l fe rtilise rs , both overa ll 
and by the co llec tive  sector especially, the p ic tu re  is even more discouraging, as 
is shown in Table 9 .1 1 :^ ^
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Table 9.11s Annual Consumption of Artificial Fertiliser 
between 1949 and 1953
consumption in 1 0 0 0 s tons consumption in kg/cad. yoke
Year
State Farm Coll. Farm National State Farm Coll. Farm National
1949 119.0 _ __ 12.4
1950 74.3 47.1 185.1 168.6 1 2 0 .8 19.3
1951 105.1 72.7 247.3 175.2 89.2 25.8
1952 105.0 51.6 226.5 114.9 39.7 23.6
1953 123.9 55.9 231.4 104.1 28.9 24.2
S  S e e  1 ^  h I  ^
The above figures c learly  show tha t not only in re la tion  to  neighbouring
countries -  where the com parative to ta l fe r t i l iz e r  u tilisa tio n  in kg./hectare,
tak ing  the 1952/1953 average, was 45.2 in Austria , 34.2 in Czechoslovakia, while
(95)in Hungary i t  was 5.7 or in comparison w ith  planned targets, but also in 
respect o f absolute quantities, the ra te  o f application in kg/cad. yoke began to 
decline s ign ifican tly  in the co llectiv ised sector a fte r 1951. By 1953 a r t if ic ia l 
fe r t il is e r  consumption per cad. yoke in the ’favoured1 co llectiv ised  sector had 
decreased to  almost the same level as the national average, which almost 
doubled during the same period. Its e ffe c t in the co llectiv ised  sector was 
negligible. In fa c t, the national average ra te  o f a r t if ic ia l fe r t il is e r  u tilisa tio n  
per cad. yoke in Hungary had been 20.3kg in 1 9 2 8 .^ ^  This decline was only 
nom inally compensated by the u tilisa tio n  o f natural fe r t il is e r , which remained 
the most im portant form  o f fe r t il is e r  u tilisa tio n  in the p riva te  sector, because of 
the considerably lower leve l o f livestock in the co llectiv ised sector. The share 
o f a r t if ic ia l fe r t il is e r  u tilisa tio n  in the predom inantly p riva te  sector of 
agricu lture  declined from  50 per cent in 1949 to  19.7 per cent in 1952, which,
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again, was the result o f the Government's d iscrim inatory  measures against the
( 9 7 )
individual peasant fa rm er. In fa c t, apart from  the nominal amount o f
a r t if ic ia l fe r t il is e r  a llocated to them on account o f th e ir  contractua l crop
cu ltiva tion , the supply to  individual peasants, throughout the period, was
v ir tu a lly  non-existent. Thus, much o f the a r t if ic ia l fe r t il is e r  production must
have been allocated to  the State sector o f agricu lture . I t  must, however, be
pointed out tha t not even th is reduced amount o f fe r t il is e r  a ll found its  way onto
the fie lds. Much o f i t  went unutilised because members, mostly agrarian-
proletarians, unacquainted w ith  modern fa rm ing techniques, 'had no" fa ith  in the
effectiveness' o f a r t if ic ia l fe rtilise rs  and/or because giving p e rio rity  to  'more
im portant ag ricu ltu ra l tasks' le ft  no tim e to  spread the fe rtilise rs ', m ostly by
hand, from  the back o f lo rries, because o f the lack o f specialised machinery.
Frequently, bags o f fe rtilis e rs  remained hidden away 'from  the eyes o f
inspectors' to avoid e ither the w ithdrawal o f special concessions or fo r  fea r o f
(98)penalty payments i f  they were caught.
In conclusion, i t  can be seen from  this short summary tha t the state 
sector was not successful. Taken together w ith  the co llectiv ised sector, the 
consolidation o f sm all-scale farm s in to  large-scale production units was not 
accompanied by an appropriate level o f mechanisation o f ag ricu ltu ra l work. A 
fram ework o f large-scale fa rm ing was being created which, poorly supplied w ith  
mechanical implements etc., had remained managed and operated by sm all-scale 
methods, tra d itio n a l types o f tools and equipment and old techniques. Notable 
progress was made only in the mechanisation o f t i l l in g  work and, which must be 
mentioned, even i f  b r ie fly , in the sphere o f e le c tr if ic a tio n  o f the villages. Before 
World War II only 39 per cent o f villages in Hungary had e le c tr ic ity . By the end 
o f the period tw o-th irds  o f a ll villages enjoyed the social and economic benefits 
of e le c t r i f ic a t io n / ^
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Under these circumstances, i t  is l i t t le  wonder tha t the rapid grow th in 
production came to  a ha lt soon a fte r  the process o f co llec tiv isa tion  had begun in 
earnest. Hungarian agricu lture  fa iled  to  solve the task o f increasing the volume 
o f production para lle l to  the regime's 'socia list reorganisation' o f agricu lture . 
The development o f agricu ltu re  was, in essence, characterised by stagnation and 
then decline. The main causes o f the unfavourable development in ag ricu ltu ra l 
production were the policies examined so fa r, the process o f co llec tiv isa tion , 
defic iencies in the state sector and the scanty supply o f machinery, and means o f 
production generally, and the low level o f ag ricu ltu ra l investm ent. D efic iencies 
in these areas resulted in the decline o f ag ricu ltu ra l production.
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PART IV: SOCIALISED AGRICULTURE, 1953-1956:
THE PHASE OF DE-COLLECTIVISATION
The summer o f 1953 witnessed a drastic change in the development o f
ag ricu ltu ra l policy in Hungary. A fte r  Stalin's m erc ifu l death, concern w ith  the
troubled p o lit ica l s itua tion  in Eastern Europe (dramatised by the rio ts  in
Czechoslovakia and East Germany), the deepening economic crises in the whole
o f the Soviet sphere (p recip ita ted by the growing imbalance in the area-wide
economy), the fa ilu re  o f 'socia list' agricu lture  to  keep pace w ith  an expanding
industry ^  and in East European countries, but especially in Hungary, the
tendency o f an over-am bitious industria l programme to  ou ts trip  the natural
resource base o f the country, resulting in the drastic lowering o f people's liv in g
standards, led Stalin's successors to  search fo r compromise.
A t the end o f June, ten days a fte r the East-Berlin revo lt, m ajor po licy
changes were announced at the closed session o f the C entra l C om m ittee 
(2)Plenum o f the Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP), to  underline the fo rthcom ing
break w ith  the past. In accordance w ith  the new Soviet line, the a ll-pow erfu l
communist party  boss in Hungary, Matyas Rakosi, was forced to  relinquish his
position as Prime M in iste r to  his moderate, less doctina ire, agrarian specialist,
Imre Nagy. On 4th Ju ly 1953 Nagy proclaimed to  the nation the 'New Course';
s ign ifican tly ,in  the name o f the government ra ther than the party , as in past
practice. He also addressed him self to  the 'working masses' ra th e r than the
'working class', i.e., the industria l p ro le ta ria t, theo re tica lly , the true  foundation
o f communist power.
The 'New Course', announced ea rlie r and carried out fas te r and fu rthe r,
perhaps, in Hungary than in other East European countries, re fle c tin g  the m ilder
policies announced la te r in the USSR by Georgi Malenkov, adopted greater
(3)tolerance and economic ra tiona lity . During the fo llow ing  months several o f
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the mistakes made in the im m ediate past were corrected. Nagy’s programme 
had p a rticu la rly  a ffected  heavy industry and the countryside: the p r io r ity  o f 
heavy industry ws abaondoned in favour o f lig h t, consumer, industries and, 
especially, agricu lture ; the exp lo ita tion  o f the peasantry was halted and a period 
o f carefu l retrenchm ent and re tre a t was ushered in. This was most apparent in 
the co llec tiv isa tion  programme and was re inforced by continued leadership 
speeches on agrarian problems. But the change was also clear from  attem pts to  
increase the proportion o f national resources allocated to agricu ltu re : physical, 
financ ia l and human. Rakosi, who remained the party  leader, now had to  share 
responsib ility, in the sp irit o f ’co llec tive  leadership', w ith  his r iv a l Nagy, who, 
over the next tw en ty  months attem pted to  implem ent the libe ra lis ing  p o lit ic a l 
and economic policies o f the 'New Course' - embodied in the 'June Resolutions'. 
Am idst much b itte r  contention w ith  Rakosi, Nagy tem pora rily  succeeded in 
decreasing the planned output o f heavy industry, reversing co lle c tiv isa tion  to 
some extent and releasing po lit ica l prisoners.
But the 'M achiavellian', cunning Rakosi obstructed and sabotaged Nagy’s 
programme un til, in February 1955, exp lo iting  the ongoing post-S talin power 
struggle w ith in  the Soviet leadership, he fin a lly  regained in fluence in Moscow 
and succeeded in removing Nagy from  a ll power and the progress o f the 'New 
Course' came to  an abrupt end. The new Prime M inister, picked by Rakosi, 
Andras Hegedus, was instructed to  m odify the 'New Course' so tha t emphasis was 
again on the development o f heavy industry and co llec tiv isa tion .
A lthough Rakosi successfully e lim ina ted his riva ls and, by the grace o f 
Moscow, again became the 'supreme master', his a ttem pt to  continue Stalinism  in 
Hungary was only p a rtia lly  successful in 1955 and fa iled  in 1956. In te rna tiona l 
and Soviet in te rna l developments moved in a d irec tion  which not only prevented 
him from  restoring his fo rm er economic line and to ta lita r ia n  methods in fu ll but 
also tended to  compromise his position. The A fro -A sian  Coinference, held in
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Bandung, Indonesia in A p ril 1955, where the Russians adopted the so-called 'Five 
Principles o f Peaceful Co-Existence' (though fa r  away) gave rise to  hope tha t a 
new era o f Soviet-East European re lations was approaching. The 'Peace T reaty ' 
w ith  A ustria  in May and the subsequent w ithdraw al o f Russian troops 
considerably softened the cold war atmosphere. The 'Sprit o f Geneva' sum m it, in 
July, markedly eased in te rna tiona l tensions. The lim ite d  Soviet re -conc ilia tion  
w ith  T ito , Rakosi's arch-enemy, in May-June sharply undermined his prestige 
even among his own fo llow ers and threatened his position.
The isolated, lonely, Im re Nagy -  who a fte r his expulsion from  the party  
was in the process o f composing his ideological defence o f his 'New Course' - 
fo llowed these developments w ith  great in terest. His 'New Course* had already 
planted the seeds o f doubt and discord. Now, in response to  the Yugoslav 
developments, d isa ffection  w ith in  party  c irc les spread and opposition -composed, 
largely, o f party in te lligents ia , students and farm ers - s low ly but inceasingly 
ra llied  around Nagy. He condemned the ideological dogmatism o f his opponents 
and suggested tha t the Soviet-Yugoslav reconcilia tion  allowed fo r  a more 
nationally based version o f communism, o f 'socia list construction '.
Meanwhile, Rakosi was biding his tim e and trie d  to  obtain a c learer 
p ic ture  o f the struggle fo r  power tha t was tak ing place w ith in  the CPSU - 
between the old S ta lin ist faction , which had now allied its e lf w ith  Malenkov, and 
Khrushchev. Thus, while Rakosi ws try in g  to  revive the red S ta lin is t line in 
Hungary, Khrushchev, in the Soviet Union, was try in g  to  abolish Stalin ism . 
Events then overtook Rakosi. A t the closed session o f the Tw entie th  Congress, 
held in Moscow in February 1956, Khrushchev exposed Stalin's crimes. I t  was one 
o f the most dram atic moments o f the communist movement and its  im pact on 
Hungary was devastating. The Congress did even more; i t  increased Yugoslavia's 
status among the 'socia list' countries. In the S ta lin -T ito  dispute, T ito  had been 
righ t and Stalin wrong. Its im m ediate e ffe c t, in Hungary, was to  galvanise and
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in tensify  the determ ination o f many leading communists to  reverse the trend 
towards Stalinism and, in fa c t, demand de-Stalin isation. Khrushchev’s an ti-S ta lin  
speech set o f f  in Hungary a d is in tegrative  process tha t brought Rakosi's reign to  
an end and culm inated in an open revo lt.
On Soviet instructions, surprisingly, Rakosi was replaced by his trusted 
deputy, Erno Gero, another staunch S ta lin is t, ra the r than by Im re Nagy or some 
other libe ra l communist leader, as everyone had expected. Andras Hegedus 
remained the Prime M in ister. Had, at th is  moment, Imre Nagy been selected to 
replace Rakosi the Hungarian revo lu tion m ight never have happened. In fa c t, 
however, from  Ju ly to  October 1956 government policies were nothing more than 
a continuation o f the old Rakosi line. A t the C entra l Com m ittee Plenum, held in 
July 1956 (which re lieved Rakosi o f his post), the resolution passed by the new 
leadership approved the d irec tion  o f the Second Five Year Plan, towards heavy 
industry, and re ite ra ted  the government's po licy o f continuing w ith  the 'socia list 
transform ation ', i.e., co llectiv isa tion , o f agricu lture . But the new, in flex ib le , 
party and government leadership was soon le f t  behind. The rap id ly a rtic u la tin g  
popular dissent and discontent which, on 23rd October, errupted in student 
demonstrations and led to  a spontaneous revolu tion, returned Im re Nagy to  
power. Erno Gero was replaced, as f ir s t  secretary, by Janos Kadar. As the party  
rap id ly disintegrated, the revolu tionary councils pressed fo r  dem ocratic re form s 
and the government responded positive ly to  th e ir  demands. In the ru ra l centres 
the transform ation from  communist to  popular rule was, on the whole, 
accomplished w ithout much violence. The peasants spontaneously made th e ir  
decisions to  disband th e ir collectives, on a scale greater than under Nagy's f irs t  
prem iership, during the 'New Course’. The ro le o f the peasantry during the 
revo lu tion was a lim ite d  one. The ru ra l population was not d ire c tly  involved in 
the revo lu tionary events, apart from  isolated instances. P o lit ic a lly , the 
peasantry re jected both Rakosi and Gero, and did not tru s t Nagy, despite his
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declared sympathy fo r the peasantry. This, however, did not mean tha t th e ir 
ro le was com plete ly passive. Much food was transported by the peasants 
themselves and distributed, w ithout payment, among the urban needy.
But when Nagy proclaim ed Hungary's neu tra lity , w ithdrew  from  the 
Warsaw Pact and announced his government's in tention to hold free , m u lti-p a rty  
elections, the die was cast. On 3rd-4th November 1956 Soviet armed forces 
invaded the country, crushed the revo lu tion and established the new Kadar 
government. Had Nagy won in 1956, his Hungary, perhaps, would not have 
d iffe red  much from  Kadar's Hungary. Only in tha t the peasants would not again 
have been coerced in to  co llectives. Nagy, who had been promised safe conduct 
by the new Kadar regime, was seized by Russian m ilita ry  o ffice rs  as he was 
leaving the sanctuary at the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest and eighteen months 
la te r was sentenced to  death and executed.
A fte r  a long and prudent w a it, fo llowed by v io len t a ttacks against the 
peasantry, the fin a l co llec tiv isa tion  o f agricu lture  (a period outside the scope o f 
the present study), launched by Kadar in 1959 and completed in 1961, was carried 
out successfully and w ithout jeopardising agricu ltu ra l production. On the 
contrary, over the years, Hungarian agricu ltu re  has become p ro fitab le ; enhanced 
g re tly  by the successful in tegra tion  o f the 'p riva te ' in to the 'soc ia lis t' sector. 
Many o f the co llectives prosper, others, at least, function reasonably well.
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Chapter 10: The 'Nagy Era1 in A g ricu ltu re , June 1953- 
December 1954: co llec tiv isa tion  in re tre a t
10.1 'New Course': Imre Nagy and the June Resolutions
A fte r  the Hungarian delegation returned to  Budapest from  Moscow, w ith
precise instructions from  the new Soviet leadership, two meetings in quick
succession were hurried ly called. On 17th June 1953, under the shadow o f the
East-Berlin uprising, the C entra l Com m ittee Secretaria t o f the HWP met to  hear
Matyas Rakosi's report on the c r it ic a l s ituation which had arisen a fte r the
(4)Moscow v is it. Then, on the decision o f th is  meeting, the Politburo was
convened on 20th June to  in it ia te , in response, a programme o f action to regiew
(5)'a ll the basic issues faced by the party and people's democracy'. Rakosi,
speaking at this meeting, stressed the 'h is to ric  significance' o f the event which,
he said, represented 'the most decisive turn ing point in the party 's h is to ry  since
(6)the assumption o f fu ll power in 1948'. But i t  was, perhaps, Jozsef Revai who 
responded to  the c r it ic a l s itua tion  most sharply. He declared tha t
many crises have faced the party in the past. But, there is an 
im portant d iffe rence between a crisis fac ing al illega l party  
and a ru ling party. While the fo rm er invokes hardly any 
national reaction the la tte r  would be fe lt  throughout the 
country. Nevertheless, we must face th is shock ... we must 
not be a fra id  o f the ensuing storm ... the serious mistakes 
which have been made in the past cannot be elim inated by 
covering them up w ith  pe tty , p a rtia l m easures/?)
Imre Nagy stressed to  the meeting the im portance o f Soviet advice on how to  
correct the errors com m itted in the past and the im portance o f comrade Rakosi’s 
a ttitu td e  towards the new po licy line. He admonished Rakosi to  make fu ll use o f 
the critic ism s he had received in Moscow and pointed out tha t so fa r he had 
given no real evidence tha t he had identified  h im self w ith  those c ritic ism s  nor 
tha t he had understood th e ir importance and the pre-conditions required fo r the
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(8)successful correction  o f those errors. Rakosi promised tha t he would 'do a ll in
(9)his power to  co rrect our p o lit ica l d irection '.
A fte r  these prelim inaries, the meeting devoted its a tten tion  to  the main 
business and adopted the fo llow ing  reso lu tions:^*^
(i) to  convene the enlarged Centra l C om m ittee Plenum fo r 27-28th June
(ii) tha t at the Plenum two reports were to  be delivered, one by Nagy and 
the other by Rakosi, on each question regarding the errors com m itted 
and the new policy line
( iii)  a working party, composed of Rakosi, Nagy, Gero and Hegedus, was set 
up and entrusted w ith  the task o f d ra ftin g  a resolution suitable fo r 
submission to  the Centra l Com m ittee Plenum on 27-28th June; the task 
o f preparing a para lle l document, based on the d ra ft resolution, which 
was 'suitable ' fo r publication, was assigned to  Revai.(H )
The Politburo was convened again on 25th June to  consider the in it ia l d ra ft, as 
drawn up by Gero, w ith  the collaboration o f the others. A fte r  a lengthy and at 
tim es acrimonious debate the d ra ft resolution was fin a lly  approved w ith  the 
comments, incorporated on the insistence o f Nagy, tha t the fo llow ing  points 
were to  be given greater em phas is :^^
(i) tha t the changes in policies to  be introduced were p rim a rily  designed to
strengthen the worker-peasant alliance
(ii) tha t the Second Congress o f the Party, held in 1951, had approved a
com plete ly erronous policy
(iii)  tha t the responsibilities o f the 'foursome' Rakosi, Gero, Revai and
Farkas, should receive greater emphasis
(iv) tha t Imre Nagy was, from  the very beginning against the excessive pace
o f co llec tiv isa tion
The D ra ft Resolution was presented by Imre Nagy, in the name o f the Po litburo, 
to  the C entra l Com m ittee Plenum convoked fo r  27-28th June, in a tough speech 
tha t pulled no punches. In e ffe c t he called on the Plenum to  rubber-stam p the 
Moscow decisions. The f irs t  report, however, was delivered by Rakosi. A lm ost
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tw o weeks had now passed between the Moscow v is it and the Plenum. This may
be ind ica tive  o f how d if f ic u lt  Rakosi must have found i t  to  te ll the Centra l
Com m ittee what, in fa c t, had happened in Moscow. In a closed session members
of the Plenum, having received the d ra ft resolution document only one hour
before the meeting started, listened in numbed silence and w ith  bated breath as
Rakosi, fo llowed by Gero, Revai and Farkas - the ’leading foursome’ -  delivered
th e ir prescribed se lf-c ritic ism s. The focus, however, was on Rakosi's speech.
Not, o f course, tha t the com m ittee members had not known about the
d iff ic u ltie s , the contradictions and the adversities, s tra in ing both the economy
and society. During the f ir s t  ha lf o f 1953 several reports were, in fa c t,
subm itted by the various party  and governmental agencies to, and ignored by, the
leadership. In March tw o reports were subm itted on the problems o f the
peasantry and ag ricu ltu ra l production alone. These had frank ly  warned tha t the
kulak liqu idation policy was in p ractice  having a disastrous e ffe c t on the middle
and, especially the upper middle, peasants, which s ign ifican tly  contribu ted to  the
mass abandonment o f land. The fines imposed on the peasants fo r n on -fu lfilm en t
o f compulsory delivered had been so excessive tha t they were impossible to  pay
(13)and the peasants had ceased to  tre a t them seriously. There were o ther 
reports too. I t  was believed then, however, tha t the main reasons fo r  the 
mounting problems lay w ith  the local organisations which disorted the 'co rrec t 
po licy o f the party ’, and w ith  ’the enemies o f the people’, who allegedly increased 
th e ir hostile ac tiv itie s  against the regime. There was no mention o f the erronous 
p o lit ic a l line pursued and the mistakes dom m itted in over-a ll economic policy. 
This was c learly  demonstrated by the Politburo resolution adopted as la te  as 28th 
May, which discussed the workings o f th National Assembly a fte r  its  ’v ic torious 
e lection ’. The resolution ca tegorica lly  stressed tha t the v ic to ry  was due to  ’the 
correct p o lit ica l line o f the party and the e ffe c tive  im plem entation o f its  po licy
(14)
in p rac tice .’ Thus, just two weeks before the delegation was summoned to
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Moscow the e ffe c tive  leadership o f the party  was unable or unprepared to
recognise the serious errors com m itted in overa ll economic and ag ricu ltu ra l
policy. Indeed, the same resolution adopted a po licy o f increasing the ra te  o f
(15)co llec tiv isa tion . A modest change in a ttitude , as noted earlie r, began to 
emerge only a fte r  the m eeting o f the Party Secretaria t on 3rd June. But, unlike 
the explanations given h ithe rto  the disclosures about the real causes o f the 
mistakes and th e ir personal connections were to ta lly  unexpected. Rakosi, v is ib ly  
shaken and w ith  hurt pride (but, as was soon to  transpire, w ithout genuine 
repentence) was m oderately s e lf-c r it ic a l fo r  having departed from  Leninist 
principles, fo r  substitu ting his ’personal leadership’ fo r  ’co llec tive  leadership' fo r 
placing h im self above the party and developing a 'cu lt o f personality ', fo r fa ilin g  
to respond to  the sound advice given by his comrades, and fo r im pa tien tly  and 
arrogantly ignoring th e ir warnings and repressing a ll va lid  c ritic ism s. W ith 
regard to the economy, he adm itted tha t early successes had led to  complacency, 
which resulted in plans which were c learly  ’adventurist’ because they had fa iled  
to  take in to  account the resource base po ten tia l o f the country: over­
industria lisation, s triv ing  fo r se lf-su ffic iency, forced co llec tiv isa tion  and the 
neglect o f agricu lture  were amongst the specific  errors made in economic 
policies. Erno Gero, as the economic 'overlord', fo llow ing  Rakosi also accepted 
blame fo r underestim ating the needs o f the working class and fo r the 
mismanagement o f the economy -  where his economic po licy o f over-emphasising 
industria l, especially heavy indusstria l, investment resulted in a lop-sided 
economy and an alarm ing reduction in the liv in g  standards o f working people. 
Jozsef Revai 'confessed' to  serious errors o f dogmatism in ideolgy and to  the 
backwardness o f cu ltu ra l life . F ina lly, M ihaly Farkas, somewhat ambiguously, 
spoke in vague generalities about the 'vio la tions in socia list le ga lity ', the
a rb itra ry  in terference in ju d ic ia l enquiries, the p o lit ic a l tr ia ls  and 
(16)imprisonments. The top leadership was fo llowed by other, lesser, pa rty
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o ffic ia ls  w ith  th e ir  confessions and c r it ic a l statements regarding th e ir  own roles 
and responsibilities in the errors com m itted. A ll speakers stressed the urgent 
need fo r  co rrective  actions.
( 1 7 )Follow ing these, the key-note address was delivered by Imre Nagy.
The main points o f his speech, custom arily, were incorporated in the D ra ft 
Resolution. But there were also great d ifferences between the two texts. Nagy’s 
speech at the personal level, in its  a ttack  on the party leadership was in its 
evaluation o f the catastrophic economic s ituation in the country, was 
considerably less restrained, more detailed and penetrating than the te x t o f the 
fin a l Resolution. He placed prim e responsib ility fo r the mistakes com m itted  on 
Rakosi, as the leaders o f the party, and on Gero, Revai and Farkas. The origins 
o f the errors, he stated, lay in th e ir ru ling  over the party and the country, th e ir 
'leaderism ' and th e ir ’cu lt o f personality '. The rapid and successful e lim ina tion  of 
the errors which, he said, went 'much deeper than it  appeared at f ir s t  sight ... is 
our p rim ary task', and this had depnded
on the extent to  which comrade Rakosi and those who, 
together w ith  him, were p rim a rily  responsible fo r com m itting  
them, comrades Gero, Revai and Farkas, those who held the 
real d irection  o f the party and the country in th e ir hands, go 
along w ith  complete uncovering o f the mistakes ...
But Nagy, in rem inding Rakosi tha t progress t i l l  then had been fa r  from  
su ffic ien t, po inting out tha t
comrade Rakosi's speech today was the f irs t  tim e tha t he had 
expressed any serious reaction to  the c ritic ism s which had 
been applied to  him personally and to  his p o lit ic a l
a c t iv i t y . ^ )
The D ra ft Resolution its e lf also exposed the errors com m itted, a ll be i t  in m ilder 
language, and it  indicated the changes needed and, in general term s, the
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measures required to  co rrect the mistakes. I t  was a comprehensive and long 
document, even in its  t i t le  'The Resolution o f the C entra l Com m ittee o f the 
Hungarian Worker's Party concerning the errors com m itted in the Party's 
p o lit ic a l d irection  and in its  p rac tica l work and the tasks re lated to  th e ir  
correction ' (A Magyar Dolgozok Partja  Kozponti Vezetosegenek hatarozata a 
part p o litika i iranyvonalaban es gyakorla ti munkajaban e lkove te tt hibakrol es 
ezek k ijavitasaval kapcsolatos fe lada tokro l) . ^ ^  As noted earlie r, there were 
in teresting differences between the te x t o f the Resolution and Nagy's speech to 
the Centra l Com m ittee. I t  is instructive  to  compare the tw o texts, especially in 
places pertinent to  a g r ic u ltu re .^ ^
The Resolution was divided in to four main sections: the f ir s t  dealt w ith  
the errors, the second analysed the origins o f the errors, the th ird  enumerated 
the measures required to  co rrec t the errors -  and outlined the fu tu re  tasks -  and 
the fou rth  discussd the pre-condition necessary to  e lim ina te  the errors. The 
preamble o f the document stated tha t 'the enlarged C entra l C om m ittee Plenum 
o f the HWP established tha t in recent years serious errors had been made in the 
party's p o lit ica l d irec tion  under the leadership o f comrade Rakosi. These errors, 
i t  stated 'adversely a ffec ted  the liv ing  standards o f the working class, weakened 
the links between the party, the state and the working masses and caused serious 
d iff ic u ltie s  in the economy'.
The f irs t  section o f the Resolution ennumerated and condemned the main 
errors in the economic policy pursued by the party  leadership, especially a fte r 
the Second Party Congress in 1951. Its main points were as fo llows:
Industry
The Resolution condemned:
i) the po licy o f excessively rapid industria lisation, especially the rapid 
development o f heavy industry as unsuitable and adventurist,
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ii) the a ttem pt at industria l autarky pursued w ithout due regard to  the 
re a lis tic  resource position o f the country, the needs o f the working class 
and working people.
According to  Nagy, going a step fu rth e r in his speech, the essence o f the errors 
was the fa c t tha t the economic policy, which aimed at 'bu ild ing socialism ', fa iled 
to  take in to  account the basic economic law o f socialism,
the constant raising o f the standard o f liv in g  o f the 
population. On the contrary, the a ttem pt to  achieve the 
maximum development o f heavy industry, which in plain 
words was megalomania, was accompanied by a fa ll in the 
standard o f liv in g  o f the workers,(2 2 )
which, he said, was a deviation from  m arxism-leninism . The roots o f the 
mistakes, according to  Nagy, were
the exessive ra te  o f development o f heavy industry, the 
unfavourable trend o f the ra tio  o f sectors 'A ' and 'B', the 
constant fa llin g  behind o f agricu lture , the growing 
indebtedness o f the country and, as an overa ll result o f a ll 
these factors, the fa ll in the liv in g  standard o f the
population.(23)
This also meant tha t,
instead o f reducing the excessive rate o f industria lisation and
_______ the_ in vestments, allocated to., it ,  .we. tried -to . solve the~ problem------------------
by increased exp lo ita tion o f ag ricu ltu ra l production and by 
pu tting  greater burdens on the peasantry.(24)
This, he said, was not only economically, but also p o lit ic a lly  harm fu l as well,
boecause i t  had led to  a weakening o f the worker-pesant alliance.
A g ricu ltu re
Serious mistakes had been com m itted in the fie ld  o f agricu lture . The Resolution 
blamed the party  leadership fo r neglecting ag ricu ltu ra l production and fo r  the
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po licy  o f fo rc ib le  and excessively rapid ’socia list transform ation ’ o f agricu lture ,
i.e., co llec tiv isa tion , pursued by the leadership. The Resolution had pointed out 
tha t,
i) the neglect o f agricu ltu re  was an inevitable consequence o f the
excessive ra te  o f industria lisa tion which had le ft  inadequate resources 
fo r the development o f agricu ltu re . As a consequence, the share of 
agricu ltu re  in to ta l investments had declined in recent years -  although, 
in absolute term s its  value had increased every year during the five -yea r 
plan period.
The production o f individual farm ers was especially neglected.
Again, Nagy in his speech went considerably fu rth e r and in to greater details. He 
declared tha t there were two sides to  the question o f reduced investm ents fo r 
agricu lture : (i) the general reduction in the development o f the en tire  
ag ricu ltu ra l production -  here, he blamed the leadership fo r th ink ing  tha t they 
could have achieved socialism while reducing the standard o f liv in g  o f the 
population and (ii) the neglect o f the production o f individual farm ers -  here, he 
noted tha t scarcely anything had been done to  help to  raise th e ir output despite 
the fa c t,
tha t the greater part o f our ag ricu ltu ra l production is 
provided by individual farm s and tha t we could not do w ithou t 
them under any circumstances, p a rticu la rly  as we have no 
possib ility  o f making up fo r th e ir production from  other
sectors o f agricu ltu re .(25)
ii)  The most s trik ing  admission, perhaps, o f the Resolution was tha t a 
s ign ifican t con tribu to ry  fa c to r fo r the indequate ag ricu ltu ra l production 
was the excessive ra te  o f ’socia list transform ation ’ o f ag ricu ltu re , fo r 
which there were no ’ob jective ’ p o lit ic a l or economic conditions in the 
country.
Because o f this, the Resolution stated, co llec tiv isa tion  had had to  be carried  out 
by force, w ith  adm in istra tive  pressures. Also, the com plicated and ever- 
changing compulsory de livery system had created great uncerta in ty  among the
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working peasants and harmed the re la tions between the pa rty  and middle
peasants. I t  had also prevented the consolidation o f the co llec tive  sector, the 
im provement o f co llec tives ’ economic position and the rapid increase in the 
welfare o f th e ir  members.
And, because o f the mistakes in these policies, ind iv idual working 
peasants, and even more so the riche r peasants had neglected th e ir  farm s, 
p a rticu la rly  long-te rm  investments e.g., in orchards, vineyards and animal
husbandry. A t the same tim e, co llec tive  farm s fa iled  to achieve the level o f 
yields o f individual farm s. Under these circumstnces the m a jo rity  o f co llec tive  
farm s became indebted to  the state and paid lower incomes to  th e ir members 
than the average individual fa rm er earned. Rather in teresting ly, re fe rrin g  his 
listeners to  the te x t o f the Resolution, Nagy said tha t
the pa rty ’s po licy was incorrect in the autumn o f 1948, when 
the decision was taken to  co llec tiv ise  agricu lture  w ith in  a 
space o f 3 to  4 years. The party la te r m odified the pace ... 
but even the modified pace was an extrem e one ... and had
serious and harm fu l consequences.(26)
One o f the consequences, according to  him, was the v io la tion  o f the vo luntary 
princip le  and the other was the d irec t or ind irec t application o f economic or 
p o lit ica l force. The forced pace o f co llec tiv isa tion , he continued,
alienated from  us, indeed set against us, broad s tra ta  o f the
working peasantry and, most o f a ll, the element cruc ia l to
ag ricu ltu ra l production, the middle peasantry, w ith  whom it  
would have been be tte r fo r us to  have established a f irm  
a lliance ... and led to  our iso lation from  the decisive masses 
o f the peasantry and to  an unsettling  o f the worker-peasant 
alliance, the fu tu re  o f which was put in peril.(27)
According to  Nagy, the large-scale and ruthless commassation o f holdings 
entailed by the forced development o f co llectives and State Farms, the excessive 
delivery quotas, the measures against the 'kulaks’ and the mass abuses o f power
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and v io la tion  o f rights, which produced insecurity amongst the land-owning 
peasantry, resulted in the peasantry losing th e ir productive w ill and led to  them 
re s tr ic tin g  or com plete ly abandoning th e ir production and o ffe ring  up th e ir  land 
to  the state or sim ply abandoning i t  to  seek th e ir means o f live lihood elsewhere. 
The result was tha t the land area abandoned or o ffe red to  the state by the 
peasants d ram atica lly  increased and by the spring o f 1953 had reached more than 
9 per cent o f the country ’s arable land area. Nagy pointed out tha t there had 
been clear evidence - which, he said, could be num erica lly demonstrated -  tha t a 
connection existed.
between the excessive development o f the collectives and the 
ex traord ina rily  large-scale growth in the state reserves o f 
uncu ltivated land.(28)
iii)  According to  the Resolution, serious errors had been made w ith  regard to 
the policy o f 'de-kulakisation'. The policy o f kulak lim ita tio n  was soon 
turned in practice  in to  a po licy o f liqu ida ting  them. This was c learly  
confirm ed by the fa c t tha t w ith in  5 years the to ta l area under th e ir  
cu ltiva tion  declined to  30 per cent o f its  orig ina l level. Those who 
remained engaged in ruthless exp lo ita tion  o f the land w ithout due regard 
to  proper economic cu ltiva tion  and curta iled livestock breeding. This was 
a grave error.
But an even greater error, according to  Nagy, was the fa c t tha t about the same 
amount o f land had been abandoned by the working peasantry as had been gained 
by the unlaw fu l measures carried out against the kulaks. And this was one o f the 
reasons, Nagy said
why we have seen in the recent past the evermore 
determ ined development in the villages o f a form  o f peasant 
so lida rity , a peasant un ity , d irected against the c ity , which 
could have dangerous consequences both fo r the worker- 
peasant alliance and fo r the en tire  people’s dem ocracy.(29)
iv) A long w ith  the collectives, the Resolution stated, the area under the 
c u ltiva tion  o f State Farns was increased too rapid ly. This prvented th e ir  
economic consolidation, the acchievement o f high yields and p ro f ita b ility
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and th e ir development in to  'Model Farms'. I t  was wrong o f the party 
leadership to  a ttem p t to  secure centra l food requirements in animal 
products p rim a rily  through the State Farms and state undertakings.
This section o f the Resolution concluded w ith  a c ritic ism  o f the leadership fo r 
neglecting the basic needs and the liv in g  standards o f the population and fo r 
increasingly supplanting p o lit ic a l education w ith  adm in istra tive  practices and 
a rb itra ry  jud ic ia l and police procedures against the population.
Section two of the Resolution, in line w ith  the s e lf-c ritic ism  o f Rakosi 
e t.a l., discussed - less sharply than Nagy in his speech, but more sharply than 
Rakosi's own cautious s e lf-c ritic is m  - the reasons fo r the mistakes. B rie fly , it  
blamed the party, or ra the r the s ituation tha t prevailed w ith in  its  leadership, fo r 
the mismanagement o f p o lit ic a l and economic policies: the incorrect method of 
leadership and cadre policies, the inappropriate relations between the party  and 
government leadership and the serious weakness in the ideological work o f the 
party. Lack o f 'co llec tive  leadership', the substitution o f personal fo r  co llec tive  
leadership, accompanied by 'cu lt o f personality ' and re s tr ic tio n  o f party  
democracy, were named as the main reasons fo r the errors. For these the 
Resolution made Rakosi, Gero, Revai and Farkas responsible. The Resolution 
deeply condemned the 'adventurist' policies pursued by the four leaders, which 
had brought the country to  bankrupcy and severely damaged the party 's lin k  to  
the masses, which was also shown by the fa c t tha t the narrow pa rty  leadership 
fa iled  to  respond to  signals o f growing illega l acts by the police and state 
security  organs against the people.
A series of recommendations (based, o f course, on Soviet advice) were 
outlined in Section Three o f the Resolutions, to change rad ica lly  the economic 
policies o f the party - to  strengthen the badly shaken worker-peasant a lliance, to  
establish a friend ly  re lationship w ith  the working peasantry and to  restore th e ir  
confidence in agricu ltu ra l production. The fo llow ing  measures connected w ith
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agricu ltu re  were intended to  a llev ia te  the problems created in the previous 
period:
1 . - a reduction in the ra te  o f industria lisation, especially in the growth o f
heavy industry
-  a serious exam ination o f the economic development plan and its  
re la tion  to  the size and d irection  o f investments. The growth o f 
industria l production and investments was to  be reduced already in 
1953 and the planned increase in industria l production in 1954 was to  
be only 8 per cent.
-  proportions o f investment between lig h t and food industries and heavy 
industries to  be rad ica lly  revised,* greater emphasis was to  be given to 
ligh t and food industries and, especially, to agricu lture , where the lag 
was the greatest -  while m aintaining the princip le tha t the growth o f 
the means o f production should be re la tive ly  greater than o f the means 
o f consumption.
Investment in 1954, compared to  1953, was to  be reduced even in 
absolute term s and in the next five -year plan was to  be set at a leve l 
which corresponded to the capabilities and a va ila b ility  o f resources in 
the country.
2 . - concerning agricu lture, cap ita l investments, p roduc tiv ity  and yields as
w ell as fa rm  output were to  be increased and the num erica l 
development o f C o llective  and State Farms was to  be slowed down. In 
line w ith  th is overa ll po licy i t  was proposed tha t:
a) substantia l assistance be given to  individual as w e ll as co llec tive  
farm ers to  help them to  develop th e ir  economic a c t iv ity  to  enable 
them not only to  fu l f i l  th e ir compulsory delivery obligations and 
pay th e ir taxes to  the state but, in addition to  increase personal 
consumption and leave a surplus fo r sale on the free  m arket; 
individual farm ers were to  be enabled to  use the services o f 
Machine T racto r Stations to  a greater extent than before; and be 
allowed to  buy a r t if ic ia l fe rtiliz e rs , at o ff ic ia l prices, on the free  
market to  a greater extent from  the autumn o f 1953; ve te rina ry  
services were to  be made available free o f charge to  a ll 
ag ricu ltu ra l producers
b) the coercive nature o f the 'free* contractua l system be term inated 
and the system made more a ttra c tiv e  to the peasants by provid ing 
a larger quantity  o f industria l consumer goods
c) while the co llective  would remain the road to  'bu ild ing socialism in 
the countryside' the im m ediate task was not th e ir  num erica l 
development but the economic strengthening o f existing co llec tive  
farm s to  increase th e ir p roduc tiv ity  and yields
d) compliance w ith  the princ ip le  o f voluntary jo in ing  o f co llectives 
was to  be ensured consistently; i t  was to  be made possible fo r  
anyone who wished to  leave the co llec tive  to  do so at the end o f
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the economic year; and the dissolution o f co llectives was also to  be 
allowed where tha t was the wish o f the m a jo rity  o f th e ir members; 
new collectives were only allowed to  be form ed on the 
recommendation o f the local councils and approved by the M in is try  
o f A g ricu ltu re
e) along w ith  increased support fo r  individual and co llec tive  farm ers 
fu rth e r re lie f was to  be given through the re-exam ination o f 
outstanding debts (about 2 00  m illion  fo rin ts) and where claim s were 
deemed not leg itim a te , r ig h tfu l, or could not be proven or 
recovered, they were to  be cancelled. Fines imposed on both 
individual and co llec tive  farm s fo r  fa ilin g  to  com plete th e ir 
compulsory deliveries (approx. 400 m illion  fo rin ts ) were to  be 
abolished
f) in the in terest o f increased ag ricu ltu ra l production, land from  state 
reserves was to  be allowed to  be leased or rented on a five  year 
ra ther than one year basis and the policy o f commassation was to 
be halted; the state should not accept any more land 'o ffe rs '
g) a new compulsory de livery system, sim pler than the existing one, 
was to be introduced from  1954 and reduced de livery quotas were 
to  be le ft  unaltered fo r several years ahead.
Here, in his address, Nagy was more c r it ic a l than the Resolution. He said tha t 
the size o f compulsory deliveries, the plans imposed on the peasantry,
were so great tha t they hindered production and reduced the 
productive sp irit, undoubtedly contribu ting  to  the o ffe rin g  up 
o f land and the increase in state reserves, and opening up, 
perhaps, the widest possibilities fo r the ille ga litie s  
com m itted against the peasantry and the k u la k s . ( 3 0 )
Nagy adm itted tha t he, too, was responsible fo r this 'because I should have
(31)
ensured the unconditional observance o f lega lity '.
h) the persecution, harrassment and the policy o f liqu ida ting  the 
kulaks was to  be stopped, but the policy o f th e ir re s tr ic tio n  
continued; the 'kulak lis t ' was to  be abolished; and the compulsory 
delivery quotas and tax burden o f kulaks was to  be eased.
According to Nagy, the grave consequence o f the 'kulak lis t ' was tha t the loca l 
organs com plete ly m isin terpreted the concept o f kulak and classified as kulak 
and put on the 'kulak lis t ' whoever they had fe lt  like  pu tting  there, anyone who
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may have la id h im self open to  personal animosities and vendettas. The 'kulak 
lis t', Nagy said
was a blunder from  the very beginning, had a harm fu l 
influence on our policies towards the peasantry and played a 
s ign ifican t part in shaking the confidence o f the working 
peasantry ... th is is why we must recommend the abo lition o f 
the kulak lis t and re tu rn  to  the only co rrect po licy in the 
present period, tha t o f re s tr ic tin g  the k u l a k . ( 3 2 )
Finally,
i) the Resolution specified tha t in addition to  increased to ta l investm ent in
agricu lture , its  d irec tion  and d is tribu tion  had to  be changed: greater 
amounts were to  be allocated to  assist the more economical and 
p ro fitab le  production, to  help farm ers to improve th e ir land and to  plant 
orchards and vineyards.
The section concluded w ith  a statem ent regarding the com m itm ent rad ica lly  to  
improve the leve l o f m ate ria l well-being, p rim a rily  o f the working class but also 
o f the peasantry and more generally the entire  population, by in troducing 
appropriate measures to  raise th e ir liv in g  standards.
And, very b rie fly , the fina l, fourth , section o f the Resolution indicated 
the im portant preconditions necessary to  accomplish a ll the above tasks:
a) 'co lle c tive  leadership' and an end to  'personality cu lt'
b) e lim ina tion  o f backwardness in the ideological and theo re tica l work o f 
the party
c) improvement in the selection, tra in ing  and prom otion o f cadres and,
d) improvement in re lations between party  and state leadership.
F inally, the D ra ft Resolution, in accordance w ith  the Politburo decision at its  
meeting on 25th June, also acknowledged Imre Nagy's opposition to  the 
in troduction o f rapid co llec tiv isa tion  in 1948/49 by pu tting  i t  on record tha t
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the exaggerated tempo o f socialisation in agricu lture was an 
e rro r aggravated by the fa c t tha t w ith in  the party comrade 
Im re Nagy opposed th is po licy, but instead of adopting these 
views the party  leadership im properly called them 
'opportunist* and subjected comrade Nagy to  pa rty
d is c ip l in e .^ )
Fu lly  aware tha t Rakosi and his associates were acting on instructions from
Moscow, the large m a jo rity  o f the Centra l Com m ittee members were not too
eager to  pa rtic ipa te  in the discussion tha t fo llowed the main speakers. Most o f
those who contributed to  the discussion focused th e ir  a tten tion  on the origins o f
past mistakes ra ther than on the tasks ahead, perhaps, understandably since most
members came to  the meeting to ta lly  unprepared and were, indeed, ill-equipped
to  analyse and propose solutions to  those tasks. Only one voice was heard,
cautioning the Plenum against a llow ing the dissolution o f co llectives. Istvan
Dobi, a fo rm er farm  worker and 'fe llo w -tra ve lle r ', knowing the sentiments o f the
peasants and the unpopularity o f collectives, feared, in the event co rre c tly , tha t
(3 4 )
i f  th is were allowed many o f them were like ly  to  be dissolved.
The Plenum also deliberated on im portant organisational and personnel
changes. The precise details o f Im re Nagy's proposed reorganisation o f the
government were om m itted from  both the te x t o f Nagy's speech to  the C entra l
Com m ittee and also from  the Resolution. This m ight not have been com plete ly
unintentional. I t  is possible tha t, in fa c t, the changes in it ia lly  proposed were
more rad ica l than what was u ltim a te ly  announced to  the Hungarian Parliam ent a
week la te r on 4th July. Nevertheless, the fo llow ing  changes were made. F irs t,
the Plenum elected a new and sm aller Po litburo which was now composed o f
Matyas Rakosi, Im re Nagy, Erno Gero, Andras Hegedus, Istvan Hidas, Istvan
K ris to f, Rudolf Foldvari, Lajos Acs and M ihaly Zsofinyecz -  w ith  candidate
members Istvan Bata and Bela Szalai. While Rakosi had been dropped from  the
Government he remained F irs t Secretary o f the Party (in line  w ith  Soviet
(3 5 )
practice , a change from  his fo rm er t i t le  o f General Secretary). The
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mistakes made in the past, however, demanded scapegoats and M ihaly Farkas,
/Qg\
the M in ister o f Defence, was tem pora rily  dropped from  the P o litburo along 
w ith  Jozsef Revai, the M in ister o f Culture, and four other members. Apart from  
being subordinated to  the Politburo, the Party Secretaria t was com plete ly 
transform ed because Gero, Farkas, Revai, Nagy, Hegediis, K r is to f and Hidas 
were dropped and only three secretaries were appointed: Rakosi, and two
inexperienced men, pushed in by Rakosi, Lajos Acs and Bela Veg, both Rakosi’s
(37)men who could not, even i f  they wished, stand up to  Rakosi as equal partners. 
Second, the Plenum decided on the re-establishment o f co llec tive  leadership and 
appointed, on the recommendation o f the Politburo, Imre Nagy as Chairman of 
the Council o f M inisters (i.e., Prime M inister), w ith  f irs t  deputies Erno Gero,
who was fu rth e r given the key position o f M in ister o f the In te rio r, and Andras
(38)Hegediis, who also took over the M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re  from  Ferenc Erdei.
His career during the next three years reached its  peak as Prim e M in is te r in 
1956.
The changes in personnel m ight at f irs t  sight appear s ign ifican t. Closer
exam ination, however, leads to  a d iffe re n t conclusion. Rakosi’s group was
checked but by no means crushed. Rakosi, as party leaders, s t i l l  had the party
machinery behind him, the Politburo and the Party Secretaria t (of which Nagy
was not a member) remained in his sphere o f influence. His fo rm er deputy,
Gero, remained in charge o f the pa rty ’s economic policy, and in addition he
gained an im portant post in the new government as M in ister o f the In te rio r. B Ta
Szalai, also a Rakosi man, in the Politburo as a candidate member, was put in
charge o f the National Planning O ffice  (Orszagos Tervh iva ta l), replacing Zoltan
(39)Vas, who was moved to  another fie ld  o f work. Essentially, the June Plenum 
fa iled  to  create the preconditions necessary fo r a rad ica l change -  fo r tha t 
Rakosi and Gero should have been dropped from  the leadership, and Nagy should 
have appointed some o f his own adherents to  im portant positions. In e ffe c t,
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those p rim a rily  responsible fo r the grave errors com m itted in the past, Rakosi, 
Gero and - apart from  a b rie f spell -  Farkas, remained in the top leadership, 
where they had undiminished scope to  manipulate and shape fu tu re  po litics . By 
accepting th is new set-up, Nagy had already begun to  dig his own grave, while 
Rakosi, behind the scenes, began to  rearrange his own lines. Nagy, at th is stage, 
as fa r  as can be seen from  the composition o f the top leadership, fa iled  to  bring 
in any o f his men. I t  would appear tha t at the June Plenum Nagy was genuinely 
pleased to  see the changes and corrections in the pa rty ’s policies. He was fu lly  
aware, o f course, tha t Rakosi and Gero and those near to  them would t ry  hard to 
bring about his downfall. But, naively, he put his trus t in the Centra l C om m ittee 
which had unanimously endorsed his June Resolution. He fa iled to  take fu lly  in to  
account the changeability o f the Centra l Com m ittee, the power o f Rakosi and 
his associates (well tra ined in intrigues) and the resistance o f the pa rty  
apparatus. Had he been able to  foresee his fu tu re  fa te , perhaps he would have 
taken a stronger line in both personnel and p o lit ica l questions. He even took 
Farkas back, the very person who, together w ith  Rakosi, was most responsible 
fo r the ille ga litie s  com m itted in the past.
The 'June Resolution' unanimously endorsed by the Centra l C om m ittee  
Plenum, as usual, was a pow erfu l condemnation o f Rakosi's misrule in Hungary. I t  
was highly c r it ic a l, embarrassing and hum ilia ting  to  Rakosi personally and to  his 
leadership, something he was un like ly to  fo rge t. Rakosi, having reta ined the 
leadership and hold over the party, s t i l l  had the power not only to ’guide’ the 
C entra l Com m ittee away from  any inquiry in to  the purges but also to  prevent 
the pub lication o f the damaging Resolution, which, had it  come in to  the open, 
would have made it  considerably more d if f ic u lt  fo r  the m a jo rity  o f the old 
leadership to  remain in o ffice . As noted earlie r, the Politburo, at its  20th June 
meeting, had agreed on publication and appointed Revai to  prepare a suitable 
document -  based on the D ra ft Resolution. This agreement, apparently, s t i l l
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prevailed on 27th June, the f irs t  day o f the Plenum. On tha t day, in his address 
to  the Plenum, Rakosi proposed tha t the resolution adopted should be made 
known to  a ll party members and published in the press. But, on the one hand, 
probably encouraged by the u n o ffic ia l news about the arrest o f B e r ia ^ ^  -  whom 
he had considered his princip le  enemy, most vehement c r it ic  and the main 
instiga to r o f the new Soviet po licy -  in the days before the Plenum met, Rakosi 
believed tha t the power struggle in Moscow had moved in his favour. On the 
other hand, perhaps even more im portan tly , having seen the shock the previous 
day's revela tion caused amongst the Centra l Com m ittee members, Rakosi 
antic ipated even greater problems and reversed his recommendation tha t the 
June Resolution be published in the press. When the Centra l C om m ittee Plenum 
entered its  second day, 28th June, Rakosi modified his earlie r proposal and asked 
the Plenum to  approve, instead, tha t:
i) there would be no publication in the press but a p o lit ic a l version o f the 
Resolution would be announced to  the forthcom ing session o f Parliam ent 
and that,
ii) the newly elected Politburo would be authorised to decide how, when and 
in what form  it  wished to  use the Resolution.
Introduced by Gero from  the chair, the modified proposal, the f irs t  point on the 
agenda fo r 28th June, was unanimously passed by the Plenum and, a t the same
(41)
tim e, i t  authorised the Politburo to  'fina lise ' the te x t o f the Resolution. In 
the event, o f course, neither the Resolution nor the speech made by Nagy were 
published u n til very recently ; and Rakosi's speech remains unpublished to  date.
Consequently, party branch secretaries and higher party  o ffic ia ls  were 
not only not informed in depth about the reasons fo r the changes but learned 
about them only when Nagy had announced the new programme o f his 
government, on 4th July. Even the news about the Plenum m eeting its e lf was 
severely restric ted . A vague attem pt, however, had been made to  prepare the
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rank and f i le  membership fo r the impending changes. On 30th June a b rie f 
ed ito ria l in the party  daily newspaper, Szabad Nep, noted tha t the C entra l 
Com m ittee had met and on the basis o f reports by comrades Rakosi and Nagy 
appropriate resolutions had been adopted by the C entra l Com m ittee Plenum, 
which had also introduced personnel changes in the leadership. The a rtic le  also 
emphasised tha t ’party leaders are not in fa llib le ’ and tha t ’every party member 
and c itizen  o f the country have the righ t and duty to  c r it ic is e  the party 
le a d e rs h ip '/^
The newly constiuted Politburo met on 2nd July to  accept fo rm a lly
Rakosi's resignation from  the prem iership and to  d ra ft 'f in a l version' o f the
Resolution. According to  o f f ic ia l sources, the most s ign ifican t departure, w ith
respect to  agricu lture , was the insertion o f the word 'main' in the sentence
dealing w ith  the fu tu re  o f the co llective  system. This now read 'the co llec tive
(43)system remains the main road to  build ing socialism in the countryside'. And 
this 'f in a l version', which became available in the West (and, o f course, in the 
Party Archives) s t i l l  remains, o ff ic ia lly , unpublished in Hungary; even today, but 
ce rta in ly  at the tim e, was available only to  a narrow c irc le  o f top party  
fu n c t io n a r ie s /^
The new National Assembly, elected on 17th May 1953, was convened fo r
the f irs t  tim e on 3rd-4th June 1953 to  hear the newly elected Chairman o f the
Council o f M inisters, Imre Nagy (in accordance w ith  the d irectives given by the
Soviet Union), present 'New Course' policies to  the nation including the main
(45)d irection o f economic policy. The announcment o f a reorganisation o f the 
government in a sense appeared as a 'norm al' sequel to  the May parliam entary 
elections. But the appointments to  the Council o f M inisters created a sensation. 
The p o lit ica l content o f Nagy's inaugural speech, on the whole, fo llow ed the 
outline o f the June Resolution. But in im portant aspects i t  also deviated from  i t  
- and even more from  his speech to the Plenum. I t  was considerably less severe
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condemnation o f Rakosi and, notably, he om itted  to  denouce the party  leadership 
by name. The crimes o f Rakosi and his entourage were not exposed to  the 
public; th is  la te r perm itted  him to  regain his influence. The new programme was 
d ra fted  by a working group o f the Politburo and the events in East Berlin  must 
have influenced its  fin a l s tructure . Apparently, Gero h im self played an 
im portan t ro le in the d r a f t i n g / ^  The programme, o f course, ran counter to  a ll 
his policies but he, too, had to  accept the necessity o f change. A f te r  a ll, i t  did 
not represent a to ta l break w ith  the S ta lin ist state adm in istra tion model. The 
main elements o f th is continued, a ll be i t  in a modified fo rm . A  measure o f 
agreement seems to  have existed w ith in  the Politburo regarding the content o f 
the programme. The main disagreement was not so much about the content - 
which, o f course, was more or less anded down from  Moscow anyway - but about 
the tone in which it  was presented to  the public. Nagy wished i t  to  be presented 
in much tougher language. In the event, his speech became a grea tly  toned-down 
version o f the June Resolution, and even more so compared to  the speech he had 
delivered to  the Plenum. Since up t i l l  then a ll deliberations about the impending 
changes had been conducted in complete secrecy, Nagy's speech caused not only 
a national but, being the f irs t  revisionary announcement, an in te rna tiona l 
sensation. A t home it  had a libe ra ting  e ffe c t on the public, w ith  especially great 
reactions amongst the peasants, but i t  resulted in confusion, alarm  and fear 
among the party a p p a ra tch ik i/4^
In the life  o f the nation Nagy, seemingly, announced nothing new. He 
promised a constitu tiona l government, in which parliam ent played a greater ro le, 
to  'consolidate lega lity ' by liqu ida ting  in ternm ent camps, to grant an amnesty fo r  
crim ina ls 'whose gu ilt was not grave enough fo r  th e ir release to  endanger state 
security ', to  review the sentences o f people who had been trea ted  unjustly, to  
increase the security o f the individual by a radica l change in police methods, 
separating the police from  the jud ic ia ry , and to  ease res tric tions on the free
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practice  o f re lig ion. In making these promises, however, he stressed tha t despite 
the regime's 'sp irit o f clemency' not an inch o f space nor a minute's respite would 
be granted to  enemies o f the regine. In the fie ld  o f po litics  Nagy, above all, 
wished to  change the prevailing structure  o f power by making the Council o f 
M inisters the responsible organ fo r d irecting  the a ffa irs  o f the state instead o f 
the Communist Party or its  leaders. This, he declared, would take the country a 
long way on the road to  the dem ocratisation o f national life . He promised to 
re tu rn  to  Leninist principles, co llec tive  leadership, se lf-c ritic ism  and in tra -p a rty  
democracy in the party's day-to-day ac tiv ities . He spoke as an orthodox Leninist 
-  and, curiously, he om itted  any mention o f Stalin's name from  his speech.
The main emphasis o f Nagy's 'New Course' was, however, on economic 
ra ther than p o lit ica l reform s. The basic thrust o f his new pogramme departed 
rad ica lly  from  Rakosi's practice . But i t  was a statement o f in tentions ra ther 
than a ca re fu lly  developed, in te rna lly  co-ordinated and consistent programme of 
p o lit ic a l and economic reform s. For tha t Nagy had neither the tim e  and the 
in fo rm ation  nor, as w ill be seen, the p o lit ica l power. Under the ensuing power 
struggle between Rakosi and him self -  characterised by an environm ent o f 
p o lit ic a l in trigue, adm in istra tive  obstruction and, often, sabotage - the 
im plem entation o f his programme turned out to  be random and incom plete. And 
the most prom inent feature o f th is well intentioned regime was, chaos, 
indecisiveness and inab ility .
In announcing his economic programme Nagy promised workers, peasants 
and the in te lligents ia  greater consideration and be tte r liv in g  conditions. He 
declared tha t fundamental changes in the policies o f the Rakosi government 
were needed in every fie ld . He promised more to  the people than any o ther East 
European leaders have pledged subsequently. To begin w ith , he said, the nation's 
fu tu re  economic programme would be based on a slower pace o f industria lisa tion  
and a sh ift o f emphasis from  heavy and m ilita ry  industry to  ligh t and food
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industries and agricu lture , w ith  the aim o f raising liv ing  standards, increasing 
consumer supplies and re la ting  the whole economic programme to  what the 
nation could a ffo rd . He declared tha t the attem pted industria lisa tion was fa r 
beyond the country ’s capacity. Thus,
in dealing w ith  problems o f our economic policy I wish to  
emphasis tha t the government w ill conduct th is po licy in 
accordance w ith  the directives, rea lis tic  programme and 
resolutions o f the Centra l Com m ittee o f the Hungarian 
Workers’ Party. This means tha t in developing our people's 
economy the government w ill always take in to  consideration 
the country's economic resources and w ill not set its e lf tasks 
fo r which the economic preconditions indispensable fo r th e ir 
realisation are lacking ... or can be realised only at the 
expense o f the liv in g  standards o f the people ... we have to  
note, and we have to  state fran k ly  before the whole country 
tha t the objectives o f the augmented five  year plan are 
beyond our strength. Its im plem entation is g rea tly  
overtaxing our resources; i t  is hampering the country's 
welfare and has recently  resulted in a decline in the standard
o f living.(48)
He then announced the measures tha t were necessary to  remedy the s ituation, 
measures to  implement the changes in economic policy and im proving liv in g  
standards. Thus,
the development o f socialist heavy industry cannot be an end 
in its e lf ... the main tasks fac ing the government in carry ing 
out its  economic policy: an overa ll and s ign ifican t reduction 
in the speed o f development o f the national economy and of 
the investment programme in con fo rm ity  w ith  the capacity 
o f the country ... The general d irec tion  o f economic 
development must also be m odified. There is no ju s tifia b le  
reason fo r an exaggerated industria lisation and s triv ing  fo r 
autarky, a ll the more since Hungary does not possess the 
necessary raw materials ... we shall ... substantia lly slow 
down the ra te  o f development o f those branches o f heavy 
industry which are manufacturing means o f production ... and 
put a much greater emphasis on ligh t and food industry, 
which w ill enable us to  satis fy  the growing needs o f the 
population ... one o f the basic principles o f the government's 
economic policy w ill be the constant raising o f the working 
people's liv in g  s ta n d a rd s .^ )
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The basis o f these measures was, o f course, not his own. I t  was given to  him and 
the Hungarian party  leadership in Moscow. Nagy's own in d iv idua lity  was 
re flec ted , perhaps, more in his policies towards agricu lture. His in ten tion  here 
was to  appease the angry peasantry and, in particu la r, to  abandon the 
accelerated pace o f co llec tiv isa tion  and persecution o f individual f a r m e r s / ^  
His programme in agricu lture  was, a ll in ten t and purposes, the ’NEP’ programme 
he advocated and o ffe red the party  ea rlie r during the debates o f 1948-49. Nagy 
had believed then, and s t i l l  believed, tha t in the trans itiona l period from  
capita lism  to socialism the main task o f the communist party  was to  lay the 
economic foundations o f socialism, fo r which NEP was the fundam ental 
instrum ent,
the NEP is the specific means and form  o f build ing socialism 
and is absolutely necessary in every country where there is a 
s ign ifican tly  large number o f small p e a s a n t s . ^  1)
Accordingly, the re lations between the working class and the peasantry must be 
based on a market exchange o f com modities between socia list industry and 
priva te  agricu lture and restructions on the output o f individual farm ers must be 
removed and a ll producitve capacity, including cap ita lis t capacity, must be 
u tilised fo r  the sake o f economic expansion. Here, Nagy called Lenin to  his help. 
Lenin h im self, he said, had emphasised tha t the build ing o f socialism  would 
in it ia lly  be tied in w ith  the growth o f individual farms, and by advocating 'NEP' 
he was merely fo llow ing  Lenin’s example. During the years o f super- 
industria lisation, from  1949 to  1953, he said, the principles o f 'NEP' were 
vio lated, a stage o f the revolu tion was jumped over and production became 
unbalanced. As a result, socialism in Hungary was brought to  the verge o f a 
catastrophe which could only be averted by re-evaluation o f the methods o f 
build ing socialism, as provided by the June Resolution, and by g e tting  r ig h t the
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balance between the production o f industria l goods and the production of 
(52)consumer goods. The weight o f Nagy's au thority  and p o lit ica l im pact was, of 
course, considerably greater now because tim e, and the Moscow leadership, by 
giving him th is mission, had com plete ly vindicated him and his ea rlie r stand.
The specific  details o f Nagy's announcement concerning the explosive 
issue o f agricu lture also conformed reasonably closely to  what was outlined in his 
speech to  the Plenum and the Resolution. While the industria lisa tion programme 
was 'exaggerated', he said, e ffo rts  to  improve agricu ltu re  had been wholly 
inadequate, w ith  disastrous results. Thus,
agricu ltu ra l production has been stagnating and during the 
past few years its  growth has been hampered by the meager 
investment, which has been reduced in the past few years, by 
the lack o f support fo r  individual farm ers and, fin a lly , by the 
rapid num erical development o f co llective  farm s which is 
neither econom ically nor p o lit ic a lly  ju s tifiab le  and which has 
made the peasant's work insecure.(53)
A g ricu ltu ra l output was to  be raised, he said, f ir s t ly  through the increase in state
invstment;
the government regards i t  as one o f its  forem ost duties 
substantia lly to  increase ag ricu ltu ra l investm ent, while 
simultaneously reducing investment in industry in order to  
ensure a speedy and large-scale increase in ag ricu ltu ra l
o u tp u t .^ )
Secondly, by giving more support to  individual farm ers fo r  increased e ffic ien cy  
and making i t  possible fo r them to  use MTS services and enabling them  to  buy 
a r t if ic ia l fe rt il iz e rs  on the free market in s ign ificant quantities.
Although, he stressed, agricu ltu ra l production was s t i l l  based m ainly on 
individual fa rm ing the government not only did not help them but persecuted 
them. Thus,
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i t  is w e ll known tha t our ag ricu ltu ra l production rests, to  a 
decisive extent, on individual farm s whose produce is not only 
indispensable to  the ocuntry but whose productive 
development is in the general in terest. The government, 
therefore, regards i t  as its  forem ost task to  help individual 
farm ers and to provide them w ith  the means o f production, 
fe rtiliz e rs , qua lity  seed and the application o f mechanised 
services and modern techniques in p ro d u c tio n .^ )
W ith regard to  increased production, he went on to  say, another pow erfu l 
d isincentive fo r individual farm ers, the uncerta in ty o f property ownership which 
had resulted from  the frequent complete and pa rtia l commassations, must be 
removed. For this, he said
the government wishes to  re in force the security o f peasant 
holdings, th e ir  property rights and th e ir production by every 
possible means. To p ro tect the peasants' holdings the 
government w ill p rohib it, as o f th is year, the commassation 
o f land, which usually takes place in the autumn -  a 
procedure which diminished the peasants' desire to  produce 
more. (56)
Next, in a c ruc ia l passage o f his address, he declared tha t the regime had trea ted  
the peasants harshly:
during the co llec tiv isa tion  programme much bully ing was 
practised. This not only offended the peasants' sense o f 
justice  but also caused serious harm to  our economy and 
played an im portant part in bringing about the present state 
o f a ffa irs .^ ? )
and tha t the bru ta l and widespread v io la tion  o f the princip le  o f free choice, o f 
vo luntary co llec tive  farm  membership, fo r  the sake o f exaggerated 
co llec tiv isa tion  by in tim ida tion  and financ ia l pressures and by punishment and 
other lawless procedures, had created unviable co llectives and great 
d issatisfaction and unrest amongst the peasants. He stressed tha t, henceforth, 
co llec tiv isa tion  must be based on voluntary acceptance by the peasants. And in 
one o f the most s trik ing  assurances to  the peasantry he promised tha t they would
- 683 -
not be forced in to  co llectives any longer and tha t co llec tiv isa tion  its e lf was to
be slowed down because 'the exaggerated speed o f co llec tiv isa tion  ... has
(58)undoubtedly contributed to  the present d iff ic u ltie s .' Moreover, those
peasants who wanted to  leave existing collectives would be allowed to  do so, 
a fte r the harvest. Thus,
in order to ensure complete respect fo r the princ ip le  o f 
vo luntary membership the government has decided, in fu tu re , 
to  allow co llective  members, who so desire, to  carry on 
fa rm ing ind iv idually -  because they th ink this m ight promote 
th e ir  prosperity -  to  leave the collectives at the end o f the 
economic year. In addition, the government w ill pe rm it the 
dissolution o f those co llectives in which the m a jo rity  o f 
members express such a desire.(59)
An in tegra l part o f Nagy's programme was his emphasis on the im portance o f and 
support fo r individual farm ers, pa rticu la rly  his stress on the role o f the middle 
peasants in production, and i t  im plied the creation, strengthening and increase in 
number o f individual farm ers -  as a class they must be allowed to  expand and 
develop th e ir farms. His statm ent, in this respect, d iffe red  i f  not in substance 
then ce rta in ly  in emphasis, from  the te x t o f the Resolution. To increase fa rm  . 
output the Resolution, too, considered support fo r individual farm ers im portan t. 
But in his address to  parliam ent Nagy put much greater emphasis on th is, p lacing 
i t  'f irs t  and forem ost'. A t the same tim e, again deviating somewhat from  the 
Resolution, Nagy was less emphatic regarding the development o f co llectives. In 
the in terest o f increased food supply they, too, must be encouraged but only on 
the basis o f free choice. Thus,
to  increase the food supply the government w ill continue to  
grant considerable aid to  co llectives in the fo rm  o f 
investment, and w ill contribu te to  the development o f th e ir  
animal husbandry and to  the w e lfare o f th e ir members 
because it  is the most FEASIBLE road fo r the p e a s a n try .^ )
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In so fa r  as the 'kulaks' were concerned, here, too, a more len ient po licy  was to 
be introduced. Persecution was to cease and the infamous 'kulak lis t ' to  be 
abolished. Thus,
excessive measures against the kulaks have resulted in ...
d iff ic u ltie s  fo r  the state in u tilis in g  the so-called 'land
reserves’ ... in fa c t, these remained u n c u lt iv a te d .^ )
Another measure aimed at increasing the output o f individual farm ers was to 
perm it complete freedom in the renting and leasing o f land. Those who desired 
to  rent from  the state reserve land would be allowed to do so fo r a period o f five  
years, intead o f the one year which was the ru le  previously, and peasants would 
be allowed to  reclaim  farm  land they had earlie r o ffe red to the state.
Last but not least, in his closing speech Nagy spoke o f the main goal o f 
socialism, and o f his new policy, tha t o f raising the liv in g  standards o f the 
population. The expansion o f production under socialism, he said, must never 
lose sight o f the 'u ltim a te  goal o f socialism', the raising o f the people's standard 
o f liv ing . Under Hungarian conditions i t  would sim ply be impossible to  achieve 
both industria lisation and co llec tiv isa tion  and an increase in a g ricu ltu ra l 
production simultaneously. Any a ttem pt to  achieve these aims, he warned, 
would result in a dram atic fa ll in the workers' and peasants' liv in g  standards, as 
had been amply demonstrated by ea rlie r policies, which led to  increasing 
d issatisfaction among the population, above a ll the working class. Therefore, 
o ther segments o f the population were also to  be granted concessions: workers 
were promised re laxation in norms and a reconsideration o f wages; to  prom ote 
the supply o f consumer goods, and in addition to  encourage lig h t consumer 
industries, permission, in the form  o f licences, was to be given to  p riva te  
enterprise in the fie ld  o f re ta il trade and sm all hand icra ft industries to  engage in 
production; professionals and in te llectua ls, pa rticu la rly  the 'o ld -tim e '
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in te lligents ia , were promised be tte r consideration and appreciation o f th e ir 
work. The new government, Nagy declared, was also determ ined to  f ig h t the 
high prices im m ediate ly and i t  promised a la rger and more s ign ifican t reduction 
in prices a fte r the a u tu m n /^
The s ta rtling  announcement o f the new government programme by Nagy 
was received w ith  a great sigh o f re lie f by the nation and was widely, though as 
was soon to  be shown, erroneously, regarded as presaging the fa ll o f Rakosi. The 
imm ediate reaction, to ta lly  unexpected by the regime, was basically th ree -fo ld . 
The nation as a whole regarded i t  not necessarily as an end to  the communist 
system, but ra ther as a great thaw. Gradually, more and more c r itic is m  came 
from  the people o f those who had repressed them. The nation slow ly began to  be 
emancipated; i t  rediscovered its e lf and began to  put names to  the repression o f 
the past and gradually, from  a position o f passive oppostition, i t  moved on to  the 
attack. These attacks, to  be sure, were s t i l l  weak, but party  functionaries, the 
police apparat, party activ is ts  and people who had been in tegra ted in to  the 
priv ilege system had received no warning or advance in fo rm ation  about the 
pending changes and th e ir origins, and, fo r these reasons, were sim ply astounded, 
frightened, shocked. Nagy's speech, coming from  the head o f state ra the r than 
through trad ition a l party lines, created serious po lit ica l confusion, unce rta in ty  
and incomprehension, even panic, w ith in  the party: i t  seems tha t low er and 
middle functionaries assumed tha t there had been a sp lit between the pa rty  and 
the government and did not know which side to  take; among the top party  
echelons there were signs o f a controversy between orthodox S ta lin ists and 
advocates o f the new programme. Lower and middle pa rty  functionaries 
watched the developments from  a distance and many o f them waited fo r  Rakosi 
to  speak and could not understand why i t  was Nagy who had made the 
announcement and why they had not been inform ed o f these developments. 
N a tura lly , they turned to  the party leadership fo r  advice on what to  do and asked
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what was to  become o f them. Most o f the peasants explained the new
programme in term s o f the inevitable change o f the p o lit ic a l system,
'communism was over' and they began to  ta lk  fre e ly  and u n fla tte r in g ly  about
th e ir  leaders in the collectives. They in terpre ted Nagy's speech as a go-ahead
and in many parts o f the country large numbers o f working peasants refused to
w a it -as instructed u n til the autumn -and amidst a great fanfare o f trum pets,
pa rticu la rly  in the eastern part o f the country, made clear th e ir in tentions to
leave the collectives, not even w a iting  u n til the harvest was gathered in. Many
o f them demanded the re tu rn  o f th e ir land, animals and implements appropriated
fo r the co llec tive  and proceeded to  enforce th e ir demand w ith  p itch -fo rks  and
sickles; there were numerous clashes in the countryside. In many co llectives,
im m ediate ly a fte r Nagy's speech a general meeting was called to  discuss the
(63)dissolution o f the co llective . The in it ia l rush was so great in many places as
/A J \
to  threaten the end o f collectives. Apparently, noone apart possibly from  
Rakosi and Dobi, perhaps not even Nagy him self, had foreseen tha t the 
dissolution o f co llec tive  farm s would take place so rap id ly and on such a large 
scale as i t  did. The im mediate and large-scale w ithdrawals o f peasants from  
collectives in Yugoslavia, when i t  was allowed ea rlie r in March 1953, could,
/ e c \
however, have served as a warning to  the new Hungarian leadership. Also, 
fa c to ry  workers demanded tha t norms be lowered, harsh labour d iscip line 
abolished and 'slave drivers' dismissed. For several days, industry almost came 
to  a standstill.
Nagy's 'New Course' announcement was published in the newspapers on
5th July, but already the next day, on 6 th  July, the o ff ic ia l pa rty  da ily
newspaper, Szabad Nep, launched a covert campaign against Nagy and his 'New
Course' policy. While, in his speech to  the National Assembly on 4th Ju ly Nagy
unambiguously stated and critic ised  the mistakes o f the past, Szabad Nep already
(66)began to  extenuate, to  gloss over those mistakes. I t  was the f ir s t  o f a long
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series o f attacks. Then, on 10th July, came the o ffic ia l annoucement o f the 
arrest o f Beria. Rakosi took th is as a signal to  mobilise the pa rty  apparat 
against the forces o f re fo rm . Also the alarm  caused by the fe rm ent throughout 
the country, by the sw ift changes in policy, by the rush o f peasants leaving the 
co llectives and, perhaps most im portan tly , by the confusion and f r ig h t Nagy's 
speech had created amongst the m a jo rity  o f party  functionaries -  frigh tened  tha t 
the 'New Course' m ight lead to  a loss o f party  au thority  and th a t the 
continuation o f 'se lf-c r it ic ism ' could sooner or la te r reach lower levels, when 
they could be called to  account -  had given Rakosi the basis to  mount a counter­
a ttack  against the 'heretics'. His task was, o f course, by no means an easy one. 
Since both the Moscow decisions and the June Resolution were s t i l l  in fo rce , he 
had to  act circum spectly. But he refused to  give up everyth ing he had so fa r  
gained through b itte r  struggle. On the one hand, he noticed w ith  great dismay 
the tremendous success Nagy had achieved in his parliam entary appearance, and 
the alarm of the appratchiks on the other hand, looking or pro tection . Something 
had to  be done to  neutralise the e ffe c t o f the announcement. One week a fte r
Nagy's announcement o f his new programme, on 11th July, Rakosi, having by now
(67)fu lly  regained his self-confidence, hastily  convened a conference o f Budapest 
Party A c tiv is ts , ostensibly to  clear the confusion which had arisen a fte r  Nagy's 
announcement, and to  quell the ris ing  hopes o f the 'enemy'. His appearance w ith  
Nagy was intended as a display o f pa rty  un ity . In fac t, i t  was his f ir s t  move to
secure a d iffe re n t in te rp re ta tion  o f the June Resolution and to  a tte m p t to  lessen
(68) (6Q)
the significance o f the change. Rakosi's speech, considerably over­
s im p lify ing  the earlie r mistakes in economic policy under his leadership, was fu ll 
o f th in ly  veiled warnings against over-estim ating Nagy's re fo rm  programme and 
'threatened unruly elements w ith  reprisals'. He assured party  members tha t
un ity  existed between the party and government and made i t  c lear th a t the pa rty  
machine was in no way resigned to  abandoning the controls. He com fo rted  the
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fear-ridden party o ffic ia ls  tha t there was no purge in the o ffin g  and reminded his
listeners, la rgely m ilita n t Stalin ists, tha t the source o f the government proposals
announced by Nagy was the party, whose basic aim, the build ing o f socialism,
remained unchanged. He made it  clear tha t the 'New Course' did not mean
lawlessness or the abandonment o f communist goals. W ith great ta c tic a l sense,
designed to  strengthen his position, Rakosi 'adm itted ' tha t the experience o f the
last few days had demonstrated tha t i t  would have been be tte r to  announce the
new programme in the name o f the party, ra ther than the government, because
'many comrades', he said, 'were not clear tha t the proposed measures, subm itted
to  the National Assembly by Nagy, had been worked out on the basis o f the
(71)resolution o f the Centra l Com m ittee. He challenged the statem ents about
the deterio ra ting liv in g  standards and maintained tha t the 'standard o f liv in g  was
higher than it  had been fo r a long tim e '. He denounced the 'enemy's' reaction  to
Nagy's speech, the 'a ttitude  tha t the plan was no longer in fo rce , th a t norms need
not be observed, tha t work discipline was unnecessary and tha t w ith  the
(72)e lim ina tion o f fines every fa c to ry  worker could do as he pleased'. Taking
advantage of the fa c t tha t the resolution remained unpublished, Rakosi could
take up an offensive position re la tive ly  easily. He re-emphasised industry,
although he accepted the need fo r slower heavy industria l development, but at
the same tim e he stressed tha t 'next year we want to  produce more coal, more
(73)steel than this year.' He did not, in fa c t, denounce the po ilcy  o f one-sided 
development o f heavy industry and declared categorica lly  tha t the five -yea r plan 
was not beyond the country's resources. Claims o f th is kind, he said, orig inated 
from  the 'enemy'. He stressed tha t the plans already in progress must go on 
because i f  they were a rb itra r ily  changed, w ithout being 'coordinated in the 
in terest o f the national economy', confusion would result. Thus,
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i t  is not true that" our plans are exaggerated. This is proven 
by the f irs t  ha lf year results, which show tha t our f ir s t  ha lf 
yearly plan, despite serious underfu lfilm ent in January and 
February, is over fu lf il le d . The erro r is tha t in our plan, 
which can be fu lf il le d , the share o f heavy industria l 
investment is too large and there is too l i t t le  investm ent in 
the sectors which d ire c tly  or in d irec tly  increase the liv ing  
standards o f our working people. I t  is th is m istake which we
wish to  e l im in a te .^ )
W ith th is statem ent many o f the past mistakes were washed away and it  also 
suggested to  his listeners the possib ility  o f a d iffe re n t in te rp re ta tion  o f Nagy's 
earlie r announcement. Behind the scenes, from  the f ir s t  week a fte r  Nagy's 
announcement, a fie rce  debate began concerning the speed and scale o f 
correcting  the disproportions tha t had develped in the economy as a resu lt o f the 
exaggerated ra te  o f industria lisation.
When addressing the meeting Rakosi sketched his views concerning 
fu tu re  ag ricu ltu ra l policy. He declared tha t,
cap ita l investment in agricu lture  had declined in recent yers, 
due to excessive industria lisation. This in its e lf was a 
m istake ... but in addition to th is we made another mistake: 
we lost sight o f the in terest o f the individual working 
peasantry. M ineral fe rtiliz e rs  and ag ricu ltu ra l machinery 
were placed almost exclusively at th  disposal o f the State and 
C o llective  Farms and they were the f ir s t  to  enjoy the 
services o f the Machine T racto r Stations.^**)
He also adm itted that,
during pa rtia l commassations the vo luntary princ ip le  was 
o ften  vio lated ... and contractua l production was done under 
duress w ith  v io la tion  o f the vo luntary princ ip le  and 
adm in istra tive regulations and penalities were used against 
individual farm ers, o ften middle peasants were trea ted  as i f  
they had been on the kulak lis t, and they were res tr ic ted  and 
harrassed the same way as kulaks.^®)
and,
tha t our system o f state deliveries changed from  year to  year 
w ith  the result tha t the working peasants did not know th e ir
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obligations to  the state in advance ... (and that) frequently  
pressure was exerted and adm in istra tive  regulations were 
used against those who were not w illin g  to  sign contracts ... 
working peasants were in a state o f uncerta in ty, they 
frequently  abandoned th e ir  land and found work in industry or 
State F a r m s . ( 7 7 )
Recognising these facts, he said, a few measures had already been taken to  
correct these mistakes. One of the main aims o f the pa rty ’s and government's 
policies was to  revise the plan to  invest more in agricu lture. Also, the proposal 
to  slow down the num erical growth o f co llectives, he said, and the proposal 
which gave the co llec tive  member the possib ility  to  leave the co llec tive  at the 
end o f the economic year, and i f  the m a jo rity  o f members so desired to  dissolve 
the co llective , were to  reassure and regain the confidence o f the ind iv idua l 
working peasants. Rakosi hoped by re laxing contro ls on the ind iv idual peasants 
to  strengthen the 'worker-peasant alliance', and he expected tha t the co llec tives  
would remain to g e th e r /* ^
However, he delighted his listeners when he declared tha t although the 
co llec tiv isa tion  campaign had been tem pora rily  suspended, co lle c tiv isa tion  
remained the supreme end in view. Thus,
we must state c learly  and unambiguously tha t our party  and 
people's democracy invariab ly see in the co llec tive  the path 
to  the socialist reconstruction o f the countryside and 
accordingly w ill in the fu tu re , too, do everyth ing to  develop 
and strengthen t h e m . (79)
In tha t respect, he said, there was no change and an ti-co lle c tive  ag ita tion  
against socialist construction would not be to le ra ted ; the Communist P a rty  
would oppose the wholesale dissolution o f the co llec tive  sector w ith  a ll its  
strength. Nobody, he warned, would be allowed to  leave the co lle c tive  before 
October, and then only those who had been members fo r  three years; land could 
only be claimed back from  State Land Reserves and only co llectives which had
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been formed under compulsion and proved unworkable would be authorised to  
dissolve. Rakosi called on the party  members in the villages, the tra c to r  drivers 
annd combine operators to  close ranks in defence o f the co llectives because they 
were superior. He stressed tha t,
we shall not stand by id ly  while the enemy is try in g  to  
undermine the results thus fa r achieved in the construction o f 
v illage socialism ... we shall not to le ra te  any an ti-co lle c tive  
ag ita tion against the construction o f s o c i a l i s m . ( 8 0 )
He implored members and supporters o f co llectives to believe tha t the party  was
com m itted to  support them and tha t the fu ll power and m ight o f People’s
Democracy stood behind them. And, as i f  to  underline th is statem ent, he
announced tha t, in addition to the various concessions given to  co llec tive  and
individual farm ers already, on the recommendation o f the top pa rty  leadership, a
decree had been passed by the Council o f M inisters which reduced a ll compulsory
deliveries by the  collectives by a fu rth e r 10%. Those who le ft ,  he said, were not
(81)to  benefit from  this concession.
He warned peasants to  remain in the co llectives and branded those
’stampeding' to  leave as 'dodgers' and 'laggards'. He im plored his listeners 'not to
lose heart' and 'not to  give in to  enemy propaganda which trie s  hard to  push
beyond our co rrect measures and a ttem pt to  ag ita te  against the whole co llec tive  
(82)movement'. His statem ent ws given a tumultuous reception by his audience. 
He then sharply attacked the kulaks who provoked peasant resistance and had 
thought tha t th e ir  tim e had come. He stessed tha t,
we proposed the abo lition o f the kulak lis t because it  gave 
reason fo r  a tremendous amount o f abuse and unnecessary 
harrassing. We have realised tha t many kulaks were able by 
reasoning to  secure the removal o f th e ir  names from  the lis t, 
but on the other hand more than once working middle 
peasants have got on the lis t, a fte r  which they were
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subjected to  restric tions, even harrassed, just like  the
kulaks.(83)
I t  was fo r th is reason, he said, th a t the kulak lis t  was abolished. But, he
continued, de lighting his listeners, although i t  had been abolished,
the kulak remains a kulak, w ith  or w ithout a lis t. Whoever
may have been in doubt about th is can see i t  from  what
happened in the last few days, when the kulak's horn grew. I t  
is our job to  break o ff  the horn.(94)
On the whole, Rakosi's statem ent, especially on agricu lture , contrad icted  much
of Nagy's earlie r announcement which had given a f irm  promise o f the
consolidation o f p riva te  farm ing and security  o f ownership. Nagy la te r
commented tha t Rakosi's speech 'le f t  the party  inclined to  fee l tha t there was no
need fo r  great changes in party  life , leadership and policy; tha t ac tua lly  the old
(85)po licy could be continued'. To be sure, Rakosi's statem ent on the dissolution 
o f co llectives also contradicted Soviet advice. The June Resolution which stated 
tha t co llectives must be allowed to  disband i f  they wished to  do so was not an 
accident or a decision o f Imre Nagy; i t  was, as noted earlie r, proposed by the 
Soviet leadership.
Rakosi's speech succeeded in damping the enthusiasm created by Nagy's 
announcements. Rakosi's fo llowers, o f course, blamed Nagy fo r the loss o f 
prestige which the party  was suffe ring, especially in ru ra l areas. The 
im plications o f his speech were not lost on party  activ is ts , nor indeed on the 
nation: tha t the new programme, as represented by Nagy's government, was not 
quite tha t o f the party's. Thus, instead o f un ity  and co llec tive  leadership there 
was now an open split w ith in  the top party  leadership. The pa rty  apparatus was 
not standing behind the government programme. The subsequent a ttitu d e  o f the 
party  proved tha t the h in t was understood and acted upon. While the pa rty  
activ is ts  breathed more free ly  again a fte r  the speech -  th e ir  fears allayed -much
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o f the nation was astounded. The im portance o f Rakosi's speech cannot be 
exaggerated. I t  in itia ted  the fig h t between h im self and Nagy, a struggle which 
lasted fo r the next year and a ha lf (un til Nagy's fa ll)  and u ltim a te ly  degenerated 
in to  a 'supreme contest' between the two tha t could only be adjudicated by 
Moscow. His speech had created tw o camps in the party  and country at large: to 
one belonged a ll those who supported a national renewal and accepted Imre Nagy 
as its  leader, to  the other camp belonged a ll those social groups which had 
previously exercised authority , or were the executants or supporters o f the 
instructions which emanated from  those authorities. The la tte r  turned out to  be 
a considerably la rger group than many had previously thought - and i t  embraced 
in addition to  most party  rank and f ile , people in local authorities, in  trade 
unions and a ll those who were in fear o f losing the privileges provided by the 
regime. The struggle remained large ly concealed from  the rank and f i le  and 
unnoticed by the mass o f the population. I t  succeeded, however, in spreading 
uncerta in ty and unease among the beneficiaries o f the regime.
Nagy, too, was forced to  speak at the meeting. While he was s t i l l  
standing by the proposed reform s, he was c learly  on the defensive. Fo llow ing the 
same line as Rakosi, Nagy reasserted the government's 'good in ten tions ' and 
a ffirm ed  the so lida rity  between the party and the government. He expressed 
agreement w ith  Rakosi's speech and his explanation o f the new po licy  and then 
went on to  emphasise the va lid ity  o f the June Resolution which, he said, was 'a
/ Q g \
compass fo r the government.' He re ite ra ted  his views on the Five Year Plan, 
the s ign ificant fa ll in liv in g  standards and the in justices com m itted  towards the 
peasants and, in particu la r, the kulaks. As proof tha t the government intended 
to  keep its  promises Nagy stressed tha t steps had already been taken on the 
proposals made a week before. One o f these measures, he said, was a decree o f 
the Council o f M inisters which was to  be published the next day, on 12th July, 
which cancelled unconditionally and w ith  im m ediate e ffe c t a ll fines imposed
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individual peasants or co llectives fo r non -fu lfilm en t o f compulsory deliveries, or
fo r  fu lf i l l in g  them too la te . Another d ra ft decree, he said, would make
(87)ve terinary services free. He also revealed tha t the Council o f M inisters had 
been instructed to  submit a d ra ft decree regulating the precise conditions and 
procedures under which peasants could leave co llectives in October. A fte r  
reasserting the government's good w ill, Nagy made i t  clear tha t he would not 
to le ra te  the collapse o f work discipline which had fo llowed his f ir s t  speech, and 
he, too, stood up against 'r igh t-w ing ' elements who agita ted, he said, against 
harvesting, threshing and compulsory deliveries, which must be completed.
Conditions in agricu ltu re  were giving serious concern to  the regime:
fie lds were neglected, harvesting, which had hardly begun, was in many places
weeks la te, threshing ha lf finished, not a single fu rrow  tille d . These a c tiv itie s
norm ally finished at the end o f July, but now peasants had only one overrid ing
aim - to  divide the co llectiv ised land, equipment and livestock among themselves
and get out o f the co llective . They tried  to  force the hand o f the authorities by
refusing to  bring in the harvest unless, and un til, th e ir aim, deco llectiv isa tion ,
was achieved. In it ia lly , the newspapers were silent about the disorders. Instead,
there was only an insistent press campaign about the need to  speed up grain
harvesting. The delay in harvesting was explained in term s o f the widespread
(88)misconceptions about the 'r igh t tim e ' fo r harvesting the grain. Because o f 
these delays certa in  food item s were beginning to  be in short supply. A ll th is  
must have made even Nagy ponder over the reaction to  his ea rlie r new 
programme announcement and, he too, must have been pressed by the pa rty  
leadership to  intervene against the movement to  abandon the co llectives, which 
in many d is tr ic ts  had been assuming form idable proportions at the height o f the 
harvest. Nagy warned against im patience in pu tting  the government's 
relaxations in to e ffe c t and promised severe punishment fo r those who attem pted 
to  thw art the state's decision by acting illega lly , pressing demands, 
m isin terpreting the new regulations. Thus,
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he who heeds the voice o f the enemy instead o f tha t o f the 
party  and government, he who abandons le ga lity  and enters 
the road o f lawlessness should not count on the assistance o f 
the party and government. This applies to  those who, w ithout 
w a iting  fo r  October intend to  leave the co llectives in the 
middle o f the summer and t ry  to  use this righ t im properly and 
not at the tim e  stipulated by the government...(89)
and
... who in te rp re t the extention o f rights and concessions as i f  
they had no obligations to  the state e ithe r in taxes or 
de livery o f produce. I t  applies not in the least to  those 
kulaks who reply to  the government’s measures by an a n ti­
dem ocratic and anti-governm ent a ttitude , by vio la tions o f 
law and by abusing the working people. Let them not count 
on mercy. They w ill fee l the fu ll fo rce o f the law. (90)
Indeed, the rush o f individual co llec tive  members who presented pe titions to
leave the co llectives were insulted and in tim idated, th e ir appeals o ften  torn-up
and flung back in to  th e ir faces. In the weeks tha t fo llowed the regim e arrested
farm ers who resisted the authorities and continued to  ag ita te  against co llectives.
(91)References to  r io tin g  also began to  appear in the press. On 7th August a
fro n t page ed ito ria l en titled  ’Le t us p ro tec t our co llectives ' (Vedjuk meg a
term eldszovetkezete inket) c lea rly  revealed the extent o f the peasants' a n ti-
192)co llec tive  ac tiv ities . The party's da ily  newspaper b it te r ly  a ttacked the 
'enemy' fo r campaigning against co llectives and complained th a t pa rty  
organisations, instead o f surpressing this, had been content to  stand id ly  by. 
Urging communists to  wage an e ffe c tive  countera ttack, the newspaper to ld  them 
tha t th e ir  ch ie f ta rge t should be shirkers, those who 'sneaked' in to  the co lle c tive  
and who now were not 'content to  leave by themselves' but wanted to  persuade 
others to  do so also. Thus,
the enemy realised tha t th is year w ill be an im portant year in 
the strengthening o f co llectives and tha t members o f good 
collectives w ill have a larger income th is year than they had 
in the period o f individual farm ing. That is why every kind o f
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hostile r i f f - r a f f ,  horse traders, good-for-nothing parasites ... 
are s trik ing  at the prosperity  o f co llec tive  members ... I t  is 
obvious tha t he who works against the common property is
working against the people ... I t  is clear tha t the state
cannot a llow  th is and must s trike  w ith  the severity  o f law 
against those who are inc iting  against c o l le c t iv e s .^ !
The newspaper also attacked ’kulaks' and 'backward elements’ among kolkhoz
peasants, who 'dared to  raise th e ir  insolent heads’. I t  c ited a typ ica l case o f a
kulak who attem pted to  destroy a co llec tive  and described the punishment given
to  such offenders, who were excluded from  the co llec tive  farm , arrested and
(94)sentenced to  five  years in prison. C learly, the regime had found i t  necessary
to  oppose a ll propaganda fo r dissolution o f co llectives because such propaganda
had seriously endangered the very system its e lf. The newspaper warned
communists about the dangerous e ffe c t o f kulak propaganda; those m ainly
influenced by i t  were 'honest but wavering co llec tive  members’ -  p a rticu la rly
those who had jo ined only recently  and not ye t received a share in the p ro fit .
The paper ca re fu lly  pointed out tha t a d is tinc tion  had to  be made between tw o
groups, 'demagogue kulaks' and the 'uncertain ones', and insisted tha t the fo rm er
could be elim inated and the la tte r  convinced only i f  the party  form ed a group o f
(95)activ is ts  on every co llec tive  farm . As part o f the government drive to  
'popularise co llectives', and reassure th e ir readers, the press con tinua lly  
published detailed accounts o f kulak a c tiv itie s  and the loya l reaction o f 'good 
peasants'. The m oral o f these stories was supposed to  be tha t fa ith fu l kolkhoz 
peasants, who had no desire to  de-co llectiv ise  the land, saved the farm  by 
exposing kulaks as enemy agents and procla im ing the co llec tive  system the only 
road to  peasant p ro s p e r ity /* ^
I t  was against th is background of a high ra te  o f vo luntary dissolutions 
tha t Nagy was compelled to  speak, w ith  great emphasis, about the im portance o f 
and the government's determ ined e ffo rt to  support the co llectives. Under 
pressure from  events and the party, Nagy, ra the r in te resting ly , assumed an even
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more extreme, in communist parlance 'le f t is t ' position than Rakosi when he 
declared tha t co llec tive  fa rm ing remained the regime's u ltim a te  goal in 
agricu lture . He ca tegorica lly  declared tha t co llec tive  fa rm ing was,
the ONLY feasible road fo r  im proving the lo t o f the
peasantry and build ing socialism in the villages .^ ?)
In addition to  the somewhat tougher language and an increased emphasis on the 
im portance o f work discipline, there were a t least three major d iffe rences 
between Nagy's 4th July and 11th Ju ly speeches. The earlie r concession to  the 
free p ractice  o f re lig ion was not repeated, the promise to  pe rm it independent 
re ta il trade was ignored (apart from  a b r ie f mention o f village c ra ft  shops) and, 
more im portan tly  in the present context, i t  was e xp lic itly  stated tha t co llectives 
and not individual farm s were the best, proper and ONLY solution fo r  the 
agrarian problems and fu tu re  prospects o f the peasantry. To th is  extent Nagy's 
second speech seemingly marked a re tre a t from  the government's ea rlie r stand.
Rakosi's speech at the meeting o f the Budapest Party A c tiv is ts  proved to
be an e ffe c tive  instrum ent in a llaying the fears o f party functionaries and
ind ica ting tha t the June Resolution would be implemented in a h igh ly res tr ic ted
manner. Assessing the effectiveness o f the meeting, a report on 15th July
confirm ed tha t Rakosi’s speech had s ig n ifica n tly  eased the tension among party
functionaries and tha t 'jub ila tion  among them  was universal'. The report also
noted tha t the 'enemy' had im m ediate ly contrasted the tw o speeches and the
general view tha t had emerged was th a t 'what had been promised by Nagy had
(98)been re trac ted  by Rakosi'. Many, on the other hand, became bew ildered by i t  
a ll. A Politburo meeting, discussing the reaction  to  the A c tiv is ts ' m eeting also 
confirm ed tha t the Party A c tiv is ts  had now relaxed somewhat, but, at the same 
tim e, i t  noted also tha t there was a danger tha t the measures would be 
implemented by the old methods, w ithou t aspiring to  co rrec ting  the old
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(99)mistakes. Thus, in addition to  fa ilin g  to  demonstrate party  un ity , the
meeting also successfully prevented the m obilisation o f the party  fo r  the 
e ffe c tive  im plem entation o f the June Resolution. For tha t, Nagy would have 
needed the power to  make the fu ll te x t o f the Resolution, includ ing the 
critic ism s, available to  the party  members to  make them w idely known 
throughout the whole party. But almost a month had gone by since tha t meeting 
when, on 8th August (in teresting ly, coincid ing w ith  Malenkov's announcement o f 
his 'New Course’) an extraord inary Po litburo meeting, under the in fluence o f 
Rakosi, approved a d ra ft proposal e n title d  'D irectives concerning the debate and 
im plem entation o f the Resolutions o f the C entra l Com m ittee o f the Hungarian 
Workers' Party adopted by the enlarged Plenum in June 1953' (Iranyelvek a 
Magyar Dolgozok P artja  Kozponti Vezetosege, 1953 juniusi k ib o v ite tt tilese 
hatarozatanak megtargyalasara es megvalositasara) . ^ ^  Issued by the Po litburo 
towards the end o f August, the D irectives were merely a considerably less 
detailed and shorter summary o f the orig ina l June Resolutions (approxim ately 
ha lf o f the length). Regarding the fu tu re  tasks the document fo llowed the 
outline o f the June Resolutions fa ir ly  closely. However, i t  raised the issues 
regarding 'co llec tive  leadership', pa rty  democracy, c ritic ism s and se lf-c ritic ism s  
only in princip le  and i t  om itted  any reference by name of leaders who were held 
responsible fo r the grave errors com m itted in the p o lit ic a l line and the a c t iv ity  
o f the party in practice. This fu rth e r confused the C entra l C om m ittee and the 
leading party functionaries, especially the secretaries at lower levels. They 
in terpre ted the D irectives as meaning tha t Rakosi had already convinced them in 
his 11th July speech tha t the Politburo had made changes in the June 
R e s o lu tio n .^  ^
The second section was devoted to  the economic polic ies o f the party. 
W ith regard to  agricu lture the D irectives acknowledged th a t the low leve l o f 
investment 'had put a brake on the production o f individual farm ers'. They also
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re fe rred  to  the mistaken po licy o f the leadership, who paid more a tten tion  to  th  
rapid, num erical, development o f co llec tive  farm s than to  th e ir perform ance and 
consolidation. The D irectives also re ite ra ted  tha t the ’basic aim o f the party  was 
substantia lly and permanently to  raise the standard o f liv in g  o f a ll, but p rim a rily  
the working class.' To achieve this they had recommended a reduction in the 
development o f industry, especially heavy industry, and an increase in lig h t and 
food industries, but s t i l l  preserving the theory tha t the re la tive  growth o f Group 
'A ' was to be greater than tha t o f Group 'B'. W ith regard to  agricu ltu re , the 
D irectives established the fo llow ing  tasks:
1. output in a ll sectors o f agricu lture  was to  be increased
2. increased aid was to  be given to  co llec tive  farm s because they
represented the MAIN road to  build ing socialism in agricu ltu re
and the main fu tu re  task, in th is  respect, the D irectives stated was:
3. to  strengthen the co llec tive  farm s econom ically and to  im prove th e ir
yields and p ro fita b ility
and, regarding the individual peasant farm er, they declared tha t
4. in order to  achieve increased fa rm  output he too should be supported to  
enable him to develop his farm , and fu l f i l  his obligation towrads the 
state, and to  leave him enough produce to  take on the free  m arket
The th ird  section o f the d irectives, w ith  the t i t le  'Le t us mobilise a ll pa rty
organisations fo r the im plem entation o f the C entra l Com m ittee's Resolution and
the Government's Programme' was, perhaps, the most s ign ifican t. I t  re fe rred
extensively to  the 'hostile a c tiv itie s  o f the enemy', whose e ffo rts  were d irected
at undermining plan and work d iscipline and aimed at breaking up the co llec tive
farm  system. The D irectives emphasised tha t at the Budapest Party A c tiv is ts '
m eeting on 11th July the party  leadership had raised only issues concerning
economic policies. Because o f th is a fee ling had developed amongst party
functionaries tha t, while there was a need fo r a change in economic policy,
w ith in  the party everything was in order and therefore  should rem ain as before.
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The D irectives warned against th is  misplaced be lie f and called fo r  action 'in th  
s p ir it o f the government programme' to  improve party  work and fo r  the 
strengthening o f p o lit ic a l education.
F ina lly, the document summarised the tasks before the party :
1. realisation o f 'co lle c tive  leadership' at a ll levels
2. correct selection o f party  cadres and e lim ina tion o f d ifferences between
old and new cadres
3. bold c ritic ism s and s e lf-c ritic ism
4. widening o f party  democracy
5. increased m obilisation o f a ll pa rty  members behind the im plem entation
o f the June Resolution and government programme
6. increased vig ilance against the 'enemy'
While the document o ffe red  hardly any analysis or revelations concerning past 
mistakes, th is last assertion was given a disproportionately great emphasis. As, 
perhaps, was the in ten tion  i t  proved su ffic ie n t to  obstruct the fu l l  appreciation 
o f the real p o lit ic a l s itua tion  and consequently paralysed the w illingness o f party 
members, especially the activ is ts , to  ra lly  wholeheartedly behind the Resolution. 
Moreover, i t  also made subsequent re tu rn  to  'sectarian po litics ' easier. As Nagy 
la te r commented 'from  the D irectives many gained the impression th a t old 
methods would not be liquidated; the D irectives, on the whole, played in to  the 
hands o f those who were not enthusiastic about the new p o l i c y . L a t e r ,  at 
the October Plenum, in fac t, Rakosi was c ritic ised  fo r the D irectives.
The D irectives re flec ted  the state o f confusion regarding the fu tu re  
development o f agricu lture . In th is connection, i t  is in te res ting  to  lis t  the 
d iffe r in g  views expressed in documents and speeches regarding the emphasis to  
be placed on the co llec tive  farm  system. They were re fe rred  to  as
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1. the 'road to  build ing socialism in the villages (or in agricu lture) -  as in
the June Resolution,
2. the 'MAIN road to  build ing socialism in the villages' -  as in the minutes
o f the Politburo m eeting o f 2nd July,
3. the 'ONLY road to  build ing socialism (even fo r  progress by the peasantry)
in the villages' -  as in Nagy's speech to  the Budapest Party A c tiv is ts ,
and again
4. the 'MAIN road to  build ing socialism in agricu ltu re ' -  as in the D irectives
of 8th August.
Progress reports fo llow ing  the discussions on the D irectives, however, revealed 
tha t despite 'great e ffo rts ' m iddle and lower party  ac tiv is ts  s t i l l  fa iled  to  grasp 
the true meaning and fu ll significance o f the new pronouncements. For instance, 
reports on 24th A u g u s t^ *^ ,  25th S e p te m b e r^ ^  and 30th S e p te m b e r^ ^  
revealed serious and persistent shortcomings in the im plem entation o f the June 
Resolution. According to  these reports, party ac tiv is ts  tended to  underestim ate 
the need fo r a fresh approach to  party work and fo r new methods and, on the 
whole, fa iled  to  mobilise fo r  the im plem entation o f the new tasks.
By the end o f Ju ly and the beginning o f August Rakosi's a tta ck  on Nagy 
slackened. Unfavourable news came fo r  him from  M o s c o w :^ *^
1. in a com memorative pub lication o f the CPSU, to  mark the 50th
anniversary o f the foundation o f the Bolshevik Party, Stalin 's name 
appeared only three tim es, while Lenin's f i f t y  tim es. I t  stated, th a t 'the 
significance and revo lu tionary work o f Lenin would come to  prominence 
again, which in recent years was eclipsed by propaganda,
2. a fte r  three weeks o f delay, Izvestya published a long appreciative a rtic le
regarding the significance o f the new programme of the Hungarian 
Government,
3. a fte r tw o years o f negotiations the Korean arm istice  was f in a lly  signed
on 27th July, grea tly  reducing in te rna tiona l tensions and the need fo r 
m ilita ry  production, which was the basis o f Rakosi’s polic ies and his 
trum p card against the supporters o f Nagy,
4. Malenkov, in the Soviet Union, delivered his own 'New Course' speech on
8th  August; he announced a s ign ifican t reduction in the development o f 
heavy industry.
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Rakosi, fo r  the moment, m iscalculated. A fte r  a ll, the champion o f the 'New 
Course' in the Soviet unin was not Beria and Nagy was not to  fa ll w ith  him ; the 
po licy o f the Hungarian and Soviet leadership,for the tim e being at any rate , 
remained unchanged. And w ith  the Korean arm istice  the open struggfle  between 
the tw o sides reached a stalem ate. Rakosi decided not to  take his opposition, fo r 
the moment, to  breaking-point. W ith great astuteness he sensed, however, the 
f ra g il i ty  o f the consensus around Malenkov and chose to  bide his tim e . For the 
moment his only desire was to  strengthen his position, as F irs t Secretary o f the 
Party, under the prem iership o f Imre Nagy. But his resistance to  Nagy's 'New 
Course' continued, inconspicuously, behind the scenes and his a tten tion , and the 
b a ttle fie ld  sh ifted to  the sphere o f 'theory ' and 'ideology'.
Perhaps not surprisingly, in response to  the various reports and d iffe re n t 
theo re tica l in terpre ta tions, the lack o f theo re tica l and ideological foundation 
underpinning the 'New Course' alleged by the party  to  be the main cause fo r  the 
continued bew ilderment amongst party activ is ts . The party, i t  was claimed, 
could not move w ithout having a 'theory ' and the new economic credo had to  be 
explained to  the party  activ is ts  in term s they would understand. The party  
leadership, therefore , was forced to  make fu rth e r e ffo rts  to stabilise its  position 
and re la te  the new programme - especially in agricu ltu re  -  to  M arx is t-Len in is t 
trad ition . But as the o ff ic ia l statem ent on the June Resolution was delayed, so 
the elaboration o f the theo re tica l and ideologica l questions was slow too and, fo r  
one reason or another, made l i t t le  progress. The f irs t  comprehensive proposal 
dealing w ith  a wide range o f theo re tica l and ideological questions, en title d  
'Report concerning the shortcomings and tasks o f the A g ita tion  and Propaganda 
Departm ent o f the Centra l C om m ittee ' (Jelentes a Kozponti Vezetoseg Ag itac ios 
es Propaganda Osztaly mukajanak hianyossagairol es fe lad a ta iro l) was subm itted 
to  the P o litburo meeting on 5th August 1 9 5 3 . ^ ^  Regarding th e o re tica l work, 
the memorandum began by noting tha t the main source o f past mistakes was its
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weakness, namely, tha t fundam ental questions re la ting  to  the development o f 
People’s Democracy and the build ing o f socialism had not been system atica lly 
analysed, the appplication o f M arxism-Leninisn and Soviet experiece to  
Hungarian conditions had not been worked out properly. From th is  i t  concluded 
that,
the main task o f the party  in order to  end the preva iling  
uncerta in ty among party  members, to secure un ity  between 
the party's theo re tica l and p ractica l work and to  develop and 
implem ent our correct p o lit ica l line is to  improve theo re tica l
w o rk .(108)
The proposal then went on to  lis t those theore tica l questions the elaboration o f 
which could have helped party members to  understand the problems raised by the 
June Resolution. The d ifferences in in te rna l and in te rna tiona l conditions under 
which the build ing o f socialism in the Soviet Union began, during the 1920s and 
1930s, and in Hungary in 1948-49, ought to  have been taken in to  account: 
d ifferences in the level o f economic development, in resource endowment and 
instead o f ’cap ita lis t encirc lem ent’ the support o f the Soviet Union and other 
member countries o f the ’peace camp1. From these the memorandum had 
concluded tha t the ra te  o f industria lisa tion and co llec tiv isa tion  in Hungary could 
not have been faste r, but should have been slower, w ith  greater a tten tion  paid to  
the needs o f the masses, the accompanying ’class struggle’ being sharper than at 
tha t tim e in the Soviet Union. In the interests o f im proving the party 's 
theo re tica l work the proposal suggested tha t working groups should begin 
preparations, in the form  o f lectures, studies and publications, on each o f the 
fo llow ing  wide-ranging questions:
1. the characteris tics o f build ing socialism in Hungary; the problems
associated w ith  the application o f NEP in Hungary,
2. the va lid ity  o f basic economic laws o f socialism in Hungary,
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3. the laws o f planned and proportional economic development and 
economic planning in Hungary,
4. increased production and p rodu c tiv ity  as the basis o f increased liv in g  
standards,
5. the new form s o f economic re la tions between socia list countries,
6. the worker peasant a lliance as the basis o f the people's dem ocratic state,
7. the problems associated w ith  co llectives,
8. the in tra -p a rty  democracy,
9. the m atters re la ting  to  lega lity .
In response to  the proposal the Po litburo m eeting appointed a working com m ittee
composed o f Revai (the party's ch ie f theore tic ic ian), Nagy, Istvan Friss and 
M arton Horvath -  and instructed i t  to  prepare a report on the above questions, 
suitable to  serve as the basis fo r discussions at the next session o f the C entra l 
Com m ittee. L i t t le  is known about the work o f th is com m ittee. I t  is, however, 
known tha t th e ir  finished report, en titled  'D irectives ' (Iranyelvek) ^ ^ ,  was 
subm itted to  Rakosi's Secretaria t, on 30th September, a fte r which, on 8 th-9 th  
October the C entra l Com m ittee O ffice  d istribu ted  the report to  o ther members 
o f the Politburo except, ra ther in te resting ly, to  Imre Nagy. Since, however, he 
was a member o f the working com m ittee, i t  is perhaps fa ir  to  assume tha t he 
must have known about the content o f the report. The D irectives, apparently 
la rge ly the work o f Revai, were scheduled to  be used at the C entra l C om m ittee 
Plenum which on the suggestion o f Rakosi, was to  take place on 17th October. In 
the event, fo r  one reason or another, i t  was postponed to  the end o f the month.
The 'D irectives ', composed o f six sections, drew several im portan t, i f  
fa m ilia r, conclusions. The most im portan t, perta in ing to  agricu ltu re , can be 
summarised as follows:
1. tha t the Hungarian Communist P a rty  (as i t  was then called), a t its  3rd 
Congress in 1946, decided co rre c tly  to  give support to  sm all-scale
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individual farm ing, but had deviated from  th is  road a fte r the 
commencement o f co llec tiv isa tion ,
2. tha t a fte r 1948, but especially a fte r  1951, the party com m ited a mistake 
in its  worker-peasant alliance policy:
(i) the main e rro r was the neglect o f the question o f alliance w ith  the
middle peasant -  which was the result o f the rapid ra te  o f 
co llec tiv isa tion ,
(ii) the policy o f liqu ida ting  the 'kulaks’ was an e rro r and i t  was wrong
to id en tify  the strengthening o f new and middle peasants a fte r the 
autumn o f 1948 w ith  'kulakisation',
( iii)  the aim now was to  achieve the simultaneous development o f
small-scale ind iv idual fa rm ing and collectives. The view tha t the 
policy o f concessions to  middle peasants was sim ply a 'peasant 
po licy' must be opposed, because th is was the po licy o f the working 
class and the strengthening o f the worker-peasant a lliance was in 
the in terest o f the working class too; the dangers in a llow ing the 
development o f sm all-scale farm ing should frigh ten  none because, 
today, the advantages in i t  ra ther than the dangers were decisive.
3. the section on the question o f NEP rejected the view th a t the June 
Resolution, the government programme had meant the in troduction  o f a 
'New Econmoic Po licy' in Hungary. But, while the party  had allowed only 
a re la tive ly  narrow scope fo r th is  po licy to  assert its e lf,  i t  must now 
change its  po licy which aimed at 'jumping' too quickly over free  m arket 
re lations and the free  trade characte ris tic  o f NEP. This meant tha t 
a fte r the rapid advance the party  had returned to  the stage o f NEP 
which had been 'jumped over', w ithout endangering the achievements o f 
the process o f build ing socialism,
4. regarding the Soviet experience o f build ing socialism the D irectives 
pointed out tha t the sacrifices the Soviet Union had to  make during the 
policy o f rapid industria lisa tion and co llec tiv isa tion  were re la ted  to  the 
circumstances tha t prevailed at tha t tim e  in the Soviet Union, i.e., 
isolation, economic backwardness and class relations. The build ing o f 
socialism in Hungary proceeded under d iffe ren t, more peaceful, 
conditions and demanded few er sacrifices. This was known to  the party, 
even at its  3rd Congress, in 1946, but i t  had been fo rgo tten  a fte r  1948, 
and even more a fte r  1951, and Soviet experience had been copied 
mechanically.
A ll this, however, did not mean tha t the build ing o f socialism  in Hungary 
signified a sort o f 'Hungarian road' to  socialism, d iffe r in g  from  the 
Soviet Union. Here too, the build ing o f socialism, both in the c itie s  and 
the villages, the co llec tiv isa tion  o f individual peasants, the squeezing out 
o f the cap ita lis t elements, the liqu ida tion  of kulaks as a class 
represented the w e ll tr ie d  and only road to  socialism as worked out by 
the Soviet Union. This generally valid experience had to  be adapted to  
Hungarian conditions.
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The tortuous e ffo rts  to  reconcile theory w ith  the new practice , and to  re la te  i t  
to  Lenin's supe rfic ia lly  s im ila r 'New Economic Policy' in 1921, proceeded not 
only behind the closed doors o f the party  but were also observable by the general 
public. The f irs t,  open, explanation o f the new programme appeared in the 
party 's theo re tica l monthly, which alluded to  a s im ila r ity  between the 'New 
Course' and the 'NEP' period in the Soviet U n io n .^ * ^  And, w ritin g  in the 
October issue o f the same journal, Jozsef Revai, drawing heavily on the 
'D irec tives ' he had prepared earlie r, insisted tha t the 'NEP' po licy had been 
applied in Hungary ever since the end o f the war. Past errors, he said, were due 
to  the fa c t tha t the po licy had been in co rrec tly  applied,
we have been applying the NEP ever since the year o f change 
(i.e., 1948/49); however, i t  is evident tha t ever since, and 
especially since 1951, we have been d is to rting  the new 
economic po licy to  an ever-increasing degree. Consequently, 
the significance o f the NEP has gradually grown weaker. The 
m istake was tha t we wanted to  replace free m arket trade by 
socialist trade too q u ic k ly .(m )
Further a tten tion  was devoted, in te r a lia , to  theo re tica l questions at the C entra l 
Com m ittee Plenum which, w ithout any previous announcement, met, fo r  the f irs t  
tim e  since the in it ia tio n  o f the 'New Course, on 31st October 1953, to  review  the 
economic programme and to  hear Rakosi de live r a Po litburo report on the 
im plem entation o f the June R e s o l u t i o n . ^ F i r s t ,  Rakosi gave a report on 
economic developments: he re ite ra ted  tha t the main aim o f the new economic 
po licy was to  e ffe c t a real increase in the liv in g  standards o f the people, while 
socia list construction s t i l l  remained the party 's basic objective. Accord ing ly, the 
pace o f industria lisa tion had to  be slowed down and the cen tra l problem o f the 
new economic po licy was the development o f ag ricu ltu ra l production. He called 
the new farm  programme, w ith  its  support fo r  both individual and co lle c tive  
farm ing, the 'Len in is t L ink', which led to  the next lin k  in the chain o f 
development. Thus,
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(developing agricu lture) is our most im portant task now and 
in the next few years; we must concentrate a ll our e ffo rts  on 
carry ing  out th is task.(H 3)
He stressed th a t the production o f ind iv idual farm s would be indispensible and o f 
decisive im portance fo r a long tim e  to  come. The most s trik in g  part o f his 
speech, perhaps, was his account o f the party  opposition to  the 'New Course'. He 
revealed tha t many party members and economic functionaries had fa iled  to  
im plem ent the new programme because they considered the emphasis on 
agricu lture , at the expense of industry, a 'r ig h tis t deviation'. In an a ttem p t to  
appease re ca lc itran t party  members, and to  prove tha t the pa rty  was always 
consistent in term s o f its  policies and goals, Rakosi declared, as Revai had 
earlie r, tha t the 'New Course' did not im ply a change in po licy as the NEP had in 
the USSR. The 'New Course', he said, although s im ila r to  NEP, had been 
fo llowed in Hungary ever since the communists took power, but i t  had been 
res tric ted , so tha t its  effectiveness was reduced. The party had made errors in 
carry ing out th is po licy and now the new measures meant only the co rrec tion  o f 
errors com m itted previously. The country had moved 'in to  a new phase o f 
socia list construction ' and nobody should be misled in to th ink ing  tha t th is  was 'a 
po licy o f renounciation o f or deviation from  the true line o f p ro tec ting  
s o c ia l is m . '^ ^  The greatest obstacle to  rea lis ing the party programme was 
in e rtia  and resistance by party members and economic o ffic ia ls . Some party  
members, he said,
regard the slowdown o f industria l development as a 
retrogressive step, see in the support granted to  agricu ltu re  
and the peasantry a r ig h tis t po licy and consider i t  a devia tion 
from  the correct road o f socia list in d u s try .(H 5 )
He insisted tha t such ideas were like ly  to  cause serious harm and th a t any po licy  
which promoted 'the well-being' o f the whole working people' was hard ly a step
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backwards. To th is  extent, Rakosi gave a fa ir  in te rp re ta tion  o f the new 
government programme.
These theore tica l deliberations, in fac t, continued in to  February 1954. 
A f te r  the regime had stemmed the peasant exodus from  the co llectives, another 
party  theore tic ian , Gyorgy Nemes, re ite ra ted  the pa rty ’s policy:
excesive emphasis was put on one aspect o f the NEP - on 
re s tr ic tin g  priva te  trade and e lim ina ting  cap ita lis t elements; 
on the other hand, the establishment o f free  trade re lations 
and support o f independent peasants was neglected.^11®)
In o ther words, one o f the ch ie f aims o f the 'New Course’ programme was to  woo 
the m iddle peasantry and the various comparisons w ith  the Soviet NEP were 
made fo r the purpose o f assuring anxious party members th a t the new po licy was 
no denial o f communist economic goals, no 'reb irth  o f cap ita lism ’ and no a ttem pt 
to  'betray the the working class in favour o f the peasantry'. For the rank and f ile  
citizens, however, these assurances were neither im portant nor com forting . As 
the ’New Course' progressed i t  had become apparent that peasants (and workers 
and technicians) were consistently blocking e ffo rts  to  boost production and were 
unconcerned w ith  party  theory.
On the basis o f Rakosi’s report, the C entra l Com m ittee, 'ac ting  in the 
sp ir it o f the June Resolution', passed a resolution in much the same v e i n . ^ ^  I t  
blamed party members fo r  the fa c t tha t greater progress in ca rry ing  out the new 
programme had not been made. Thus,
some economic and party  o ffic ia ls  ... even oppose carry ing  
out the po licy o f the government ... things like  this have been 
apparent ... in the Planning O ffice , the M in is try  o f Heavy 
Industry (especially), the M eta llu rgy and Machine Industry as 
w ell as in the Party C entra l Com m ittee apparatus and in the 
planning and financ ia l departments. In the in te rest o f 
speedier rea lisa tion o f the party's June Resolution the 
wrangling and open opposition in some places must be stopped 
im m edia te ly .^*® )
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The C entra l Com m ittee, most probably on Nagy’s in it ia tiv e , reprimanded Rakosi 
fo r  his August 'D irec tives ’ and proceeded to  summarise the major tasks of the 
new economic policy as fo llows:
in the fu tu re  the prim ary goal o f our economic policy w ill be 
to raise continously and considerably, the standard o f liv in g  
o f the people, especially tha t o f the working class ... to  
continue, at a slower pace, the socia list po licy o f 
industria lisation, which w ill remain the main line o f our 
party. In accordance w ith  this, the pace o f industria lia tion  
must be retarded, especially the pace in the development o f 
heavy industry, and plans fo r economic development as w e ll 
as re levant investments must be reviewed. On the other 
hand, investments in agricu ltu re  must be raised and 
ag ricu ltu ra l production and yields must be increased, 
including on individual farm s. The num erical increase o f 
co llectives must be slowed down.(H9)
In its  po licy towards the peasants, the resolution more or less fa ith fu lly  fo llowed 
the line Nagy had taken in his 4th Ju ly speech. A g ricu ltu re , the resolution 
stated, was to  be emphasised fo r the next tw o or three years and to  ensure the 
success o f th is po licy there had to  be a reorganisation o f basic industria l 
production and investm ent. The production o f farm  equipment and im plem ents 
was to  be increased, the quantity  and qua lity  o f ligh t industria l goods and food 
production improved. In the end the Plenum passed the resolution by a m a jo rity  
and urged the Politburo, vac illa ting  under the influence o f Rakosi, and the 
government to  pursue the reform  policies.
The next im portant step forw ard in the process o f im plem entation o f the 
'New Course' s t i l l  fu rth e r was taken by the party's Third Congress which, the 
Plenum announced, was to be convened in A p ril 1954.
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10.2 ’New Course*: A g ricu ltu ra l re fo rm  measures and developments
The announcement o f the 'New Course' was a p o lit ic a l as w e ll as an 
economic decision. Its fundam etal aim was the im plem entation o f 'co lle c tive  
leadership' and the re fo rm  o f economic management. The fo rm er turned in to  a 
continous bureaucratic struggle fo r  power between Rakosi and his 'old guard' 
supporters, mainly in the party apparatus - who tr ie d  to  keep to  the fo rm er 
course and destroy the dangerous popularity  Nagy had suddenly begun to  enjoy 
w ith  the masses -  and Nagy, and his supporters, mainly in the state 
adm in istra tion and some sections o f the in te lligen ts ia ,(1 2 0 ) | r j ecj to
strengthen the role o f government and implement the 'New Course' re form s. The 
result was an atmosphere o f la ten t crisis which prevailed fo r the next tw en ty 
months. During this period there were tim es when Rakosi's wing was pushed in to  
the background -  w ithout giving up his position fo r a moment. In public Rakosi 
and his supporters tried  to  put on a good face and pretended to  be conc ilia to ry  or 
even, seemingly, in favour o f Nagy's reform s. In p riva te , however, he agita ted 
and conspired against Nagy, going as fa r as to  encourage the opposition o f the 
party  apparatus which was la rge ly outside Nagy's contro l. Despite some bad luck 
and delays in im plem entation, the 'New Course' nevertheless achieved some 
lim ite d  results in the re fo rm  o f economic management. The most s trik in g  
change, at least po ten tia lly , happened in ag ricu ltu ra l policy, especially in the 
new a ttitu de  to  priva te  farm ing.
When the 'New Course' was announced by Nagy, as shown earlie r, 
in te rna l economic conditions in Hungary had made a review of, in te r a lia , 
ag ricu ltu ra l policy and the re laxa tion o f the co llec tiv isa tion  drive im perative . 
The fa ilu re  o f the Five Year Plan, the growing imbalance in the economy, the 
decline in liv in g  standards, the catastrophic s itua tion  in agricu ltu re , in both 
socia list and private sectors -  the fa ll in ag ricu ltu ra l output, the grow ing in te rna l 
d iff ic u ltie s  o f co llective  farms, the in to lerable tension in the countryside, the
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low work morale fe lt  by both co llec tive  and priva te  farm ers -  had made it  
abundantly clear tha t the point o f dim inishing returns had been reached. Workers 
could no longer be forced to  fu l f i l  the over-am bitious industria lisa tion ta rge t 
and, increasingly, expressed th e ir resistance in mounting go-slow campaigns and 
strikes. Farm production lagged seriously f irs t  because o f the fee ling  o f 
insecurity  o f tenure induced by the co llec tiv isa tion  drive and, second, because o f 
the po licy o f deliberate d iscrim ination against priva te  farm ers in the supply o f 
producer’s goods -  both cap ita l and current -  intended, pa rtly  at least, to  help the 
pace o f co llec tiv isa tion . Peasant sabotage and opposition to  co llec tiv isa tion , in 
addition, aggravated the c r it ic a l food shortage in urban centres. C learly , the 
regime had reached the lim its  o f its  a b ility  to  push heavy industria lisa tion  
p ro f ita b ility  in term s o f its  human and economic resources. The fa ilu re , in a 
sense, was a ll the more notable fo r the fa c t tha t the country ’s government had at 
its  disposal not only the lessons o f the Soviet experience, but d irec t Soviet 
supervision as w e l l . ^ ^  Any fu rth e r developments necessitated a re -o rien ta tion  
o f plans. In agricu ltu re  i t  was only too clear by June 1953 tha t the peasant, 
especially the middle peasant, had not been won over to  the communist v iew ; he 
had, in fa c t, been antagonised by the co llec tiv isa tion . The regime was forced to  
recognise tha t i f  agricu ltu re  was to  supply the population, and the growing urban 
centres, w ith  food, increased resources had to  be allocated to farm s, and to  the 
production o f manufactured consumer goods o f a kind the peasants would wish to  
buy. Therefore, a new policy had to  be in itia ted , representing a step back fo r 
the regime: to  restore the 'a lliance' w ith  the middle peasants, to  look in to  the 
abuses com m itted during the co llec tiv isa tion  drive and, above a ll, to  increase 
ag ricu ltu ra l output and ru ra l liv in g  standards. Having been forced to  draw the 
lessons from  the d iff ic u ltie s  and d istortions tha t appeared in the dom estic 
economy, the June Resolution represented the f irs t,  ten ta tive , step towards a 
pa rtia l break w ith  the S ta lin ist concept o f build ing socialism: they meant
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abandonment o f the one-sided, forced economic development -  which was to  be 
the de trim en t o f industries connected w ith  agricu lture and o f agricu ltu re  itse lf, 
an end to  the neglect o f even the minimum m ateria l and techn ica l needs o f 
agricu ltu re , and the abandonment o f the po licy o f 'socialist transfo rm ation1, i*e., 
co llec tiv isa tion  o f agricu lture . The main goals o f communist economic planning, 
industria lisa tion and co llec tiv isa tion , however, remained but the pace had been 
tem pora rily  slowed to  await more propitious circumstances.
The road to  re form , however, was not an easy one. A lthough the C entra l 
Com m ittee endorsed the June Resolutions, such resolutions were bound to 
remain in e ffe c tive  unless the means o f im plem entation were also secured. And 
they were not. The most im portan t d irec ting  agency fo r the nationa l economy 
remained the 'Economic Policy C om m ittee ' (Gazdasag P o litika i B izo ttsag) o f the 
party. This com m ittee elaborated the main d irectives of the economy and sent 
them to  the various sections o f the Party Secretaria t which, in tu rn , issued them 
to  the appropriate economic m inistries fo r im plem entation. Erno Gero (in 
addition to  the posts o f M in ister o f the In te rio r and F irst Deputy Prim e M in is te r 
-as noted earlier) remained Chairman o f the ’Economic Po licy C om m ittee ’, 
where he was assisted by Istvan Friss, the party's ch ie f economic expert, who 
was also the Chairman o f the 'Plan, Finance and Trade Departm ent' (Terv -  
Penziigyi es Kereskedelmi Osztaly) o f the C entra l Com m ittee. Both Gero and 
Friss were staunch Rakosi supporters. Moreover, the economic sub-com m ittee 
o f the Politburo was headed by Rakosi and Gero (no im portant economic measure 
could be taken w ithout th e ir consent) and, a fte r  June 1953, the Chairman o f the 
National Planning O ffice  (Orszagos T ervh iva ta l) was Bela Szalai and the M in is te r 
o f A g ricu ltu re , Andras Hegediis -  both Rakosi men. Thus, Rakosi and his 
associates were able to  in te rfe re , slow down or even s ide-track measures aimed 
at im plem enting the economic programme o f the 'New Course'. A lthough it  was 
true  tha t Nagy had at his disposal the machinery o f the government, even so, he
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was often  powerless to  preva il against the in ten tiona l in terference o f the party
machine (which, during the previous period, had also penetrated the
governmental hierarchy). Clashes between the supporters o f government and
representatives o f the party, try in g  hard to  uphold the princ ip le  o f 'leading role
(122)of the party ’ became more or less the order o f the day.
The period between the middle o f July 1953 and the p a rty ’s Third
Congress, in May 1954, was devoted to  spelling out the new ag ricu ltu ra l
programme, one o f the main goals o f the ’New Course'. During th is period a
series o f re fo rm  measures a ffe c tin g  both co llec tive  and priva te  farm ing, were
introduced to  serve this purpose. The f irs t  comprehensive proposal, on which
most o f these measures and governmental decrees were based, was d ra fted  by
the 'Plan, F inancial and Trade Departm ent' o f the C entra l C om m ittee and
subm itted by its  Chairman, Istvan Friss, to  the Politburo m eeting on 15th July 
(123)1953 fo r approval. Its  recommendations, w ith  minor addenda, were adopted
by the Politburo at its  next session. A fte r  this, w ith in  a short space o f tim e , the
preparation and publication o f the re levant resolutions and governm ental decrees
to  introduce the changes had begun. On the basis o f the C entra l C om m ittee
Resolutions to  increase the 1953 farm  output and to  strengthen the w orker-
peasant alliance, the government issued a to ta l o f 45 resolutions a ffe c tin g  
(124)agricu lture . Some o f these made th e ir influence fe lt  in 1953 but the
m ajo rity  only had an e ffe c t during the next year or even la te r.
The f ir s t  measures o f the Nagy government were hurried a ttem pts to  
prevent the dissolution o f co llectives and to  revive ag ricu ltu ra l production by 
granting a number o f concessions to  both co llective  and p riva te  farm ers. 
Scarcely had the new permissive po licy been made public than an 'ille g a l' mass 
exodus from  the co llectives had got under way. C o llective  members had taken 
Nagy's word as permission, almost encouragement, to  leave the co llectives, 
which added chaos to  the existing problems. The government tr ie d  desperately
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to  stabilise the ag ricu ltu ra l sector o f the economy by combined ta c tics  o f 
persuasion and dissuasion, making i t  increasingly d if f ic u lt  fo r  the peasants to  
invoke the governnent's pledge. A t the same tim e, i t  tr ie d  to  make the 
co llectives more a ttra c tive  fo r the peasants to  remain in, through a fa ir ly  broad 
pogramme o f government aid and concessions, beyond those which were also 
granted to  individual peasants as incentives to  develop th e ir farm s, increase 
fa rm  output and thus to  increase the supply o f food to  workers and, in tu rn , th e ir  
liv in g  standards. A ll concessions, however, favoured the co llec tive  fa rm er.
The main elements o f the new agricu ltu ra l policy, in the in it ia l phase, 
can be divided in to  the fo llow ing  four groups:
1 . measures to  correct the blunders com m itted in the sphere o f
procurements,
2 . measures to  ease the tax burden o f the peasants,
3. measures, d ire c tly  and ind irec tly , to  encourage ag ricu ltu ra l production,
and,
4. measures to  strengthen the co llec tive  fa rm  system.
The f ir s t  three o f these groups aimed at provid ing incentives to  increase 
ag ricu ltu ra l production and the liv in g  standards o f individual farm ers. 
Accord ingly, the fo llow ing  measures were announced by the government, in 
addition to  two ea rlie r pronouncements which prohibited the commassation o f 
land during the autumn o f 1953 and the spring o f 1954, and abolished the 'kulak 
lis t ' but continued the policy o f 'kulak r e s t r ic t io n ' . ^ ^
on 7th July compulsory de live ry quotas and payments fo r  land-tax were
reduced fo r farm ers who suffered loss o f harvest due to  bad 
weather.
on 12th Ju ly (a) a Council o f M inisters decree wiped the punishment
slate clean by cancelling a ll fines, amounting to  445 
m ill. Fts. (Forints), fo r  non -fu lfilm en t o f compulsory 
deliveries fo r  both co llec tive  and ind iv idua l
fa rm ers .(126)
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on 26th July
on 30th July
on 1st August
on 2nd August
(b) the same decree cancelled, fo r  both categories of 
peasants, a ll arrears in compulsory de live ry  quotas in 
the economic year 1952/53 and reduced compulsory 
de live ry quotas fo r co llectives by 10 per cent fo r  a ll 
produce, provided they fu lf i l le d  the 1953 compulsory 
de live ry plan on tim e.
As a result the peasants were re lieved o f the fo llow ing  
amounts o f compulsory delivries per y e a r : ( 1 ^ 7 )
11,149 ra il-tru cks  o f bread grain
8,157 ra il-tru cks  o f fodder (coarse) grain
900 ra il-tru cks  o f potatoes
444,000 hecto litres o f wine
2 2 0 , 0 0 0 litre s  o f m ilk
20,150 quintals o f eggs
17,300 quintals o f pou ltry
728 ra il-tru cks  o f pigs
96 ra il-tru cks  o f ca ttle
a Council o f M inisters resolution cancelled a ll tax arrears fo r 
co llec tive  members, provided they remained members o f 
co llectives and paid the 1953 taxes by the end o f the year; i t  
cancelled 50 per cent o f tax arrears o f individual peasants 
provided thev paid the other ha lf o f the arrears by the end o f
the y e a r . ( 1 2 o )
a Council o f M inisters resolution granted a to ta l o f 67.5 m ill. 
Fts. o f long-term  cred it, to  co llec tive  and ind iv idua l farm ers, 
fo r the construction o f additional silo s p a c e . ^ ^ 9 )
(a) a Council o f M inisters decree regulated the u tilisa tio n  
and lease o f state reserve lands (to be in operaton 
before the autumn sowing but at the la tes t by 1st 
October 1953) and granted 50 m ill. Fts. c red it fo r  th e ir  
cu ltiva tion ; the decree contained provision fo r  the 
re tu rn  o f land to  peasants leaving the c o lle c t iv e s .^ * * )
(b) a Council o f M inisters resolution gave permission to  
increase the size o f priva te , household plots from  h a lf-  
th ree-quarte r to  one cad. y o k e /1^ 1)
(c) another Council o f M inisters decree introduced free 
ve terinary services fo r both categories o f peasants.
(a) a Council o f M inisters resolution cancelled debt arrears 
amounting to 130 m ill. Fts.^1^ )  fo r  Machine T rac to r 
Station fees owed predom inantly by co lle c tive  farm s; 
the resolution also reorganised and reduced the fees 
payable to  MTS by both categories o f peasants, g iv ing 
greater re lie f to  co llec tive  farm ers; fo r the economic 
year 1953/54 th is amounted to  a saving o f 100 m ill. 
F ts .^ * } )  jj. gave peasants a free choice to  pay in 
cash or kind.
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on 16th August
on 18th August 
on 23rd August
The new fee set fo r  fie ld  work, per cad. yoke, was 
as fo llows: (134)
(i) fo r medium-deep ploughing (16 to  20  cm) fo r
co llectives, reduced from  42 kgs. o f wheat (or 84 
Fts . )  to  32 kgs. o f wheat (or 64 Fts.)
( ii)  fo r individual peasants the fee was set at 56 kgs. 
o f wheat (or 106 Fts.) instead o f 84 kgs. o f wheat
(o r 161 Fts.)
( iii)  the fees fo r a llo ther fie ld  work were reduced 
proportionate ly.
a Council o f M inisters decree was issued ’in the in te res t o f 
strengthening the co llec tive  and increasing the income o f its  
members'. The decree, in te r a lia , provided fo r the
fo llow ing:(135)
(i) i t  cancelled the portion o f m edium -term  cred its
which had been granted in 1953 and were re ­
payable at the end o f tha t year: these debts 
amounted to  66  m ill. Fts.
(ii) i t  also cancelled credits granted to  co llec tives  fo r
the purchase o f seeds on the free m arket (the 
amount was the d iffe rence between the o ffo c ia l 
and free  market prices): these debts amounted to  
another 40 m ill. Fts.
( iii)  the decree also extended m edium -term  and long­
term  credits, in existence as o f 31st December 
1952, so tha t long-te rm  credits became payable 
w ith in  a max. period o f 20  years, and medium- 
term  credits w ith in  6 years.
In addition, a ll payments which were due on these 
credits during 1953 were cancelled: th is amounted 
to 40 m ill. Fts. The rescheduling o f c red its  was 
only available to  co llectives which continued to  
operate on a co llec tive  basis.
(iv) the decree also prolonged the stipu lated period 
required fo r depreciation o f medium and long­
term  credits, granted a fte r 1st January 1953. The 
terms on these loans were extended from  2 - 1 2  
years to  3-20 years, depending upon the use to  
which the funds were put (i.e. a ffo res ta tion , 
e le c tr if ica tio n , irr iga tion , construction etc.).
a M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re  decree provided ve te rina ry  surgeons 
w ith  free vaccine against swine fever.(136 )
a Council o f M inisters resolution granted a 20 per cent 
reduction in income tax  fo r the ag ricu ltu ra l population (fo r 
1953), amounting to  a saving o f 500 m ill. Fts.(^37)
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on 29th August a Council o f M inisters decree announced a lim ite d  concession
on compulsory deliveries fo r  individual peasants. Accord ing 
to  the decree, ind iv idual peasants who fu lf il le d  th e ir  1953 
bread-grain and fodder deliveries were granted a 10 per cent 
reduction in th e ir  sugar-beet, maize, sunflower and potatoes 
de livery q u o t a s . ( 1 3 8 )  The decree also li f te d  trade 
res tric tions on grain and row crops.
on 10th September a Council o f M inisters resolution introduced a new
contractua l system: i t  ended the ’coercive' nature o f the old 
system and inceased the voluntary delivery prices (i.e., 
supplements to  compulsory deliveries). I t  emphasised the 
'vo luntary ' nature o f the new system and made i t  more 
a ttra c tive  fo r the peasants by the provision o f g rea ter 
quantities o f industria l goods.
The new, increased prices paid to  producers, in Forin ts, were 
as follows:(139)
Commodity unit old price New Price
Tobacco m etric -qu in ta l 290 500
Paprika seeds it 2900 8000
Tomato seeds ii 3000 8000
Onions it 55 80 to  160
Flax it 61.5 75 to  150
Hemp n 40 50 to  95
Sugar-beet and cotton growers were promised rewards and other priv ileges. 
C o llectives were promised greater support than individual peasants: on the basis 
o f th is decree they had recived k to  2 cad. yokes fo r  free cu ltiva tio n  fo r  every 
cad. yoke contract production, depending on the importance o f the crops grown 
on one cad. yoke. Contractors received in te res t-free  loans fo r sowing seed and 
fe rt il iz e rs  from  the enterprises which contracted to  buy the produce. 
Proceedings against peasants who fa iled  to  meet th e ir obligations were 
suspended. The new contractua l system signified an 80 m ill. Forin ts increase in 
income fo r  peasants in 1953 and approxim ate ly 700 m ill. Forin ts in 1 9 5 4 . ^ ^  
The resolution raised the prices o f those products which the pesant did not like  
to  grow because he found the price too low; the regime aimed to  persuade the 
peasants to  grow such products fo r export. The contract pig producers received 
1 0 0 - 2 0 0  per cent price increases.
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on 12th September
on 13th September
on 14th September
on 15th September
fu rth e r increases were announced. Accord ing to  the 
new decree the state paid farm ers on con tract 2 00  to  
300 per cent more fo r  lard and pork.(141)
(a) a M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re  decree li f te d  the 
re s tr ic tio n  on the renting o f p riva te  land.(142)
(b) a Council o f M inisters resolution concerning the 
qua lity  con tro l o f ag ricu ltu ra l w ork.(143)
a Council o f M inisters decree reduced investments in 
heavy industry and revised the a lloca tion o f investm ent 
funds in the various sectors o f the econom y.(144)
the C entra l Com m ittee Resolution approved the new 
and reduced compulsory delivery system, which was to 
go in to  e ffe c t on 1st January 1954. The new system 
reduced delivery quotas fo r both categories o f peasants 
and established them fo r 3 years in advance (u n til 31st 
December 1956), so tha t the ru ra l population could plan 
and work in security.
According to the Resolution, the delivery quyotas fo r crops, livestock and animal 
products were established according to  the combined area o f cu ltiva ted  land and 
pastures, while de livery quotas fo r wine were based on the area o f vineyards. 
Vineyards and orchards were to  be com plete ly exempt from  de live ry  quotas fo r 
crops, livestock and animal products; de live ry obligations fo r  crops, m ilk  and 
wine were com plete ly abolished fo r p riva te , household plots o f co lle c tive
members. D e livery quotas were to  be reduced as follows:.(145)
fo r crops
from  collectives 15 to  25 per cent
from  individual 15 per cent
from  state reserve land 30 per cent
fo r livestock and animal products
from  collectives 20 to  30 per cent
from  individual peasants 15 per cent
from  state reserve land 50 per cent
fo r wine
from  collectives 
from  individual peasants
25 to  50 per cent 
25 per cent
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The Resolution granted additional concessions: (i) 20 per cent reduction in 
de livery quotas fo r newly form ed collectives, (ii) an exemption from  income tax  
in 1953 and 1954, fo r income derived from  state reserve land contract fo r  a 5 
year period, ( iii)  a reduction o f 50 per cent in meat deliveries was granted fo r  
individual farm ers w ith  3 children younger than 14 years o f age, and to ta l 
exemption i f  they had 4 children, (iv) individual farm ers were only required to  
make m ilk  deliveries from  one cow, regardless o f the actual number o f cows they 
owned.
on 18th Setpember
on 19th September
on 25th September
the proposed new ’Model C harte r’ fo r  co llectives was 
adopted by the meeting o f the Third Nationa l Council 
fo r Collectives and Machine T rac to r Stations, held on 
19th-20th September 1953. I t  was confirm ed by the 
Resolutions o f the Council o f M inisters and the C entra l 
C om m ittee o f the party.(14*>)
a Council o f M inisters resolution was passed, regarding 
fu rth e r concessions given in the in te res t o f 
the collectives and increasing th e irstrengthening
incomes.(147)
the M in ister o f A g ricu ltu re , Andras Hegediis, announced 
the long awaited government decree regu la ting  the 
procedure fo r w ithdrawal or dissolution o f co llectives. 
According to  the decree, published on 4th O ctober, 
members were not allowed to  qu it u n til a fte r  the 
com pletion o f the autumn bread-grain sowing. 
Regarding the rules and regulations fo r  w ithdraw l, the 
decree contained tw o main p ro v is io n s :^® )
(i) fo r the d is tribu tion  o f state reserve land (i.e ., o f 
poor qua lity) to  the departing members and
(ii) fo r the payment by the departing members o f 
th e ir share in the co lle c tive ’s debt -  includ ing a ll 
taxes and arrears which had already (supposedly) 
been cancelled by the government.
The decree made it  clear tha t the regime, while m aintaining its  promise, sought 
to  make dissolution as d if f ic u lt ,  and compensation as meagure, as possible. A 
member intending to  leave had to  n o tify  the co llective 's  management in w ritin g . 
On the management's recommendation the General M eeting o f the co lle c tive  was
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then authorised to  decide a ll questions regarding the handing back o f land,
livestock and equipment contribu ted to  the co lle c tive ’s holding and on the
settlem ent o f a ll other issues arising from  the w ithdraw l. A decision to  dissolve
the co llec tive  needed a tw o-th irds  m a jo rity  o f a ll its  members and then the
approval o f the M in ister o f A g ricu ltu re . Dissolutions and w ithdrawals could only
be approved at the end o f the economic year, in October. A f te r  th is, a member
was guaranteed the righ t to  w ithdraw  from  the co llec tive  in October o f any year,
provided 6 months notice was given in w riting . Buildings, equipments, orchards,
vineyards etc., fo rm ing the common pool o f collectives, could not be d is tribu ted
but were to  be re-a llocated by the m inister o f A g ricu ltu re  to  o ther co llectives.
W ithdrawing members were to  receive, from  state reserve land, the same
amount o f land as they had o rig ina lly  contributed to  the co llec tive , so as not to
disturb the consolidated land o f the co llective . Land could also be given to  the
departing member from  the unparcelled co llec tive  land or from  land lay ing  at
the edges o f the consolidated land o f the co llec tive . Moreover, 35 per cent o f
the value o f livestock, equipment etc., contributed to  the co lle c tive  was
w ithheld from  the departing member and attached to  the ind iv is ib le  fund o f the
co llec tive  and 50 per cent o f his dividend share could be w ithheld by the
(149)co llec tive  from  the departing member.
on 10th October a Council o f M inisters decree removed res tric tions  on pig, 
ca ttle , c a lf and sheep slaughtering. According to  the decree 
both co llec tive  and individual farm ers who fu lf il le d  th e ir
de livery quotas and contractua l obligations towards the state
fo r the de live ry o f those animals could obtain licences fo r
s la u g h te r .( lS O )
on 18th October (a) a Council o f M inisters resolution concerning the
preparations fo r mechanical repairs on State Farms and 
Machine T racto r Stations during the w in ter.(151 )
b) a Council o f M inisters decree ins truc ting  the M in is try  
o f Finance to  grant, to  co llectives and ind iv idua l
farm ers, cred it fo r the entire  cost (instead o f 50 per 
cent previously granted) fo r the construction  o f 
1 0 0 ,0 0 0 m of silosJ152)
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These government concessions, together w ith  the reductions in compulsory 
deliveries and income tax and be tte r procurement prices fo r  some 51 con trac tua l 
crops in 1954, (a ll more favourable fo r the co llectives) in addition to  the free  
ve terinary services, amounted to  savings o f hundreds o f m illions o f fo rin ts . They 
were designed to  increase the incomes o f both co llec tive  and ind iv idua l farm ers. 
The regime had hoped tha t the various de livery, financ ia l and tax  concessions, 
re in forced by p o lit ic a l ag ita tion, would improve the operational prospects o f 
collectives and individual farms.
The campaign to  dissuade the peasants from  leaving the co llectives and 
farm ing independently had been waged on both economic and p o lit ic a l grounds. 
The economic concessions were accompanied by a strengthening o f 
adm in istra tive , and especially party contro ls in the countryside. Many 
experienced party  functionaries had le ft  the villages, because o f the emphasis on 
industry, and fo r  years the party  in villages had adm itted few  working peasants. 
As part o f its  drive to  make party and mass organisations e ffe c tiv e  instrum ents 
fo r carry ing out top policy decisions, the regim e constantly denounced ’p e tty  
despotism’ in local party organisations and w ith in  the co llectives, and harped n 
the necessity o f im proving work. During September, party meetings were held 
throughout the countryside to  discuss the shortcomings in de ta il. The press 
deplored one-man leadership, haphazard working methods -  ignoring the voice o f 
members w ith in  the co llective  and, above a ll, poor propaganda. On 7th 
September the party daily newspaper complained tha t people's educators (i.e ., 
propagandists) had fa iled  to  explain the party's ag ricu ltu ra l po licy  to  the 
peasants and tha t instead o f expanding th e ir  a c tiv itie s  they had w ith d ra w n /* '^  
On 22nd September the same newspaper complained again th a t many pa rty  
com m ittees ignored the 'cadres’ in th e ir d is tr ic ts  and gave no help. I t  also
critic ised  the com m ittee leaders fo r fa ilin g  to  guide organisations to  con tro l
^ (154)production.
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The la x ity  o f ru ra l party  o ffic ia ls  and people’s educators was la rge ly  due
to  the fa c t, o f course, tha t they themselves were too confused about what the
new programme would actua lly  mean fo r  the peasants. To remedy the s itua tion
the party  sent not only hundreds o f agita tors, but also the arm y’s own p o lit ic a l
o ffice rs  in to  the countryside -  conveniently, because one o f the very f ir s t
measures o f Nagy's government was to  reduce the size o f the arm y and u tilise
the human and m ateria l resources released elsewhere in the economy -  to
persuade the peasants to  remain in the collectives. The p o lit ic a l campaign to
dissuade the peasants who were in ten t on leaving the co llectives despite
economic concessions (or because o f them) and adm in istra tive  deterren ts making
i t  more d if f ic u lt  fo r the peasants to  w ithdraw  and/or dissolve the co llec tives
went through several phases, from  screaming ’t ra ito r ’, ’kulak' and ’d irty -hyena ’ in
la te  Ju ly and the middle o f September, to  the ra the r pleading ’you -w ill-b e -so rry ’
tone which the regime la te r adopted. In a speech on 19th September Andras
Hegediis, M in ister o f A g ricu ltu re , denounced requests fo r  the d issolution o f
co llectives as the 'work o f the enemy, o f kulaks, o f hostile elements’. He warned
tha t every kind o f financia l and adm in istra tive  obstacle would be in troduced to
(155)ru in those who wished to  resume individual farm ing. Shocked by the mass
exodus, on 25th September, Hegediis announced his decree ’regu la ting ’ the 
procedure fo r w ithdrawal from  or the dissolution o f collectives, i.e., making i t  
econom ically more d if f ic u lt  to  w ithdraw  or to  dissolve. In a speech at 
Kecskemet on 29th September, Nagy spoke w ith  apprciation about the 
achievements o f co llective  members. A lthough he c r itic ise d  the in te rna l 
problems o f co llectives em phatically he re ite ra ted  the regime's b e lie f th a t the 
only real road to  agricu ltu ra l prosperity lay in continued re liance upon co lle c tive  
farm ing. And, he counselled, those
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vac illa ting  should lis ten  to  good advice; inspite o f mistakes, 
problems and d iff ic u lt ie s  they should s tick  to  the co llectives. 
Transitional problems and d iff ic u ltie s  should not d ive rt them 
from  the correct road. They should lis ten  to  good advice 
given by the party and government.(156)
Nagy scorned those peasants who, he said,
th ink they would be allowed to  leave the co llec tive  by leaving 
behind debts and taking away assets. Such action was never 
intended and i f  those elements a ttem pt to  resort to  i t  they 
w ill find  out tha t the government is resolved to  fo i l them 
w ith  a f irm  hand.(157)
A t a County meeting in Nyiregyhaza on 27th September, M ihaly Farkas, by th is 
tim e  a Politburo member again, had said that,
we shall organise co llectives tha t w ill make the mouth o f the 
individual peasant water. Despite shortcomings the party  and 
govrnment maintain tha t co llec tive  fa rm ing is the only 
correct road to  fo llow . The shortcomings w ill be re c tif ie d  
w ith  the help o f the co llec tive  members. Order w ill be 
created and an undream t-of prosperous li fe  w ill be secured in 
the co llectives in Hungary.(158)
Declaring tha t i t  would neither be understandable nor wise fo r  a peasant to  leave 
his co llec tive  now, Farkas added tha t
a peasant should use his sober judgement and remain in the 
co llec tive  since the party and the government, by remedying 
the shortcomings, are, in fa c t, ju s tify in g  the peasant who 
intended to  qu it and recognising his com pla in ts .^ **))
To improve the image o f the co llec tive  management the party  da ily  newspaper 
called on 12th October fo r  a more dem ocratic atmosphere at co lle c tive  
meetings, demanded tha t the opinins o f co llec tive  members who were fo rm e rly  
'm iddle peasants' be given fu ll consideration, because they were farm ers, 'w ith  
wide experience, who understand the fin e r points o f a g r ic u l t u r e '/ * ^  Despite
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improved prospects fo r  the co llec tive  fa rm ing  and a ll the e ffo rts  o f the regime 
to  prevent the dissolution o f the co llec tive  system the 'sober judgem ent' o f the 
peasants was to  leave the collectives in great numbers. Indeed, because so many 
o f them le ft ,  illega lly , and w ith in  a short tim e, to  establish a p riva te  farm-based 
existence, a serious labour shortage had developed. Existing governmental 
regulations, however, prevented workers from  changing th e ir  place o f work. To 
help to  boost ag ricu ltu ra l production, i t  was necessary to  augment the supply o f 
farm  labour. On 9th September a Council o f M inisters resolu tion had given 
unskilled industria l workers fo rm e rly  employed on co llectives permission to  
re tu rn  to  them, i f  th e ir facto ries would discharge them. Thus,
in the in terest o f ensuring su ffic ien t manpower fo r  the 
collectives and fu rthe ring  the development and prosperity o f 
co llec tive  fa rm ing the Council o f M inisters has adopted a 
resulution concerning the re tu rn  o f co llec tive  members, now 
employed in industry ... The Council o f M inisters hereby 
orders the d irectors o f a ll industria l plants ... w ith  the 
exception o f coal, iron ore and bauxite, m eta llurgy and food 
industry enterprises, engaged on seasonal work, to  release 
these workers.^®
The resolution proposed tha t the co llectives grant the re tu rn ing  members 100 kgs 
o f bread-grain in advance payment and from  then onwards u n til 1st Ju ly 1954 
payment at the ra te  o f 1.5 kgs plus 8 Forin ts per work-day un it. I f  they were 
needed the collectives would be given grain loans, from  centra l reserves, in order 
to  supply members re turn ing from  industry. The resolution indicated a reversal 
in long-te rm  manpower planning, i.e., the transfe r o f workers from  industry to  
agricu lture . This was to  have a dual e ffe c t: an increase in a g ricu ltu ra l 
production and a decrease in the number o f non-food producing consumers. A t 
the same tim e i t  was to result in decreased industria l production. In the event, 
many peasants who had m igrated to  industry returned, at the w r itte n  request o f 
co llec tive  management to  agricu lture : some 2 2 0 , 0 0 0  during the tw o  years to
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mid-1955, but the m a jo rity  o f them increased the number o f individual 
farm ers. Very few  o f them in fa c t went back to  the co llectives. I t  had been 
reported tha t 'those who le f t  fo r industry, previous co llec tive  members, returned 
only in insign ificant numbers to  the c o l le c t iv e s '. ^ ^
By October these and other threats against those in tending to  leave the 
co llectives were being carried out. The departing member o ften  found h im self 
reduced to  a penny by one hostile  provision a fte r  another. The road back to  
p riva te  farm ing was not an easy one, and the regime made i t  disadvantageous fo r  
the peasant to  w ithdraw . Many incurred debts fo r  years to  come; some 
u ltim a te ly  became tire d  o f the sufferings and le f t  again fo r  industry. The most 
p roh ib itive , perhaps, was the decision not to re tu rn  the peasant's own land, which 
his fa m ily  had cu ltiva ted  fo r  generations (as, in fa c t, was promised by Nagy); 
very o ften th e ir land was reta ined by the co llective  and they were 'compensated' 
w ith  a p lot from  the state reserve land elsewhere which was not only not 
'equivalent' but o f in fe rio r qua lity , very often useless, land which fo r  the most 
part was neglected and uncu ltiva ted. A number o f such peasants refused these 
plots and moved to  the c ities  to  swell the ranks o f industria l workers. Accord ing 
to  a report prepared by the Secretaria t o f Local Councils,only 25-30 per cent o f 
peasants had the land they o rig ina lly  contributed returned to  t h e m / * ^  Also, 
much fr ic tio n  developed at the tim e of w ithdraw al between leaving and 
remaining members because o f the re ten tion  (or taking-out) o f the land and o ther 
assets o rig ina lly  contributed. Those who remained in the co llec tives  behaved 
extrem ely meanly towards those leaving. In many instances, members were not 
given back th e ir livestock (or were given animals o f in fe r io r  qua lity ) and 
equipment, even i f  the co llec tive  had a surplus o f these. Then there was the 
problem o f a lloca ting a portion o f the to ta l debt burden o f the co lle c tive . 
Departing members were o ften burdened w ith  d isproportionate debt. Those who 
remained were very resentfu l and labelled the leavers 'tra ito rs  to  the movement',
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while those leaving looked fo r  a long tim e  upon those who remained as i f  they 
had in flic te d  greater harm and loss on t h e m . ^ ^
The peak o f the mass exodus from  the co llectives was between 
September and October. The crisis was more or less over by December. While 
there was resistance on almost everyth ing else, i t  seemed tha t the v illage 
belonged to  Nagy, the party, the police and industry to  Rakosi. W ithdrawals and 
dissolutions continued throughout 1954, though at a g rea tly  reduced leve l. The 
orig ina l idea was tha t the decision to  w ithdraw  or to  dissolve would be postponed 
u n til October, the end o f the farm ing year, and only then would i t  be accepted 
o ffic ia lly . But since no police nor emergency aid measures could have kept the 
peasants in the co llectives in practice, e ithe r on the grounds tha t they had been 
formed against the w ill o f th e ir members or because i t  was apparent th a t they 
did not make econom ically viable enterprises, w ithdrawals and dissolutions were
/ I  A /» \
accepted as inevitable and the regime ’closed its  eye to  these'. The figures 
on co llec tive  dissolutions and w ithdrawals give a p a rtia l p ic tu re  o f the exten t o f 
peasant resistance to co llectiv isa tion . Between 30th June and 31st December 
1953 the to ta l number o f co llectives declined by 68 8  -  o f which 461 were Type III 
and 227 Types I and II; the to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l acreage under co lle c tive  cu ltiv a tio n  
declined by 829,000 cad. yokes -  708,000 in Type III (w ith  643,000 cad. yokes o f 
arable land area) and 121,000 in Types I and II (w ith  109,000 cad. yokes o f arable 
land area); th e ir  to ta l membership declined by 126,079 (from  376,088 to  250,009)
-  107,042 in Type III (from  300,370 to  193,328) and 19,037 in Types I and II (from  
75,718 to  56,681); the to ta l number o f fam ilies  declined by 95,792 (from  293,550 
to  197,758) -  79,518 in Type III (from  225,869 to  146,518) and 16,441 in Types I 
and II (from  67,681 to  5 1 ,2 4 0 ) .^ ^  The num erical developments o f co llec tives , 
th e ir area membership fo r the period, between June 1953 and December 1954, is 
shown in Tables 10.1 and 10.2 on p.727 and p.728.^1^
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I t  should, however, be noted tha t the data which can be obtained from  the table
do not correspond to  the actual figures o f w ithdrawals and dissolutions because
concurrently  w ith  these, during the period between 30th June and 31st December
1953, about 18,000 new members had joined the co llectives and 56 new
C ollective  Farms were formed. Thus, the to ta l number o f actual dissolutions
was 744 - o f which 493 were o f Type III and 251 o f Types I and II and the to ta l
membership dropped by about 142,000.^® ^
A very close relationship can be established between dissolutions and
w ithdrawals and the great pressure and coercive methods which had been used in
the fo rm ation  o f co llectives during the la te r years: 82 per cent o f a ll the
dissolved co llectives were form ed during 1951 and 1952: 60 per cent o f the
dissolved Types I and II collectives were formed in 1951 and 71 per cent o f Type
III co llectives dissolved were formed in 1 9 5 2 . ^ ^  The m a jo rity  o f those who
le f t  the co llectives had been owners of land, la rge ly sm all and middle peasants,
before the te rro r and economic burdens forced them in to  co llectives, especially
during the autumn and w in te r o f 1 9 5 2 . ^ ^  Since the middle peasants
represented a re la tive ly  higher proportion in the co llectives which were form ed
la te r, the share o f middle peasants who w ithdrew  was correspondingly
h ig h e r / * ^  In the last quarter o f 1953 83.5 per cent o f a ll the fam ilies who le f t
were small and middle peasants. While the proportions o f small and middle
peasants leaving the Type III collectives were the same -  about 39 per cent - the
proportions o f small peasants and middle peasants leaving the Types I and II
(173)co llectives were 25.1 and 21.6 per cent respective ly. The s trik ing
disproportion between the percentage o f farm s dissolved and the percentage o f 
departing members may, in fa c t, be explained by the fa c t tha t the m a jo rity  o f 
members who qu it were small (or smallish) peasants who contribu ted sm all plots 
and by the fa c t tha t the property o f many peasants who le f t  the co llectives was 
fo rc ib ly  w ithheld. Although there were fo rm er landless agrian pro le tarians too
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who began to  vac illa te  a fte r June and 'lost fa ith  in the cooperative
(174)
movement', and some o f them in fa c t le f t  the collectives, most stood by 
co llec tive  farm ing. T he y  had brought neither land nor equipment and animals 
in to  the co llec tive  and had thus nothing to  cla im . The ir in terest was in the 
surviva l o f collectives and the continuation o f communal farm ing. Therefore, 
those leaving the co llectives were overwhelm ingly from  the fo rm er land-owning 
class. The same d iffe rence in behaviour was demonstrated a fte r the p o lit ic a l 
cris is o f 1956. This is c learly  re flec ted  in the changed com position o f 
membership o f the co llectives, especially o f Type III co llectives, in which, 
whereas in June the proportion o f members who had owned more than 7 cad. 
yokes was 33.6 per cent, by the end o f the year th is  had dropped by 30 and by the 
end o f 1954 to 28 per c e n t . ^ * ^  Few of the agrarian prole tarians le f t  the 
co llectives and the m a jo rity  grouping, more than tw o-th irds, again became the 
landless and poor agrarian proletarians. The land-owning peasants le f t  f ir s t  and 
forem ost the organisationally weak and large co llectives. For them the 
co llec tive  provided considerably less than the small fa rm  had given them before. 
During 1954 some 25,000, mostly poor peasants, joined -  or in ce rta in  instances - 
rejoined - collectives. But did not not o ffse t the continued w ithdrawals, because 
at the same tim e, some 45,000, amonst them many middle peasants, had le f t  the
/ i
co llec tive  sector. So, the w ithdrawals continued at a slower ra te  and while
a number o f new collectives were form ed many existing ones had dissolved.
Looking at the overall balance fo r  the period from  June 1953 to
(177)December 1954, the fo llow ing  p ic tu re  emerges:
a) assuming tha t those collectives which were form ed during th is  period 
remained in existence -  349 Types I and II and 566 Type III co llectives, 
making a to ta l o f 915, or 17.5 per cent were dissolved;
b) some 532 collectives remained com plete ly unaffected by the upheaval - 
from  these not even a single member, or fam ily , had w ithdrawn,
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c) 72 new co llectives were formed - o f which 35 were Types I and II and 37 
were Type III -  and on 2862 collectives the acreage and membership had 
dropped.
d) taking in to  account those who newly joined during the 18 months, 
approxim ately 140,000 fam ilies departed from  the co llectives, e ithe r 
because as members they had w ithdrawn or because the co llec tive  its e lf 
was dissolved.
e) the m a jo rity  o f members and fam ilies  who le f t  the collectes were small
or middle peasants: 27 per cent o f landless and 54 per cent o f land­
owning fam ilies had le f t  the co llectives. The change in membership 
structure  was in the same proportion as tha t o f fam ilies.
By the end o f 1954, compared to  mid-153, and tak ing  in to  account those 
who newly joined, the size o f co llec tive  membership was down to  49.5 
per cent o f its  previous level, i.e., more than ha lf o f the co lle c tive  
membership had disappeared.
The M in ister o f A g ricu ltu re , Andras Hegediis, had expected an even higher
figure. Considering the level o f in tim ida tion  and te rro r used during the la tte r
stages o f the co llec tiv isa tion  drive the loss o f ha lf the membership, he said, was
(178)not such a high number. From the ra te  o f dissolutions im m dia te ly  a fte r
Nagy's speech i t  ce rta in ly  seemed as i f  the cooperative movement in Hungary
was doomed to  almost complete d isintegration. Rakosi’s speech on 11th Ju ly
applied a brake in the process and many o f those who wanted to  w ithdraw
changed th e ir mind. The peasants may also have been influenced by the party's
propaganda campaign soon a fte r. A t the C entra l Com m ittee meeting, held on
31st October, 1953, Rakosi boasted tha t the success o f party  ac tiv is ts  in
preventing co llectives breaking up ensured tha t under 10 per cent would be
(179)dissolved (his figu re  was o f course inaccurate). Be tha t as i t  may, the result 
o f the 'crack-down' was tha t the peasantry again reduced production. Generally, 
those who remained in the co llectives were those who were ide log ica lly  
com m itted to  them or were e ither unable or unsuitable to  earn a liv in g  by 
priva te  farm ing.
f) due p a rtly  to  w ithdrawals and dissolutions and p a rtly  because many 
co llectives had returned th e ir state reserve land, or part o f it ,  (because
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w ith  the reduced membership they were unable to  cu ltiva te  the land) 
during the 18 months the acreage under co llec tive  cu ltiva tio n  declined 
by 33 per cent (i.e., by more than 935,000 cad. yokes). As a resu lt the 
share o f the co llec tive  sector in to ta l farm land declined from  18.3 to  
13.1 per cent, while th e ir share in to ta l arable land area (excluding the 
area ^g jjo ted  to  household plots) had declined from  24.6 to  15.6 per 
cent. Taking in to  account the share o f State Farms at 13.3 per cent 
(which declined, nom inally, since June 1953 from  13.6 per cent), the 
socia list ag ricu ltu ra l sector (excluding local au tho rity  ownership) 
represented 28.9 per cent o f the to ta l arable land area a t the end o f 
1954.
Special problems were presented by the dissolutions o f collectives. Because the
fo rm er land-owning peasants had le ft  the co llectives w ith  less land than they had
contributed orig ina lly  a s ituation o f excess land over manpower had developed in
the collectives. The ra tio  o f land to co llec tive  member, in the second h a lf o f
1953, in about 18-19 per cent o f the co llectives (about 755) was 10 cad. yokes,
but in many more i t  was as high as 20 cad. yokes per m e m b e r / * ^  The s itua tion
became pa rticu la rly  serious in the Transdanubian region and in the northern
industria l counties, as w e ll as in Bacs and Hajdu. According to  a report published
in the spring o f 1954 these were the main centres where excess land over
manpower had created pa rticu la r d iff ic u ltie s . The manpower s itua tion  did not
improve during 1954. A t the end o f tha t year, on average, there was more
agricu ltu ra l and arable land per member than a year earlie r. In 1954 there was
(182)about 10 cad. yokes o f land per fam ily . Moreover, mass w ithdrawals had
shifted the age composition o f co llectives towards older age groups, a s h ift 
which adversely a ffected e ffic iency. Also, the increased size o f p riva te , 
household plots and the high proportion o f members, about 8 per cent, in non- 
manual positions -  which was inherited from  the pre-dissolutions period -  has 
fu rth e r aggravated the re la tive  manpower shortage and had a negative e ffe c t on 
e ffic iency. According to  a survey carried out at the end o f 1953, assuming 250 
work-days fo r  men and 150 fo r women per annum, crop cu ltiva tio n  alone went 
short o f 1.78 m illion  work days in the co llec tive  sector. The shortage was
(183)pa rticu la rly  acute in about 180 to  200 collectives. Because o f th is, many
collectives were forced to  enter in to share-cropping agreements, in sugar-beet 
and maize cu ltiva tion , w ith  members’ fam ilies. On the bene fit side, the 
manpower shortage improved labour u tilisa tio n  and work a ttitudes: members on 
the remaining collectives, on the whole, tended to  work harder than before (but, 
o f course, s t i l l  less than individual farm ers). Figures fo r  1954, compared to  
1953, show tha t the proportion o f members who worked the m inimum declined 
from  9.7 to  5.6 per cent, while those who worked more than 40 work-day units 
had increaesd from  69.8 to  79.9 per cent and those w ith  more than 300 work-day 
units, from  26.5 to  39.5 per c e n t . ^ ^  Furthermore, in search o f greater 
e ffic iency  in the face o f the manpower shortage a nominal im provem ent in the 
qua lity  of personnel in leading positions had begaun, although, during early 1954, 
many complaints were s t i l l  heard tha t the wishes and w ill o f co lle c tive  members 
had been ignored and corrupt, untrained and unsuitable chairmen were forced 
upon the collectives (s im ilar complaints were heard against o ther loca l and MTS 
leaders). Despite th is, figures do indicate some im provement in the educational 
level o f co llective  chairman: w ith in  a year the proportion o f chairm an w ith  
middle or higher grade education had risen from  the very low leve l o f 4.4 to  12.8 
per cent -  a three fo ld  in c rease /1* ^  Another po ten tia l boost to  the operation o f 
co llectives was provided by the improved ra tio  o f equipment and lives tock to  
acreage - since these were, in many instances, not returned to  departing 
members, a nominal increase o f 1.3 per cent in the number o f lives tock per 100 
dad. yokes was recorded: an increase from  12.5 in 1953 to  13.8 in 1954 and to
14.3 per cent in 1 9 5 5 .^ *^
During 1954 the co llec tive  system was more or less le f t  to  its  own 
devices and, on the whole, received l i t t le  and cautious p o lit ic a l encouragement 
or economic support. Many o f the promises made by the government remained 
large ly un fu lfilled . Its emphasis, regarding the co llec tive  sector sh ifted  from
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quantity  to  qua lity . The pa rty ’s main concern became the consolidation and 
strengthening o f existing co llectives ra ther than fo rm ing new ones -  but even in 
th is the results were mixed. In 1954, however, and even more so in 1955, 
a ttem pts were again made to  induce peasants to  re jo in  the co llectives, but w ith  
l i t t le  success.
The decline o f the co llec tive  sector involved a fa ir ly  im portan t
m odifica tion o f the ru ra l s tructure . Due to  the changed conditions resu lting
from  the concessions discussed earlier, and w ith  the im proving supply o f
consumer goods, individual peasants’ inc lina tion  to  produce had slow ly begun to
increase. The f lig h t from  land had stopped, recently  abandoned land was, once
again, tille d , the encouragment o f production on individual farm s resu lting in an
increase in p riva te  investment in livestock and improvement o f the p ro d u c tiv ity
o f the soil. Many began p lanting orchards and vineyards; purchases o f
ag ricu ltu ra l implements rose by 73 per cent, while those o f sm all ag ricu ltu ra l
(187)machines increased by 220 per cent. Those who qu it the co llec tives  and
those who m igrated back to  agricu lture  from  industry had together swollen the
ranks o f individual farms over the two years to  the middle o f 1955, despite the
(188)d iffic u ltie s , by more than 220,000, or 21 per cent. And ru ra l Hungary was
dominated by a priva te  ag ricu ltu ra l sector o f more than 70 per cent o f the to ta l
arable land area. The sources o f th is increase in the number and area o f
individual farm s were in it ia lly  the recla im ing o f land, more than 70,000 cad.
yokes,and the ren ting  o f land, approxim ately 500,000 cad. yokes by May 1954 by
(189)peasants from  the state reserve land fund. During 1954 most o f the state
reserve land fund found owners. An im portant role in th is  increase was also 
played, as noted earlie r, by workers re turn ing from  non-agricu ltu ra l em ploym ent. 
The dominant fa c to r, however, was the mass exodus from  the co llectives. The 
turnover in buying and selling land, which had declined to  a minimum during the 
previous few years, also increased. The buyers, according to  survey, were m ainly
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working peasants in the less the less than 8 cad. yokes category o f sm all holders. 
On average they purchased between 2 and 4 cad. yokes o f land and added it  to 
th e ir holdings. Working peasants w ith  smallholdings in the 8 to  15 cad. yokes 
category only occasionally bought land (the survey provided no figu re  fo r the 
above 25 cad. yokes category). The sellers were peasants whose land was at a 
distance from  th e ir homes and therefo re  could not easily look a fte r  i t / * ^
Three major problems, however, impeded the im provem ent o f the 
operation o f individual farm s: the high taxes, the heavy compulsory de live ry  
quotas and the serious delays in the im plem entation o f the various concessions by 
the government.
The to ta l taxes fo r the ru ra l population in 1953 were set p rio r to  the 
June Plenum, at 3154 m ill. Forints, including the 200 m ill. Forin ts o f tax  arrears 
which the state antic ipated co llecting. In July the Council o f M inisters decided 
to  reduce this amount fo  52 m ill. Forin ts and, at the same tim e, i t  cancelled ha lf 
o f the tax  arrears incurred in the previous year, fo r  those who paid the o ther 
ha lf. In the event, the to ta l tax  b ill fo r  1953 fo r  the ru ra l population was set a 
3091 m ill. Forints, about 76 m ill. Forin ts less than i t  was in 1952. N a tu ra lly , the 
peasants were pleased to  hear the good news abut thes tax  concessions. The ir 
happiness, however, only lasted u n til August, when they received th e ir  tax  
returns. They now found they had to pay more tax than in the previous year. The 
unexpected increase in taxes was brought about by the fa c t -  apparently, w e ll 
known to  the authorities who, however, fa iled  to  take i t  in to  account when the 
tax  plan was m odified in Ju ly -  tha t since 1952 the decline in the size o f the 
taxable land fund was tw ice  as much as the tax plan, prepared in the f ir s t  ha lf o f 
1953, had allowed fo r. The plan had estim ated tha t the 3091 m ill. Forin ts  tax 
b ill would result, on average per tax-payer, in an increase o f ’only’ 24.1 per cent 
in taxes. That the increase was considerably more only became known when the 
to ta l ta x -b ill was disaggregated. Instead o f reca lcu la tion, however, pa rty  and
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government organs decided to correct the erro r on the basis o f ind iv idual appeals 
by tax-payers, who were thoroughly investigated; where the tax  set was 
considered unduly high i t  was reduced. In the event, almost 400 m ill. Forin ts o f 
the tax b ill was cancelled and the to ta l ru ra l tax b ill payable came to  2719 m ill. 
Forints, which was almost the same amount the peasants ac tua lly  paid in 
1952.(191)
The second main problem was compulsory deliveries. A part from
cancelling arrears the government did not reduce de livery quotas fo r individual
peasants in 1953 - and they were set at a considerably higher leve l than in 1952.
Despite the various concessions and the fa c t tha t the 1953 harvest was medium-
to-good, forsaken fie lds were cu ltiva ted  again, and ag ricu ltu ra l production rose -
the gross value o f to ta l farm  output, at constant prices, (1949=100) was 112 per 
(192)cent. , -  may working peasants, because o f high de livery quotas, regional
variations in weather (some regions were considerably worse than the average)
and growing resistance to  deliveries could not, or would not, f u l f i l  th e ir
compulsory de livery obligations, especially in grain, meat, maize, m ilk , eggs
etc., in fu ll.  Many working peasants who did f u l f i l  quotas remained w ithou t
bread and/or sowing seed fo r the next year. A report prepared fo r the Po litbu ro
and the Party Secretaria t on 13th August 1953 recorded s ign ifican t under-
fu lf ilm e n t in grain collections, blaming, in addition to peasant resistance,village
council and local party  organisations fo r  fa ilin g  to  take energetic action against
(193)'incorrect a ttitudes ’ to  delivery obligations. To a llev ia te  the resu ltan t
hardships the M in is try  o f Crop C o llection ordered some 400 ra il-w agon loads o f 
bread grain and 4000 rail-wagon loads o f seed to  be d istribu ted  on favourable 
term s among the needy^9^  -  who were f irs t  investigated and ajudged on 
individual m erit; in some cases the government cancelled a proportion o f th e ir  
de livery quotas. But many, especially b e tte r-o ff peasants in more favourable 
c lim a tic  regions, were able to  fu l f i l  th e ir de livery obligations and have enough
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le f t  fo r  themselves fo r p riva te  consumption and seeds and even, w ith  the greater 
freedom now given, to  dispose o f some o f th e ir  produce on the free  m arket. 
Indeed, many peasants, tempted by the greater freedom, risked the consequences 
and ’diverted* produce from  compulsory deliveries to  the free  m arket. The 
re la tive  trends o f production and sales through the two d iffe re n t channels are as 
shown in Table 1 0 . 3 . ^ ^
TABLE 10.3 Index Numbers o f Production and Sales o f Farm 
Produce, 1949 = 100
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Gross output o f agriculture^3)... 106 123 93 112 114
Tota l sales ... 115 133 120 105 116
Sales to  State purchasing agent 120 149 144 93 80
Free market sales 96 106 80 126 178
(a) Before allowances fo r duplication
Between 1949 and 1952 sales o f ag ricu ltu ra l produce on the free  m arket fe ll by 
o n e -fifth , while sales to  the state purchasing agencies increased by 44 per cent 
inspite o f a fa ll in to ta l production. In 1954 sales on the free m arket were nearly 
double th e ir 1952 level and accounted fo r  nearly th re e -fifth s  o f to ta l sales. The 
new, reduced, compulsory de livery system, introduced in Janaury 1954, provided 
greater m ate ria l incentives, which created more favourable conditions fo r  
increasing ag ricu ltu ra l production. But i t  was s t i l l  inadequate, and on the whole 
i t  fa iled  to  overcome the resistance o f working peasants to  fu lf i l l in g  th e ir  
obligations to  the state, pa rtly  owning to  the poor harvest and n o n -fu lfilm e n t o f 
compulsory deliveries remained a problem.
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In the context o f increased production i t  should be mentioned tha t some
o f the increase was due to  ’New Course' policies encouraging priva te , household
ag ricu ltu ra l production, w ith  la rger plots, be tte r incentives and the o ffe r  o f
c red it fo r p lo t owners w ithout a cow to  buy livestock. As a result, many
peasants took the opportun ity to  expand th e ir  holdings in to  sm all farm s. O ffic ia ls
perm itted  them to  do so e ithe r because they were uncertain about the po licy or
because they fe lt  tha t th is was the only a lte rna tive  to  com plete dissolution o f
the co llective . The fa c t was, however, tha t many co llectives which were not
fo rm a lly  dissolved in p ractice  d isintegrated because of the peasants reversion to
privete  farm ing, nom inally w ith in  the socialised sector. This presented problems
during the spring o f 1954 and many complaints were heard about the 'oversized
plots which became de trim enta l to  co llec tive  f a r m in g . ^ ^
The th ird  problem a ff l ic t in g  individual farm ers re la ted to  the
concessions introduced by the government. F irs tly , they were introduced in a
piecemeal fashion and under too varied headings. Secondly, the concessions had
to  be registered in the 'de livery ' books' o f working peasants, which was o ften
done only a fte r months o f delay -  creating uncerta in ty and resu lting  in the end in
haste and inconsistencies. The hurried and o ften  con trad ic to ry  detailed
measures issued by the M in is try  o f Crop C ollection, and th e ir  frequent
(197)m odifica tion, fu rthe r added to  these problems. A s itua tion  report subm itted 
from  County Bacs on 12th November 1953 provides in te resting  and typ ica l 
examples regarding the overt opposition o f functionaries to  the im plem entation 
o f the government programme. I t  revealed, in te r a lia , tha t
party and village council functionaries loca lly  introduced 
measures which greatly  hindered the im plem entation o f the 
government programme and which indicated tha t they 
trea ted working peasants w ith  the same old and inco rrec t
m e th o d s .(1 9 8 )
The report c ited  a number o f cases showing tha t in many places functionaries o f
one kind or another had lim ite d  the concessions available to  working peasants by
ille ga lly  making them dependent on the fu lf ilm e n t o f ce rta in  conditions. They
had employed a rb itra ry , adm in istra tive  methods to  enforce the fu lf ilm e n t o f the
delivery plan and, at the same tim e, had opposed the 'libe ra lism ' introduced in
the free  m arketing o f produce. In one v illage, fo r  example, council o ffic ia ls
confiscated eggs and pou ltry  taken to  the free  m arket by peasants who fa iled  to
fu l f i l  th e ir  de live ry obligations. Many peasants were even accused by name, over
the m arket loudspeaker system, o f being 'speculators' and as such 'the enemies o f
(199)the people'. S im ilar cases were reported from  a number o f other counties.
Whereas the 'New Course' programme had brought changes in almost a ll 
sectors o f the economy, the State Farms were le f t  v ir tu a lly  untouched. While i t  
is true tha t some measures were introduced to  increase production on State 
Farms -  prices were raised and steps were taken to  reduce costs and raise 
p roduc tiv ity  -  one the whole, no substantia l change took place. While the 
co llec tive  farm  population was allowed to  reve rt to  p riva te  farm ing, the most 
drastic announcement made w ith  respect to  State Farms was th a t no fu rth e r 
expansion would take place and tha t the main task in the sector was 
consolidation. Despite some o f the benefic ia l measures, State Farms remained 
grossly in e ffic ie n t and fa r  from  being modern, large-scale, 'model' production 
units. The investments allocated to  them had not resulted in commensurate 
returns and State Farms constituted a serious drain on the economy. They were 
pa rticu la rly  in e ffic ie n t in animal husbandry, ch ie fly  because o f the absence o f a 
suitable fodder base but also because o f the mistakes in organisation and 
management. To improve th e ir operational e ffic iency , a sweeping shake-up o f 
adm in istra tion and management in the second ha lf o f 1953 had been carried  out. 
F irs t, in August 1953, the separate M in is try  o f State Farms was merged w ith  the 
M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re  and w ith in  the new struc tu re  State Farms were managed
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by 12 C h ie f D ir e c to r a te s .^ ^  Apparently, some tim e in 1952 the regime had
contemplated enlarging State Farm holdings substantia lly. The reason why this
had fa iled  to  m ateria lise was the great d iff ic u ltie s  experienced w ith  state farm s
at the tim e . Once the 'New Course' had been launched the main task o f State
Farm adm in istrators became one o f in teg ra ting  State Farm production in to  the
new ag ricu ltu ra l planning system and tha t presumably was why the M in is try  of
State Farms was abolished. Second, to  improve managerial e ffic ie n cy  many top
managers were replaced. According to  a survey conducted in June 1954, 29.4 per
cent o f d irectors (90 people) 39.5 per cent o f C h ie f Agronom ists (89 people), 48.8
per cent o f C h ie f Anim al Breeders (120 people) and 48.3 per cent o f C h ie f
Accountants were replaced during the second ha lf o f 1953. The extent o f the
replacements confirm ed just how in e ffic ie n t top management on State Farms
had b e c o m e .^ ^  W ith the more libe ra l approach o f the 'New Course', fo rm er
agricu ltu ra l experts and specialists, had been drawn in to  work on State Farms
again and new ones had been tra ined to  improve the qua lity  o f techn ica l 
(202)s ta ff. Despite these measures State Farms remained loss makers and th e ir
financ ia l position deterio rated even fu rth e r (see p.662). During the period under 
investigation they fa iled com plete ly to  become 'model' farm s. On 24th May 1954 
even Rakosi had to  urge tha t 'S tate Farms must become model farm s not only on 
paper, but also in practice ', and to  a tta in  th is goal, he said, ' i t  was necessary tha t 
workers be financ ia lly  interested in fu lf i l l in g  and o v e r- fu lf i ll in g  production plans 
and reducing c o s t s . '^ ^
Foremost among the objectives o f the 'New Course' was a substantia l 
im provem ent in the liv in g  standards o f the population and an increase in fa rm  
output. The change in p rio ritie s  which these objectives entailed could, perhaps, 
best be seen in the revised d irec tion  o f investments. The June 1953 Resolution 
c learly  stated that, simultaneously w ith  the reduction in to ta l investm ent, its  
d irection  must be altered and more resources allocated to  ag ricu ltu re  and
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consumer good industries. This was to  co rrec t the m iscalculation made in the 
plan revision o f 1951, which by fa ilin g  to  leave enough room fo r the expansion of 
food production, had in te rfe red  w ith  the a tta inm ent o f the p r io r ity  targets 
themselves. A fte r  frequent, and long, discussions -  and six m odifica tions - on 
14th September 1953 the Council o f M inisters announced a cut in investm ents fo r
f
the second ha lf o f 1953 and promised a fu rth e r reduction fo r 1954. For the
second ha lf o f 1953 the government modified the s tructure  o f the investm ent
plan: the share o f industry in to ta l investment was reduced from  46.9 per cent in
1952 to  42.9 per cent, and w ith in  th is the proportion going to  heavy industry was
(204)reduced from  44.1 per cent in 1952 to  39.9 per cent. A lthough no specific  
figures are available fo r  th is early period, the revised plan devoted a greater 
proportion o f investm ent resources to agricu ltu re  and ligh t, consumer, industries. 
I t  was, however, stated tha t in the second ha lf o f 1953 d irec t investm ent in 
agricu lture was 70.1 per cent greater than in the f ir s t  ha lf o f the y e a r . ^ ^  
However, i t  proved rem arkably d if f ic u lt  fo r the Nagy government to  im plem ent 
the modified investment plan, around which great disagreements and ba ttles  had 
developed. Those who ideologica lly favoured industry -  a number o f m in istries 
and economic leaders at various levels o f decision making i.e. supporters o f the 
Rakosi wing -  successfully obstructed the im plem entation o f the revised 
investment plan. Because o f th is, during the second ha lf o f 1953 only m inor 
s truc tu ra l changes in the a lloca tion o f investm ent had occurred. A reso lu tion o f 
the Council o f M inisters on 30th October complained about the ind iffe rence  and 
passivity o f economic leaders, at both national and local levels, towards 
im plem enting the revised investment programme. The s itua tion  in th is  respect 
grew so much worse tha t a conference, attended by some 250 people - includ ing 
Rakosi had to  be called at the National Planning O ffice  (Orszagos T e rvh iva ta l) 
on 21st November 1953, where one speaker complained to  the conference th a t,
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employees o f Investment C h ie f Departments sent out 
instructions to  branch ch ie f departments asking fo r  a 
reduction in investments accompanied by a note saying ’here 
is your obituary notice .(206)
Others complained tha t many o ffic ia ls  in the National Planning O ffic e  regarded
the im plem entation o f the government programme as the concern o f the C h ie f
Departm ents o f ligh t and food industries, dom estic trade and agricu ltu re  and,
because o f th is, o ffic ia ls  working in other fie lds did not help s u ffic ie n tly  to  carry
out the various tasks. Under the circumstances, i t  weas not surprising tha t a
report prepared by the National Planning O ffice  (Orszagos Te rvh iva ta l) fo r  the
Council o f M inisters on 24th December 1953 s t i l l  noted a ’s ign ifican t lag in the
im plem entation o f the revised investm ent plan, in te r a lia , in agricu ltu re  and
(207)lig h t, consumer, industries.' Indeed, the sw itchover, e.g., to  production of
(208)small ag ricu ltu ra l machinery and implements, began only in December. 
To ta l actual investment in 1953 in the end turned out to  be g rea te r than the 
revised plan and approached the leve l o f 1952 -  the share o f heavy industry was 
s ligh tly  reduced,to 43.7 per cent, while the share o f to ta l industria l investments 
remained unchanged at 46.9 per cent -  the value o f to ta l investm ents was 16,800 
m ill. Forin ts, compared w ith  16,000 m ill. Forin ts in 1 9 5 2 . ^ ^  Su ffice  to  say 
here, however, tha t by the middle o f 1954 the government succeeded in reducing 
the o rig ina lly  planned rate s ig n ifica n tly  and in re -a lloca ting  investm ent: the 
share o f to ta l industria l investment was reduced to  38.7 per cent and, w ith in  
tha t, the share o f heavy industry was reduced to  33.6 per cent, while the share o f 
ag ricu ltu ra l investment was raised from  13.0 per cent to 22.7 per c e n t . ^ ^  A 
fu rth e r a ttem pt by the Politburo (in the absence of Nagy) to  reduce investments 
during the summer o f 1954, in a h ighly controversia l manner created a sp lit 
between party  and government, however. More about th is  la te r. As the 
development o f heavy industry was reined back, the tasks o f large fac to ries  were 
redefined so as to  supply the population d ire c tly  and to  sa tis fy  the needs o f
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agricu lture . The subordination o f industria l to  ag ricu ltu ra l po licy was re flec ted  
by the decision according to  which,
the government considers its  most im portant task to  assist 
production on individual farm s w ith  cap ita l goods, tools and 
equipment, fe rtiliz e rs , qua lity  seed and other means o f agro­
techno logy.^ 11 )
Accordingly, major construction projects in industry were e ithe r to  be cancelled
or slowed down and the spare capacity resu lting from  the reduction in heavy
industria l production was to  be d iverted to  the new objectives. Factories in
heavy industry were given the task o f producing consumer goods and farm
machinery, such as tracto rs , fe r t i l iz e r  spreaders, hay elevators, bee t-cutters,
harrows and fe rtiliz e rs . W ith the reduction in the size o f the People’s A rm y even
arms facto ries wer converted, not only fo r  the m anufacturing bu also fo r  the
repair o f fa rm  machinery. To help agricu lture , 'Patronage Brigades' were form ed
in heavy industria l facto ries, whose members v is ited Machine T rac to r Stations
and State and C o llective  Farms during the w in te r months and repaired and
(212)overhauled machinery and other equipment fo r them. Also, the 'Hortobagy 
Canal Construction', pa rtly  completed before the Second World War, was speeded 
up to  help agricu lture  w ith  irr iga tion .
The movement fo r reform s also aimed to  improve the liv in g  standards o f 
the population. This was to  be achieved by increasing the supply o f consumer 
goods, reducing prices and granting special wage increases. Im m edia te ly a fte r 
Nagy's July speech the government ordered the release o f stocks o f consumer 
goods, bringing a large amount o f food, including pork and bu tte r, which had been 
v ir tu a lly  unobtainable in the past six months, out o f cold stores. In fa c t, the 
food shortages experienced during the year had been accentuated by the 
accum ulation o f excessive stocks and continued food exports to  the Soviet Union 
and o ther East European countries. Another measure aimed at im proving the
-  744 -
supply o f consumer goods and services was tha t to  revive handicra ft trade. The
decline in the handicra ft industries, which resulted in a serious shortage of
im portan t goods and services, was to  be reversed. For the second ha lf o f 1953
the Council o f M inisters approved a to ta l consumption expenditure plan o f 20,000
m ill. Forints. This was approxim ate ly 10 per cent more than previously planned
and about 20  percent more than the actual trade turnover in the f ir s t  h a lf o f the
(213)year. A lthough the supply o f ce rta in  food item s could not be increased,
during the second ha lf 1953, and some, e.g., eggs and bu tte r, even declined, the
supply o f others, the most im portant foodstuffs, increased. Compared to  the
same period o f 1952, fo r  example, bread supply was up by 20, fa ts  by 30, meat by
(214)11 and sugar by 12 per cent respective ly. The volume o f re ta il trade
turnover, compard to  the same preiod in 1952, was up by more than 5 per cent in
July and more than 4 per cent in August.
In addition to  the a ttem pt to  increase the supply o f food and consumer
goods, the improvement in liv in g  standards also involved price reductions and
wage increases. Food prices in Hungary reached an a ll- tim e  high in the summer
o f 1952 and showed no appreciable decline u n til 1st Ju ly 1953, when prices o f
certa in  foodstuffs, along w ith  clo thing, were lowered as part o f an overa ll price
decrease. The government claimed tha t i t  had resulted in a 150 m ill. Forin ts
saving fo r  the popu la tion .^  ^  Further extensive price cuts were made on 6 th
September, when, again, prices o f foodstu ffs  and clo th ing  and o ther consumer
goods -  a ffe c ting  some 1 0 , 0 0 0  food and industria l item s - were reduced by 10 per
cent and 20 per cent respective ly. These reductions, on average, reduced the
re ta il price level by 3.2 per cent and resulted in another antic ipated 850 m ill.
(21 6)Forin ts saving to  the population. The party da ily  newspaper, Szabad Nep,
a ttr ib u te d  the cut in food prices to  the work o f ag ricu ltu ra l experts and the 
reduction in consumer goods' prices to  the 'strenuous' e ffo rts  o f technicians:
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the e ffo rts  o f the scientists, the planners the pedagogues, the 
a rtis ts  and d ire c tly  and in d ire c tly  every member o f the 
Hungarian in te lligen ts ia  have helped to  make price cuts 
possib le.^ 17)
The ed ito ria l spec ifica lly  stressed tha t the ’in tge lligen ts ia ’ had g rea tly  bene fitted
from  the price cuts. C learly , the party  had attem pted to  increase its  ties w ith
in te llectua ls, technicians an white  co lla r workers. I t  should, however, be noted
tha t even w ith  these price  cuts food was s t i l l  considerably more expensive than
it  was in 1949. Another round o f price cuts o f 10 per cent was decreed on 14th
March 1954, which lowered the prices o f meat, fa ts, m ilk  and animal products,
(218)w ith  an estimated saving o f 500 m ill. Forin ts to  the population. As a resu lt
o f the good harvest re ta il prices o f vegetables and fru its  in the sta te  shops in
July and August 1953 were lower than in 1952, and the state re ta il price  o f many
items declined even to  below the 1951 level. While the free  m arket price o f
vegetables and fru its  also s ig n ifica n tly  decreased, the prices o f da iry products,
(219)eggs and fa ts  on the free  m arket were higher than in the previous year.
A fte r  the September price reductions the volume o f re ta il trade tu rnover o f
manufactured goods increased on average by 8 per cent - the increase fo r  some
items, however, was considerably more, e.g., 116 per cent fo r  radios, 342 per
(220)cent fo r sewing machines and 600 per cent fo r build ing m ateria ls. Very
quickly, however, many item s were reported to  have become scarce and people
were unable to  purchase them fo r some tim e  to  come.
Although wage increases had been granted since 1949 money wages
remained nearly the same as norms had been increased proportionate ly. Now, to
improve the m ate ria l conditions o f wage earners, the government raised the
wages and salaries o f various categories o f workers by 10 per cent in Ju ly  1953,
a ffe tin g  some 928,000 workers in the second ha lf o f 1953 and resu lting  in a 981
(221)m ill. Forin ts rise in costs per annum. Then, on 1st February 1954 the
government decreed another general wage increase o f 10 per cent which
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affected  workers in the steel and e le c tr ic  power industries, as w e ll as others,
e.g. jan ito rs , turners, cleaning women, etc. Approx im ate ly  350,000 workers,
especially low income groups, benefitted from  these measures. Two months
la te r pensions were reorganised and improved, a ffe c tin g  some 250,000 old age
(222)pensioners. Earlie r, in September 1953, the government had taken another 
measure to  raise the standard o f liv in g  in d ire c tly  by decreasing the amount 
people had to  pledge fo r  the compulsory 'Peace Loan1 (Bekekdlcson). P rio r to  the 
'New Course' people had to  contribu te  at least one month's wage or salary, which 
was a large levy on th e ir income. Now, the 4th 'Peace Loan' proposed a 700 m ill. 
Forin ts reduction (from  1700 m ill, to  1000 m ill. Forints) and stipu lated tha t no 
pledge could be more than tw o weeks' income. According to  the party  da ily  
newspaper,
a considerable increase in the m ate ria l resources o f 
agricu ltu re  has made it  possible fo r the government to  reduce 
the amount o f the state loan. The new loan w ill be invested 
in lig h t industry and ag ricu ltu ra l production w ith  the purpose 
o f provid ing an im m ediate improvement in the standard o f 
l i v in g . ( 2 2 3 )
This was again in line w ith  the new government's po licy  o f courting  the
consumer. I f  there was less saving forced in to  government bonds, more cash was
released fo r purchasing. The press gave considerably less space to exhortations
to  'over-subscribe' the loan and fo r  the f ir s t  tim e  no lis t  o f subscribers from
among prom inent people were published.
According to  o f f ic ia l data, as a result o f these measures the rea l income
of workers and employees had already increased by 6 per cent in 1953 and rose a
(224)fu rth e r 18 per cent in 1954. But since the increase was from  a very low
level th e ir rea l income in 1953 was s t i l l  only 87 per cent (workers in 
m anufacturing industry) 88  per cent o f tha t in 1949, while the output o f
( nn  r \
m anufacturing industry increased over the same period by 216 per cent.
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With the re la tive ly  good harvest and the various governmental measures, the real 
income o f the ru ra l population increased even more than tha t o f workers over 
the same period. I f  the real income o f co llec tive  farm  workers had not improved 
so markedly as tha t o f individual peasants th is was because they were paid in 
'labour-day units ’ (munkaegyseg), which had not been raised, and because they 
had lower incentives, had to  work less (which was ra ther a ttra c tiv e  fo r  those 
lacking am bition) and were generally less skilled and less productive.
Increased liv in g  standards, however, had l i t t le  economic foundation. 
During the autumn and the very cold w in te r o f 1953-54 in the course o f 
im plem entation o f the government programme, contradictions suddenly surfaced, 
creating severe tensions in the economy. While the in it ia l measures o f the 'New 
Course' had brought about an im provem ent in the liv in g  standards o f the 
population, they wre also in fla tiona ry  and had a disruptive e ffe c t on the economy 
at a tim e  when Hungary was already su ffe ring  from  a chronic fo re ign  trade 
d e fic it.  A report prepared by the Plan, Finance and Trade Departm ent (Terv- 
PenzUgyi es Kereskedelmi O sztaly) o f the C entra l Com m ittee recorded th a t the 
rapid change w idely expected a fte r the announcement o f the new government 
programme had fa iled  to  m ateria lise, and gave three main reasons fo r  the 
fa i lu re /226*
a) the reorganisation o f the plan required more tim e. The very bad harvest 
in 1952 was s t i l l  having an adverse influence on the economy and put a 
brake on the possible im provement in liv in g  standards, while the fore ign 
trade d e fic it  prevented any appreciable increase in im ports o f m ateria ls 
needed by ligh t industries.
b) there was a serious unde r-fu lfilm en t in industria l production and energy 
requirements, and because o f the severe w in te r increased demand 
s ign ifican tly , energy had to  be rationed. Compulsory crop co llections in 
July, August and September, were underfu lfilled , too. Because o f the 
weak work o f party  organisations and increased a c tiv itie s  o f hostile  
elements work discipline, especially, in m ining, m eta llu rgy  and 
construction, had slackened.
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c) the faste r im plem entation o f the government programme was hindered 
by functionaries, m inistries and other leading organisations who fa iled  to  
understand properly the Resolution o f the C entra l C om m ittee.
The re laxation o f Rakosi's harsh labour policies, and expectations o f improved
liv in g  conditions by workers, brought the usual problems, resu lting in the
slackening o f wage discipline and lower p roduc tiv ity . The wage increases, in
re la tion  to  the low leve l reached over the previous period, were perceived by the
workers as insu ffic ien t and resulted in wage pressures. This is confirm ed by the
fa c t tha t managers most d ire c tly  exposed to  the pressures and mood of workers
vio lated wage discip line and ’ove r-fu lfilled* the wage b ill plan by 830 m ill.
(227)Forin ts during the second ha lf o f 1953 and f ir s t  quarter o f 1954.
The transform ation o f the product p ro file  o f the industria l sector to
increased production o f consumer goods, as envisaged by the 'New Course', could
not be achieved w ith in  such a short tim e, nor w ithout new cap ita l goods, which in
tu rn  needed extra  finance and credits, which proved to  be unobtainable, e ithe r
from  the East or from  the West. The expansion envisaged in hand icra ft
industries also fa iled  to  m ateria lise in the in it ia l phase. This was revealed on
28th September 1953 by the M in ister o f L igh t Industry, who adm itted  tha t only
12 00  licences had been granted instead o f the minimum o f 1 0 , 0 0 0  tha t were
necessary. His report also observed tha t no appreciable im provem ent had been
achieved in the supply to  the population even in the areas where licences had
(228)already been granted. Nor could the willingness o f the peasants to  produce 
and de liver more be changed s ign ifican tly  overnight. Many s t i l l  feared tha t 
should i t  become known tha t they were beginning to  be be tte r o f f  than before 
the screw would be put on them again. Many o f them remained as cautious and 
d is trus tfu l as before.
Despite the good harvest and the fa c t tha t the 'New Course' measures 
had some positive influence, even in 1953, the s itua tion  in ag ricu ltu re  was s t i l l
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fa r  from  sa tis facto ry . While industria l production had increased nearly th ree fo ld  
compared w ith  the pre-war level, ag ricu ltu ra l production, especially bread-grain 
production, remained below the pre-war leve l even in good harvest years (except 
1951). In a speech delivered on 19th October 1953 Nagy adm itted tha t in a 
period o f accelerated urbanisation and population increase - and hence increasing 
in te rna l needs fo r ag ricu ltu ra l produce -  the output o f bread-grain decreased 
s ig n ifica n tly  compared w ith  the pre-war leve l and it  was the most im portan t 
unsolved problem. The expansion o f industria l crops had d ire c tly  threatened the 
bread-grain and potato growing areas, causing serious worries at the close o f 
1953 about the problem o f food grain, and bread shortages s t i l l  existed w idely in 
the country. Thus,
there are certa in  sh ifts  in the re la tive  areas on which 
pa rticu la r crops are grown, namely in favour o f the industria l 
and oil-seed crops, at the expense o f food grain and potato 
growing areas and th is has been an im portant fa c to r in 
making the problem o f food grain one o f the f irs t  unsolved 
questions. The average yields o f our principa l crops have
hardly changed.(229)
Now, while not discouraging industria l crops, Nagy openly regre tted  having
previously forced peasants to  sow such crops, and he declared tha t the emphasis
should be placed on grain and fodder. Nagy was even more concerned about the
state o f livestock. Tne number o f c a ttle  decreased and there was a sharp fa ll in
the number o f cows and sows; the qua lity  o f livestock, too, was consideraly low er
than during the 1930s. These defic iencies resulted in the de te rio ra tion  o f export
possib ilities fo r animal husbandry: while in 1949 6.7 per cent o f exports were o f
livestock, th is percentage decreased to  2.2 per cent by 1954 - in 1938 17.4 per
(230)cent o f Hungarian exports had been livestock. In another speech, on 26th
O ctober 1953, Nagy declared tha t agricu ltu re , on the whole, had fa iled  to  
respond to  the measures as fu lly  as expected; the ag ricu ltu ra l lag was very fa r
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from  solution and the mistakes o f past policies, together w ith  the bad harvest in
(231)1952, s t i l l  weighed heavily upon agricu lture .
The problems o f agricu ltu re , in term s o f the hardships o f the 
peasants,were also discussed widely. During th is tim e  there was a renaissance o f 
Hungarian lite ra tu re  and w rite rs  began to  explore themes which were 
troublesome fo r the regim e. Populist w rite rs , like  the ’V illage Explorers’ in the 
la te  1930s began to  v is it the countryside during the summer and autumn and in 
a rtic les, reports, novels and poems, described the deep d issatisfaction and misery 
o f the peasants. Two poems, pa rticu la rly , created a national sensation. The f irs t  
open c ritic ism  o f the regime's policies towards peasants was by the young poet, 
Sandor Csori (who had been sent to  univers ity  by the party) who returned from  
his priv ileged li fe  in the cap ita l to his home v illage and was shocked by the 
qua lity  o f life  he found there. He wrote an agonising, penitent self-confession, 
exposing the misery o f the peasantry. Thus,
in marvellous numbers and glorious results lived I 
enthusiastically and fa iled  to  see how my people carried 
the burden o f th e ir  te rr ib le  fa te  on th e ir shoulders.
Their tru th fu l complaints, which spoke o f low wages, 
fa iled to  reach up to  me ... how the peasants who 
delivered th e ir produce lived in suspicion and
destitu tio n .(232)
The other poem, 'Nyirsegi Naplo' (Nyirseg D iary), by Peter Kucka, a pa rty  poet 
par excellence, was almost 200  lines long and described his to rm en ting  
impressions o f a journey through the 'Nyirseg', a pa rticu la rly  poor region, where 
he met a cursing women who b itte r ly  poured out her misery. I t  is w orthw h ile  to 
quote him at some length. Thus,
from  her narrow shoulder
she threw the hoe polished by use,
ringing to  the ground
and she shook her skinny f is t  high
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as roadside trees in the wind
and from  her mouth, a toothless emptiness,
curses and sobbing bubbled up together,
broken and ugly as when the stomach throws up some food.
Because she was sobbing now. Her helpless rage 
and manifold misery shook her: 
she can't buy medicine fo r  her child, 
and she w ill have no support fo r her old age, 
and the earth and sun and her s t i l l  
u n fu lfille d  hopes have drained her strength, 
and she moaned under the yoke o f li fe  
fo r  s ix ty  long b itte r  years ....(233)
And the poet asks, 'you who are the party, do you know th is miserable, sobbing
woman? She is your mother'. Further in the poem the peasants themselves
appear gloomy, m is trus tfu l, determ ined to  leave the collectives.
Despite the fa c t tha t some care was apparently taken tha t w ith  the price
reductions the supply o f goods to  the population should increase to  meet the
additional purchasing power, th is  was not achieved. Because o f th is  a serious
disequilibrium  developed in the economy, which led to  in fla tion . To th is  extent
the price reductions proved a very in e ffe c tive  and tem porary way to improve
liv in g  standards. Improving supply to  the population by im porting  consumer
goods and m ateria ls fo r  the consumer industries, on the other hand, was seriously
lim ite d  by the accumulated debt on fore ign trade w ith  other East European and
Western countries a like. A considerable part o f the indebtedness was due not
only to  the huge resource needs o f heavy industry in the earlie r period - and the
grossly unfavourable term s o f trade w ith  the Soviet Union - but also to  the
massive im porta tion  o f m ilita ry  equipment from  the Soviet Union imposed on
Hungary. Trade w ith  western countries showed a huge d e fic it  in every year
between 1950 and 1954: on average 30.1 per cent o f Hungary's im ports came
from  th is source (the share o f consumer goods represented, on average, about 11
per cent), while only 23.6 per cent o f her exports went there, crea ting  an ever- 
(234)increasing gap. Since other East European countries were pursuing an
economic po licy s im ila r to Hungary's they, too, were short o f consumer goods.
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Increased personal consumption, therefo re , could only be met by im porting  from  
the West. This, however, was severely lim ite d  by the accumulated debt. To this 
extent, Nagy's government had inherited a heavy lia b ili ty  in th is fie ld . A t the 
Foreign Trade Conference held on 3rd June 1952 Erno Gero stated tha t
fore ign trade again, or i f  you like  i t  unchangably remains the
weakest,the most vulnerable point o f the economy.(235)
The imbaance in fore ign trade presented pa rticu la rly  acute problems towards the 
end o f 1954 and the beginning o f 1955. I t  was used, in te r alia by Rakosi and his 
accomplices in th e ir fin a l a ttack  on Nagy and may have been a con tribu to ry  
fa c to r in his fa ll.
On 19th December 1953 the Centra l Com m ittee o f the Hungarian 
Workers' Party had met again to discuss a proposal devoted almost e n tire ly  to  
the question o f fu rth e r development o f ag ricu ltu ra l production. The keynote 
speech was delivered by Andras Hegediis, in his capacity as M in is te r o f 
A g ricu ltu re . Both his speech and the combined resolution subsequently adopted 
by the Plenum and decreed by the Council o f M inisters, en titled  'The Resolution 
o f the C entra l Com m ittee o f the Hungarian Workers' Party and the Council o f 
M inisters o f the Hungarian Peoples' Republic concerning the development o f 
ag ricu ltu ra l production' (A Magyar Dolgozok Partja  Kozponti Vezetosegenek es a 
Magyar Nepkoztarsasag M inisztertanacsanak hatarozata a mezogazdasagi 
term eles fe jlesztesero l) , ^ ^  id en tified  the problems and prescribed the 
fo rthcom ing tasks fac ing agricu lture  in crop cu ltiva tion  and animal husbandry, 
fo r  the next three years -  from  1st January 1954 to 31st December 1956. In its  
preamble the resolution cha rac te ris tica lly  stated tha t ag ricu ltu re  played a 
s ign ifican t ro le in the increase and consolidation o f liv in g  standards, which was 
the main goal o f the party  and government. Thus,
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the party and government are now concentrating a ll th e ir 
e ffo rts  in ensuring tha t the supply o f food, m ate ria l and 
cu ltu ra l goods to  the population and, p rim arily , the working 
class, should increase rap id ly.(237)
To achieve th is goal, according to  the resolution, during the next three years the
population had to  be supplied w ith  adequate bread, flo u r and dry-pasta, and the
grain problem fin a lly  solved. The resolution indicated tha t by 1956 per capita
meat consumption was to increase from  24 kgs to  36 kgs,fa t consumption from
14 kgs to  20 kgs, m ilk  consumption from  110 litre s  to  140 litre s  and the ta rge t
(238)fo r sugar consumption was set at 30 kgs per annum. W ith regard to
investments, the 'A g ricu ltu ra l Development Plan' noted tha t to co rrect the
earlie r d istortions in favour o f agricu lture , during the next three years some
12,000-13,000 m ill. Forin ts would be spent on developing agricu ltu re  - which was
approxim ate ly 2 i  tim es more than during the previous three years. O f th is,
nearly 3000 m ill. Forin ts was to  be allocated in 1954. In its  annual break-down
the development plan specified the sown area to  be devoted to  staple crops, the
planned increase in yields, the crop ro ta tion  the num erical increase in livestock
(according to  kinds) the quantity  and types o f machinery to  be delivered by
industry to  agricu ltu re  and the methods and the ra te  o f propogation o f qua lity -
seed. Regarding crops, the specified objective was to  achieve an increase o f 1.0-
1.5 quintals per cad. yoke fo r bread-grain (wheat and rye), to  reach an average of
(239)10.5-11.0 quintals per cad. yoke during the next three years.
The document indicated the princ ipa l reasons fo r the decline in livestock 
production:
our livestock breeding has been unable to  meet the 
population's growing requirements fo r  food from  animal 
sources sa tis fac to rily . The princ ipa l cause o f the low yields 
in livestock breeding lies in the fa ilu re  to  ensure unbroken 
fodder supplies. In years o f unfavourable weather then state 
o f livestock deteriorates and its  p rodu c tiv ity  declines. In the 
next two or three years the stepping up o f yields constitutes 
the fundamental task in livestock breeding.(240)
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W ith the general objectives o f the programme the document spec ifica lly  outlined 
livestock goals fo r  1956. Table 10.4 compares th is goal w ith  the livestock census 
(where available) during previous y e a r s : ^ ^
TABLE 10.4 Livestock Census in Thousands of Head
Types 1938/39 1948 1949 1950/51 Accelerated 
plan 1954
Goals fo r 
1956
C a ttle 2372 1627 200 0 1700 2400 2 2 0 0
Pigs 3886 2827 5200 4500 6000 5500
Sheep 1808 591 950 - 2 0 0 0 2300
P oultry 2193l(a) 17500 - 2500 2 0 0 0 0
(a) th is was the number o f pou ltry  in 1935.
S c o u le e .  ** t e e  <\a • a ^ v ,
The above tab le indicates tha t the 1956 goals fo r ca ttle  and pigs were below
those in the accelerated plan fo r 1954 and about the same as the amount o f
livestock in 1949. Even i f  the ca ttle  ta rge t were achieved i t  would be below the
1938/39 pre-war mark. Considering the fa c t tha t sheep numbers had been
greatly  depleted during earlie r years the goal o f the 'development plan' was
somewhat op tim is tic .
Rather in teresting ly, the document om itted  the question o f
co llec tiv isa tion  from  its  agenda: i t  sated tha t during the next three years, i.e.
u n til 31st December 1956, there was no in ten tion  to  expand the co llec tive  sector
o f agricu ltu re  num erica lly. W ith regard fo  the 'socia list' sector o f agricu ltu re ,
the document merely noted tha t the measures serving the development o f
agricu ltu re  would enable 'C o llec tive  and State Farms, w ith  th e ir  improved
average crop and livestock yields, th e ir  greater p ro f ita b ility  and the app lica tion
o f sc ie n tific  methods and agro-technology, to  show th e ir  superio rity  in
(242)ag ricu ltu ra l production'. What th is meant, and th is  was spelled out by the
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document, was tha t the fo r  the next three years agricu lture  would be based on 
sm all scale priva te  farm ing. Thus,
the realisation o f the resolution concerning the development 
o f agricu ltu re  would rest, p rim arily , on small, and 
pa rticu la rly  m iddle, peasants.(243)
The cessasion in the num erica l expansion o f the collecive sector was perhaps 
even more e x p lic itly  spelled out in an e d ito ria l a rtic le  on the resolution by 
Ferenc Fekete. A fte r  explaining tha t the socialist sector played an im portan t 
role in the development o f ag ricu ltu ra l production, he wrote tha t,
the economic, p o lit ic a l and organisational strengthening o f 
collectives, operating on 20 per cent o f arable land area, is a 
decisive fa c to r in ensuring the food supply to  the people ... 
and the rapid increase in th e ir production has been made 
easier by the fa c t tha t instead o f th e ir num erical expansion, 
now, the emphasis was on th e ir consolidation.(244)
In accordance w ith  the resolution, 1000 party  cadres were transferred to  ru ra l 
d is tr ic t centres during January 1954 fo r the purpose o f strengthening ag ricu ltu re  
p o lit ic a lly . And in A p ril 1954 a system fo r  exchanging techn ica l experience 
between collectives was in s t i t u t e d . ^ ^
In spite o f the d iff ic u ltie s  encounterd so fa r  in the im plem entation o f the 
government programme, the resolution ca tegorica lly  stressed tha t the ta rge ts  
set in the development plan were 'w holly rea lis tic  and can be achieved'. 
However, the 1954 Budget allocated 'only' 2670 m ill. Forin ts, at curren t prices, 
somewhat less than planned.(246) j?ven th is figure, however, represented an 
apprciable increase in the share of investm ent going to  agricu ltu re , 13 per cent 
in 1953 to  22.7 per cent in 1954; th is turned out to  be a peak in a g ricu ltu ra l 
investments. From 1955 its  share declined, and the same leve l was not achieved 
again u n til 1958. O f the to ta l investments, some 299.5 m ill. Forin ts  were
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allocated to  collectives. I t  was a sum which, in re la tion  to  th e ir needs, was s t i l l
inadequate but in re la tion  to  th e ir reduced arable land area i t  was more than
th e ir  share in 1953. As a result, the assets o f co llectives, 1955 Forin ts per cad.
(247)yoke, were 70 per cent more than in 1953, th is also represented a peak.
On 1st January 1954 the new system o f compulsory deliveries had come 
in to  f o r c e . ^ ^  In a number o f ways i t  was an improvement on the previous one. 
The new system established unchanged de live ry quotas fo r three years in 
advance.' While the decree im plem enting the new system fo llowed the general 
provisions set out in September 1953, some o f the concessions given in the new 
system were even more extensive than those outlined in the orig ina l 
announcement. (See page 717 and 718 above). The fo llow ing  were the p rinc ipa l 
provisions o f the new decree:
1. Compulsory delivery quotas were reduced as fo llow s (the amount o f 
reduction is given in percentage):
Commodity Type III Types I & II 
co llectives
Individual
peasants
Crop produce 25 15 to  20 10 to  15
Pigs & C a ttle 30 30 25 to  30
Poultry  & eggs 50 40 40
M ilk 30 20 to  25 15 to  20
Wine 50 30 25
The new system com plete ly abolished crop, m ilk  and wine de livery obligations 
fo r the priva te  plots o f co llec tive  members and reduced th e ir pou ltry  and egg 
de livery norms by 40 per cent. Grain quotas fo r individual peasants and Types I
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and II co llectives were computed on a graduated scale, according to  the category 
and amount o f land held, while those fo r  Type III co llectives were computed at a 
fixed  ra te  per cadastral yoke, according to  the category but irrespective  o f the 
amount o f land: fo r example, an individual peasant holding 1 to  3 cad. yokes 
category I (least fe rt ile )  land was required to  deliver 59 kgs/cad. yoke and 
progressed to  124 kgs/cad. yoke, depending on the amount o f land held; while 
members o f Types I and II co llectives, category I, were required to de live r 56 
kgs/cad. yoke and progressed to  113 kgs/cad. yoke depending on the amount o f 
land held (previously, both individual peasants and members o f Types I and II 
co llectives were the same -  66 kgs/cad. yoke); members o f Type III co llectives 
were required to  de liver 75 kgs/cad. yoke (form erly , 100 kgs/cad. yoke) fo r 
category I land; th is remained constant, irrespective o f the amount o f land held, 
varying only w ith  the fe r t i l i t y  o f the land.
2. D e livery quotas fo r  'kulaks' and other 'v illage explo iters ' were set 5 per 
cent higher than those levied on individual peasants holding the 
equivalent type and quan tity  o f land.
3. D e livery quota obligations levied on a ll peasants were based on the ara 
o f arable and meadow land together, i f  th is reached or exceeded one 
cadastral yoke.
4. Special crop, meat and m ilk  quota reductions and exemptions were 
granted to  peasants who were 'overaged'; had 3 or more ch ild ren under 14 
years o f age, or peasants serving w ith  the active m ilita ry  forces.
5. Arable land under production con trac t was exempted from  produce 
de live ry obligations and had reduced meat delivery quotas.
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6. Produce and meat delivery quotas were cancelled fo r  areas sown w ith
rice  and fo r every such cad. yoke 2 cad. yokes were exempted from  crop
delivery obligations. A t the same tim e, however, the peasant was 
obliged to  de liver 80 per cent o f his rice  crop to the state in lieu o f his 
crop de live ry  quota.
7. Type III co llectives were exempted from  de live ry obligations fo r
meadows exceeding 20 per cent o f the arable land held; while Types I and 
II co llectives and individual peasants were exempted fo r  meadows 
exceeding the to ta l area o f arable land.
8. Crop delivery obligations had to  be fu lf il le d  w ith in  the fo llow ing  groups:
bread-grain, fodder corn, maize, sunflower seed and potato deliveries.
a) bread-grain had to  be fu lf il le d  by the peasants in proportion to  his 
actual production results in wheat and rye
b) i f  bread-grain de live ry (based on calculations o f the sowing plan) 
was not feasible, the arrears could be fu lf i l le d  in barley or oats - 
and fa ilin g  these, in maize, sunflower seed or potatoes
c) corn fodder deliveries could be fu lf i l le d  in barley or oats, w ith  
maize or bread-grain. Barley, oats or bread-grain could be 
delivered in lieu o f maize -  and fa ilin g  these, beans, peas and 
len tils  could be delivered
d) fa ttened pigs could be delivered in lieu o f corn fodder and maize 
delivery obigations; while fa ttened pigs or lard could be substituted 
fo r sunflower deliveries.
Meat de livery quotas were required o f a ll peasants whose to ta l arable 
land and meadows atta ined, or exceeded, \  cad. yoke.
C o llective  members were not required to  f u l f i l  meat de live ry quotas on 
the land held in th e ir p riva te  plots. In place o f this they could deliver 3 
kgs. o f pou ltry  and eggs annually, or a corresponding weight o f la rd.
The standards fo r  pou ltry  and egg deliveries were to be un ifo rm  fo r the 
whole country. Peasants whose to ta l arable land was less than 3 cad. 
yokes could fu l f i l  th e ir entire  meat de livery quota, optionally, in pou ltry , 
eggs, young pigs, fa ttened pigs or mutton.
For a period o f one year a 20 per cent reduction in meat and m ilk  
de livery quotas was granted to  a ll co llectives established a fte r  1st 
September 1953.
Four regional units were to determ ine meat delivery quotas, tak ing  in to  
consideration the d is tr ic t, the producing capacity and the various breeds 
o f ca ttle .
Wine de livery obligations were required o f a ll peasants whose vineyards 
atta ined, or exceeded one-quarter cad. yoke. New vineyards were 
exempted from  de livery obligations during th e ir  f irs t  4 years, and were 
to  de liver only ha lf th e ir quota obligations in the f if th .
Peasants who fa iled to  fu l f i l  de live ry  obligations w ith in  the s tipu la ted 
tim e were to  be given in term ediate warning by the executive com m ittee  
o f the local council. I f  the peasant was at fa u lt his de live ry quota would
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be raised by 10 per cent and he would have to  f u l f i l  the increased norm 
w ith in  3 days.
16. Individual quotas fo r peasants were to  be determ ined by the executive 
com m ittee o f the loca l council, through discussions w ith  the peasant 
regarding the size o f area on which delivery quotas was to  be assessed 
and w ith  respect to  the next year’s m ilk  and meat delivery quotas.
F inally, the decree raised the above-quota prices o f produce appreciably - the
above-quota price fo r wheat was set at 220 Forints, fo r rye 190 Forin ts, fo r
barley, oats and maize 200 Forints per qu inta l (= 100 kgs.) respective ly. For
pou ltry  the new price was 18 Forints, fo r  fa ttened pigs 19-22 Forin ts, and fo r
(249)ca ttle  a very low 6.50 Forin ts per k ilo .
One of the most s ign ifican t features o f the new delivery decree was the 
provision s ta ting tha t members o f Type I and II co llectives were to  be set an 
in term ediate de livery rate, between tha t o f the individual peasant and Type III 
(most advanced) collectives. The emphasis on th is category indicated tha t the 
government had made additional concessions to  the peasantry in an a ttem p t to  
persuade them to  jo in  or re tu rn  to the co llectives. Previously, a ll the emphasis 
was placed on Type III co llectives and Types I and II, very few in number, were 
required to  fu l f i l  the same de livery requirements as individual peasants. The 
emphasis placed on lower Types I and II co llectives was also indicated in a rtic les  
appearing in the papers directed towards the co llectives themselves:
those peasants who are applying fo r  membership now, o f th e ir  
own w ill and conviction, deserve a place in the co llective , 
regardless o f whether or not they have or have not previously 
been co llec tive  members. To refuse them is only to  create a 
gap and encourage discord between the working peasantry o f 
the co llectives and individual farm s.(250)
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A number o f other s ign ifican t features were contained in the new decree:
1. in ’re s tr ic tin g  kulaks' the government set them higher quota deliveries 
than from  the rest o f the individual peasants
2. peasants signing contracts fo r crops were exempted from  compulsory 
deliveries fo r  the contracted area and the meat de live ry quota fo r 
peasants who entered in to contracts w ith  the state was reduced
3. the new de livery regulations indicated tha t the government was 
p a rticu la rly  interested in fu rthe ring  the cu ltiva tion  o f rice : the highest 
incentives o ffe red to cu ltiva to rs  o f th is crop
4. members’ p riva te  plots were en tire ly  excempted from  crop, m ilk  and 
wine deliveries and were allowed to  o ffe r meat deliveries instead. This 
was designed to  make the jo in ing  o f collectives more tem p ting  to  the 
individual peasantry
5. the au thority  to  set, or adjust, de livery quotas was delegated to  the 
executive com m ittee o f local councils
W ithout doubt, these measures made the compulsory delivery system fo r  the 
peasants more bearable. I t  did not, however, a lte r the fa c t th a t a large 
proportion o f the peasants’ production, even a fte r th is  decree, had to  be sold at 
unfavourable prices. Indeed, the more dynamic development o f ag ricu ltu ra l 
production -  a fte r  the cessation o f forced co llec tiv isa tion  - was g rea tly  hindered 
by the serious disproportions in state procurement prices, by the low leve l of 
ag ricu ltu ra l production prices and by the r ig id itie s  o f the compulsory de live ry  
system. The greatest problem o f the state procurement prices, in the staple 
production branches, especially bread-grain and fodder (coarse) grain production 
and c a ttle  raising, was tha t they provided no incentives to  produce. They also 
gailed to  provide incentives in the case o f many o ther products, e.g., wine, 
pou ltry , goose, live r, paprika etc. o f which Hungary used to  be a s ign ifican t 
exporter. The compulsory delivery price o f wheat, at 60 Forin ts, rye, a t 54 
Forin ts, barley and oats, at 50 Forin ts and maize, at 52 Forin ts per qu in ta l only 
covered approxim ately one-th ird to  one-quarter o f the production costs. The
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de live ry price o f beef, at 2.70 Forin ts/kg. in 1953 and 3.80 Forin ts /kg . in 1954, 
also covered only a sm all proportion o f the costs o f livestock r a is in g . ^ ^  
Furtherm ore, because production o f crops had to  be carried out in a ll regions o f 
the country, in accordance w ith  the sowing plan, whether i t  was p ro fitab le  or 
not, the compulsory delivery system seriously hindered specialisation in 
agricu ltu re . The in f le x ib ility  o f the system was also responsible fo r the serious 
lag in bread-grain growing in the country. A t th is tim e yields in bread-grain 
production were hardly any higher than at the tu rn  o f the century (Hungary was 
at the botton o f the world league). Low yields and declin ing sown area devoted 
to  bread-grain growing - as shown in Table 10.5 below - explained the worsening 
read-grain shortage in the e o u n t r y : ^ ^
TABLE 10.5 Development o f sown areas and production o f 
bread grain between 1949-1953
Year Bread-Grain sown area in 
1000 cad. yokes
To ta l production 
in ra il-w agon loads
1934/38 average 3856 291,631
1949 3583 260,281
1950 3427 285,378
1951 3423 314,046
1952 3269 224,155
1953 3051 274,387
On 20th January 1954 the government also announced its  new con trac t purchase
-  763 -
system fo r industria l crops. The party da ily  newspaper, commenting on the 
decree, stated tha t i t  was to  increase the income o f working peasants by 81 m ill. 
Forin ts, and added,
in the past few years many working peasants have had bad 
experience w ith  contractua l cu ltiva tion . The prices paid fo r  
de livery o f crops were low and there was too much red tape. 
C ontracting firm s paid no a tten tion  to  local conditions; the 
did not concern themselves w ith  the su ita b ility  o f the soil fo r 
growing pa rticu la r crops, not did they show any in te rest in 
the peasant's past experience.(253)
The a rtic le  declared tha t the conclusion o f cu ltiva tion  contracts was the most 
burning problem tha t a ffected  a ll villages. The government tr ie d  to  encourage 
the production o f certa in  industria l crops, which were suitable fo r  processing 
in to  consumer goods or trad ing  in te rna tiona lly , while, at the same tim e, i t  
o ffe red producers an incentive by granting them the righ t to  purchase additional 
consumer goods, such as tex tile s  and sugar. But the government apparently 
found d iff ic u ltie s  in extending the contract purchase system. This was c lea rly  
indicated by Istvan Dobi in his address to  the plenary session o f the Cooperative 
Council. Dobi considered it ,
quite un justifiab le  tha t some collectives, pa rtly  remembering 
unpleasant experience in the past, were re luctan t to  sign such 
contracts. They must realise tha t by this a ttitu d e  they 
deprive themselves o f a considerable source o f income.
Contrary to  past experience the new system o f production 
contracts were based p rim a rily  on ensuring pro fitabe
production.(254)
W ith these words, o f course, he pub lic ly  adm itted tha t the previous system, 
instead o f having been an incentive programme, has proved to  be an exp lo ita tive  
one.
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In the meantime, on the p o lit ica l fron t, Rakosi's opposition to  Nagy's 
a ttem pts to  im plem ent, in te r a lia , his ru ra l programme continued behind the 
scenes. Sometime in m id-January 1954 (the exact date is not available) the 
differences between the two were brought before the Soviet leadership. I t  is 
lik e ly  tha t Nagy, exasperated by Rakosi's obstructionism , decided to  se ttle  the 
issue once and fo r a ll and complained to  the Soviet leaders. The Hungarian 
leadership was summoned to  Moscow. Nagy described the event in the fo llow ing  
terms:
By the end o f 1953 and the beginning o f 1954 it  had already 
become evident to  the Soviet comrades, too, tha t there was 
opposition to the June Resolution, and fo r th is they blamed, 
princ ipa lly , Matyas Rakosi ...(255)
It  appears tha t as a result Nagy gained the advantage over Rakosi, who was 
c ritic ised  more than before and to ld  to  stop his obstruction ist po licy  and co- 
opereate w ith  the im plem entation o f Nagy's programme. Nagy had hard ly been 
in the public eye at a ll, since his 4th July speech and even when he did speak he 
la rge ly lim ite d  him self to  peasant questions. Now, encouraged by the Moscow 
v is it, he delivered a major p o lit ica l speech in the National Assembly on 23rd 
January 1954. In his report Nagy drew up a balance sheet o f the government's 
a c tiv itie s  during the f irs t  six months o f his 'New Course' programme. He 
'trium phan tly ' praised the achievements o f his government which, he said, had 
resulted in raising the confidence o f the people. Some o f his po licy  measures 
were slowly beginning to  show results: the burden o f the peasantry had been 
g reatly  reduced and th e ir  incomes increased, handicra ft industry had been 
expanded, market prices had declined by 13.3 per cent during the six months and 
employees on wages and salaries had saved some 550 m ill. Forin ts due to  various 
measures (also, in te r a lia , in ternm ent camps had been closed and the 
rehab ilita tion  programmes had got under way, etc.). He announced th a t a
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number o f new economic and cu ltu ra l reform s were on the way and vehemently 
attacked those who, at tim es overtly, at tim es covertly , a ttem pted to 
underestimate the significance o f the government programme, w ith  the aim o f
( o c c \
undermining its  reputation and shaking people's confidence in it .
For a while, a fte r  the Moscow v is it and Nagy’s appearance at the . 
National Assembly, 'peace' seemed to  reign on the surface. But Rakosi, deeply 
hum ilia ted by his fa ll from  grace in the eyes o f Moscow and the c r itic ism  he had 
received there, fo r the second tim e, s t i l l  refused to  accept the judgement o f the 
June Resolution. Disagreements between him and Nagy soon fla red  up again.
The overa ll shakiness o f the ag ricu ltu ra l s ituation, the continuing 
withdrawals from  and dissolutions o f collectives had sparked o f f  a bew ildering 
number o f speeches, statements and artic les during early 1954, re fle c tin g  o ften  
con flic ting  a ttitudes towards co llectiv isa tion  and he individual peasants. On 9th 
January 1954 the party da ily  newspaper condemned d is tr ic t and loca l organs fo r  
th e ir many ’mistakes’, abuses in dealing w ith  the ’m iddle’ peasants and the 
creation o f obstacles to  resignations from  the co llectives. Working peasants who 
le f t  the collectives, he stated,
must be regarded as fu tu re  co llective  members and must be 
trea ted as such ... there are s t il l many who have not received 
th e ir share o f land ... and, in some places, the trea tm en t o f 
fo rm er co llec tive  members is shocking.(257)
Nagy, in his report to  the National Assembly, promised fu rth e r aid to  individual 
farm ers and rea ffirm ed  his government’s a ttitu d e  towards, especially, the 
’m iddle’ peasant, whom he regarded as the centra l figu re  in ag ricu ltu ra l 
production:
today the middle peasant, who loves his work and knows how 
to  run his fa rm , is the centra l fa c to r in the country's 
agricu ltu ra l production ... the w e lfare  o f the middle
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peasantry, its  m ateria l progress, and the increase o f its  
productive capacity are an essential precondition -  together 
w ith  the collectives -  fo r  the rapid liqu idation o f the 
backwardness o f our agricu lture  and the progress o f 
ag ricu ltu ra l production ... they should enrich themselves and 
should augment and renew th e ir machinery and equipment 
and w ill be helped by the government to  increase th e ir  
wealth.
While giving reassurances to  the individual peasantry, many others, however, 
took pains to point out tha t
the co llec tive  is capable o f more than the individual fa rm . 
The united strength o f co llec tive  peasants can give more to  
those who work on the land and to  the en tire  country than the 
e ffo rts  o f individual farm ers.(259)
Laszlo Nemes also claimed i t  was ’obvious' tha t ’socialised' ag ricu ltu re  would 
solve the country ’s problem be tte r. However, he said, that,
at present conditions do not pe rm it the socia list 
reorganisation o f a ll the country's agricu lture . The economic 
and technica l conditions are not favourable; the tremendous 
task o f mechanising agricu lture has been only p a rtia lly  
achieved. But more than anything else the p o lit ic a l 
conditions are not favourable fo r  the working peasants and 
especially the sizeable number o f m iddle peasants, are yet 
convinced the correctness o f the socia list course and intend 
to  continue farm ing individually.^®®)
This testim ony to  the importance o f m iddle peasants was repeated on many 
occasions. Basic in it ,  o f course, was the rea lisa tion tha t Hungary's economy 
could not a ffo rd  a prolonged slump in farm  deliveries and tha t co lle c tiv isa tion  
could not be pursued at the cost o f dem oralising the ch ie f supplier. The e ffo rts  
to  appease the individual peasantry, however, did not produce the quick results 
tha t many had hoped. Despite marked reductions in the burden o f compulsory 
deliveries and numerous other concessions, designed to spur on a g ricu ltu ra l 
output, the quantity  o f produce made available to  the state was much less than 
was needed.
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W ithin three months, however, by about M arch -A p ril 1954, the
occasional complaints o f neglect the remaining co llectives had grown in to  a
national campaign. The mood w ith in  the co llectives was tha t the 's ta te  supports
those who are outside ra ther than inside the co llectives more.' In a report
to  the Politburo the main reason fo r  the continued w ithdrawals from  the
co llectives was given as the 'increased production aid given to  ind iv idual 
(2621peasants'. These complaints were persistently exploited, o f course, by
Rakosi, who grumbled at a meeting o f the Politburo tha t,
we praise these priva te  peasants so much tha t w illy -n illy  the 
co llec tive  farm  is driven in to  the b a c k g r o u n d . ( 2 6 3 )
I f  I had been a co llec tive  peasant -  he added - I te ll you, I 
would have grumbled a long tim e  a g o . ( 2 6 4 )
A t the same tim e, complaints were increasingly being made against the
co llec tive  members who, in th e ir a ttem pt to  boost th e ir incomes, increased th e ir
priva te  household p lo t farm ing to  the de trim ent o f co lle c tive  farm ing.
Apparently, i t  had become a widespread practice  fo r co llec tive  members, in
addition to  the one cad. yoke priva te  p lo t prescribed under the law, to  enlarge
th e ir  p lo t as much as two or three cad. yokes, tw ice  or three tim es the legal
lim it ,  from  state reserve land, thus fo rm ing a handsome sm all-scale fa rm . Also,
there were numerous instances o f co llec tive  members who, in add ition to  the
legal l im it  o f 1 cow and 2 piglets, owned over 2 cows and 3 or 4 p ig le t s . ^ ^
They used co llec tive  equipment and fodder fo r  working th e ir plots and feeding
th e ir animals, and raised food not only fo r th e ir own needs but fo r  sale on a
s ign ifican t scale. On 25th May Andras Hegediis was forced to  declare th a t the
state would put a stop to  such m alpractices, legal regulations would be f irm ly
enforced and 'oversized plots would have to  make crop deliveries and pay taxes
(266}
as i f  they were individual farms'. Despite Hegediis' warning conditions did
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not improve and in October 1954 Ferenc Erdei decried ’over-concentration* on 
p riva te  plots, c la im ing tha t they had been enlarged to  tw o or three tim es the 
legal size. Their owners were also keeping more animals than the legal lim it.  
Erdei declared tha t,
such an a ttitu de  endangers the development o f the co llec tive  
and i t  means tha t the peasant relies fo r  his existence more on 
his private p lo t than on the co llec tive  e ffo rt. This is not only 
against the in terest o f the co llec tive  but also against the 
individual in terest o f members because they deny themselves 
the advantages o f co llec tive  farm ing, the higher y ie ld  
produced by machines in large-scale f a r m i n g . ( 2 6 7 )
A t the same tim e, measures taken to  increase the income o f the ind iv idua l 
peasants again brought the problem of the ’kulak' and the th rea t o f 'ku lak isation ' 
(the creation o f new kulaks) to the fore. On 14th January the pa rty  da ily  
newspaper stated tha t
the view expressed by some people tha t support o f the middle 
peasants may enta il the danger o f strengthening the 
cap ita lis t forces in agricu ltu re  ... is likew ise wrong ... True, 
we must not fo rge t the danger im plied in strengthening the 
cap ita lis t elements in ru ra l areas. I t  would be a grave 
misatke to  th ink  tha t small-scale producton cannot breed 
exploiters. I t  would be a mistake to  overlook the fa c t tha t in 
the village there are ... kulaks who have not reconciled 
themselves to  the defeat o f capita lism : last year's attacks 
against co llec tive  farm ing should be a warning to  us.(268)
The same points were also made by Laszlo Nemes in his a rtic le  on 9th February, 
when he declared
the incorrect a ttitu de  which over-estim ates the danger o f 
peasants turn ing in to kulaks ... causes many persons to  refuse 
to  support the policy o f developing sm all-scale peasant 
farm ing ... o f course, the strengthening o f individual farm ers 
and an expansion o f possibilities o f free m arketing are not 
free  o f certa in  dangers o f rev iv ing  cap ita lis t elements. I t  
would be a grave mistake i f  we overlooked th is danger, if ,  
while figh tin g  the views o f those who over-estim ate th is 
th rea t, we under-estimated th is possibility.(269)
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During February and March, however, the campaign against the kulaks fla red  up 
again. On 25th March 1954 the party  o f f ic ia l da ily newspaper set the keynote 
fo r  a new policy,
during the last nine months, the paragraph concerning the 
kulak problem was o ften  in co rre c tly  in terpre ted ... The 
kulaks ... are ty rin g  to  regain th e ir  lost influence and are 
raising th e ir  heads ... They are try ing  to  recover th e ir  
machines and th e ir c a ttle  ... The villagers must be made to  
understand tha t the aboliton o f the kulak lis t does not mean 
tha t restric tions on the kulaks have been l i f t e d . ( 2 7 0 )
From m id -A pril onwards the newspapers were flooded w ith  accounts o f tr ia ls  of 
’kulaks’ and th e ir 'accomplices' fo r a rb it r a r i ly  taking possession o f land 
belonging to  co llectives (but which had orig ina lly  belonged to  them) and which 
they had no righ t to  recla im  (they had received compensation fo r  it) . On 14th 
May an a rtic le  in the party o f f ic ia l da ily  attacked so-called 'ku lak-law yers ', who 
dared defend the claims o f peasants; they now risked being barred from  practice  
or arrested as 'filthy-hyenas':
lawyers ... have used th e ir knowledge of the law and the 
position accorded to  them by the People's Democracy to  
pester co llectives w ith  a flood o f unfounded petitions and to  
in s titu te  lega lly  groundless law suits ... The People's 
Democracy w ill not to le ra te  kulak lawyers who, fed on kulak 
money, in trigue against the property o f collectives, which is 
protected by socialist law, and seek to  savage it  like  f i l th y  
hyenas.^ ^
On 15th May the argument was carried a step fu rthe r:
the new phase in build ing socialism, as in te rpre ted  by the 
kulaks, means tha t they can make unfounded claims fo r  the 
recovery o f equipment, land and buildings ... which are the 
law fu l property o f our c o l l e c t i v e s . ( 2 7 2 )
Rakosi, too, added his observation on the 'kulak problem':
- 770 -
in the past ... the policy o f re s tr ic tin g  the kulak o ften  slipped 
in to  a po licy o f liqu ida ting  the kulak; since last June an 
opposite extrem e can be experienced in many places. There 
is hardly any fig h t against the kulak and the kulak is trea ted  
as i f  he were a medium peasant.(273)
So, once again, attacks on the 'kulaks' had begun and they were being blamed fo r
everyth ing -  they had grown stronger, endeavoured to  undermine d iscip line
amongst the peasants, sabotaged the fu lf ilm e n t o f even the reduced compulsory
deliveries and by 'in tim ida tion ' encouraged other peasants to  do the same.
Because o f th e ir a c tiv itie s  and the neglect o f the co llec tive  sector, the whole
working population had suffered.
As was to  be expected w ith  the party  engaged in debate in preparation
fo r its  forthcom ing congress, the p o lit ica l pressure on Nagy's government
in tensified. These veiled hos tilitie s  between Rakosi and Nagy continued u n til
May, when the Hungarian leadership was summoned to  Moscow once again fo r
conc ilia to ry  discussions. On th is occasion, however, i t  was Rakosi who
complained and sought audience w ith  the Soviet leadership. The excuse fo r  th is
was provided by two happenings. The f irs t  was a le tte r  addressed to  the C en tra l
Com m ittee by Istvan Kovacs, the Budapest Party Secretary (an adherent o f
Rakosi who may, in fa c t, have been prompted by him), expressing alarm  at the
(274)disharmony between party  and government. The second was a report under 
preparation by Istvan Friss (also an adherent o f Rakosi), head o f the Plan, 
Finance and Trade Departm ent o f the Centra l Com m ittee, which drew a tte n tio n  
to  worrying problems in the economy. The report acknowledged tha t a fte r  the 
very hard w in te r months some improvements had taken place during March and 
A p ril - in  industria l production and in the economy generally, and especia lly in 
the disposition of p riva te  farm ers -  nevertheless, the underlying trend was one o f 
deepening economic tensions. The main areas fo r  concern, according to  the 
report, were as f o l lo w s : ^ ^
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1. the s ign ifican t increse in the money supply -  which was 40 to  50 per cent 
higher than a year before
2. the debt on trade w ith  the west had increased d ram atica lly , by 641.8 
m ill. Foreign Exchange Forin ts since 31st December 1953 (the value in 
Forin ts at the o ff ic ia l exchange ra te  set by the National Bank).
3. the great delay in the production o f small ag ricu ltu ra l m achinery and 
implements - which only began at the end o f 1953
4. the increase in purchasing power, especially in ru ra l areas, due to  the 
various measures, was too great; an increase o f 18 to 20  per cent in the 
supply o f goods to  the re ta il network would be needed fo r 1954, while i t  
was predictable tha t the ra te  o f grow th in national income would slow 
down s ign ifican tly
5. the slcaking o f state discipline re flec ted  in the:
a) non -fu lfilm en t o f compulsory deliveries
b) non-payment o f the reduced income taxes
c) o ve r-fu lfilm e n t o f the wage b ill, adversely a ffe c tin g  the trend o f
production costs
The preva iling  trends among the peasants were especially w orry ing  fo r  the 
regime around th is tim e. In the f irs t quarter o f 1954, e.g., compulsory deliveries 
o f eggs were underfu lfilled  by 53 per cent, while sales on the free  m arket were 
o ve rfu lfille d  by 220 per cent. This was, o f course, not only due to  the slackening 
o f discipline but also to  pric ing policy: fo r  example, while the compulsory
de live ry price o f eggs was a mere 0.38 Forin ts, the free m arket price  was 1.38
Forints. S im ila r problems prevailed in re la tion  to  o ther products. 
U nde rfu lfilm en t o f compulsory deliveries created problems in food supplies to  
the population, especially w ith  meat, and th is also contributed to  the increase in
( O r7fl)
the fore ign trade d e fic it. Furtherm ore, much concern was pub lic ly
expressed around this tim e by economic o ffic ia ls  over the fa c t th a t the increased 
liv in g  standards achieved since June were endangered by the appreciable slow­
down in the rates o f gowth, tha t the various •one-sided' concessions given to  
individual peasants disadvantaged those liv in g  on wages and salaries and th a t the
drastic reduction in co llective  membership jeopardised fu rth e r 'soc ia lis t
(277)development'. According to  one report, by the A g ricu ltu ra l Section o f the
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C entra l Com m ittee, in March 1954, great obstacles were m ounting in the party 
o f increasing agricu ltu ra l production. A lthough the measures taken did increase 
the inc lina tion  o f individual peasants to  produce more, the conditions to  f u l f i l  
the plan were s t i l l  missing in many respects. The production o f a r t if ic ia l
fe rt il iz e rs  was insu ffic ien t, the production o f machinery had jus t begun and the
(278)sown area too was inadequate. In the event, since the report was not ready 
u n til the end o f A p ril, Rakosi had to  s ta ll fo r  tim e, in which he was conveniently 
aided by the tem porary illness o f Nagy, and he succeeded in arranging fo r  the 
congress, scheduled fo r A p ril, to  be put back to  May. Rakosi, seizing the 
opportunity provided by the le tte r  and the report, tried  to make a t r ip  to  Moscow 
w ithout Nagy to  appeal to  the Soviet leadership. The Soviet leaders, however, 
refused permission and, to  his dismay, asked tha t Nagy accompany him . When he
did go to Moscow, at the beginning o f May, he complained but the Soviet leaders
(279)censured him, and Gero again fo r  a ttem pting  to  revise and postpone the
June Resolutions. Furtherm ore, Rakosi was urged by the Soviet leaders to
correct past mistakes and m aintain co llec tive  leadership. The ve rd ic t o f the
Soviet leaders on Kovacs' le tte r  was tha t i t  'lacked Bolshevik frankness and got
(280)o ff  on the wrong track  ending up as i t  did w ith  a compromise o f p rinc ip le '.
In response to  Friss' report on the economy, however, the Soviet leaders, wishing 
to  demonstrate un ity  between the tw o at the coming pa rty  congress, also 
protested against certa in  excesses on the part o f Nagy.(281)
The discussions the Hungarian leadership had in Moscow, and the 
instructions received there, determ ined the programme and the tone o f the Third 
Party Congress o f the HWP, which was held from  24th to  30th May 1 9 5 4 . ^ ^  It  
was expected to  be a 're fo rm  congress', but i t  was not: to  dem onstrate party  
un ity , i t  turned out to  be a 'compromise congress'. To ensure th a t 'peace' and 
'un ity ' would prevail, at least on the face o f it ,  Marshall Voroshilov ( t i tu la r  head 
o f state and Politburo member) was sent to  Budapest a few days before, not only
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to  attend the congress but also to  'smooth over' any d ifferences tha t m ight s t i l l
arise between Rakosi and Nagy fo llow ing  the Moscow discussions. That
differences did, in fa c t, exist -  even at tha t la te  stage - was confirm ed by the
fa c t tha t during the days im m ediate ly before the congress, ne ither Rakosi's nor
Nagy's report was ready. The Congress Preparatory Com m ittee, the P o litburo
and then Marshall Voroschilov had to  intervene and ask Rakosi, not one but three
tim es, to  a lte r his report. Nagy, too, had to  m odify his own report to  the
congress s ign ifican tly . The differences between the two were papered over and
Marshall Voroshilov, at least tem porarily , managed to  preserve appearances; the
(283)basic differences, however, remained.
In order to  demonstrate un ity , the congress was opened by Nagy and 
closed by Rakosi. But, fo r a ll the setbacks Rakosi remained the unquestionable 
head o f the party and the keynote address to  the congress was delivered by him  - 
speaking fo r  five  hours. A fte r  a general review  o f the h is to ry  o f the People's 
Democracy over the past ten years and the fore ign s ituation, he turned his 
a tten tion  to  the national economy. This he discussed under the fo llow ing  main 
headings:
1 . the great accomplishment o f industry
2 . the s ituation in agricu lture
3. the characteristics o f the 'New Course'
4. the questions re la ting  to  increased p rodu c tiv ity  and the reduction in 
production costs
5. the party's policy regarding the peasants
6 . the socialist sector o f agricu lture
7. the work o f leading econmic, adm in is tra tive  and party  organs
8 . the Second Five Year Plan
In his view the development o f heavy industry in pa rticu la r has been very fas t
since 1951; he cited numerous quan tita tive  achievements as proof o f th is. But he 
adm itted tha t mistakes had been made (w ithout m entioning personal 
responsibilities in th is regard), workers' conditions o f l i fe  had not im proved and,
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more seriously, agricu ltu ra l development had been neglected, and d istortions and 
imbalances had developed in the economy. These mistakes, he said, had marred 
the re lations between the party  and the working class, weakened the w orker- 
peasant alliance and made it  more d if f ic u lt  to  raise the m ate ria l and cu ltu ra l 
standard of the people. The ’New Course’, he adm itted, was necessary to  co rrect 
the mistakes o f the past and he in tim ated tha t these had been remedied already 
by the party ’s June, October and December Resolutions. While seemingly fu lly  
endorsing the principles o f the 'New Course', 'Rakosi noted, however, tha t things 
were seriously wrong because some o f the re fo rm  measures in itia te d  since June 
1953 had had harm fu l e ffec ts , especially on peasants and workers' d iscip line, and 
had resulted in increased 'kulak influence' over individual peasants and relaxed 
a ttitudes towards compulsory deliveries. Also in industry, where fa c to ry  
managers had encouraged slackness o f discipline, lowering o f p ro d u c tiv ity  had 
resulted in over payment o f wages. He sharply c ritic ised  the 'libe ra lism ' which, 
he said, in fected many party  and state organs. Thus,
Due to  bad work by our p o lit ica l and economic leaders, 
fu rth e r price reductions are impossible u n til production rises 
and costs fa ll. Wage discipline had become very slack -  o ften  
w ith  the encouragement o f p o lit ica l, economic and trade 
union leaders. This in to lerable s itua tion  must end. Our 
agita tors have raised fa r  too high the hopes o f what the New 
Course would bring.(284)
His address re flec ted  his worries and the party's displeasure at the developments 
in agricu lture . I t  is not surprising, then, tha t he devoted a th ird  o f his report to  
the problems o f the ru ra l sector, where he was try in g  to  draw a d iv id ing  line 
between the middle peasant -  who must be helped, he said - and the kulaks -  who 
must be res tric ted  and fought. Thus,
the measures taken by the government to  improve the lo t o f 
the peasantry have resulted in higher incomes fo r individual
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producers, th e ir  am bition to  produce more has grown and 
they have taken over the cu ltiva tion  o f un tilled  reserve lands 
... much remains (however) to  be done to  realise the Decree 
o f the P arty  and government o f 23rd December on the 
development o f ag ricu ltu ra l production so tha t our 
agricu ltu re  may indeed progress rap id ly  from  year to  year ... 
people ask whether the many benefits given to  the peasantry, 
including individual farm ers, w ill not result in many middle
peasants beco m in g  ku laks .(285 )
He adm itted tha t th is danger existed, but i t
must not be exaggerated. The teaching o f Lenin tha t 
production hour by hour produces capita lism , does apply to  
our conditions, but Lenin and Stalin also said tha t as long as 
small-scale production predominates one must do everyth ing 
in one's power to  enable the small farm ers to  increase th e ir  
output. A  few  dozen, or a few hundred middle farm s may 
become kulak farm s, but in th is case measures to  re s tr ic t 
them would be applied to  them .(286)
He emphasised tha t the need to  help and re ly  on poor peasants, establishing a 
solid alliance w ith  the middle peasants and not fo r a moment ceasing to  f ig h t the 
w ell-to-do-kulaks.
In discussing the position o f the socia list sector o f agricu ltu re , Rakosi 
declared th a t 'na tu ra lly ' both the party and the working class f irm ly  re lied  on the 
collectives. He exorted party members to  improve th e ir work in the co llectives 
and assert the ir rights, and those o f th e ir  members, to  help them fin a n c ia lly  and 
provide them w ith  'the best agronomists and cadres'. The co lle c tiv isa tion  o f a ll 
land, he said, was s t i l l  the u ltim a te , unchanged, purpose o f the party . He 
stressed that,
we should not lose sight fo r a moment o f the fa c t tha t the 
development o f co llectives is the unavoidable, the main way 
o f build ing socialism in the villages and sooner or la te r a ll the 
peasants w ill be convinced o f th e ir correctness and w ill take
this r o a d . (2 8 7 )
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A t th is  stage, however, the most urgent task, he said, was to  strengthen the
co llectives and help them to  achieve higher yields so th a t th  incoe o f the ir
members would surpass the average income o f m iddle peasants. The tra c to r
stock owned by the MTS, he pointed out, must be increased and co llectives had a
prio r cla im  on the 1 2 ,0 0 0  trac to rs  owned by them (tha t year, he indicated they
(288)would receive another 5000 tractors). W ith regard to  co rrec ting  the many
com plaints against the State Farms (which, he said, were in e ffic ie n t and 
produced at much too high a cost, while th e ir  yields were extrem ely low) the 
most urgent task was to  improve th e ir work, increase the level o f leadership and 
improve th e ir labour d is c ip l in e d * ^
In discussing economic tasks, Rakosi presented the C entra l C om m ittee ’s 
guidelines fo r the Second Five Year Plan. Since the p o lit ic a l upheavals o f the 
preceding twelve months had prevented the comprehensive elaboration o f the 
new plan, Rakosi announced tha t i t  would be postponed fo r a year and would run 
from  1956 to  1960 and 1955 would be used fo r  the adequate 'preparation ' o f the 
plan. He declared tha t the new plan was,
to  continue at a substantia lly slower pace than the f ir s t,  w ith  
ca re fu l consideration o f the mistakes com m itted and w ith  
greater emphasis on consumer goods and f o o d s . ( 2 9 0 )
He stressed tha t rapid all-round progress had to  be atta ined in ag ricu ltu re , in
both co llec tive  and private sectors, because agricu ltu re  constitu ted  the key
(291)problem o f the second plan. I t  i§ qu ite  like ly  tha t agricu ltu re  was one cause 
o f the postponement, the other was the 'in te rna tiona l division o f labour i.e., the 
coordination o f the Hungarian plan w ith  the new Soviet plan, which also began in 
1956. Dealing w ith  the problem o f agricu lture , Rakosi declared tha t the 'bu ild ing 
of socialism must continue not only in towns but also in villages', a g ricu ltu ra l 
production must be substantia lly increased and during the second plan period the
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country's grain problem must f in a lly  be solved. To achieve th is  the aim o f the
second plan was fo r agricu ltu re  to  catch up w ith  socia list industry, so that
socia list production predominated in the whole economy. For th is, the num erical
development o f co llectives must continue, im ply ing -  but not spec ifica lly  s ta ting
- tha t the process o f co llec tiv isa tion  was to  be completed by the end o f the
second plan period (the year 1955 was to  be used fo r preparation and fu rth e r
(292)rapid transform ation would commence during the new plan period).
Nagy's contribu tion  to  the Congress discussions, on 28th May (the 2nd
point on the agenda), while creating great in te rest and expectations, resulted in
some disappointment. He did not speak at a ll on m atters re la tin g  to  the national
economy, nor on measures re la ting  to  the June Resolution, but lim ite d  h im self to
dealing w ith  the problems o f state adm in istra tion and o f local councils and 'the
(293)serious lax ities  which have been noticeable in the work o f both'. Nagy's plan
was to  improve the work o f local councils by making them less bureaucratic,
more representative and, to  prevent confusion in th e ir  work as a resu lt o f
in terference by the various m in is try  and governmental o ffices, to  extend th e ir
power and to  place them under the contro l o f the National Assembly and the
Presidentia l Council, instead o f the adm in istra tive  agencies and, in the last
instance, the Council o f M inisters. This would have had im portan tan t p o lit ic a l
im plications but i t  never progressed fu rth e r than the planning stage. Nagy also
proposed to  revive the People's Independence Front under the new name
(294)P a tr io tic  People's Front (Hazafias N epfron t). He subm itted a proposal to
the Politburo, before the Congress, in which he f irs t  advocated the re ­
establishment o f the 1948 coa lition  a ll be i t  on the Polish model -  i.e ., parties 
w ithou t real p o lit ica l power -but when th is idea was re jected he turned to  the
idea o f the P a tr io tic  People's Front (PPF), te llin g  the Po litburo th a t i t  could
(295)mobilise the mass support the party has fa iled  to  muster. The idea its e lf
was adopted by the Politburo but an intense debate developed over whether the
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PPF was to  be in the fo rm at o f a mass 'organisation' w ith  both co llec tive  and
individual membership - as Nagy wanted -  or a mass 'movement' embracing other
mass organisations but having no ind iv idual membership. Since no agreement
was reached w ith in  the Politburo the question was subm itted to  the Soviet
leadership during the Moscow v is it, where the la tte r , i.e., the mass 'movement'
(296)version, gained approval. A lthough the issue was raised at the congress, the 
question o f the PPF was not debated since i t  was precluded from  the 
congressional agenda and hence no resolution was passed. Indeed, Nagy him self, 
in the enforced sp irit o f 'pa rty  un ity ' and 'compromise', moved away from  his 
o rig ina l position and re ferred to the PPF as a mass 'movement' in his congress 
report. The essence o f the opposition was the fea r tha t a new fro n t in the 
fo rm at o f an 'organisation', w ith  individual membership, could have become a 
po ten tia l r iva l to  Rakosi's disciplined party  and possibly have provided an 
a lte rna tive  power base fo r Nagy. Hence, its  development on those lines was 
obstructed. A fte r  the Congress, a conference was held, on 12th August 1954, 
which entrusted a nine member com m ittee (including Rakosi) w ith  the task o f 
d ra ftin g  a sta tu te  fo r  the PPF. A fte r  a C entra l Com m ittee resolution, passed in 
October, the fro n t was fo rm a lly  inaugurated on 24th October 1954. W hatever 
Nagy's intentions m ight have been fo r  the PPF, i t  was revived on the model o f a 
broad soc io -po litica l mass 'movement' in which the HWP's leading ro le was not 
dependent on a num erical preponderance o f party members. I t  was, in e ffe c t, 
turned in to a propaganda machine fo r the party. This did not, however, prevent 
Rakosi from  charging Nagy la te r, in the Spring o f 1955, w ith  having endeavoured 
tb  endanger the 'leading role o f the party ' by rev iv ing  the PPF. As w ill be seen, 
the PPF was to  play a lim ite d  role during the 1956 revolu tion. A fte rw ards i t  was 
used by the new Kadar regime as not much more than an e lectioneering g im m ick.
On 30th May, the last day, the congress elected a 71 member C entra l 
Com m ittee (one-th ird o f the old membership was replaced w ith  new people). The
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Politburo and the Secretaria t were again reorganised: the number o f Po litburo
members was again reduced to  nine, composed o f Matyas Rakosi, Im re Nagy,
Erno Gero, M ihaly Farkas, Andras Hegediis, A n ta l Apro, Istvan Hidas, Lajos Acs
and Bela Szalai (a new member). The membership o f the Secre taria t was
increased from  fou r to five  -  Matyas Rakosi, M ihaly Farkas , Lajos Acs, Bela Veg
and Janos M atolcsi was added as a new member. Rakosi was o ff ic ia l ly  elected
(297)F irs t Secretary o f the Party. The elections to  pa rty ’s leading bodies,
however, did not a lte r the proportion o f Nagy’s supporters; as before, the 
predominance of Rakosi’s associated on these bodies remained unchanged.
In closing speeches assessing its  work, Nagy was m ild ly  c r it ic a l o f the 
congress fo r neglecting to  discuss the general p o lit ic a l issues and, instead, 
concentrating too much on fac tu a l details regarding the national economy. He 
warned against the danger o f re tu rn ing  to  ’old’ lines o f po licy. Rakosi, 
seemingly more satisfied w ith  the outcome, insisted tha t, on the whole, the work 
o f the congress was positive fo r  i t  had acknowledged the progress the pa rty  had 
made since 1951, had demonstrated ’pa rty  un ity ’ and shown the way to  ’build ing 
socialism ’. He, too, however, was somewhat c r it ic a l, because, he said, issues 
re la ting  in te r alia to  questions o f ideology, party  work and fu rth e r ag ricu ltu ra l 
development had been relegated to  the background. He warned against 
complacency because, he stressed, the congress merely indicated the problems 
and fu tu re  tasks but it  did not resolve them.
Thus the congress discussions ended, as arranged in Moscow, in a spurious 
compromise -  both Rakosi's and Nagy’s reports were adopted as resolutions 
ind iv idua lly . Both had to  make concessions and moderate th e ir  views: while 
Rakosi, in a sense, endorsed the policies o f the 'New Course' decreed in the June 
Resolution, Nagy refra ined from  raising the legacies o f errors and crim es o f the 
past, the question o f rehab ilita tion  o f p o lit ic a l prisoners and, above a ll, -which 
ba ffled  many - refra ined h im self from  speaking at a ll on the economy, which was
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rap id ly  coming under severe strain. Discussions on sensitive controversia l issues, 
fo r example, in tra -p a rty  d ifferences accum ulating since June 1953 and the 
problem o f resistance to  economic policy changes were only mentioned en 
passant but were not on the congress agenda. The problem o f resistance to  
changes was apo logetica lly smoothed over as 'excusable wrong-doing' under the 
confused circumstances and delays in im plem entation o f the measures were 
described as somewhat 'exaggerated'. A lthough the congress raised the problem 
o f slow p roduc tiv ity  grow th and the unsatisfactory trend o f production costs i t  
did not look in to  th e ir  deeper origins, nor did i t  examine the urgent problems o f 
rap id ly worsening imbalance between purchasing power and consumer goods 
output, due to  excessive wage increases, inadequate improvement in labour 
p roduc tiv ity  and fa ilu re  to  rea llocate resources to  supply the population, 
resulting in an ever increasing d e fic it on the Balance o f Payments.
Nevertheless, Rakosi's speech to  the congress, fu l l  o f covert 
reservations, and Nagy's abortive a ttem pt to  revive the PPF not only showed 
tha t there were deep splits in the party but also expressed differences on basic 
questions. I t  was then not surprising tha t th is spurious 'peace', 'p a rty -u n ity ' and 
'sp irit o f compromise', which, on the whole, marked the congress discussions, 
proved to be ra ther b r it t le  and short-lived. Soon a fte r the congress in tra -p a rty  
d ifferences in tensified and the r iv a lry  between Rakosi and Nagy seemed to  have 
shifted to  the economic ba ttle fie ld .
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10.3 'New Course': G rowing economic problems and policy disagreements; the
October 1954 Centra l C om m ittee Plenum
It  is a delica te task, even today, to  assess the general economic and, 
especially, the ag ricu ltu ra l achievements o f Nagy's policies in 1953-54 
ob jective ly . The period, as shown, was marred by passions, confusion deliberate 
obstruction, allegations and counter-a llegations. A part from  these facto rs, the 
evaluation is fu rth e r com plicated by the fa c t tha t the e ffec ts  o f re fo rm  
measures introduced in one period are not confined to  that period and may only 
make themselves fe lt  in the next period, or production cycle. In the present 
case, however, the next period witnessed a reversal o f many o f the 'New Course' 
policies. Furtherm ore, in agricu ltu re  c lim a tic  variations, too, have an im portan t 
e ffe c t on the results. Under these circumstances, therefore, any evaluation is 
faced w ith  lim ita tions .
Nevertheless, i t  can be said w ith  some ce rta in ty  tha t, on the whole, 
im portant as the measures proved to  be, the p rac tica l economic results o f Nagy's 
policies were not very substantia l and were fa r below expectations (but, o f 
course, the generally m ilder p o lit ic a l atmosphere was welcome). The overa ll 
economic s itua tion  at the end of 1954 did not look vastly d iffe re n t from  the 
s ituation a year earlie r. In term s o f both industria l and ag ricu ltu ra l production 
'New Course' created new problems which seriously hampered the ra te  o f 
development, and achievements did not seem to  have measured up to  
investments or to  economic requirements.
Looking f irs t,  however, at the development o f agricu ltu re  in 1954 (the 
last year o f the plan period 1950-1954), and the plan period as a whole, the slow 
growth o f ag ricu ltu ra l production remained one o f the main concerns fo r  the 
government. Despite the various incentives given to  farm ers, the increased ra te  
o f ag ricu ltu ra l inevestment, mechanisation and fe r t i l iz e r  u tilisa tio n , the gains in 
ag ricu ltu ra l production -  pa rtly  because o f adverse weather conditions and p a rtly
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fo r  o ther reasons -  were sm aller than antic ipated and food supplies and food
exports were s t i l l  below requirements. Although to ta l investm ent allocated grew
modestly from  year to  year (see table on p.616) i t  s t i l l  lagged behind the 1949
proportion (when i t  was 18 per cent o f a ll investment) and fe ll short o f the needs
o f agricu lture  and co llec tiv isa tion . On the whole, ag ricu ltu ra l investm ent fa iled
to  reach even the levels specified on the F ive-Year Plan. Its  share over the
1950-1954 plan period represented, on average, only 13.7 per cent o f to ta l
investments; an average figure which is lif te d  by the g rea tly  increased share o f
22.7 per cent in 1954. The share o f the investments a llocated to the
co llectiv ised sector, even i f  the amount spent on developing the m achine-tractor
stations network is included, represented no more than about one-th ird  o f to ta l
investments. When the d is tribu tion  o f investments is examined, according to  end
use, i t  is shown tha t, on average, s ligh tly  more than tw o-th irds  o f the investment
allocated to the co llectiv ised sector (81 per cent in 1954) was a llocated to
construction, ra ther than concentrating scarce resources on developing the
means o f production e.g., fe rtiliz e rs , pesticides, ve terinary care, machines e tc.,
to  boost ag ricu ltu ra l output d irc t ly . On top o f th is, many o f the construction
(298)projects were outdated and o ften  misconceived. The d is tr ibu tion  o f
ag ricu ltu ra l investment according to  end use is shown in Table 10.6 (see 
(299)p.783). The poor choice o f investment a llocation, o f course, can be
explained by the decision to  co llectiv ise  both crop production and livestock 
raising simultaneously, which made construction unavoidable, despite the 
arguments against i t  at the tim e  in Hungary, tha t, on the lines o f the 'Lenin ist 
princip le  o f gradualism ’, in the absence o f the prerequisites fo r  large-scale 
animal husbandry i t  ought to  have remained based on the sm all-scale f a r m . ^ ^  
Although the amount allocated to  the development o f co llec tives ’ machine stock 
increased by 8 per cent (see Table 10.6 p.783) -  which was the highest a llocated 
in any one year over the period -  under the severe res tric tions  imposed on large 
machine purchases, i t  was only adequate in re la tion  to  the reduced arable land
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area rem aining under the cu ltiva tio n  by collectives. N a tiona lly , however, -
despite fa llin g  behind planned targets -  more large machines were supplied to
agricu ltu re , w ith  the exception o f machines fo r harvesting and gathering in the
crops, than on average in any one year during the 1950-1953 period: e.g., in 1954
agricu ltu re  received 4456 trac to rs , 3130 tra c to r  ploughs; 1393 cu ltiva to rs , 371
combines and 549 reaper-binders, instead o f the yearly  average o f 2161, 2210,
815, 449 and 755 respective ly, over the 1950-1953 p e rio d /3^  As a result, 100
per cent mechanisation was achieved in 1954 in autumn deep-ploughing and the
degree o f mechanisation in hoeing and harvesting had increased from  7.7 and
(302)27.7 per cent in 1953 to  15.9 and 47.9 per cent respective ly. In a change
from  previous p ractice  the MTS gave p r io r ity  to  co llectives w ith  a labour
shortage; also, in 1954 the proprtion o f th e ir work done on co llectives decreased
from  76.3 per cent to  67.0 per cent, while the proportion o f work done fo r
(303)individual farm ers increased from  6.5 to  18.2 per cent. Despite increases in
the tra c to r  stock o f the MTS the overa ll level o f mechanisation o f basic t i l l in g
work, both on co llectives and individual farms, remained very low. The area o f
irr iga ted  land on co llectives decreased in step w ith  the reduction in th e ir  to ta l
arable land under cu ltiva tion : out o f a to ta l 17,500 cad. yokes reduction in
irr iga ted  area, 9,500 cad. yokes was accounted fo r  by co llec tives .(304)
increase in the u tilisa tio n  o f a r t if ic ia l fe rt il iz e rs  from  1953 (see:p.645) is shown
in Table 10.7(305):
TABLE 10.7 Annual consumption of artificial fertilizers
in 1954
Consumption in 1000 tons Consumption in kgs/cad.yoke
State Farm Coll. Farm National State Farm Coll. Farm National
161.0 61.0 308.9 140.6 47.1 32.5
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The u tilisa tio n  o f a r t if ic ia l fe rt il iz e rs  by the co llectives increased from  28.9 
kgs/cad. yoke in 1953 to  47.1 kgs/cad.yoke in 1954 - an increase o f 63 per cent - 
while u tilisa tio n  nationally, which includs individual farm ing, rose from  24.8 
kgs/cad.yoke in 1953 to  32.5 kgs./cad.yoke, a 34 per cent rise. Sim iar changes 
occurred, although at a much low er level, in the case o f individual farms, 
including household plots, and Types I and II co llectives, where the ra te  o f 
u tilisa tio n  increased from  6.1 kgs/cad.yoke in 1953 to  10.2 kgs/cad.yoke in 
1954.(306)
The question whether some o f the improvements in conditions compared
w ith  ea rlie r years m ight have resulted in improved production and a greater
volume o f marketed produce is d if f ic u lt  to  answer, m ainly because o f the
influence of. the weather. C erta in ly , at least some of the improvements in
conditions pointed towards an apreciable increase in ag ricu ltu ra l production. The
balance fo r 1954, despite the bad harvest, showed a modest im provem ent but no
rad ica l reversal o f the s ituation in agricu lture , which fo r a long tim e had been
deplorable. To ta l ag ricu ltu ra l production in 1954 exceeded the previous year’s
level by only 2 per cent. A summary o f the development o f ag ricu ltu ra l
production fo r  the year, and fo r the period 1950-56, is provided in Table 10.8 on 
(307)p.786. The figures c learly  show tha t the perform ance o f Hungarian
agricu ltu re  was s t i l l  in fe rio r when compared w ith  pre-w ar production. The 
modest increase actua lly  achieved in re la tion  to  1949 -  while hardly impressive 
when we considered tha t in tha t year the a fte r-e ffe c ts  of World War II were s t i l l  
noticeable -  was the result o f the strenuous e ffo rts  made by individual peasants 
cu ltiva tin g  most o f the land under desperately unfavourable conditions. The plan
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TABLE 10.8 Gross and Net values of agricultural 
output (at constant prices)
Gross output 1938=100 Net output 1938=100 T o ta l Gross Net
marketed output output 
Year produce^)
to ta l crop livestock to ta l crop livestock 1938=100 1949=100
1950 90 81 100 94 81 147 85 106 112
1951 104 109 93 112 112 108 98 123 133
1952 79 65 94 70 58 109 88 93 83
1953 94 100 80 97 100 72 90 112 115
1954 96 86 102 92 85 118 85 114 110
1955 108 101 109 106 96 130 105 128 127
1956 95 82 103 89 77 119 “ 112 106
(a) Source: Adatok es Adalekok ... op .c it., p.161. \  ^  , "Lo
period also includes two exceptionally good years (1951 and 1955) and one 
medium-to-good year (1953) w ith  reasonably abundant harvests. The to ta l 
marketed produce from  1949 onwards was less then in 1938, fo r  tw o main 
reasons: (i) because to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l output (except 1951 and 1955) was less 
than in 1938 and (ii) because sm all-scale individual farms marketed a sm aller 
proportion o f th e ir produce than in 1938. The volume o f marketed produce was 
sm aller than in 1939 in every year u n til 1955. So, during the F ive -Y ear Plan 
period, to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l production (except in 1951) did not reach the prewar 
level. The good harvest in 1955 brought i t  above the 1938 level but i t  declined 
again in 1956 (the harvest was gathered before the outbreak o f revo lu tion). 
O vera ll production, however, stagnated, while requirements -  because of 
population grow th (1934/38=100, 1953=106)/3^  not to  mention the other 
im portant fac to r, urbanisation - had grown substantia lly. Thus stagnation came 
at the worst possible moment. Further exam ination also reveals tha t both to ta l 
and marketed production showed a flu c tu a tin g  trend, below the 1938 level. 
In te resting ly, despite the fa c t that, compared w ith  1938, to ta l production was 
lowest in 1952, the re la tive
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sh o rtfa ll in marketed produce was the sm allest. This was c learly  re la ted to  the
pa rticu la rly  intensive compulsory de livery co llection  in tha t year. In la te r years,
the extraord inary re lationship between the two -  since compulsory deliveries
were reduced under N a g y  -  improved s ign ifican tly . Examining the figures fo r
gross production in 1954 more closely shows tha t, while there was a pronounced
increase in to ta l livestock prodction -  the number o f sheep, horses and pou ltry
increased while the number o f c a ttle  and pigs decreased - to ta l crop production
was s ig n ifica n tly  below the previous year. The development in livestock, in
(309)thousand head, is shown in Table 10.9:
TABLE 10.9 Trend in L ivestock Numbers (thousand head)
Year Pigs C a ttle Horses Sheep P ou ltry
2nd March 1953 4977 2236 681 1637 18,190
1st March 1954 4454 2075 683 1869 18,938
1st March 1955 5818 2128 711 1857 22,815
1st March 1956 6056 2170 729 1930 22,779
c o u l e e ,  *» i k c z e  ^  » ^ 0 *% j
C a ttle  breeding had fa iled to  develop sa tis fac to rily  over the F ive-Y ear Plan 
period, e ithe r in quan tita tive  or qua n tita tive  term s: the c a ttle  stock declined 
under Nagy and over the period essentially stagnated, and the number o f cows 
declined; the productive increase (productive increase = d iffe rence  between live  
b irths and deaths) per 100 cows fa iled  to  develop sa tis fa c to rily  and at 51 was at 
its  lowest in 1953 -  showing the a fte r-e ffe c ts  o f 1952; i t  increased to  63 in 1954 
and 66  in 1955, but had declined to 62 again by 1 9 5 6 ,^ *^  most probably owing to  
policy changes under Nagy (in 1953 and 1954) and Rakosi in 1955. But the
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unsatis factory long-term  development o f ca ttle  stock was la rge ly due to  the 
unsound re la tive  pric ing  po licy fo r ca ttle  raising and pig breeding tha t prevailed 
during the whole period. The reason fo r the declin ing number o f cows was the 
low price paid fo r calves, which provided no incentive to  producers to  raise 
calves. Despite adm in istra tive  regulations the incidence o f 'emergency* 
slaughtering o f animals and 'b lack market* slaughtering o f calves increased 
considerably. Another reason fo r  the poor performance o f c a ttle  breeding was 
the fa c t th a t throughout the period farm s had to  struggle w ith  fodder shortage, 
mainly because much of th e ir  fodder production was siphoned-off through 
compulsory deliveries to  centra l state stocks. The l i t t le  tha t was le f t  was more 
p ro fitab ly  used to  fa tte n  pigs because o f the re la tive  prices. Since 
adm in istra tive  regulations prevented a reduction in c a ttle  numbers, the 
marketed ca ttle  production and qua lity  decreased. Compared w ith  the 1930s the 
qua lity  o f the ca ttle  stock had deteriorated considerably by the end o f the 
period; while the average weight o f slaughtered ca ttle  was 468 kgs., before the 
war i t  declined to  410 kgs. in 1954 and 408 kgs in 1 9 5 5 .^ *^  Because o f the 
fodder shortage, its  u tilisa tio n  and re la tive  prices, the annual average m ilk  y ie ld  
per cow also fa iled  to  improve and even in 1953 did not reach the pre-w ar level. 
Policy changes a fte r 1954 fin a lly  brought i t  back to  the pre-war level. In term s 
o f social sectors, the output o f livestock on co llectives remained low. A m ajor 
additional fa c to r impeding improved animal husbandry -  besides shortage and 
poor qua lity  o f fodder -  on co llectives was poor organisation and tra in in g  o f 
zoological personnel and inadequate care and lack o f proper shelters, a ll o f which 
were worse than in other sectors. The State Farms showed b e tte r results; they 
were, o f course, able to  obtain the best breeding animals and conditions fo r  
livestock raising there were somewhat be tte r. L ivestock ra ising was most 
successful on individual farm s and household plots o f co llec tive  members, on 
which i t  was fu rth e r enhanced by the 'New Course' measures. W ith in  anim al
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husbandry pig raising is p a rticu la rly  quick to  respond to  new po licy measures: 
they have a much greater ra te  o f propogation and growth. Looking at Table 10.9 
i t  can be seen tha t the highest stock o f pigs during the period was reached in 
1955 and 1956. This was undoubtedly the result o f the maize output in the years 
im m ediate ly before, and, perhaps more im portan tly , the improved contractua l 
conditions established fo r pig raising: contractual prices fo r  pigs were increased 
considerably by Nagy's 'New Course' measures in 1954 and the volume of
(312)
contracts rose appreciably a fte r  1954. Livestock breeding had made
im portant strides in hungary a fte r  the Land Reform o f 1945. The main causes, 
then, fo r the unfavourable development during the f irs t  F ive-Y ear Plan period 
(1950-1954) were the p ric ing  and co llec tiv isa tion  policies and, most im portan tly , 
the inadequate fodder supply. These and other facto rs m ight explain the 
frequent shortages o f meat, lard and dairy products experienced during the 
period. Meat consumption, which was 41.4 kgs. per capita  in 1935, declined to 
32.5 kgs. by 1953-55. Consumption o f da iry products present a s im ila r
(313)
p ictu re . W ith regard to  sheep, i t  is in teresting to  note tha t inspite o f the 14 
per cent increase in sheep numbers compared w ith  1938, wool production 
declined by almost 30 per cent between 1938 and 1 9 5 5 .^ *^
W ith regard to crop production, a pa rticu la r concern fo r the government 
was the continued sho rtfa ll (except in 1951) in bread-grain (wheat and rye) 
output, compared w ith  1938 (see p.762), and the resultant growing d if f ic u lty  in 
obtaining enough grain to  feed the population. I t  looked as i f  Hungary was faced 
w ith  a permanent shortage o f bread-grain, which reached acute proportions in 
1954. T o ta l bread-grain production was down by 22 per cent (from  274,387 ra il-  
wagons in 1953 to  214,025 in 1954): wheat was down by 24 per cent (from  218,202 
rail-wagons in 1953 to 166,047 in 1954) and to ta l rye output was down by 15 per 
cent (from  56,185 rail-wagons in 1953 to  47,978 in 1 9 5 4 ) .^ *^  The sh o rtfa ll 
production is even more pronounced i f  considered tha t the areas sown to  these
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crops increased in 1954 fo r the f irs t tim e since 1949 (every year a fte r the area 
decreased, see p.762) fo r wheat and the rise was 6 per cent (from  2,293,039 cad. 
yokes to  2,449,708 cad. yokes) and fo r  rye 7 per cent (from  757,574 cad. yokes to 
810,137 cad. yokes) between 1954 and 1 9 5 4 .^ ^  Average yields fo r wheat, rye 
and barley de terio ra ted  in a ll sectors (see p.620).
I t  is not surprising then tha t in November 1954 Andras HegedUs, the
M in ister o f A g ricu ltu re , subm itted a proposal to  the Politburo meeting, c la im ing
to  o ffe r a solution to  Hungary’s grain problem. He argued tha t Hungary should
stop exporting grain and concentrate on supplying the domestic m arket and
build ing up a permanent reserve base. He called fo r  the in troduction  o f new,
high, y ie ld seeds and fo r the development o f agro-techniques to  enable the
country to  reduce the area devoted to  grain production and, at the same tim e , to
expand the areas o f those crops which proved more suitable fo r export, on the
one hand, and to  increase the area devoted to  fodder, on the other. This, w ith
improved incentives, would help, he said, to  increase livestock production in the
country. The res truc tu ring  o f Hungarian agricu lture  in th is manner, he argued,
would generally improve the country ’s sorely de fic ien t export capacity. A
decision on Hegediis’ proposal had to  w a it another six months, when, under
changed p o lit ica l conditions, i t  was adopted by the party  as a resolution, but in a
(317)drastica lly  modified form .
F ina lly , a few words about the weather fa c to r in ag ricu ltu ra l production. 
I t  had been seen tha t to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l production displayed a flu c tu a tin g  trend, 
below the 1938 level. Crop and livestock production, w ith  some deviation, 
showed s im ila r trends. O ff ic ia l sources associate these fluctua tions w ith  
c lim a tic  variations. This is, o f course, substantia lly correct: c lim a tic  changes do 
have an im portant a ffe c t on ag ricu ltu ra l production results. But, in te res ting ly , 
i f  c lim a tic  variations are set against the resilience o f productive forces i t  
becomes clear tha t over the period the e ffic ien cy  o f in te rac tion  between these
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tw o variables had deteriorated. C lim a tic  conditions during the 1945-1948 period
were, on the whole, even less favourable than during the 1950-1955 period. The
unsatisfactory performance o f Hungarian agricu lture  in the la tte r  period was
probably more a ttribu tab le  to  the decline in the resilience, the w illingness and
capacity to  produce, as a result o f the policies pursued by the regime than i t  was
to  the weather. Also, looking at the net value o f agricu ltu ra l production, the
dete rio ra tion  in the e ffic iency  o f productive forces between 1938 and 1956
becomes evident, considering tha t a sm all reduction in labour input seems to
(318)have been more than o ffse t by the increase in cap ita l inputs.
A closer exam ination o f the performance o f the co llectiv ised sector
reveals tha t during 1954 the government's declared goal o f 'strengthening' the
remaining co llectives was not achieved. During the year, as noted ea rlie r, the
process o f dissolutions and w ithdrawals from  the co llectives continued, a lbe it at
a slower rate . Many, mostly medium pesants, le f t  the co llectives, although
some, mostly landless and poor peasants, joined or re-joined them. In term s of
both crop production and livestock breeding the co llectives fa iled  to  develop
sa tis fac to rily . During the autumn o f 1954, at the end o f the economic year, 1323
co llectives managed to  balance th e ir  books, some only just, w ith  a surplus o f
varying size, while fo r 1931 co llectives the economic year ended w ith  a 
(319)d e fic it.  According to  th e ir  financ ia l reports the to ta l assets o f co llectives
were 5100 m illion  Forints, while th e ir  to ta l debts amounted to  4200 m illion
Forints, despite the fa c t tha t in a year th e ir  to ta l assets had increased by 22 per
(320)cent. While the dividend share paid by co llectives increased m arg ina lly, the 
national average paid per labour-day un it (munkaegyseg) was s t i l l  only 8.29 
Forints. Collectives operating at a loss, however, could only manage to  pay a 
dividend by postponing th e ir debt payments. The sum quoted, however, was 
worth somewhat more in p ractice  since tw o-th irds  o f dividends paid by 
co llectives were in bread-grain, or o ther produce, which was calcu la ted at free
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state purchasing prices. Thus, i f  members had managed to  accumulate su ffic ien t 
labour-day units they were able to  secure th e ir bread, and part o f the fodder 
they needed fo r the livestock on th e ir household plots, from  the co llec tive . But 
the monetary income they received was small, and had to  be supplemented by 
income derived from  th e ir  household plots. The low monetary remuneration 
received from  the co llec tive  a ffected  young adult fa m ily  members especially 
hard: since they had no fam ilies  o f th e ir own they received no household p lot and 
hence had no additional source o f income. In fa c t, the process of w ithdrawals 
during 1953 and 1954 was large ly in itia te d  by these dissatisfied young fa m ily  
members. Because o f the sho rtfa ll in the 1954 grain harvest many co llectives, 
and individual farm ers, could not f u l f i l  th e ir compulsory grain de live ry  plan and 
could only d is tribu te  bread-grain to  th e ir members by fu lf i l l in g  pa rt o f th e ir 
grain delivery obligations to  the state in maize -  fo r which permission was 
granted by the government -  and th e ir seed requirements fo r  the next year had 
to  be met by the state: in 1954, again, more than 300 rail-wagons o f bread-grain 
had to  be d istribu ted fo r seed among needy co llectives. In many places 
co llectives could only d is tribu te  2.5 kgs. o f bread-grain per labour-day un it, and
(321)
some as l i t t le  as 0.4-1.0 kg ./un it. During the autumn o f 1954 th is  was one
o f the main reasons fo r  the continued dissolutions and w ithdrawals from
collectives. Incomes and consumption o f co llec tive  membrs were generally fa r
below those o f individual farm ers. The ir incomes also lagged considerably behind
those o f workers doing the same job on State Farms, by about 20 to  40 per 
(322)cent. Nor, o f course, did they receive pensions, fa m ily  allowances or sick
pay, to  which both State Farm and industria l workers were en title d . The ir 
income was also uncerta in - although at about th is  tim e some o f the 
econom ically b e tte r-o ff co llectives began to  give advance payments to  th e ir  
members on a m onthly or quarte rly  basis. The main reason fo r  the be tte r 
incomes o f individual farm ers was th e ir generally higher y ie ld  per un it o f land
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compared w ith  tha t achieved by co llec tive  farm ers and, o f course, they worked 
harder. The ob jective  reasons fo r th is were tha t:
i) ind iv idual farm ers placed greater emphasis on the more valuable, labour 
intensive root crops (maize, potatoes, sugar-beet), vegetables, f ru it ,  
wine etc., while the stocking densities fo r animals were higher, and
ii) the average yields on individual farm s were usually higher fo r  both crops 
and animals: th e ir p roduc tiv ity  nationa lly  was more than 20  per cent 
higher than on collectives .(323)
So individual farm ers enjoyed a la rger income and be tte r liv in g  conditions than 
co llec tive  peasants, inspite o f th e ir higher ra te  o f taxa tion  and compulsory 
de livery burdens.
One o f the main objectives o f Nagy’s new economic programme was to
raise workers' and peasants' purchasing power and the supply o f consumer goods
to  match. The fundamental problem was tha t during 1954 he succeeded in
ra ising wages and peasant incomes but ag ricu ltu ra l and industria l output and
p rodu c tiv ity  lagged behind the increased purchasing power. Output o f industry,
as o f agricu lture , grew by only 2 per cent (heavy industry declined somewhat),
instead o f the 8 per cent targeted by the, reduced, 1954 plan: th is inspite  o f the
(324)increased output o f handicra ft industry, which was up by 30 per cent. The 
per capita  average o f real earnings o f workers and employees, on the o ther hand, 
increased by 20 per cent compared w ith  1949 and to ta l average real income rose 
by 15 per cent. But during 1953/54 only ha lf o f a ll workers and employees 
received increased wages and salaries. Despite the wage increases p ro d u c tiv ity  
declined to  below tha t o f the previous year. Workers responded to  the more 
'libe ra l atmosphere' tha t prevailed during 1954 by increased absentism and, in 
many places, labour indiscipline increased to  a chaotic extent. The per cap ita  
rea l income o f peasants, although lower than 1949, increased by 10-15 pr cent in
/ooc\
1954. The peasants, however, s t i l l  had insu ffic ien t incentives to  produce as
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there were s t i l l  few  consumer goods, or agricu ltu ra l implements, to  spend th e ir  
money on. To make things even more d if f ic u lt ,  the bad weather in the f irs t  ha lf 
o f 1954 adversely a ffec ted  much of the harvest. Suddenly, during the summer 
and autumn o f 1954, the problems o f growing imbalance, the prospects o f run­
away in fla tion , food shortages and a rap id ly de terio ra ting  balance o f payments in 
the economy began to  overshadow everything else. And the search began fo r 
solutions to  both p o lit ic a l and economic problems. Soon Rakosi and his group 
began to  accuse Nagy o f having deviated from  sound economic principles by 
g iving 'advance payments' to  workers and peasants -  describing the ra ther modest
/o 9C\
increase in the liv in g  standards o f workers as 'extravagant', and sounding the 
alarm about the worsening labour discipline, fa llin g  p rodu c tiv ity  and growing 
resistance o f a ll categories o f peasants to  compulsory deliveries. They began to  
argue tha t the economic d iff ic u ltie s  could be remedied by ra ising prices and 
taxes and reducing wages - just the opposite o f what Nagy advocated. I t  is 
in teresting to  note how Nagy la te r recalled and defended h im self against th is  
accusation. Thus,
I am also blamed because in 1954 the standard o f liv in g  rose 
by 15 per cent, although industria l production and 
p roduc tiv ity  did not increase and production costs did not 
drop. This stagement is true only when taken out o f context. 
Why do the 'le ft-w in g ' extrem ists fa il to  speak o f the 
development o f industria l production and p roduc tiv ity , o f 
production costs and the rise in the standard of liv in g  
between 1949 and 1954? Should not there have been a rise in 
the standard o f liv ing , corresponding to  and resu lting from  
the tremendous increase in production tha t occurred between 
1949 and 1953? The rise in the standard o f liv in g  tha t came 
about in 1954 as a result o f the im plem entation o f the June 
policy in the New Course was not a kind o f advance payment, 
as the 'le ft-w in g ' extrem ists try  to  make i t  appear, but sim ply 
a payment o f the debts incurred by the 'le ft-w in g ' before 
1953.<327>
Be tha t as i t  may, w ith in  weeks fo llow ing  the 'congress o f compromise' i t  was 
becoming openly clear tha t tension was sharpening, tha t serious d iffe rences o f
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opinion existed amongst the top party leadership, and economic po licy makers,
regarding the evaluation o f the economic s itua tion  and the steps to  be taken to
ha lt the worsening economic performance. The f irs t  sign o f growing tension was
provided by Nagy in a speech to  the Academy o f Sciences, on 14th June 1954; he
accepted tha t 'socia list planning' was fa iling , but blamed th is on the fa c t tha t the
economic forces operating under socialism 'had not been adequately
investigated', and to  remedy this he announced tha t he was going to  set up a
research in s titu te  and found a sc ie n tific  journa l to  go over the theory once 
(328)again. Then, on 28th June, the anniversary o f the 'June Resolution', the
party's o f f ic ia l da ily newspaper, Szabad Nep, published an ed ito ria l leader 
review ing the 'New Course' over the past year. From this the sharpening 
con flic ts  between p o lit ica l groupings could already be fe lt .  In an unusually 
reserved tone, it  began by noting tha t
i t  cannot be said tha t everything had changed, only tha t 
something has begun. Even i f  the organisation o f work has 
improved, we must state tha t i t  fa iled  to  improve nearly as 
much as needed or as much as we planned.(329)
The a rtic le  la id pa rticu la r stress on two circumstances:
i) tha t the party's new policies over the past year had brought the whole 
country to  the boil, and
ii) tha t the new policies had blazed a t ra il perhaps most rap id ly  in 
agricu lture .
In conclusion, the a rtic le  called fo r more action. But th is ra the r general 
conclusion could not have any m obilizing power. W ithin days, on 2nd July, the 
Council o f M inisters, in an a ttem pt to  redress the growing imbalance and 
tensions build ing up in the economy, passed a resolution which reduced the to ta l 
investm ent a llocation fo r 1954 by 3000 m illion  Forints, i.e., from  14,000 to
(330)11,000 m ill. Forints, and instructed the heads o f high-spending m inistries to
decide on cuts in th e ir planned investment expenditure ammounting to  2 0 0 0  m ill.
Forin ts by 5th July. O ther questionable investments were to  be reviewed by the
Council o f M inisters. The in ten tion was to  re-a llocate the investm ent funds
released fo r  the production o f consumer goods, in order to  redress the growing
imbalance in the economy. But, as o ften  before, the im plem entation o f th is
resolution was substantia lly slowed down by the various branch m in istries. This
is confirm ed by a report published on 19th July, and also by a subsequent m eeting
o f the Council o f M inisters on 23rd July chaired by Imre Nagy, both o f which
complained about the slow and inadequate progress w ith  im plem entation o f the
resolution and blamed the 'incorrect a ttitu de  o f m inisters', many o f whom
(331)conveniently 'disappeared on holiday'. Rather than stopping investments
altogether, they merely slowed them down. This, according to  the resolu tion
passed by the meeting, seriously 'endangered the solution o f the tasks set in the
plan and the uninterrupted supply to  the population in the second-half o f the
(332)year.' This resolution urged the im plem entation o f the ea rlie r resolution
w ithout fu rth e r delay. The real reason fo r the d iff ic u ltie s  in im plem entation o f 
the government resolution, apparently, was tha t, in addition to  the m od ifica tions 
fo r 1954 it  raised the whole issue o f the one-year plan fo r  1955, which was 
considered as an im portant forerunner, a preparatory year, fo r the Second F ive- 
Year Plan, which was to  commence in 1956. Meanwhile, the balance o f the 
economy continued to deteriorate.
Events than began to  move fast. The impetus fo r th is  must have been 
provided by the fa c t that, sometime between 23rd and 28th July, Nagy le f t  fo r  a 
long vacation in the Soviet Union (the exact date is not known), not to  re tu rn  
u n til the f ir s t  week o f September. During his long absence Rakosi and Gero 
began th e ir  onslaught in earnest, using the growing economic d iff ic u lt ie s , 
together w ith  rumours o f re s tr ic tive  measures, as leverage against Nagy in
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e ffe c t, creating the impression tha t most o f the promises made by Nagy under
the June Resolution were to  be repudiated. This discouraged the adherents o f
the 'New Course' and, at the same tim e, emboldened the S talin ists throughout
the party  network. On 28th Ju ly 1954 (in the absence o f Nagy), on the in it ia t iv e
o f Rakosi and Gero, the Politburo was hurried ly convened to  consider the d ra ft
1955 Plan, prepared by the National Planning O ffice  (Orszagos T ervh iva ta l),
(333)under Bela Szalai (a Rakosi adherent). The document pointed out tha t the 
party's Third Congress had set the guidelines fo r the development o f the Secnd 
F ive-Year Plan, which also applied to  the 1955 Plan. According to  the guidelines 
the main elements were:
i) to  increase fu rth e r the standard o f liv ing ; agricu lture  was to  be fu rth e r
developed and the remnants o f exaggerated industria lisa tion had to  be 
liquidated
ii) to  increase the production o f consumer goods and to  continue w ith  the
restruc tu ring  o f industry, which had already begun
In order to  achieve these goals, the document indicated, tha t the 1955 Plan 
would need to  solve three main tasks:
i) to  increase the supply o f goods by 9 per cent
ii) to  invest 7500-8500 m illion  Forin ts in the econmy fo r fu rth e r
development
iii)  to  create a surplus o f 1200 m illion  fore ign trade Forin ts to  secure
external balance
The National Planning O ffice  (Orszagos Tervh iva ta l), however, pointed out tha t 
i t  was unable to  submit a plan which simultaneously satisfied a ll these 
requirements because they exceeded the lim its  set by the Nationa l Income. The 
document noted tha t the construction o f the 1955 Plan had been made 
considerably more d if f ic u lt  by the fa c t tha t the remnants o f the excaggerated
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industria la tion  o f the previous period were s t i l l  present in the economy; as a 
result, the increase envisaged in the production o f consumer goods and 
implements fo r  agricu lture  could not be achieved, the indebtedness o f the 
fore ign trade sector continued unabated, state reserves were depleted and the 
c ircu la tion  o f money in the economy continued to  rise. The recommendation o f 
the d ra ft document, essentially, was tha t
i) since a ll requirements could not be satisfied at the same tim e , re ta il 
sales turnover could only be increased by 1 -2  per cent, a t most, to 
m aintain or slighly increase the liv in g  standards o f the working class.
The conditions required to  achieve this were tha t,
ii) free market prices had to  decrease by 30 per cent. The measures
required to  achieve such a massive reduction should not, however,
adversely a ffe c t the incentives fo r peasants to  produce.
ii i)  severe economies were needed in other areas and the leve l o f
employment in the state and economic apparatus had to  be s ig n ifica n tly  
reduced.
These recommendations were adopted by the Politburo, and it  passed a resolution 
on 28th July which, in general term s, pointed out that,
i) the position taken by the Council o f M inistes earlie r (i.e., on 23rd July)
did not satisfy the m a jo rity  o f the top party leadership and, there fo re , 
urgent economic measures needed to be introduced to  halt, and reverse, 
the worsening economic situation.
ii) the 1955 Plan must not repeat the mistakes o f the ea rlie r period; the
tasks to  be set must not be irra tiona l and should not exhaust the 
country's strength.
ii i)  the d iff ic u ltie s  tha t emerged during the construction o f the 1955 Plan
must not be resolved at the expense of the fo llow ing year, 1956.
A fte r  these general prelim inaries, the resolution indicated a number o f concrete 
requirements: the 1955 Plan had to  allocate a to ta l o f 7500-8500 m illio n  Forin ts 
to  investm ent, achieve a 1200 m illon fore ign trade-Forin ts surplus on fo re ign  
trade and a re ta il sales turnover consistent w ith  these two constra in ts. F ina lly ,
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the Politburo appointed the Economic Policy Com m ittee (Gazdasagpolitikai
Bizottsag), in e ffe c t Gero, its  Chairman, to  work out the deta iled policy
measures needed to  remedy the economic situation. These were to  cover a ll
areas, e.g., procurements, taxation, investments, wages policy, w e lfa re  po licy (to
achieve a saving o f 1500 m illion  Forints), the size o f the adm in is tra tive  work
force in facto ries (where a 15 per cent reduction was indicated), p roduc tiv ity ,
(334)qua lity  o f production etc. Gero was given the job o f preparing the public,
by in fo rm ing them about the 'character' and 'urgency' o f the P o litburo resolution.
I t  needed no deep analysis to  show tha t the resolution had essentially 
ruled out any fu rth e r increase in liv in g  standards and peasant (but not only 
peasant) purchasing power; tha t i t  would reduce the slowly rev iv ing  w illingess o f 
peasants to  produce; or tha t i t  would result in the revision o f many o f the 
measures introduced a fte r 1953. I t  meant, in e ffe c t, tha t the P o litbu ro  thought 
i t  necessary in order to  reduce fore ign debt to  secure an export surplus by 
reducing the supply to  the population below the level approved by the plan. Since 
the resolution was adopted on the recommendation o f Rakosi and Gero, in the 
absence of Nagy and a number o f o ther members who were also away on summer 
holidays, i t  was not surprising tha t i t  la te r met fie rce  opposition, not only from
( O O C \
Nagy, but others too. During the weeks tha t fo llowed, Gero and the
Economic Policy Com m ittee began to  work out and submit to  P o litbu ro  meetings
a number o f harsh 'de fla tiona ry ' proposals in an a ttem pt to  'remedy' the
economic s ituation, a ll o f which were approved by the Politburo. Furtherm ore,
acting  w ithout the knowledge o f the government, the Economic Po licy
Com m ittee passed a number o f resolutions and enacted decrees which, according
to  Nagy, i t  had no righ t to  d o . ^ ^
F irs t, however, Gero published a very long, au tho rita tive  a rtic le  in the
party  o ff ic ia l daily newspaper, on 1st August, even the t i t le  o f which 'Le t us
(337)prepare fo r W inter' (Keszuljunk fe l a te lre ) was designed not only to  in form
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but to  warn the general public about the economic d iff ic u ltie s  and, in general 
term s, the harsh measures which were being proposed to  remedy the d iff ic u ltie s . 
Gero, in his usual harsh style called fo r fu rth e r sacrifices, stressed the urgent 
need fo r solving the im m ediate tasks in production, the liqu ida tion  o f shortages 
especially in coal mining, m eta llurgy and construction, to  avoid a repe titio n  o f 
the deplorable fa ilu res during the previous w in ter. In his a rtic le  he made no 
reference to any specific  measures. One ha lf sentence - which looked as i f  i t  
was raison d'etre o f the whole a rtic le  -  however, c learly  indicated the changed 
emphasis in economic policy:
the development o f agricu ltu ra l production is indispensable 
fo r a reduction in market prices, to  make a fu rth e r increase 
in the purchasing power o f the fo r in t possible.(338)
Follow ing this, before Nagy's re tu rn  a number o f Po litburo meetings were called
by Rakosi during August and early September to  discuss and approve the deta ils
o f major cuts in state expenditure, including social benefits, and higher taxa tion
proposals put forw ard by the Economic Policy Com m ittee under Gero. Thus, on
2nd and 9th August the Politburo approved a budget cut in economic, social and
cu ltu ra l expenditure amounting to 2000 m illion  Forin ts fo r 1955. The pro jected
savings from  the reductions in the various social benefits, e.g., in social
insurance, state subsidised sports, day homes and nurseries, subsidies to  fa c to ry
canteens, health foods, in troduction o f new pension plans, reduction o f tra ve l
(339)discount rates, a ltogether amounted to  nearly 1500 m illion  Forin ts. A l l o f
these d ire c tly  a ffec ted  the workers' standard o f liv ing . The peasants were not 
fo rgo tten  e ither. On the instruction o f the Economic Policy C om m ittee, the 
M in is try  o f Finance prepared a proposal increasing taxes on a ll peasants by 600 
m illion  F o r in t s / '* ^  The need fo r 'ra tiona lisa tion ', i.e., to  reduce the s ta ff  o f 
the various centra l stage and economic departments, had also been raised at
- 801 -
these meetings. Then, on 4th September, the discussions were extended to
include employees o f industria l enterprises and cooperatives. The result was
tha t, during 1954, some 60,000 employees and in te llectua ls  lost th e ir  jobs and
another 50,000 were scheduled to  go in 1955. Because o f the reduction in
investm ent fo r  1955, and industria l reorganisation some 60,000-70,000 manual
workers were projected to  become surplus to  requirements and plans were drawn
up to  redeploy these workers in mining, ligh t and food industries and on State and
C o llective  F a r m s .^ ^  Indeed, according to  Nagy, Rakosi even suggested
creating 'a r t if ic ia l unemployment' to  spread fear among the employed, which, he
claimed, was the most e ffe c tive  method to  improve labour d iscip line and 
(342)p roduc tiv ity . Istvan Friss a Po litburo member, described these proposed
measures as 'cruel, but necessary', while in a confidentia l le tte r  Erno Gero
pointed out tha t ' i t  is a d if f ic u lt  and complex task to  put order in to  the
economy', but many o f the proposals were 'unpopular' and because o f th is  i t  was
v ita l tha t the whole leadership 'assume responsib ility ' and unamimously back the
proposed measures. He observed tha t there was some disagreement and
reservation about the measures among some members o f the Po litburo, and he
(343)pointed out the need fo r  fu rthe r discussion. This, in fa c t, took place a
month la te r, on 15th September.
These proposed measures to  solve the threatening problem o f in fla tio n  
and to  re-establish budgetary equilibrium  would, i f  implemented, have la rge ly 
undermined Nagy's e ffo rts  to raise the standard o f liv in g  and would have brought 
his ideas in to disrepute. Nagy la te r recalled tha t,
to arouse panic and to  ju s tify  and make th e ir proposals fo r  
undermining the June policy acceptable, oppostion elements 
at the head o f organs d irec ting  the party, the governnment 
and the economy began pred icting in fla tio n  and 
unemployment -  in a very misleading manner, as events 
proved. These proposals called fo r  a general reduction in 
industria l output; a large-scale cutback in social provisions
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fo r  the workers; a great reduction in the standard o f liv in g  of 
persons liv in g  on wages and salaries; and an increase in the 
burden on the peasants.(344)
I t  is somewhat doubtfu l i f  the proposed measures would have been e ffe c tive  in 
increasing production, which was what in fa c t was needed. Assuming tha t they 
had been able to  solve the problems o f the economy, at what price? Nagy la te r 
accused the Economic Policy Com m ittee o f a ttem pting  to  remedy the economic
situation not by measures appropriate fo r inceasing production but only by
. (345)economies.
This was the state o f a ffa irs  when Nagy returned from  his vacation. He
was s t i l l  confident o f Moscow's support -  while he was on vacation in the Crim ea
he went fo r an 'un o ffic ia l' v is it to Moscow - and was ready to  repel th is  la test
challenge to  his 'New Course' reform s. In quick succession, three Politburo
meetings were called. A t the f irs t,  on 8 th  September, Nagy c ritic ise d  the
'ra tiona lisa tion ' measures being implemented to  reduce the level o f employment
in the centra l adm in istra tive  apparatus -  which, o f course, proved extrem ely
unpopular among those a ffected  -  as 'hasty and i l l  prepared', and said they
contravened the June policy l i n e . ^ ^  S tr ic t ly  speaking, i t  would appear, Nagy
now contradicted his own report to  the Third Congress, in which he had said tha t
the centra l state apparatus was over-centra lised, in fla ted  and, as a result,
(347)unwieldy and over-bureaucratic. But while Nagy wanted to  begin the
process o f 'ra tiona lisa tion ' from  the top, Gero and Rakosi defended the top 
bureaucratic organs and, o f course, 'ra tiona lised' the lower levels o f employment.
A week la te r another Politburo meeting was called, on 15th September, 
at which a debate began -  th is  tim e, in the absence of Gero (who was 'ostensibly' 
ill)  - about the fu tu re  o f the economic programme proposed by the Economic 
Policy Com m ittee, which had now been supplemented by an addendum prepared 
by the Plan, Finance and Trade Department o f the Centra l C om m ittee, under
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Istvan Friss. This proposal had become known as the 'Gero-Friss economic 
programme1. ^ ^ ^  The debate was a forerunner o f the 'G reat Debate' th a t took 
place in the C entra l Com m ittee a fo rtn ig h t la te r. By th is tim e  a slow reversal in 
the anti-N agy trend became noticable (in the press and, o f course, in the shape 
o f the hurried departure o f Gero from  the scene), which must have been inspired 
by the conviction tha t Nagy had been given renewed support by Moscow.
The focus o f the debate, which e lic ited  stubborn opposition from  Nagy
and some other members o f the Politburo, was the proposed reduction in liv in g
standards, the in ten tin  to  solve the d iff ic u lt ie s  of the national economy and
restore economic equilibrium  by a reduction in the purchasing power o f the
population, and especially the peasantry. The notion tha t the various form s o f
economies should h it those liv ing  on wages and salaries, too, was strongly
opposed. In Gero's absence it  was Istvan Friss who, as co-author o f the proposal,
a ttem pted to  defend Rakosi's and Gero's ideas. During the debate i t  had become
clear tha t a number o f differences existed, e.g., while there was apparently an
overa ll consensus tha t agricu lture  ought to  receive increased investm ent a t the
expense o f industry, and tha t the production o f consumer goods ought to  be
increased, differences existed regarding the rates at which various branches o f
industry should be developed. I t  is d if f ic u lt  to  establish wether these d iffe rences
were genuine or merely ta c tica l, to  slow down industria l changes. Many
expressed dissatisfaction w ith  the narrow party  leadership's a b ility  to  govern: i t
has shown no vision, no decisive measures had been taken, they demanded an end
to  the preva iling  view tha t ' i t  is our fa u lt (i.e ., the party leadership's) th a t the
(349)correctness o f the June po licy is constantly questioned'. A p a rtic u la r ly
heated confronta tion developed between Friss and Nagy. According to  Friss, the 
fundam ental problem was tha t w ithout increased production i t  was impossible to 
increase liv in g  standards. Up t i l l  then, he said, increased liv in g  standards had 
been achieved through increased in te rna tiona l indebtedness, by running down
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stocks and by a reduction in productive capacity. He had cla im ed tha t the 
reasons why this s itua tion  had developed was because, ’the most part the 
consequences o f the measures introduced were not worked o u t ' . ^ ^  Nagy 
attacked the proposal at the outset because i t  'lacked ideologica l and p o lit ica l 
consideration’ and strove only fo r  'p rac tica l solutions' concealed behind an 
underestimation o f the 'question o f princip le '. There were two concepts, he said, 
in economic policy -  the old one, which insisted on the slow d ism antling o f the 
legacies o f 'overindustria lisation ' and the new one, the June line which had so fa r 
been prevented from  asserting its e lf fu lly . Nothing less than the maximum 
development o f industria l and ag ricu ltu ra l production, he said, could lead the 
country out o f its  economic d iff ic u ltie s .
In a sense, both Friss and Nagy believed, and emphasised, the im portance 
o f increased production, but they argued from  fundam entally d iffe re n t positions. 
Friss s t i l l  believed and stressed the im ortance o f an industria l development - 
which he did not wish to  give up -  and, at the same tim e, he thought i t  necessary 
to  reduce, or at least to  contain, peasant liv in g  standards, through a reduction in 
ag ricu ltu ra l prices. Nagy, on the other hand, opposed any masure which aimed at 
reducing, or res tric ting , the vigorous development o f agricu ltu re . The flow  o f 
money to  the villages, he said, 'did not present a danger', increased peasant 
purchasing power 'should frigh ten  no one', i t  was a pre-condition fo r  increased 
liv in g  standards fo r the workers. Nagy believed tha t industria l, especially heavy 
industria l, production served neither the increase in in te rna l stocks nor the 
development o f agricu lture, nor fore ign trade. He believed tha t industry, as i t  
was at tha t tim e, was unable to  satisfy the requirements o f e ithe r 'c a p ita lis t' or 
'friend ly ' nations. Therefore, he said, i t  was v ita l to  res truc tu re  industria l 
production rad ica lly  by build ing on the country's own resources. Y e t, he said, it  
was characteris tic  tha t the Economic Policy Com m ittee had fa ile d  to  make a 
single proposal fo r increasing production or, more im po rtan tly , rea lign ing
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industria l production, although i t  had been instructed to  do s o . ^ ^  He declared 
tha t the previous concept o f re ly ing  on the ’generous help o f the Soviet Union fo r 
our economic development’ was mistaken and he opposed any suggestion tha t to  
overcome the present economic d iff ic u ltie s  the government ought to  tu rn  to  the 
Soviet Union fo r  assistance.
Rakosi, uncharacte ris tica lly  quiet, contribu ted very l i t t le  to  the debate. 
His main contribu tion  was a weak a ttem pt -  which no one present believed - to  
tr iv ia lise  the differences, denying the existence o f ’two concepts’ o f economic 
policy. He adm itted tha t although the ra te  o f industria l development had been 
reduced, i t  m ight have to  be cut even fu rthe r. He agreed tha t ag ricu ltu re  should 
continue to receive more money and goods. But, he said, he s t i l l  believed tha t 
the main task was to  restore discipline and introduce e ffe c tive  economies.
The m eting ended in an ’uneasy stalem ate', w ithout an agreement. The 
resolution adopted rejected the Gero-Friss proposal (and, o f course, Friss's views) 
because i t  relegated the most im portant question o f increasing production and 
res truc tu ring  industry to  the background and saw the way out o f the economic 
d iff ic u ltie s  in the in troduction of economies and the reuction o f purchasing 
power. The danger in this, the resolution pointed out, was tha t economic po licy  
would be divorced from  the party's general policies. Any recom mendation fo r  a 
reduction in liv in g  standards and a slowing down in the ra te  o f ag ricu ltu ra l 
development (which should ra ther be increased) must be re jected, the resolu tion 
said. The resistance shown to  the June line must be overcome and those 
hindering its  im plem entation removed. A l l these points were in favour o f Nagy. 
But, at the same tim e, the resolution expressed serious reservations about the 
'inco rrec t' view tha t no fu rth e r consultations or discussions were needed 
regarding the concept o f 'overindustria lisation '; th is had to  be fu rth e r studied. 
More im portan tly , perhaps, the resolution raised the alarm about the 
'undesirable' developments tha t had taken place since June 1953, especially, the
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'extravagant’ mode o f liv in g  and the decline in discipline, which had to  be 
liquidated. A ll these points c learly  represented the Rakosi-Gero line. F ina lly , 
the meeting called upon Nagy to  d ra ft and present a Po litburo report to  the
/ q  c n \
C entra l Com m ittee Plenum. A fte r  Nagy had declined th is  (because of
pressure o f work) the job was given to  Szalai.
Since, fo r one reason or another, no agreement had so fa r been reached 
on a c lear-cu t proposal, which could then be presented to  the C entra l 
Com m ittee, another a ttem pt was made at a Politburo meeting convened on 27th 
September (uncom fortably near to  the date o f the Centra l C om m ittee meeting) - 
s t i l l  in the absence of Gero -  to  try  to  iron out the differences and come to  a
| q : q \
unanimous view. I t  can, perhaps, be assumed tha t it  was Nagy -  stubbornly 
loyal to  o ff ic ia l party procedures and w ith  his uncompromising re jec tio n  of 
’factiona lism ' w ith in  the party -  ra ther than the Rakosi or Gero group -  the 
obstructionists and procrastinators -  who called fo r  the m eeting. Nagy, 
confident in the righteousness o f his cause and, at the same tim e, fa ith fu l to  the 
party, believed i t  v ita l, on th is occasion, to  go to  the Centra l C om m ittee  w ith  
the un ity  o f the Politburo behind an agreed economic programme, to  provide 
’unambiguous' d irectives to  the party  on the June policies. This, however, was 
not to  be.
I t  is not known what, i f  any, m odifications had been made by Gero and
Friss to  th e ir orig ina l proposal o f 15th September fo r th is discussion. That some
m odifica tion, however, insubstantial, m ight have been made is in d ire c tly
(3 5 4 )
suggested by Hegediis. Be tha t as i t  may, whatever the m od ifica tion  m ight 
have been i t  fa iled  to produce an agreement and the proposal was again re jected .
The tone o f the debate was set by M ihaly Farkas, who fo r  ta c tic a l 
reasons, suddenly became a supporter o f Nagy and attacked the proposal on the 
grounds tha t i f  fa iled  to  state ca tegorica lly  the main sources o f the economic 
d iff ic u ltie s  which, he argued, were the resistance to  the June Resolution and the
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errors com m itted in the past. Nagy, by now throughly prepared fo r  the meeting, 
also sharply c ritic ised  the proposal -  raising a number o f specific  objections to it .  
He f irs t,  however, pointed out tha t the coming C entra l C om m ittee Plenum was 
the most im portant one since June 1953. This tim e, he stressed, unlike in the 
past, the party  must be given clear d irection. The proposal tha t was presented 
to  the Centra l Com m ittee had to  demonstrate tha t the Po litburo was in fu ll 
con tro l o f the s ituation and had to provide leadership to  both party  and country. 
The proposal also had to  emphasise the significance o f the June Resolution and 
the extremism o f the NEP policy. Issues like  waste and production costs, while 
c learly  im portant, were secondary and should not be allowed to  'cloud* the main 
issues. Nagy emphasised how im portant i t  was tha t the tasks ahead should be 
organised in to a system; the economic policy o f the 'New Course', he said, had to 
be worked out c o n s is te n tly .^ *^
A fte r  a heated, and at tim es acrimonious, debate i t  was in th is  sp irit 
tha t the Politburo adopted a resolution condemning the proposal on the grounds 
tha t i t  'lacked ana ly tica l depth' and was 'over-cautious' in po in ting  out th a t the 
main sources o f the economic d iff ic u ltie s  wre the de libera te ly slow pace o f re ­
alignment o f the industria l structure  and the continuation, in many places, o f the 
'old practices' in economic policies. These points, according to  the resolution, 
had to  be emphasised so strongly th t nobody could misunderstand them . The 
decisive task was to  liqu idate 'old practices' and to  allow  the policies o f the 'New 
Course' to  assert themselves fu lly  and in a ll spheres o f the national economy. It  
was through increased production and increased in te rna l stocks tha t the June 
policy could be executed, and the only correct and p rac tica l road was 're liance
4. ^  .  ( 3 5 6 )on our own strength and resources'.
The upshot o f a ll this was, o f course, tha t (i) there was no unanimously 
agreed Politburo proposal to  be put to  the C entra l C om m ittee and, (ii)  i t  was 
impossible to  conceal the widening r i f t  in the Po litburo even to  m ainta in the
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’appearance* o f party un ity  any longer. The fin a l ba ttle  now had to  take place in 
the C entra l Com m ittee, in fro n t o f the fu ll membership.
A fte r  these pre lim inaries the Centra l Com m ittee Plenum o f the HWP
/OC7\
was convoked on ls t-3 rd  October, 1954, s t i l l  in the absence o f Gero. No
C entra l Com m ittee meeting, apart, perhaps, from  the one in June 1953,
a ttrac ted  so much a tten tion  and generated so much excitem ent as th is  one. Some
21 member, almost one-th ird o f its  to ta l membership, contributed to  the ensuing
d e b a te / '* ^  Two reports were subm itted to  the meeting: the deta ils concerning
the 'State and Tasks o f the national economy* as agreed, were spelled out by Bela
Szalai and the report on 'Questions re la ting  to  the co llec tive  work o f the C entra l
Committee* was delivered by M ihaly Farkas. Szalai's report ca re fu lly  re flec ted
the views and u tilised the lessons learned from  the 'tw o -fro n t struggle* which
marked the discussions at the ea rlie r Po litburo meetings. A lthough he was
care fu l to  remain silent about the con flic ts  and disagreements inside the
Politburo the fa c t tha t there was no o ff ic ia l Po litburo proposal on the economy
was not lost on the members. A fte r  review ing the achievements an shortcomings
o f the past 16 months, Szalai turned to  the 'fundamental fac to rs  and sources o f
the present economic d iff ic u ltie s  in the national economy' which, he said, were
endangering the new programme. These, he argued, (re fle c tin g  Nagy’s views)
(359)were not to  be found in the policy o f the 'New Course' but in:
i) the hesita tion and lack o f e f fo r t  to  implement tha t po licy, the slow pace
o f conversion to  a more consumer oriented industry
For th is, as head o f the National Planning o ffice  (Orszagos T e rvh iva ta l), he 
accepted re s p o n s ib i l i ty /^ ^
ii) the resistance to  tha t policy, which showed its e lf in many form s,
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and in
ii i)  the theo re tica lly  unfounded and erroneous concept which perceived the 
'New Course' exclusively in term s o f increasing liv in g  standards.
To overcome the d iff ic u ltie s , he said, i t  was f irs t  and forem ost necessary to  
restore the normal equilibrium  between purchasing power and com m odity stocks, 
not by reducing liv in g  standards and purchasing power but by increasing the 
supply o f consumer goods to  the population. A fte r  con firm ing  th a t the 
resolutions passed previously were s t i l l  valid, he indicated (and from  then 
onwards he was coming closer to Rakosi's and Gero's views) tha t an increase 
s im ila r to  tha t since 1953 was not possible in the next period, though he promised 
tha t every e ffo rt would be made at least to  m aintain the existing leve l. This, 
however, depended on how successfully production was increased and costs 
reduced. Szalai then went on to  lis t selected, concrete targets:
in 1955 both industria l and ag ricu ltu ra l production were to  increase by 5 
per cent
in industry output o f the 'means o f consumption' was to grow fa s te r than 
of the 'means o f production'; the increase in lig h t industry's output was 
to  be 8-9 per cent
the share o f investment in agricu ltu re  was to  be the same as tha t 
planned, but not achieved, in 1954.
Szalai noted tha t agricu ltu re  was expected to  solve the bread-grain problem in 
the near fu tu re . This, he said, would only be possible by increasing the 
peasantry's in terest in production. S im ila rly , he said, an un interrup ted supply o f 
raw m ateria l im ports fo r  industry could be achieved through increased 
increntives (by means o f an increase in procurement prices) to  tra d it io n a l, w e ll 
proven agricu ltu ra l export products. In Szalai's opinion increased incentives and 
extended free market re lations would result in s ign ifican t surplus production in 
agricu lture  which, in tu rn , would result in an appropriate reduction in free
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market prices, w ithout weakening the peasants’ purchasing power, to  the bene fit 
o f the whole economy, and especially the working class.
The rest o f Szalai’s speech was devoted to  problems o f pa rty  work. He 
demanded tha t in fu tu re  the party, pa rticu la rly  the party  activ is ts , not only 
needed to  be to ld  before decisions were taken on im portant p o lit ic a l and 
economic measures, but the need fo r  such measures to  be explained to  them.
Several members of the Centra l C om m ittee were drawn in to  the debate 
tha t fo llowed Szalai’s address on the economy and the 1955 Plan. Some o f these 
contributors to  the debate blamed the pre-1953, some the post-1953 policies, 
while others pointed a finger at the inadequacies in the im plem entation o f the 
June policy as the main source o f the d iff ic u ltie s . Nor was the debate en tire ly  
res tric ted  to these themes. Some named slackness in party  d iscip line as the 
source, while many others were sharply c r it ic a l o f the party  leadership, even the 
Politburo, fo r passing resolutions which were not thought through properly. I t  is, 
o f course, not easy to  reproduce the atmosphere o f the meeting here. Most o f 
the tim e i t  looked like  open war, ra ther than a debate, between the pro-Rakosi 
and pro-Nagy groups. Besides the speeches by Rakosi and Nagy, to  be discussed 
in a moment, there were two main contributions, in te r a lia , which are o f 
pa rticu la r in terest and relevance and worthy o f fu rth e r consideration.
In the absence o f Andras Hegediis, the A g ricu ltu re  M in is te r (who was 
v is iting  China), Andras Szobek, M in ister fo r Procurements, spoke on ag ricu ltu re . 
He reminded his listeners -  as i f  they needed to  be reminded -  o f the grave 
bread-grain s ituation in the country, and also o f the mood o f the peasantry. In 
Szobek's opinion consumer requirements could not be sa tis fie ld  from  dom estic 
production even i f  the grain procurem nt plan was fu lf i l le d  in fu ll.  That, 
however, he adm itted would not be the case: he accepted tha t there would be 
only an 80 per cent fu lf ilm e n t. While in western and north-w estern regions o f 
the country the peasants had some reserves, peasants on the Great Plain, and
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especially in the Duna-Tisza region, were su ffe ring  from  shortage o f grain: at 
least 130,000-140,000 peasant fam ilies did not have enough bread and many 
collectives, too, did not have enough grain to  last the fu ll year. These individual 
and co llec tive  farm ers, he said, were forced to  buy bread and flo u r during the 
year from  stocks reserved fo r  public consumption. Szobek adm itted  fra n k ly  tha t, 
according to  the calculations o f the National Planning O ffic e  (Orszagos 
Tervh iva ta l), some 31,000-33,000 rail-wagons o f bread-grain would need to  be 
imported, but even tha t amount, he said, m ight not be enough. Szobek expected 
tha t the m a jo rity  o f peasants would fu l f i l  th e ir de livery obligations, but he 
warned tha t some 130,000-140,000 farm ers would have to  be forced to  do so 
adm in is tra tive ly . When threshing commenced, he said, the co llec tives  were in 
the vanguard in fu lf i l l in g  th e ir  deliveries. But when the low yie lds became 
known they too held back from  deliveries. He reported tha t procurem ent agents 
in many places had been beaten u p / ^ ^
There were, o f course, others who raised issues re la tin g  to  ag ricu ltu re  
during the debate. The main feature  o f these contributions was the stress put on 
the im portance o f developing ag ricu ltu ra l exports. For many, ag ricu ltu re  was a 
s ign ifican tly  more im portant source fo r  fu tu re  development than industry. 
According to  them, agricu lture , even w ith  the prolonged surv iva l o f sm all-scale 
individual farm ing, had great capacity to  increase production and to  sa tis fy  both 
domestic and export requirements. For example, Zoltan Vas pointed out tha t 
since ’we must reckon w ith  the existence o f small-scale ind iv idua l fa rm ing  fo r  a 
long tim e to  come’ the ag ricu ltu ra l development programme had to  be worked 
out in such a way as tio  take in to  account tha t 'a decisive share o f the m arketed 
product w ill be supplied by small-scale individual farm s.(363) j-j- waSj perhaps,
not surprising tha t nobody ta lked about the fu rth e r num erica l development o f 
co llectives. Indeed, to  Zoltan Szanto even the distant fu tu re  o f ’soc ia lis t
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reorganisation' o f agricu lture  seemed in doubt. Thus, in Szanto's words, i t  was 
questionable
... whether the stand taken by the party's Third Congress, 
tha t by the end o f the Second F ive-Year Plan the socia list 
system in agricu ltu re  w ill become dom inant, is a re a lis tic  
one.(364)
According to Szanto there were two separat questions involved in th is: whether 
co llec tiv isa tion  could be achieved by the end o f 1960 (i) on the basis o f 
mechanisation and (ii) by observing the vo luntary princip le . Szanto had serious 
doubts on both accounts.
In his contribu tion to  the debate, Andor Berei (another ta c tic a l supporter 
of Nagy) sketched his views regarding the problem o f equ ilibrium  between 
purchasing power and com m odity stocks. According to  him, th is  was the cen tra l 
issue o f the economic d iff ic u ltie s , the solution o f which was the 'spring-board' 
fo r the successful execution o f the 'New Course' po licy. Berei came in to  sharp 
co n flic t w ith  the views of Friss, co-author o f the stringent economic plan, who 
alone in the Centra l Com m ittee, in Gero's absence, s t il l defended the Rakosi- 
Gero plan and maintained tha t economic equilibrium  could not be achieved in 
1955 w ithout a reduction in purchasing power. For Berei i t  was not the 
disproportionate increase in purchasing power th a t was at the centre o f the 
d iff ic u ltie s . The share o f consumption in the National Income, he said, was 
sm aller than in 1949, so a 15-20 per cent increase in purchasing power could not 
be considered excessive. The source o f the problem, he stressed, was the fa c t 
tha t com m odity stocks had fa iled  to  increase s u ffic ie n tly  and at the rig h t tim e. 
And he gave reasons fo r tha t: (i) the desperately needed reduction and re ­
allocation o f investment had only m aterialised months a fte r  the decision was 
taken to  incease the share o f consumption, and even then it  had been carried  out 
in a hasty, uncoordinated manner, (ii) the s tructu re  o f the economy had
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deterio ra ted in recent years (a large share o f production did not serve the 
requirements o f the population) and ( iii)  production had stagnated during the past 
year. In his opinion the economic structure  had to  be transform ed (to  produce 
more goods which were needed by the population) and production increased to  
restore economic equ ilibrium . Berei accepted th a t i t  was possible to  resolve the 
problem o f disequilibrium  by a reduction in purchasing power. This, according to  
him, could, theo re tica lly , be done in two ways: (i) by substantia lly increasing the 
leve l o f taxa tion  o f the peasantry and/or (ii) by in troducing ra tiona lisa tion  
measures which, although they set out from  a correct view the need to  make 
economies and fig h t waste, would result in a reduction o f the liv in g  standards o f 
a s ign ifican t section o f society i f  implemented in flex ib ly . Accord ing to  Berei, 
ne ither road was feasible: the fo rm er because i t  reduced incentives fo r  the 
peasants to  produce - pu tting  a brake on ag ricu ltu ra l production and development 
-  and would weaken the worker-peasant alliance, which had been strengthened 
a fte r the June Resolution; the la tte r , because, he warned, i t  would lead to  unrest 
not only among w h ite -co lla r s ta ff  but in te lligen ts ia  and workers a like, resu lting
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in serious p o lit ic a l consequences. Berei concluded his speech by supporting 
the proposition tha t in order to  provide the basis fo r the planning agencies' work 
the economic programme o f the 'New Course’ had to  be properly worked out.
As the struggle around these questions had fu lly  developed Nagy believed 
the tim e had arrived fo r him to  launch his determ ined a ttack  on the 'le ft-w in g  
opposition', the Rakosi-Gero group and th e ir p ro g ra m m e /^ ^  A  large part o f his 
speech was devoted to  discussing the mistakes com m itted in the pre-1953 period. 
Follow ing tha t, Nagy made a v io len t a ttack  on the 'surviva l o f dogmatism ' and 
stressed the importance o f f ig h tin g  against 'le ftism ', and 'sectarian ism ' and 
especially against what he called the 'double-dealing' (ketkulacsossag), in 
sabotaging the im plem entation o f the June Resolution at a ll le v e ls / '* ^  L ike  
others before him , he claimed tha t the economic d iff ic u lt ie s  were not the resu lt
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o f his policies, but o f the deliberate resistance to  them. He resta ted the policy
o f the ’New Course’ and called fo r  an end to  th is  resistance. Nagy denounced
those who wished to  resolve the economic d iff ic u lt ie s  by a w ithdraw al o f 
purchasing power, through the in troduction  o f various auste rity  measures and a 
reduction in state budgetary expenditure, thereby reducing the standard o f 
liv ing , which they claimed was too high. He v io len tly  a ttacked those who spoke 
about the ’extravagant' mode o f l i fe  o f the people. He asked whose standard was 
high -  the workers?, the peasants?, the in te lligentsia? and replied
neither th e ir income, th e ir  d ie t, th e ir  clothes nor th e ir  
lodgings indicate th is to  be so ... How can we support a 
socialism tha t does not assure the workers bread? What 
enthusiasm can we expect from  a socialism tha t is not 
capable o f provid ing meat, m ilk  and bu tte r fo r the workers?
The old economic policy gave no consideration e ithe r to  the 
people or to  soceity and through it  the concept o f socialism
became a narrow one, conceived only in the idea o f maximum
industry. This is not socia lism !^68)
And it  was not, he said, how to  build socialism. Nagy also attacked those who 
hoped to develop agricu ltu re  w ithou t im proving the welfare o f the peasantry. 
This, he said, con flic ted  w ith  the M arx is t-Len in is t p rinc ip le  o f m axim ising the 
workers’ m ate ria l and cu ltu ra l we lfare . Nagy stressed tha t i t  was impossible to  
raise ag ricu ltu ra l production w ithout im proving the peasantry’s standard o f 
liv ing . And since individual fa rm ing dominated agricu ltu re  the peasants should be 
allowed to  sell most o f th e ir produce on the free  m arket.
Nagy’s speech was a resounding success. He had swept his audience 
along w ith  him. On this occasion his presentation eclipsed Rakosi’s irreso lu te  
report, which fo llowed. Rakosi, on the re trea t, condemned the mistakes
com m itted even more than Nagy and insisted tha t the P o litburo was com ple te ly 
united on the June Resolution and the Third Congress resolution, as w e ll as on 
the questions re la ting  to  the delays and errors in industria l re -a lignm ent and
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development o f agricu ltu re . According to  one partic ipan t, nobody seemed to  
(370)believe him. Rakosi agreed w ith  a ll the points raised by ’comrade Nagy’,
(371)even in 'the sharp fo rm ’, as he put i t  in which ’he had delivered i t ’. '  He
complained to  his listeners tha t ’we have lost f if te e n  invaluable months' and
(372)stressed tha t 'we shall have to  make th is up now'. He was even more
em phatic than Nagy on liv in g  standards, which, he promised, not only had to  be
maintained but increased; a ll other tasks were to  be subordinated to  th is. He
declared tha t nobody had thought tha t e ithe r the p ro le ta ria t or the peasantry had
an 'extravagant' life -s ty le , but pointed out, however, tha t there were many
(373)costly ins titu tions in the country which were not ’ta ilo red  to  our pockets'. 
Rakosi accepted tha t ag ricu ltu ra l development was a pre-condition fo r  an 
increase in the liv in g  standards o f the working people, p rim a rily  the working 
class. He adm itted tha t i f  agricu ltu re  was to  develop sa tis fac to rily  the peasants 
had to  be allowed to  earn a good income, and he confirm ed what Nagy had said, 
tha t ’nobody should be a fra id  o f the increased purchasing power o f the 
peasantry’. He warned tha t,
we can not a ffo rd  the luxury o f disappointing the peasants 
every two years, and then having to  bribe them back again on 
the side o f people's dem ocracy.^
But Rakosi ca re fu lly  avoided e ither c r it ic is m  or se lf-c ritic ism . He accepted no 
personal responsib ility fo r any mistakes, merely repeating some o f the c r itic ism s 
and blam ing economic leaders fo r  the d iff ic u lt ie s  and fo r  th e ir  negligence.
Under the im pact o f Nagy’s speech -  and not fo rg e ttin g  the fa c t th a t its  
decision always re lfec ted  the views o f Moscow -  the C entra l C om m ittee Plenum 
confirm ed Nagy's programme. The m a jo rity  o f members en thusiastica lly  
applauded Nagy and promised th e ir  support fo r the im plem entation o f the 
policies o f the 'New Course'. D iff ic u lt ie s , however, arose when -  a t the end of
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the m eeting - the C entra l Com m ittee Planum came to  adopt the customary 
resolution (which had im plica tions fo r  the events im m edia te ly a fte r  the 
meeting). Since no agreed proposal was subm itted by the P o litburo on the 
economy - apart from  the report by Szalai on the 'State and Tasks o f the national 
economy' - the C entra l C om m ittee only adopted a resolution on the second 
report, by Farkas, on 'Some questions concerning the co llec tive  work o f the 
C entra l Com m ittee '. This resolution contained a scathing a ttack  on those party 
'elements' who opposed the 'New Course' i.e., Rakosi and his group, w ithout, 
however, naming them. These were 'elements’ who clung to 'old, fa lse ideas', 
'le ft-w ingers ' w ith  a narrow minded 'sectarian ' a ttitude . The resolu tion also 
sharply c ritic ised  the Politburo fo r  its  methods o f operation, fo r  neg lecting to  
draw the C entra l C om m ittee in to  the decision-making process -  w ithou t which 
the leading organ o f the party could not fu l f i l  its  proper ro le -  so tha t its  
meetings o ften became no more than mere fo rm a lities . C learly , the C entra l 
Commitee members were ge tting  more and more im patient and fru s tra te d  w ith  
the way the policies were evolved by the top leadership. The Plenum there fo re  
requested the Politburo to  submit im portan t issues, o f which there were plenty, 
to  them fo r  discussion, supported w ith  proper in fo rm ation  to  enable them to  
make decisions, and not to  make the C om m ittee members fe a r fu l o f vo ic ing
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th e ir  opinions. F ina lly, the C entra l Com m ittee instructed the Po litburo
f irs t  to  d ra ft a resolution on the 'sta te and tasks o f the national economy' and 
then to  work out the detailed programme fo r 1955, tak ing  in to  account the 
lessons learned from  the debate in the Plenum, and to  mobilise the h ithe rto  
passive party  apparatus in to  active support fo r the 'New Course'.
Despite the clear instructions and uncompromising tone o f the Plenum, 
the period im m ediate ly a fte r i t  was not one o f p o lit ic a l consolidation but o f 
deepening p o lit ica l crisis, o f confusion and fu rth e r division w ith in  the top 
leadership. For almost two weeks, fo llow ing  Nagy's clear v ic to ry  at_the C entra l
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Com m ittee, nothing visib le happened. Since the Politburo refused to  allow  the
publication o f the damning resolution o f the C entra l C om m ittee, the country
o ff ic ia lly  learned nothing about the deliberations o f the Plenum. Inspite o f the
speech Rakosi delivered at the Plenum, he and his group refused to  accept
defeat, hoping to  be able to  reverse the C entra l C om m ittee ’s decision in the near
fu tu re . They also managed to  manipulate the Politburo to  vote down Nagy’s
request to  have his speech published in the press.(376) f j rst  th e general
public heard about the C entra l Com m ittee meeting was on 10th October, when
Szalai’s report was published in the party  o f f ic ia l da ily newspaper, Szabad 
(377)Nep. While i t  raised the issues re la tin g  to  the economic d iff ic u lt ie s , i t
remained conspicuously silent on the discussions and con flic ts  which had taken
place in the Plenum. Then, on 11th October, the s ta ff o f the Szabad Nep
apparently began to  apply pressure fo r  action in support o f Nagy by publishing an
a rtic le  under the t i t le  'A long the June Road w ith  the C entra l Com m ittee 's
(378)guidance’ (A Kozponti Vezetoseg iranym utatasaval tovabb a juniusi u ton).
This was an ind ictm ent o f the continued opposition to  the 'New Course'. The 
a rtic le  reported tha t the C entra l C om m ittee had taken a determ ined stand 
against 'those party  elements who believed tha t the party  and government had 
advanced too rap id ly in the d irection  o f raising the standard o f liv ing '. I t  pointed 
out tha t,
a ll opposition to  the policy o f the 'New Course not only 
hinders a solution to  our trans ito ry  d iff ic u lt ie s  but 
constitutes the main source o f the d iff ic u lt ie s  themselves.
Our party  has to  conduct a most energetic struggle against 
any expression o f opposition because these deeply hurt the 
in terests o f the working class and o f the people as a 
whole.(379)
The Po litburo then met on 14th October as instructed by the C entra l C om m ittee
to  consider the d ra ft resolution which, a fte r several heated debates, was f in a lly
(380)adopted on 18th October and printed on 22nd October in Szabad Nep.
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Before publication, however, two events -  one o f which created a storm
in pa rty  c ircles, while the o ther had enormous repercussions across the country -
had taken place. F irs t, Erno Gero (who returned from  the Soviet Union about
th is  tim e), whose economic 's ta tu re ' and programme were being destroyed (calls
were made fo r  his resignation), delivered a speech on 18th October to  the County
P arty  Com m ittee at Szolnok. W ith his usual firmness he declared, in te r a lia  -
much to  the astonishment and abhorance o f the party rank and f ile  -  tha t the
opponents o f Nagy's new po licy  programme would be 'swept away w ith  an iron
(381)hand'. Soon a fte r th is, Nagy apparently very dissatisfied w ith  the f in a l te x t
(382)of the Politburo resolution, in an obstinate, i f  not desparate, move rew rote
the speech he had delivered at the Centra l Com m ittee (though re ta in ing  parts o f
it)  and published it  as an a rtic le  under the t i t le  'A fte r  the meeting o f the C entra l
Com m ittee ' (A Kozponti Vezetoseg iilese utan). This appeared in Szabad Nep on 
(383)20th October. In th is  long a rtic le  which made fron t-page news, Nagy
presented his arguments to  the country as a whole. He attacked his opponents, 
accusing them o f 'dogmatism', 'lack o f sc ie n tific  sp irit', 'lack o f knowledge, 
experience and foresight' and even 'an ti-M arx ism ' in the ir economic plans and 
adm in istra tion. The fo rm er policy, he wrote, o f 'exaggerated industria lisa tion ', 
w ithou t due regard fo r the people, had given a 'false in te rp re ta tion  o f socialism '. 
He also drew a tten tion  to  the fa c t tha t,
our economic adm in istra tive  agencies fa iled  to  re -a lign  
industria l production, rea llocate investm ent and im plem ent 
the June Resolution and government program m e.^84)
He also stressed tha t the 'peasants are the mainstay o f our people's democracy 
and pointed out tha t 'our party should never, not even fo r a m inute, fo rg e t the 
significance of small-scale individual farm ers'. Nagy also w rote about the 
im portance o f peasant purchasing power and th e ir liv in g  standards, which, he
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wrote, were cruc ia l fo r  any improvement in the standard o f liv in g  o f the
, (385)workers.
When the Resolution was published on 22nd October, a fte r  Nagy's a rtic le , 
i t  hardly raised any in te rest among the public. I t  was shorter than Nagy's a rtic le  
and d iffe red  s ig n ifica n tly  from  it ,  not only in tone but also in content. And i t  is 
not d if f ic u lt  to  see why Nagy objected to  i t  so strongly tha t he decided to  publish 
his own version o f the significance o f the C entra l Com m ittee decision. Athough 
the resolution confirm ed tha t 'the only proper and possible path to  socialism in 
our country ' was the po licy o f the 'New Course', i t  also stressed tha t 'we must 
not forget tha t industria lisa tion ' was the main means 'to  build socialism ' and tha t 
i t  was 'an indispensable fa c to r fo r the development o f the economy' -  even a
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precondition fo r  ag ricu ltu ra l development. A t the same tim e, the resolution 
protested against the in te rp re ta tion  o f 'inco rrec t, com pliant libera lism ' o f the 
'New Course' using the m otto o f 'strengthening re lations w ith  the masses' as an 
excuse, renouncing c iv ic  and labour discipline, resulting in the waste o f social 
property, irra tio n a l u tilisa tio n  o f m ateria l and equipment and an increase in the 
size o f the unproductive w orkforce/****^
Nagy's trium ph at the C entra l Com m ittee ra llied  a number o f in flu e n tia l 
journalists (and others) on the s ta ff o f the party 's o ff ic ia l da ily, Szabad Nep, (and 
elsewhere) in to his camp. Encouraged by Nagy's a rtic le  -  and dissatisfied w ith  
Rakosi's po licy line -  they decided to  step up th e ir earlie r e ffo rts  in support o f 
Nagy. In the ed ito ria l o ffice  o f Szabad Nep a three-day general m eeting was 
convened on 23rd October to  debate the resolution published the previous day. 
During the debate calls were made to  end the opposition to  the 'New Course' and 
fo r  genuine party democracy. Copies o f the mimeographed m inutes o f the 
meeting were sent to  a ll members o f the C entra l Com m ittee, 'to  s t ir  them in to  
action ' on behalf o f Nagy. This in tra -p a rty  opposition in fu ria ted  the Po litburo, 
and even Nagy had to  disown it  by declaring tha t he had nothing to  do w ith  
'factiona lism '.^***^
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A fte r  long preparation the P a tr io tic  People’s Front (PPF) held, its
opening congress on 23rd October. Nagy addressed an audience o f 2000 at the
congress, which was held at the M unicipal Theatre in Budapest (Varosi Szinhaz).
He went s tra igh t to the question o f power, assigning the PPF the ro le o f p o lit ic a l
and moral 'avant garde’. He was given a tum ultuous reception. Am idst a storm
o f applause, as i f  i t  were a ’vote o f confidence' from  a dem ocratic parliam ent, he
(389)appealed to  the delegates to  continue to  support his 'New Course'. Nagy
asked them:
do the P a tr io tic  People’s Front grant to  the government the 
help, the confidence needed fo r  the rea lisa tion o f the 'Policy 
o f June’ and fo r the realisation o f the government programme 
to  overcome our d i f f i c u l t i e s ? ( 3 9 0 )
And the assemblage o f workers, peasants, w rite rs , scientists and party
functionaries rose to  th e ir fee t and roared 'Yes, yes we grant i t '  and, as Szabad
(391)Nep reported the next day, applauded fo r minutes.
A t th is congress Nagy reached the zenith  o f his precarious v ic to ry . 
( 3 9 2 )Around th is  tim e Rakosi, apparently decisive ly beaten, le f t  the country,
ostensibly il l ,  fo r a long vacation in the Soviet Union - p a rtly  at a hea lth  resort
(393)and p a rtly  in Moscow - not to  re tu rn  u n til 29th November. Gero, too, had
( 3 9 4 )withdrawn in to  a hospital reserved fo r  party leaders. For a while i t  seemed
as i f  there was only one leader in the country -  Nagy: a paragon o f respec tab ility
( 3 9 5 )and, i t  must be said, naive complacency. His in many ways 'un lucky' star,
however, did not remain high fo r long. Unknown, perhaps, to  him , events 
elsewhere were already beginning to  take a downturn fo r him.
Meanwhile, as instructed by the C entra l Com m ittee, the P o litbu ro  met 
on 3rd November and set-up a com m ittee composed o f Im re Nagy (Chairman), 
Erno Gero, Andor Berei (Nagy's most outspoken, i f  ta c tica l, defender a t the 
Plenum), Jozsef Bognar, Laszlo Hay, Arpad Kiss and Zoltan Vas, to  work out the
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economic programme fo r  1955. The ir work was completed at the end o f 
November, and th e ir  long proposal (about 142 typ e -w ritte n  pages) was subm itted 
fo r  discussions. But fo r  several com plicated reasons, as w ill be seen, th is 
discussion could never take place because by tha t tim e  it  was gradually becoming 
known tha t the previous 'old Rakosi line ' would be revived a fte r the tem porary 
set-back.(396)
During his stay in the Soviet Union Rakosi was very ac tive  in
undermining Nagy's position. He held several discussions w ith  Soviet leaders,
subm itted detailed reports to  Kaganovich, a hard-line S ta lin ist, explaining tha t
Nagy's group wanted to  take over the leadership and change the position and
policy line o f the party  rad ica lly . He also described the 'very d if f ic u lt  economic
situa tion  in the country, which he alleged had been brought ‘ about by Nagy's
libera lis ing  course. But the real opportun ity fo r him to  e lim ina te  Nagy was
provided by other events. F irs t, in October, a development took place which was
not only to  change the policy line d rastica lly  but also to  transform  the whole
p o lit ic a l scenario. Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan went together fo r  a v is it
to  Peking to attend the celebrations o f the F ifth  Anniversary o f communism
there (from  Hungary i t  was Hegediis who attended). During th e ir  journey the
three apparently agreed among themselves (and, i t  is suggested, also w ith  Mao
Tse-Tung) to unseat Malenkov. The e lim ina tion  o f Malenkov, i t  seems, was most
im portant to Khrushchev and fo r  th is reason he was ready to  a lly  h im se lf w ith
the old Stalinists like  Kaganovich (one o f the ch ie f opponents o f Malenkov) and
Molotov. Rakosi's reports about Nagy f it te d  adm irably in to Khrushchev's plans -
Malenkov was Nagy's leading p ro tec to r and he could use Nagy and his polic ies in
Hungary to  show where Malenkov's own policies were leading the Soviet
(397)Union. Second, the tem porary tigh ten ing  up o f Soviet fo re ign  po licy  a fte r
the Paris agreement on 23rd October, associated w ith  an increase in 
in te rna tiona l tensions, had given Khrushchev another opportun ity to  undermine
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Malenkov's position by reverting  to  the pre-Malenkov line o f g iving top p r io r ity
(398)to  the expansion o f heavy industry. Because o f these developments, Rakosi 
found more receptive  ears fo r  his com plaints in Moscow than ever before. Rakosi 
was sure, he would make i t  sure, i f  Khrushchev's line was adopted in the Soviet 
Union, Nagy, in Hungary, would be finished and he would once again enjoy the 
favour and support o f the Soviet leadership.
These developments, combined w ith  his relentless intrigues against Nagy
while in Moscow, must have been more than encouraging fo r Rakosi. According
to  Hegediis - who v is ited in him Moscow on his way back from  China -  Rakosi
to ld  him then tha t the Soviet leaders supported him, tha t he had been 'given the
marshalls baton' and 'instructed to  take over power from  Nagy' on his re tu rn .
Hegediis confirm ed tha t his own discussions w ith  Molotov corroborated what
(399)Rakosi had to ld  him . This was also confirm ed by the fa c t tha t Rakosi, from  
Moscow, instructed his deputy, Farkas, in Hungary (possibly e ither by telephone 
or te legram ) 'to  hold the fro n t' u n til his re tu rn . On receiving th is  ins truc tion  
Farkas (always a re liab le  barom eter o f sh ifts  in power), hurried ly  called a 
Po litburo meeting on 24th November, in the absence o f Nagy, at which he began 
to  a ttack  Nagy by raising, fo r the f irs t  tim e, the issue o f the 'inherent dangers in 
the phenomenon o f righ t-w ing  d e v ia ta t io n .^ ^
When Rakosi returned to Hungary on 29th November, v is ib ily  fu l l  o f 
confidence, he began his assault on Nagy s tra igh t away, w ith  the support o f 
Farkas. W ithin tw o days of his re tu rn  he called a Politburo meeting, on 1st 
December, to  discuss a report he had subm itted, w ith  the t i t le  'General debate in 
connection w ith  the events o f the last few weeks' (A lta lanos v ita  az e lm u lt hetek 
esemenyeivel kapcsolatban) . ^ ^  Rakosi began the a ttack  by declaring tha t 'our 
people's democracy is confronted w ith  p o lit ic a l and economic d iff ic u lt is ,  and 
th e ir  in te rna tiona l e ffec ts  are already being fe lt '.  Follow ing this, he pointed out 
tha t the mistakes recently  com m itted - 'loss o f party  au thority ', 'com ing to  a
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ha lt w ith  the build ing o f socialism in the countryside’, ’lack o f pa rty  u n ity ’,
’problems o f the economy and increased standard o f liv in g ’, ’r ig h t-w in g ’, even
’an ti-M arx is t deviation among the in te lligen ts ia ’ -  had created serious concren
w ith in  the ’socia list camp’. For a ll these mistakes Rakosi placed the
responsib ility  squarely on the shoulders o f Nagy. During the debate Nagy tried
desperately to  defend his position and the necessity o f the ’tw o -fro n t struggle ’
(i.e., against both the le f t  and the righ t), but in vain. Rakosi concluded tha t the
(402)’main danger’ was the danger o f the ’r igh t-w ing  deviation’. However, i t  was
s t i l l  not easy fo r Rakosi to  d ra ft the customary fin a l resolution. Nagy stubbornly
resisted. During the next fo rtn ig h t three versions o f a resolution were dra fted
and re jected by Nagy. Eventually, on 15th December, in the absence o f Nagy,
the P o litburo passed unanimously a resolution (w ith  some minor m odifica tions)
which dealt exclusively w ith  the dangers inherent in ’r igh t-w ing  dev ia tion ’ and
how to  f ig h t t h e m . ^ ^  The im plem entation o f th is resolution had, in p ractice ,
already begun. The im portance o f th is resolution cannot be exaggerated; i t
meant the beginning o f the end o f Nagy. Furtherm ore, on the basis o f the
resolution, the Politburo had already proposed tha t during January 1955
appropriate measures should be worked out -  aimed almost e n tire ly  against
(404)Nagy's 'peasant po licy ' -  in the fo llow ing  spheres :
the fees charged by MTSs fo r  th e ir  technica l services were to  be more 
d iffe re n tia te d  in favour o f co llectives
the compulsory de livery system was to  be made more re s tr ic tiv e  
trad ing  by private butchers was to  be res tric ted
re ta il traders' licences in towns were to  be w ithdrawn, i f  there  was a 
good reason, because there were too many o f them
propaganda and ag ita tion  work to  increase the number o f co llec tives  was 
to  begin in the spring
pa rtia l or fu ll commassation o f land was to begin during the autum n
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the earlie r regulation, under which co llec tive  members were not allowed 
to  leave the co llectives fo r three years a fte r  jo in ing  was to  be restored
the level o f taxa tion  on peasants and handicra ft industries was to  be 
increased during 1955.
C learly a ll these measures, w ithout exception, were designed to  undermine
confidence and the po licy o f the ’New Course’ itse lf.
During December the p o lit ica l scenario began to  change ra the r rap id ly .
The v ita l developments in the in te rna tiona l s itua tion  during the month decided
the in tra -p a rty  fig h t in favour o f Rakosi. From December, discussions on
revising the defence industry, to  strengthen heavy industry, began again. A ttacks
by Rakosi and others on Nagy's alleged 'r ig h tis t deviation and references to  his
PPF as a counter-revo lu tionary organisation, began to  be in tensified. The party
apparatus tuned almost overnight against the Nagy policy line. By the tim e  the
Tenth Anniversary o f the convocation o f the Provisional Assembly and the
ins ta lla tion  o f the Provisional Government was celebrated in Debrecen on 21st
December (the orig ina l scene o f these events) i t  was clear to  everyone th a t the
fig h t between Rakosi's and Nagy's groups was entering an acute phase. A t the
famous protestant 'G reat Church' (Nagytemplom) in Debrecen the clash between
the tw o opposing groups in fa c t became v io lent at tim es. While Rakosi de livered
a se lf-confident, even high-handed, speech about 'bu ild ing socialism', w ithou t any
reference to  past mistakes, Nagy's speech -  the last he made in public, u n til 1956
- was dull, life less and non-po litica l. I t  seemed as i f  he had already w ithdrawn,
or else tha t he was to ta lly  unaware o f the 'budding conspiracy'. A f te r  the
celebrations there was a reception fo r the delegates at the 'Golden B u ll'
(405)(Aranybika) H ote l. According to  Hegediis, who attended th is  reception, the 
fa c t th a t there were two p o lit ica l groups there became m anifestly obvious to  a ll. 
He observes, tha t at one table Nagy sat w ith  his friends, m ostly w rite rs  and 
journalists, and at another table there was Rakosi w ith  his adherents, the 'new
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possessors o f power’ and they were 'eyeing each other across the t a b le s ' . ^ ^  
Ominously, Nagy complained to  his friends at the reception tha t he had met 
Farkas, who confronted him w ith  the fo llow ing  ’provocative’ words: 'there is no 
New Course ... i t  is r ig h tis t to  pursue it ,  the old road must be pursued, only some 
mistakes need to  be c o r r e c te d '.^ ^
In fa c t, by th is  tim e Rakosi -  whose in form ation link  to  Moscow was 
always considerably be tte r and more re liab le  than Nagy's -  already knew fo r  
certa in  tha t in the Soviet Union a new p o lit ic a l alignment, led by Khrushchev, 
had emerged - at Malenkov's expense.(408) g jnce was keen to  spread the
news -  p o lit ic a lly  i t  was advantageous fo r  him to  do so -  most o f the Hungarian 
leadership, too, knew about it .  More im portan tly , the c r it ic a l reports about 
Nagy he had subm itted to  the Soviet leaders while in Moscow could now be put to  
good use. The fo rm a l denouncement came when the Hungarian delegation was 
summoned to  Moscow on 7th January -  again, as in June 1953, to  be instructed 
how to  change th e ir poicy and reorganise th e ir government. The delegation, 
composed o f Rakosi, Gero, Nagy and Szalai was almost identica l to  th a t o f June 
1953; the Soviet side was the same, too, except fo r  the absence o f Beria and the 
presence o f B u lg a n in .^ *^  On th is occasion, however, the message was reversed.
The Soviet leaders rebuked Nagy fo r  the economic problems which had 
arisen because o f the 'New Course'. In th e ir  words i t  had 'wrecked' the economy 
which, under the crushing burden of fore ign debt, was near collapse. Industria l 
production was down and nothing in th e ir  view could ju s tify  a rise in liv in g  
standards because a large part o f the co llectiv ised system had disin tegrated. 
W ith regard to  po litics , the Soviet leaders accused Nagy o f encouraging 
'factiona lism ' and 'popular opposition', degrading the 'leading ro le  o f the party ' 
and thereby threatening the country w ith  a p o lit ica l crisis. For a ll these evils 
one person alone was responsible -  N a g y .^ * ^  He was, apparently, reduced to  
silence most o f the tim e  (like Rakosi 18 months before). He did t ry  to  put up a
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sp irited  defence and to  explain the reasons fo r the economic d iff ic u ltie s , but was
shouted down before he could make his point. Nagy reported ly became very
agita ted when he was to ld  by the Soviet leaders tha t 'he had not kept before his
eyes the m agnificant example o f Soviet ko lkh o zy '/4**^ Nagy apparently replied:
(412)'you made not a few mistakes o f your own when you form ed your kolkhozy'.
This genuinely angered the Soviet leadership -  how dare Nagy c ritis ise  the Soviet
Union? This incident, i t  is believed, may have done him more harm, in the long
run, than a ll o f Rakosi's accusa tions/4**^
A t th is stage, however, Nagy was only rebuked: his position as Chairman
of the Council o f M inistes was not danger. For various com plicated reasons the
Soviet leaders did not wish to  replace him. Having warned him to  behave, he was
merely instructed to  reverse his industria l po licy and restore order in Hungary.
Shortly a fte r  his re tu rn  to  Hungary from  Moscow, however, Nagy suffered a
(414)coronary thrombosis -  i t  was reported in the press on 20th January.' 1 While in
Moscow, at the C entra l Com m ittee meeting on 25th January, Khrushchev
denounced the post-Stalin reversal in industria lisation; the im portance o f heavy
(415)industry as w e ll as agricu lture  was o ff ic ia lly  stressed again. This decisive
change in policy could be observed in Hungary on 23rd January, when the party 
o f f ic ia l da ily  newspaper announced the continuation o f the construction o f the 
'S talin Ironworks' and a number o f o ther such projects, which had been stopped by 
the 'New C ourse '/4**^ Rakosi openly insisted tha t industria lisa tion was more 
urgent than the improvement o f liv in g  standards. A lthough it  had not ye t been 
announced, Malenkov in the Soviet Union had also been ousted from  his position, 
along w ith  these changes. Now it  was the hard-liners' tu rn  to  go over to  the 
offensive. The 'Nagy re form  era' in Hungary was over.
These developments had fin a lly  provided Rakosi w ith  the chance to  
engineer Nagy’s downfall. Soon the Politburo called fo r  a medical repo rt on
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Nagy ostensibly to  assess whether he was in a position to  f u l f i l  his obligations as 
Chairman o f the Council o f M inisters. Apparently, a ’suitable ' report was 
produced and Nagy was soon isolated and silenced. W ithin a short tim e, as w ill 
be seen, he was fo rm a lly  removed, f ir s t ly  from  his prem iership and then from  a ll 
pa rty  functions (la te r even from  membership).
PART FOUR
For a s trik ing ly  candid p ic ture  o f the fa ilu re  o f Soviet ag ricu ltu re  and 
livestock breeding see: Khrushchev's 'On measures to  fu rth e r the 
development o f Soviet A g ricu ltu re ' a report delivered to  the C entra l 
Com m ittee o f the CPSP, on 3rd September 1953. Khrushchev revealed 
tha t the percentage decline in the number o f cows during the 'S ta lin  
epoch' (1928-1953) equalled the percentage increse in population fo r  the 
same peiod, approxim ate ly 30 per cent. The f irs t  measures o f the post- 
Stalin regime in the USSR to revive agricu lture  by o ffe rin g  concessions 
to  the peasants were announced by Malenkov to  the Supreme Soviet in 
August and by Khrushchev to  the C entra l Com m ittee on 3rd September 
1953.
The leading organs o f the HWP were the Centra l Leadership, the 
Secretaria t and the P o lit ica l Com m ittee. But here the more fa m ilia r  
expressions 'C entra l C om m ittee ' and 'Politburo ' are used.
The 'New Course' was expounded in a series o f speeches by Soviet and 
East European leaders. Imre Nagy's announcement, on 4th Ju ly 1953, 
was the earliest. O ther announcements were as fo llow s: Georgi 
Malenkov, on 8th August; Georghe Gheorghu-Dej, on 22nd August; N ik ita  
Khrushchev, on 3rd September; Vulko Chervenkov, on 5th Septembr; 
Boleslew Be irut, on 29th October.
The dogmatic policies in Czechoslovakia continued fo r  several years, in 
contrast to  other East European states, especially, Hungary and Poland, 
although the speech by President Zapotecky, on 1st August, did ind ica te  
tha t many co llectives were disbanded by the spontaneous decision o f 
th e ir members. The regime was le f t  w ith  no choice other than to  
legalise, tem porarily , these dissolutions. President Zapotocky, 
Malenkov's protege, advocated s im ila r policies to Imre Nagy, in te r a lia , 
he too critis ised the forced co llec tiv isa tion  and promised peasants th a t 
they would be allowed to  leave the co llectives to  pursue p riva te  fa rm ing, 
i f  they so desired. But, Novotny, F irs t Secrtary o f the Communist Party, 
reacted vigorously, ordering the party  apparatus to  oppose every 
un tim e ly dissolution. The Soviets, in the struggle between Zapotecky 
and Novotny, u ltim a te ly , decided in the la tte r 's  favour.
In East Germany, in A p ril 1953, U lbrich t's  request fo r urgent economic 
aid was turned down by the Soviet leadership. Instead, he was asked to  
change policy. To resolve the economic crisis, U lb rich t decreed an 
increase in industria l output on 28th May which was met by fie rce  
resistance and rio ts  from  workers. On 11th June the SED newspaper 
prin ted a declaration o f the 'New Course’. A fte r  the popular uprising on 
17th June showed the unpopularity o f U lb rich t, the Soviet leadership 
decided to  back him, provided he wholeheartedly embraced the 'New 
Course'. He confessed to  mistakes and the fu ll tex t o f the 'New Course' 
was published. (See: 'Der Neue Kurse und die Aufgaben der P a rte i' (The 
New Course and the Tasks o f the Party), Neues Deutschland, 28th Ju ly 
1953.
O ccurring at a tim e o f the post-Stalin power struggle in the USSR, the 
signs o f unrest in Eastern Europe were especially ominous fo r  Moscow.
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Seeing tha t steps had to  be taken w ithou t delay -  to  a llay in terna l 
discontent -  Moscow, i t  is believed, f ir s t  designated Hungary as the 
testing  ground, a ’pilot* country fo r the new m ilder policy. Even today it  
is not known precisely why Moscow selected Hungary to  in it ia te  the 
revised po licy line. I t  has been suggested tha t the Soviet leaders 
considered tha t the s ituation was the gravest in Hungary. O ther East 
European countries would have fo llowed suit la te r. Ther m ight be two 
possible reasons why th is did not happen. One was the uprising in East- 
Berlin , on 17th June, which frightened Moscow and the o ther was the fa ll 
o f Beria.
An in te resting  allusion here is the apparent paralle lism  between the ’New 
Course’, as expounded in the Soviet Bloc, and the re fo rm is t programme 
carried out in Yugoslavia a fte r  1950. The evidnce seems to  suggest tha t 
the Soviet leadership had studied the Yugoslav example w ith  great care, 
fo r some tim e.
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Chapter 11: From Controlled Relaxation to Revolution,
February 1955-December 1956: a return to old policies?
11.1 Rakosi resurgent, February 1955-February 1956: co llec tiv isa tion  resumed
Malenkov's o ff ic ia l resignation as Chairman of the Council o f M inisters
in the Soviet Union, on 8 th  February 1956, was followed shortly by the dow nfa ll
o f Imre Nagy in Hungary. The fa ll o f the two men had im portant repercussions
and was accompanied by a new s h ift in economic policy. The new th ink ing
introduced by Khrushchev was a curious m ixture o f neo-Stalinism, modest
p o lit ica l re laxation, decentralisation and 'peaceful coexistence' w ith  Yugoslavia
and the West. In the sphere o f economics the prim acy o f heavy industry was
rea ffirm ed  and the previous policy, emphasising ligh t, consumer, industries was
repudiated. The new line was, o f course, soon fo llowed in Hungary. Rakosi's
re tu rn  to  power, however, did not im m ediate ly bring a re tu rn  to  the economic
policy pursued before the 'New Course'. Although the p r io r ity  o f heavy industry
was emphasised again th is emphasis, in the in it ia l stages, was more moderate,
and even the calls fo r the resumption o f co llec tiv isa tion  were ra the r restrained.
The reasons fo r  th is were complex but can m ostly be a ttribu ted  to  externa l and
in terna l p o lit ic a l factors, which tended to  place certa in  lim ita tio n s  on Rakosi's 
(1)power.
Rather im patient attem pts to  bring agricu lture  under t ig h te r contro l, 
however, and the old theme tha t 'socia list reorganisation o f ag ricu ltu re ' should 
be resumed, cautiously, did return. One o f the earliest indications o f th is  was 
the resolution passed by the Politburo at its  meeting on 26th January 1955, which 
stated tha t
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socialist reorganisation o f agricu lture ought to  be put back on 
the agenda ... and the numerical development o f co llectives 
should begin during the autumn and preparatory ag ita tion  and 
propaganda campaign, already, in the spring ... and depending 
on local conditions general and pa rtia l commassation and the 
three year rule ought to  be re-introduced.(2)
Then, on 6th February, a long a rtic le  by Janos Matolcsi openly emphasised tha t
the present backwardness o f agricu lture  can only be 
elim inated by pu tting  production on a socialist, large-scale 
basis, i f  working small and medium peasants jo in  the
co lle c tive s .^ )
Furtherm ore, at a Po litburo meeting on 10th February, Rakosi cautiously 
declared tha t
we do not want to  change the correct policy, only the 
excesses.
From subsequent events i t  could be seen tha t the most im portant o f the
'excesses' was Nagy's 'hindering o f the socialist transform ation o f agricu lture '.
Another less d irect sign involved the playwright, Gyula Hay. Shaken by
the revelations made under Nagy's term  o f o ffice , he wrote a play in 1954 called
'The Justice o f Jasper Varro' (Varro Gaspar igazsaga), dep icting the p ligh t o f the
poor peasantry under the Kolkhoz system. The play was prin ted at the beginning
of 1955 and rehearsals in the 'N ationa l Theatre' (Nem zeti Szinhaz) began, but
(5)a fte r his comeback Rakosi prevented its  performance.
Next, a vigorous campaign began against 'r igh t-w ing  deviation '. The 
Centra l Com m ittee Plenum met on 2nd-4th March 1955, in the absence of
/ c )  ( n \
Nagy , and unanimously passed a resolution (apparently i t  was ready in 
advance) confirm ing the new Soviet line. W ithout com plete ly negating the 
v a lid ity  o f the June 1953 Resolution (which was basically sound) the C entra l 
Com m ittee focused its  a tten tion  on the mistakes and d istortions com m itted  in
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its  im plem entation, ever since 4th July 1953, which were largely a ttribu ted  to 
'r ig h tis t deviation '. Thus,
the causes o f the serious d iff ic u ltie s  which have become 
manifest in the s ituation o f our national economy can be 
found p rim arily  in the fa c t tha t since June 1953, r igh tis t, 
an ti-M arx is t, an ti-pa rty  and opportunist views gained 
currency. (8)
(9)The main characteris tics o f th is 'r ig h tis t deviation ' were declared to  be :
excessive re trea t from  heavy industry
re ta rd ing  the development o f the co llec tive  farm  system in agricu ltu re  
and 'idealising' and 'praising' small-scale priva te  fa rm ing
the inc lina tion  o f the press to  ignore the positive achievements o f the 
ea rlie r period
because o f these,
there was a drop in production and p roduc tiv ity
the increase in liv in g  standards had no firm  foundation; the working class 
had been duped w ith  promises.
The resolution critic ised  Nagy fo r supporting and holding dangerous 'r ig h tis t, 
an ti-M arx is t, an ti-pa rty  and opportun itis t' views w ith  respect to  Hungary's 
economic development:
pa rticu la rly  great harm has ben done by those righ t-w ing  
views ... which have appeared concerning the main issues of 
the party's agrarian policy ... certa in  petty-bourgeois theories 
-  crushed by Marxism long ago -  have been revived and even 
published in some periodica l concerned w ith  theory ... on the 
basis o f false tenets, some people began to deny the 
im perative necessity o f the socialist transform ation  o f 
agricu lture and under th is p re text started to  wreck the 
co llec tiv isa tion  movement. Such views are largely
responsible fo r the fa c t tha t there was no num erical increase 
in our co llec tive  farm s last year
-  853 -
The resolution, by pointing out the fa c t tha t even the reduced procurement plan 
remained under fu lf ille d , h it on the nub o f the ag ricu ltu ra l problem: the 
peasantry’s silent resistance to  the purposes o f the state:
some party members have adopted an incorrect a ttitu de  on 
the question o f procurement. I t  is due to  this righ t-w ing  
a ttitude  and to  the undermining work o f the kulaks tha t in 
1954 even the co rrec tly  reduced delivery plans were not 
fu lf ille d . The importance o f produce co llection was not 
su ffic ie n tly  stressed and the slackening discipline in produce 
co llection  was watched id ly .(H )
A t th is stage, however, a co llec tiv isa tion  plan had not yet been fu lly  worked out. 
The resolution merely went on to  chart a new compromise between re a lity  and 
ideology, promising to  continue the concessions to  the peasants and, at the same 
tim e, ind ica ting the necessity to  expand the co llective  sector, on the basis o f the 
'vo luntary princip le ':
The Centra l Com m ittee ... c learly  sees the opportunities 
inherent in the development o f production o f individual 
peasant farm s ... however, being aware o f the lim its  to  which 
small-scale peasant farm ing can be developed, the C entra l 
Com m ittee deems it  necessary tha t, by observing the 
voluntary princip le  la id down by Lenin, the party and state 
authorities should do widespread p o lit ica l, economic and 
organisational work in the in terest o f the consolidation and 
enlargement o f the co llec tive  farm  movement.
The C entra l Com m ittee, at th is stage, did not pass a resolution against Nagy 
personally nor did i t  indicate his fu tu re . He s t i l l  remained in his position. I t  did, 
however, pass a separate resolution condemning Nagy's le tte r  to  the C entra l 
Com m ittee and sta ting tha t since he could not be present, because o f illness, the 
Centra l Com m ittee would re turn  to  his case when he had recovered. Serious 
negotations w ith  Nagy must have begun during th is tim e. Apparently, the Soviet 
leadership expected tha t Nagy, like  Malenkov, would confess to  ’errors o f 
judgement' and exercise 'se lf-c ritic ism s '. But Nagy, perhaps fo r the f ir s t  tim e  in
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his communist career, refused e ither to  recant or to  resign, insisting tha t he be
(13)given the opportunity to  present his own case to  the Centra l Com m ittee. The 
Soviet leaders even dispatched Suslov to  Hungary in an a ttem pt to  persuade Nagy 
to  w ithdraw vo lun ta rily . When th is  fa iled  the axe fe ll.
The case against him, dra fted in part by Suslov, was presented at the 
special Centra l Com m ittee Plenum on 14th A p ril 1955. Here Nagy was attacked 
in person and accused o f a s tring  o f po lit ica l wrong-doings and opinions, including 
’factionalism ', 'r igh t-w ing  opportunism', 'anti-M arxism ', 'nepotism ' and 
'c lerica lism '. Thus,
comrade Nagy, in the in terest o f realising his r ig h tis t, 
opportunist policies resorted to  un-party like , an ti-pa rty  and 
even fac tiona lis t methods which are com plete ly incom patible 
w ith  the un ity  and the discipline o f the M arxist-Len in is t
p a r t y . ( 1 4 )
The main charges against Nagy's economic policies were neglect o f 
industria lisation, encouragement o f la x ity  and lack o f work d iscip line and 
hindering the 'socialist transform ation o f agricu lture '. Thus,
comrade Nagy tried  to  put brakes on the m otor o f socia list 
construction, socialist industria lisation and, especially, the 
development o f heavy industry and in the countryside the 
movement o f the ag ricu ltu ra l cooperatives, which is the 
decisive method of socialist construction o f the v i l la g e s .^ )
In his closing speech Rakosi linked Nagy's mistakes to  the views he had held in 
1949 and quoted at length from  the te x t o f the 1949 Resolution.
A c ting  on these charges the Centra l Com m ittee then dismissed Nagy 
from  his premiership, expelled him from  a ll his party o ffices (in November 1955 
even from  his party membership) and relieved him o f his un ivers ity  post and Vice 
Chairmanship o f the P a tr io tic  People's Front (PPF). A few days la te r, on 18th 
A p ril 1955, the National Assembly duly announced Nagy's rem oval and, on the
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recommendation o f the Centra l Com m ittee, confirm ed the appointm ent o f
Andras Hegedus as his successor (who remained in o ffice  u n til 25th October
( 16)1956). A t the same tim e  the Assembly 'approved' the budget fo r 1955.
Nagy's programme had most d ire c tly  benefitted the countryside -  where 
he was regarded as someone who gave land to  the peasants and then saved them 
from  fu rth e r enforced co llectiv isa tion . I t  was not surprising, then, tha t the 
im m ediate reaction to  his dismissal came, spontaneously, from  the villages. 
Strikes by farm ers quickly gathered momentum and food shortages developed, 
pa rticu la rly  o f m e a t .^ ^
Follow ing the March Plenum the regime had been pa rticu la rly  concerned 
w ith  the problems o f agricu ltu ra l organisation and w ith  the tempo and degree o f 
co llec tiv isa tion  to  be imposed. The main problem was how to  a tta in  greater 
co llec tiv isa tion  w ithout so alienating the individual peasant as seriously to  
endanger the country's food supply. For a while i t  seemed as i f  the regim e was 
less than prepared to  launch a fu ll, d irec t, assault on the individual farm ers. A t 
the Conference o f D is tr ic t Party Com m ittee Secretaries, on 25th-26th March, 
Rakosi and Lajos Acs, a fte r castigating 'r ig h tis t views', were at pains to  c la r ify  
the party's position on fu rth e r co llec tiv isa tion . On the whole, they indicated 
tha t a fu ll, eventual, co llectiv isa tion  was intended. Rakosi declared tha t
fo r  many years to come there w ill be tens and hundreds o f 
thousands o f individual farm ers. I f  we were to  fo rge t th is 
fa c t in our work i t  would undoubtedly give the impression 
tha t the party and the government cared less than they do fo r 
the individual farmers. The spreading o f such wrong views 
would cause serious harm to  the People's Democracy and to  
the peasantry itse lf. This misconception should be dispelled 
at a ll costs. We do and we shall adhere to  the decision o f the 
Centra l Com m ittee, which c learly  states that we w ill 
continue to  give the same support as before to  the individual 
farm ers, as expounded in the June 1953 R e s o l u t i o n . ^ )
and,
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we help individual working peasants in every way in order to 
induce them to  produce as much as possible u n til they decide 
spontaneously to jo in  the collectives, seeing the ir a ttra c tiv e
examples.vl9;
despite his stress on the importance o f individual farm ers Rakosi, a t the same 
tim e, also stated tha t a s ign ifican t increase in ag ricu ltu ra l output was only 
possible through 'socialist reorganisation o f agricu lture ':
during the past 18 months some individual farm ers have 
developed the notion that, as a m atte r o f fac t, we had given 
up the idea o f developing the collectives or at least had 
shelved it  fo r many years to  come. Therefore, i f  we want to  
increase the co llectives soundly, w ith  the s tr ic t observance 
o f the voluntary princip le  -  and tha t is the only way we can
do i t  -  them the comrades must carry out serious p o lit ic a l
enlightm ent work in support o f the c o l l e c t i v e s . ^ )
During preparations, however, the plan fo r co llec tiv isa tion  gradually became
more ambitious. A t the Politburo meeting on 8th A p ril the o rig ina l plan to
commence the co llec tiv isa tion  campaign on a voluntary basis during the autumn
was brought forward to the end o f the summer. In the in terven ing period the aim
was stated to be the consolidation o f existing co llectives in order to  improve
'th e ir management, yields and p ro fita b ility  to  exceed tha t o f individual farm s', so
tha t by th e ir exemplary farm ing results they would promote the process o f 
(21)
co llec tiv isa tion . This aim was no more, perhaps even less, than th a t o f the
June 1953 Resolution. During A p ril and May 1955 a barrage o f propaganda and
ag ita tion  began in the press and the countryside ignoring com plete ly the
resistance o f the peasants and the bad harvest results in 1954 and p u tting  the
blame squarely on 'enemy h o s tility ' and 'righ t-w ing  deviation ' fo r  'un fu rling  the
fla g  against the socialist reorganisation o f agricu lture and encouraging the
(22)dissolutions and w ithdrawals from  the collectives'. During the preparations 
the observance o f the Leninist voluntary aspects o f co llec tiv isa tion  had been 
continua lly stressed, although its  value could not have been any more than before
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1953, because at the same tim e i t  was accompanied by quan tita tive  requirements
and the re -in troduction  o f the dreaded policy o f commassation o f land in the
form ation  o f new collectives, a practice which was suspended in June 1953. A t
the Politburo meeting on 26th May, Rakosi outlined, and the Politburo endorsed,
a fa ir ly  moderate plan fo r co llectiv isa tion , which specified tha t some 50-60,000
fam ilies should jo in  the co llectives by the end o f 1955 and the same number
again during 1956. This, i f  realised, would have resulted in co llec tive
membership reaching or s ligh tly  exceeding the peak achieved before the June
1953 Resolution by the end o f 1956. I t  was fu rth e r envisaged tha t by the end o f
the Second Five Year Plan (1960) some 500,000 small and medium peasants, w ith
about 5 m ilion cad. yokes, i.e., approxim ately ha lf the to ta l, o f arable land were
to  be organised in to  collectives. W ith regard to  the richer peasants, the kulak
question, the resolution stated tha t the process o f ’socialist reorganisation o f
(23)agricu ltu re ’ would progress under the theory o f 'sharpening class struggle'.
Follow ing these prelim inaries, the Centra l Com m ittee Plenum met on
7th-8th June and passed a resolution on 'The fu rth e r tasks concerning the
socialist reorganisation of agricu lture  and increasing ag ricu ltu ra l production ' (A
mezogazdasag szocialista atszervezesenek es a mezogazdasagi term eles
fellenditesenek tovabbi fe lada ta iro l), which confirm ed the goal o f 
(24)co llec tiv isa tion . The keynote speech was delivered by Andras Hegedus. He
confirm ed tha t co llectiv isa tion , a fte r a ll, was to  s ta rt at the beginnig o f the
autumn -  but, avoiding the mistakes com m itted during the pre-1953 period,
large ly because, he declared, 'today the pre-conditions already exist and we can
(25)proceed in bigger steps'. HegedUs also outlined the conditions under which
co llec tiv isa tion  was to  progress. These were included in the usual way in the
(26)
resolution, which provided fo r  the fo llow ing measures:
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i) the ’voluntary princip le ' would be s tr ic t ly  observed; althogh ag ita tion and 
propaganda campaigns conducted by party organisations would not 
constitu te  a v io la tion  o f tha t princip le
ii) co llec tiv isa tion  would be carried out under the (Stalin's) theory of
'sharpening class struggle'
ii i)  commassation o f land would be used in the fo rm ation  o f new collectives
-  but peasants were to  receive land o f equal value in the commassation
exchanges; kulaks were to receive land in remote areas
iv) a fte r declaring tha t the co llec tive  'was not a house w ith  a passage-way'
he announced the re in troduction  of the three year rule, i.e., co llec tive
members could only apply to  the General Meeting o f the co llec tive  to
w ithdraw a fte r three years o f membership
v) simultaneously w ith  the co llectiv isa tion , ag ricu ltu ra l output should be
increased.
Regarding the last statem ent, the resolution b lun tly  declared tha t the desired 
improvement in agricu ltu ra l production was not to  be sought at the expense of 
co llectiv isa tion . The 'struggle fo r co llec tiv isa tion ' and the 'struggle fo r  higher 
outputs' should be combined:
the two princip le tasks -  the socialist reorganisation o f 
agricu lture and the development o f ag ricu ltu ra l production - 
must be resolved simultaneously, as a 'dual-task'.C27)
The resolution linked co llec tiv isa tion  to  the unrea listic objectives of:
i) raising agricu ltu ra l production by 25 per cent
ii) strengthening the worker-peasant alliance
ii i)  converting the medium peasants in to  f irm  allies, and
iv) iso lating the kulaks
Because o f the prevailing bread-grain problems in the country, the resolu tion 
stipulated tha t a compulsory minimum of 3.3-3.4 m illion  cad. yokes o f sown area 
should be devoted to  bread-grain production. Each individual and co lle c tive
fa rm er was obliged to  allocate a specified sown area to  bread-grain which was to
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be fixed  and entered in to th e ir delivery books by d is tr ic t councils, a decree
(28)announced on 5th August. Peasants who fa iled to  comply w ith  th is regulation 
and fu l f i l  the ir a llocated ta rge t were to  lose a ll compulsory delivery concessions. 
And since the regime was concerned w ith  the problem o f non -fu lfilm en t of 
compulsory deliveries, the resolution declared tha t the compulsory de livery 
system was here to  stay fo r ever:
in our country compulsory deliveries are not a tem porary 
regulation but a permanent and characte ris tic  feature o f our 
economic system, which w ill be maintained even in
socialism,(29)
and it  called fo r the application o f the fu ll force o f the law against those who 
vio lated the delivery obligations - free market rights in grain were to  be 
suspended u n til a ll peasants in the v illage (co llective  gu ilt) fu lf i l le d  th e ir 
compulsory deliveries and compulsory bulk-purchase plan (in addition to  the 
form er) by the state, the term s of which, the resolution stated, were favourable 
to the peasants (i.e., approxim ately the same price as the free m arket price). 
The aim of the regime, apparently, was not financ ia l gain at the expense o f the 
peasant but an increase in to ta l grain co llection. By trea ting  the whole v illage 
as a un it, o f course, the regime in tensified local pressure on reca lc itran t farm ers 
and sought to re s tr ic t the growing black markets, in an a ttem pt to a llev ia te  the 
sho rtfa ll in bread-grain co llection  by the state. Indeed, on 12th June Erno Gero 
revealed tha t Hungary had changed from  being a grain exporting to  a grain 
im porting country because o f the fa ilu re  o f grain collections -  and large 
quantities o f fodder, sugar and fa ts  were also having to  be im p o r te d / ^  Between 
the second ha lf o f 1954 and the f irs t  ha lf o f 1955 the regime had to  purchase 500 
m illion  deviza Forints worth o f flou r, bread-grain and fodder grain on Western 
m arke ts .^  ^
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The long-term  cure, however, was sought in co llec tiv isa tion . For the 
moment, the resolution summed up the regime’s plan fo r  increased 
co llec tiv isa tion  through moderate means. I t  stated that,
in con fo rm ity  w ith  the resolution o f the Third Party 
Congress, the co llec tiv is tion  movement must be developed 
quan tita tive ly  through the vo luntary enlistm ent o f individual 
farm ers at a pace which would perm it the socialist sector o f 
agricu lture  to  gain predominance by the end of the Second 
Five Year PlanJ32)
This, o f course, s t i l l  pointed toward a slow ra te  o f co llec tiv isa tion . Since the 
area under cu ltiva tion  by State Farms, included in the socia list sector, 
represented 13 per cent, the resolution im plied a goal fo r C o llective  Farms o f at 
least 37 per cent o f the arable land area by the end o f 1960. This increase would 
not have carried the colectivised area very s ign ifican tly  beyond what i t  had been 
in June 1953, before Nagy’s premiership when, including the area occupied by 
priva te  household plots, i t  was about 26 per cent, w ith  a to ta l membership o f 
376,088.(33)
The C entra l Committee's, and the subsequent resolution's, obsessive
concern w ith  the questions o f ’sharpening class struggle’, the 'iso la tion o f kulks’
and the middle peasants was unjustified by re a lity  because - as a resu lt o f the
pre-1953 policies - many o f the kulak holdings (the above 25 cad. yokes category)
had already been liquidated and a fte r 1953 the number o f rem aining kulak
holdings, together w ith  the 20-25 cad. yokes category just below it ,  did not
increase in number, but ra ther declined from  1954 on. Between June 1953 and
June 1956 the number o f kulak holdings decreased in each year by 1,400, 2,000
and 600 respective ly while the number in the 20-25 cad. yokes category
(34)decreased by 4,100 between 1954 and June 1956. Thus, the issues regarding
the 'kulak danger' and 'sharpening class struggle ' were de libera te ly exaggerated
(35)in order to  provide the fram ework fo r  co llec tiv isa tion .
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While Nagy’s policies had been repudiated, especially his low p r io r ity  
trea tm ent o f heavy industria l development, the investment plan fo r 1955, 
adopted at the March Plenum, on the whole s t i l l  re flected  the po licy  o f the ’New 
Course'. C learly, a fte r the reversal o f investment policy in June 1953 and, 
especially, in 1954 - the e ffec ts  o f which had not been fu lly  absorbed ye t -  
another reversal must have presented genuine d ifficu ltie s . This fa c t, perhaps, 
explains the setting o f lower targets fo r 1955; even these were not achieved, 
however. A ctua l to ta l investment at current prices, was 10,892 m ill. Forin ts 
(the lowest since 1950 and 728 m illion  Forints below tha t in 1954 (which was 
11,620 m ill. F o r i n t s ) . T h e  share o f industry was 4,698 m ill. Forin ts (40.4 per 
cent) -  w ith  heavy industry taking 3,853 m ill. Forints (82 per cent); lig h t industry 
397 m ill. Forints (8.5 per cent); food industry 448 m ill. Forints (9.5 per cent). The 
new regime apparently realised the importance o f adopting a strongly agrarian- 
oriented investment plan. The share o f agricu lture in to ta l investm ent, at 2,668 
m ill. Forints, was s ligh tly  below tha t in 1954 (at 2,677 m ill. Forin ts) but in 
re la tive  term s, at 24.5 per cent, i t  represented a larger share o f the to ta l 
investment than in 1954: o f th is the share o f State Farms was 982 m ill. Forin ts 
(36.8 per cent), MTSs 444 m ill. Fornts (16.6 per cent), fo res try  373 m ill. Forin ts 
(14 per cent) and other state organisations 525 m ill. Forin ts (19.8 per cent) -  
making the to ta l investment a lloca tion to the state sector 2,324 m ill. Forin ts 
(87.1 per cent), to  the co llec tive  sector 341 m ill. Forints (12.8 per cent), and to  
other cooperative agencies 3 m ill. Forin ts (1.1 per cent). I t  wasonly during 1956 - 
and not because in the last quarter o f that year a ll investm ent tem pora rily  
stopped due to the crisis -  tha t agricu ltu ra l investment declined to  1,800 m ill. 
Forints, representing about 16 per cent o f to ta l investment. As a resu lt o f the 
level o f investment and, perhaps, because Nagy's investment po licy in agricu ltu re  
was making its e lf fe lt  in 1955, mechanisation in agricu ltu re  s ig n ifica n tly  
increased between 31st December 1954 and 31st December 1955: ag ricu ltu re
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received 5,975 trac to rs , 3,709 tractor-p loughs, 638 harvesters, 468 threshing
machines etc. -  the momentum o f mechanisation, however, slowed down again
(37)during 1956 when the increases were 1,838, 2,591, 237 and 326 respective ly. 
Compared w ith  1954 (see: p.784) there was a decline in the overall u tilisa tio n  o f 
a r t if ic ia l fe rt iliz e rs  in 1955; th is leve l then remained unchanged in 1956, as 
shown in Table 1 1 .1 :^ ^
Table 11.1 Annual Consumption of Artificial fertilizers 
in 1955 and 1956
Year
Consumption in tons Consumption in kg/cad. yoke
S.F C.F National S.F C.F N ationa l
1955
1956
118.5 62.8
106.5 91.0
256.0
256.7
105.9
96.0
51.1
54.1
27.3
27.4
The reduction in consumption o f a r t if ic ia l fe rt il iz e rs  was la rge ly due to  the
radica l reduction in imports.
One of the main weaknesses o f the economy was in fore ign trade, where
the continued deterio ra tion caused serious concern fo r the government. In 1955,
while the im port plan was ’over fu lf il le d ’ by one per cent, the export plan was
under fu lf il le d  by 7 per cent. The d e fic it in the balance o f payments was brought
about by the decline o f more than 25 per cent in exports to Western countries:
according to  calculations o f the Centra l S ta tis tica l O ffice  debts to  western
countries had increased by 785 m ill, deviza Forin ts during 1955. This was only
s ligh tly  o ffse t by the reduction in debts to socialist countries by 436 m ill, deviza 
(39)Forints. Improvement in the balance o f fore ign trade, however, co n flic te d  
w ith  the new policy o f industria lisation -  which became more conspicuous during
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the execution o f the 1955 plan -  and w ith  the fu rth e r strides towards the 
development o f heavy industry made during the preparation o f the Second Five 
Year Plan, beginning in August 1955 - delayed once more by the p o lit ic a l tu rm o il 
-  which envisaged an annual average rise o f 11 per cent in heavy industria l 
production between 1956 and 1 9 6 0 .^ ^  A reduction o f 500 m ill, deviza Forin ts in 
debts was planned fo r 1956, but only 37 m ill, deviza Forin ts reduction was 
achieved, partly  because the Plan was to ta lly  unrea lis tic  and p a rtly  because o f
•  •  + (41)the uprising that year.
Follow ing the March and, especially, the June C entra l C om m ittee
meetings the numerical development o f co llectives was again pushed fo r  a while
s t ill,  at least o ffic ia lly , on a voluntary basis, although this was frequen tly  backed
up by heavy-handed ag ita tion and propaganda campaigns fo r co lle c tiv isa tion  o f 
(42)individual farm ers. Pressures on, and prosecution of, the kulaks became 
more and more in tensified too; o ff ic ia l spokesmen began to  com plain th a t kulaks 
and other 'class enemies' were sabotaging the delivery programme:
last year, kulaks and speculators in the villages grew much 
stronger. They have in every way endeavoured to  undermine 
discipline among the citizens, they have hampered de live ry  
schedules ...(43)
The result was tha t dissolutions o f and w ithdrawals from  co llectives came more 
or less to  a ha lt and the number, area and membership o f co llectives, a fte r  two 
years o f decline, began slowly to  rise once again. I t  is d if f ic u lt ,  even today, to  
measure the degree o f success the regime had achieved during th is  period o f 
'vo luntary ' co llectiv isa tion . This is so fo r several reasons. F irs t i t  must be borne 
in mind tha t during he f irs t  ha lf o f the year, as in 1954, dissolutions o f and 
w ithdrawals from  colectives continued, a ll be i t  at a lower ra te . Second, lack o f 
monthly figures on the development o f co llectives does not pe rm it a month by 
month evaluation; a ll the s ta tis tica l publications given are end o f year levels.
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Third, much o f the contemporary press in fo rm ation  is shrouded in o ff ic ia l cla im s 
tha t do not give an accurate p icture. Nevertheless, according to  one source, 
during 1955, mostly during the f irs t  six months o f the year, 30,000 members 
w ithdrew from  collectives in approxim ately equal proportions from  Types I, & II
(44)
and Type III. According to another source, during the f irs t  six or seven
months, while 7-8,000 fam ilies had le ft ,  21-22,000 fam ilies  had jo ined the 
(45)collectives. Contemporary press reports noted tha t between 1st A p ril and
the end o f June, 147 new co llec tive  farm s were form ed and, in the same period,
15,000 new members were added to  to ta l m embership^*^, while another reported
tha t between 1st January and 1st August 30,000 peasants had joined the 
47)collectives.
Be tha t as i t  may, w ithout doubt co llec tiv isa tion  showed very modest 
success during this phase. Indeed, from  the middle o f June to  the beginning o f 
August o ff ic ia l spokesmen public ly voiced th e ir d issatisfaction w ith  the 
'unsatisfactory' progress and even 'stagnation' o f co llec tiv isa tion  on numerous 
occasions.
A ll th is was to  change during August. Rakosi, not content w ith  the very 
modest gains in co llec tiv isa tion  in the, more or less, 'vo luntary ' phase, now 
decided to  step up the ra te  o f co llectiv isa tion . The Po litburo met on 11th 
August and, a fte r condemning the 'lack o f progress', Rakosi to ld  its  members 
that i f  the ra te  o f co llec tiv isa tion  could only be increased by the app lication o f 
adm in istra tive methods, i.e., by coercion, tha t wuld be a 'lesser ev il'. He hinted 
that 'when someone was called in to  pay taxes tha t could not be regarded as an 
adm in istra tive m e th o d '/ ^  Henceforth, the 'vo luntary princ ip le ' was thrown 
overboard and a new vigorous co llectiv isa tion  policy inaugurated w ith  im m ediate 
e ffe c t. During the f ir s t  20 days o f August, i t  was reported, 5,000 new members 
were added to  to ta l membership, to  bring the to ta l increase, between 1st 
January and 21st August, to  35,000; during the same period, 156 new Type III
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C ollective  Farms, as well as 66 Types I and II farm s, were form ed and about 20-
25 new co llec tive  villages were created, i.e., where 50-80 per cent o f the local
(49)population or arable land area was in the co llec tive  sector.
The pressure fo r co llectiv isa tion  was fu rth e r increased by a Politburo 
meeting on 31st August, which passed a resolution oblig ing party and state 
organisations 'to  double th e ir e ffo rts ' in co llec tiv isa tion . The resolution pointed 
out tha t prevailing conditions perm itted a 'great leap forw ard ' and stated tha t it  
was desirable to  achieve the goal o f co llec tiv isa tion  set fo r the end o f 1955 by
the end o f September, in order tha t communal work could then begin during the
(50)autumn.
Why this sudden change in policy in August? It  would appear tha t, apart 
from  Rakosi's growing impatience w ith  the slow progress, there were two 
fundamental, objective, reasons fo r  the dram atic  increase in the ra te  of 
co llectiv isa tion . F irs t, by August i t  had become known tha t, because o f the good 
weather, the 1955 harvest was excellent; th is prompted Rakosi to  believe th a t a
much higher ra te  was possible w ithout the d iff ic u ltie s  he had to  face during
(51)1952/53. Second, fo r the f irs t  tim e, the average crop yields on State and
C o llective  Farms exceeded those on individual farm s; th is brought the question
of private ownership o f land in to question.
In 1955 (the last fu ll year before the uprising), p a rtly  because o f the good
weather (p len tifu l ra in fa ll), pa rtly  because o f hard work by the peasantry, and
pa rtly  as a result o f Nagy's policies, e ither s t i l l  operating or indeed continued by
his successor, e.g., investment, incentives, ag ricu ltu ra l production developed
favourably. The fa c t tha t some 1,500 ra il wagons o f qua lity  seed went in to  the
(52)soil also contributed to  the good harvest results. The levels o f ag ricu ltu ra l 
production in many branches, especially crops, were be tte r than at any tim e  
since 1945 (including 1951) and com fortab ly exceeded even the pre-w ar levels: 
compared w ith  1938 and 1949 to ta l, gross and marketed ag ricu ltu ra l outputs, at
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constant prices, were 108 and 128 and 105 and 127 respective ly (see p.775), while
the increases in to ta l gross and marketed production compared w ith  1954 were
(53)11.5 and 21 per cent respectively. As a result, in 1955 to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l
(54)procurement was more than 28 per cent greater than in 1954 and the
(55)increased crop procurement plan was o ve r-fu lfille d  by 3 per cent. Some
improvement in livestock production, especially pigs and pou ltry , also took place:
the number o f livestock at the end o f 1955 was generally higher than in 1954,
although the number o f cows fa iled  to  grow sa tis fac to rily  (see p.777). The
qua lity  o f livestock raising also showed a slow improvement and yields o f dairy
products increased.
Because of the good harvest and the financia l assistance provided fo r
State and C o llective  Farms, average yields on both s ign ifican tly  improved and,
as noted, exceeded those on individual farms fo r the f ir s t  tim e. The
( 56)development o f yields in 1955 is shown in Table 11.2:
Table 11.2 Development of average yields in 1955 for selected products
Average yields o f 1955 as 
percentage o f years
Crop 1931-1940 1954
Wheat 113.9 132.4 138.1 119.0
Rye 107.7 118.6 137.3 125.4
Autumn barley 151.2 158.6 120.3 1 1 0 .2
I W e  f
I t  should, however, be noted tha t although yields on co llectives were be tte r than 
those on individual farm s fo r most crops, th e ir to ta l gross and marketed 
production and procurements per unit of arable land were s t i l l  below those of
Average yields o f
S.F C.F.
as 96 o f ind iv idual 
farm s
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individual farms. This was so fo r several reasons: f irs t,  th e ir  re la tiv e ly  lower
share in intensive branches o f production such as ho rticu ltu re  and th e ir
backwardness in livestock raising and m arketing etc.; second, th e ir  s t i l l
(57)re la tive ly  low leve l o f mechanisation and continuing labour shortage; th ird ,
the low level o f techn ica l education o f th e ir management personnel in 1955, fo r
example, only 157 persons completed the 10 month chairman's course and 423 the 
(58)accountant's course. Many chairmen and top managers on co llec tive  farm s 
lacked any appropriate qua lifica tion  and many managerial posts remained 
unfilled . The d is tribu tion  o f management by level o f tra in ing, in 1955 is shown in 
Table 11.3:(59)
Table 11.3 - The distribution of Collective Farm managers by level of 
professional training in 1955
number w ith  number
w ithout
Name U niversity Secondary Elem entary professional T o ta l
tra in ing
tra in ing
Chairmen 40 636 899 2184 3759
Agronomists^3) 49 142 77 33 301
Accountants 28 314 1791 1442 3635
Brigade Leaders 4 83 1361 3515 4963
(a) members and employees 
-WpiM/cg rv\ . SrR }
Finally, concerning procurements, the lower level per un it o f arable land was 
because of th e ir lower delivery obligations and the fa c t tha t increasingly a la rger 
proportion o f the labour-day payment (munkaegyseg) was made in kind to  th e ir 
members, e.g., in 1955 71.5 per cent o f each labour-day un it worked was paid in 
kind.<60>
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In 1955 to ta l industria l production, at 1954 prices, was also 9.6 per cent 
(611more than in 1954, despite the fa c t tha t o n e -fifth  o f industria l enterprises
(62)
fa iled  to  fu l f i l  the ir plans. The increase was aided by a 1.9 per cent increase 
in the size o f the workforce and the increased share o f investm ent projects 
completed - most o f which were stopped under Nagy. More im portan t, however, 
was the improvement in labour discipline and p roduc tiv ity  under the new 
p o lit ic a l c lim ate  and the reorganisation and tigh ten ing  o f ’slackened* norms. 
Q ua lity  and choice, however, did not im p r o v e / ^  Because o f the appreciable 
increase in industria l and ag ricu ltu ra l prodcution National Income rose by 8.9 per
//?C\
cent compared w ith  1954. A t the same tim e, he growth o f consumption, or
ra the r real wages and real incomes, slowed down: while in 1953 and 1954 per
capita  to ta l consumption increased by 9 and 7 per cent respective ly, in 1955 the
(66)increase was only 3 per cent. Compared w ith  1949 the index o f rea l wages o f
workers and employees was 106 in 1955 while the increase, compared w ith  1954, 
(67)was 3.5 per cent. The slow down in the increase in real wages o f workers and
employees was pa rtly  due to  the reorganisation and tigh ten ing  o f norms and
other measures which a ffe c td  a ll s tra ta  o f the population, e.g., pension
contributions increased from  one to  three per cent -  which alone resulted in a
(68)700 m ill. Forin ts reduction in to ta l net earnings; and, a fte r  tw o  years o f 
cessation, the subscription rates fo r  ’Peace Loans' were increased. There were 
also increased taxes fo r  childless couples, s tr ic te r  conditions fo r  c la im ing 
sickness benefit and disguised price increases, a ll o f which in one way or another 
a ffec ted  real wages.
Because of the excellent harvest, and the incentives o ffe red  to  the 
peasants to  sell on the free market a fte r compulsory deliveries had been made, 
the real incomes o f the peasantry, despite increased compulsory de liveries and 
tax  burdens, developed more favourably than planned and s ig n ifica n tly  exceeded 
those o f industria l workers: compared w ith  1949 the peasants' rea l income and
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consumption in 1955 were 18 and 25 per cent higher respective ly, and 8 per cent
higher than in 1 9 5 4 .^ ^  According to  la te r calculations the increase in the
purchasing power o f the peasantry in 1955, at 2,300 m ill. Forin ts, was the
h ighest^*^ in any year ' t i l l  then, and the peak in the rea l incomes and
consumption o f the peasantry was reached in 1955 ra ther than 1954, as had o ften
(71)been suggested earlie r. I t  should, however, be noted tha t the increase, i f
any, in the real incomes of many poor peasants, who a fte r fu lf i l l in g  compulsory
deliveries were le ft  w ith  no surplus to  sell on the free m arket (or only i f  they
reduced the ir own consumption) was cons ide rab ly  less. The good harvest results
also benefitted the incomes o f co llec tive  farm s and the ir members: while the
value o f one labour-day un it (munkaegyseg) in 1954 was 25.71 Forin ts, th is
increased in 1955 to  31.93 Forints. Furtherm ore, the proportion o f co llec tive
farm s which closed the economic year w ith  a d e fic it declined from  58 per cent in
1954 to  21 per cent in 1955; the to ta l d e fic it  was reduced from  300 m ill. Forin ts
to  128 m ill. Forints w ith in  the y e a r .^ ^
Thus, i t  can be seen tha t, in the sphere o f incomes the benefic ia l
influence o f the post-1953 measures continued to  make its e lf fe lt .  That an even
more dynamic increase in real incomes did not occur was due to  the marked
extension in the compulsory delivery system and in the tax burden levied on the
peasantry in 1955. W ith regard to  the form er, while the rates o f compulsory
(73)de livery quotas established in 1954 remained unaltered fo r 1955 , a number o f
products, above those stipulated by the basic compulsory de live ry  regulations -
which the state orig ina lly  intended to  purchase on the free m arket -w ere brought
under the umbrella o f compulsory deliveries, fo r both co llec tive  and individual
farm ers, thereby v io la ting  the compulsory de livery regulations which were
supposed to  have been established fo r  several years in advance. From now on, the
(74)delivery obligations levied on the peasantry were made up o f three parts:
i) tax in kind -  fo r which the peasants received no compensatory payment;
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ii) basic compulsory de livery obligation, la id  down in the orig ina l regulation
- fo r which the peasants received low, 'nominal' compulsory de live ry  
prices;
ii i)  extended compulsory obligation newly prescribed by the 1955 regulations
- fo r  which the peasants received 'free ' state procurement prices.
The last, while generally not as disadvantageous to  the peasants as the basic
compulsory deliveries, created resitance and a fee ling  o f anim osity towards the
regime among the peasants and adversely a ffec ted  the party  and state
authorities' re lations in the countryside, not only because i t  meant an increase in
compulsory deliveries, but also bcause o f the regime's breach o f promise. I t  also,
o f course, adversely a ffected  the peasantry's income and resulted in the renewed
decline o f the free market too. The reason behind this, it  was o ff ic ia lly
explained, was the rap id ly accum ulating fore ign debt, and an e ffo r t  to  try  to
(75)increase the exports o f agricu ltu ra l products.
In 1955 the regime also increased the level o f taxation on the peasantry -
although even w ith  the increase the taxa tion  o f the ru ra l population did not
reach the pre-June 1953 level. In 1954, out o f the to ta l 3,550 m ill. Forin ts levied
on the population as a whole, the share o f ru ra l money taxes was 2,194 m ill.
(76)Forints and the tax-in -k ind  amounted to a value o f 240 m ill. Forin ts. The
actual amount o f money taxes collected by the state from  the ru ra l population in
1954 ws 2,108 m ill. Forints in money taxes and 200 m ill. Forin ts in tax-in -k ind ,
leaving arrears to  the tune o f 86 m ill. Forin ts o f money taxes and 40 m ill.
Forints o f tax -in -k ind  respectively. A t the same tim e, the regime co llected  150
m ill. Forin ts through the compulsory insurance system against f ire  and damage 
. (77)by hail. In 1955 the government incresed ru ra l money taxes by 143 m ill.
Forints, to  a to ta l o f 2,337 m ill. Forin ts and levied an additional 240 m ill. Forin ts
of tax-in -k ind , making the grand to ta l ru ra l taxa tion  o f 2,550 m ill. Forin ts. In
addition, the decree on taxes also stipulated tha t 250 m ill. Forin ts out o f the
(78)to ta l debt arrears o f the ru ra l population would have to be co llected in 1955.
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(79)Besides taxes, a large proportion o f the debts, 319 m ill. Forin ts , represented 
redemption loan-debts incurred by the peasants in respect o f land received under 
the Land Reform  o f 1945. Because o f the hardships o f ensuing years many 
peasants, especially the poorer peasants, were e ither unable 'to  redeem’ or paid 
o ff  th is loan only in part. Now, in its  a ttem m pt to  speed up the process o f 
co llec tiv isa tion , the regime used this un-paid debt as a lever against peasants 
who resisted the pressure to  jo in  the co llectives by demanding payment in fu ll 
from  those who were outside, while suspending payment by those who were, and 
remained, in the collectivesed sector.
In August 1955, largely, as noted earlie r, in response to  the good harvest 
results, the programme of co llectiv isa tion , and the pressure on peasants to  enter 
the collectives, were stepped up again using the old methods which were so 
fa m ilia r  during the co llec tiv isa tion  drive o f 1951/2. While in August there were 
s t i l l  many o ff ic ia l complaints about the slowness o f co llec tiv isa tion , by the 
autumn a ll these complaints had died away. The peak of th is new wave in 
co llec tiv isa tion  was in September-October and i t  lasted, w ith  d im inish ing results, 
u n til about the spring o f 1956. During th is period the anguished peasants once 
again became the subject o f harassment, confiscation and impossible demands.
While u n til August, under the 'vo luntary stage', some adm in is tra tive  
measures were used in establishing co llectives, e.g., making w ithdrawals from  
collectives more d if f ic u lt ,  by the occasional, and ra ther moderate commassation 
and ag ita tion  against small tenant farm ers (leasing land from  the State Land 
Reserve Fund) (kishaszonberlet), making property rights more and more insecure 
and increasing the general level o f economic burden on the individual peasants 
(though th is was more bearable because o f the good harvest), the s itua tion  in 
respect o f a ll these and other devices worsened considerably during September 
and October. As before the ch ief methods o f ge tting  the peasants to  enter the 
co llectives continued to  be:
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i) economic and financ ia l support fo r collectives,
ii) social benefits fo r members o f co llec tive  farms,
ii i)  po litica l, social and economic pressure on individual peasants
A decree published on 30th Ju ly announced tha t co llec tive  farm s would be
specially favoured in receiving supplies o f seed-grain, gra ftings, insecticides,
sm all machinery and other equipment, in conclusion o f contracts fo r  breeding
and fa tten ing  o f livestock, and in the extension o f loans /® ^ In s im ila r fashion it
was promised tha t members o f co llectives were to  receive priv ileges in free
medical trea tm ent, fa m ily  allowances, m ate rn ity  benefits, pensions, tax  re lie f
(81)and reduced delvery quotas on the produce from  private  household plots.
I t  has been suggested tha t peasants might have been a ttrac ted  by the
improved results o f some collectives, and also encouraged by some of the
concessions, e.g. by the reduction in delivery quotas despite the good harvest, in
th e ir  decision to enter the co llective . There is no evidence to  support this.
N e ither contemporary press nor in te rna l party reports ever indicated (or
exploited) such cases. C learly, i t  was the widespread u tilisa tio n  o f
adm in istra tive measures which played the cruc ia l role in fo rc ing  the peasants
in to  the co lle c tive s /® ^
The a ttack on the peasants, as before, was accompanied by heavy-handed
agita tion  and propaganda campaigns. Since local members o f co llectives
generally refused to  partic ipa te , o ffic ia ls  from  outside areas were brought in fo r
(83)the purpose o f ag ita tion. Sone 1,200 'people educators’, ’experienced’ party 
and fa c to ry  workers ’capable o f exercising leadership' were reported to  have 
been sent by the regime to  the countryside to  strengthen and help the 
co llec tiv isa tion  campaign -  one-th ird  to  MTSs and State F a rm s /® ^  In many 
d is tr ic ts  and villages these agita tors v io lated the law, using excessive pressures, 
even te rro r, against working peasants who refused to  give up th e ir  land 
'vo lun ta rily ' and jo in the co llective . It  would appear from  the available evidence 
tha t, in some instances, party functionaries who b la ten tly  v io la ted the law, e.g.,
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the use o f actual physical violence, were brought before the courts, some even
expelled from  the party, but generally party  and government au thorities  closed
(85)the ir eyes to  ’m ilder’ form s of coercion.
The two perhaps most e ffe c tive  and speediest ways to  fa c il ita te  the 
extension o f the co llectiv ised sector were through the a tta ck  on sm all tenant 
farm ing (kishaszonberlet) and the re in troduction  o f commassation o f land. 
Regarding the f irs t,  adm in istra tive  authorities began to  dishonour con tractua l 
arrangements valid fo r several years ahead and give notice to  peasants to  qu it 
the land they leased from  the State Land Reserve Fund. In 1955 th is  measure 
alone resulted in 500,000 cad. yokes addition to  the co llectiv ised land area; but 
only a m ino rity  o f these small tenant farm ers actua lly  became members o f the 
co lle c tive s /**^
The June 1955 Resolution had reintroduced the special, and w ithout
question the most e ffe c tive  adm in istra tive  weapon o f harassing the individual
peasants and com piling them to enter the co llec tive  farm s, namely, 'p a rtia l and
general commassation o f land’ (reszleges es altalanos tagositas), i.e., to
consolidate the holdings o f state and co llec tive  farm s by regrouping th e ir  land
into one piece. Since general commassation o f land was, at least th e o re tica lly ,
perm itted in loca lities  where 80-90 per cent o f the peasants had jo ined the
co llective , while p a rtia l commassation o f land could be carried out w ithou t any
lim ita tio n  - hence giving organisers o f co llectives more fa r-reach ing  powers -the
(87)la tte r  was considerably more w idely used, and abused, than the fo rm er. On
31st August the Politburo designated 200 villages where general, and 200
colectives wehre p a rtia l commassation o f land were to  be carried out, w ith in
(88)specified dates, by the end of the summer. ' In 1955 the leve l o f 
commassations was the same as during the early 1950s: the 1955 commassation 
d ire c tly  a ffec ted  97 working peasants in each lo ca lity  on average, which 
corresponded to  the average number o f peasants a ffec ted  by commassations
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during the early 1950s. There was, however, a s ign ifican t d iffe rence  compared
w ith  previous years. Since the number o f rich  peasants decreased s ign ifican tly
over the period, which is confirm ed by the fa c t tha t only 4-5 r ich e r peasants
were d ire c tly  a ffected  in each lo ca lity , the reason d 'e tre o f commassations, i.e.,
the a lterna tives o f accepting in fe r io r qua lity  land in exchange or jo in ing  the
(89)collectives, were much less concealed now than during the early 1950s. As
before, commassations, the absence o f proper compensation, g rea tly  reduced the
willingness o f the individual peasant to  p r o d u c e /^  Moreover, because o f the
threat o f commassations the individual peasant was not only unw illing  to  make
investments but was also re luctan t to use the necessary quantity  o f fe r t il iz e rs  on
(91)his land, w ith  adverse e ffec ts  on p roduc tiv ity , yields, etc. The 1955
commassations, o f course, came too la te  to  have an e ffe c t on the 1955
production results; the ir adverse e ffe c t was to  be fe lt  the next year.
Among methods used to  force peasants in to  co llectives was an arsenal o f
other a rb itra ry  and 'Draconian' adm in istra tive  measures -  called fo r  by Rakosi
during the summer - which were applied against peasants who fa ile d  to  f u l f i l
(92)sowing plans, the new de livery quotas or other obligations. The most b ru ta l
method, perhaps, ws the so-called 'transfe r' (transzferalas) o f peasants, when,
because o f tax or delivery arrears, peasants 'w ithou t any advance notice ', were
fo rc ib ly  moved out o f th e ir own homes and land and 'transferred ' to  other parts 
(93)o f the country. And often, i f  no 'reason' at a ll could be found, peasants who 
were most highly respected in th e ir own villages were sim ply singled out and 
harassed u n til they agreed to  jo in  the co llec tive . S im ilar measures had been 
taken against the b e tte r-o ff peasants and the 'kulaks'. Since the number o f 
kulaks had fa llen  over the years, the attacks were now on 'kulaks and b e tte r-o ff 
peasants’. And in many ways it  was like  the 'old days' again. In the summer o f 
1955 the Rakosi regime ta c it ly  re instated the infamous 'kulak l is t ' /® ^  The fig h t 
against kulaks -  or ra ther 'rich  peasants' as they were re fe rred  to  in a w ider
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sense -  had been revived, in the sp irit o f 'sharpening class struggle '. They were
denounced as the only people who opposed the goverment's po licy o f developing
collectives, and who were even encouraged by 'treacherous emigres' in the 
(9 5 )
West. In villages where a general commassation programme had been carried
out they were ordered, w ithout fu rth e r ado, to  leave th e ir land by a set date, as
it  was designated to  become C o llective  or State Farm l a n d / ^  D is tr ic t and
village party and government authorities were instructed to  take resolute action
against the class enemy's anti-kolkhoz a c tiv itie s , and to  prevent 'kulaks' and
(9 7 )
other class-alien elements from  in fi lt ra t in g  the collectives.
The early results o f the autumn co llec tiv isa tion  campaign were 
encouraging fo r the regime. During September and October the organisation o f 
collectives moved from  the counties in the Trans-Tisza region (i.e., eastern 
Hungary, w ith  many poor peasants a hotbed o f radicalism ) to  the Trans-Danubian 
region (i.e., western Hungary, a stronghold o f sm all and medium peasants). 
W ithin one week in September, in the county o f Somogy, 985 new members
(98)
entered the collectives and in the counties o f Somogy, Komarom and Fejer,
(9 9 )
28 new 'Cooperative Villages' were inaugurated, while in the counties o f Vas 
and Zala, i t  was reported, Cooperative Villages were inaugurated, 'one a fte r  
another, by the d o z e n '. ^ ^  Since the aim o f the regime was the exclusive 
prom oting o f the development o f the higher, Type III, co llectives (i.e. kolkhozes) 
the peasants were mostly organised in to existing co llectives. In many instances 
even lower, Types I and II, co llectives were fo rc ib ly  'reorganised' in to  the higher 
type: the number o f Type III co llectives increased by 21 per cent, while the 
number o f Types I & II declined by 17 per c e n t . ^ ^
By November 1955, the ta rge t set by the Politburo fo r  the acreage 
collectiv ised had been ove rfu lfille d  by 40,000 cad. yokes, and membership, too, 
increased by more than planned: during the second ha lf o f 1955 the to ta l number 
of collectives increased by about 450, 67,000 fam ilies entered c o l le c t iv e s ^ ^
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and to ta l membership grew by almost 7 6 ,O O o /*^  A t the same tim e, 219 new 
’Cooperative Villages’ were c r e a t e d / * ^  The m a jo rity  o f fam ilies  had entered 
the co llectives during the autumn campaign -  in September alone some 20,518 
fam ilies had jo in e d / * ^  Encouraged by these early results, the leadership 
decided at the C entra l Com m ittee m eeting in November 1955 to  keep up the 
campaign and make co llec tiv isa tion  a 'permanent t a s k ' / * ^  Thus, ag ita tion, 
propaganda and coercion continued during the f irs t  months o f 1956 and by the 
end o f February 1956 a fu rth e r 21,000 peasants had been forced in to  the 
c o l le c t iv e s / * ^
During these months, many, especially, the poor peasants gave up th e ir  
land ra ther than a ttem pt to  fig h t against the pressure. Some were sim ply 
re jo in ing collectives. Most o f those entering fo r  the f irs t  tim e  were poor 
peasants w ith  a few acres o f land: the average area per member brought in to  the 
co llectives in 1955 was 4.4 cad. yokes; by 1956, however, th is figu re  declined to  
3.6 cad. y o k e s / * ^  There were counties, however, where the average was 
considerably less, hardly more than the size o f th e ir p riva te  household plots. 
Despite the regime's increasing use o f force, especially in the Trans-Danubian 
region o f the country -  ignoring the ea rlie r promises not to repeat the mistakes 
of the pre-1953 era - its  aim regarding the middle peasants was not achieved. 
Contrary to the party's expectations, the middle peasant once again proved the 
most resistant to  o ff ic ia l policy. This is confirm ed by the fa c t tha t the 
proportion o f middle peasants in co llectives, i.e., farm ers w ith  more than 7 cad. 
yokes, declined from  28 per cent at the end o f 1954 to  27.1 per cent by the end 
o f 1 9 5 5 / * ^  The small number o f middle peasants who entered were in places 
where new co llectives were formed, or where the pressure o f 'general' or 'p a rtia l' 
commassation in th e ir villages forced them to  jo in /* * * ^  Indeed, the 
predominance o f poor peasants entering the collectives cauesd some concern 
w ith in  the party's leadership. This is indicated by the fac t tha t Rakosi raised
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th is issue at the Politburo m eeting on 1st December 1955, pondering what was to 
happen when ’we gradually run out o f poor peasants’. Then, he declared, 'we shall 
have to  move w ith  force against the middle peasants’, and he designated the use 
o f commassations as the main weapon against t h e m . ^ ^
Although the num erical results o f the autumn co llec tiv isa tion  campaign, 
and selective economic indicators such as yields, may have looked favourable, 
the re a lity  inside many co llectives looked d rastica lly  d iffe re n t. Even more 
d if f ic u lt  than fo rc ing  the peasants in to  the collectives was ge tting  the 
co llectives to function properly. A lthough the peasants in it ia lly  gave in to 
pressure, a large percentage o f the 450 newly form ed collectives existed only 'on 
paper’, as nominal groupings, where labour discipline was extrem ely slack and 
communal work never rea lly  b e g a n .^ *^  By la te 1955 there were already signs 
tha t in many collectives, where there was o ften not even work fo r the newly 
recru ited  members -  pa rtly  because o f organisational problems and pa rtly  
because o f lack o f resources fo r investment -  they became disillusioned and 
demoralised, and e ither seldom showed up fo r  work or simply began to  d r if t  away 
from  the co llectives a g a in /* * ^  This was despite the decree provision tha t 
membership was compulsory fo r at least three years. Members who le f t  a fte r 
tha t period were not en titled  to receive the same land they had brought in, but 
were to  be compensted w ith  land o f 'equal value' elsewhere in the v illage, so as 
not to  break up the co llec tive  f i e l d s / * ^  A t th is stage, th is 'd r if t in g ' was on a 
small scale but i t  became considerably more serious by the spring o f 1956. 
Nevertheless, the alarm was raised at the Politburo meeting on 1st December 
1955, which demanded tha t
e ffo rts  must be made to  ensure tha t co llectives begin to 
carry on w ith  co llec tive  work, otherwise the entire  system 
w ill d is integrate ... we must not allow m atters to reach the 
stage when the situation o f 1953 (i.e., dissolutions) is 
repeated.(115)
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Another problem giving some concern to  the regime was tha t when they entered 
the co llec tive  the m a jo rity  o f peasants kept back more animals and equipments 
fo r th e ir 'oversized' priva te  household plots than was o ff ic ia lly  perm itted . Apart 
from  natural resistance on the part o f the peasants, there were two main 
objective reasons fo r th e ir  re luctance: f ir s t  because many collectivees did not 
have the financ ia l resources to  pay fo r th e n /11^  and, second, the peasants kept 
'postponing' handing them over because of lack o f fodder to  feed them and lack 
of s ta b lin g /11*^ The regime had passed several decrees, in fa c t, regarding the 
terms of payment to be made to  peasants contribu ting  livestock and equipment 
to the co llec tive  when they joined. Such payments were, o f course, always 
obligatory but more o ften  than not, in practice, no such payments were made. 
This policy increased the resistance o f the middle peasants in pa rticu la r. In an 
attem pt to  end these abuses by regulating the tim e and term s o f payment, a 
M in istry  o f A g ricu ltu re  decree in September 1955 specified tha t 25 per cent o f 
the sum to  be paid to  members would have to  be put in the co llectives ' 'reserve 
fund' and 75 per cent had to  be paid to  the con tribu ting  members, in four equal 
yearly in s ta lm e n ts /11^  To fa c ilita te  this, c red it was made available fo r the 
collectives. A large percentage o f the newly form ed co llectives which decided 
to take on the cred it com mitm ents, however, rap id ly became heavily 
in deb ted /11^  It was, then, not surprising tha t by early 1956 reports were 
flooding in noting tha t newly form ed collectives were unable to  meet th e ir  
delivery obligations, and tha t th e ir production and income prospects were g iving 
cause fo r serious concern. Yet, the ideological prejudice o f the regim e against 
measures introduced by Nagy during the 'New Course' was c learly  demonstrated 
when the Politburo, on 18th January 1956, introduced two new measures which 
adversely a ffected  the operational prospects o f co llectives even fu rth e r; f irs t,  i t  
revoked the 1953 concession, cancelling de livery arrears accumulated before 
1953 - henceforth, part o f the arrears could be suspended only on condition tha t
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the co llec tive  fu lf il le d  its  de livery obligations to  the state in the coming years in 
fu ll, and, second, c red it debts, also suspended in 1953, had to  be repaid: in 1956 
th is amounted to  almost 444 m ill. F o r in t s . ^ ^  I t  is not known how much o f th is 
debt was in the event discharged, but considering the poorer 1956 harvest i t  
represented a s ign ifican t burden and depressed the mood o f co llec tive  members 
even fu rthe r.
The peasants’ resistance to  co llec tiv isa tion  can, also, be seen in th e ir
a ttitudes towards priva te  p lot farm ing. C ritic ism s o f 'overconcentra tion ' on
private  plots continued throughout 1955. P rivate plots were enlarged fa r beyond
what was o ffic a lly  perm itted  under the laws. In response to an ea rlie r Council o f
M inisters resolution, a decree was issued by the M in ister o f A g ricu ltu re  provid ing
tha t co llec tive  members had to  transfe r to  the co llective  a ll personally farm ed
land in excess o f a one cad. yoke priva te  p l o t . ^ ^  Members were allowed to
keep one priva te  cow, any others had to  be sold. The co llec tive , i t  was
stipulated, had the f irs t  option on purchasing this excess livestock, and i f  i t  did
not choose to  buy i t  the fa rm er had to  sell i t  elsewhere and surrender 20-35 per
cent o f the selling price to  the co llec tive . Those who fa iled  to  com ply w ith  the
regulation lim itin g  private p lo t sizes and livestock numbers were set compulsory
delivery quotas on a ll the land they farm ed at the assessment ra te  fo r  individual
(122)farm ers, and these quotas were made re troac tive  to  1954. Despite these
stringent regulations, concern w ith  the ’unhealthy grow th ’ o f p riva te  plots and
excess livestock continued and there were frequent calls to  con tro l the s ituation.
On 7th May 1955 Ferenc Erdei revealed tha t already 25,000 cad. yokes more land
was in co llec tive  priva te  plots than perm itted ; the figure continued to  grow 
(123)during 1955. The farm  and priva te  p lo t concessions granted by Nagy in 1953 
created a reaction among the peasant population which could not be e ffe c tiv e ly  
contro lled and ind irec tly  contributed to  the disorganisation o f the co lle c tive  
sector. Complaints about co llec tive  members who t ille d  th e ir  land ille g a lly  and
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were preoccupied w ith  p riva te  livestock instead o f working on the co llective  
were abundant throughout 1055. In some instances members only v is ited the 
C o llective  Farm when they had to  borrow a team of horses fo r th e ir private 
p lots.(124)
The widespread use o f coercion to  force the peasants in to  collectives, 
however, achieved the exact opposite o f what was intended. By the end o f 1955 
peasant a ttitudes towards co llec tiv isa tion  began to  harden. The use o f force also 
weakened the party ’s position in ru ra l areas even fu rthe r. Moreover, it  
generated a high degree o f ’unease’ and ’uncerta in ty ', not only among the ranks o f 
the ru ra l party, but also among C entra l Com m ittee members. But in a speech to 
the Budapest Party Academy in la te  autumn, Rakosi defended his policy, 
declaring that ’one can only learn to swim in w ater’. ^ ^  In other words, only 
inside the co llec tive  could the peasant ’learn' to  become a convinced co llec tive  
farm er. And f irs t  he had to  be made to  jo in  the co llec tive . Rakosi's declaration, 
however, fa iled  to  dispel the growing doubts o f many ru ra l party  members, 
especially those who were called upon to  apply the coercive measures. By the 
end o f 1955 there were already signs tha t the ru ra l party a c tiv  was beginning to  
’lose fa ith ' in the effectiveness, and even the correctness, o f the methods used; 
many became cynical and hesitant i f  th is was indeed the 'only co rrect method to
/ I  o c \
co llectiv ise '. And th is was sensed by the peasants, who responded by
progressively increased resistance to  co llec tiv isa tion . W ith great astuteness 
they perceived the opportunities presented by the s ituation and fought back in 
every way they could: by ’d r if t in g ' out or w ithdraw ing from  the co llectives, 
working on th e ir p riva te  plots, and seldom showing up fo r work in the co llec tive , 
w ithholding th e ir production and refusing to  deliver food fo r the c ities .
The problems o f growing peasant resistance and the prospects o f the 
polarisation o f organised 'peasant un ity ’ were used by Rakosi as a p re tex t to  
abandon the organisation o f the P a tr io tic  People's Front (Hazafias N epfron t),
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which had created so much tension between him  and Nagy a year before. To 
reduce the im portance o f the movement in the c ities  presented no great 
d iff ic u ltie s , since i t  was su ffic ien t not to  develop i t  fu rth e r or m erely to 
maintain fo rm a l re la tions between the mass organisations (tomegszervezetek) 
and people's fro n t com m ittees (nepfrontbizottsagok) a ffilia te d  to  the P a tr io tic  
People's Front (PPF). The s ituation was considerably more com plicated, 
however, in the villages, where farm ers' c irc les (gazdakor) and other clubs, e.g., 
reading clubs (olvasoegyesiilet) had been established by the PPF w ith in  its 
organisational s tructure . These farm ers' c irc les played an im portant part in 
rura l life , in fa c t, in the pre-communist era. During the f irs t  period of 
co llectiv isa tion , 1948-1949, they were dissolved on the grounds tha t they were 
ra lly ing  points fo r 'enemies o f co llec tiv isa tion ' and a ll th e ir property and funds 
were confiscated. W ith the establishment o f the PPF the Nagy regime revived 
these farm ers' c ircles, and the ir property had been returned, apparently as part 
o f the regime's a ttem pt to  broaden its base o f popular support. In addition, i t  
was probably hoped tha t the m ingling o f individual and co llec tive  peasants would 
weaken the re luctance o f the fo rm er to  co llectiv ise . There were, however, a 
number o f press complaints tha t individual farm ers in the c irc les o ften  refused 
to  adm it co llec tive  farm ers in to  th e ir groups. Because these branch 
organisations form ed an in tegra l part o f the PPF, the 'w ithering  away' o f the 
movement in ru ra l areas could only be solved by detaching them from  the PPF or 
banning them altogether. On Rakosi's proposal, taking the f irs t  option, they 
were separated from  the PPF and attached to  local adult educational 
organisations, under m in is te ria l d irection . Rakosi ju s tifie d  his action by 
declaring tha t during the process o f co llec tiv isa tion  the c irc les could develop 
in to centres fo r  peasant resistance.
In the meantime, im portant in terna l and external developments had been 
taking place in the wider p o litica l sphere, which soon culm inated in the h is to ric
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p o lit ic a l cris is o f 1956. The progressive d isa ffection  w ith in  party  c irc les and the
more gradual a rticu la tion  o f popular discontent have been term ed the ’e lite ' and
(128)the 'mass' process respective ly in the genesis o f the 1956 uprising. While
the mass process did not m ateria lise u n til the summer o f 1956 -  a fte r  the im pact
o f the in tra -pa rty  debate and the 20th Soviet Party Congress began to  activa te
the w ider public - d isa ffection  at the top began to  spread much earlie r. While
Rakosi, a fte r his v ic to ry  over Nagy, attem pted to  re-establish 'the cu lt o f
personality ' around him self, slowly but surely, opposition w ith in  and outside the
party  began to  develop against his a ttem pt to restore his fo rm er p o lit ic a l power.
(129)The opposition to the regime had developed through three d is tinc t phases:
the f ir s t  phase began a fte r the Soviet-Yugoslav reconc ilia tion  talks, in 
May-June 1955, by in te llectua ls, ch ie fly  journalists, w rite rs  and other 
party  members had ended, in th e ir defeat, in December 1955;
the second, more s ign ifican t, phase opened w ith  Khrushchev's an ti-S ta lin  
speech at the 20th Soviet Party Congress in February 1956 and closed in 
July 1956 w ith  the removal o f Rakosi;
the th ird  phase o f opposition was directed against his successor, Gero, 
and ended in October in the Hungarian uprising.
Follow ing Nagy's fa ll most o f his adherents, mainly in te llec tua ls  and party 
members -  journalists, w riters, scientists, artis ts , un iversity students, together 
w ith  other in tra -pa rty  opposition groups, fe ll in to  a depressed silence fo r a while. 
These heterogeneous groups may not have had a common cause but they shared a 
deep disappointment and resentment at the fa ilures and crim es o f the 
r e g im e / * ^  They were resentfu l o f those like  Rakosi whose policies they saw as 
an abuse o f th e ir ideals and, above a ll, they were d isaffected because o f the 
recent harsh trea tm ent o f Nagy and the m isrepresentation o f his June po licy as 
'r ig h tis t' an ti-M arx is t deviation by the March 1955 Resolution o f the Cental 
Com m ittee.
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A fte r  his re tu rn  to  power Rakosi moved speedily in the f ir s t  week o f May
to  a fin a l purge o f the rem aining journalists who had favoured Nagy’s position in
October 1 9 5 4 . ^ ^  Some of them were dismissed, some transferred to  lesser
newspapers, some sent abroad as fore ign correspondents; no arrest, however, was
made. F inally, the party 's o ff ic ia l newspaper, Szabad Nep, was ’cleansed' o f
opposition elements and re -s ta ffed  w ith  m ed iocre /com plian t journalists. Rakosi's
seemingly secure position, however, was suddenly and unexpectedly undermimed
by events which revived the 'flagging' sp irit o f Nagy's fo llowers. The most
im portant one was the v is it of Khrushchev and Bulganin to  Yugoslavia between
28th May and 2nd June 1955, to  re-establish re lations w ith  T ito . But beside
Soviet declarations tha t a ll the accusations against Yugoslavia by Stalin when he
expelled Yugoslavia from  the Com inform  in 1948 had been false, T ito  held out
fo r more - he wanted an admissions tha t each country was free to  choose its  own
road to  socialism. And Khrushchev was prepared to  give th is  concession,
including the winding up o f the Cominform  (in the event disbanded in A p ril 1956),
whose main task in the recent past had been anti-Yugoslavia propaganda. The
Soviet-Yugoslav reconcilia tion , and the rehab ilita tion  o f T ito , had seriously
shaken Rakosi's prestige (even in the eyes o f some o f his own fo llowers) and
threatened his position since he, among a ll East European leaders, had been the
leading and most hostile opponent o f T ito  and he had also been personally
responsible fo r the show -tria l and execution o f the alleged 'H ungarian-T ito ist',
Laszlo Rajk, in 1949. His a n ti-T ito is t record suddenly became a great lia b ili ty
fo r him -  i f  T ito  was, a fte r a ll, innocent than Rajk, too would have to  be
rehab ilita ted . In Hungary, however, this Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement was in
no way apparent. On 28th May 1955, the day o f Khrushchev’s declaration in
Belgrade, a meeting o f the communist party group o f the Hungarian State
(132)Publishing House was being held in Budapest. A t th is  meeting, M iklos
Gimes, once the ed ito r o f Magyar Nemzet, stood up and, a fte r  noting tha t
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Hungarian and Soviet policies seemed to  be out o f step, called on the party
leadership to  draw its  conclusions from  the Belgrade declarations and change its
a ttitu de  to  Yugoslavia, urging revision o f the a n ti-T ito is t t r ia l o f Rajk and his
(133)fo llow ers. I t  was c learly  an a ttem pt to  im p lica te  Rakosi in responsib ility  fo r
the faked tr ia l.  Gimes s tirred  up a hornets’ nest. But Rakosi was not w illin g  to
’c lear’ Rajk's name and, o f course, to  adm it his own gu ilt. W ithin a few days
Gimes and others were expelled from  the party, while some o f his less vocal
suppoters at the meeting were severely reprimanded.
A fte r  Khrushchev briefed the Hungarian (and- Czech) leaders in
Bucharest on his way home, a communique was issued which expressed hope tha t
’to  strengthen the cause o f peace and socialism ’ friend ly  re lations would be re-
(134)established w ith  Yugoslavia. On his re turn, Rakosi was s t il l dragging his
fee t in responding to  the new Soviet-Yugoslav l i n e . ^ ^  A t the C entra l
Com m ittee meeting which followed, on 7th-8 th  June, Rakosi m erely ’greeted’
Yugoslavia and promised tha t the 'Hungarian Workers’ Party would work w ith  a ll
its  strength to  improve and deepen good re lations w ith  Yugoslavia’, and did not
raise the a ll im portant issue o f r e h a b i l i ta t io n .^ ^  His grudging concession to
T ito  was the release o f Rajk's w ife , Julia, from  prison in July. For th is T ito
repaid him in a speech at Karlovac on 27th July w ith  an acrimonious
denounciation o f 'certa in ' Hungarian leaders who prevented the resto ra tion  of
good re lations, continued 'th e ir old de trim en ta l polic ies’, and fa iled  to  accept the
responsib ility  fo r the break (w ith  Yugoslavia) and its  consequences (i.e., the
(137)execution o f Rajk and other innocent men).
Thus,
these men have th e ir  hands soaked in blood, have staged 
tria ls , given false in form ation, sentenced innocent men to 
death. They have had Yugoslavia mixed up in a ll these tria ls , 
as in the cae o f the Rajk tr ia l,  and they now find i t  d if f ic u lt  
to  adm it th e ir mistakes before th e ir own people.1(138)
- 885 -
Rakosi's response, and his f irs t  public reference to  the issue, was in his speech at
Csepel on 8th August, in which he s t i l l  fa iled  to  mention the Rajk case (indeed,
he fa iled  to  mention i t  even as la te  as the November C entra l Com m ittee
meeting) but feebly sh ifted the responsib ility fo r  the anti-Yugoslav and a n ti-T ito
campaign o f past years to  his Secret Police Chief, Peter Gabor (already in
prison). In his speech, Rakosi even pretended tha t com plete u n ifo rm ity  of
(139)opinion had been achieved w ith in  the party. For a while the outward
appearance was tha t Rakosi had won the day and succeeded in re-consolidating 
his power. Indeed, the public revision o f the Rajk t r ia l had to  await almost 
another year, when the im pact o f the 20th Soviet Party Congress put the process 
o f his (and others') rehab ilita tion  in to motion. And only months a fte r tha t did 
Hungarian policy towards Yugoslavia begin to  change to some degree.
Failure to  rehab ilita te  Rajk created fu rthe r tensions and played no small
part in even fu rth e r a lienating the in te lligents ia , who became increasingly
restive; i t  also increased d isa ffec tion  even w ith in  leading party  c irc les. The
Rajk case and the rehab ilita tion  o f the v ic tim s o f the show tria ls , however, were
not the only subject o f discontent. Lack o f some degree o f free c r itic ism  in
cu ltu ra l a ffa irs  was another im portant issue throughout the summer, creating
tensions w ith in  in te lle c tua l circles. C onfo rm ity  and sectarianism prevailed, the
party leadership banned the production o f certa in  dramas and the pub lica tion o f
(140)certa in  books. In September 1955 the issue of Irodalm i Ujsag was 
confiscated by the police because it  contained two c r it ic a l pieces o f poetry -  one 
by Laszlo Benjamin, rid icu ling  the 'w r ite r ' M in ister o f Culture , Jozsef Darvas, 
who 'a fte r  lec tu ring  the w rite rs  should h im self show how to  w rite ' and the other, 
by Lajos Konya, h in ting  at the misery o f the peasants brought upon them by the 
ongoing 'land commassation' p o l i c y / * ^
The w riters, already exasperated by the sanctions and prohib itions which 
h it dozens o f novels, plays and poems, reacted w ith  unprecedented te m e rity . The
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seizure o f the journal was the last straw and i t  provided an excellent opportun ity
fo r the d isaffected in te llectua ls  to  launch a broad protest movement against the
restora tion o f Rakosi's fo rm er power and to  resist the loss o f freedom they had
gained under Nagy's more libe ra l cu ltu ra l po licy. Lack o f sa tis facto ry  response
from  the authorities, a fte r o ff ic ia l protest, and the subseqent dismissal o f the
'offending' ch ie f ed ito r, on charges o f publishing 'an ti-pa rty  w ritings ' exacerbated
the s itua tion  even fu rth e r and spurred the in te llectua ls  in to  action o f a more
organised nature. The members o f th  Presidium o f the W riters' Association,
almost a ll o f them party  members, subm itted th e ir resignation en masse. This
was a prelude to an even more daring action. Some weeks la te r, at a m eeting o f
th e ir party ce ll held between 10th-13th November 1955, a d ra ft le tte r, signed by 
(142)59 in te llec tua ls  and artists, which became known as the 'W riters '
Memorandum', was read, and a fte r i t  was overwhelm ingly endorsed (by 200 votes 
to  6, in the presence o f two Centra l Com m ittee members) i t  was delivered to  the 
party's headquarters on 14th N o v e m b e r ) /* ^  The memorandum, deploring 
censorship and the 'adm in istra tive ' and 'despotic' methods employed in the whole 
of the regime's cu ltu ra l policy, declared tha t the in te llectua ls  and a rtis ts  had had 
enough and asked fo r greater freedom fo r  crea tive  a rtis ts  to  pursue th e ir  work 
unhindered.
The significance o f the document was not p rim arily  in the content but in 
the deed. Insofar as the content was concerned it  was a ra ther cautious protest, 
wrapped in communist jargon, against a displeasing cu ltu ra l policy o f the party. 
Everyone concerned, however, knew tha t i t  was much more than tha t: i t  was a 
denounciation o f the entire  policy o f the party and its  present leadership. And 
although it  did not mention Nagy's name it  was a covert statem ent o f fa ith  in 
Nagy's policies and his 'New Course'. The memorandum created a sensation. 
Next day the whole country had already heard the 'rumours' o f the 're b u ff' Rakosi 
had received from  the w riters. People did not have the te x t, but tha t only made
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i t  more exciting. But Rakosi, not used to  a ffro n t o f such open opposition to  him
and his regime, reacted w ithou t a moment's hesita tion and w ith  unprecedented
pub lic ity . His f irs t  re ta lia tio n  against the w rite rs  was aimed at Nagy. A lthough
Nagy had not been involved in e ither d ra ftin g  or adopting the memorandum,
Rakosi believed (even i f  he had no proof) tha t Nagy must have been aware o f it
or, perhaps, tha t he was even the prim e m otiva tor. He seized the opportun ity
provided by the memorandum to  strike  out against his adversary. Soon a fte r the
memorandum was delivered, on Rakosi's d irec t orders, Nagy was summoned by
the C entra l Contro l Com m ittee (Kozponti Ellenorzo B izottsag) which, a fte r
enumerating the charges against him - his refusal to  make his confession o f error
and his gathering around h im self an an ti-pa rty  group which had become the
(144)'ra lly in g  point o f the enemies o f socialism* -  expelled him from  the party , on
the same line as the March and A p ril 1955 Resolutions, fo r  'r ig h tis t
deviationism ', fo r 'in com pa tib ility  w ith  the party sp irit' and fo r  diversionary 
(145)a c tiv itie s . The o ff ic ia l confirm ation  o f his expulsion was announced on 3rd
December 1 9 5 5 .^ ^  Nagy, who during the summer was qu ie tly  composing the
p o lit ica l d issertation tha t was intended to  be his ideological 'defence' o f his 'New
(147)Course', was devastated by the expulsion. I t  was apparently a fte r  his
expulsion from  the party tha t the em bittered Nagy added two chapters - one, on 
'E th ics and Morals in Hungarian Public L ife ' and the other on the 'F ive basic 
principles o f in terna tiona l re lations and the question o f our fore ign po licy ' - to 
his p o lit ic a l testim ony in December and January 1956 conta in ing harsh 
condemnation o f the prevailing orthodoxy and cautious c ritic ism s o f Soviet 
in terference in Hungary's p o lit ica l life  and thereby 'se tting foo t on the road to  
D a m a s c u s '/* ^
Having silenced the journalists and had Nagy expelled from  the party, 
Rakosi was ready to  move against the rebellious w rite rs . They were f irs t  
summoned to  a large meeting (attended by some 2000 functionaries) o f the
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Budapest Party A c tiv is ts  held, on Rakosi’s in it ia tiv e , on 6th December in the
build ing o f the ’Iron and Steel Workers’ Trade Union' (in the same hall in which
Rajk and his friends had been sentenced to  death). Here, in a storm y meeting,
(149)which was described as having had the atmosphere o f a lynch t r ia l , they 
were pub lic ly  denounced. A Centra l Com m ittee Resolution was read out 
condeming the w rite rs  because they had:
launched an a ttack  on the leaders o f the party and the state,
organised a fac tion  to  propogate th e ir bourgeoise p o lit ic a l and lite ra ry  
ideas, and
instigated the critic ism s o f the March 1955 Resolution o f the Centra l 
C om m ittee
The te x t o f the Resolution was apparently drawn up w ithout the knowledge of 
the Cental Com m ittee, whose members were supposed to  sign it ,  and numerous 
signatures were in fa c t missing, although the Resolution was said to  have been 
'passed u n a n im o u s ly '.^ ^  This was a clear confirm ation  tha t even the Centra l 
Com m ittee was divided on the question o f how the case o f Nagy should be 
handled; how he was expelled from  the party. Many members o f the C entra l 
Com m ittee sympathised s ilen tly  w ith  the w rite rs ' resistance and believed tha t it  
was incorrect to  represent Nagy's June policy as 'r ig h tis t' but were too a fra id  to 
oppose Rakosi openly. The existence o f 's ilent sympathy' was revealed by Rakosi 
him self when, in his report to  the Politburo meeting in December on the work o f 
the Centra l Com m ittee meeting in November, he complained th a t although the 
meeting had resolved the basic tasks i t  had set out to  discharge successfully, i t  
must nevertheless be noted that:
there are signs, and we must not gloss over them, tha t 
several comrades at the meeting did not en tire ly  agree w ith  
the March 1955 Resolution o f the C entra l Com m ittee, nor 
w ith  the party's present policy, but did not dare to say so, and
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remained silent. This state o f a ffa irs  cannot be maintained 
fo r  long.(151)
He recommended tha t the way out o f th is undesirable situation lay in increased 
struggle against the 'r ig h tis t’ m anifestations.
A fte r  the meeting the promoters o f the memorandum were summoned, 
one by one, by high-ranking o ffic ia ls  o f the Centra l Contro l C om m ittee 
(Kozponti Ellenorzo B izottsag), who trie d  to convince them o f th e ir mistakes and 
persuade them to w ithdraw th e ir  signatures from  the memorandum. A fte r  
several weeks o f considerable pressure and threats most o f them obliged. Those 
who refused were e ither expelled from  the party or severely reprimanded.
For almost two months an atmosphere o f uncerta inty, fear and isolation 
descended upon the w riters, and Hungarian public life  generally. I t  appeared as 
though the opposition to  Rakosi had been silenced and suppressed once and fo r 
a ll. But it  was an illusionary calm and, once again, the 'wind o f change' came 
from  Moscow. Unknown to  Rakosi, and perhaps even to many leading communits 
in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev was preparing fo r the fa te fu l 20th Party 
Congress. The unsuspecting Rakosi, addressing the Congress on 17th February, 
i.e., one week before Khrushchev's revelations, proudly announced tha t by 1960 
Hungary would have la id down 'the solid economic foundation o f s o c ia l is m '.^ ^  
The famous anti-S ta lin  speech Khrushchev delivered to  a closed session on 24th 
February 1956, in which he b itte r ly  assailed S talin fo r his paranoic misdeeds and 
blunders, threw  a ll the East European countries, especially Hungary, in to  a state 
o f tu rm o il. The Congress thus strengthened the position o f Nagy and his followes 
and a ll those urging change in ea rlie r policies. A t the same tim e, i t  p rec ip ita ted  
the fa ll o f Rakosi.
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11.2 The im pact o f destalin isation, February-October 1956; co llec tiv isa tion  in 
ferm ent
When Rakosi returned from  the 20th Congress he appeared to  be
unworried. Khrushchev's report, a fte r a ll, dealt spec ifica lly  w ith  Stalin's
domestic misuse o f power and his bungling o f Soviet-Yugoslav re lations. He
made no reference to  Stalinism  in East European countries. Leaders there would
have to  draw the ir own conclusions, on the one hand, from  what they had learned
from  his a ttack on Stalin and, on the other hand, from  the general d r if t  o f
discussions at the Congress. Rakosi, not quite sure what was going on in
Moscow, had, ra ther uncharacte ris tica lly , misread the changing p o lit ic a l c lim ate
and even expected the early demise of Khrushchev. When he arrived back in
(155)Budapest w ith  a copy o f Khrushchev's 'secret speech' in his hand , he 
apparently to ld  his friends not to  worry as 'in a few months Khrushchev w ill be a 
t ra ito r  and everying w ill be back to  n o r m a l ' . ^ ^  I t  seems tha t he e ithe r fa iled 
to  sense the danger to  his position or believed tha t he would be able to  ride out 
the storm . Be tha t as i t  may, while Moscow c learly  signalled the end o f the 
Stalin era, fo r the f ir s t  tim e  ' tha t tested veteran o f the revo lu tionary 
m o v e m e n t '^ ^  -  who was always the f irs t  in his mechanical im ita tio n  o f the 
Soviet Union - did not fo llow  Khrushchev's example in condemning the mistakes 
o f Stalinism.
For about one month fo llow ing  the Congress there was no reaction from
Budapest. Rakosi did his level best to  minimise Khrushchev's bombshell, and to
fo re s ta ll its  e ffects  he tried  to keep the fu ll te x t o f the speech secret. He only
c ircu la ted  specially prepared exerpts from  i t  w ith in  the p a r ty /*  ^  But
Khrushchev's revelations could not, o f course, be kept secret fo r long and details
(159)o f the speech rapid ly became known both inside and outside the party. 
People in party organisations, universities, o ffices and factories, s ilent u n til tha t 
moment, began to  discuss feverishly the probable e ffe c t o f the Congress on
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Hungary. Debates in the Politburo, convened on several occasions to discuss the 
d ra ft report subm itted by Rakosi on his re tu rn  from  the Congress, showed the 
existence o f serious disagreements among the top leadership over his a ttem pt to 
m inimise the significance of the 20th Congress. Indeed, the orig ina l
decision to  convene the enlarged Centra l Com m ittee Plenum on 9th March, to  
hear Rakosi's report on 'The 20th Soviet Party Congress and the fu rth e r tasks of 
the Party ', in the event had to be postponed fo r several days. But even a fte r 
these debates Rakosi did not s ign ifican tly  m odify his position.
In his report to  the enlarged Centra l Com m ittee Plenum convened on 
12th-13th March, Rakosi, underlin ing the 'w e ll known m erits o f Stalin ' showed no 
inh ib ition  about fo rm a lly  repudiating the 'cu lt o f personality ' as 'alien to 
Marxism' and declaring tha t the princip le o f 'co llec tive  leadership' was basic fo r 
a pro le tarian party and tha t a revolu tionary should not be a fra id  o f adm itting  
mistakes. He insisted, however, tha t the June 1953 Resolution had been 
'essentially implemented', tha t the Soviet Congress had led him to conclude tha t 
the mistakes had already been corrected, tha t the party's main po licy d irec tion  
in Hungary was 'co rrec t in a ll spheres' and tha t the party  was 'strong and united'. 
'Our national economy', he declared, 'rests on healthy fo u n d a t io n s '.^ ^  Some 
delicate questions, however, were raised by Centra l Com m ittee members 
regarding Farkas' cu lpab ility , the delays in rehab ilita tion  and the growing 
problems of co llec tiv isa tion , where fu rth e r establishment o f collectives, in some 
cases, was only 'on paper', in other cases, not even fo rm a l establishment took 
place but 'lip -serv ice ' to  the policy was paid. Among the more prom inant 
contributors to the debate were Janos Kadar -  speaking fo r the f ir s t  tim e  since 
his release from  prison -  who pointed out the apparent divergence between 
declared policy and im plem entation in practice , the importance o f m ate ria l 
incentives fo r the peasants and increased output from  collectives. He also 
emphasised the urgent need fo r rehab ilita tions. Another speaker was Jozsef
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Revai, who, while opposed to  the views o f Nagy, objected to  the fa c t tha t his
expulsion from  the party  had been carried out by the C entra l Contro l
Commission (Kozponti E llenorzo B izottsag), w ithout the knowledge o f the
C entra l Com m ittee. He also spoke about the mishandling o f the ’kulak question'
(162)and the development o f the P a tr io tic  People's Front (PPF). Rakosi,
however, stubbornly resisted a ll c ritic ism s and again blamed Nagy fo r  a ll the
mistakes; anyone who held a d iffe re n t opinion was a 'r igh t-w ing  
f t  a
devia tion ist'. He did, however, promise more 'co llec tive  leadership', the
conclusion o f rehab ilita tions by 4th A p ril, an upward wage revision, worth 800 
m ill. Forin ts and a Politburo discussion on how to 'strengthen socia list le ga lity  
even fu rthe r'. The Centra l Com m ittee in the end approved Rakosi's reassuring 
report and, although the Resolution fin a lly  adopted rea ffirm ed  the des irab ility  o f 
co llec tive  leadership and increased in tra -pa rty  democracy, improved economic 
planning, a more libe ra l cu ltu ra l po licy and greater 'p o litic a l content', through 
workers' leadership, fo r the PPF, i t  generally confirm ed Rakosi's ea rlie r 
p o l ic ie s / * ^  The outcome of the Plenum, however, caused widespread 
disappointment. Many believed tha t the promises made by Rakosi amounted to  
no more than 'em pty words' and tha t his a ttitude  proved tha t he had 'learned 
nothing from  the past' and had no real desire fo r a change in the p o lit ic a l line. 
The great expectations o f many C entra l Com m ittee and party  members a fte r  the 
20th Congress remained unsatisfied by the Plenum and its  R e s o lu t io n .^ ^  Much 
was expected, and many objected to  the fa c t tha t not enough was said about the 
Stalin question, the Rajk t r ia l and the ro le o f Farkas. Reports reaching the party  
leadership on 17th March indicated tha t
the great expectations tha t had materialised a fte r  the 2 0 th  
Soviet Party Congress and before the March C entra l 
Com m ittee Plenum were not fu lly  satisfied by the resolution 
and the report. More was expected....^®®)
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A large number o f party member called fo r  the ’renewal* o f the party  leadership, 
ind ica ting  tha t they had enough o f ’se lf c itic ism , and be tte r qua lified  people
(I
were needed to  lead the country '. The party its e lf was in tu rm o il.
From the second h a lf o f March onwards, pa rtly  because o f the lack o f 
new measures and pa rtly  because o f the spread o f details o f Khrushchev’s speech, 
d issatisfaction began to  grow. The various centra l institu tions were inundated 
w ith  correspondence, published in the press, demanding tha t the 'new lin e ’ be 
implemented in Hungary, tha t the more popular leaders replaced earlie r 
(including Nagy) should be rehab ilita ted , tha t the Centra l C om m ittee should be 
more sincere w ith , and re ly  more on, party members, and tha t they should 'speak 
w ith  workers as adults’ about the country's economic problems. Complaints were 
also voiced tha t the leadership was fo rc ing  people to  re ly  on fore ign news media 
fo r th e ir in fo rm ation  about v ita l events. The protests at economic
d iff ic u lt ie s  and bureaucratic oppression had m ultip lied. A t the Po litburo 
meeting on 5th A p ril, discussing the tasks emanating from  the 20th Congress and 
the March Centra l Com m ittee Plenum Resolution, i t  was pointed out tha t signs 
o f fear, uncerta in ty and d istrust were much more in evidence among party  
members at party activ is ts ' meetings throughout the c o u n try /1^
Rakosi, driven increasingly by the pressures o f party and public opinion, 
took the f irs t  steps and adopted a policy o f 'con tro lled p o lit ic a l re laxa tion '. While 
in other East European countries Stalinists took defensive action by resigning, 
Rakosi was more stubborn and decided to  'hang on' in the hope tha t he would be 
able to  calm the p o lit ica l s ituation. His tw o main concessions in the sphere o f 
po litics, in te r a lia , in a ttem pting  to  contro l the new surge o f opposition, were to 
rehab ilita te  Rajk and to  establish a debating club, the Pe tofi C irc le  (P e to fi Kor), 
both o f which, in the event, backfired and contributed to his f in a l eclipse.
On 27th March 1956, at a meeting o f Party A c tiv is ts  in the sm all town o f 
Eger, in order to  demonstrate the party's compliance w ith  the new Moscow line,
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Rakosi delivered a cautiously worded speech on the delicate question o f Rajk's 
rehab ilita tion . He grudgingly conceded at last tha t the Rajk t r ia l was based on 
'provocation* but he blamed it  on the 'im pe ria lis t agent' Beria and 'Gabor Peter's 
gang'. He went on to  say that,
there fo re  the Supreme Court in accordance w ith  the C entra l 
Com m ittee's June Resolution has re h a b ilita te d  Comrade 
Rajk and other comrades. Other cases have s im ila rly  been 
reviewed, the innocently condemned have been rehab ilita ted , 
and others have been pardoned.(170)
His announcement, w ithout acknowledging his role in the t r ia l,  and his plan to 
stage a 'show tr ia l' at which Gabor Peter would take the blame, provoked a new 
wave o f cric ism . As a result o f fu rth e r pressure at the Budapest P arty  A c tiv is ts  
meeting held in the Sportsstadium (Sportcsarnok) on 18th May, Rakosi fin a lly  
accepted responsib ility fo r  the tr ia l,  the 'cu lt o f personality ' and the 
i l le g a l i t ie s . ^ ^  Rakosi's forced se lf-c ritic ism  fa iled, however, to  achieve its  
aim - i t  was considered unconvincing and earned him no c red it. Instead it  led to 
renewed pressure.
On 17th March, ostensibly to  introduce a degree o f libe ra lisa tion  in the
cu ltu ra l sphere, the party had given permission fo r the se tting  up o f a debating
forum  in Budapest, called the P e tro fi C irc le , w ith in  the fram ew ork o f DISZ
(172)(Federation o f Working Youth). The C irc le  was rep lica ted in most
p rovincia l c ities . I t  was intended to  be a sort o f 'evening group' fo r  ca re fu lly  
staged discussions on various top ica l and theore tica l questions. Instead, the 
group became an ou tle t fo r the growing disenchantment o f students, w rite rs , 
in te llectua ls , peasants and in fluen tia l pa rty  members. The C irc le  eagerly 
embraced the decisions o f the 20th Soviet Party Congress and demanded th e ir  
im plem entation in Hungary in the form  o f destalin isation o f the party. The 
C ircle 's discussions always began w ith  a statem ent 'in the sp ir it o f the Congress',
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a fte r  which they talked about Hungarian rea lities. A t f irs t,  its  small meetings,
discussing lite ra ry  and re lated topics, did not a ttra c t mass public a tten tion . But
as the debates probed deeper and deeper in to  subjects embarrasing fo r  the
regime -  the Second Five Year Plan, on 22nd May (more about th is in a moment),
the problems of historiography, on 30th May, the bankruptcy o f M arx is t-Len in is t
philosophy in Hungary, on 14th June -  i t  rapid ly gained mass public in terest. By
the summer o f 1956 the C irc le  had grown in to a movement provid ing a p la tfo rm
fo r the opposition to  Rakosi's regime. According to  the S ta lin ist Erno Gero, i t
had even become a 'second p o lit ic a l centre ’ in the country, a r iv a l to  the
(173)party. The clim ax o f the series o f debates, which pa rticu la rly  aroused mass 
public in terest, was reached on 17th June, w ith  a discussion on 'Socialist 
Lega lity ', when Julia Rajk, the widow of Laszlo Rajk, d ram atica lly  accused her 
husband's 'murderers', who, unpunished, were 's t il l s itt in g  in m in is te ria l seats', 
and declared that
I shall never rest u n til those who have ruined the country, the 
party, destroyed thousands and pushed millons in to misery 
receive the ir just punishment, Comrades, help me in th is
s t r u g g le !^ 4 )
Ten days la te r, on 27th June, at the fin a l debate, on the position o f the 
Hungarian press and in form ation , which was attended by some 6,000 people and 
lasted u n til dawn, the party ’s cu ltu ra l p o lity  came under a ttack. Now there were 
open declarations tha t mere personnel changes in the party's leadership were 
in su ffic ien t, and calls fo r  s truc tu ra l changes in the system its e lf, fo r 
revolu tinoary action and fo r the re tu rn  to  power o f Im re N a g y . ^ ^  The 
atmosphere at the meeting was no longer one o f debate but o f near revo lt; there 
were even calls fo r Rakosi's resignation.
This open challenge to  his leadership, and the party, was too much fo r 
Rakosi to  to le ra te . The Centra l Com m ittee, o rig ina lly  scheduled to  meet on
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10th July, was hurried ly convened on 30th June. Assisted by the evidence from
the Poznan rio ts  on 28th June, Rakosi succeeded once again, fo r  the last tim e  in
his life , in persuading the apprehensive Centra l Com m ittee to  re ta lia te  against
the mounting opposition. A fte r  iden tify ing  the P e to fi C irc le  as the centre o f
an ti-pa rty  attacks, the C entra l Com m ittee passed a resolution condemning the
C irc le ’s ’an ti-pa rty  m anifestations’, noting tha t some o f its  members had gone so
fa r as ’to  deny the leading role o f the party* and expressed 'bourgeois, counter-
revo lu tinary views', and alleging tha t the open opposition to the party  had been
( 1  761organised by a fac tion  around Imre Nagy. The resolution banned fu tu re
meetings o f the C irc le  and, a fte r a summary o f proceedings, expelled some o f its
princ ipa l speakers from  the party. This, however, made l i t t le  d iffe rence since
the opposition continued what they had begun in the Pe tofi C irc le  in other
m etropo litan in te lle c tua l clubs, in rura l conferences, as well as in the press, and
(177)th e ir in fluence continued to  raise rapid ly. Rakosi blamed Nagy fo r  the
organised opposition against him. In fac t, while i t  was true tha t Nagy and his
supporters were greatly  encouraged by the post 20th Congress developments,
Nagy him self ca re fu lly  avoided getting  involved in organising, or even
pa rtic ipa ting  in, a fo rm a l opposition faction . This was pa rtly  because o f his
genuine dislike o f factions and pa rtly  because o f his unwavering loya lty  to  the
party. Nagy was confidently  biding his tim e  and aw aiting his readmission to  the
party. I t  was not, in fac t, u n til m id-October, when Nagy was f in a lly  re instated
to  the party, tha t he made his f irs t  o f f ic ia l appearance on the p o lit ica l scene.
Rakosi, encouraged perhaps by the manner in which the Poznan rebe llion
had been dealt w ith , subm itted a plan to  the Po litburo on 16th Ju ly proposing the
arrest o f 400 to  500 o f his leading opponents, including Nagy, the dissolution o f
the W riters' Association and the P e to fi C irc le , and the preparation o f a t r ia l o f
(178)the an ti-pa rty  conspirators. His colleagues in the Politburo were aghast,
and frightened by such plans. A re tu rn  to  s ta lin is t te rro r was no longer
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acceptable a fte r the 20th Congress e ither to  them or, indeed, to  the Soviet
leaders. On 17th July, prompted perhaps by the Hungarian P o litburo members
themselves, Anastas Mikoyan, F irs t Deputy Chairman o f the USSR Council of
M inisters, arrived unexpectedly from  Moscow and appeared at the reconvened
P o litbu ro  meeting w ith  a b rie f message -  Rakosi must resign. Rakosi had become
extrem ely unpopular both in Hungary and w ith  T ito , who on the occasion o f his
Moscow v is it, had demanded tha t the Soviet leadership should remove him. A t
the same tim e, Mikoyan arranged Rakosi’s replacement by Erno Gero. Had the
choice fa llen  on Nagy, or some other more libera l communist leaders, e.g.,
Kadar, ra ther than Gero, staunch s ta lin is t, the Hungarian uprising m ight have
(179)been avoided. But Nagy was becoming too nationa lis tic  fo r  Moscow’s lik ing . 
Rakosi, very re luc tan tly , resigned, on grounds o f ' i l l  health' and his replacem ent 
by Gero was announced the next day, at the fu ll Plenum o f the C entra l
C om m ittee which was in session on 18th-21st July 1956. Rakosi's re ign was over
„ (180) fo r  ever.
In economic, and in pa rticu la r ag ricu ltu ra l policies during th is  period 
there was no countepart to  the m oderately libe ra l sh ift in the p o lit ic a l sphere. 
While some concessions were made to  de flec t a tten tion  o f an increasingly 
discontented population from  po litics  to  economics, there remained a noticeable 
contrad ic tion  between the continued emphasis on the policy o f accelerated 
industria lisa tion and co llec tiv isa tion  -  both o f which were regarded as re lics  o f 
the S ta lin ist period -  and the feeble attem pts to  liberalise in other areas. Hard ly 
had Rakosi arrived back from  the 20th Party Congress, than it  became obvious 
th a t the co llec tiv isa tion  drive was not only going to  be maintained but was even 
to  be pursued w ith  increasing vigour. Encouraged by the almost 21,000 new 
entrants to  co llectives during January and February, a Po litburo reso lu tion on 
3rd March 1956, raised the 1956 ta rge t fo r  peasant fam ilies jo in ing  the 
co llectives from  60,000 to  1 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; they were to  bring in more than ha lf a
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m illion  cadastral yokes o f land, and the aim now was to  com plete the 'socia list 
reorganisation o f ag ricu ltu re ’ by 1 9 6 o / * ^  Rakosi's s im p lis tic  th ink ing  about 
how to  reach th is ta rge t was w ell illus tra ted  when he declared tha t
we shall have to  e lim inate, altogether, the preva iling  an ti­
entering mood amongst the peasants.^;?)
Since by this tim e he had run out o f any real and e ffe c tive  arguments to  induce 
them to  jo in , as a last resort he simply suggested tha t
we shall have to  te l l the peasants tha t in three years' tim e
there w ill be nothing else but co llectives, so the sooner they
get i t  over w ith  entering the collectives the better.(18<J)
Despite the figures, co llec tiv isa tion , however, had lost its  dynamism. Ind irec tly  
aided by Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Congress, and because o f the mounting
and increasingly obvious po lit ica l crisis from  about the spring o f 1956, i t  had
become almost impossible to pursue the policy o f co llec tiv isa tion  by coercion 
any fu rthe r. The changed atmosphere had been sensed by the peasants in some 
parts o f the country as early as the autumn o f 1955. By the spring o f 1956 th is 
opposition towards newly established collectives had begun to  spread to  other 
regions. The insens itiv ity  o f the Rakosi regime towards the peasants was c learly  
demonstrated by the decision to  continue w ith  land commassations u n til the 
autumn of 1956, to  reduce certa in  social concessions and to  increase taxes -  a ll 
o f which, d ire c tly  or ind irec tly , created fu rth e r hardships fo r  the individual 
peasants. A t the same tim e, i t  should be noted, to  aid the process o f 
co llectiv isa tion , a decree published earlie r granted fu ll income tax  exemptions 
from  1956 to  peasants jo in ing  the c o lle c tiv e s /***^  Moreover, at the end o f May 
-  by which tim e i t  had become known tha t the 1956 harvest was going to  be w e ll 
below the good year o f 1955 - a Politburo resolution increased the produce
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delivery quotas fo r the y e a r.^® ^  I t  was not surprising, then, tha t by the spring 
not only were protests about the state tak ing  away land leased by the peasants 
from  the state Reserve Land Fund - to  sm all fo rm  tenant fa rm ing  - becoming
less frequent but peasants were beginning to  'o ffe r ’ th e ir  own land to  the state
. (186) again.
A f te r  long preparation and delay due to  the p o lit ica l changes, the Rakosi
regime had published d ra ft d irectives fo r its  Second F ive-Year Plan. These were
hailed by an ed ito ria l in the party's da ily newspaper, Szabad Nep, as a 'grand
national programme fo r socialist construction and the fu rth e r e levation o f our 
(187)people'. Encouraged by the slight improvement in the economy in 1955, the
plan represented a return, w ith  some m odifications, to  the course charted in the 
F irs t Five Year Plan (1950-1954). In an unprecedented step, to  comply w ith  the 
wishes o f the Centra l Com m ittee not to conceal the economic d iff ic u lt ie s  and to  
show how they were to  be overcome - and to  show tha t he had embraced the 
princip le  o f in tra -pa ty  democracy - Rakosi had chosen to  release the plan as a 
set o f 'd ra ft d irectives', ra ther than as a finished document. There was to  be a 
month o f public discussion, in the hope tha t suggestions and observations would 
'uncover reserves o f the people's economy not ye t considered in the d ra ft 
d irectives'. The discussion was to  be confined to  details and not to  include the 
actual fram ew ork o f the d ra ft d irectives. Another purpose may have been to  
d ive rt the a tten tion  o f the increasingly disenchanted and no longer en tire ly  
passive public to economic questions, and to  arouse popular ite res t and support 
fo r the regime. A lthough the new plan, on the whole, rea ffirm ed  the goal o f 
heavy industria l development and co llec tiv isa tion , i t  tried  to  pursue these 
w ithout making the 'old mistakes'. Rakosi's in terna l democracy in the economics 
sphere backfired, however. The public discussion tha t fo llowed subjected the 
Rakosi-Gero plan to a devastating array o f c r itic ism . By July some 35,000 
c r it ic a l suggestions and observations had been subm itted by numerous economic
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(188)and agrarian experts, party and state functionaries, workers and peasants. 
Concurrently w ith  the release o f the 'd ra ft d irectives', in an e ffo r t to  calm the 
post-20th Congress p o lit ica l atmosphere, and to  enhance workers' in terest in the 
plan, the regime had given some lim ite d  economic concessions to  the population. 
On 1st May a range o f consumer good prices were reduced, resulting, according 
to  the regime, in an estim ated 900 m ill. Forints saving per annum fo r 
co n su m e rs .^*^  Because o f the rapid ly worsening p o litica l s ituation, however, 
there was hardly any response among consumers and, o f course, there was no 
economic foundation fo r the price cuts. The only d irec t adm in istra tive  
concession in the sphere o f agricu lture was tha t some of the pressures on the 
kulaks were relaxed. An ed ito ria l on 14th A p ril, under the t i t le  'Should kulaks' 
re la tives and the ir fam ily  members be adm itted in to the co llectives?' (Fel lehet- 
e venni kulakok rokonait, csaladtagjait a term eloszovetkezetekbe? ) ^ ^ ,  had 
posed the question whether the descendants o f kulaks could be useful members o f 
collectives, discussed how to  boost production and raised the question o f 
increased support fo r individual farmers. I t  pointed out, in te r a lia , tha t
those who have fears fo r the co llec tive  movement on account 
o f improved agro-technology and increased output o f 
individual farm ers are setting out on the wrong t r a i l ^ l )
and concluded tha t a peasant who was more cultured and produced more was
closer to  the co llective  because he understood its  advantages be tte r. In the
event, the regime magnanimously allowed kulaks' re lations to  jo in  the 
(192)collectives. A t the same tim e, in an a ttem pt to  boost morale in the
villages, middle peasants who had been unjustly categorised as kulaks were
'rehab ilita ted ' and removed from  the 'kulak lis t', thus lessening th e ir  economic
burden. This process was carried out during the summer throughout the
(193)country. O ther urgent economic concessions, such as review ing tax debts
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and a lloca ting new credits and machines to  co llectives struggling w ith  chronic
economic d iff ic u ltie s , were discussed at length but not implemented. Because of
ine rtia  and preoccupation w ith  po lit ica l developments these urgent questions
(194)were relegated to  the background.
These lim ite d  emergency measures, however, proved to  be fa r  too l i t t le
and too la te  and made very l i t t le  im pact on the rapid ly growing p o lit ic a l and
economic discontent among the working population or on the function ing  o f the
economy. On 4th June a report on the economic s ituation by the A g itp rop
Department o f the Centra l Com m ittee indicated very severe supply d iff ic u lt ie s
in industry and revealed tha t instead o f the usual 2-3 months supply stocks at the
(195)Supply Organisations were already down to  about one month. Moreover,
strikes and go-slows broke out at several facto ries on 2nd July in protest against 
low wages and industria l disorganisation and reports coming in to  pa rty  
headquarters assessing the public reaction to  the Poznan rio ts  indicated tha t in 
Hungary too the ground was fe r t ile  fo r such 'p ro v o c a t io n '.^ ^  The peasants had 
drawn great strength from  the 20th Congress -  the main thrust o f which, as fa r 
as they were concerned, was against coercion and fo r more democracy and a 
c r it ic a l sp irit -  and the ir resistance, as co llec tiv isa tion  continued unabated, 
became more and more open. By the middle o f 1956 reports were reaching the 
authorities tha t the numerical development o f collectives, fo r a ll in ten t and
(197)
purposes, produced results merely 'on paper'. O ther reports indicated tha t
the number o f dissolutions and, especially, calls fo r dissolution, a lbe it s t i l l
sporadic, was on the increase in many areas o f the country, and especially in the
(198)Trans Danubian region.
I t  was against th is background tha t the C entra l Com m ittee m eeting on
18th-21st July discussed the in terna l p o lit ica l developments, the im p lica tions o f
the events in Poznan, the Second F ive-Year Plan and the state and fu rth e r tasks 
(199)o f the economy. The inaugural speech by Gero on the f ir s t  day, and the
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C entra l Com m ittee resolutions on the second day, already indicated the polic ies
Gero was in ten t on pursuing i.e., a continuation o f Rakosi’s economic polic ies but
in more moderate terms. In his speech, which was m ainly on in te rna l and
in terna tiona l p o lit ica l developments, Gero trie d  to  convey the impression o f
steering a 'safe* middle course. He called fo r a ’clean sheet* and a ’tw o -fro n t
struggle* against both 'le ft-w in g ' and 'r igh t-w ing ' deviation ist views -  though
om ittin g  to  mention Nagy's n a m e .^ ^ ^  The C entra l Com m ittee resolu tion, in
b rie f, acknowledged tha t from  1955 onwards the party's leadershiip had repeated
some o f the earlie r mistakes, endorses the 'tw o -fro n t struggle' and guidelines fo r
the fu rth e r development of the economy, and called fo r the dem ocratisation o f
state organs and mass organisations (w ith  an increased role fo r Parliam ent, Local
Councils and the PPF), fo r a gradual reduction in the overcentra lisa tion o f the
economy (by giving more autonomy to  enterprises and reducing the number o f
'success indicators') and fo r the continuation o f co llec tiv isa tion  and the
strengthening o f collectives. The keynote speech on the Second Year Plan and
the economy was delivered by Andras Hegediis, who was reta ined as prim e
m inister, on the th ird  day o f the Plenum.(201) pje announcec3 tha t the o rig ina l
'd ra ft d irectives' o f the plan, published three months previously had been
(202)modified as a result o f the public debate. While forced indus tria lia tion
continued to  be the objective o f the economic policy, he said, th is was to  be in 
more moderate form : lower investm ent, a lower growth ra te  and a more 
balanced structure  o f investment were needed, he declared, to  cope w ith  the 
d iff ic u ltie s  tha t had emerged.
Although the fu ll elaboration and im plem entation o f the plan was
prevented by the events in October, i t  is o f in terest to  look at the deta ils  o f the
(203)approved plan. For industry, compared w ith  1955, the planned increase in 
the output o f socialist industry was 47-50 per cent by 1960 (instead o f 50-52 per 
cent), s t i l l  w ith  an emphasis on heavy industria l development - the ra tio  o f
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Category 'A* (means o f production) to  Category 'B' (means o f consumption) was
set at 58-60 per cent to  38-40 per cent. Tw o-th irds o f the planned increase in
industria l production was to  come from  higher labour p roduc tiv ity , which was to
increase by 36 per cent (42, 20, and 34 per cent respective ly in heavy, lig h t and
food industries) and there was to  be a simultaneous reduction in costs o f 16 per
cent ove the period. The planned increase in National Income was 40 per cent
(instead o f 42-43 per cent) and 20-22 per cent o f th is increase was to  be
allocated to  investment. T o ta l planned investment, s t i l l  ambitous, was 76-78,000
m ill. Forints (instead o f 78-80,000 m ill. Forints) which was 10-12,000 m ill.
Forin ts more than actual investment during the F irs t Five Year Plan. The
planned increase in fore ign trade was 50 per cent, while the real wages o f
workers and employees and real incomes of peasants were to  rise by 25 per cent
(204)in both cases; subscriptions to  'Peace Loans' were to  end.
The most in te resting  part o f the plan and the C entra l C om m ittee 
resolution was the section devoted to  agricu lture. I t  re flec ted  the general 
concern o f the regime w ith  the stagtation o f ag ricu ltu ra l production. Though the 
plan adm itted tha t production 'has not risen appreciably above the pre-w ar level', 
i t  called fo r an increase o f some 27 per cent in the period 1956-1960:^® ^ 11 
per cent fo r  bread grain, 41 per cent fo r maize, 25-30 per cent fo r  livestock fo r 
slaughter, 35-40 per cent fo r m ilk. These increases were to be accomplished 
m ainly by raising crop yields and extending the fodder base fo r  livestock: yields 
per cad. yoke, compared w ith  1955, were to  rise by 10-12 per cent fo r cereals, 30 
per cent fo r maize, 25 per cent fo r  potatoes and 22 per cent fo r  sugar-beet. 
G reater use o f fe rt il iz e rs  and insecticides was to  be made possible by expanding 
the chemical industry. The plan envisaged tha t the country's grain problem 
would be solved in the period 1956-60 and adequate reserves created. The 
planned state investment in agricu lture was set at 13,000 m ill. Forin ts, while 
another 1000 m ill. Forin ts was to be invested by the co llectives from  th e ir  own
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f u n d s . ^ ^  This, representing about 17 per cent o f to ta l investm ent, was lower 
than in 1954 and 1955, but above the average of 13.7 per cent reached during the 
F irs t Five Year Plan period. Much o f the investment was to  go in to  increased 
mechanisation: the tra c to r park was to  expand by the equivalent o f 19,000, 15 
horse-power trac to rs , or from  one tra c to r  fo r  400 cad. yoks to  one fo r 228 cad. 
yokes.
This, however, was only ha lf o f the ag ricu ltu ra l programme, which the 
plan (and the resolution) described as ’dual' in nature. The other ha lf, 
'simultaneously w ith  the growth o f ag ricu ltu ra l output', was the continued drive 
fo r the num erical development and strengthening o f the co llectiv ised sector, 
although, at least in theory, th is was to  be pursued in a m ilder fo rm . 
Representing a ta c tic a l re trea t, the new co llec tiv isa tion  policy returned to  the 
goals set by the Resolution o f the Third Party Congress in May 1954, revis ing 
both the ta rge t and the conditins under which co llec tiv isa tion  was to  proceed. A t 
f irs t the two halves o f the agricu ltu ra l programme, i.e., higher output and the 
maintenance o f co llectiv isa tion , m ight appear to  be con trad ic to ry , since 
individual peasants, comprising by fa r the largest section o f the peasantry, would 
not be lik e ly  to  increase the ir production i f  they were faced w ith  the renewed 
presures o f co llec tiv isa tion  and the like lihood o f loss o f th e ir independence. The 
Resolution, therefore , condemned the use o f force and stressed tha t 
co llec tiv isa tion  was to  be 'gradual' and based, once again, on 's tr ic t  adherence to  
the princ ip le  o f vo luntary accession', and stated:
i t  must be ensured, through the economic and cu ltu ra l 
elevation o f co llective  farm  membership tha t the advantages 
o f co llectives unfold w ith  such persuasive force as to  induce 
the MAJORITY of the peasants to  choose the road o f la rge- 
scale socialist farm ing.
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Thus the resolution scaled down the previous goal, set by Rakosi in March 1956,
on reaching 100  per cent co llectiv isa tion , to  a considerably more modest ta rge t
o f bringing 55-60 per cent o f the to ta l arable land area in to  the socia list sector,
i.e., C o llective  and State Farms, by the end o f the Second Five Year Plan 
(208)period. To fa c ilita te  the progress o f co llectiv isa tion , representing a change
in tactics , the resolution transferred the emphasis from  the establishment o f the
higher Type III, to  the lower, Types I and II, forms o f co llectives, which i t
declared should be encouraged and supported, although it  held out the Type III,
i./e ., fu ll kolkhozy, as the u ltim a te  goal. The plan, and the resolution, also
recognised tha t individual farm ers could not be ignored a ltogether i f  the planned
rise in agricu ltu ra l output was to  be achieved, and promised them greater
incentives, as well as ’m ateria l conditions w ith  the help o f which they can exp lo it
(209)th e ir existing possibilities more e ffe c tiv e ly ’. The plan also stated tha t the 
Machine T racto r Stations ’should carry  out 70 per cent more work fo r  ind iv idual 
farm ers’.
F ina lly, ostensibly in response to  the public debate on the Second Five 
Year Plan, the plan document raised the des irab ility  o f in troducing a more 
flex ib le  planning mechanism, reduce over-centra lisaton and inv igo ra ting  loca l 
councils by increasing the ir financ ia l a u to n o m y .^ ^
The removal o f Rakosi and the Centra l Com m ittee resolution reduced 
the in te rna l p o litica l tensions fo r a b rie f period, but the s itua tion  remained 
c r it ic a l. Gero’s appointment not only fa iled  to  e lic it  any great enthusiasm but, 
in fa c t, increased suspicion, both inside and outside party  c irc les, regarding the 
party's policy intentions. Despite the fa c t tha t some economic concessions were 
again made, or promised, to  the peasantry and re form  in tentions had been 
announced, most o f these measures were perceived as a response to  a cris is 
s ituation and added to  ra ther than diminished the regime's ever-m ounting 
economic and po lit ica l problems. In a speech to the Gyor-Sopron County
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C om m ittee o f the PPF in August, Hegedus announced the pub lica tion of a decree
which stated tha t individual peasants did not have to  pay back taxes o f up to
50,000 Forin ts, and the system by which cap ita l was supplied to  the collectives
was extended and rationalised. I t  was decided to  convert long and medium term
credits to  a uniform  period o f 25 years and a uniform  in te rest ra te  o f one per
cent,and new credits were also to be given fo r 25 years fo r the purposes o f
building, soil improvement and plantation, while 10-15 years credits were to  be
given fo r the purchase o f equipment and livestock. A t the same tim e,
collectives were given equal status w ith  the state sector in the a lloca tion o f
building m ateria ls . ^ 1 ^  On 26th August Ferenc Erdei announced tha t new
regulations were soon to  be published to  make conditions fo r  new entrants in to
collectives more a ttra c tive : compensation fo r livestock, fa rm  buildings, seeds
and new plantations was to  be paid out in cash; a double or treb le  rent value was
to  be fixed fo r vineyards and orchards, income expected from  work already
performed was to  be paid in advance and, fin a lly , payment o f rent to  aged
co llective  members was no longer to be dependent on active  work in the 
(212)co llective . Furtherm ore, m odifications were to  be introduced to  give lower, 
Types I & II, collectives an advantage -  compared w ith  individual farm ers -  w ith  
regard to  prices paid fo r MTS services and the supply o f fe r t il iz e rs  and other 
m aterials, and some types o f collectives -  mainly those specialising in f ru i t  and 
vegetables -  were to  be given p r io r ity  in the d is tribu tion  o f 'reserve land' and 
exemption from  land com m assa tion .^^^
A part from  these concessions, made or promised to  the peasantry, 
intentions had also been announced to  introduce more flex ib le , planning methods 
and decentra lisation o f management in various areas o f MTS, agricu ltu re  and 
industry, so as to  give MTS, collectives and enterprises a higher degree o f 
autonomy. In the months preceding the events in October, Hungary appeared to  
have taken perhaps the most sign ificant steps in th is d irection . W ith regard to
✓
- 907 -
agricu lture , i t  was decided tha t fo r the ag ricu ltu ra l year 1956/57 no con tro l 
figures fo r  sown area would be established -  except fo r  bread grain and tha t 
there were to  be no contro l figures fo r livestock. A fte r  th is re fo rm  ag ricu ltu ra l 
plans fo r co llectives and individual farm ers would have consisted essentia lly o f 
schedules fo r state procurements, w ith  a more or less closely defined com m odity 
composition. Moreover, in establishing these schedules local councils were to  be 
given more independence from  the centra l authorities. In the same vein, plans 
were in existence f o r : ^ ^
i) co llectives to  be authorised to  undertake such processing a c tiv itie s  as
the bo ttling  o f wine and the production o f bu tte r and cheese,
ii) the revision o f the compulsory deliverys system in 1957, and
iii)  the MTS to be given the righ t to set th e ir  own norms.
W ith regard to  industry the Planning O ffice  apparently began preparations a fte r  
a meeting on 25th September fo r certa in  re fo rm  measures which focused on the 
'ra tiona lisa tion ' o f the command economy, to  be introduced in a two-phase 
package -  a smaller, piecemeal adjustment in 1957 and a more fundam enta l 
change in 1 9 5 8 .^ *^  The measures were designed to  l im it  the number o f 
compulsory d irectives and to  give more independence to  firm s  to  enable them  to  
decide, fo r  example, the fo rm at o f th e ir  production. A price re fo rm  was also 
under consideration, w ith  the aim o f creating an industria l price system closer to  
the costs o f production but w ithout, o f course, abandoning the fixed , tw o - t ie r  
price system separating industria l wholesale from  re ta il prices.
A ll these measures, e ithe r arleady introduced or envisaged, in 
agricu lture, sought to  take account o f farm ers' discontent and resistance to  
jo in ing the collectives, especially the more advanced type, by provid ing some 
fa c ilit ie s  fo r  modest forms of cooperation. But e ffo rts  a fte r the Ju ly C en tra l 
C om m ittee meeting were too la te, and not enough, to  stop the rap id ly  increasing
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ferm ent. The ir im plem entation in any case, was cut short by the events in 
October. The delay in reform s was no longer only an economic problem. I t  had 
become an in tegra l part o f the deepening p o lit ic a l crisis, which hindered the 
im plem entation o f even these lim ite d  reform s. As the summer wore on, the 
surface o f Gero's Hungary began to  heave from  the rebellious pressures at work 
underneath it .  The mounting critic ism s by various segments o f Hungarian 
society brought in to public discussion many problems tha t had long been taboo, 
including not only the methods, but the very logic o f the regim e’s co llec tiv isa tion  
policy. Although this was now claimed to  be 'voluntary* in nature, and the harsh 
tac tics  o f the previous period had supposedly been repudiated, in re a lity  i t  was 
nothing o f the sort and the various form s o f d irec t force continued to  be applied. 
But in the changed po lit ica l c lim a te  the use o f force had even less chance of 
success than before: more and more peasants sim ply refused to  jo in , while many 
more le f t  the collectives, and by the autumn the peasants' resistance appeared to 
have brought the regime's co llec tiv isa tion  po licy to  a s tandstill. C ontrary  to 
popular be lie f, w ithdrawals from  and dissolutions o f co llectives on a la rge r scale 
had begun not under the pressure o f the uprising but during the summer o f 1956 
and, a fte r a slight increase in October, surged up - reaching a peak in November 
and December 1956 - a fte r the revo lu tion was crushed.
I t  would appear from  available evidence tha t by early August, peasants
resistance to  co llec tiv isa tion  assumed such proportions th a t the regime
succeeded in fo rc ing  only one-tenth as many peasants in to the co llec tives  as in
the same period o f the previous year. A t the same tim e, the number o f peasants
who decided to  leave and the number o f co llectives which decided to  dissolve
(216)themselves grew almost as rapid ly. Reports from  loca l organisations
indicating actual w ithdrawals and dissolutions or calls fo r dissolution were 
flooding in throughout August and September. W ithdrawals from  and/or 
dissolutions o f collectives on a la rger scale were f irs t  reported at the beginning
- 909 -
of August from  Zala county in western Hungary. According to  the report the
situa tion  there, 'especially in the last few  days', became c r it ic a l and the
problem, the report noted, was not only 'tha t in many collectives communal work
never began' but tha t in about 34 villages calls fo r  dissolution became so intense
and widespread tha t there was 'a danger tha t the mood fo r  dissolutions w ill
(217)spread to  other parts o f the country'. The existence o f th is danger was,
indeed, corroborated by reports from  the counties o f Gyor, Szolnok and
Csongrad, which noted s im ila r aspirations fo r  dissolutions among the peasants.
Another report also submitted in early August, to  the Politburo, spoke o f 'serious
disorders' in Somogy county, where, the report noted, in about 25-30 co llectives,
'serious problems existed' because members were dissatisfied and 'had expressed
a strong desire' to  leave the collectives. S im ila rly , la te r in August, o ther reports
were reaching centra l organisations from  a number o f other lo ca lities , e.g., from
12 collectives in Baranya county, and several other co llectives in 20 villages in
Vas county where members were ca lling  fo r the dissolution o f th e ir  
(218)collectives. By the middle o f August the d r if t  o f peasants from  the
collectives grew to  almost a flood in some counties o f the Trans-Danubian
region, where in some villages there were even threats tha t the peasants would
stage a 'small-scale Poznan' i f  the authorities attem pted to  prevent the
(219)dissolution o f the collectives. Police in tervention to  stop peasants
d is tribu ting  the co llective 's assets, a ttem pted in some places, became highly
(220)dangerous. During September, la rge ly in response to the commencement o f
the regime's hated commassation o f land programme, the s itua tion  de te rio ra ted  
fu rth e r in a ffected  areas and applications fo r  w ithdrawals from  and dissolutions 
o f co llectives increased considerably. A report prepared in September indicated 
tha t in Somogy county members in 40 co llectives, out o f a to ta l o f 327, had 
already announced the dissolution o f th e ir co llectives, while in numerous others 
some 3-4,000 fam ilies out o f the to ta l o f 11,852, more than one th ird  o f the
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members, had indicated th e ir desire to  leave the co llectives and re tu rn  to
(221)individual farm ing. There are no comparable data fo r  o ther counties but it
can safely be assumed tha t Somogy county was not an isolated phenomenon. A
report subm itted to  the Politburo at the end o f September noted tha t, at a
conservative estimate, more than 100 collectives in the Trans-Danubian region
alone existed 'm erely on paper’, w ith  a membership united not by the idea of
(222)communal work but by the thought o f dissolution. During September the
peasants’ pressure fo r dissolutions spread ra ther quickly to  o ther regions o f the
country. The main reasons given o ff ic ia lly  fo r the w ithdrawals and/on
(223)dissolutions can be summarised as follows:
(i) excesssive use o f force in form ing collectives,
(ii) inadequate leadership and weak economic management o f co llectives,
( iii)  low incomes, lack o f economic independence and uncerta in fu tu re ,
(iv) expectations o f large income and asset d is tribu tion  by members from  the
dissolution o f the co llective ,
(v) tensions inside the co llec tive  between middle and poor peasnats, and
(vi) the struggle o f individual peasants fo r the re tu rn  o f th e ir  o rig ina l
ancestral land.
On the whole, the scale of w ithdrawals and dissolutions o f co llectives can be
linked to  the level o f force used in the establishment o f the co llec tives  and to
management and organisational problems. Dissolutions occurred on a la rger
scale in those counties where during 1955 and 1956 the force used in organising
collectives was the greatest. A report subm itted to  the P o litburo at the end o f
September noted tha t the main reason fo r the dissolutions was the ’excesses
(224)com m itted in establishing co llectives during 1955 and 1956'. A t the
beginning o f the dissolution process occasional reference was made to  the 
’destructive ’ influence o f the 'enemy' and 'kulak' but even then th is  argument 
carried l i t le  c red ib ility .
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I t  is probably not an exaggeration to  say tha t the party 's commassation 
programme which was being implemented during September, was la rge ly 
responsible fo r the fin a l show-down between the peasants and the authorities. In 
many places i t  evoked great anger and sharp, o ften  open, con fron ta tion  between 
the two. The extent o f the September commassation programme surpassed the 
levels o f any previous years. According to  a report by the M in is try  o f 
A g ricu ltu re  on 15th September, the number o f general commassations approved 
by 8 th September was 1137 and the number o f land reorganisations, i.e., p a rtia l
(n n  c \
commassations, was 30, a ffe c tin g  in a ll 423 villages and 15 towns. This was 
a large-scale programme, and in many places i t  poisoned the re la tions even 
between the individual and co llec tive  peasants - individual peasants refused to  
speak to  and avoided co llec tive  peasants, and especially, th e ir  leaders. An 
im portant contribu tory  fa c to r in the rap id ly  de te rio ra ting  s itua tion  was the fa c t 
tha t in many places party  and local council o ffic ia ls , as w e ll as newspapers, 
themselves disapproved o f and o ften  condemned the commassation programme. 
The disputes and wranglings over commassations not only angered ind iv idua l 
peasants but also adversely a ffected the members o f newly form ed co llectives, 
as w e ll as existing ones, which were themselves scheduled fo r  commassation.
A fu rth e r reason fo r the w ithdrawals and dissolutions was the low 
incomes paid by collectives. While th is was always a serious problem, under the 
prevailing p o lit ica l crisis the low dividend paid because o f the low er than 
average harvest in 1956 fu rth e r increased discontent. Accord ing to  one source 
the poor 1956 harvest meant tha t a dividend o f 2.5 kgs o f bread grain per labour- 
day un it could only be paid in some co llectives i f  the others lim ite d  th e ir 
d is tribu tion  to  no more than 4 kgs and handed over the remainder to the weakest 
farms. I t  was also antic ipated tha t many individual peasants would be forced to  
reduce th e ir own consumption to pay taxes and f u l f i l  th e ir  deliveries to  the 
state. So the ru ra l scene in the autumn o f 1956 gave cause fo r  serious
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dissatisfaction. I f  they had met th e ir obligations to  the state in fu l l many 
peasants would have had hardly any food le ft .  So the peasants were forced to  
s trike  back at the regime as best they could; they w ithheld production, refused 
to de live r food and decided to  dissolve th e ir  co llectives. The regim e lacked the 
power to  stop them. The M in ister o f Procurement, Andras Szobek, in his report 
to  the C entra l Com m ittee on 23rd October 1956, the day the disturbances broke 
out, noted tha t there had been a sharp decline in deliveries in many parts o f the 
country:
during recent weeks, but especially during the last few days, 
both contractua l and compulsory deliveries declined
d ra m a tic a lly .(2 2 7 )
He went on to  say tha t
the reason why up to  now no open confron ta tion  has occurred
is because I have instructed procurement agents to  be
extrem ely pa tien t.(228)
Dissolutions, and calls fo r dissolutions, had also begun in response to  the
extensive propaganda campaigns waged by the opposition against the ledership's 
policy on the development o f co llectives and against compulsory deliveries. 
There had been a whole series o f in teresting debates and published a rtic les  which 
examined the fau lts  o f the policy o f co llec tiv isa tion , and o f co llectives, and 
discussed the importance, and fu tu re , o f individual farm ing. Since these debates 
and a rtic les  set the main trend o f developments im m ediate ly before the
revolu tion is i t  ins truc tive  to  look at some o f them at length.
The party's weekly peasant newspaper, Szabad Fold, in itia te d  the debate, 
in September 1956, w ith  an a rtic le  by Andras Sandor, 'New roles fo r  the 
C o llective  Farms' (Uj szerepet a term eloszdvetkezeteknek), which raised the 
issue o f the role played by the lower, Types I & II farm s in co lle c tiv isa tio n  and
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discussed c r it ic a lly  the ongoing 'feud between the au thorities  and co llec tive  
(229)members'. Another more extensive a rtic le  by Istvan Markus, reporting  on a
debate organised the W riters' Association (attended by some 1400, m ostly middle
peasants and co llec tive  members) and published under the t i t le  'Summing up in
Somogy' (Somogyi Osszegezes) created even greater in te rest and caused fu rth e r
(230)uncerta in ty among party functionaries. Markus, a ru ra l sociologist (w ith
three o f his associates) studied the history o f four typ ica l v illages in the county 
o f Somogy fo r two months. They found tha t co llec tiv isa tion  had at f irs t  
succeeded among the very poor peasants (who had nothing to  loose), but tha t 
when the regime had attem pted to  co llectiv ise  the 'm iddle ' peasants i t  had 
encountered intense opposition. This opposition had become apparent by 1950 
and led to  the regime to  employ force. These policies, although helping to  
extend the co llectiv ised sector, had at the same tim e  demoralised those peasants 
who clung to  th e ir farm s w ith  de trim enta l results. There had been a s ign ifican t 
change fo r the be tte r in 1953, when the Nagy regime put a stop to  the po licy  o f 
force and perm itted  peasants to  leave the co llectives. When the new drive fo r 
co llectiv isa tion  began in 1955, a fte r the fa ll o f Nagy and the re tu rn  o f Rakosi to  
fu ll power, the various form s o f d irec t pressures and fo rce  were applied again 
even 'more openly and more generally than during 1951/52'. A f te r  th is h is to rica l 
survey, Markus turned his a tten tion  to  the problems o f the co llectives and 
possible solutions. The substance o f his argument was not to  oppose socialised 
agricu lture as such but to  challenge the whole concept o f co llectives and the 
regime's policies which had sacrificed productive e ffic ie n cy  in agricu ltue to  
dogmatism and centralised contro l. These policies could bring about the collapse 
and abandonment o f ind iv idua lly  worked farm s - and thus the consolidation o f 
those lands in large-scale farm s -  but could not create econom ically viable la rge- 
scale farms. Markus proposed tha t i f  fu tu re  co lle c tiv isa tion  was to  be 
successful, sweeping reform s were necessary to meet the fo llow ing  demands o f 
the peasants, which he called the 'essence' o f his programme:
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(i) co llectives which were econom ically viable should remain, those which
were not should be allowed to  dissolve,
(ii) co llectives should be allowed to  choose th e ir  own members when they
were established, and even to  accept 'kulaks' i f  they so desired,
( iii)  co llectives should have a maximum o f freedom in conducting th e ir
operations,
(iv) co llectives should be allowed to  purchase and m aintain th e ir  own
agricu ltu re  machines ra ther than employing the services o f s ta te -run 
MTS -  which should be disbanded.
Markus’ a rtic le  was taken up as the subject o f debate by the P e to fi C irc le  on 
25th September, when a ll the speakers were reported to  have agreed tha t 
'fundamental changes' were required in the regime's ag ricu ltu ra l po licy:
the ha ll was jam-packed ... scientists, co llec tive  farm  
chairmen, w riters, ag ricu ltu ra l experts and leaders o f v illage 
councils attended ... the debate lasted u n til a fte r m idnight. 
The speakers a ll, w ithout exception, took the position tha t 
co llec tiv isa tion  is necessary but c ritic ised  its  effects.(231)
Follow ing this, on 7th October, Szabad Fold agreed tha t the Markus a rtic le  was 
an excellent one and declared that,
the summary of the experience acquired in Somogy county 
shows tha t there is something wrong w ith  the development o f 
agricu ltu re  along socialist lines. The leaders o f the great 
drive fo r co llectiv isa tion  which began in 1949 in county 
Somogy and, we may add, in other d is tr ic ts  disregarded the
preva iling conditions, the social and economic situation; thus
in more than one case co llec tiv isa tion  was forced in a 
d irec tion  disliked by the village, against the w ill o f the mass
o f the p e a s a n t r y . ( 2 o 2 )
On 17th October another a rtic le , 'Garden Hungary' (Kertm agyarorszag), was
again taken up by the Pe tofi C irc le  as the top ic fo r a debate in Kaposvar, in
Somogy county, discussing the problems and fu tu re  o f co llectives and the
(233)significance o f individual farm ing. On the basis o f th is  debate numerous
debates were organised in other d is tric ts , in v itin g  county leaders from  Baranya,
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Zala, Hajdu-Bihar and Bacs, among others, involving some 1,200-1,300
(234)people. F inally, on 21st October, Szabad Fold carried an a rtic le  by Istvan
Dobi, Chairman of the Presidium o f the National Assembly, in which he adm itted 
'serious mistakes' and 'unscrupulousness o f shocking proportions' in the campaign 
to  organise collectives. He also adm itted tha t
many thousands o f good individual farm ers were put out o f 
production and bad co llec tive  farm s substituted, poorly run 
by disillusioned, em bittered p e a s a n t s . (235)
These debates, conducted under the patronage o f the party, showed there was a
deep cleavage between those who wanted to continue co llec tiv is ing  and those
who were opposed to  it .  The language o f the opponents, in fa c t, was very s im ila r
to  tha t o f Gomulka's supporters in Poland. They did not oppose co llec tive
fa rm ing  per se, nor the e ffo rts  to  conduct propaganda campaigns in favour o f it ,
but th e ir  insistence tha t i t  should be genuinely vo luntary and tha t only
econom ically viable farms should be formed would have put an end to  any la rge-
scale programme. Furtherm ore, Markus' proposal tha t co llec tive  farm s be
allowed to  have th e ir own heavy machinery was directed against the system of
state contro l that operated through the Machine T rac to r Stations. I t  is
reasonable to  assume, however, tha t many o f those who favoured these proposals
were not so much concerned w ith  im proving the co llec tive  farm s as w ith
abolishing them altogether.
These debates, publications and propaganda campaigns re fle c t the
situa tion  in agricu lture im m ediate ly before the revo lu tion began, on 23rd
October 1956. Under the preva iling  atmosphere o f peasant discontent and
dissolution ferm ent the regime resorted to  defensive action and con tra ry  to
statutes, acquiesced at the end o f September in individual w ithdrawals from  the 
(236)collectives. But apart from  th is i t  fa iled  to  respond to  the rap id ly
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dete rio ra ting  s ituation; o ther desperately needed changes in ag ricu ltu ra l policies
were not adopted. A  proposal prepared by the A g ricu ltu ra l Departm ent o f the
C entra l Com m ittee, on the basis o f a meeting attended by ag ricu ltu ra l leaders o f
county party com m ittees on 22nd-23rd October, ind ica ting  to  the P o litbu ro  tha t
(2371’very fast rad ica l changes were needed in ag ricu ltu ra l policies', was fa r  too 
la te  to  have any decisive im pact. Although by the autumn the regime's 
agricu ltu ra l policies had a ll but bankrupted the reputa tion o f the cooperative 
movement in Hungary, and deeply antagonised the individual farm ers, the 
unconstrained freedom o f debate and propaganda campaigns in favour o f the 
peasants did not create an overt revo lu tionary mood among them. I t  did, 
however, achieve tw o im portant things: f irs t,  i t  g rea tly  increased the 
uncerta in ty among party  and state functionaries and, second, i t  made the ru ra l 
population aware tha t urban areas were equally opposed, in te r a lia , to  the 
agricu ltu ra l policies o f the regime. Any rem aining doubts were, o f course, 
dispelled by the uprising in Budapest on 23rd October, when i t  became crysta l 
clear to everyone tha t the 'c ity ' and the 'countryside', perhaps fo r  the f ir s t  tim e 
in h istory, were genuinely united in the pursuit o f a single goal. That was the 
reason fo r the spontaneous, a ll be i t  ra ther cautious, support given by the 
peasantry to  the urban revolutionaries.
A fin a l assessment o f the success o f the co llec tiv isa tion  campaign over
the Rakosi and Gero periods, from  January 1955 to  October 1956, is now in
order. The development in the number o f co llectives and th e ir membership is
(238)shown in Tables 11.4 and 11.5, on pages 918 and 919. '  F irs t, however, a word
of warning. I t  is d if f ic u lt  to measure the success o f the co lle c tiv isa tion  
campaign over th is period in num erical term s accurate ly. This is so fo r  three 
main reasons: f irs t,  the data are concealed by the various o ff ic ia l c la im s and the 
figures provided by the various o ffic ia l sources are o ften not en tire ly  consistent; 
second, the figures given include co llectives and th e ir membership which existed
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merely ’on paper' as nominal groupings and did not ca rry  out proper communal
work, and, th ird , changes in the number o f co llectives and in membership conceal
the fo rm ation  and dissolution and jo in ing  and leaving o f co llectives. No
in form ation  is available about these, and the lack o f m onthly figures means they
cannot be properly calculated. Nevertheless, i t  can be seen from  the tables tha t
while w ithdrawals and dissolutions continued over much o f the period, in 1955
to ta l membership o f co llectives increased by almost 76,000 while the number o f
co llectives increased by 435. Taking the period from  December 1954 to  October
1956 as a whole, the to ta l number o f co llectives increased by 630, while the
increase in to ta l membership was 127,000. The number o f co llectives and the
to ta l membership and land area never recovered the June 1953 leve l and was
substantia lly below the peak reached at the end o f 1952. On closer exam ination
the figures show only a nominal change in the to ta l number o f co llectives a fte r
December 1955, although the emphasis on Type III co llectives during the
co llec tiv isa tion  drive is c learly  shown by a s ign ifican t increase in th e ir  number.
A fte r  June 1956 both the number o f co llectives and th e ir membership began to
decline m arginally when, during the summer, peasants entering and leaving the
collectives were more or less balanced; there was a nominal increase in the area,
however, which may be a ttribu tab le  to  the fa c t tha t peasants began to  'o ffe r '
land to  the state. The number o f co llectives, membership and area under
collectives began to  rise again from  September, la rge ly owing to  the extensive
commassation programme commencing in tha t month. F ina lly , fo r the sake o f
completeness, i t  should be noted tha t the number o f MTS declined from  364 in
December 1954 to  312 in December 1955 and 287 by December 1956. These
changes were largely due to  ra tiona lisa tion  measures. W ith regard to  State
Farms the change, w ith  a decline from  494 in June 1954 to  486 in June 1956, was
(239)even less pronounced.
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In short, in spite o f a ll the pressures, coercion and, o ften, te rro r, the 
success o f the regim e’s co llec tiv isa tion  po licy was, to  say the least, extrem ely 
modest. Whether the new tac tics  m ight have succeeded in a tta in ing  the goal set 
fo r  1960 is a question le f t  unanswered in the rubble o f the revo lt.
Meanwhile, in the p o lit ic a l sphere, the removal o f Rakosi, the main 
ta rge t o f the opposition forces, had brought a reduction in p o lit ic a l tension in the 
country. A ttacks on the regime by the small organisation groups, both inside and 
outside the party, lost th e ir momentum. And w ith  the universities closed fo r  the 
summer vacation, a re la tive  calm descended m om entarily upon the country. As 
a result, Gero, believing tha t the im m ediate p o lit ica l crisis was over, made some 
symbolic concessions but on the whole attem pted to  continue the fo rm er 
policies. As a p o lit ica l gesture, he arranged the arrest o f M ihaly Farkas and 
other secret police agents (including Farkas’ son) lif te d  the sanctions against 
rebellious w rite rs  and, in September, gave permission to  the P e to fi C irc le  to  
organise meetings again. To rescue the rapid ly de te rio ra ting  economy, and 
especially to re lieve the mounting pressures on the fore ign trade sector caused 
by the growing fore ign indebtedness, he secured the help o f the Soviet Union, 
obtaining 10 m ill, dollars and 60 m ill Rubles in the form  o f long-te rm  cred its  on 
4th O c to b e r . ^ ^
During the calm summer months Gero was m ainly engaged in the 
d if f ic u lt  task o f winning not only the fu ll support o f Moscow but, especially, 
Khrushchev’s help and mediation on his behalf to  obtain T ito ’s endorsement fo r 
his leadership -  T ito  was not a ltogether happy w ith  the replacem ent o f Rakosi by 
Gero. Towards the end o f the summer the country was even le f t  w ithout 
e ffe c tive  leadership: on 8 th September Gero le f t  fo r  a holiday in the Soviet
Union and the next day Janos Kadar departed, leading a delegation to  attend the 
8 th  Congress o f the Chinese Party. U n til th e ir re turn, on 7th O ctober, the 
leadership was le f t  in the hands o f the two secretaries, Lajos Acs and Istvan
- 921 -
Kovacs, and Andras Hegediis; a ll three, according to  ra ther unkind o ff ic ia l
(241)descriptions, were 'the embodiment o f uncerta in ty  and impotence'. While on 
holiday in the Crimea, Gero, together w ith  Khrushchev, 'acc iden ta lly ' met T ito , 
also on holiday in the Soviet Union, f irs t,  on 30th September, fo r  p re lim inary 
ta lks and then again, th is  tim e  jo ined by Kadar -  on his way back from  China - 
M ikoyan and Suslov, on 6 th  October. A fte r  Gero's repeated apologies fo r  having 
'slandered the Yugoslav leaders' his promises to  correct past mistakes and plea 
fo r  support and the re-establishment o f friendship - the discussions helped along 
by Khrushchev -  T ito , to rn  between his desire to  please Khrushchev and his 
prejudice against Gero, had f in a lly  shown willingness to  fo rge t the past, on one 
condition: tha t Im re Nagy be readm itted to  the party. To continue the 
discussions and work out the details o f a possible new accord, T ito  inv ited  a 
Hungarian delegation to Belgrade.
Meanwhile, at home, as soon as the summer was over, and the opposition
began to  fee l deceived, the pressure and attacks upon the regim e in tensified
again. Dealings in in te rna tiona l diplomacy could not hide the public's
dissatisfaction w ith  Gero. The opposition, perceiving the regime's vu lne rab ility ,
focused on two issues: the complete rehab ilita tion  o f Rajk and the readmission o f
Im re Nagy to  the party and the leadership o f the country. Rajk's reburia l, w ith
honours, had long been demanded by his widow and his friends. In the face o f
mounting pressure the party agreed and the fin a l act in the h is to ry  o f the 'Rajk
a ffa ir ', his re in ternm ent, took place, w ith  due pomp, on 6 th  October, and was
attended by some 300,000 people. The reburia l, apart from  provid ing a pe rfec t
occasion fo r  a mass demonstration, caused a 'profound cris is o f conscience'
(242)among functionaries and activ is ts , adding fu rth e r to  th e ir  unce rta in ty  and
vacilla tion .
During th is tim e, in te rm itte n t negotiations took place between the party  
centre and Imre Nagy, who fo rm a lly  asked fo r readmission to  the pa rty  on 4th
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October, but despite the advice and e ffo rts  at persuasion o f M ikoyan and Suslov
he refused to  exercise ’se lf-c ritic ism '. Delayed p a rtly  by the absence o f Gero
and Kadar abroad and p a rtly  by Nagy's stubborness, i t  took the Po litbu ro  nine
days to  endorse his re instatem ent, on 13th October. But even at th is  la te  state
o f the growing p o lit ic a l tu rm o il a heated argument developed between Gero and
Nagy before the la tte r 's  f in a l readmission. Since no agreement was reached,
however, on whether Nagy would be given a post in the power s truc tu re , the
'Nagy a ffa ir ' remained fa r from  resolved. His case could have been se ttled  -  and
the subsequent revo lu tion perhaps avoided -  had he been alowed to  re jo in  the
government, possibly even to  replace Hegediis as prime m in ister (and Kadar
(244)made f irs t  secretary). Gero, however, resisted w ith  a ll his power. 1 The next
day, 14th October, Gero - having now complied w ith  T ito 's request -  departed at
the head o f the delegation, comprising Kadar, Kovacs, Apro and Hegediis, to
Belgrade, tak ing up the in v ita tion  issued in the Crim ea to  reach an
accommodation w ith  T ito  and, at the same tim e, hoping perhaps to  use the
(245)occasion to  block Nagy's re -en try  in to  po litics . During th e ir  absence,
lasting over a week, Lajos Acs, in charge at party  headquarters, apparently kept 
sending telegrams to Gero warning him about the growing p o lit ic a l tensions at 
home and urging the leaders to  re tu rn  im m ediate ly. But not w ishing to  offend 
th e ir  hosts and endanger th e ir new reconcilia tion , the delegation stayed in 
Yugoslavia fo r some days a fte r the main business was c o n c lu d e d .^ ^  Gero's 
v is it f in a lly  bore f ru it  w ith  the signing o f a declaration o f 'friendsh ip  and 
cooperation' between the two countries. This was perhaps Gero's only success in 
his three months term  of o ffice ; i t  made l i t t le  impression on the Hungarian 
public, however.
While Gero was away a cris is unexpectedly exploded in Poland, 
incomplete accounts o f which appeared in the Hungarian press. This la tes t news, 
in the midst o f growing critic ism s, speculation and revo lu tionary ideas appearing
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in many papers and journals, was the fin a l event needed to  'f ire ' Hungary. By
standing up against Soviet in te rfe rence in Polish in te rna l a ffa irs  Gomulka had
succeeded in reaching an accommodation w ith  the Russians and being accepted
as F irs t Secretary o f the Party; on 21st October he was able to  announce tha t
Poland was to  go her own way. This, fo r the Hungarian opposition, both
organised and popular, was o il on f ire . The Hungarians saw a re fle c tio n  o f
themselves and th e ir  own aspirations in the Poles and th e ir p o lit ic a l crisis.
During the weekend o f 19th-22nd October, un ivers ity  students and
in te llectua ls  throughout the country, taking advantage o f the Polish
developments -  and helped by the sp lit in the Hungarian party leadership over the
past years -stepped up th e ir ag ita tion . W ithout ove rtly  a ttack ing  the system
itse lf, the voice o f the opposition became nationa lis tic  and anti-Sovie t: by 16th
October i t  was openly demanding tha t Soviet forces should leave the country.
O vernight the idea o f pe titions and resolutions spread like  w ild fire , the demands,
varying from  5 to  16, were everywhere d iffe ren t. Follow ing the resolutions
enthusiastically passed in the p rov inc ia l c ities  o f Gyor and Szeged on 22nd
October, the re -ac tiv ia ted  P e to fi C irc le  in Budapest adopted a resolution which,
apart from  ca lling  fo r the revision o f the Second F ive-Y ear Plan, the explusion
of Rakosi from  the party, the public t r ia l o f Farkas, the pub lica tion o f fore ign
trade agreements and freedom of expression in lite ra tu re , included the proposal
tha t Im re Nagy should re jo in  the C entra l Com m ittee and the government. On
the same day a mass meeting o f students at the Technical U n ivers ity  o f
Budapest, joined by engineers and workers from  many fac to ries  also adopted an
(247)even more radica l resolution which made 16 demands: '
1. w ithdraw al o f Soviet forces,
2 . new, secret, party elections,
3. re instatem ent o f Nagy as Prim e M inister,
4. public t r ia l o f Farkas and his accomplices,
5. m u lti-pa rty  general elections,
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6 . re-exam ination o f Soviet-Hungarian relations on the basis o f equality,
7. economic reorganisation as recommended by experts,
8 . pub lication o f fo re ign  trade agreements,
9. revision o f industria l production norms,
10 . s im ila r revision o f the ag ricu ltu ra l de livery system,
1 1 . release o f p o lit ic a l prisoners,
1 2 . freedom o f expression and the press,
13. removal o f the S talin statue in Budapest,
14. resto ra tion  o f Kossuth’s coat o f arms,
15. expression o f so lida rity  w ith  Poland and
16. the convocation o f a Youth Parliam ent.
A fte r  learn ing tha t the W rite rs ’ Association proposed to  express its  so lida rity
w ith  Poland on the fo llow ing  day, 23rd October, by laying a wreath a t the statue
of General Bern, a hero o f Hungary’s War o f Independence o f 1848-1849, who was
of Polish orig in, the meeting decided to  organise a s ilen t dem onstration to
express th e ir  sympathy w ith  the Poles on the same occasion.
The top Hungarian leadership - Gero, Kadar, Hegediis and Kovacs - had,
o f course, no knowledge of these la test disturbances breaking out a ll over the
country. The ir special tra in  re tu rn ing from  Belgrade arrived in Budapest in m id-
morning o f 23rd October. They were fee ling extrem ely pleased at having
succeeded in obtaining T ito ’s support - convincing him tha t as successors to
Rakosi they were acceptable friends and allies. But th e ir  fee ling  o f trium ph was
quickly spoiled when Acs, who, together w ith  the rest o f the Politburo members
(and re latives), had waited anxiously fo r  th e ir  re tu rn  at the station, wasted no
tim e in b rie fing  them about the p o lit ic a l s ituation and impending student
(248)demonstration. But even a hurried ly convened Po litburo meeting was unable 
to  stop the developments.
Early in the morning o f 23rd October the student demands had become 
known throughout Budapest. Radio Budapest re fe rred  to  the planned 
dem onstration but la te r announced a communique from  the M in is te r o f the 
In te rio r p roh ib iting  it .  The ban was, however, lif te d  during the early afternoon, 
when the dem onstration was already underway. Thousands o f young people took 
part, including students, fac to ry  workers, soldiers in uniform  and others.
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Standing beside the statue o f General Bern, Peter Veres, President o f the 
W riters ' Association, read a manifesto to  the crowd, who also listened to  a 
proclam ation o f the students' sixteen demands. Most o f the crowd afterw ards 
crossed the Danube to  jo in  demonstrators at the huge Kossuth Square, in fro n t o f 
the Parliam ent Building, where about 300,000 people had gathered, wanting to 
hear Imre Nagy and demanding redress o f th e ir own and Hungary's grievances. 
A fte r  repeated calls Nagy re luc tan tly  addressed the crowd b r ie fly  from  a 
balcony o f the Parliam ent Building. So fa r there was nothing to  suggest th a t the 
dem onstration would end in any other way than the crowds re tu rn ing  home. An 
episode, however, at 8.00 pm in the evening greatly  em bittered the people. The 
public was eagerly aw aiting a speech by the F irs t Secretary, Gero, which he was 
to  broadcast at tha t tim e. The general hope was tha t he would take in to  account 
the popular demands expressed by the students and would make some 
conc ilia to ry  announcement. Gero's speech, however, made none o f the hoped fo r  
concessions. He described the demonstrators as 'mobs' and 'enemies o f the 
people', whose purpose was to  'undermine the power o f the working class ... to  
shake people's fa ith  in th e ir party ', and whose c ritic ism  o f the Soviet m ilita ry  
presence and o f exp lo itive  trade agreements did not contain a grain o f tru th  
because the tru th  was tha t,
the Soviet Union not only liberated our country from  the yoke 
o f H orthy fascism and German im perialism  but a fte r the war, 
when our country lay prostrate, the Soviet Union also stood 
by us and concluded agreements w ith  us on the basis o f fu ll 
equality, and tha t i t  s t i l l  continues th is p o lic y .^ 4 9 )
The harsh tone o f his cold, arrogant voice brought home to  his listeners, perhaps 
more than anything u n til now, the nature o f the power they wished to  re fo rm . 
The very same evening a large crowd o f students went to  the Radio Broadcasting 
Building, w ith  the in ten tion o f making another a ttem pt (the f irs t,  on the evening
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of 22nd October, had fa iled) to  have th e ir  16 demands broadcast, in order to 
bring them to  the a tten tion  o f the nation as a whole. Once again, the leadership 
stubbornly refused to  perm it the demands to  be read over the radio. The build ing 
was protected by a detachment o f Security Police, who panicked and opened f ire  
on the s t i l l  unarmed crowd, k illin g  a number o f people and wounding others. In 
so fa r as any one moment can be selected as the turn ing point which changed the 
peaceful dem onstration in to  a vio lent uprising, i t  would be th is moment, when
the in tensively hated and universally feared secret police attacked defenceless
i (250) people.
An uprising swept the cap ita l and the national fe rm ent grew sw ift ly , 
w ith  the army jo in ing  the revolutionaries. The figh tin g  tha t broke out on the 
evening o f 23rd October pushed Nagy and his fo llowers back in to  power. But the 
'libe ra l' fac tion  o f the party was unable to  stem the course o f events. The 
uprising closed a chapter and opened a new one in the h is to ry  o f post-war 
Hungary and in ag ricu ltu ra l economic developments.
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11.3 The Revolution and the Peasantry, October-Decem ber 1956: collapse o f
co llec tiv isa tion
Few h is to rica l events have received as thorough chronological and 
ana ly tica l a tten tion  as the Hungarian Revolution, which began on 23rd October 
as a peaceful mass demonstration by students and fla red in to  armed revo lt, 
raging fo r several days. In the present context, then, consideration w ill be 
lim ite d  to  those aspects o f its  development tha t re la te  d ire c tly  to  the peasantry 
and a g r ic u l tu r e .^ ^
In a period o f th irteen  days the revolu tion, in the p o lit ic a l sphere, passed
through three d is tinc t phases. The f ir s t  phase extended from  the in it ia l lim ite d
Soviet m ilita ry  in tervention to  Gero's fa ll and Nagy's rise to  power. During the
night o f 23rd/24th October the C entra l Com m ittee of the HWP was hurried ly
convened (the meeting was o rig ina lly  scheduled fo r 31st October), and a fte r
pro tracted  and heated debate Gero fin a lly  agreed to  the re insta tem ent o f Imre
Nagy to  the Centra l Com m ittee and the Politburo, and also to  his appointm ent as
a sort o f 'figurehead' prim e m inister, to  replace Andras Hegediis, who remained
as F irs t Deputy prem ier, fo r a few days. Gero was confirm ed as F irs t Secretary
o f the party, but the Centra l C om m ittee approved lim ite d  personnel changes, in
both its e lf and in the Politburo, to  include some moderates and centris ts , in te r 
(252)alia, Janos Kadar. A t the same tim e, in the lig h t o f the po ten tia l
un rea lia b ility  o f the Hungarian Arm ed Forces, and the weakening o f the Secret 
Police (AVH), the regime hastily  asked fo r assistance from  Soviet troops, which 
had recen tly  been re inforced and had been on the a le rt since 20th O ctober. The ir 
in tervention, in the event, m isfired since it  both crystalised the Hungarians' 
objectives and presented them w ith  a visib le enemy to  fig h t. I f  th e ir  ea rlie r 
demands were, perhaps, too diverse to  be p o lit ic a lly  e ffe c tive , they could now 
focus on ge tting  the Russians out o f th e ir country. Early in the morning o f 24th
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October figh ting  broke out at several points in Budapest between Soviet troops, 
helped by Hungarian Secret Police, and the insurgents, la te r to  be named 
’freedom figh te rs ’ -  com prising s trik ing  workers, in te llectua ls, soldiers and a 
large proportion o f students and youth generally. The ordinary police 
sympathised w ith  the rebels, g iving them weapons or fig h tin g  on th e ir side. 
C erta in  units o f the Hungarian army, too, fought as such on the side o f the 
insurgents, but the army as a whole d isintegrated from  the s ta rt o f the 
revolu tion. Hungarian soldiers, as d is tinc t from  most senior o ffice rs , handed 
over lig h t weapons to  th e ir com patriots and opened the door o f m unition stores. 
The f ir s t  m ilita ry  confron ta tion  between the Soviet armed forces and the 
insurgents resulted in some casualties on both sides, and in the destruction o f 
much Soviet m ilita ry  hardware, but since i t  was lim ite d  in scope - the hesitant 
Soviet leadership s t i l l  hoped fo r a p o lit ica l solution to the troubles -  i t  soon 
subsided to  an essentially defensive deployment. For a b rie f spell a fte r  th is only 
isolated clashes occurred in the Budapest area, while in the provinces local
/OC9\
communist o ffic ia ls  handed over power w ith  hardly any resistance. Here,
the f ir s t  days o f the revo lu tion saw the transfer o f power from  the communist
(254)bureaucracy to  the new Revolutionary and Workers' Councils.
(255)In his f irs t  prime m in is te ria l radio broadcast , on 24th O ctober, Nagy 
- having apparently agreed to  the im position o f a curfew  and m a rtia l law, 
imposed in his name by the C entra l Com m ittee -  called upon the insurgents to  
lay down th e ir arms and stop fig h tin g  in order to  avoid fu rth e r bloodshed. He 
promised an amnesty and pledged his government to  extend dem ocratisation o f 
the country in every fie ld  o f party, state, p o lit ic a l and economic life , on the 
basis o f his June 1953 programme, to  raise liv in g  standards and to  pursue the 
development o f 'socialism ' in a manner 'corresponding to  our national 
characteristics '. He excoriated 'hostile elements' who had jo ined the 'ranks o f 
peacefu lly dem onstrating Hungarian youth' and 'turned against the People's
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Democracy and the power o f the people.' The surrender deadline was then 
postponed several tim es w ithout e ffe c t, u n til i t  was f in a lly  abandoned 
a ltogether. However, the rebel resistance in Budapest fa lte red  somewhat
but i t  was renewed on 25th October a fte r  Soviet tanks and Hungarian security 
forces opened f ire  on an unarmed group o f demonstrators in fro n t o f the 
Parliam ent building, k illin g  more than 170 people. This massacre shocked and 
em bittered the nation. By th is tim e even the Soviet leadership had come to 
realise tha t Gero's position was no longer tenable. On 24th October Mikoyan and 
Suslov arrived in Budapest to  assess the p o lit ic a l s ituation. They found tha t 
despite the reorganisation o f the party's leading bodies Gero remained in 
command, but tha t his e ffe c tive  power did not extend much fu rth e r than a few 
government and party  strongholds. A f te r  long discussions the Politburo, guided 
by Mikoyan and Suslov, decided tha t Gero had to  resign and be replaced as F irs t 
Secretary o f the party  by Kadar. The news o f Gero's departure and Kadar's 
appointment was broadcast shortly a fte r midday on 25th October, and was 
greeted w ith  joy by the Hungarian people; the insurgents, too, derived some 
encouragement. The fo llow ing  day Gero, accompanied by the most d iscredited 
leaders o f the old regime, including Hegediis, sought the security  o f Soviet 
te rr ito ry . W ith th e ir departure Nagy was f in a lly  free to move from  party  
headquarters to  the Parliam ent building, sym bolically severing his dependence on 
the party.
Soon a fte r the announcement o f the changes both Kadar and Nagy went
/OCQ\
on the a ir to appeal fo r  order. Kadar acknowledged tha t the uprising two 
days before had in it ia lly  been 'honest and peaceful', but he cla im ed i t  had 
degenerated (a fte r a few hours), 'in  accordance w ith  the in tentions o f a n ti­
dem ocratic and counter-revolutionary elements', in to  an 'armed a tta ck  against 
the state power o f the People's Democracy'. He promised tha t a fte r  the 
resto ra tion o f order the government would conduct ta lks w ith  the Soviet
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(259)government 'in  the sp irit o f com plete equality '. Nagy's address, 
im m edia te ly a fte r him, was more conc ilia to ry , although he, too, re fe rred  b rie fly  
to  the 'sm all group o f counter-revolutionaries' who had provoked the disorders. 
But he did promise tha t, a fte r order had been restored, he would submit an 'a ll-  
embracing and well-founded programme o f reform s' to  the National Assembly. 
The im plem entation o f tha t programme, he said, demanded the reorganisation o f 
the government 'on the basis o f a revived P a trio tic  People's Front (PPF), ra lly ing  
w ith in  its  ranks the broadest dem ocratic forces o f the nation'. He too 
announced, more c learly  than Kadar, tha t his government had begun 
negotiations, again 'on the basis o f complete equality', w ith  the Soviet Union 
concerning, in te r a lia , the w ithdraw al o f Soviet forces stationed in Hungary. 
F ina lly , he called upon those who took up arms 'but not w ith  the in ten tion  o f 
overthrow ing our People's Democracy' to  stop figh ting  and promised tha t no 
penal proceedings would be ins titu ted  against them. C learly, th is declaration 
re flec ted  the ineffectiveness o f ea rlie r appeals to stop figh tin g  and the promise 
o f amnesty.
Negotiations between Mikoyan and Suslov and the Hungarians on the
extent o f reform s necessary to stabilise the p o lit ica l s ituation in the country
resulted in a declaration by the Centra l Com m ittee, 'led by comrade Imre Nagy,
(2fi0)on the afternoon of 26th October. This declaration recommended the
e lection o f a new national, government, 'on the basis o f the broadest national 
foundation', which would 'make good, w ithout fa il, the crimes o f the past' and 
in it ia te  negotiations, 'on the Polish model', w ith  the Soviet government. I t  
approved the election o f Workers' Councils in the facto ries, but emphasised tha t 
the maintenance of socialism ccould not be put in question. The Soviet 
leadership was apparently w illin g  to  to le ra te  a re fo rm is t government as long as 
the supremacy o f the party was maintained, i f  necessary by the presence o f 
Soviet and armed forces.
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In the meantime, strikes and figh tin g  continued in Budapest and spread 
throughout the country, w ith  rebels a ttack ing  or in contro l o f various provinc ia l 
centres, e.g., Gyor, Szeged, Szolnok, Pecs, M iskolc, Sopron, Vac and Hatvan. 
They were re in forced by the mass desertions o f Hungarian troops to  th e ir  side. 
Revolutionary lea fle ts , signed by the 'Provisional Revolutionary Hungarian 
Government' and 'N ationa l Defence Com m ittee ' appeared throughout the 
country, w ith  calls fo r: a national government, the rescinding o f m a rtia l law, 
denunciation o f the Warsaw Pact, w ithdrawal o f Soviet troops, an im m ediate 
p o lit ica l amnesty, pu tting  Hungarian socialism on a rea lly  dem ocratic basis, 
disarmament o f the Secret Police, continued demonstrations, 'u n til v ic to ry ' and 
recognition o f Nagy and Kadar as members o f the 'R evolutionary Hungarian 
Government'. Concurrently, across the country the much hated symbols o f 
communist rule disappeared: red stars were removed from  public buildings, the 
communist coat-of-arm s was cut out o f flags and there was the occasional 
bonfire o f party publications.
I t  was against the background o f revolu tionary a c tiv itie s  and pressures, 
and continual negotiations w ith  the Russians, tha t Nagy prepared to  announce 
the fo rm ation  o f his new government, which he did at midday on 27th O ctober. In 
order to gain public confidence, he inv ited  both communists and non-communists 
to  jo in  him. The non-communists were two fo rm er leaders o f the Independent 
Smallholders' Party, Zoltan T ildy  (back from  prison) as m in ister w ithout 
po rtfo lio , and Bela Kovacs (also just back from  prison) as m in ister o f agricu ltu re , 
both o f whom commanded some sympathy but, on the whole, carried l i t t le  
weight, and Ferenc Erdei, Deputy Prem ier. W ith his record o f eager 
subservience to  the Stalin ists while a representative o f the National Peasant 
Party he was more o f a lia b ility  than an a ttra c tio n  to the non-communists. The 
non-communists, at th is stage, served in a personal, non-party, capacity. The 
Social Democrats had not ye t joined in the government. Nagy's changes were,
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however, la rge ly  cosmetic, as the m a jo rity  o f his government were communists, 
p rim a rily  centrists like  Kadar and revisionists like  Gyorgy Lukacs. This 
government was a sort o f trans ition  between a not to ta lly  de-Stalinised one- 
party  government and a coa lition . Because o f the tig h t cordon tha t surrounded 
the party  headquarters and the Parliam ent build ing (w ith  Nagy v ir tu a lly  a 
prisoner), th is government was not at f ir s t  able to  function  fu lly  or 
independently. I t  ce rta in ly  did not impress the insurgents and the revo lu tionary 
com mitteess im m ediate ly denounced the communists' predominance in the large 
26 member government. The fo rm ation  o f th is government, however, marked 
the beginnings o f Nagy's personal libera tion  -  at least he had taken measures on 
his own, and openly. W ith this the f irs t  phase o f the revolu tion ended.
The second phase was one o f gradual consolidation. I t  witnessed the 
evolution o f the Nagy government -  under a great surge o f popular pressure 
re flec ted  in the unceasing flow  o f delegations to  Nagy - toward a m u ltipa rty  
coa lition . I t  was a period during which Nagy, casting aside his fo rm er hesita tion, 
slow ly but surely became convinced o f the v a lid ity  o f the revo lu tionary cause 
and the need fo r his government to  satisfy the leg itim a te  demands o f the people. 
I t  was presumably also a period during which Nagy was under judgem ent in 
Moscow.
On the morning o f 28th October Nagy ordered an im m ediate cease-fire 
and instructed the security  forces to  f ig h t only i f  attacked. He also indicated 
tha t a new national army would be form ed. The Soviet troops patched up a 
tem porary truce, and in the provinces they w ithdrew  from  the towns to  camp in 
the countryside. Fighting, apart from  a few  isolated skirmishes, stopped a fte r 
th is date, la rge ly on the insurgents' term s. The cease-fire became fu lly  
e ffe c tive  by the tim e  a new cabinet took o ffic e  on 30th October. L a te r on the
(9R -I \
same day, when broadcasting the programme o f his new government, Nagy
rejected the view tha t 'sees the popular movement as a coun ter-revo lu tion ' and
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promised to  disband the Security Police (AVH ) a fte r  the resto ra tion o f order. 
The resentment against the AVH , however, ws so universal and deep tha t he was 
obliged to take th is decisive step the fo llow ing  day, on 29th October. As a result 
Nagy freed h im self from  the contro l o f the AVH fo r the f ir s t  tim e. In his 
speech, Nagy undertook to  review  wages and salaries, production norms and 
w e lfare benefits and promised aid to  both priva te  and co llec tive  farm s and to  put 
an end to  'the serious ille ga litie s ' com m itted in the co llec tive  fa rm  movement 
and division o f land. He announced tha t agreement had been reached on the 
question o f Soviet m ilita ry  w ithdraw al from  Budapest and re ite ra ted  tha t 
negotiations were in progress to  se ttle  re lations between Hungary and the Soviet 
Union, including the question o f w ithdrawal o f a ll Soviet troops stationed in 
Hungary. The frequent re ite ra tio n  tha t the 'negotiatons fo r Soviet w ithdraw al' 
were in progress indicated tha t Nagy did not have a mandate from  the Soviet 
leadership to  make such a promise. The revolutionaries, however, re jected any 
government tha t did not promise im mediate evacuation o f Soviet troops from  
Hungary.
Also on the 28th October, the C entra l Com m ittee announced its
abdication and delegated its  'power', fo r the duration o f the crisis, to  a s ix-
( 2 6 2 )member emergency party  com m ittee, chaired by Kadar. This sm all
'caretaker' pa rty  com m ittee, however, was to  lead a party w ithou t troops, since
the party its e lf d isintegrated during these days. A t the same tim e , the Nagy
government functioned not so much as a government as a ta rge t o f nationwide
pressures fo r more and more rapid and rad ica l changes. Indeed, the whole
country was already in the grip o f a general s trike  in support o f rad ica l reform s.
By th is  tim e, the main demands o f the insurgents, indeed o f the population, had
( 2 6 3 )become quite clear. What they wanted was:
i) a re tu rn  to  m u ltipa rty  democracy, w ith  a communist party  tha t was legal
but w ithout any special prerogatives; general and free  elections, w ith  
candidates to be nominated by the people.
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ii) freedom o f re lig ion, assembly, press and opinion, comparable to  Western 
democracies.
ii i)  agricu ltu re  based on individual peasant holdings; co llectives to  be 
allowed to  carry on i f  th e ir members so desired -  but only on tha t 
condition. No land to  be returned to  its  pre-1945 owners; the 1945 Land 
Reform to  be irrevocable. Peasants who had sustained losses by the 
enforcem ent o f co llec tiv isa tion  to  be given compensation. The hated 
system o f compulsory deliveries to  be abolished.
iv) industria l plants and mines to  rem ain in public ownership, w ith  fa r  
reaching autonomy fo r  the large plants, o r networks o f sm aller plants, to  
be managed by free ly  elected Workers’ Councils.
v) Soviet troops pulled out o f the country as soon as possible and steps to  be 
taken towards making Hungary independent from  the Soviet Union and, 
u ltim a te ly , 'non-aligned*.
In response to the continual flow  of demands, delegations o f workers, Workers' 
Councils, Revolutionary Comm ittees and mounting popular pressures, an 
apparently somewhat re luctan t Nagy fe lt  compelled to go on the a ir on 30th 
October, 'in the in terest o f fu rth e r dem ocratisation' to announce tha t his 
government, w ith  the fu ll agreement o f the Politburo, repudiated the one-party 
system. He proclaimed the re tu rn  to m u lti-p a rty  conditions, on the basis o f 
democracy between coa lition  parties, as had existed a fte r 1 9 4 5 ^ ^  -  and which, 
incidently, had received the blessing o f the A llie d  Contro l Commission on which 
the Soviet Union was represented. In accordance w ith  this decision he announced 
the fo rm ation  o f a new national coa lition  government, w ith  a sm all inner 
cabinet, composed o f Imre Nagy, Geza Losonczy, Janos Kadar (communist 
party), Zoltan T ildy, Bela Kovacs (Indepedent Smallholders' Party), Ferenc Erdei 
(National Peasant Party) and 'a person to  be nominated by the Social Dem ocratic 
Party '. This cabinet would organise a general e lection. Speaking on behalf o f 
the Communist Party, Janos Kadar, F irs t Secretary o f the party, confirm ed tha t, 
as he said, 'to  avoid fu rthe r bloodshed' he had agreed to th is step and supported
/oec\
the coa lition . Kadar, probably like  Nagy h im e lf, was not rea lly  happy to
relinquish to ta l power, but believed tha t only by such a move could the
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communists now a ttem pt to  dominate dem ocratic socialism (as they had done up
to  1948) and perhaps even to  save centra l au thority  from  to ta l collapse.
Follow ing them, T ildy on behalf o f the Smallholders, and Erdei, fo r  the National
Peasant Party, announced the ir wholehearted approval and called upon the ir
respective parties to  begin to  reorganise th e ir long dispersed forces. T ildy, at
the same tim e, in his capacity as M in iste r o f State, also announced tha t the
compulsory delivery system 'which had borne so heavily on the peasants’ would be
abolished ’as o f today’. C onfirm ation o f th is was given the fo llow ing  day, 31st
(266)October, by Nagy and by the M in is try  o f A g ricu ltu re . The Social
Dem ocratic Party was very slow to  get started and was rent by fie rce  in te rna l 
(267)disputes. On the same day numerous other decisions were also made w ith
the aim o f strengthening the national and dem ocratic institu tions o f the country.
A ll remnants o f a rb itra ry  police powers were abolished and p o lit ic a l prisoners -
the most celebrated among them Cardinal Mindszenty, Prim ate o f Hungary -
were released. W ith these announcements one o f the major aims o f the
revolu tion, free elections and a new m u ltipa rty  coa lition  government, was
achieved, apparently w ith  Russian blessing.
Regarding the complex issue o f Soviet a ttitudes to these developments,
i t  w ill su ffice  to  say tha t u n til 30th October the Soviet leadership appeared to  be
undecided. Indeed, Khrushchev la te r revealed that the leadership was divided on
(268)the wisdom o f in tervention. There were probably three main reasons fo r
th is ’wait-and-see’ a ttitude . F irs t, the moderates (and centrists) had recently  
won the argument over the crisis in Poland and had been proved co rrec t by the 
preservation o f communist rule there under Gomulka. Second, the in te rna tiona l 
s ituation between 28th and 30th October was such as to  make the Soviet 
leadership behave cautiously. Undoubtedly, they must have been w e ll in form ed 
about the Anglo-Franco-Israeli preparations fo r a possible o ffensive against 
Egypt. But as long as no action was taken there the Soviet leadership must have
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judged it  prudent to  continue w ith  the w ithdrawals. Third, the domestic
s itua tion  in Hungary s t i l l  seemed to  favour the earch fo r an amicable solution.
On 27th October Mikoyan and Suslov arrived once again in Budapest. I t  is quite
probable tha t Nagy and his government on this occasion succeeded in persuading
the Soviet vis ito rs both o f the seriousness o f the s ituation and o f the v a lid ity  o f
the hopes tha t a peaceful solution could be negotiated between Moscow and
Budapest. Bearing in mind the Polish solution, i t  would seem almost ce rta in  tha t
the Soviet leadership, at this stage, was neither obstinate, in transigent nor
insensitive to  a compromise solution fo r the s ituation in Hungary. I t  is,
therefore , very probable tha t the Soviet leaders were in fa c t prepared to  go as
fa r as they could in making concessions while, at the same tim e, a ttem p ting  to
lim it  and contest every move of w ithdrawal. Indeed, Khrushchev, a ttend ing a
reception at the Turkish embassy on 29th October, went even as fa r as to
(269)envisage a neutra l state fo r  Hungary, s im ila r to  tha t o f Finland. On 30th
October the Soviet government broadcast a declaration, published the fo llow ing
day, in which i t  announced that i t  was ’ready to enter in to  negotiations’ w ith  the
Hungarian government (together w ith  other partic ipants o f the Warsaw Treaty)
on the question o f the ’presence o f Soviet troops on the te rr ito ry  o f Hungary’ and
conceded tha t ’v io la tions’ and mistakes’ had been made ’in re la tions between
Socialist States, pa rticu la rly , in the economic and m ilita ry  spheres'. The
declaraton upheld peaceful coexistence between the Soviet Union and the o ther
Socialist states ’on the princip le o f complete equality, o f respect fo r  te r r ito r ia l
in te g rity , state independence and sovereignty and non-in terference in one
anothers’ in te rna l a ffa irs .' A t the same tim e, i t  warned against the forces o f
’reaction and counter-revolution ' which tried  to  take advantage o f the d iscontent
o f 'pa rt o f the working people’ and to  undermine ’the foundation o f the people's
(270)dem ocratic system ... and restore the old landlords' and cap ita lis ts ' order.'
The Soviet po licy statement was received w ith  great in terest and enthusiasm in
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Hungary: i t  strengthened the hope o f the Hungarian people to  consolidate th e ir  
v ic to ry , while fo r  Nagy and his government i t  c learly  indicated th a t the 
disposition o f the Soviet Union was favourable ra ther than hostile to  a negotiated 
solution.
On the same day Mikoyan and Suslov flew  in to  Budapest fo r  the th ird
tim e  to  negotiate on the basis o f the declaration. A f te r  pro tracted ta lks w ith
Nagy, Kadar, T ildy  and other po litic ians, they le f t  the fo llow ing  day. The ir
discussions focused on three main areas: the im m ediate evacuation o f Soviet
troops, Hungary’s w ithdraw al from  the Warsaw Treaty and the resto ra tion o f the
m u ltipa rty  system -  in a pre-em ptive move just announced by Nagy. Both
Mikoyan and Suslov apparently remained in good sp irit throughout the discussions
- i f  they had any reservations, they did not show them - and at the end, a happy
T ildy  reported they seemed to  have accepted a ll the detailed proposals put
forw ard by the Hungarian government, including T ildy's statem ent to  M ikoyan
(271)tha t Hungary would in any case denounce the Warsaw Treaty. However,
despite the apparent willingness o f Mikoyan to  negotiate, and to  accept the
various proposals, the rea l mood o f the Soviet emissaries, and o f Moscow, must
have become less than concilia to ry , especially a fte r  the fu ll in ten t o f the
Hungarian government had emerged and been conveyed back to  Moscow. M ikoyan
and Suslov were, o f course, in a position to  see at f ir s t  hand the breakdown o f
the one-party system and the restoration o f the m u ltipa rty  system in Hungary.
Moreover, th e ir a ttitu de  must have been changed by the dram atic inc ident at
(272)Party Headquarters in Republic Square (Koztarsasag Ter) ea rlie r in the day.
In addition, on th is  day -  which saw the beginning o f the p a rtia l w ithdraw al, o f 
Soviet forces from  Budapest -  the B ritish  Prime M in ister, Anthony Eden, was 
giving the news in the House of Commons o f the B ritish  and French u ltim a tum  to  
Egypt. Egypt re jected the u ltim atum  and the B ritish  and French were 
com m itted to  using force. The next day, 31st October, while discussions
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between the Hungarian government and the Soviet v is ito rs were s t i l l  underway, 
news arrived tha t B ritish  and French forces had begun to  bomb Egypt. Whatever 
compromise solution the Soviet government may have had in mind fo r  Hungary 
previously, this event must have added a new dimension to  the Hungarian 
revolu tion.
But tha t was not a ll. On the same day, 31st October, as Mikoyan and 
Suslov were about to depart fo r Moscow, Nagy announced to  an ad hoc meeting 
in fro n t o f the Parliam ent build ing on Kossuth Square tha t his government had 
opened preparatory negotations fo r the w ithdrawal o f Soviet troops from  
Hungary and, even more im portan tly , fo r the abrogation 'o f the obligations 
imposed upon us by the Warsaw Treaty'. In his emotional speech he emphasised 
tha t i t  was not he who had called on Soviet troops fo r  help, as rumours had it ;  
th is was a measure, he said, tha t had been taken w ithout his knowledge:
Imre Nagy, the champion o f Hungarian Sovereignty,
Hungarian freedom, and Hungarian independence did not 
. ca ll in these troops. On the contrary i t  was he who fought 
fo r  the ir w ith d ra w a l.^ 7 3 )
Overcome by emotion by the end o f his speech, Nagy asked fo r  a l i t t le  more 
patience, fo r confidence in his government and fo r support 'in our p a tr io tic  
e ffo rts '. I t  was the f ir s t  tim e tha t Nagy had used language like  th is. I t  
suggested tha t he was no longer the communist o f fo rm er days, one the Soviet 
leaders were inclined to  accept, but the spokesman o f his people.
Soon a fte r, M ikoyan and Suslov -  who had broought reassuring news fo r 
Hungary -  departed again fo r Moscow, to  give an account o f th e ir  mission in 
Hungary to  the Soviet leadership. They had le ft  behind a Hungarian government 
which fe lt  more or less assured tha t the Soviet government was genuinely ready, 
both in princip le  and in fa c t, to  renegotiate the revision o f the Warsaw T reaty  
and to  w ithdraw  its  troops from  Hungary. That i t  was now only a question o f
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f ix in g  the term s and conditions o f the arrangement by fu rth e r top level b ila te ra l 
negotiations. But apart from  several reassuring verbal messages from  Yuri 
Andropov, the Soviet Ambassador to  Budapest, nothing fu rth e r happened. It is 
highly probable tha t by th is tim e, taking a ll these developments in to  account, 
any chance o f fu rth e r negotiations was already compromised; th a t the Soviet 
leadership on 30th or, at the la test, 31st October, had decided on a second 
m ilita ry  in te rven tion  in Hungary at the f ir s t  opportune moment. The reason they 
hesitated fo r  the next four days was because, quite apart from  in te rna tiona l 
considerations, a second in tervention, unlike the f irs t  one, presented much 
greater d iff ic u ltie s : i t  could not be ascribed to a request from  e ithe r the 
communist party  or the Hungarian government, which was c lea rly  unable to 
re tu rn  to  its  fo rm er policies. A successful, speedy, m ilita ry  in te rven tion  needed 
carefu l preparations, Soviet troops had to  be re inforced and redeployed in to  key 
positions. And arrangements fo r just tha t were already underway. This is 
confirm ed by the fa c t tha t during the night o f 30th-31st October w orry ing 
developments began to  take place, news o f which was published early  in the 
afternoon on 31st October, at the very tim e tha t the 'prom ising’ ta lks between 
the Hungarian cabinet and Mikoyan and Suslov were reaching th e ir  conclusion. 
Radio Miskolc announced tha t:
yesterday, on 30th October, we were the f irs t  to  in fo rm  
the population o f the country o f Marshall Zhukov's order 
to  the Soviet troops to  begin th e ir w ithdraw al from  the 
te rr ito ry  o f Hungary. As reported, the w ithdraw al o f 
Soviet units has begun. However, fo r reasons tha t we and 
the people o f the country do not understand, large Soviet 
forces .... have changed d irection  and again entered the 
te rr ito ry  o f Hungary from  Zahony, moving in the d irec tion  
o f Nyiregyhaza. The reason fo r th is c ircu la r movement o f 
Soviet troops is incomprehensible to  us. We observed the 
movement o f Soviet troops a ll night ... and we in form ed 
the President o f the Council o f M inisters o f the 
happenings during the n igh t.(274)
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Thus, when Nagy delivered his impassioned speech before the Parliam ent 
concerning Soviet troop w ithdrawals and his in ten tion to  w ithdraw  from  the 
Warsaw T reaty  (and his fo llow  up speech the next day, on 1st November) he had 
already received this in fo rm ation  and rumours had begun to  spread tha t, while 
some troops had le ft  Hungary, others had made a 'U '-tu rn  and returned to  the 
west by another route. His speech, in fac t, was aimed at warding o f f  a possible 
Soviet in tervention. For the next few days contrad ictory Soviet troop 
movements continued to ba ffle  observers, inevitab ly giving rise to  questions 
about Soviet s incerity.
The fin a l phase o f the revolu tion began w ith  the declara tion o f 
Hungarian neu tra lity  on 1st November, and ended on 4th November w ith  the 
fo rc ib le  removal o f the revo lu tionary regime by Soviet in tervention. I t  was a 
re la tive ly  tranqu il period. During the days tha t fo llowed the ceasefire, on 30th- 
31st October, i t  seemed as i f  v ic to ry  had been achieved. The general s trike  was 
s t i l l  in progress and l i t t le  work was being done, but the people o f Budapest began 
to  take the f irs t steps to clear away the rubble, restore order and bring l i fe  back 
to  normal conditions.
On the morning o f 1st November Nagy -  having taken over d irec t 
responsib ility fo r fore ign a ffa irs  -  called in the Soviet Ambassador to  Hungary, 
Y u ri Andropov, to  protest against the entry o f fresh Soviet m ilita ry  units, o f 
which his government, he said, had received au thorita tive  in fo rm ation . He 
warned Andropov tha t th is was a ’v io la tion  o f the Warsaw T reaty ' and unless 
these units were w ithdrawn his government would have no option but to  denounce 
the Warsaw Treaty and declare Hungarian neu tra lity . Despite vague assurances 
by Andropov tha t w ithdrawal was under way, news poured in throughout the day 
about Soviet troop movements in to  the country -  and overwhelmed by nationwide 
demands - Nagy, a fte r consulting and receiving the fu ll consent o f Kadar, o ther 
leading communists, and his own cabinet, f in a lly  took the cu ric ia l step o f
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announcing Hungary’s n e u tra lity  and her w ithdrawal from  the Warsaw Treaty 
w ith  im m ediate e ffe c t. His proclamation, in a radio broadcast to  the nation, 
ended w ith  the words:
we appeal to  our neighbours, countries near and fa r, to  
respect the unalterable decision o f our people. I t  is 
indeed true tha t our people are as united in th is decision 
as perhaps never before in th e ir h istory. Working m illions 
o f Hungary: p ro tect and strengthen - w ith  revolu tionary 
determ ination, sa c rific ia l work and the consolidation o f 
order -  our country, free , independent, dem ocratic and 
neutra l Hungary.(275)
Follow ing his announcement, Nagy summoned Andropov to  convey the u ltim atum  
o ffic ia lly . A t the same tim e  he sent a note to  the Soviet Presidium asking tha t a 
tim e  and place be fixed  fo r negotiations on the w ithdraw al of Soviet forces, as 
agreed in the declaration o f 30th October, and no tified  the Secretary-General o f 
the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjbld, o f his government's decision, asking him 
to  place the question o f Hungarian neu tra lity  on the agenda fo r the fo rthcom ing
(eJr}R\
session o f the General Assembly. Nagy also sought the help o f the 'fou r
Great Powers’ to  safeguard the country's neu tra lity . Alas, the 'fo u r Great
Powers' were in a state o f confusion over the Suez crisis and, toge th r w ith  the
United Nations, they followed the events in Hungary w ith  sym pathetic but
im potent fascination. I t  was not u n til the Soviet troops had a ttacked and
occupied Budapest and other major c itie s  in Hungary (on 4th November), tha t the
Security Council began to  deal in earnest w ith  the crisis in Hungary. By then i t
(277)was fa r  too la te  even fo r a modicum o f achievement.
I t  would be inappropriate to  discuss the fu ll e ffe c t o f the proclam ation 
here. Suffice to  say tha t i t  was intended to  bring extra  pressure and, at the 
same tim e, obtain some element o f guarantee on Soviet w ithdraw al. Since the 
whole country had given such proof o f its  determ ination to  be free  o f Soviet 
domination, i t  was impossible fo r Nagy to give way in the face o f a show o f
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strength. Indeed, at a meeting w ith  Andropov arranged at his request, Nagy
la te r declared h im se lf ready to  drop proceedings at the United Nations provided
the in flu x  o f Soviet troops in to  Hungary ceased and an e ffo r t  was made at
(278)genuine withdrawals. But, despite continued d ip lom atic  promises during the
next few  days, nothing o f substance had been forthcom ing. Unquestionably,
Nagy's proclam ation caused considerable embarrassment in Moscow. Coming
a fte r  the announcement, and form ation , o f a m u ltipa rty  coa lition  government i t
re in forced Soviet fears tha t Hungary, once p o lit ic a lly  fu lly  consolidated, would
re jec t everything to  do w ith  Soviet communism. The o ff ic ia l Soviet position,
both in Budapest and at the United Nations, however, remained unchanged u n til
4th November: during the in terven ing days numerous statements were issued
denying new Soviet troop movements in to  and confirm ing Moscow's in ten tion  to
w ithdraw  its  troops from  Hungary and to  continue negotiations concerning the
Warsaw Treaty. I t  is highly probable, as discussed earlier, tha t a decision on a
second in tervention was, in fa c t, taken on 31st October, andd subsequent
negotiations were intended merely to  camouflage the preparations to  crush the
revolu tion. The disappearance o f Janos Kadar during the night o f 1st November
is a fu rth e r ind ication tha t w ith in  tw en ty  four hours the balance had d e fin ite
(279)sh ifted towards the in tervention.
On the evening o f 1st November, a fte r Nagy made his announcement on 
n e u tra lity  and a break w ith  the Warsaw Treaty, Kadar made a radio broadcast in 
which he praised the revolution and endorsed national independence and Soviet 
w ithdrawal, but made no d irec t reference to  Nagy's decision on ne u tra lity . His 
speech, however, contained a warning tha t,
the uprising o f the people has come to  a crossroads.
E ither the Hungarian dem ocratic parties w ill have enough 
strength to  stabilise our achievements or we must face 
an open counter-revolution. We did not fig h t in order tha t 
mines and factories be snatched from  the hands o f the
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working class, or tha t land be taken from  the hands o f the
peasantry.(28u)
He added, perhaps even more s ign ifican tly , tha t
a grave and alarm ing danger exists that fore ign armed 
in tervention may reduce our country to  the trag ic  fa te  o f 
Korea. Our anxiety fo r  the fu tu re  o f our country leads us 
to  do our utm ost to  avert th is danger. We must e lim ina te  
the nests o f counter-revo lu tion and reaction.(281)
To help in th is and to  cleanse the party  from  the 'crimes o f the past', he said, the
old communist party would be dissolved and a new one form ed under the name
'Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party ' (Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart, or HSWP).
This new party, he announced, was to  be reorganised by a preparatory
com m ittee, whose members included Kadar, Nagy, Donath, Losonczy, Lukacs,
(282)Kopacsi and Szanto and would publish a newspaper to  be called
Nepszabadsag. In his closing words, he said tha t th is re frm ed party  would be
prepared to  do its  share in the figh t fo r the socia list 
fu tu re  o f our people. I t  is clear to  us tha t there has never 
before been so great a need fo r  holding the dem ocratic 
forces together. We tu rn  to  the newly formed dem ocratic 
parties and f irs t  o f a ll to  the o ther workers' party, the
Social Dem ocratic Party, w ith  a request to  overcome the
danger of a menacing counter-revolution and in te rven tion  
from  abroad by consolidating the governm ent.(283)
W ith these ominous words Kadar, accompanied by Ferenc M iinnich (a f irm
Stalin ist), disappeared from  Budapest a few  hours la te r and remained missing
u n til 4th November. I t  then transpired tha t they had gone to  Uzhgorod, in the 
(284)Carpathian Ukraine, from  where he would o ffe r h im self as head o f the new 
government, once the Soviet m ilita ry  had regained con tro l o f Hungary. His 
disappearance, however, was kept a closely guarded secret, and, 'in  name only', 
he was s t i l l  included in Nagy's reshuffled coa lition  government o f 3rd November. 
He returned to  Budapest on 7th November. O ther leading communists, Apro,
/ O Q C \
Marosan, Kiss and Nogradi, fo llowed him somewhat la te r.
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The few days between the proclam ation of n e u tra lity  and the second 
Soviet in tervention saw the beginnings o f p o lit ica l pluralism  in the country and a 
fu rth e r dem ocratisation o f the government. During these days o f p o lit ic a l 
freedom the dem ocratic parties, none too sure what to  make o f i t  a ll, a fte r 
almost a decade of oppression, re-emerged somewhat on the pa tte rn  o f 1945 and 
were soon in the process o f reorganisation. A part from  the three main p o lit ic a l 
parties, the Independent Smallholders', the National Peasant and Social 
Dem ocratic Parties, which, w ith  the communists, had form ed the government 
between 1945 and 1948, a number o f new p o lit ica l parties were created. They a ll 
devoted tremendous energy to  re-establishing dem ocratic p o lit ic a l machinery. I t  
was w idely thought tha t there was excessive and prem ature p o life ra tio n  o f 
p o lit ic a l parties (and newspapers) re fle c tin g  a ll shades o f opinion, which tended
/ooe\
to  de flec t energies from  the main tasks.
Im m ediate ly a fte r 30th October, when Nagy repudiated the once-party
system and T ildy  had inv ited  his fo rm er party, the Smallholders, as w e ll as the
National Peasant Party and Social Dem ocratic Party to reorganise th e ir  ranks
and prepare fo r elections, scheduled fo r January 1957, those three main parties
prom ptly  set about re-establishing themselves. This was not an easy task. Many
o f th e ir leaders had been exiled, imprisoned or k illed  fo r th e ir  intransigence, or,
because o f po lit ica l am biton or under sheer pressure, had become collaborators,
'fe llow  trave lle rs ', o f the post-1948 communist regime; a few  la te r even joined
the communist party and now occupied im portant adm in istra tive  positions in the
(287)state hierarchy. The reborn parties had, on the whole, no tim e  fo r  these
people and pressures soon grew against the readmission o f these 'tra ito rs ' in to 
th e ir fo rm er parties, although because of expendiency or reasons o f national, 
in terest a few  tem porary exceptions were made.
The f irs t  party to  put its e lf on a firm  footing, as everyone had expected, 
was the Smallholders' Party. As the largest opposition party  before Rakosi's
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takeover they had considerable leverage. A t th e ir Constituent Assembly, on
30th October, an Executive Com m ittee o f nine members was form ed, to  ou tline
the party's p la tfo rm  and Bela Kovacs was elected G eneral-Secretary o f the
rejuvenated party in his absence. A fte r  some vac illa tion  Kovacs was persuaded
(288)by his friends to  accept the post. A f te r  some debate, Zoltan T ildy , whom
some party members distrusted (because o f his part in winding up the pa rty  in
1948), and Istvan Dobi (a 'fe llow  trave lle r' who was try ing  to  find his way back to
his fo rm er party) were excluded from  the leadership; although the party 's
Constituent Assembly allowed them to  remain, provisionally, in the government
and the Presidentia l Council o f the Republic. A number o f other collaborators,
the most prom inent being Lajos Dinnyes (a fo rm er prem ier), Jozsef Bognar and
Gyula O rtu tay, m inisters in the Rakosi regime, were refused readmission. On 1st
November the party began to  publish a da ily  newspaper, called 'Kis Ujsag'.
S im ila r problems faced the other two main p o lit ica l parties. They too
were determ ined to  dissociate themselves from  form er leaders and members who
had collaborated w ith  the communists. In re la tion  to its  size, perhaps, the
National Peasant Party had the greatest number o f renegades and com munist
'fe llow  trave lle rs ' among its  membership. Indeed, because the pa rty  fe lt  its e lf  to
have been compromised the most in the past i t  changed its  name to  the 'P e to fi
Party ' at its  Constituent Assembly, on 31st October (announced on 1st
November), to  'express its  sharp opposition to  the years o f S ta lin is t ty rany '.
A fte r  the resignation o f the old leadership the revived party, representing the
'populist trend o f the le ft ',  elected Ferenc Farkas as the new General-Secretary,
(289)w ith  a group o f eleven D irectors in which Professor Istvan Bibo, a lawyer,
(290)and A t t i la  Szigeti (rebel leader o f Gyor) received leading positions. One o f 
the party 's foremost 'tra ito rs ', Ferenc Erdei, whom Nagy had appointed Deputy 
Prem ier, was dropped from  its  ranks. On 1st November the party 's newspaper, 
Szabad Szo, made its  f irs t appearance.
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The Social Dem ocratic Party also announced its  re-establishm ent on 1st 
November. Its  veteran leader, Anna Keth ly, was elected President and Gyula 
Kelemen General-Secretary, w ith  Andras Revesz as Deputy General- 
S ecre ta ry .^  ^  Renegades and 'fe llow  trave lle rs ’, such as Arpad Szakasits
(form er President o f the Republic), Sandor Ronai and Zoltan Horvath, were 
refused readmission to  its  ranks, accused o f having been instrum enta l in the 
merger w ith  the communist party  in 1948. A t f irs t,  the party  was re luc tan t to  
jo in  Nagy’s government -  ob jecting to  its ch ie fly  communist composition - but, 
a fte r attending a meeting o f the ’Socialist In te rna tiona l’, a conference just 
taking place in Vienna fo r ta lks w ith  Social Dem ocratic delegates, the party
agreed to  partic ipa te  in government. On the same day it  began publishing its
,x i' » (292) newspaper, ’Nepszava’.
Apart from  these three main ’coa lition  parties’ (in add ition to  the 
communists), which began pa rtic ipa ting  in Nagy's government, the lega lisa tion o f 
a m u ltipa rty  system encouraged the fo rm ation  o f a number o f o ther parties, 
which had not been members o f the 1945 coa lition  government. Among the most 
im portant were the Hungarian Independent Party and the Young Hungarians' 
Party. The release o f Cardinal Mindszenty gave the C atho lic parties, the 
Catholic People's Party, the Dem ocratic People's Party and the Federation o f 
Christian Youth, a leader. Indeed, over the next few days, a mushrooming o f 
fringe parties, some 40 groups in to ta l, took place in the country.
One o f the most im portant and urgent questions o f these days o f p o lit ic a l 
freedom, i.e., between 30th October and 3rd November, was how the country 
would adjust to  th is newly gained freedom. What would be the p o lit ic a l a ttitudes 
o f these re-emerged parties? Would not p o lit ica l prejudice or economic 
selfishness im pair those achievements which were worth keeping or rev ive the 
mistakes o f the past? Nagy, throughout the revolu tion, emphasised his 
government's com m itm ent to  the maintenance o f socialism in Hungary. In his
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speech on 28th October he warned those who were 'prone to  see only the black
(293)side o f our h is tory during the past tw elve years'. He asked people not to
lose sight o f the achievements o f those years, under the leadership o f the 
communist party, which were the best guarantee o f Hungary's fu tu re . In s im ila r 
manner, the leaders o f the other three main parties also declared th e ir  f irm
be lie f in democracy and opposition to  a re tu rn  to  the pre-w ar ca p ita lis t regime.
Indeed, during these days o f dem ocratic revo lu tionary fe rvour -  w ith  the 
unceasing flow  o f demands from  Workers' Councils and Revolutionary 
Comm ittees - no sensible po litic ian  would have gone in to  the fac to ries  or the 
countryside to  te ll the workers and peasants to  re tu rn  'the ir ' fac to ries  and th e ir 
land to  the previous owners.
On 31st October, at a meeting held in Pecs fo r the purpose o f 
reconstitu ting  the Smallholders' Party, Bela Kovacs, in his f irs t  p o lit ic a l speech 
fo r years declared tha t
the Smallholders' Party has fu ll lib e rty  to  reassemble but
the question is whether, on its  reconstitu tion , tha t party
w ill procla im  the old ideas again. No-one should dream o f 
going back to  the world o f aristocrats, bankers and 
capita lis ts. That world is de fin ite ly  gone! A true member 
o f the Smallholders' Party cannot th ink on the lines o f 
1939 or o f 1945. The last ten years were b itte r  but they 
also provided a useful lesson (294)#
Speaking o f the present condition o f the peasantry, Kovacs declared th a t they 
needed th e ir own organisation to  p ro tec t th e ir in terests, in the same way as the 
working-class and in te llectua ls. He said tha t the old 'Peasant A lliance ' 
(Parasztszovetseg) should be reconstituted.
In s im ila r vein, Ferenc Farkas, on behalf o f the P e to fi Party, declared in 
a broadcast tha t
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we shall re ta in  the gains and conquests o f socialism to  the 
fu lles t extent tha t they can be useful in a free , 
dem ocratic and socialist country, fo llow ing  the w ill o f the
p e o p l e . ( 2 9 5 )
Anna Kethly, head o f the Social Dem ocratic Party, in an a rtic le  in Nepszava, 
warned against the counter-revo lu tionary dangers which threatened the goals o f 
the revolution:
freed from  one prison, le t us not perm it the country to  
become a prison o f another colour. Le t us watch over the 
factories, mines and the land, which must remain in the 
hands o f the p e o p l e . ( 2 9 6 )
On behalf o f the agrian population, the newspaper Paraszt Fliggetlenseg, the
organ of the Hungarian National Revolutionary Com m ittee, published nine
( 2 9 7 )demands by the farm ing population:
1. Complete re jection  ... o f S ta lin ist peasant policy. A decree must be
issued ordering the dissolution o f weak co llectives and colectives 
established by force. Peasants must be granted the r ig h t to  leave 
collectives ... The land, property and animals which they brought to  the 
co llective  must be returned to  them and they must be given state 
support. The present system o f state assistance to  co llectives must be 
discontinued. State support must be administered by a co lle c tive  centre 
... elected by co llec tive  members.
2. An agricu ltu ra l delegation, composed o f peasant representatives,
members o f the new parties, ag ricu ltu ra l experts and journa lis ts  must be 
sent to study the systems o f large-scale farm ing in Western Europe - 
Denmark, Holland, England, Scandinavia -  and in the United States and 
th e ir experience must be used to  benefit Hungarian agricu ltu re .
3. The present set up o f the Machine T rac to r Stations (MTS) must be
discontinued.
4. Far-reaching financ ia l assistance must be given to  ind iv idua l peasant
farmers.
5. The old system o f selling and purchasing land must be restored.
6 . We approve the discontinuation o f the compulsory de livery system, which
exploited the peasantry. But th is is only a f irs t  step. The extrem ely
high peasant taxes must be reduced im m ediate ly and the present system 
o f taxation must be revised ...
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7. State Farms whose output and p ro fits  are inadequate must be liqu idated.
8 . The M in is try  o f Crop C o llection must be abolished, the M in istries o f 
A g ricu ltu re  and State Farms merged and the bureaucratic apparatus 
reduced.
9. Peasant Revolutionary Comm ittees must be established in every v illage. 
Members o f the Comm ittees should be recru ited  from  the dem ocratic 
parties and they should take power u n til elections are held.
Apart from  the occasional ca ll by revo lu tionary 'free radio ' stations -  located in 
various parts o f the country -  fo r the dissolution o f the co llectives, th is was the 
most comprehensive single fo rm ula tion  o f demands put fo rw ard  on behalf o f the 
peasantry.
Concerning peasant representation, another im portant m a tte r which soon
came before the Executive Com m ittee o f the Smallholders' P a rty  was the
possib ility  fo r form ing a united agrarian party, combining its  own membership
w ith  tha t o f the P e to fi Party. The two organisations had, o f course, worked
together as fa r back as 1939 in the 'Peasant A lliance ' (Parasztszovetseg)
although at tha t tim e the 'Nationa l Peasant Party ' had no p o lit ic a l, weight
comparable to  the Smallholders' Party. In 1945 its  significance increased when i t
became the fou rth  party in the coa lition  government. Now, many in the
Smallholders’ Party believed that the tim e was appropriate fo r  a merger o f the
two parties. When the rev iva l o f the 'Peasant A lliance ' (Parasztszovetseg) was
announced on 20th October the means were again at hand. Not a ll members o f
the Executive Com m ittee o f the Smallholders' Party, however, favoured a united
party but the m ajority  o f the younger generation and some older leaders,
including Bela Kovacs, the General-Secretary, supported th is  move. There was,
o f course, no opportun ity fo r a fu ll debate, nor fo r  the im p lem entation o f th is
(298)plan, because o f the second Soviet in tervention.
W ith the re-establishment o f the parties, and the apparent consolidaton 
of a p lu ra lis tic  system, pressure on Nagy's 30th October government fo r  fu rth e r
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dem ocratic isation began to  grow. The three main coa lition  parties wished to
obtain equal representation in the government w ith  the communists, who s t il l
held the m a jo rity  o f m in is te ria l posts and the main influence in the cabinet.
A ttacks on the composition o f the government continued, leading to  a fin a l
reorganisation on 3rd November w ith  a new, enlarged cabinet and w ider
representation fo r  the non-communist coa lition  parties. Three m in is te ria l posts
each were a llo tted  to  the communists, the Smallholders and the Social
Democrats and two to  the P e to fi Party. In the new cabinet Im re Nagy
(communist) retained the prem iership and the fore ign a ffa irs  po rtfo lio . The fu ll
cabinet, under the t it le  M inisters o f State, comprised Janos Kadar (in name only)
and Geza Losonczy (communists), Zoltan T ildy, Bela Kovacs and Istvan B. Szabo
(Smallholders), Anna Keth ly, Gyula Kelemen and Jozsef Fischer (Social
Democrats), Ferenc Farkas and Prof. Istvan Bibo (P eto fi Party) and the
independent General Pal M aleter, as Defence M in ister and representative o f the
'freedom figh te rs ’. Some 19 communists and 'fe llow  trave lle rs ', the most
prom inent being Jozsef Bognar, Ferenc Erdei, Gyorgy Lukacs, Im re Horvath,
Ferenc Munnich, A n ta l Apro and Rezso Nyers, were relieved o f th e ir  m in is te ria l
posts. With the exception o f Foreign A ffa irs  and Defence, the Presidentia l
(299)Council le ft  a ll the m in isteria l po rtfo lios vacant. These m in istries were
run, as fa r as they could be run at a ll, by o ffic ia ls  appointed or e lected on the 
spot.
Because o f the second Soviet in tervention, the reconstructed government 
had no opportunity to submit a programme to  the nation. Nor were the three 
main coa lition  parties able to  d ra ft fo rm a l party programmes. Nevertheless, 
from  what emerged from  the various pronouncements o f the party  leaders i t  can 
be establshed tha t a ll o f them professed to  stand on the basis o f 'freedom , 
independence and d e m o c ra c y . '^ ^  The Social Dem ocratic Party emphasised 
tha t Hungary must become a dem ocratic socia list country. While both the
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Smallholders’ and P e to fi Parties declared th e ir  fu ll acceptance o f the 1945 Land
Reform Law -  in some respects they went even fu rthe r, declaring tha t no land in
excess o f 25 cad. yokes should be returned to  previous o w n e r s ^ ^  -  they also
stressed the righ t o f the peasants to  determ ine free ly  whether to  own property
or to  remain in co llectives. Both advocated free ag ricu ltu ra l production and
marketing, the P e to fi Party, while fu lly  respecting the rig h t o f the peasants to
sell th e ir products w ithout res tric tion , considered it  necessary to  m aintain
existing co llectives u n til some form  o f peasant-cooperatives could be set up on a 
(302)sound basis. Its c rit ic ism  o f the co llec tive  farm  system was not because of
its  theo re tica l advantages or disadvantages but because many o f the farm s had 
been set up under coercion. A co llec tive  farm  system w ith  genuinely vo luntary 
organisation would not, therefore , be objectionable. The in flu e n tia l Workers' 
Councils, set up in facto ries and industria l concerns, did not have a d is tin c tive  
ideology, apart from  th e ir general opposition to  the resto ra tion  o f unrestric ted  
capita lism : in th e ir view, facto ries and mines should belong to  the workers, no 
facto ries or land should be given back to  capita lis ts and big land-owners. 
Furthermore, there was also a general consensus among a ll the three main
parties tha t Hungary should not partic ipa te  in any ’m ilita ry  b lock’, but should
• , ♦ i ,(303)remain ’neutra l’.
I t  must, however, be noted tha t during these days o f p o lit ic a l tu rm o il a 
few small parties did emerge, some o f which hoped fo r a re tu rn  to  the pre-w ar 
’ancien regim e’ -  among them was the extreme righ t-w ing  ’fasc is t’ pa rty . These 
fragmented po lit ica l forces, however, remained quite un in fluen tia l and there is 
l i t t le  evidence tha t a re tu rn  to  a sem i-feudal, cap ita lis tic , system was generally 
considered desirable or indeed im m inent. However, i t  has been suggested tha t 
the various Catholic groupings, a ttra c tin g  the more c le rica l, conservative and 
even reactionary elements, could have been the forerunner o f a pow erfu l 
Christian Dem ocratic movement, allegedly under the leadership o f Cardinal
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Mindszenty, to  contest the claims to  power o f Nagy’s coa lition  government and 
to  restore the pre-war p o lit ica l conditions in H u n g a ry / '* ^  One o f the main 
sources o f such speculation was the Cardinal’s own -  according to  some 
de libera te ly vague and ambiguous, i f  not openly se lf-con trad ic to ry  -  public 
broadcast to  the nation on the evening o f 3rd November (i.e., just a few hours 
away from  the Soviet in te r v e n t io n ) .^ ^  I t  is in teresting to  look b r ie fly  at the
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main points o f his speech, which have given rise to  various in te rpre ta tions:
1 . he began by declaring tha t he stood by his ’conviction, physically and 
sp iritua lly  in tac t, just as I was eight years ago’ - th is  was in te rpre ted  as 
im plying tha t he wuld carry  on where he le f t  o f f  eight years ago;
2. he proclaimed his desire fo r Hungary 'to  live  in friendship and in m utual 
respect w ith  the great United States o f Am erica and w ith  the m ighty 
Russian Empire'; because o f th is he was accused o f speaking derogato rily  
o f the Soviet Union as the 'Russian Empire';
3 . he called fo r  a new general e lection, 'w ithou t abuses', under in te rna tiona l 
supervision, in which every party would partic ipa te ;
4. while he warned against 'pa rty  struggle and disagreement' and 'p riva te  
vengeance', he asserted tha t he h im self was 'and w ill remain independent 
o f any party, and -  because o f my o ffic e  -  above it ';
5. while re fra in ing  from  opposing Nagy's government, he re fe rred  to  its
members as 'the successors o f a fa llen  regime' who 'ca rry  th e ir  own 
responsibilities fo r th e ir ac tiv ities , omissions, defaults and wrong 
measures'. He declared tha t he did not wish to make any denunciatory 
statem ent about them because tha t would re ta rd  the s ta rt o f work and 
the course o f production in the country;
6 . while declaring his desire 'to  live  in a society w ithou t classes' he
rea ffirm ed his be lie f in a system 'o f p riva te  ownership, r ig h tly  and ju s tly  
lim ite d  by social in terest';
7. 'as head o f the Hungarian Roman C atho lic  Church', he declared, 'just as
the Bench o f Bishops stated in a jo in t le tte r  in 1945', tha t the Church did 
not 'oppose the just d irection  o f h is to rica l progress'; development, he 
said was even to  be promoted;
8 . f in a lly , he called fo r the freedom o f religous ins truc tion  and the 
restoration o f the institu tions and societies o f the C atho lic  Church - 
among other things, its  press. This led to  the accusation tha t he had not 
made it  clear whether he was re fe rr in g  to  the fo rm er church schools or 
the larger estates, etc.
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C erta in ly , there were some unfortunate obscurities in his address, which enabled
the post-revo lutionary Hungarian regime to  accuse him of ’coun ter-revo lu tionary
inc item ent’ to  restore capita lism  and the large landed estates, especially those
(307)fo rm erly  owned by the Church. The Cardinal h im self, in his memoirs,
re fu ted these accusations, re fe rrin g  to  his statem ent tha t the Church 'did not
oppose the just d irection  o f h is to rica l progress’, which, in his view, im plied
clearly  tha t the Church had accepted the provisions o f the 1945 Land Reform  
(308)Law. Others, mostly Western commentators, gave a more sym pathetic
in te rp re ta tion  o f his speech. Be tha t as i t  may, the speech was unquestionably 
controversial, apparently perplexing even some of the fa ith fu l, and in general i t  
reduced ra ther than increased his popularity. C learly, the overwhelm ing popular 
consensus favoured the maintenance of public ownership o f industries, w ith  some 
form  o f partic ipa tion  by the workers, and a free ag ricu ltu ra l system w ith  
maximum lim its  to land holdings. Not to  mention the fa c t tha t the num erica lly  
strong peasantry had at th is stage had l i t t le  opportun ity to  con tribu te  to  the 
discussions. Their voice would have been heard only w ith  the im plem enta tion  o f 
the promised free General E lections, but there can be no doubt th a t they would 
not have supported any party  whose programme was to  restore the large estates. 
Moreover, i t  also should be pointed out tha t whatever the Cardinal said, or m ight 
have said, in these fin a l few hours o f freedom, his speech came too la te  to  
influence the course o f events - these were already in motion.
Despite the continuing in flux  o f Soviet troops in to  Hungary, Moscow 
maintained a concilia to ry  facade and agreed to  negotiate on the Hungarian 
goverment’s demands fo r m ilita ry  w ithdrawal. On the n ight o f the 3rd 
November, however, the s itua tion  had been d rastica lly  changed. W hile s t i l l  
pretending to  be giving ground in th e ir negotiations the Soviet m ilita ry  
representatives invited a Hungarian delegation, led by the M in is te r o f Defence, 
General Pal M aleter, to  the Soviet A rm y Headquarters at Tokbl, near Budapest,
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to  se ttle  the tech ica l details fo r the w ithdraw al from  the country. The 
Hungarian negotiators then attended a banquet there in th e ir honour. I t  was 
almost m idnight when the party was in terrupted by the a rriva l o f General Serov, 
Head o f the Soviet Security Police, accompanied by NKVD o ffice rs , whom he 
ordered to  arrest the Hungarian delegation. A t the same tim e , w ithout any 
warning, a massive Soviet m ilita ry  a ttack was launched on a ll points of 
resistance. W ithin a few hours, a ll s tra teg ic centres, a irfie lds, ra ilways and main 
roads had been brought under Soviet contro l. No e ffe c tive  resistance could be 
organised by the Hungarian army. Nagy -  since communications between him self 
and the Hungarian negotia ting delegation had been in terrupted -  s t i l l  believed in 
the successful outcome o f the negotiations fo r  the w ithdraw al o f Soviet troops 
and gave specific instructions not to  open f ire  on Soviet troops. Indeed, i t  was 
not u n til he saw the Soviet tanks in fro n t o f the Parliam ent and news was 
received tha t Janos Kadar had set up another government tha t he delivered his 
famous, i f  b rie f, radio announcement that,
today at daybreak Soviet troops attacked our cap ita l w ith
the obvious in ten tion o f overthrow ing the legal Hungarian
dem ocratic government.(309)
Rescinding his earlie r instructions, he now decided to  resist the Soviet troops by 
fo rce  o f arms. The Hungarian army, the National Guard and groups o f freedom 
fighters, mostly equipped w ith  small arms and 'M o lo tov-cockta ils ', fought side by 
side against the overwhelm ing power o f the Soviet forces.
The nation learned on the morning o f 4th November tha t Janos Kadar, 
F irs t Secretary o f the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWF), and three 
other fo rm er members o f the Nagy government, had le f t  i t  on 1st November and 
gone over to the Soviet side, because o f the government’s in a b ility  to  f ig h t the 
'counter-revolu tionary danger'. In his radio broadcast, in order to  defeat 'fascism
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and reaction ’, Kadar announced the fo rm ation  o f his a lte rna tive  'Hungarian 
Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government (Magyar Forradalm i Munkas-Paraszt 
Kormany).(^lO) Repudiating the popular nature o f the revo lu tion, he declared 
tha t reactionary elements were seeking to  overthrow  socialism in Hungary and to  
restore the cap ita lis ts  and landowners to  power. The new government, he said, 
had requested the help o f the Soviet troops to  defeat those 's in is te r forces o f 
reaction '.
Follow ing the occupation o f Budapest by Soviet forces, loca l resistance 
continued in various centres u n til overcome by force, or the figh te rs  had run out 
o f ammuntion: ignoring the surrender u ltim atum  isued by the Soviet commander 
in Budapest, some centres w ith in  the c ity  continued to resist u n til 8 th  November 
and in outly ing industria l areas fig h tin g  went on u n til about 11th November. 
Heavy destruction and considerable loss o f li fe  were caused by the Soviet Arm ed 
Forces. The destruction o f the c ity  o f Budapest was rated worse than in World 
War II. The revolution had run its  course. Imre Nagy, together w ith  his fa m ily , 
some o f his m inisters and others, sought and obtained asylum at the Yugoslav 
Embassy. But trus ting  an agreement w ith  Kadar, which 'guaranteed' th e ir  
personal safety, Nagy and his entourage le f t  the Embassy on 22nd November, 
only to  fa ll in to  a trap  set up by the Soviet leaders. They were p rom ptly  
abducted and deported to  Romania. They were 'tr ie d ' and some nineteen months 
la te r they were executed fo r th e ir  pa rtic ipa tion  in the revo lu tion . Many o ther 
partic ipants in the revolution were also executed or sentenced to  various lengths 
o f imprisonment.
A t th is point it  would be convenient to  look at the developments in the 
countryside and the a ttitude  o f the peasants towards the revo lu tion , while 
p o lit ica l leaders and revolutionary forces were fram ing the conditions fo r  a new 
regime. The e ffec ts  o f the revolution, in the p o lit ica l sphere, took place almost 
en tire ly  in the c ities. A fte r  the outbreak o f figh tin g  in Budapest the tu rm o il
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began to  spread to  the more distant provinc ia l towns. But perhaps because of
inertia , lack o f com munication or just frank disbelief, i t  spread only slow ly. The
countryside remained re la tive ly  calm, the a ttitude  o f the bulk o f the peasantry
was one o f caution. They went about th e ir da ily business almost as i f  nothing
had happened -  the autumn sowing and ag ricu ltu ra l work continued w ithou t even
one day o f d i s r u p t i o n . ^ O n  the whole, the ru ra l population did not trus t
e ither leadership: i t  re jected Rakosi's and Gero's ru le w ith  about equal in tensity .
Despite his w ell known sympathy fo r  them, the peasantry remained cautious
towards Nagy: they assumed a neutra l position and waited fo r fu rth e r
developments. As before, the c ity  -  where the action was tak ing  place -
remained a domain o f the distrusted 'them ' and th e ir  a lienation from  c ity  rule
(312)was manifest in th e ir w ithhold ing o f support from  a ll rulers. There was also
the problem o f communication. The countryside obtained its  in fo rm ation  from
radio broadcasts, but in it ia lly  there was no regular, system atic in fo rm ation
available to  them regarding the events in Budapest. This lack o f in fo rm a tion  not
only a ffected  the peasants but also paralysed party  organisations and th e ir
(313)a c tiv itie s  and led to  great uncerta in ty among them.
As the incredible news of the successful armed uprising against Soviet 
troops and the Secret Police and the d is in tegration o f pa rty  au th o rity  f in a lly  
began to  spread a fte r 25th October, the countryside began to  s tir . O rganisation 
and recru itm en t o f revo lu tionary forces, as w e ll as demonstrations, began in the 
villages. Existing V illage Councils were dissolved everywhere and, at f ir s t  in a 
c lim ate  o f prudent expectations, and then w ith  enthusiasm, National, 
Revolutionary and Peasant Com m ittees were set up in th e ir places. The f irs t  
action o f almost a ll o f these Com m ittees was to  end the programme o f 'land 
commassation' w ith  im m ediate e ffe c t and to  arrange dem ocratic e lections to  set 
up 'Land Reorganisation Comm ittees' (Foldrendezo B izottsag) to prepare fo r  the 
legal re turn o f the land to the previous owners, on the basis o f the 1945 Land
Reform L a w .^ * ^  In a number o f places, party  and government o ffic ia ls  -  often 
people o f low calibre who had been banished to  the provinces as the penalty fo r 
fa ilu re  elsewhere -  and leaders o f State and C o llective  Farms were dismissed, 
occasionally w ith  p itch forks, or sim ply driven out o f the villages a fte r 
Revolutionary Com m ittees were form ed there. According to  some reports, even 
at the beginning o f 1957 80 per cent o f co llec tive  fa rm  chairm en had not 
returned to  th e ir previous place o f w o r k .^ * ^  Once in contro l, the peasants 
began to  destroy party and tax records and other documents which could have 
been used against them. The records o f land ownership, however, were ca re fu lly
/q  1 c \
preserved. W ith the continuation o f the revo lu tionary upheavals the
peasants o ften  went to  the nearest town to  pa rtic ipa te  in dem onstrations and the
ru ra l population began to  maintain fa ir ly  close contact w ith  Budapest. But
otherwise the peasantry, on the whole, remained a passive but benevolent
observer o f the revolu tionary events. Only in occasional instances did some
peasants partic ipa te  in the armed fig h tin g  against isolated Soviet army
detachments or a ttem pt to  hinder Soviet troop movements w ith  lo rrie s  and 
(317)carts. Generally, the bulk o f the peasantry remained fa r  away from  the
centres o f revo lu tionary action and, on the whole, refra ined from  p a rtic ip a tin g  in 
armed violence. Revenge against local functionaries and some w e ll known local 
tyran ts -  o ften imposed from  outside the v illage - did, however, resu lt in some 
figh ting , burnings and even murder o f a few  people. But throughout the 
revolu tion these remained extrem ely rare occasions. The f lig h t o f fo rm e r party 
functionaries, co llec tive  farm  chairmen etc., undoubtedly helped to  prevent 
more trouble. The bitterness against county, d is tr ic t and co lle c tive  farm  
o ffic ia ls  was strongest in regions where the villages were populated w ith  small 
and medium peasant landowners and weakest in areas which had previously been 
dominated by large estates. The personnel running the co llectives from  county 
and d is tr ic t o ffices contracted by 70-80 per cent, though leaders who were
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generally held in high esteem by the peasants were allowed to  remain at th e ir
+ (318) posts.
The most s ign ificant evidence o f the peasant’s support fo r  the revo lu tion
rea lly  lay not in figh ting  but in sympathy, in the co llection  and shipment o f food
to  the s trik ing  workers and insurgents in the c ities . Thousands o f lo rry  and ca rt
loads o f food were collected by the ru ra l population, absolutely vo lun ta rily  and
spontaneously and delivered, even a fte r  4th November, o ften  at great personal
(319)risk, to  the c ities, where i t  was d istribu ted  free on street corners.
While the revo lu tionary events in the c ities  were p rinc ipa lly  in the
sphere o f po litics, the consequences in the countryside were la rge ly lim ite d  to
changes in the structure  o f agricu lture . The changes, however, were only
re la tive  and did not touch the basic ag ricu ltu ra l s tructure tha t had emerged ten
years earlie r, a fte r the 1945 Land Reform . There was no general demand fo r  the
re tu rn  o f estates to  fo rm er landowners. Only in isolated cases had fo rm er
landowners, or the ir descendants, made th e ir reappearance -  e ithe r from  humble
’re tire m en t’ or ’dropping’ in from  the West -  w ith  barely concealed hopes o f
regaining th e ir fo rm er estates. On the whole, however, they got no fu rth e r than
(320)expressing th e ir desire or put forw ard th e ir claims, and ne ither the coa lition
parties nor, indeed the people had anything to  do w ith  them. Even the riche r
peasants, the 'kulaks' (i.e., in the above 25 cad. yokes category o f holdings),
learning, perhaps, from  th e ir experiences in 1953, refra ined, by and large, from
recla im ing th e ir form er property; not did they succeed even in increasing the
size o f th e ir own holdings. Only on rare occasions did ’kulaks’ approach
(321)C o llective  Farms asking fo r the re tu rn  o f th e ir  property. This is c lea rly
confirm ed by the evidence tha t the number o f holdings in the above 25 cad.
yokes category even declined from  6,500 in mid 1956 to 4,900 by the m iddle o f
1957, and th e ir to ta l are diminished from  233,000 to  177,000 cad. yokes over the
(322)same period. In teresting ly, even the next sm aller category, between 20 and
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25 cad. yokes showed only a nominal increase. From a ll the available evidence it
is clear tha t the pesants favoured a system o f sm all and medium size holdings,
farmed p riva te ly , but many had no objection, in princip le , to  co llectives,
provided entry in to  them was genuinely vo luntary and provided they were run fo r
the benefit o f the partic ipants.
The overall p ic tu re  w ith  regard to  changes in the socia list sector o f
agricu lture, however, was d iffe re n t. The acreage in the ownership o f the State
Sector (State Farms, Forestry land and MTS) increased nom inally from  4,253,000
(323)cad. yokes to  4,294,000 cad. yokes between mid 1956 and mid 1957. More
specifica lly , the revolu tion did not a ffe c t the acreage under cu ltiva tio n  by State
Farms, which remained at its  previous level o f about 12 per cent o f to ta l 
(324)agricu ltua l land. There were, however, considerable changes in the labour
force: over the same period, roughly, 10,000 and 8,000 workers le f t  the State
/ooc\
Farms and MTS respective ly. According to  o f f ic ia l claims the main reason
fo r the reduction in employment in State Farms was 'the progress made in
mechanisation and the u tilisa tio n  o f labour', while the reduction in MTS
employment was a ttribu ted  to  the fa c t tha t under the preva iling  s itua tion  less
f326)machine-work was required from  them. O ther con tribu to ry  reasons may
have been the peasants' a ttitu d e  towards the state and its  perceived 'benefits ' 
and, perhaps less im portan tly , the few hundred persons, m ainly from  the leaders 
o f these organisations, who had ben dismissed or driven away by the local 
Revolutionary Comm ittees. The re la tive  smallness o f the reduction was, 
undoubtedly due mainly to  the fa c t tha t most o f these farm s had been 
established on large estates, previously owned by the 'gentry ', and the a ttitu d e  o f 
the peasants towards them - apart from  com plaints about the q ua lity  and high 
costs o f MTS services - was p rim arly  tha t they were a place o f em ployment.
The s truc tu ra l change w ith in  the socia list sector o f ag ricu ltu re  was 
mostly lim ite d  to  the co llec tive  farm ing system. The peasantry reacted to  the
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upheavals by abandoning the co llec tive  farm s. In teresting ly, however, the
withdrawals from  and dissolutions o f co llectives -  which had begun during the
summer o f 1956 -  while accelerating somewhat, did not assume nearly such
'explosive* proportions as many had expected. A t the outbreak o f fig h tin g  the
peasants' f ir s t  tought was not w ithdraw al from  or dissolution o f co llectives,
ce rta in ly  not on a large scale. Inded, i t  seemed at f irs t as i f  the countryside
would escape the devastating im pact o f the revolu tion. The peasants had noted
w ith  approval the aboltion o f the compulsory delivery system by Nagy, and
members o f those co llectives which did not dissolve ou trigh t decided to  w a it fo r
fu rth e r developments, in pa rticu la r the General Elections, promised fo r January
1957. These were expected to  result in a com plete reappraisal o f the en tire
co llec tive  farm  system and an orderly and proper re tu rn  o f land, w ith in  a legal
fram ework, leading u ltim a te ly  to  an individual fa rm ing system. Unquestionably,
the generally ra ther conservative a ttitu de  o f the peasants, acquired over the
centuries, also seemed to restra in them. During the entire revo lu tionary period,
i.e., from  23rd October to  4th November, no more than 700, i.e., about 14 per
cent, o f the co llectives were actua lly  dissolved (many o f these had probably
indicated th e ir in ten tion to  dissolve just p rio r to  the revolution) and another 700
had given notice o f th e ir  in ten tion to  dissolve. Thus, 72 per cent o f a ll
(327)collectives remained in tac t.
The s ituation changed dram atica lly , however, a fte r  4th November. 
Follow ing the defeat o f the revolu tion, shattering the peasants' hopes fo r  the 
fu tu re , the movement from  the co llectives turned in to a rout and the scale o f 
dissolutions exceeded even the great exodus o f 1953. Accord ing to  o f f ic ia l 
claims another reason fo r  the sudden upsurge in dissolutions was th a t a fte r  4th 
November the insurgents were slowly squeezed out o f the urban centres in to  the 
countryside, where they allegedly encouraged or even 'forced' the dissolution o f 
co llectives 'u n til the government brought them under contro l, by about m id-
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(328)December’. This c la im , however, is hardly borne out by evidence since the
process o f dissolutions continued on a mass scale and, in fa c t, the regim e was
unable to reverse the tide  u n til the end o f January 1957. While i t  is true  tha t
between m id-November and mid-December 1956 the ra te  o f dissolutions
progrssively increased, in the next period, from  m id-December 1956 to  m id-
January 1957, i t  acclerated even more. A t th is point the co llectiv ised sector had
(329)dropped back to close to  its  1950 level.
The trend in the number o f co llectives and th e ir membership over the 
period is shown in Tables 11.6 and 11.7. on pages 962 and 9 6 3 . ^ ^  F irs t, 
however, a word o f warning. I t  is d if f ic u lt  to  measure the fu ll im pact o f the 
dissolutions over th is period accurate ly in num erical term s. This is so fo r three 
main reasons: f irs t,  the changes in the number o f co llectives and in th e ir
membership conceal the fo rm ation  o f new colectives, a lbe it in sm all numbers, 
from  about m id-December 1956; second, in some places, when one big co llec tive  
was dissolved tw o sm aller ones were formed in its  place; th ird , some higher, 
Type III collectives and th e ir members joined or were converted to  lower, Type I 
or II collectives. Nevertheless, i t  can be seen from  the tables how the crisis 
shook the co llec tive  farm  sector. As the tables show, by the end o f 1956 nearly 
59 per cent o f the co llectives had been dissolved, 60 and 66  per cent o f th e ir  
to ta l agricu ltu ra l land area and membership respective ly had disappeared; more 
than 237,000 members le f t  the co llectives. The proportion o f co lle c tive  farm  
membership in the to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l labour force fe ll from  17.3 per cent in June 
1956 (see: Table 11.5, on p.919) to  5.9 per cent and the to ta l a g ricu ltu ra l land 
area under the co llectives, as a percentage o f to ta l ag ricu ltu ra l land area, 
declined from  20.8 per cent in September 1956 (see Table 11.4, on p.918) to  8.5 
per cent by the end o f 1956. I t  should be noted, however, tha t some o f the 
collectives had remained in operation w ith  a reduced area and membership.
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However, th is p ic tu re  is not complete, fo r tw o main reasons. F irs t,
there was a s ign ifican t regional varia tion  in the ra te  o f dissolution o f co llectives.
The drop was greatest in the Transdanubian region o f the country (western
Hungary) -  tra d itio n a lly  a stronghold o f small and medium peasant farm ers,
where the fo rm ation  o f co llectives had been accompanied by the greatest
amount o f pressure and coercion. I t  was smallest in the Trans-Tisza region
(eastern Hungary) -  previously dominated by large estates and now the stronghold
o f landless, poor peasants and form er farm  labourers, who had gained most both
from  the Land Reform and the co llec tiv isa tion . These labourers were said to
have been more accustomed to  co llective  work, and the absence of individual
housing and farm  buildings made dissolution considerably more d if f ic u lt .  The
proportion o f dissolutions o f co llectives located in some of the counties o f the
Transdanubian region were as follows: Baranya - 81.6 per cent; Gyor-Sopron -
60.8 per cent; Vas -  71.4 per cent; Zala -  71.3 per cent; Somogy, where as noted
earlier, in ’Summing Up in Somogy’ (Somogyi Osszegezes), the discontent w ith
(331)the co llectives was highest, a massive 89.3 per cent had dissolved. Second,
the figures given the above tables did not represent the deepest point o f the
crisis, which most sources confirm  was on 15th January 1957. Accord ing to  one
source, at tha t tim e 1467 collectives were in existence, a figu re  which includes
some 190 new collectives, form ed a fte r 15th December 1956. Taking this in to
(332)account, in re a lity  only 1277 collectives remained in tac t. Comparing th is
w ith  the 5011 co llectives which existed at 15th October 1956 (just before the
revolution) means tha t on average 74.5 per cent o f the co llectives had been
dissolved during the upheavals. According to  another source, only 700
(333)collectives in the entire  country remained solid ly behind communal farm ing. 
Comparing th is figu re  w ith  the number at 15th October 1956 means th a t 86  per 
cent o f co llectives had dissolved. Whatever the precise figu re , the peasants 
unquestionably abandoned the collectives o f a mass scale.
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According to  various o ff ic ia l surveys, the reasons fo r  the w ithdrawals 
and dissolutions, as before, were many and varied. It  is su ffic ie n t to  lis t  the 
main reasons given by the peasants fo r the dissolutions/****^
1. the use o f force in co llec tiv isa tion  drives, especially during 1955-1956; 
the programme of land commassation w ithout adequate compensation;
2 . incompetent and wastefu l management practices in collectives;
3. unsuitable.chairmen imposed from  above;
4. high taxes and the confiscation o f livestock fo r tax  and compulsory 
delivery arrears;
5. antagonism between the various stra ta  o f co llec tive  members, especially
between the poor, fo rm e rly  landless and be tte r o f f  middle peasants
w ith in  the collectives, which continued and even sharpened during the
revolu tion;
6 . the hope of d is tribu ting  co llectives ’ assets;
7. struggle by individual peasants fo r the re tu rn  o f th e ir ’ancestral’ land;
8 . the co llectives ’ membership was a r t if ic ia l ly  swollen by 'lumpen-
elements’, who avoided work;
9. un fa ir division o f co llectives ’ incomes;
1 0 . the decisions taken by management w ithout appropriate consu lta tion o f 
membership, especially regarding large investments, compulsory co tton  
growing, etc.
1 1 . lack o f independence of collectives.
These make it  clear tha t decisions to  dissolve co llectives were not a ttr ib u ta b le  
to  some ’external’ or ’kulak’ pressure but, by and large, to  the problems preva iling  
inside the co llectives. The most cha racte ris tic  feature o f the dissolutions, 
especially a fte r 4th November, was th e ir  spontaneity; the economic v ia ib ility ,  or 
otherwise, o f a co llec tive  played hardly any ro le in the decision to  dissolve.
I t  is not too d if f ic u lt  to  pin point which s tra ta  o f peasantry w ithdrew  
from  or dissolved the collectives. Those peasants who had previously owned 
land, i.e., la rge ly small and middle peasants, le f t  the co llectives in large 
numbers. As a result, the proportion o f poor and landless peasants among
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co llec tive  membership rose s ign ifican tly . This is confirm ed by a report, 
prepared by the A g ricu ltu ra l Departm ent o f the Centra l C om m ittee and the 
M in is try  o f A ricu ltu re , which indicated tha t between 31st March 1956 and 31st 
March 1957 the proportion o f agrarian p ro le ta ria t and poor peasants increased 
from  37.6 per cent tko  57.6 per cent, while the proportion o f sm all peasants
/ n o c \
decreased from  35.8 per cent to  27.3 per cent. The members o f the
dis in tegrating co llectives divided a ll the property o f the co llec tives  among
themselves, tak ing  the fa rm  implements, machinery fodder and livestock. In
some places these were even snatched away from  State Farms and Machine
T rac to r Stations. The peasants tended to  leave the largest co llec tives  f irs t.
Small collectives, on the whole, proved to  have bette r in te rna l human re lations
than large ones. This was one reason why some large units were divided in to
sm aller units, where members fe lt  more in contro l and could oversee
organisational problems be tte r. The agrarian p ro le ta ria t, the poor and
’dw arf' peasants, who had l i t t le  or nothing to  gain by dissolution, generally
resisted it  and even defended th e ir co llectives. These were, perhaps, the only
peasants who rea lly  trusted the regime and, more im portan tly , who would not
have been able to  make an adequate liv in g  outside the co llec tive . The main
reason why they had joined in the f irs t  place was tha t the only way fo r  them to
’own land’ was through collectives. Many o f them would not have been able to
move to  industry or State Farms and i f  le f t  would have remained w ithou t work
and bread. I t  should, however, be noted tha t when the new regim e la te r
increased the wages o f industria l workers many agrarian prole tarians and ’dw arf’
(337)holders turned to  industry and urban enterprises to seek employment there.
While some o f the co llec tive  members who w ithdrew form ed low er Types 
I and II collectives -  because incomes and independence were g reater there than 
in Type III co llectives -  by fa r the most im portant a ttra c tio n  was tha t as 
individual farm ers -  especially a fte r the various concessions, the abo lition  o f
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compulsory deliveries, the ha lt in land commassations, increased ag ricu ltu ra l 
prices and the ending o f other economic burdens, such as compulsory insurance 
they could do even be tte r. The be tte r results in production and p ro f ita b ility  on 
individual farm s, o f course, had handicapped the co llec tiv isa tion  campaign 
before the revo lu tion  too. W ith the decline in the number o f co lle c tive  farm s 
the number o f individual, p riva te  farm s grew by more than 217,000, i.e., by 
about 15 per cent, while the area under th is fo rm  o f cu ltiva tion  increased by 
more than 1.1 m illion  cad. yokes, to  reach around the 1949 leve l - as shown in 
Table 11.8 and Table 8.2 on p.529.(338)
Table 11.8 The number of individual farms and their 
cultivated area in the years 1956, 1957 and 1958
Time
Individual Farms
Number in Area in 
1 0 0 0 ’s 1 0 0 0 's cad.
yokes
Average area in 
cad. yokes
1956 1 445 0 7 586 5 5.25
1957 1 662 7 8 682 2 5.35
1958 1 634 1 8 554 3 5.24
cv\ * b b t  i U  »
There was, however, no re tu rn  to  large individual farms; the average acreage 
was about 2 cad. yokes sm aller than in 1949, ind ica ting  a certa in  le ve lling  o f the 
peasantry.
Once the process o f dissolutions began on a large scale the Kadar regim e 
could do no more than acknowledge it ,  ex post fa c to , a llow ing the peasantry 
e ither to  m ainta in or dissolve co llectives as they wished. A t f irs t,  i t  only warned 
against anarchy and ’ illega l’ appropriation o f co llec tive  property; la te r  it
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attem pted to  regulate it .  In its  f irs t,  15 point ag ricu ltu ra l programme, published
on 27th November the government called fo r  the ’development o f ag ricu ltu ra l
production ' and, curiously, fo r the 'aboliton o f compulsory deliveries' and fo r
'assistance to  be given to  individual farm ers'. I t  promised tha t the government
'would f irm ly  liqu idate  a ll ille g a litie s  com m itted in the fie ld  o f ag ricu ltu ra l
co llectives, stop the commassation o f land and exp lo ita tion '. A t the same tim e,
(339)i t  issued appeal to  the peasants to  'defend th e ir co llec tive  farm s'. I t  called 
on the leaders and members o f C o llective  Farms, State Farms and Machine 
T rac to r Stations to  do everything w ith in  th e ir power to  prevent plunder or 
destruction o f co llec tive  farm  or state property. Departing members were to  be 
pe rm itted  tok take w ith  them only what was specified by the General Assembly 
m e e tin g /3^  But the exodus from  the co llectives continued.
Two serious problems faced the new leadership as a result. One was to  
se ttle  the leaseholds (foldhasznalat) and t it le s  to  land ownerships (tu la jdon jog); 
the other, re lated problem was the se ttling  o f the financ ia l obligations o f 
members who le f t  the collectives. The fo rm er fe ll in to  tw o parts: in the f ir s t  
place, there was the question o f se ttling , i f  possible before the spring 
ag ricu ltu ra l work began, the t it le s  to  land ownership and leaseholds o f the more 
than 237,000 peasants who le ft  the co llectives. This, on its  own, required more 
land area than the one m illion  cad. yokes released through the dissolution o f 
co llectives by the summer o f 1957. Then, in the second place, and in add ition to  
the above, there was the question o f the legal re tu rn  o f land, more than 500,000 
cad. yokes taken away from  some 160,000 persons by the sta te  a fte r  1st 
September 1949, in most cases w ithou t any compensation^3^  not to  m ention the 
livestock, equipment and houses requisitioned by the state over the same period. 
On the whole, the regime was successful in meeting its  obligations on both o f 
these accounts -  although only p a rtia lly  in the la tte r  cases -  by s tipu la ting  tha t 
land could not be released e ither when i t  was already in blocks la rge r than 25
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cad. yokes or when there had already been investment on i t  (beruhazott te r ii le t).
A t the same tim e, i t  kept a close watch over the social status o f the claim ants
fo r damages and insited tha t th e ir to ta l holdings must not exceed 20-25 cad. 
(342)yokes. While the land claims of the peasants leaving the co llectives were
met in fu ll by the government, the claims fo r  damages resulting from  measures
taken earlie r could only be 70-80 per cent satisfied and even then only by
(343)releasing land from  state land reserves. Indeed, in the end, approxim ate ly
78 per cent o f the to ta l land o f surviving and newly form ed co llectives had to  be
provided from  the same s o u r c e / '* ^
While by the early months o f 1957 the regime on the whole succeeded in
achieving a level o f re la tive  satis faction and calm on the question o f land
ownership t it le s  and leaseholds, the various financ ia l obligations o f departing
co llec tive  members proved to  be considerably more problem atic and uncertain.
The origins o f these obligations were the ’illega l' appropriation o f co llec tive
property and the just aportioning o f state c red it repayment and o ther debts
among w ithdraw ing members, or members who forced the dissolution of
collectives. According to  o ff ic ia l financ ia l reports, these debts amounted to
one-th ird  o f the to ta l c red it obligations o f the dissolving co llectives, a to ta l of
444 m ill. Forints, against which the value o f appropriated assets amounted to  294
(345)m ill. Forints and leaving a d e fic it o f 148 m ill. Forints. To safeguard the
interests o f suriving co llectives, the regime issued numerous decrees s tipu la ting  
tha t assets, equipment and livestock etc., were to  be handed over fo r  the 
disposal by Local Councils or, i f  already appropriated, returned irrespective  of 
what the peasant, who held them had o rig ina lly  brought in to the co llectives. I f  
the peasant to  whom such assets had been d istribu ted no longer had them he had 
to  pay appropriate compensation fo r them to  the s ta te .^ * ^  The enforcem ent o f 
these regulations, however, proved to  be extrem ely d if f ic u lt  and in some cases, 
e.g., in the case o f fodder, the regime could not even hope to  succeed. Then new
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decrees were enacted and to  re in fo rce  the law the police were asked to  help. 
Most o f these operations, however, achieved l i t t le .  While in a number o f places 
a ttem pts were made to  place more than th e ir fa ir  share o f the debt burden on 
the departing members, the more general view tha t developed was tha t the 
’b e tte r-o ff',  ex-co llective  members, 'cheated' the 'have-not's who remained in the 
co llectives: the prevailing view among the remaining members was tha t 
departing members, small and middle peasants, le f t  the co llectives w ith  greater 
wealth than they had brought w ith  them when they joined. As a result 
antagonism and c o n flic t between them, which had always been there, increased 
sharply in the months ahead.
But this, however, was not a ll. The surviving co llec tive  farm s had to
face fu rth e r problems. They were le f t  w ith  reduced and inadequate labour,
livestock, equipment and agrarian experts. The reduction in th e ir  labour force
resulted in an increased agricu ltu ra l acreage per co llec tive  farm  member: while
in mid-1956 this figure  was 7.5 cad. yokes/member, by mid-1957 i t  had increased
(347)to  9.5 cad. yokes/member. They also experienced a drastic reduction in
th e ir livestock numbers. A t the beginning o f 1957 there was no common
livestock at a ll in some 700-800 co llec tive  farm s.(348) departure o f m iddle
peasants, while nom inally im proving the age s tructure  o f co llectives, resulted in
a s ign ifican t drop in the number o f people w ith  expert knowledge o f ag ricu ltu ra l
production. And there were p rac tica lly  no agronomists. The co lle c tive  and
party leadership during th is period a ll but disappeared: some 70-80 per cent o f
d is tr ic t and country adm in istra tive leaders (and 80 per cent o f co lle c tive  farm
(349)chairmen) were forced out. Most o f the rem aining and new co lle c tive  farm  
leadership had no more than elementary education and l i t t le  or no experience o f 
organising large-scale agricu ltu ra l production and management. Unquestionably, 
the cris is tha t h it the co llective  fa rm  sector o f agricu ltu re  was extrem ely 
serious.
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A t the same tim e, the individual, p riva te  peasants had made great 
strides. The subsequent, 'sellers’ market gave them a measure o f prosperity they 
had not enjoyed since the beginning o f co llectiv isa tion , in 1949. The freedom to 
m arket th e ir own produce increased from  32.8 per cent in 1955 to  65.6 per cent 
in 1957 and 69.9 per cent in 1958^**^ combined w ith  improved ag ricu ltu ra l 
prices, provided them w ith  great incentives fo r production. As a result th e ir  
incomes s ign ifican tly  increased: the average annual income o f a ll individual
farm s has been estim ated at 20,000 Forin ts -  w ith  a fa c to r o f 0.5 -  3.0 varia tion , 
according to  the size o f h o ld in g / '* '^  This meant that th e ir  standard o f liv in g  
reached, and in many cases, surpassed, tha t o f industria l workers and, o f course, 
was considerably higher than tha t o f co llec tive  farm  members.
The new regime had le f t  th is 'status quo', which had spontaneously 
developed in the countryside, since restoration o f order in the c itie s  and 
recovery o f industria l production had been given top p r io r ity . The losses 
in flic te d  upon the national economy by the revolu tion and its  a fte rm a th  were 
considerable, both in men and in m ateria l. The damage to  industry, the socia list 
sector o f agricu lture  and to  both trade stocks and buildings in Budapest were the 
most im portant items o f cap ita l destruction, in addition to  the considerable loss 
in industria l production. The seriousness of the s ituation is w e ll demonstrated by 
the fa c t tha t in November 1956 m anufacturing industry output was 20 per cent 
o f the level the previous year, and even in December i t  was barely above 30 per
/q CO\
cent. Tota l losses in the value o f the cap ita l stock amounted to  almost 3000
/o c o\
m ill. Forints: '  the estim ated d is tribu tion  o f the losses among the various
sectors was the fo llow ing: in industry -  850 m ill. Forints, or 2.2 per cent; in the 
socia list sectors o f agricu lture  -  400 m ill. Forin ts or 1.7 per cent (o f which 
damage to State Farms was 150 m ill. Forints); in transport -  30 m ill. Forin ts or
0.1 per cent; in housing -  340 m ill. Forints; in stocks o f consumer goods - 
destroyed, damaged or looted - 750 m ill. Forin ts or 4.3 per cent; o ther sectors -
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(354)130 m ill. Forits . The loss in production amounted to  more than 20,000 m ill.
(355)Forints. In its  to ta lity  the crisis in 1956 had cost Hungary o n e -fifth  o f its
Gross National Product.
Economic recovery in the period tha t fo llowed was helped by a reduction 
in investment, three years o f good harvests, a low level o f defence expenditure 
and, tem porarily , by re lie f provided by friend ly  socialist countries. In addition to 
the value o f long-term  cred its -  provided - China 100 m ill. Rubles, Poland -  40 
m ill. Rubles, Czechoslovakia -  100 m ill. Rubles -  the value in goods and 
convertib le currency provided by Czechoslovakia, DDR, Yugoslavia and Poland 
was 90 m ill. Crown, 2.2 m ill. Marks, 150 m ill. Dinars and 100 m ill. Z lo ty
respective ly. During 1957 the Soviet Union provided 875 m ill. Rubles in goods
/  o  r  n  \
and convertib le  currency. As a result o f the various measures industria l
production had reached its  pre-revo lu tion level by mid-1957.
In the sphere o f agricu lture  the new government was forced to
manoeuvre as best i t  could in a s ituation which, in a sense, was beyond its  
contro l. I t  was forced to  make two im portant, i f  tem porary, concessions: a truce 
on the co llec tiv isa tion  fro n t and a substantia l increase in the prices o f farm  
products. I t  made no e ffo r t  to  revive the compulsory delivery system. For the 
next two years, there were no plans, no centra l d irection  o f ag ricu ltu ra l
production. Instead, the government re lied on the free market fo r  ag ricu ltu ra l 
produce and on state purchasing, a prices considerably higher than those 
fo rm erly  paid fo r compulsory deliveries. Despite the fa c t tha t the higher prices 
were greatly  o ffse t by the re-im position o f a land tax, paid in wheat or some 
other grain, a rise in income tax rates and by higher prices fo r things the 
peasants wished to  buy, the real income and consumption o f individual peasants - 
who now held 78 per cent o f arable land -  increased considerably. N e ither did 
the government fo rce  individual peasants to  pay im m ediate ly fo r the equipment, 
livestock (and other products) and land, some o f which they had 'ille g a lly ' taken
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from  the co llectives. For a while i t  even to lera ted the resentment which 
developed among urban workers and co llec tive  farm  members at what they 
considered to  have been un justified  gains by the individual peasants who, in th e ir  
view, p ro fited  from  the changes at th e ir  expense.
As tim e went by, and the revo lu tion became a th ing o f the past, o f f ic ia l 
a ttitudes, however, began to  s tiffe n . The regime began to  say more and more 
em phatica lly tha t the fu tu re  o f agricu lture  lay in co llective  farm ing, and some 
e ffo rts  were made to  recoup some o f the losses o f the revolution. The party  had, 
o f course, never given up the idea tha t u ltim a te ly  co llec tive  farm s must 
dominate agricu lture . From early 1957, observing s tr ic t ly  the 'vo luntary 
princ ip le ', co llectives began to  be set up again throughout the country. The 
pace, however, remained very slow and cautious, as the s ta tis tica l data in Table
11.9 indicate, on p .9 7 4 : ^ ^
Faced w ith  general d iff ic u ltie s  in the economy, and preoccupied w ith
re fo rm  intentions in the industria l sector, the regime was slow in a rriv in g  at a 
long-te rm  policy fo r  agricu lture. On the basis o f what the new government had 
said and done about the priva te  sector o f agricu lture , the Hungarian peasantry 
could expect, indeed had expected, tha they would achieve an un-co llectiv ised 
agricu lture , as in Poland and Yugoslavia. This, however, was not to  be. The 
development o f co llectives could not be le f t  to  spontaneity. A fte r  tw o years o f 
ta c tic a l re trea t, in 1957 and 1958, forced co llec tiv isa tion  was launched again in 
the f ir s t  quarter o f 1959, and in tw o successive stages it  was com pleted rap id ly  
in the w in ter o f 1960/1961. Hungarian agricu lture , much like  many ( i f  not a ll) o f 
its  neighbours, was to ta lly  included in the socia list sector. The only permanent 
achievement le f t  by the revolution, in the sphere o f agricu lture , was Nagy's 
abo lition  o f compulsory deliveries, which were never again re-in troduced. The 
rapid success o f the regime in co llec tiv is ing  agricu lture com ple te ly was 
especially noteworthy in the ligh t o f the way the peasants had resisted a ll
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previous e ffo rts  to  co llectiv ise  them -  even though the reluctance o f individual 
peasants to  enter, or re-enter, co llectives remained obvious. Indeed, the 
magnitude o f its  v ic to ry  in co llec tiv isa tion  even apparently took the regime 
its e lf by surprise. I t  owed its  success to  carefu l planning by top 's tra teg is ts ’, 
using a 'ca rro t and s tick ’ po licy to  take in it ia lly  re la tive ly  modest steps towards 
’socia list agricu ltu re ’, backed up w ith  the supplies o f machinery, build ing 
m aterials, fe rt il iz e rs  and other resources necessary fo r large-scale farm ing. In 
addition, at the psychological level, the state o f mind o f the peasants - indeed, 
o f the entire  population -  permeated a fte r the defeat o f the revo lu tion w ith  a 
fee ling  tha t a ll resistance was fu ti le  must have contributed to  the regime's 
success.
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Chapter 11
1. This is not the place to  discuss in any de ta il the developments in the 
in te rna tiona l and in te rna l p o lit ica l situations. There are several 
excellent general studies dealing w ith  those aspects. In summary, 
however: Rakosi c learly  hoped fo r the continuation o f the ’cold war’. In 
a speech he delivered to  the Party Academy in May 1955 he accused 
Nagy o f ’overestim ating the easing o f tensions in the in te rna tiona l 
s itua tion ’, Szabad Nep, 20th May 1955. However, developments in the 
in terna tiona l s itua tion  po ten tia lly  weakened and compromised his 
position, a llow ing him to  carry out lim ite d  revisionism. The ’cold war* 
tension, in fa c t, softened: on 15th May, A ustria  became neutra l and
Soviet troops soon w ithdrew; 26th May-2nd June the Soviet delegation 
achieved reconcilia tion  w ith  T ito  in Yugoslavia; 18th-23rd July, the 
’Geneva Summit' took place; while no substantial accord was achieved, 
the atmosphere was relaxed and the 'cold war' attenuated. A t home, 
opposition w ith in  the party grew and became more and more outspoken, 
especially on the issue o f rehab ilita tion  o f p o lit ica l, prisoners, which 
in it ia lly  came to  a halt and was only resumed la te r, and even then w ith  
some reluctance. Also, people inside and outsie the party viewed the 
possib ility  o f re tu rn ing  to  the old S ta lin ist days w ith  dismay. In addition, 
the ongoing power struggle w ith in  the Soviet Presidium rendered Rakosi's 
position less than certa in , making i t  d if f ic u lt  fo r him to  an tic ipa te  fu lly  
the in tentions and policies o f Moscow. Thus, his re tu rn  to  power was 
qua lified both by the new a ttitude  in the Soviet Union and by the erosion 
o f party un ity  at home.
2. Sandor Balogh and Ba lin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi demokracia
tortene te , 1944-1962, Bp. Kossuth, 1978, p.254.
3. Szabad Nep, 6 th  February 1955.
4. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  Magyarorszagon, Dem okratikus es
Szocialista agraratalakulas 1945-1961, Bp. Akadem iai Kiado, 1972, p.143.
5. Paul Ignotus, Hungary, Ernest Benn, London, 1972, p.232.
6 . According to  o ff ic ia l statements the meeting was o rig ina lly  planned fo r
15th February. I t  was, however, postponed because Nagy, on 1st 
February, reported illness. Meanwhile, Rakosi tr ie d  to  make Nagy agree 
to  a resolution he had prepared against the 'r ig h tis t deviation ists ', but 
fa iled . A New date was set fo r 18th-19th February but, fo r  one reason 
or another, th is new date could not be kept e ithe r (perhaps, because o f 
the in terp lay between Nagy and the Soviet leaders). U ltim a te ly , i t  was
decided tha t the meeting would go ahead w ithout Nagy. Nagy, in a
le tte r, on 25th February, protested against the fa c t tha t the m eeting was 
being arranged in his absence. He received no reply.
7. Kozgazdasagi Szemle, No. 3-4, 1955, pp.260-268. The main points o f the 
Resolution also appeared in Szabad Nep, 9th March 1955. In te resting ly , 
while the June 1953 Resolution was never published, th is Resolution was 
almost instan tly  out. Reputedly, i t  was in fa c t w ithheld u n til 9th March 
as a 'b irthday present’ fo r Rakosi.
8. Szabad Nep, 9th March 1955.
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9. Dezso Nemes et aL, A magyar fo rrada lm i munkasmozgalom to rte n e te , 
Bp. Kossuth, 1970, vol. 3, pp.215-216.
10. Szabad Nep, 9th March 1955.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Had he been allowed to  have an open debate the most lik e ly  outcome 
would have been defeat fo r Nagy. Then he would have accepted the 
C entra l C om m ittee ’s decision. But i t  was, o f course, such a debate tha t 
both Rakosi and the Soviet leaders wished to  avoid. When Suslov 
adm itted fa ilu re , Rakosi was given a free hand to  deal w ith  Nagy. Nagy, 
on the o ther hand, preferred to  accept a ’dishonourable’ re tirem en t 
ra the r than to  confess aned collaborate w ith  Rakosi.
14. Imre Nagy, On Communism ’In defence o f the New Course’, London, 
Thames and Hudson, 1957, p.XLIII; Szabad Nep, 18th A p ril 1955.
15. Szabad Nep, 18th A p ril 1955.
16. Ibid.
17. For a v iv id  description o f both the public mood and the spontaneous 
strikes o f farm ers im m ediate ly a fte r Nagy’s dismissal, and how the 
peasants attem pted to  become se lf-su ffic ien t in expectation o f a 
renewed co llec tiv isa tion  drive, see: Dora Scarle tt, Window onto Hungary, 
Bradford, England, 1958, pp.218-219.
18. Szabad Nep, 26th March 1955.
19. Ibid.
20. Szabad Nep, 27th March 1955.
21. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.147.
22. Szabad Nep, 9th June 1955.
23. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.147.
24. Szabad Nep, 9th June 1955.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Szabad Nep, 23rd July 1955
29. Sandor Balogh and Balin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi demokracia ...
op .c it., p.255; Szabad Nep, 9th June 1955.
Szabad Nep, 12th June 1955.
Sandor Balogh and Balin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi demokracia ... 
op .c it., p.254.
Szabad Nep, 9th June 1955.
In te resting ly, w ith  hindsight, even Janos Kadar completed 
co llec tiv isa tion  quicker than, at th is stage, Rakosi wanted it .
Mezogazdasagi S ta tisz tika i Zsebkonyv, Bp. Kozponti S ta tisz tika i H iva ta l, 
1959, pp.24-26.
The theory o f 'sharpening class struggle' did not only apply to  agricu ltu re  
but was revived as a general too l in the context tha t 'the advance o f 
socialism inevitab ly calls fo rth  class struggle'. See: Tarsadalm i Szemle, 
May 1955 and January 1956 and also the ed ito ria l a rtic le  on Stalin's 
b irthday en titled  'Loya lty  to  Leninism - Stalin's great legacy' (Hiiseg 
leninizmushoz -  Sztalin nagy oroksege), Szabad Nep, 21st December 
1955.
The s ta tis tica l data were compiled from : Mezogazdasagi A d a tta r, Bp. 
Kozponti S ta tisz tika i H iva ta l, 1965, vol. 2. p.402; S ta tisz tika i Zsebkonyv, 
Bp. Kozponti S ta tisz tika i H iva ta l, 1956, p.46; Sandor Balogh and B a lin t 
Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi demokracia ... op.c it., p.249.
Mezogazdasagi A da tta r ... op .c it., vol. 2, p.61.
Ibid., vol. 1, pp.663-664 and pp.670-671.
Odon Szabo Barla, 'Gazdasagpolitika es Gazdasagi fejkodes az MDP KV 
1953 Juniusi iilese utan', P a rtto rte n e ti Kbzlemenyek, no. 2, 1981, p.51.
Ibid., p.52
Sandor Balogh and Balin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi dem okracia ... 
op .c it., p.253.
Szabad Nep, 25th July 1955.
Szabad Nep, 23rd June 1955.
Bela Fazekas, A mezogazdasagi term eloszovetkezeti mozgalom 
Magyarorszagon, Bp. Kossuth, 1976, p.93.
Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.148.
Szabad Nep, 31st June 1955.
Szabad Nep, 9th August 1955.
Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.148. fn.445.
-  979 -
49. Szabad Nep, 28th August 1955.
50. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op.c it., p.149, fn.448.
51. The harvest in Hungary is norm ally  gathered in between 10th and 25th 
July; the main period fo r  threshing is the month between 15th Ju ly and 
15th August. Thus, Rakosi would have gained fu ll knowledge regarding 
the harvest results sometime in la te  July or early August. Sandor Balogh 
and Ferenc Poloskei (eds.), Agra rpo litika  es Agrarata lakulas 
Magyarorszagon, 1944 -  1962, Bp. Akademiai Kiado, 1979, p.88.
52. Szabad Nep, 2nd January 1956.
53. Compared to  1954 the grain, maize, potatoes, tobacco, f r u i t  and 
vegetable production results were very good, while fo r  rice  they were 
poor and fo r sugar-beet mediocre.
54. Mezogazdasagi A da tta r ... op .c it., vol. 1, p.272.
55. Odon Szabo Barla, 'Gazdasagpolitika ... op.c it., p.50.
56. Szabad Nep, 2nd January 1956 and fo r fu rth e r comparisons see: 
Mezogazdasagi A d a tta r, ... op .c it., vol. 1, pp. 168-169 and pp.233-278.
57. Bela Fazekas, A mezogazdasagi ... op.cit., p.93.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., p.95.
60. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op.c it., p.145.
61. S ta tisz tika i Zsebkonyv... op .c it., p.53.
62. Odon Szabo Barla, 'Gazdasapolitika ...' op .c it., p.50.
63. Ibid.
64. Sandor Balogh and B a lin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi dem okracia ... 
op .c it., p.250.
65. S ta tisz tika i Evkdnyv 1949-1955, Bp. Kozponti S ta tisz tika i H iva ta l, 1957, 
p.39.
66. Sandor Balogh and Ba lin t Szabo (eds.) A magyar nepi dem okracia ... 
op .c it., p.250.
67. Adatok es Adalekok a Nepgazdasag Fejlodesenek Tanulmanyozasahoz 
1949-1955. Bp. Kozponti S ta tisz tika i H ivata l, 1957, p.361.
68. Sandor Balogh and Ba lin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi dem okracia ... 
op .c it., p.250.
69. Bela Fazekas, Mezogazdasagunk a felszabadulas utan, Bp. Mezogazdasagi 
Kiado, 1967, p.373.
- 980 -
70. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.145.
71. Ibid.
72. Ib id., pp.145-146.
73. Kozgazdasagi Szemle, no. 7-8, 1955, p.922.
74. Sandor Balogh and Balin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi demokracia ...
op .c it., p.252.
75. Sandor Balogh and Ferenc Poloskei, A g ra rpo litika  ... op .c it., p.31.
76. Sandor Balogh and Ba lin t Szabo (eds.), a magyar nepi demokracia ...
op .c it., p.251.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Szabad Nep, 31st July 1955.
81. Szabad Fold, 21st August 1955.
82. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op.c it., p.150.
83. Sandor Balogh and Ba lin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi demokracia ...
op .c it., p.256.
84. Bela Fazekas, A mezogazdasagi ... op.c it., p.93.
85. Sandor Balogh and Balin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi demokracia ...
op .c it., • p.257; Sandor Balogh and Ferenc Poloskei, A g ra rpo litika  ... 
op .c it., p.31; Szabad Fold, 13th November 1955. The most cha rac te ris tic  
d isc ip linary actions were taken in county Vas, during the autumn o f 1955.
86. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.150.
87. Sandor Balogh and Balin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi demokracia ...
op .c it., p.256.
88. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.149.
89. Ibid., p.150
90. Laszlo Borbely, 'Az 1949-1956 tagositasok szerepe es hatasuk hazank
mezogazdasagaban’, S ta tisztiaka i Szemle, 1957, no. 4, p.456.
91. Ib id., p.453.
92. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.149.
-  981 -
93. Ibid.
94. Sandor Balogh and Ferenc Poloskei (eds.), A g ra rpo litika  ... op .c it., p.31.
95. Szabad Nep, 11th September 1955.
96. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.149.
97. Szabad Nep, 12th May 1955.
98. Szabad Nep, 7th September 1955.
99. B a lin t Szabo (ed.), A Szocializmus Utjan. A felszabadulast koveto
negyedszazad kronologiaja, Bp. Akadem iai Kiado, 1970, p.144.
100. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.150.
101. Bela Fazekas, A mezogazdasagi ... op .c it., p.93.
102. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.151.
103. Ibid.
104. Bela Fazekas, A mezogazdasagi ... op .c it., p. 93.
105. Sandor Balogh and Balin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi demokracia ...
op .c it., p.256.
106. Ibid.
107. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.151.
108. Sandor Balogh and Ba lin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi dem okracia ...
op .c it., p.256.
109. Mezogazdasagi A da tta r .. op.c it., vol. 2, p.13.
110. Sandor Balogh and Balin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi dem okracia ...
op .c it., p.256.
111. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.151.
112. Ferenc Donath, Reform es Forradalom. A magyar Mezogazdasag
S truktra lis  Atalakulasa 1945-1975, Bp. Akademiai Kiado, 1977, p .157.
113. Ibid.
114. Szabad Nep, 9th June 1955.
115. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.155.
116. Ferenc Donath, Reform es Forradalom ... op.c it., p.157.
117. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.154.
- 982 -
118. Szabad Nep, 29th September 1955.
119. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.153.
120. Ibid., pp.154-155.
121. Szabad Nep, 13th May 1955.
122. Ibid.
123. Szabad Nep, 7th May 1955.
124. Dunantuli Naplo, 20th February 1956.
125. Sandor Balogh and B a lin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi demokracia ...
op.c it., p.257.
126. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.152.
127. Sandor Balogh and B a lin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi demokracia ...
op.c it., p.257.
128. Bennet, Kovrig, The Hungarian People's Republic, The Johns Hopkins 
Press, Ba ltim ore and London, 1970, p .105.
129. Since i t  is not the objective o f th is study to  examine h is to rica l events 
and p o lit ic a l developments leading up to  the revo lu tion  (and the 
Revolution itse lf), these receive only a cursory conideration. The theme 
had been examined in depth, and breadth, in several outstanding studies.
130. I t  is not easy to categorise accurate ly those groups which form ed the 
most in fluen tia l opposition to the Rakosi regime. A part from  what may 
be term ed the 'dem ocratic opposition' around Nagy there were others 
who came in to co n flic t w ith  Rakosi but, at the same tim e , were not 
prepared to jo in  Nagy's grup fo rm a lly . While opposing Rakosi they s t i l l  
retained th e ir 'pa rty  mindedness'. Some were rehab ilita ted  communists, 
whom Rakosi purged earlie r but were released from  prison by Nagy 
during the 'New Course' and readm itted to  the party  and some, e.g., 
Janos Kadar, were even appointed to  p o lit ic a l and party  o ffices. Some 
o f the rehab ilita ted  communists fo r  a while, re tired  from  po litics  but 
la te r, e.g., Ferenc Donath, joined Nagy's 'dem ocratic opposition' group, 
while others joined Kadar's in fo rm a l gathering.
Ferenc A, Vali, R if t  and Revolt in Hungary, Harvard U n ivers ity  Press, 
1961, p.200 and Andras Hegediis, E let egy eszme arnyekaban (a 
biographical in terview  by Zoltan Zsille), P riva te  publication, Vienna, 
1985, pp.231-232.
131. Kadar was set free on 9th October 1954 and im m edia te ly appointed 
Party Secretary o f the largest industria l d is tr ic t o f Budapest. As a sop 
to  Western opinion, in connection w ith  Hungarian membership o f the UN, 
on 21st November 1954 Anna Keth ly, w ell known SDP leader, and other 
Social Democrats were also released. S im ila rly  he allowed the release of 
Cardinal Mindszenty from  prison on 17th July (though he was s t i l l  kept 
tem pora rily  under house arrest).
- 983 -
132. M iklos Molnar, Laszlo Nagy, R eform ator vagy forrada lm ar vo lt-e  Imre 
Nagy, A Magyar F iizetek Kiadasa, Paris, 1983, p.72.
133. Ibid.
134. Szabad Nep, 6th June 1955.
135. I t  is not known whether, in Budapest, the Soviet leaders had given Rakosi
to  understand not to  take too seriously the reconcilia tion  w ith  T ito , or
whether Rakosi h im self drew th is conclusion from  the Bucharest 
discussions. M iklos Molnar, Laszlo Nagy, Reform ator vagy ... op .c it., 
p.72.
136. Szabad Nep, 9th June 1955.
137. Imre Nagy, On Communism ... op.c it., pp.17-18.
138. Royal Ins titu te  o f In te rnational A ffa irs , Documents on In te rna tiona l
A ffa irs , London 1955, p.271.
139. Szabad Nep, 9th August 1955.
140. The organ o f the ’W riters ' Association'. During the summer i t  organised
c r it ic a l debates in its  columns and gave voice to  disillusioned and
alienated w rite rs  and in te llectua ls.
141. Tamas Acze l -  T ibor Meray, T isz tito  Vihar, Adalekok egy korszak
tortenetehez, London, Big Ben Publishing Co., 1959, p.298.
142. D iffe re n t authors give d iffe rr in g  figures on the number o f signatories. 
Latest Hungarian sources give i t  as 59, the figure used here.
143. Ibid., pp.303-317.
144. T ibor Meray, Thirteen Days tha t Shook the K rem lin , London, Thames and 
Hudson, 1958, p.40.
145. Ibid.
146. B a lin t Szabo (ed.), A Szocializmus utjan ... op .c it., p.146.
W ithholding it ,  however, from  the general public by publishing i t  in 
'P arty  L ife ' (P a rte le t), the bu lle tin  issued fo r party functionaries ra ther 
than in Szabad Nep. But, o f course, the whole country 'knew' about it .
147. Accord ing to  one source, he again had a slight heart a ttack . T ibor
Meray, Thirteen Days ... op .c it., p.41.
148. Ferenc Vali, R if t  and Revolt ... op .c it., p.205; His conversion to  national
communism analogous to tha t practiced by T ito : national independence, 
n eu tra lity , sovereignity and equality, as w e ll as Hungarian national 
fee ling  and trad itions. His la te r w ritings were fu rth e r distinguished by a 
p a tr io tic  sentiment, rev iv ing  Kossuth's vision o f close cooperation w ith  
neighbouring people w ith in  the fram ew ork o f free and independent
-  984 -
nations. See: Imre Nagy, On Communism ... op.c it., pp.22-24; pp.33-34; 
p.40.
149. Tamas Acze l -  T ibor Meray, T isz tito  Vihar ... op .c it., p.319.
150. M iklos Molnar, Budapest 1956: a h istory o f the Hungarian Revolu tion, 
London, George A llen & Unwin, 1971, p.81.
151. Ba lin t Szabo, Az 'otvenes evek'. E lm elet es po litika  a szocia lista  epites 
elso idoszakaban Magyarorszagon 1948-1957, Bp. Kossuth, 1986, pp.285- 
286.
152. Tamas Aczel - T ibor Meray, T isz tito  Vihar ... op .c it., p.326-328. The 
resolution was la te r published in the 'Irodalm i Ujsag' so eventua lly the 
whole country knew about the w rite rs ' struggle.
153. Szabad Nep, 18th February 1956; The Hungarian delegation to  the 
Congress was composed o f Matyas Rakosi, Istvan Kovacs and Bela Szalai. 
Andras Hegedus Elet egy eszme ... op.c it., p.238.
154. See te x t o f Khrushchev's speech at the closed session o f the 20th Party 
Congress in Robert V Daniels (ed.), A Documentary H is to ry  o f 
Communism, New York, 1960, vol. 2, pp.224-231.
155. Andras Hegedus, E let egy eszme ... op.c it., p.238.
156. Paul Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution: social forces in the 
Hungarian Uprising, Stanford U nivers ity  Press, 1961, p.71.
157. On 6th A p ril 1956, on Hungary's L iberation Day, Rakosi received a 
fulsome telegramme from  Khrushchev and Bulganin in which, in te r a lia , 
they re ferred to  him in these words. Rakosi, not im m edia te ly sacked as 
a S tlin is t -  or even c ritic ised  by Khrushchev -  and now, two months a fte r  
the 20th Party Congress, receiv ing such a greeting must have fe lt  secure 
and assumed tha t the power struggle in Moscow was evidently not over. 
Andras Hegedus, Elet egy eszme ... op l.c it., p.240.
158. Tamas Aczel -  T ibor Meray, T isz tito  Vihar ... op.c it., p.341.
159. The 'Secret Speech' became known through various channels e.g., Radio 
Free Europe broadcasts, baloons released from  the West, etc. 
Apparently, the f irs t extesive summary o f Khrushchev's speech, available 
to East European countries (and the West) was in an a rtic le  published on 
20th March 1956 in Borba. According to  Hegedus, the Polish regim e was 
suspected o f f irs t  dissem iniating the content o f the speech to  the West. 
Andras Hegedus, Elet egy eszme ... op.c it., p.239.
160. The Politburo was convened fo r  the 1st, 3rd and 9th March 1956.
161. Szabad Nep, 15th March 1956.
162. Ibid.
163. Sandor Balogh and Ba lin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi dem okracia ... 
op .c it., p.266.
-  985 -
164. Szabad Nep, 14th and 15th March 1956.
165. Ivan Szenes, A Kommunista Part Uljaszervezese Magyarszagon 1956-
1957, Bp. Kossuth, 1981, p. 14.
166. Janos Berecz, E llenforradalom  to lla l es fegyverre l 1956, Bp. Kossuth, 
1981, pp.50-51.
167. Ibid., p.51.
168. Ibid., pp.49-50.
169. Ibid., p.49.
170. Szabad Nep, 29th March 1956.
171. Szabad Nep, 19th May 1956.
172. W illiam  E. G r iff ith , 'The P e to fi C irc le : Forum fo r fe rm ent in the
Hungarian thaw', Hungarian Q uarte rly , No. 1, 1962, pp.142-165.
173. Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary, N.Y. Colunbia U n ivers ity  Press, 
1962, p.195.
174. Tamas Acze l -  T ibor Meray, T isz tito  Vihar ... op .c it., pp.351-352.
175. Ibid., pp.352-358.
176. Szabad Nep, 1st July 1956
177. Sandor Balogh and Ba lin t Szabo, (eds.), A magyar nepi dem okracia ... 
op.c it., p.269.
178. M iklos Molnar, Laszlo Nagy, R eform ator vagy ... op .c it., p.80.
179. Bennet Kovrig, The Hungarian People's ... op .c it., p.110, & fn.37.
180. Szabad Nep, 19th July 1956.
181. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.151.
182. Ibid.
183. Ibid.
184. Szabad Nep, 22nd February 1956.
185. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.151.
186. Ibid.
187. Szabad Nep, 27th A p ril 1956.
188. Sandor Balogh and Balin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi dem okracia ... 
op.c it., p.270.
-  986 -
189. Odon Szabo Barla, 'Gazdasagpolitika ... op.c it., p.53.
190. Szabad Nep, 14th A p ril 1956.
191. Ibid.
192. Szabad Nep, 28th May 1956.
193. Sandor Balogh and Ferenc Poloskei (eds.), A g ra rpo litika  ... op .c it., p.31.
194. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.156.
195. Odon Szabo Barla, 'Gazdasagpolitika ... op.c it., p.53.
196. Janos Berecz, E llenforrdalom  ... op .c it., p.64.
197. Ferenc Donath, Reform es forradalom  ... op .c it., p.158.
198. Ibid.
199. The Centra l Com m ittee also added Janos Kadar, Jozsef Revai, Karo ly 
Kiss and Gyorgy Marosan to the Politburo and elected Kadar as 
Secretary o f the Centra l Com m iuttee. For gross v io la tion  o f 'socia list 
lega lity ', on the fu rth  day, the Centra l Com m ittee stripped M ihaly 
Farkas o f his party  o ffices and expelled him from  the party.
200. The Resolution o f the C entra l Com m ittee, Partegyseggel a szocia lista
dem okraciaert, Bp. Szikra, 1956, p.14 and Szabad Nep, 23rd Ju ly  1956.
201. For Andras Hegediis' speech see: A nepgazdasag fe jlesztesevel a nepjolet 
emeleseert, Bp. Szikra, 1956, pp. 6-89.
202. The influence o f the public debate on the fin a l plan is, o f course, 
d if f ic u lt  to assess. C erta in ly , many economists and the P e to fi C irc le , in 
th e ir debate, attacked the d ra ft plan sharply and took pains to  explain 
how in the past th e ir advice was pushed aside, causing the nation great 
damage. More im portan tly , however, ther was a great need fo r  a more 
re a lis tic  plan because of the disproportions in the econmy and the fa c t 
tha t certa in  basic m ateria ls were scarce.
203. The data were obtained from : A nepgazdasag fe jlesztesevel ... op .c it., 
pp.8-11 and Sandor Balogh and B a lin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi 
demokracia, op .c it., p.272-273. Wherever available, figures fo r the 
o rig ina l plan are given in brackets. The figures, 58-60 and 38-40, given 
fo r the division between Category 'A ' and Category 'B' are in co rre c tly  
given by a ll sources. The author is aware tha t the min. and max. figures 
should add up to  100, i.e., 58-62 and 38-42.
204. A Council of M inisters Resolution stopped subscriptions to  'Peace Loans', 
at the beginning o f October 1956.
205. A nepgazdasag fejlesztesevel ... op.c it., p.8.
206. Ibid.
- 987 -
207. Partegyseggel a szocia lista ... op .c it., p.22
208. Sandor Balogh and Balin t Szabo (eds.), A magyar nepi demokracia ...
op.c it., p.273.
209. Ibid., p.272.
210. A negazdasag fe jle sz te seve l... op .c it., p.66
211. Szabad Nep, 13th August 1956.
212. Szabad Nep, 27th August 1956.
213. Szabad Nep, 9th September 1956.
214. Szabad Nep, 26th September 1956.
215. Odon Szabo Barla, ’Gazdasagpolitika ... op.c it., p.54.
216. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.156.
217. Ibid., p.157.
218. Ibid.
219. Ferenc Donath, Reform es forradalom  ... op.c it., p.158.
220. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.158.
221. Peter Simon, 'Term eloszovetkezeti mozgalmunk az e llen fo rrada lm i
valsag idejen', P a rtto rtene ti Kozlemenyek, No.2, June 1971, p.92.
222. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.157.
223. Peter Simon, ’Term eloszovetkezeti mozgalmunk ... op .c it. pp.92-93.
224. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op.c it., p.158.
225. Istvan P inter, ’Az 1956 evi ellenforradalom  fa lun ’, Szazadok, no.5-6,
1960, p.837.
226. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.156.
227. Istvan P inter, 'Az 1956 evi e llenforradalom  ... op .c it., p.837.
228. Ibid.
229. Szabad Fold, 30th September 1956 and fo r fu rth e r discussion see: Szabad 
Fold, 7th and 21st October 1956.
230. Csillag (monthly journal o f the W riters' Association), no. 9, 1956, pp.525- 
540.
231. Szabad Ifjusag, 27th September 1956.
- 988 -
232. Szabad Fold 7th October 1956.
233. Istvan P inter, 'Az 1956 evi e llenforradalom  ... op .c it., p.839.
234. Somogyi Neplap, 18th and 19th October 1956.
235. Szabad Fold, 21st October 1956.
236. Sandor Orban, Ket Agrarforradalom  ... op .c it., p.158.
237. Ibid., p.159 fn.511.
238. The data were compiled from : Adatok es Adalekok ... op .c it., p.236; 
S ta tisz tika i Evkonyv 1949-1955 ... op .c it., p.197; Mezogazdasagi A d a tta r 
... op .c it., vol. 1, p.8; vol. 2, p.4 and p.8.
For the 15th October 1956 figures see: Peter Simon,
'Terem loszbvetkezeti mozgalmunk ... op .c it., p.89.
239. Mezogazdasagi A da tta r ... op .c it., vol. 1, p.8.
240. Jan Wszlaki, Communist economic strategy: the ro le o f E ast-C entra l 
Europe, Washington, 1959, p.74; see also Janos Radvanyi, Hungary and 
the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and R ea lpo litik , Hoover In s titu te  
Press, Stanford University, 1972, p.6 - th is source gives a figu re  o f 100 
m ill. Rubles cred it.
241. Dezso Nemes et al, A magyar fo rrada lm i ... op.c it., pp.230-231.
242. Janos Berecz, 'E llenforradalom  ... op .c it., p.76.
243. Andras Hegedus, Elet egy eszme ... op .c it., p.255.
244. Ibid.
245. Ibid., pp.248-249.
246. Ibid., p.250.
247. Ferenc A. Vali, R ift  and Revolt ... op .c it., p.266.
248. Andras Hegedus, Elet egy eszme ... op .c it., p.255.
249. The Revolt in Hungary: a documentary chronology o f events, News from
behind the Iron Curtain, December 1956, p.5.
250. Ibid., p.7.
251. Several general and specialised studies exist on the Hungarian 
Revolution. Among these, on which the summary discussion tha t fo llows, 
was based see: Bennet Kovrig, The Hungarian People's Republic, the John 
Hopkins Press, 1970; Ferenc A. Vali, R if t  and Revolt in Hungary, 
Harvard U n iversity Press, 1961; T ibor Meray, Thirteen Days tha t Shook 
the K rem lin , London, Thames ' Hudson, 1956; Paul Kecskemeti, The 
Unexpected Revolution, 1961; Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary,
